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No US-China war – multiple checks

Leon 17 Pak

Leon 17 – David Pak Yue, Assistant Professor Department of Political Science & History, Keuka College (“Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Situating China's Economic and Military Rise,” Asian Politics & Policy, vol 9, is 1, January 2017, Wiley )

Clarifying these issues requires an analysis of constraints of China's current and expected military capabilities economic interdependence; and China's dispositions toward rule-based international institutional complexes while China has seen tremendous economic growth sustaining its economic prosperity depends to a large extent on global trade, internal and external stability, and the ability to access natural resources. A deep level of international institutional engagement that it has exhibited while rising in wealth and power is quite dissimilar to aggressive rising challengers in the past where autarky or economic self-sufficiency and aloofness from rule-based institutions tended to mark their behavior China will have strong disincentives to initiate conflicts that may disrupt trade and resource flows and essentially slow its own rise its military also does not have the kind of power projection capability that would allow it to mount a serious challenge to U.S. military primacy in the Western Pacific much less to initiate a revisionist war to reorder the core systemic arrangements it has seldom been more involved and engaged in such arrangements in modern times

constraints of China's military capabilities economic interdependence dispositions toward international institution sustaining economic prosperity depends on trade internal and external stability ability to access resources deep institutional engagement it has exhibited is dissimilar to rising challengers in the past China have strong disincentives to initiate conflicts its military also does not power projection that would allow a serious challenge to U.S. much less a war

This article first suggests that neither theoretical nor policy questions pertaining to China's rise can be properly addressed without examining the nature and meaning of any power shifts that are said to be in process, or the balance of economic and military forces within the intersecting global and East Asian regional systems. Clarifying these issues in turn requires an analysis of such factors as the trajectories, reversibility, and distributional consequences of differential growth; the possibilities and constraints of China's current and expected military capabilities, especially in relation to power projection and strategic means of coercion (i.e., naval and air forces capable of long-range operations, as well as nuclear forces and the capabilities and ranges of delivery vehicles); economic interdependence; and China's dispositions toward rule-based international institutional complexes. This article argues that while China has seen tremendous economic growth and substantial military modernization, sustaining its economic prosperity depends to a large extent on global trade, internal and external stability, and the ability to access natural resources. A deep level of international institutional engagement that it has exhibited while rising in wealth and power is quite dissimilar to aggressive rising challengers in the past (e.g., Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany) where autarky or economic self-sufficiency and aloofness from rule-based institutions tended to mark their behavior. Inasmuch as engagement and enmeshment continue to be prioritized in Chinese foreign policy, China will likely have strong disincentives to initiate conflicts that may disrupt trade and resource flows and essentially slow its own rise. For the foreseeable future, its military also does not have the kind of power projection capability and its foundational sources—or what can be called the command of the commons (Pose, 2003)—that would allow it to mount a serious challenge to U.S. military primacy in the Western Pacific, much less to initiate a revisionist war to reorder the core systemic arrangements; on the contrary, it has seldom been more involved and engaged in such arrangements in modern times. This relatively benign conclusion, however, is conditional on China's continued access to the resources necessary for further development and growth by means of trade or acquisition, which also serves as a linchpin of domestic regime stability. This can be attributed to Deng Xiaoping's admonition for China to “hide its capabilities and bide its time” in international politics, a concept traceable to Sun Tzu's classic notion that high strategic virtue lies in winning without a fight (see Sun, 2009; see also Friedberg, 2011; Kissinger, 2011). It is still too early to tell if tensions in China's geographical periphery and China's more recent assertiveness in international affairs indicate a fundamental reorientation or an adjustment in policy, but in any case, such tensions and the possibility of escalation should not be taken lightly

<h4>No US-China war – multiple checks</h4><p><strong>Leon 17 </strong>– David <u><strong>Pak</u></strong> Yue, Assistant Professor Department of Political Science & History, Keuka College (“Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Situating China's Economic and Military Rise,” Asian Politics & Policy, vol 9, is 1, January 2017, Wiley )</p><p>This article first suggests that neither theoretical nor policy questions pertaining to China's rise can be properly addressed without examining the nature and meaning of any power shifts that are said to be in process, or the balance of economic and military forces within the intersecting global and East Asian regional systems. <u>Clarifying these issues</u> in turn <u>requires an analysis of</u> such factors as the trajectories, reversibility, and distributional consequences of differential growth; the possibilities and <u><strong><mark>constraints of China's</mark> current and expected <mark>military capabilities</u></strong></mark>, especially in relation to power projection and strategic means of coercion (i.e., naval and air forces capable of long-range operations, as well as nuclear forces and the capabilities and ranges of delivery vehicles); <u><strong><mark>economic</mark> <mark>interdependence</mark>; and China's <mark>dispositions toward</mark> rule-based <mark>international institution</strong></mark>al<strong> </strong>complexes</u>. This article argues that <u>while China has seen tremendous economic growth</u> and substantial military modernization, <u><strong><mark>sustaining</mark> its <mark>economic prosperity depends</mark> </strong>to a large extent<strong> <mark>on</mark> </strong>global<strong> <mark>trade</mark>, <mark>internal and external</mark> </strong><mark>stability</mark>, and the<strong> <mark>ability to access</mark> </strong>natural<strong> <mark>resources</mark>. A <mark>deep</mark> level of international <mark>institutional engagement</mark> that <mark>it has exhibited</mark> </strong>while rising in wealth and power<strong> <mark>is</mark> </strong>quite<strong> <mark>dissimilar to</mark> </strong>aggressive<strong> <mark>rising challengers in the past</u></strong></mark> (e.g., Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany) <u>where autarky or economic self-sufficiency and aloofness from rule-based institutions tended to mark their behavior</u>. Inasmuch as engagement and enmeshment continue to be prioritized in Chinese foreign policy, <u><strong><mark>China</mark> will</u></strong> likely <u><strong><mark>have strong disincentives to initiate conflicts</strong></mark> that may disrupt trade and resource flows and essentially slow its own rise</u>. For the foreseeable future, <u><strong><mark>its military also does not</mark> have the kind of <mark>power projection</mark> capability</u></strong> and its foundational sources—or what can be called the command of the commons (Pose, 2003)—<u><strong><mark>that would allow</mark> it to mount <mark>a serious challenge</u></strong> <u>to U.S.</mark> military primacy in the Western Pacific</u>, <u><strong><mark>much less</mark> </strong>to initiate<strong> <mark>a </strong></mark>revisionist<strong> <mark>war</strong></mark> to reorder the core systemic arrangements</u>; on the contrary, <u>it has seldom been more involved and engaged in such arrangements in modern times</u>. This relatively benign conclusion, however, is conditional on China's continued access to the resources necessary for further development and growth by means of trade or acquisition, which also serves as a linchpin of domestic regime stability. This can be attributed to Deng Xiaoping's admonition for China to “hide its capabilities and bide its time” in international politics, a concept traceable to Sun Tzu's classic notion that high strategic virtue lies in winning without a fight (see Sun, 2009; see also Friedberg, 2011; Kissinger, 2011). It is still too early to tell if tensions in China's geographical periphery and China's more recent assertiveness in international affairs indicate a fundamental reorientation or an adjustment in policy, but in any case, such tensions and the possibility of escalation should not be taken lightly</p>

Global Immigration

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Washburn Rural BP

Gabe Esquivel

1ac Family (Econ and Global Immigration) 2nr Adv CP (only infrastructure plank) wages on case US soft power bad

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“Resolved” means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases 64

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined as meaning “to establish by law”.

“resolve,” is defined as meaning “to establish by law”

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

<h4><u>“Resolved” means to enact a policy by law.</h4><p></u><strong>Words and Phrases 64<u></strong> (Permanent Edition)</p><p>Definition of the word <mark>“resolve,”</u></mark> given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” <u>It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which <mark>is defined</u></mark> by Bouvier <u><mark>as meaning “to establish by law”</mark>.</p></u>

NC PWEST r1

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Andrew Lin

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Nuke war causes extinction

PND 16

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf

Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke will still make the rest of the world uninhabitable inducing global famine lasting decades Toon and Robock note resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the U S and China would decline most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not

will still make the world uninhabitable inducing global famine lasting decades Even a 'small' nuclear war produce smoke and ultraviolet radiation Recent studies predict that agricultural production would decline most likely cause the deaths of all humans nuclear weapons use threatens human survival

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about 20 percent for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well.

<h4>Nuke war causes extinction </h4><p><strong>PND 16</strong>. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf</p><p>Consequences human survival 12. <u>Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke</u> from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') <u><mark>will still make</u></mark> 'our' country (and <u>the rest of <mark>the world</u></mark>) <u><strong><mark>uninhabitable</u></strong></mark>, potentially <u><mark>inducing global famine lasting</u></mark> up to <u><strong><mark>decades</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Toon and Robock</strong> note</u> in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, <u>resulting in <strong>self assured destruction</strong>. <mark>Even a 'small' nuclear war </mark>between <strong>India</strong> and <strong>Pakistan</u></strong>, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, <u>could <mark>produce</mark> so much <mark>smoke</mark> that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age</u> of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, <u>shortening the growing season around the world <mark>and</mark> threatening the global food supply</u>. Furthermore, there would be <u>massive ozone depletion, allowing more <strong><mark>ultraviolet</strong></mark> <mark>radiation</u></mark> to reach Earth's surface. <u><strong><mark>Recent studies</strong> predict that agricultural production</mark> in parts of the <strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>and <strong>China</strong> <mark>would decline</u></mark> by about 20 percent for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would <u><mark>most likely cause the deaths of</mark> most/nearly all/<strong><mark>all humans</strong></mark> (and severely impact/extinguish <strong>other species</strong>) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades</u>. 15. <u>Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic</u>, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. <u><strong>Gareth Evans</strong>’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by <mark>nuclear weapons use</mark> as one that</u> at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially <u><strong><mark>threatens human survival </mark>with an immediacy that even climate change does not</u></strong>, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well. </p>

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Badgerland

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Tyler Emanuel

Arjun Shreekumar

1AC - Full res 1NC - DA PIC Wage-Spec 1AR - condo all 2nr - case pic condo 2ar - condo

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COVID’s decrease in migration ensured a growing but fragile movement away from populism – best studies prove

BIPP 22

BIPP 22 {The Bennett Institute For Public Policy, University of Cambridge} - ("Support for populist politics ‘collapsed’ during the pandemic – global report," Bennett Institute for Public Policy, published 1-18-2022, accessed 12-15-2022, https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/blog/great-reset/)//marlborough-wr/

Support for populist parties and politicians, and agreement with populist sentiment, has diminished during the pandemic, according to a “mega-dataset” taking in attitudes of over half a million people across 109 countries since 2020.¶ there are clear signs of a turning tide for the “populist wave”, as the mishandling of coronavirus by populist leaders – along with a desire for stability and a decline in “polarising” attitudes resulting from the pandemic – starts to move public opinion.¶ threats posed by the pandemic saw a “technocratic” shift in political authority worldwide, with increased trust in government, and in experts such as scientists and civil servants. Yet faith in the democratic process has continued to falter.¶ The story of politics in recent years has been the emergence of anti-establishment politicians who thrive on the growing distrust of experts From Erdogan and Bolsonaro to the ‘strong men’ of Eastern Europe, the planet has experienced a wave of political populism. Covid-19 may have caused that wave to crest Electoral support for populist parties has collapsed around the world in a way we don’t see for more mainstream politicians. There is strong evidence that the pandemic has severely blunted the rise of populism the approval ratings of populist leaders the world over began declining almost as soon as coronavirus hit, and have continued to sink ever since.¶ populist leaders have seen a 10 percentage point drop between the spring of 2020 and the last quarter of 2021, while ratings for non-populists – on average – returned to around pre-pandemic levels.¶ Electoral support also plunged for their parties seen most clearly in Europe, where the proportion of people intending to vote for a populist party* has fallen by an average of 11 percentage points to 27%. Support for Europe’s opposition populist parties also fell over the pandemic – by 5 pp on average to 11% – while it rose for “mainstream” opposition.¶ political “tribalism” – fertile ground for populists – has declined in most countries. Levels of agreement with statements such as “corrupt elites” divide our nation or the “will of the people” should be obeyed fell in almost every nation surveyed. areas with the sharpest drops in populist attitudes are some of the poorer “left behind” regions – from Eastern Poland to Southern Italy and Northern Hungary – that have been a focus for populist rhetoric and support. ¶ This may be down to some rebalancing of wealth as people escaped cities overrun with the virus Covid-19 border closures stopped migration and globalised trade

according to a “mega-dataset across 109 countries there are clear signs of a turning tide for the “populist wave”, mishandling of coronavirus along with a desire for stability move opinion faith in democratic process continued to falter. approval ratings continued to sink ratings for non-populists returned to pre-pandemic levels. political “tribalism” declined Covid-19 border closures stopped migration and globalised trade

Support for populist parties and politicians, and agreement with populist sentiment, has diminished during the pandemic, according to a “mega-dataset” taking in attitudes of over half a million people across 109 countries since 2020.¶ A University of Cambridge team say there are clear signs of a turning tide for the “populist wave”, as the mishandling of coronavirus by populist leaders – along with a desire for stability and a decline in “polarising” attitudes resulting from the pandemic – starts to move public opinion.¶ The authors of the new report, from Cambridge’s Centre for the Future of Democracy (CFD), describe the study as the first global overview of how the Covid-19 crisis has affected political beliefs.¶ They say that threats posed by the pandemic saw a “technocratic” shift in political authority worldwide, with increased trust in government, and in experts such as scientists and civil servants. Yet faith in the democratic process has continued to falter.¶ “The story of politics in recent years has been the emergence of anti-establishment politicians who thrive on the growing distrust of experts,” said Dr Roberto Foa, Co-Director of the CFD and the report’s lead author.¶ “From Erdogan and Bolsonaro to the ‘strong men’ of Eastern Europe, the planet has experienced a wave of political populism. Covid-19 may have caused that wave to crest.”¶ “Electoral support for populist parties has collapsed around the world in a way we don’t see for more mainstream politicians. There is strong evidence that the pandemic has severely blunted the rise of populism,” said Foa.¶ The findings are published today by Cambridge’s Bennett Institute for Public Policy.¶ The first months of the pandemic saw many political leaders get a boost in ratings – a classic “rally round the flag” effect in troubled times, say researchers.¶ However, the approval ratings of populist leaders the world over began declining almost as soon as coronavirus hit, and have continued to sink ever since.¶ On average, populist leaders have seen a 10 percentage point drop between the spring of 2020 and the last quarter of 2021, while ratings for non-populists – on average – returned to around pre-pandemic levels.¶ Electoral support also plunged for their parties – seen most clearly in Europe, where the proportion of people intending to vote for a populist party* has fallen by an average of 11 percentage points to 27%.¶ Overall, across Europe, early lockdowns saw voting intention for incumbent parties increase. Yet all the continent’s governing populists – from Italy’s Five Star to Hungary’s Fidezs – bucked the trend with the largest declines in support.¶ Support for Europe’s opposition populist parties also fell over the pandemic – by 5 pp on average to 11% – while it rose for “mainstream” opposition.¶ Researchers suggest several factors for populism’s fading appeal. One is simply the botch job made of the pandemic by populist governments: from Bolsonaro’s mask veto to Trump’s “bleach injection” suggestion.¶ The report’s polling shows the public considered populist leaders to be less trustworthy sources of virus-related information than centrist counterparts.¶ In June 2020, approval of government handling of the crisis was 11 percentage points lower on average in countries with populist leaders than in those with more centrist governance. By the end of 2020, this gap had widened to 16 points. ¶ Researchers also found that political “tribalism” – fertile ground for populists – has declined in most countries. The percentage of party supporters expressing a “strong dislike” of those who vote for opposing politicians fell in most nations (although not the US) during the crisis.¶ “The pandemic fostered a sense of shared purpose that may have reduced the political polarisation we’ve seen over the last decade,” said CFD researcher and report co-author Dr Xavier Romero-Vidal. “This could help explain why populist leaders are struggling to mobilise support.”¶ Some of the ideas propagated by populists are losing ground. Levels of agreement with statements such as “corrupt elites” divide our nation or the “will of the people” should be obeyed fell in almost every nation surveyed.¶ For example, agreement with four such statements** fell on average by 9 percentage points in Italy to 66%, 10 points in France to 61%, and 8 points in the UK to 64%, between 2019 and 2021.¶ Commitment to these ideas has also waned. Even among supporters, in almost every nation a smaller number now “strongly agree” than did in 2019. In developed democracies, this shift is predominantly among those aged over 55.¶ Moreover, areas with the sharpest drops in populist attitudes are some of the poorer “left behind” regions – from Eastern Poland to Southern Italy and Northern Hungary – that have been a focus for populist rhetoric and support. ¶ “This may be down to some rebalancing of wealth as people escaped cities overrun with the virus,” said Foa. “In addition, Covid-19 border closures stopped migration and globalised trade more effectively than any populist government.”

<h4>COVID’s decrease in migration ensured a <u>growing but fragile</u> movement away from populism – best studies prove</h4><p><strong>BIPP 22</strong> {The Bennett Institute For Public Policy, University of Cambridge} - ("Support for populist politics ‘collapsed’ during the pandemic – global report," Bennett Institute for Public Policy, published 1-18-2022, accessed 12-15-2022, https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/blog/great-reset/)//marlborough-wr/</p><p><u>Support for populist parties and politicians, and agreement with populist sentiment, has <strong>diminished during the pandemic</strong>, <mark>according</mark> <mark>to a “<strong>mega-dataset</strong></mark>” taking in attitudes of over half a million people <strong><mark>across 109 countries</strong></mark> since 2020.¶ </u>A University of Cambridge team say <u><mark>there</mark> <mark>are <strong>clear signs of a turning tide</strong></mark> <mark>for</mark> <mark>the “populist wave”,</mark> as the <mark>mishandling</mark> <mark>of</mark> <mark>coronavirus</mark> by populist leaders – <mark>along</mark> <mark>with</mark> <mark>a desire for stability</mark> and a decline in “polarising” attitudes resulting from the pandemic – starts to <mark>move</mark> public <mark>opinion</mark>.¶ </u>The authors of the new report, from Cambridge’s Centre for the Future of Democracy (CFD), describe the study as the first global overview of how the Covid-19 crisis has affected political beliefs.¶ They say that <u>threats posed by the pandemic saw a “technocratic” shift in political authority worldwide, with increased trust in government, and in experts such as scientists and civil servants. Yet <strong><mark>faith</mark> <mark>in</mark> the <mark>democratic process</mark> has <mark>continued to falter</strong>.</mark>¶ </u>“<u>The story of politics in recent years has been the <strong>emergence of anti-establishment politicians</strong> who thrive on the growing distrust of experts</u>,” said Dr Roberto Foa, Co-Director of the CFD and the report’s lead author.¶ “<u>From Erdogan and Bolsonaro to the ‘strong men’ of Eastern Europe, the planet has experienced a wave of political populism. Covid-19 may have caused that wave to crest</u>.”¶ “<u>Electoral support for populist parties has collapsed around the world in a way we don’t see for more mainstream politicians. There is strong evidence that the pandemic has <strong>severely blunted the rise of populism</u></strong>,” said Foa.¶ The findings are published today by Cambridge’s Bennett Institute for Public Policy.¶ The first months of the pandemic saw many political leaders get a boost in ratings – a classic “rally round the flag” effect in troubled times, say researchers.¶ However, <u>the <mark>approval</mark> <mark>ratings</mark> of populist leaders the world over began declining almost as soon as coronavirus hit, and have <mark>continued to sink</mark> ever since.¶ </u>On average, <u>populist leaders have seen a 10 percentage point drop between the spring of 2020 and the last quarter of 2021, while <mark>ratings</mark> <mark>for non-populists</mark> – on average – <mark>returned</mark> <mark>to</mark> around <mark>pre-pandemic levels.</mark>¶ <strong>Electoral support also plunged for their parties</u></strong> – <u>seen most clearly in Europe, where the proportion of people intending to vote for a populist party* has fallen by an average of 11 percentage points to 27%.</u>¶ Overall, across Europe, early lockdowns saw voting intention for incumbent parties increase. Yet all the continent’s governing populists – from Italy’s Five Star to Hungary’s Fidezs – bucked the trend with the largest declines in support.¶ <u>Support for Europe’s opposition populist parties also fell over the pandemic – by 5 pp on average to 11% – while it rose for “mainstream” opposition.¶ </u>Researchers suggest several factors for populism’s fading appeal. One is simply the botch job made of the pandemic by populist governments: from Bolsonaro’s mask veto to Trump’s “bleach injection” suggestion.¶ The report’s polling shows the public considered populist leaders to be less trustworthy sources of virus-related information than centrist counterparts.¶ In June 2020, approval of government handling of the crisis was 11 percentage points lower on average in countries with populist leaders than in those with more centrist governance. By the end of 2020, this gap had widened to 16 points. ¶ Researchers also found that <u><mark>political “tribalism”</mark> – fertile ground for populists – has <mark>declined</mark> in most countries.</u> The percentage of party supporters expressing a “strong dislike” of those who vote for opposing politicians fell in most nations (although not the US) during the crisis.¶ “The pandemic fostered a sense of shared purpose that may have reduced the political polarisation we’ve seen over the last decade,” said CFD researcher and report co-author Dr Xavier Romero-Vidal. “This could help explain why populist leaders are struggling to mobilise support.”¶ Some of the ideas propagated by populists are losing ground. <u>Levels of agreement with statements such as “corrupt elites” divide our nation or the “will of the people” should be obeyed fell in almost every nation surveyed.</u>¶ For example, agreement with four such statements** fell on average by 9 percentage points in Italy to 66%, 10 points in France to 61%, and 8 points in the UK to 64%, between 2019 and 2021.¶ Commitment to these ideas has also waned. Even among supporters, in almost every nation a smaller number now “strongly agree” than did in 2019. In developed democracies, this shift is predominantly among those aged over 55.¶ Moreover, <u>areas with the sharpest drops in populist attitudes are some of the poorer “left behind” regions – from Eastern Poland to Southern Italy and Northern Hungary – that have been a focus for populist rhetoric and support. ¶ </u>“<u>This may be down to some rebalancing of wealth as people escaped cities overrun with the virus</u>,” said Foa. “In addition, <u><strong><mark>Covid-19 border closures stopped migration and globalised trade</u></strong></mark> more effectively than any populist government.”</p>

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Golden Desert

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Lynbrook BZ

Krauss, Gordon

AC: Dismantle Department of Homeland Security NC: Extra T, Populism DA, Desecuritize CP, Trade PIC 1AR: All NR: Desecuritize CP, Populism DA 2AR: All

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Eliminating nukes make states shift to CBWs – they see it as the only option

Horowitz, 13

Horowitz, 13 – University of Pennsylvania political science professor

[Michael, and Neil Narang, UC Santa Barbara political science, "Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb? Exploring the Relationship between ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58.3, 2013, accessed 12-13-19] Using newly collected data on CBWs pursuit and possession over time, we find that n countries that acquire nuclear weapons become less interested in pursuing other types of WMDs and are even willing to give them up in some cases. As the “poor man’s a bomb CBWs seem to be viewed by many countries as the best chance they have, short of nuclear weapons, at developing deadly weapons to protect themselves against their neighbors or increase their ability to threaten them. we present the first rigorous tests measuring the spread of CBWs we focus on the interaction between bio and nuclear weapons proliferation evaluating the extent to which the pursuit or possession of one type of WMD influences the pursuit of another type Do policy makers and military leaders treat nuclear, CBWs as substitutes or complements in their overall weapons arsenal? What is the actual relationship between nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons possession empirically? Does possessing a nuclear weapons program or capability increase or decrease the probability that a state will pursue biological or chemical weapons and vice versa? Finally, are the same factors known to be correlated with nuclear weapons proliferation also correlated with CBWs proliferation? , if the evidence suggests leaders treat nuclear, bio and chemical weapons capabilities as substitutes because each one is perceived to increase national security in a similar way), then analysts should adjust assessments of proliferation risk downward for one capability conditional on observing another. if leaders treat the three weapons capabilities as substitutes then efforts to create a more robust nuclear nonproliferation regime could have the inadvertent consequence of increasing demand for CBWs capabilities thus shifting proliferation risk. WMDs do function as substitutes in one important fashion once countries acquire nuclear weapons, they become less interested in initiating pursuit of other types of WMDs and they are more likely to abandon other types of WMDs This key finding provides an empirical basis for the notion that CBWs function as a “poor man’s nuclear bomb,” since possession of nuclear weapons appears to be systematically associated with a reduction in the demand for less powerful CBWs.

countries that acquire nuclear weapons become less interested in pursuing other WMDs even willing to give them up As the “poor man’s a bomb CBWs seem to be viewed as the best chance they have, short of nuclear weapons to protect themselves we present irst rigorous tests measuring spread of CBWs Do policy makers and military leaders treat nuclear, CBWs as substitutes or complements in their overall weapons arsenal? What is the actual relationship between nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons possession empirically? Does possessing a nuclear weapons program or capability increase or decrease the probability that a state will pursue biological or chemical weapons and vice versa? Finally, are the same factors known to be correlated with nuclear weapons proliferation also correlated with CBWs proliferation? a more robust nuclear nonprolif regime could increas demand for CBWs shifting WMDs function as substitutes once countries acquire nuclear weapons, they abandon other WMDs This finding provides an empirical basis possession of nuc s appears systematically associated with a reduction in demand for CBWs

[Michael, and Neil Narang, UC Santa Barbara political science, "Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb? Exploring the Relationship between ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58.3, 2013, accessed 12-13-19] The causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation have received a great deal of academic attention. However, nuclear weapons are rarely discussed in isolation in policy circles. Instead, nuclear weapons are relevant as part of a category of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that includes chemical and biological weapons (CBWs). Are the factors that drive CBWs proliferation similar to those that drive nuclear proliferation? What is the relationship between these weapons types? In this article, we explore whether nuclear weapons and CBWs serve as complements or substitutes. Using newly collected data on both CBWs pursuit and possession over time, we find that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons generally function as complements at the pursuit stage. In addition, countries that acquire nuclear weapons become less interested in pursuing other types of WMDs and are even willing to give them up in some cases. What motivates countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)?1 Despite a wave of research over the last several years on the spread of nuclear weapons and the consequences for international security, the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBWs) remains relatively underexplored. In some ways, this makes sense—the West’s concern with Iran’s WMD development program is not driven by Iran’s chemical or biological weapons programs. Instead, it is Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons that propels international concern about the Iranian regime. On the other hand, policy makers worried a great deal about Saddam Hussein’s CBWs arsenal before the Gulf War—especially after evidence surfaced of Saddam’s usage of chemical weapons against the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq. As the “poor man’s atomic bomb,” CBWs seem to be viewed by many countries as the best chance they have, short of nuclear weapons, at developing deadly weapons to protect themselves against their neighbors—or increase their ability to threaten them. In this article, we present the first rigorous tests measuring the spread of CBWs, focusing on both the pursuit of these systems and their implications. More important, we focus on the interaction between biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons proliferation, evaluating the extent to which the pursuit or possession of one type of WMD influences the pursuit of another type of WMD. Do policy makers and military leaders treat nuclear, CBWs as substitutes or complements in their overall weapons arsenal? What is the actual relationship between nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons possession empirically? Does possessing a nuclear weapons program or capability increase or decrease the probability that a state will pursue biological or chemical weapons and vice versa? Finally, are the same factors known to be correlated with nuclear weapons proliferation also correlated with CBWs proliferation? The answers to these questions are important for academics and policy makers. For example, if the evidence suggests that leaders treat nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons capabilities as substitutes in their strategic arsenal (perhaps because each one is perceived to increase national security in a similar way), then analysts should adjust their assessments of proliferation risk downward for one capability conditional on observing another. Conversely, if evidence suggests that leaders treat these weapons technologies as complements, then analysts should adjust their assessments of proliferation risk upward for any one technology upon observing another. Finally, if the evidence suggests that leaders treat the three weapons capabilities as substitutes, then efforts to create a more robust nuclear nonproliferation regime could have the inadvertent consequence of increasing demand for CBWs capabilities, thus shifting proliferation risk. Our results demonstrate three critical facets of the relationship between nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons proliferation. First, we find that many of the same security and economic factors that drive nuclear weapons proliferation also influence CBWs proliferation. Second, while we lack causal evidence, our statistical models support our argument that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons generally function as complements at the pursuit stage. That is, countries that seek one of these weapons generally seek all three simultaneously. Third, there is some tentative evidence that WMDs do function as substitutes in one important fashion; once countries acquire nuclear weapons, they become less interested in initiating pursuit of other types of WMDs and they are more likely to abandon other types of WMDs. This key finding provides an empirical basis for the notion that CBWs function as a “poor man’s nuclear bomb,” since possession of nuclear weapons appears to be systematically associated with a reduction in the demand for less powerful CBWs.

<h4>Eliminating nukes make states shift to CBWs – they see it as the only option</h4><p><strong>Horowitz, 13 </strong>– University of Pennsylvania political science professor</p><p><u>[Michael, and Neil Narang, UC Santa Barbara political science, "Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb? Exploring the Relationship between ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58.3, 2013, accessed 12-13-19]</p><p></u>The causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation have received a great deal of academic attention. However, nuclear weapons are rarely discussed in isolation in policy circles. Instead, nuclear weapons are relevant as part of a category of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that includes chemical and biological weapons (CBWs). Are the factors that drive CBWs proliferation similar to those that drive nuclear proliferation? What is the relationship between these weapons types? In this article, we explore whether nuclear weapons and CBWs serve as complements or substitutes. <u>Using newly collected data on</u> both <u>CBWs pursuit and possession over time, we find that n</u>uclear, biological, and chemical weapons generally function as complements at the pursuit stage. In addition, <u><mark>countries that acquire nuclear weapons become <strong>less interested in pursuing other</strong></mark> types of <strong><mark>WMDs</strong> </mark>and are <strong><mark>even willing to give them up</mark> </strong>in some cases.</p><p></u>What motivates countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)?1 Despite a wave of research over the last several years on the spread of nuclear weapons and the consequences for international security, the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBWs) remains relatively underexplored. In some ways, this makes sense—the West’s concern with Iran’s WMD development program is not driven by Iran’s chemical or biological weapons programs. Instead, it is Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons that propels international concern about the Iranian regime. On the other hand, policy makers worried a great deal about Saddam Hussein’s CBWs arsenal before the Gulf War—especially after evidence surfaced of Saddam’s usage of chemical weapons against the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq. <u><mark>As the “<strong>poor man’s</u></strong> <u><strong>a</u></strong></mark>tomic <u><strong><mark>bomb</u></strong></mark>,” <u><mark>CBWs seem to be viewed </mark>by many countries <mark>as <strong>the best chance they have, short of nuclear weapons</strong></mark>, at developing deadly weapons <strong><mark>to protect themselves</strong> </mark>against their neighbors</u>—<u>or increase their ability to threaten them.</p><p></u>In this article, <u><mark>we present </mark>the f<mark>irst <strong>rigorous tests</strong> measuring </mark>the <mark>spread of CBWs</u></mark>, focusing on both the pursuit of these systems and their implications. More important, <u>we focus on the interaction between bio</u>logical, chemical, <u>and nuclear weapons proliferation</u>, <u>evaluating the extent to which the pursuit or possession of one type of WMD influences the pursuit of another type </u>of WMD.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Do policy makers and military leaders treat nuclear, CBWs as substitutes or complements in their overall weapons arsenal? What is the actual relationship between nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons possession empirically? Does possessing a nuclear weapons program or capability increase or decrease the probability that a state will pursue biological or chemical weapons and vice versa? Finally, are the same factors known to be correlated with nuclear weapons proliferation also correlated with CBWs proliferation?</p><p></u></strong></mark>The answers to these questions are important for academics and policy makers. For example<u>, if the evidence suggests</u> that <u>leaders treat nuclear, bio</u>logical, <u>and chemical weapons capabilities as substitutes</u> in their strategic arsenal (perhaps <u>because each one is perceived to increase national security in a similar way), then analysts should adjust</u> their <u>assessments of proliferation risk downward for one capability conditional on observing another.</u> Conversely, if evidence suggests that leaders treat these weapons technologies as complements, then analysts should adjust their assessments of proliferation risk upward for any one technology upon observing another. Finally, <u>if</u> the evidence suggests that <u>leaders treat the three weapons capabilities as substitutes</u>, <u>then efforts to create <strong><mark>a more robust nuclear nonprolif</mark>eration<mark> regime could</strong></mark> have the inadvertent consequence of <strong><mark>increas</strong></mark>ing <strong><mark>demand for CBWs </mark>capabilities</u></strong>, <u>thus <strong><mark>shifting</strong> </mark>proliferation risk.</p><p></u>Our results demonstrate three critical facets of the relationship between nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons proliferation. First, we find that many of the same security and economic factors that drive nuclear weapons proliferation also influence CBWs proliferation. Second, while we lack causal evidence, our statistical models support our argument that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons generally function as complements at the pursuit stage. That is, countries that seek one of these weapons generally seek all three simultaneously. Third, there is some tentative evidence that <u><strong><mark>WMDs</strong> </mark>do <strong><mark>function as</strong> <strong>substitutes</strong> </mark>in one important fashion</u>; <u><mark>once countries acquire nuclear weapons, they </mark>become <strong>less interested</strong> in initiating pursuit of other types of WMDs</u> <u>and they are <strong>more likely to <mark>abandon other</strong></mark> types of <strong><mark>WMDs</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>This </mark>key <mark>finding provides an <strong>empirical basis</strong> </mark>for the notion that CBWs function as a “poor man’s nuclear bomb,” since <mark>possession of nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s appears </mark>to be <strong><mark>systematically associated </strong>with a <strong>reduction in</strong></mark> the<strong> <mark>demand for</strong></mark> less powerful <strong><mark>CBWs</strong></mark>.</p></u>

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Berkeley

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Nova 42 AY

Joshua Chung

AC - Miscalculation NC - Reform CP Bioweapons DA PROSWIFT DA NR - Reform CP Bioweapons DA

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Extinction outweighs – it’s the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely.

Burns 17

Elizabeth Burns 17. Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction?, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00455091.2016.1278150?needAccess=true, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017)

extinction would prevent the existence of very many people it is a good thing for people to exist and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this The ‘good could be understood in two ways. first it is good for that person that they come to exist if humans were to go extinct the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity billions of people would likely die painful deaths The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation there is value in human life and something valuable about creating future people When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible set of people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost humans’ capacity for rationality is valuable in itself we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Each scenario would involve significant physical and/ non-physical harms extinction could cause premature death A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as to be respected taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury Existing people could endure non-physical harms the fact there would not be any future people could give rise to a personal reason there could be various deleterious psychological effects There are two main sources of this trauma The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children this is by no means universa it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction The second is a higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled without the hope of posterity for our race all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction

extinction prevent existence it is good for people to exist and extinction would deprive people of this foregone billions will never get that opportunity billions of people would die painful deaths there would be no future generations the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life humans’ capacity for rationality is valuable in itself Existing people would endure physical pain and painful premature deaths reject a principle when it fails to show respect to person as rational agent killed without their consent Existing people could endure non-physical harms there could be various psychological effects sense of hopelessness despair there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. psychological harm are personal reasons to reject principle that permitted human extinction

Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universal, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

<h4>Extinction outweighs – it’s the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely.</h4><p>Elizabeth<strong> Burns 17</strong>. Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction?, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00455091.2016.1278150?needAccess=true, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017)</p><p>Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the <u><mark>extinction</u></mark> of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It <u>would <mark>prevent</mark> the <mark>existence</mark> of very many</u> happy <u>people</u> One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that <u><mark>it is </mark>a <mark>good </mark>thing <mark>for people to exist</u> </mark>and enjoy happy lives <u><mark>and extinction would deprive </mark>more <mark>people of </mark>enjoying <mark>this</u> </mark>good. <u>The ‘good</u>’ in this case <u>could be understood in</u> at least <u>two ways.</u> According to the <u>first</u>, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that <u>it is good for that person that they come to exist</u>. The second view might hold that <u>if humans were to go extinct</u>, <u>the utility <mark>foregone</mark> by the <mark>billions</mark> (or more) of people who could have lived but <mark>will</mark> now <mark>never get that opportunity</u></mark>, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that <u><strong><mark>billions of people would </mark>likely <mark>die painful deaths</u></strong></mark>. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. <u>The worst thing about human extinction is that <mark>there would be no future generations</u></mark>. Since there could be so many generations in our future, <u><strong><mark>the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation</u></strong></mark>. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that <u>there is value in human life and</u> also <u>something valuable about creating future people</u> which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. <u>When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that</u> <u>a possible</u> person or a <u>set</u> <u>of</u> possible <u>people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist</u>. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. <u><strong><mark>It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life </mark>and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost</u></strong> A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about <u><mark>humans’ capacity for rationality</u> </mark>which <u><mark>is valuable in itself</u></mark>. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that <u>we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity</u>. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. <u><strong><mark>Existing people would endure physical pain and</mark>/or <mark>painful </mark>and/or <mark>premature deaths</u></strong> </mark>Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. <u>Each</u> of these <u>scenario</u>s <u>would involve significant physical</u> <u>and/</u>or <u>non-physical harms</u> to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of <u>extinction could cause</u> <u>premature death</u>. <u>A nuclear winter</u> <u>that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case</u>. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, <u>being caused to die prematurely can be reason to <mark>reject</mark> <mark>a principle when it fails</mark> <mark>to show</mark> <mark>respect</mark> <mark>to</mark> the <mark>person as </mark>a <mark>rational agent</u></mark>. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘<u>appreciating</u> <u>the value of human life is primarily a matter of</u> <u>seeing human lives as</u> something <u>to be respected</u>, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because <u>taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person</u>. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, <u><strong>if they are <mark>killed without their consent</mark>, their interests have not been taken into account</u></strong>, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be <u>a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury</u>. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. <u><strong><mark>Existing people could endure non-physical harms</u></strong></mark> I said earlier than <u>the fact</u> in itself that <u>there would not be any future people</u> is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason <u>could give rise to a personal reason</u> that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that <u><mark>there could be various </mark>deleterious <mark>psychological effects</u> </mark>that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. <u>There are two main sources of this trauma</u>, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. <u>The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being</u> <u>that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children</u>. Whilst <u><strong>this is by no means universa</u></strong>l, <u><strong>it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction</u></strong> and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. <u>The second is a</u> more general, <u>higher level <mark>sense of hopelessness </mark>or <mark>despair</mark> that <mark>there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you</u>.</mark> <u>Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled</u>. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘<u>without the hope of posterity for our race</u> if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, <u>all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’</u> (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). <u>Both sources of <mark>psychological harm are personal reasons</mark> <mark>to reject</mark> a <mark>principle that permitted human extinction</u></mark>. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction. </p>

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No prior questions

Jarvis ’0

Jarvis ’0 [Darryl; 2000; Former Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sydney; International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, University of South Carolina Press, “Continental Drift,” p. 128-129; GR]

epistemological and ontological debate to support this is the only task of international theory smacks of intellectual elitism and displays contempt for those in their daily struggle What does Ashley’s project his deconstructive efforts say to the oppressed ? How does it help solve the casualties of war ? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions comprise the policy and practice no to support that problem-solving theory is bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving nightmarish realities that millions confront daily In what sense can this “debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics” be judged helpful to anyone other than those foolish enough to be excited by abstract debate

epistemological and ontological debate smacks of elitism and displays contempt for those in struggle What do efforts say to the oppressed ? How does it help solve war ? Does it speak to those who comprise policy no to support that problem-solving theory is bad—is a position that abrogates any hope solving realities that millions confront In what sense can “debate toward [a] pit of epistemology be helpful

More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflect our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly, it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. But to support that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggle as actors in international politics. What does Ashley’s project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the émigrés of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to support that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or in some way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, “So what?” To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this “debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics” be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate.

<h4>No prior questions</h4><p><strong>Jarvis ’0</strong> [Darryl; 2000; Former Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sydney; International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, University of South Carolina Press, “Continental Drift,” p. 128-129; GR]</p><p>More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflect our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly, it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in <u><strong><mark>epistemological and ontological debate</u></strong></mark>, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. But <u>to support</u> that <u>this is the <strong>only task</strong> of international theory</u>, let alone the most important one, <u><mark>smacks of <strong></mark>intellectual <mark>elitism</strong> and displays</u></mark> a certain <u><strong><mark>contempt</strong> for those</mark> </u>who search for guidance <u><mark>in</mark> their<mark> <strong></mark>daily <mark>struggle</u></strong></mark> as actors in international politics. <u><mark>What do</mark>es Ashley’s project</u>, <u>his <strong>deconstructive <mark>efforts</u></strong></mark>, or valiant fight against positivism <u><mark>say to the</u></mark> truly marginalized, <u><strong><mark>oppressed</u></strong></mark>, and destitute<u><strong><mark>?</strong> How does it help solve</u></mark> the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, <u>the <strong>casualties of <mark>war</u></strong></mark>, or the émigrés of death squads<u><strong><mark>?</strong> Does it <strong></mark>in any way <mark>speak</strong> to those who</mark>se actions </u>and thoughts <u><mark>comprise</mark> the <strong><mark>policy</mark> and practice</u></strong> of international relations?</p><p>On all these questions one must answer <u><strong><mark>no</u></strong></mark>. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But <u><mark>to support that <strong>problem-solving</u></strong></mark> technical <u><mark>theory is</u></mark> not necessary—or in some way <u><mark>bad—is a <strong></mark>contemptuous <mark>position</strong> that <strong>abrogates</strong> any <strong>hope</mark> of <mark>solving</strong></mark> </u>some of the <u><strong>nightmarish <mark>realities</strong> that <strong>millions confront</mark> daily</u></strong>. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, “So what?” To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? <u><mark>In what sense can</mark> this <mark>“debate toward [a] <strong></mark>bottomless <mark>pit</strong> of <strong>epistemology</mark> and metaphysics”</strong><mark> be</mark> judged</u> pertinent, relevant, <u><strong><mark>helpful</u></strong></mark>, or cogent <u>to <strong>anyone</strong> other than those <strong>foolish enough</strong> to be</u> scholastically <u>excited by <strong>abstract</u></strong> and recondite <u>debate</u>. </p>

2AC

Security K

2AC – K – T/L

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A

The Longhorn Classic

Doubles

Niles North Mazhankou & Khan

Gershom Chan, Het Desai, Lindsay Feinstein

1AC – Russian Cyber v1.3.7 1NC – T Dialogue, Security K, Courts CP, Con Con CP, DoS PIC, Dip Cap DA, Debt Ceiling DA Block – Courts CP, T Dialogue, Debt Ceiling DA 2NR – Courts CP

hspolicy22/LiberalArtsAndScienceAcademy/WiDo/LiberalArtsAndScienceAcademy-WiDo-Aff-The-Longhorn-Classic-Doubles.docx

2022-12-04 03:07:44

WiDo

Liberal Arts And Science Academy WiDo

For docs, contact only: lasaddubs@gmail.com For chains, put both: lasaddubs@gmail.com lasadebatedocs@googlegroups.com Gideon Witchel (he/him) - 2A Jack Dollinger (he/him) - 2N

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“Justice” is certain.

SEP ’17

SEP ’17 [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; 2017; began in September 1995 when John Perry was the Director of the Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI), which has nearly 1600 entries online as of March 2018; “Justice”; https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice/] brett

justice is a matter of claims that can be rightfully made against the agent dispensing justice, whether a person or an institution we demand justice justice is a matter of obligation for the agent dispensing it, and that the agent wrongs the recipient if the latter is denied what is due the obligations it creates should be enforceable: we can be made to deliver what is due to others as a matter of justice, either by the recipients themselves or by third partie The obligatory nature of justice generally goes hand-in-hand with enforceability

justice is obligatory

Second, Justinian’s definition underlines that just treatment is something due to each person, in other words that justice is a matter of claims that can be rightfully made against the agent dispensing justice, whether a person or an institution. Here there is a contrast with other virtues: we demand justice, but we beg for charity or forgiveness. This also means that justice is a matter of obligation for the agent dispensing it, and that the agent wrongs the recipient if the latter is denied what is due to her. It is a characteristic mark of justice that the obligations it creates should be enforceable: we can be made to deliver what is due to others as a matter of justice, either by the recipients themselves or by third parties. However it overstates the position to make the enforceability of its requirements a defining feature of justice (see Buchanan 1987). On the one hand, there are some claims of justice that seem not to be enforceable (by anyone). When we dispense gifts to our children or our friends, we ought to treat each recipient fairly, but neither the beneficiaries themselves nor anyone else can rightfully force the giver to do so. On the other hand, in cases of extreme emergency, it may sometimes be justifiable to force people to do more than justice requires them to do – there may exist enforceable duties of humanity. But these are rare exceptions. The obligatory nature of justice generally goes hand-in-hand with enforceability.

<h4>“<u>Justice</u>” is <u>certain</u>.</h4><p><strong>SEP ’17</strong> [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; 2017; began in September 1995 when John Perry was the Director of the Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI), which has nearly 1600 entries online as of March 2018; “Justice”; https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice/] brett</p><p>Second, Justinian’s definition underlines that just treatment is something due to each person, in other words that <u><strong>justice</u></strong> <u>is a matter of claims that can be rightfully made against the agent dispensing justice, whether a person or an institution</u>. Here there is a contrast with other virtues: <u>we <strong>demand justice</u></strong>, but we beg for charity or forgiveness. This also means that <u><strong><mark>justice</strong> is</mark> a matter of <strong>obligation</strong> for the agent dispensing it, and that the agent wrongs the recipient if the latter is denied what is due</u> to her. It is a characteristic mark of justice that <u>the <strong>obligations</strong> it creates should be <strong>enforceable</strong>: we can be made to deliver what is due to others as a matter of justice, either by the recipients themselves or by third partie</u>s. However it overstates the position to make the enforceability of its requirements a defining feature of justice (see Buchanan 1987). On the one hand, there are some claims of justice that seem not to be enforceable (by anyone). When we dispense gifts to our children or our friends, we ought to treat each recipient fairly, but neither the beneficiaries themselves nor anyone else can rightfully force the giver to do so. On the other hand, in cases of extreme emergency, it may sometimes be justifiable to force people to do more than justice requires them to do – there may exist enforceable duties of humanity. But these are rare exceptions. <u><strong>The <mark>obligatory</mark> nature of justice generally goes hand-in-hand with enforceability</u></strong>.</p>

OFF

1NC – CP

./documents/hsld22/Sammamish/LyWa/Sammamish-LyWa-Neg-TOC-Digital-Speech-and-Debate-Series-3-Doubles.docx

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TOC Digital Speech and Debate Series 3

Doubles

Sammamish LW

Kim,Kodumuru,Maan

1AC - Schengen 1NC - T subsets, T conditional, Populism DA, ICJ CP 1AR - All 2NR - ICJ, Case 2AR - RVI, CP

hsld22/Sammamish/LyWa/Sammamish-LyWa-Neg-TOC-Digital-Speech-and-Debate-Series-3-Doubles.docx

2023-03-12 16:48:50

LyWa

Sammamish LyWa

*ghill update * the wiki won't let me disclose round 2 for some reason it crashes everytime i try so just dm me if you want docs for that round Feel free to contact me before round for disclosure or if you want me to meet any accommodation! Number - 4252409655 Email - lydiawang327@gmail.com Messenger - Lydia Wang

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No food wars – institutional responses prevent escalation

Cliffe 16

Cliffe 16 [Sarah Cliffe, Director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, 3/29/16, “Food Security, Nutrition, and Peace,” http://cic.nyu.edu/news_commentary/food-security-nutrition-and-peace

current research does not indicate a clear link between food insecurity and conflict Food security – and food prices – are a highly political issue But their link to conflict is indirect Many countries face food price or natural resource shocks without falling into conflict factors determining their resilience are whether food insecurity is combined with other stresses We sometimes read drought was a factor in the Syrian conflict, it would be too simplistic to suggest it was the primary driver whether countries have strong enough institutions providing help quickly to citizens affected by food insecurity During the 08 food crisis, developing countries with low institutional strength experienced more food price protests This is the difference in the events in Haiti versus Mexico or the Philippines where far greater institutional strength existed to deal with the food price shocks and protests did not spur deteriorating national security or widespread violence

current research does not indicate a link between food insecurity and conflict Many countries face food price or resource shocks without conflict factors determining resilience are whether food insecurity is combined with other stresses it would be too simplistic to suggest it was the primary driver whether countries have institutions providing help to citizens affected During the 08 crisis, developing countries experienced more protests This is the difference in Haiti versus Mexico or the Philippines institutional strength existed food shocks did not spur deteriorating national security

However, current research does not yet indicate a clear link between climate change, food insecurity and conflict, except perhaps where rapidly deteriorating water availability cuts across existing tensions and weak institutions. But a series of interlinked problems – changing global patterns of consumption of energy and scarce resources, increasing demands for food imports (which draw on land, water, and energy inputs) can create pressure on fragile situations. Food security – and food prices – are a highly political issue, being a very immediate and visible source of popular welfare or popular uncertainty. But their link to conflict (and the wider links between climate change and conflict) is indirect rather than direct. What makes some countries more resilient than others? Many countries face food price or natural resource shocks without falling into conflict. Essentially, the two important factors in determining their resilience are: First, whether food insecurity is combined with other stresses – issues such as unemployment, but most fundamentally issues such as political exclusion or human rights abuses. We sometimes read nowadays that the 2006-2009 drought was a factor in the Syrian conflict, by driving rural-urban migration that caused societal stresses. It may of course have been one factor amongst many but it would be too simplistic to suggest that it was the primary driver of the Syrian conflict. Second, whether countries have strong enough institutions to fulfill a social compact with their citizens, providing help quickly to citizens affected by food insecurity, with or without international assistance. During the 2007-2008 food crisis, developing countries with low institutional strength experienced more food price protests than those with higher institutional strengths, and more than half these protests turned violent. This for example, is the difference in the events in Haiti versus those in Mexico or the Philippines where far greater institutional strength existed to deal with the food price shocks and protests did not spur deteriorating national security or widespread violence.

<h4><u>No</u> food wars – <u>institutional responses</u> prevent escalation </h4><p><strong>Cliffe 16</strong> [Sarah Cliffe, Director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, 3/29/16, “Food Security, Nutrition, and Peace,” http://cic.nyu.edu/news_commentary/food-security-nutrition-and-peace</p><p>However, <u><mark>current research <strong>does not</u></strong></mark> yet <u><mark>indicate a</mark> clear <mark>link between</u></mark> climate change, <u><mark>food insecurity and conflict</u></mark>, except perhaps where rapidly deteriorating water availability cuts across existing tensions and weak institutions. But a series of interlinked problems – changing global patterns of consumption of energy and scarce resources, increasing demands for food imports (which draw on land, water, and energy inputs) can create pressure on fragile situations. <u>Food security – and food prices – are a highly political issue</u>, being a very immediate and visible source of popular welfare or popular uncertainty. <u>But their <strong>link to conflict</u></strong> (and the wider links between climate change and conflict) <u>is indirect</u> rather than direct. What makes some countries more resilient than others? <u><strong><mark>Many</strong> countries face food price or</mark> natural <mark>resource shocks <strong>without</mark> falling into <mark>conflict</u></strong></mark>. Essentially, the two important <u><mark>factors</u></mark> in <u><mark>determining</mark> their <mark>resilience are</u></mark>: First, <u><mark>whether food insecurity is combined with <strong>other stresses</u></strong></mark> – issues such as unemployment, but most fundamentally issues such as political exclusion or human rights abuses. <u>We sometimes read</u> nowadays that the 2006-2009 <u>drought was a factor in the Syrian conflict,</u> by driving rural-urban migration that caused societal stresses. It may of course have been one factor amongst many but <u><mark>it would be <strong>too simplistic</strong> to suggest</u></mark> that <u><mark>it was the primary driver</u></mark> of the Syrian conflict. Second, <u><mark>whether countries have</mark> strong enough <mark>institutions</u></mark> to fulfill a social compact with their citizens, <u><mark>providing help</mark> quickly <mark>to citizens affected</mark> by food insecurity</u>, with or without international assistance. <u><mark>During the</u></mark> 2007-20<u><mark>08</mark> food <mark>crisis, developing countries</mark> with low institutional strength <mark>experienced more</mark> food price <mark>protests</u></mark> than those with higher institutional strengths, and more than half these protests turned violent. <u><mark>This</u></mark> for example, <u><mark>is the difference</mark> in the events <mark>in Haiti versus</u></mark> those in <u><strong><mark>Mexico or the Philippines</strong></mark> where far greater <mark>institutional strength existed</mark> to deal with the <mark>food</mark> price <mark>shocks</mark> and <strong>protests <mark>did not spur deteriorating national security</strong></mark> or widespread violence</u>.</p>

Case

Hydropower DA

1NC – Adv 1

./documents/hsld22/Harker/SaYi/Harker-SaYi-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round-1.docx

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Glenbrooks

1

Harvard-Westlake ZG

Sarah Li

1ac - dams 1nc - t nebel, hydropower da, rbo cp, case 1ar - all 2nr - hydropower da, case 2ar - same

hsld22/Harker/SaYi/Harker-SaYi-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round-1.docx

2022-11-19 16:25:49

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It also causes nuclear war and magnifies every geopolitical impact.

Scheffran 16

Jürgen Scheffran 16, Professor at the Institute for Geography at the University of Hamburg and head of the Research Group Climate Change and Security in the CliSAP Cluster of Excellence and the Center for Earth System Research and Sustainability, et al., April 2016, “The Climate-Nuclear Nexus: Exploring the linkages between climate change and nuclear threats,” http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/file/2016/01/WFC_2015_The_Climate-Nuclear_Nexus.pdf

Climate change endangers ecosystems and social systems all over the world degradation of resources decline of water and food forced migration, and disasters will affect population clusters Climate-related shocks will add stress to the world’s existing conflicts and act as a “threat multiplier” in already fragile regions This could contribute to a decline of international stability and trigger hostility between nations nuclear weapons possess destructive force to destroy life on Earth With hundreds of weapons on ‘hair trigger alert’, the risks of nuclear war caused by accident, miscalculation or intent remain plentiful and imminent Conflicts induced by climate change could contribute to global insecurity enhance the chance of a nuclear weapon being used create more fertile breeding grounds for terrorism including nuclear terrorism and feed the ambitions among states to acquire nuclear arms nuclear war could lead to a rapid prolonged drop in average global temperatures and significantly disrupt the global climate for years threatening the food supply for most of the world

Climate change endangers ecosystems all over the world decline of water and food migration disasters add stress to existing conflicts as a “threat multiplier This could decline international stability and trigger hostility between nations nuclear weapons possess force to destroy life on Earth risks of nuclear war by accident, miscalc or intent remain plentiful Conflicts induced by climate change could contribute to global insecurity enhance the chance of a nuclear weapon being used create nuclear terrorism, and feed ambitions among states to acquire nuclear arms

Climate change and nuclear weapons represent two key threats of our time. Climate change endangers ecosystems and social systems all over the world. The degradation of natural resources, the decline of water and food supplies, forced migration, and more frequent and intense disasters will greatly affect population clusters, big and small. Climate-related shocks will add stress to the world’s existing conflicts and act as a “threat multiplier” in already fragile regions. This could contribute to a decline of international stability and trigger hostility between people and nations. Meanwhile, the 15,500 nuclear weapons that remain in the arsenals of only a few states possess the destructive force to destroy life on Earth as we know multiple times over. With nuclear deterrence strategies still in place, and hundreds of weapons on ‘hair trigger alert’, the risks of nuclear war caused by accident, miscalculation or intent remain plentiful and imminent. Despite growing recognition that climate change and nuclear weapons pose critical security risks, the linkages between both threats are largely ignored. However, nuclear and climate risks interfere with each other in a mutually enforcing way. Conflicts induced by climate change could contribute to global insecurity, which, in turn, could enhance the chance of a nuclear weapon being used, could create more fertile breeding grounds for terrorism, including nuclear terrorism, and could feed the ambitions among some states to acquire nuclear arms. Furthermore, as evidenced by a series of incidents in recent years, extreme weather events, environmental degradation and major seismic events can directly impact the safety and security of nuclear installations. Moreover, a nuclear war could lead to a rapid and prolonged drop in average global temperatures and significantly disrupt the global climate for years to come, which would have disastrous implications for agriculture, threatening the food supply for most of the world. Finally, climate change, nuclear weapons and nuclear energy pose threats of intergenerational harm, as evidenced by the transgenerational effects of nuclear testing and nuclear power accidents and the lasting impacts on the climate, environment and public health by carbon emissions.

<h4>It also causes <u>nuclear war</u> and magnifies every <u>geopolitical impact</u>.</h4><p>Jürgen <strong>Scheffran 16</strong>, Professor at the Institute for Geography at the University of Hamburg and head of the Research Group Climate Change and Security in the CliSAP Cluster of Excellence and the Center for Earth System Research and Sustainability, et al., April 2016, “The Climate-Nuclear Nexus: Exploring the linkages between climate change and nuclear threats,” http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/file/2016/01/WFC_2015_The_Climate-Nuclear_Nexus.pdf</p><p>Climate change and nuclear weapons represent two key threats of our time. <u><mark>Climate change endangers ecosystems</mark> and social systems <strong><mark>all over the world</u></strong></mark>. The <u>degradation of</u> natural <u>resources</u>, the <u><mark>decline of water and food</u></mark> supplies, <u>forced <mark>migration</mark>, and</u> more frequent and intense <u><mark>disasters</mark> will</u> greatly <u>affect population clusters</u>, big and small. <u>Climate-related shocks will <strong><mark>add stress to</mark> the world’s <mark>existing conflicts</strong></mark> and <strong>act <mark>as a “threat multiplier</strong></mark>” in already fragile regions</u>. <u><mark>This could</mark> contribute to a <strong><mark>decline</mark> of <mark>international stability</strong> and trigger <strong>hostility between</u></strong></mark> people and <u><strong><mark>nations</u></strong></mark>. Meanwhile, the 15,500 <u><mark>nuclear weapons</u></mark> that remain in the arsenals of only a few states <u><mark>possess</u></mark> the <u>destructive <mark>force to <strong>destroy life on Earth</u></strong></mark> as we know multiple times over. <u>With</u> nuclear deterrence strategies still in place, and <u>hundreds of weapons on ‘hair trigger alert’, the <strong><mark>risks of nuclear war</strong></mark> caused <mark>by accident, miscalc</mark>ulation <mark>or intent remain</u> <u><strong>plentiful</mark> and imminent</u></strong>. Despite growing recognition that climate change and nuclear weapons pose critical security risks, the linkages between both threats are largely ignored. However, nuclear and climate risks interfere with each other in a mutually enforcing way. <u><mark>Conflicts induced by climate change could contribute to <strong>global insecurity</u></strong></mark>, which, in turn, could <u><strong><mark>enhance the chance</mark> <mark>of a nuclear weapon being used</u></strong></mark>, could <u><mark>create</mark> more fertile breeding grounds for terrorism</u>, <u>including <strong><mark>nuclear terrorism</u></strong>,<u> and</u></mark> could <u><mark>feed</mark> the <mark>ambitions among</u></mark> some <u><mark>states to <strong>acquire nuclear arms</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, as evidenced by a series of incidents in recent years, extreme weather events, environmental degradation and major seismic events can directly impact the safety and security of nuclear installations. Moreover, a <u>nuclear war could lead to a rapid</u> and <u>prolonged drop in average global temperatures and significantly disrupt the global climate for years</u> to come, which would have disastrous implications for agriculture, <u><strong>threatening the food supply for most of the world</u></strong>. Finally, climate change, nuclear weapons and nuclear energy pose threats of intergenerational harm, as evidenced by the transgenerational effects of nuclear testing and nuclear power accidents and the lasting impacts on the climate, environment and public health by carbon emissions. </p>

1ac

1ac – Warming

./documents/hspolicy19/HenryWGrady/NkWa/Henry%20W%20Grady-Nkosi-Wakefield-Aff-Emory-Doubles.docx

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Emory

Doubles

Greenhill LH

Bannister, Giampetruzzi, McIntosh

hspolicy19/HenryWGrady/NkWa/Henry%20W%20Grady-Nkosi-Wakefield-Aff-Emory-Doubles.docx

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Henry W Grady NkWa

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Interpretation: medicines is a generic bare plural. The aff may not defend that member nations of the World Trade Organization reduce intellectual property protections for a subset of medicines.

Nebel 19

Nebel 19 Jake Nebel [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs.] , 8-12-2019, "Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution," Briefly, https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/ SM

. Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances since generics tolerate exceptions, plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs) do not negate generic resolutions Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations “Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural. First, ask yourself, honestly, whether the following speech sounds good to you: “Eight colleges and universities—namely, those in the Ivy League—ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them, but not the Ivies. Therefore, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since it’s not a valid inference, “colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural. Second, “colleges and universities” fails the upward-entailment test for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” ( This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals. Third, “colleges and universities” fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Dogs are barking outside my window.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some dogs barking outside my window. One test of this appeals to the drastic change of meaning caused by inserting any adverb of quantification You cannot add any such adverb into the sentence without drastically changing its meaning. To apply this test to the resolution, let’s again isolate the bare plural subject: “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” Adding generally (“Colleges and universities generally ought not consider the SAT”) or ever (“Colleges and universities ought not ever consider the SAT”) result in comparatively minor changes of meaning. “colleges and universities” is generic rather than existential in the resolution. Fourth, it is extremely unlikely that the topic committee would have written the resolution with the existential interpretation of “colleges and universities” in mind. If they intended the existential interpretation, they would have added explicit existential quantifiers like “some The committee, moreover, does not write resolutions for the 0.1 percent of debaters who debate on the national circuit; they write resolutions, at least in large part, to be debated by the vast majority of students on the vast majority of circuits, who would take the resolution to be (pretty obviously, I’d imagine) generic

Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances First, ask yourself, whether Eight colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests Therefore colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests it’s not a valid inference Second, “colleges and universities” fails the upward-entailment test Third, “colleges and universities” fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals. Fourth, it is unlikely the topic committee would have written the resolution with the existential interpretation The committee does not write resolutions for the national circuit

Both distinctions are important. Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances. But, since generics tolerate exceptions, plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs) do not negate generic resolutions. Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations. But there are two important things to keep in mind. First, generic generalizations are also often expressed via other means (e.g., definite singulars, indefinite singulars, and bare singulars). Second, and more importantly for present purposes, bare plurals can also be used to express existential generalizations. For example, “Birds are singing outside my window” is true just in case there are some birds singing outside my window; it doesn’t require birds in general to be singing outside my window. So, what about “colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions”? Are they generic or existential bare plurals? On other topics I have taken great pains to point out that their bare plurals are generic—because, well, they are. On this topic, though, I think the answer is a bit more nuanced. Let’s see why. 1.1 “Colleges and Universities” “Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural. I don’t think this claim should require any argument, when you think about it, but here are a few reasons. First, ask yourself, honestly, whether the following speech sounds good to you: “Eight colleges and universities—namely, those in the Ivy League—ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them, but not the Ivies. Therefore, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow. Anyone who sincerely believes that it is valid argument is, to be charitable, deeply confused. But the inference above would be good if “colleges and universities” in the resolution were existential. By way of contrast: “Eight birds are singing outside my window. Maybe lots of birds aren’t singing outside my window, but eight birds are. Therefore, birds are singing outside my window.” Since the bare plural “birds” in the conclusion gets an existential reading, the conclusion follows from the premise that eight birds are singing outside my window: “eight” entails “some.” If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since it’s not a valid inference, “colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural. Second, “colleges and universities” fails the upward-entailment test for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” (To isolate “colleges and universities,” I’ve eliminated the other bare plurals in the resolution; it cannot plausibly be generic in the isolated case but existential in the resolution.) This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals. Third, “colleges and universities” fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Dogs are barking outside my window.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some dogs barking outside my window. One test of this appeals to the drastic change of meaning caused by inserting any adverb of quantification (e.g., always, sometimes, generally, often, seldom, never, ever). You cannot add any such adverb into the sentence without drastically changing its meaning. To apply this test to the resolution, let’s again isolate the bare plural subject: “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” Adding generally (“Colleges and universities generally ought not consider the SAT”) or ever (“Colleges and universities ought not ever consider the SAT”) result in comparatively minor changes of meaning. (Note that this test doesn’t require there to be no change of meaning and doesn’t have to work for every adverb of quantification.) This strongly suggests what we already know: that “colleges and universities” is generic rather than existential in the resolution. Fourth, it is extremely unlikely that the topic committee would have written the resolution with the existential interpretation of “colleges and universities” in mind. If they intended the existential interpretation, they would have added explicit existential quantifiers like “some.” No such addition would be necessary or expected for the generic interpretation since generics lack explicit quantifiers by default. The topic committee’s likely intentions are not decisive, but they strongly suggest that the generic interpretation is correct, since it’s prima facie unlikely that a committee charged with writing a sentence to be debated would be so badly mistaken about what their sentence means (which they would be if they intended the existential interpretation). The committee, moreover, does not write resolutions for the 0.1 percent of debaters who debate on the national circuit; they write resolutions, at least in large part, to be debated by the vast majority of students on the vast majority of circuits, who would take the resolution to be (pretty obviously, I’d imagine) generic with respect to “colleges and universities,” given its face-value meaning and standard expectations about what LD resolutions tend to mean.

<h4>Interpretation: medicines is a generic bare plural. The aff may not defend that member nations of the World Trade Organization reduce intellectual property protections for a subset of medicines.</h4><p><strong>Nebel 19 </strong>Jake Nebel [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs.] , 8-12-2019, "Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution," Briefly, https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/ SM</p><p>Both distinctions are important<u>. <mark>Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances</u></mark>. But, <u>since generics tolerate exceptions, plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs) do not negate generic resolutions</u>. <u>Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations</u>. But there are two important things to keep in mind. First, generic generalizations are also often expressed via other means (e.g., definite singulars, indefinite singulars, and bare singulars). Second, and more importantly for present purposes, bare plurals can also be used to express existential generalizations. For example, “Birds are singing outside my window” is true just in case there are some birds singing outside my window; it doesn’t require birds in general to be singing outside my window. So, what about “colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions”? Are they generic or existential bare plurals? On other topics I have taken great pains to point out that their bare plurals are generic—because, well, they are. On this topic, though, I think the answer is a bit more nuanced. Let’s see why. 1.1 “Colleges and Universities” <u>“Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural.</u> I don’t think this claim should require any argument, when you think about it, but here are a few reasons. <u><mark>First, ask yourself,</mark> honestly, <mark>whether</mark> the following speech sounds good to you: “<mark>Eight colleges and universities</mark>—namely, those in the Ivy League—<mark>ought not consider standardized tests</mark> in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them, but not the Ivies. <mark>Therefore</mark>, in the United States, <mark>colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests</mark> in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow</u>. Anyone who sincerely believes that it is valid argument is, to be charitable, deeply confused. But the inference above would be good if “colleges and universities” in the resolution were existential. By way of contrast: “Eight birds are singing outside my window. Maybe lots of birds aren’t singing outside my window, but eight birds are. Therefore, birds are singing outside my window.” Since the bare plural “birds” in the conclusion gets an existential reading, the conclusion follows from the premise that eight birds are singing outside my window: “eight” entails “some.” <u>If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since <mark>it’s not a valid inference</mark>, “colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural. <mark>Second, “colleges and universities” fails the upward-entailment test</mark> for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” (</u>To isolate “colleges and universities,” I’ve eliminated the other bare plurals in the resolution; it cannot plausibly be generic in the isolated case but existential in the resolution.) <u>This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals. <mark>Third, “colleges and universities” fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals.</mark> Consider the sentence, “Dogs are barking outside my window.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some dogs barking outside my window. One test of this appeals to the drastic change of meaning caused by inserting any adverb of quantification</u> (e.g., always, sometimes, generally, often, seldom, never, ever). <u>You cannot add any such adverb into the sentence without drastically changing its meaning. To apply this test to the resolution, let’s again isolate the bare plural subject: “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” Adding generally (“Colleges and universities generally ought not consider the SAT”) or ever (“Colleges and universities ought not ever consider the SAT”) result in comparatively minor changes of meaning. </u>(Note that this test doesn’t require there to be no change of meaning and doesn’t have to work for every adverb of quantification.) This strongly suggests what we already know: that <u>“colleges and universities” is generic rather than existential in the resolution. <mark>Fourth, it is</mark> extremely <mark>unlikely</mark> that <mark>the topic committee would have written the resolution with the existential interpretation</mark> of “colleges and universities” in mind. If they intended the existential interpretation, they would have added explicit existential quantifiers like “some</u>.” No such addition would be necessary or expected for the generic interpretation since generics lack explicit quantifiers by default. The topic committee’s likely intentions are not decisive, but they strongly suggest that the generic interpretation is correct, since it’s prima facie unlikely that a committee charged with writing a sentence to be debated would be so badly mistaken about what their sentence means (which they would be if they intended the existential interpretation). <u><mark>The committee</mark>, moreover, <mark>does not write resolutions for the</mark> 0.1 percent of debaters who debate on the <mark>national circuit</mark>; they write resolutions, at least in large part, to be debated by the vast majority of students on the vast majority of circuits, who would take the resolution to be (pretty obviously, I’d imagine) generic </u>with respect to “colleges and universities,” given its face-value meaning and standard expectations about what LD resolutions tend to mean.</p>

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AI development makes extinction inevitable and outweighs everything

Turchin & Denkenberger 18

Turchin & Denkenberger 18 [Alexey, David. Turchin is a researcher at the Science for Life Extension Foundation; Denkenberger is with the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI) @ Tennessee State University, Alliance to Feed the Earth in Disasters (ALLFED). 05/03/2018. “Classification of Global Catastrophic Risks Connected with Artificial Intelligence.” AI & SOCIETY, pp. 1–17.]

the probability and seriousness of AI failures will increase with time AI is an extremely powerful and completely unpredictable technology, millions of times more powerful than nuclear weapons. Its existence could create multiple individual global risks, most of which we can not currently imagine The sheer number of possible failure modes suggests that there are more to come.

the probability and seriousness of AI failures increase with time AI is extremely powerful and completely unpredictable millions of times more powerful than nuclear weapons existence could create multiple individual global risks, most of which we can not currently imagine The sheer number of possible failure modes suggests there are more to come

According to Yampolskiy and Spellchecker (2016), the probability and seriousness of AI failures will increase with time. We estimate that they will reach their peak between the appearance of the first self-improving AI and the moment that an AI or group of AIs reach global power, and will later diminish, as late-stage AI halting seems to be a low-probability event. AI is an extremely powerful and completely unpredictable technology, millions of times more powerful than nuclear weapons. Its existence could create multiple individual global risks, most of which we can not currently imagine. We present several dozen separate global risk scenarios connected with AI in this article, but it is likely that some of the most serious are not included. The sheer number of possible failure modes suggests that there are more to come.

<h4>AI development makes extinction <u>inevitable</u> and outweighs <u>everything</u> </h4><p><strong>Turchin & Denkenberger 18<u></strong> [Alexey, David. Turchin is a researcher at the Science for Life Extension Foundation; Denkenberger is with the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI) @ Tennessee State University, Alliance to Feed the Earth in Disasters (ALLFED). 05/03/2018. “Classification of Global Catastrophic Risks Connected with Artificial Intelligence.” AI & SOCIETY, pp. 1–17.]</p><p></u>According to Yampolskiy and Spellchecker (2016), <u><mark>the <strong>probability</strong> and <strong>seriousness</strong> of AI failures</mark> will <strong><mark>increase with time</u></strong></mark>. We estimate that they will reach their peak between the appearance of the first self-improving AI and the moment that an AI or group of AIs reach global power, and will later diminish, as late-stage AI halting seems to be a low-probability event. <u><mark>AI is</mark> an <strong><mark>extremely powerful</strong> and <strong>completely unpredictable</strong></mark> technology, <strong><mark>millions of times more powerful than nuclear weapons</strong></mark>. Its <mark>existence could create <strong>multiple individual global risks</strong>, most of which we <strong>can not currently imagine</u></strong></mark>. We present several dozen separate global risk scenarios connected with AI in this article, but it is likely that some of the most serious are not included. <u><mark>The <strong>sheer number of possible failure modes</strong> suggests</mark> that <mark>there are more to come</mark>.</p></u>

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Successful terror plots risk extinction.

Krstić '17 [Marko; January 2017; assistant professor of microelectronics and physics at the University of Belgrade, PhD in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from the University of Belgrade; "Tendency of using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes," Military Technical Courier, Vol. 65, No. 2, p. 481-498]

Krstić '17 [Marko; January 2017; assistant professor of microelectronics and physics at the University of Belgrade, PhD in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from the University of Belgrade; "Tendency of using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes," Military Technical Courier, Vol. 65, No. 2, p. 481-498] CBRN = Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear threats

a single terrorist or isolated terrorist group could improvise a biological weapon or use other ways to spread anthrax smallpox or other biological agents and thereby cause mass casualties and destroy the health care system of a state. CBRN weapons are secretly shipped to terrorists or hostile governments and represent a significant and growing threat to many countries the primary danger is a threat of the military use of these weapons in conventional wars with traditional military means while the threat of covert attacks, which include terrorism is rashly and unfairly neglected. Covert attacks are difficult to deter or prevent and CBRN weapons suitable for this type of attack are available to a growing number of enemy states and groups restrictions on their use appear to be diminishing The danger of terrorist use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction represents a very serious threat for many countries; if a terrorist group could gain access to this weapon, it is highly likely it would use it CBRN weapons are rightly viewed with a special sense of horror their effects can be devastating and indiscriminating and they take the most stringent toll among the most vulnerable population, chemical and biological weapons are a particularly attractive alternative for groups that do not have the ability to produce nuclear weapons, and this risk raises complex but important ethical issues The possibility that terrorists use chemical or biological substances may increase over the next decade interest among non-state actors, including terrorists, for biological and chemical materials is real and growing, and the number of potential perpetrators is increasing many of these groups had developed an international network and did not need to rely on state sponsors for financial and technical support. CBRN weapons are biologically invisible to the naked eye, odorless and potentially lethal in the form of particles; natural organisms are so readily available, and can be "camouflaged" in natural disasters . Along with nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are part of an unholy trinity of weapons of mass destruction The society is now faced with the threat of an apocalyptic and asymmetric war in which kamikaze attackers are able to arm themselves with WMD without even having to have a "physical" weapon to create fear

a single group could improvise a CBRN weapon secretly weapons are available to a growing number of enemy groups danger of terrorist use of nuclear weapons represents a very serious threat if a terrorist could access it is highly likely it would use CBRN weapons are a special horror effects can be devastating and indiscriminating chemical and biological weapons are attractive possibility terrorists use chemical or bio substances may increase the number of perpetrators is increasing weapons are invisible odorless lethal readily available, and can be "camouflaged nuclear chemical biological weapons are a trinity of weapons of mass destruction society is faced with threat of apocalyptic kamikaze attack with WMD4

The studies of a few cases of earlier CBRN actions have led experts to identify the key characteristics of terrorist groups that could potentially have an interest to use these weapons. It is thought that conservatism is inherent in terrorist organizations, but it must not be forgotten that some terrorists are inclined to innovations in weapons and tactics, as well as to taking risks in actions or in the choice of weapons. Many experts agree that most terrorist organizations want to use proven methods to achieve desired effects. Innovations, especially in the field of CBRN weapons, often indicate terrorists are likely to be led by other factors rather than by pure curiosity and desire to experiment. For some individuals, repression and democratic and strong rule of law are positive determinants of the emergence of CBRN actions which points to a new and more complex global security environment with an increasing risk of terrorists trying to perform a CBRN attack. It is a frightening fact that a single terrorist or isolated terrorist group could improvise a biological weapon or use other ways to spread anthrax, smallpox or other biological agents and thereby cause mass casualties and destroy the health care system of a state. CBRN weapons are secretly shipped to terrorists or hostile governments and represent a significant and growing threat to many countries. Although the threat of CBRN attacks is widely recognized as the central issue of national security, most analysts assume that the primary danger is a threat of the military use of these weapons in conventional wars with traditional military means while the threat of covert attacks, which include terrorism, is rashly and unfairly neglected. Covert attacks are difficult to deter or prevent and CBRN weapons suitable for this type of attack are available to a growing number of enemy states and groups. At the same time, restrictions on their use appear to be diminishing, and so-called new terrorists do not always escalate and become apparent only by using unconventional weapons. These weapons are easily spread or transmitted from person to person, have a high mortality rate and a potential impact on public health, causing mass casualties that can crush health systems and cause public panic and social disruption, thus requiring special efforts to suppress them. When assessing the threat of CBRN weapons, we should take into account the change in capacity to carry out terrorist attacks that are on the rise among countries and non-government elements. Analysts believe that the fear of chemical and biological terrorist attacks is excessive, they point out that, in the past, very few attacks involved these weapons, and even those few attempts that have occurred were mostly thwarted by the authorities. A relative ease with which biological weapons can be obtained, along with other current changes and turbulences in the world, sets the stage for another type of warfare in the 21st century. The potential for CBRN terrorism has widely grown since 11 September, when some of these materials were used. The danger of terrorist use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction represents a very serious threat for many countries; if a terrorist group could gain access to this weapon, it is highly likely it would use it, or threaten to use it. Although there is very little information on terrorists and their ability to come into possession of nuclear weapons or on their intentions to get them, the risk of CBRN weapons has certainly increased since the terrorists started to become more familiar with these agents and their harmful consequences. Discovering the nature of the threat of biological weapons, as well as the appropriate response to them requires an emphasis on the biological characteristics of these instruments of war and terror. Preparing for a terrorist attack may seem daunting and there are a small number of people with practical experience and a good knowledge of CBRN weapons, because until recently there was no need to own them. In the past, most of the planning regarding emergency response to terrorism concentrated on the concerns of open attacks (bombing). However, the threats of CBRN weapons are taken seriously, especially in the USA, where media, fascinated by new weapons of mass destruction, encourage a growing fear for public safety. Terrorists who have significant human and material resources are much more likely to realize their intentions than lone perpetrators or small terrorist groups. A CBRN terrorism threat is certainly a matter of concern; however, terrorists will face many obstacles in the implementation of an attack of this kind. This includes the acquisition of materials and preparation for spreading them as well as a selection and a survey of a chosen objective and a correct dose required to achieve a desired effect. The growing threat of CBRN terrorism Terrorism can be defined as a deliberate act of violence intended to cause damage, but also to create an appropriate political and ideological situation, so that the use of these non-traditional weapons of terror outside the context is obvious, and the goals will not be military, but civilian ones (Bioterrorism, chemical weapons, and radiation terrorism, nd). Toxic substances, regardless of whether they are of animal, vegetable or mineral origin, were used throughout the history for political assassinations and sabotage; despite the risk of severe penalties, the prospects for success favoured the use of toxic substances. Such use has always been reduced, however, since only a small number of people had access to substances and possessed the ability of learn how to use them (Pascal, 1999). CBRN weapons are rightly viewed with a special sense of horror, their effects can be devastating and indiscriminating, and they take the most stringent toll among the most vulnerable population, non-combatants (e.g. a biological attack cannot be detected sufficiently fast after the disease spreads through the population). Moreover, chemical and biological weapons are a particularly attractive alternative for groups that do not have the ability to produce nuclear weapons, and this risk raises complex but important ethical issues (London, 2003). The common name for CBRN terrorism which causes the death of a large number of people, large scale damage and a strong echo worldwide is post-industrial or hyper-terrorism. This means that non-state elements possess and dispose of assets that were previously held only by states, but unlike them, which often fear reprisals after WMD attacks, terrorists, having no geographical location, are ready to use WMD with much less scrupulousness and fear (Kurmnik, Ribnikar, 2003). Some authors have described the factors that make chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorist attacks in many ways unique and demanding, such as an element of surprise, invisible agents, ordnance, the risk of repetition and new types of risks (Ruggiero, Voss, 2015). In the past 30 years, the use of CBRN weapons has become a major concern for many nations around the world. The public has become insensitive to traditional terrorist attacks that seem to be a less efficient way for terrorist organizations to achieve their goals. What causes shock and fear is actually presenting the properties of weapons which can be used by terrorist organizations to enhance their efforts and the effectiveness of attacks. CBRN terrorism is often a synonym for weapons of mass destruction, although this form of terrorism and related incidents do not require attacks and inflicting harm to large numbers of people they do not even require deadly attacks at all. The number of studies on this type of terrorism is limited due to the lack of available data on this terrorism type. There is a very small number of databases of CBRN incidents, and even the existing ones have relatively little to do with them and they are compared to conventional terrorism (Jesse, 2012). Some experts emphasize the factors that promote such attacks and these factors include the availability of information and expertise, increased frustration of terrorists, demonization of the target population, as well as a millennial, apocalyptic or messianic vision. Experts also differ in opinion when it comes to possible perpetrators of CBRN incidents, and include religious fundamentalists and cults1 as possible perpetrators of such attacks, especially when these groups address to ethereal audience, emphasizing the hatred of unbelievers (Ivanova, Sandler, 2007). Concerns about super terrorism which involves the use of CBRN weapons are mainly focused on what terrorists can do in the context of our social reality, with an emphasis on terrorist motivations, initiatives and limitations. When considering which terrorist groups may be inclined to commit CBRN terrorism, it is important to recognize the spectrum of these acts, as well as to analyze the following categorization: (a) massive casualty events produced by conventional weapons; (b) CBRN scams; (c) conventional attack on a nuclear facility; (d) limited-scale chemical or biological attack or a radiological dispersion; (e) large scale chemical or biological attack or a radiological dispersion; and (f) CBRN strikes (super terrorism) that can lead to thousands of victims. In addition to the motivation and willingness to inflict mass casualties in any way, terrorists must have technical and financial capabilities to come into possession of material and acquire skills for these types of weapons and materials and carry out a successful attack. Chemical and biological weapons can pose a risk to terrorists thus deterring them from using such weapons (Post, 2005, pp.148-151). The possibility that terrorists use chemical or biological substances may increase over the next decade, according to US intelligence agencies. According to CIA2, an interest among non-state actors, including terrorists, for biological and chemical materials is real and growing, and the number of potential perpetrators is increasing. The agency also noted that many of these groups had developed an international network and did not need to rely on state sponsors for financial and technical support. However, it is believed that it is less likely that terrorists would choose chemical and biological weapons over conventional explosives, because these weapons are difficult to control and their results are unpredictable (Condesman, Burke, 2001). The risk of CBRN weapons is growing since terrorists are better acquainted with these agents and their potential for causing harm3. These agents possess desirable characteristics as weapons of terror; they are biologically invisible to the naked eye, odorless and potentially lethal in the form of particles; natural organisms are so readily available, and can be "camouflaged" in natural disasters and used to spread fear and various diseases. Chemical agents quickly attack the critical physiological centers of the body, disabling or killing the victim. Biological and chemical weapons require the application of huge amounts of resources and result in different effects, causing fear and panic in the contaminated areas. Often referred to as "weapons of mass destruction", but, in medical terms, they are weapons of potential mass casualties because they can lead to massive death toll in the absence of preventive measures and timely response (Meyer, Spinella, 2014, pp.645-656). "Bioterrorism is the intentional use of microorganisms or toxins derived from living organisms used for hostile purposes intended to cause disease or death in man, animals and plants, on which they depend". The threat of bioterrorist attacks is real, and each individual is a potential terrorist, when terrorists are "invisible" prior to an attack which also can be "invisible" in the form of causing infectious diseases or epidemics. Citizens who are not aware they are infected are potential safety hazard and so-called dangerous bodies (Mijalković, 2011). In the last ten years, the issue of CBRN weapons has attracted the attention of experts, but a list of priorities by the heads of states has never been established. Biological weapons almost became forgotten after they had been banned by the 1972 Convention on Biological Weapons. A significant attention was paid to them during the 90s of the last century. The important thing is that biological weapons attract much less attention than other similar weapons, but probably represent the greatest danger, and in addition to their use in war, they are available as instruments of terror in peace. Some countries showed willingness to use such weapons against defenseless populations to achieve strategic objectives, and in this regard, some analysts believe that those who attacked the World Trade Center in 1993 applied cyanide on their bombs (this was not confirmed, but a large amount of cyanide was found in possession of the perpetrators). Such a group will prove to be less inefficient, because if terrorists decide to shock and surprise the government by inflicting enormous damage, CBRN weapons will become more attractive and more accessible (Bettis, 1998). Motives and forms of behavior of individuals and groups who acquired or used CBRN weapons have existed since long ago and there is no doubt that modern society is vulnerable to such attacks (Tucker, 2000). Fear of biological terrorism is certainly greater than the fear of the conventional forms of terrorism; some of these fears are justified and some are often exaggerated. Some agents are really very contagious and deadly, and if used properly, have a potential to result in casualties similar to those in a nuclear attack. Perhaps the scariest aspect of biological weapons is that the body is attacked without warning, people are afraid of the threat as it is invisible, and cannot be heard or felt. The history of warfare, terrorism and crime involving biological agents in the last century is considerably less dangerous and more deadly than the history of conventional warfare (Parachini, 2001). Today, some states and some terrorist groups can more easily overcome technological barriers due to the increased flow of information and access to previously unavailable technologies. Along with nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are part of an unholy trinity of weapons of mass destruction (Davis, Johnson-Winegar, 2000, pp.15-28). The society is now faced with the threat of an apocalyptic and asymmetric war scenario in which kamikaze attackers are able to arm themselves with WMD4 without even having to have a "physical" weapon to create fear; they probably still prefer simple, proven methods: a stampede in an enclosed place, or just an explosive device, which will kill many people5 (Palmer, 2004, pp.3-9). Early detection and response to biological or chemical terrorism are crucial to solving this problem (U.S. Congress House, 2003, p.117).

<h4>Successful terror plots risk <u>extinction</u>.</h4><p><strong>Krstić '17 [Marko; January 2017; assistant professor of microelectronics and physics at the University of Belgrade, PhD in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from the University of Belgrade; "Tendency of using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes," Military Technical Courier, Vol. 65, No. 2, p. 481-498]</p><p>CBRN = Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear threats</p><p></strong>The studies of a few cases of earlier CBRN actions have led experts to identify the key characteristics of terrorist groups that could potentially have an interest to use these weapons. It is thought that conservatism is inherent in terrorist organizations, but it must not be forgotten that some terrorists are inclined to innovations in weapons and tactics, as well as to taking risks in actions or in the choice of weapons. Many experts agree that most terrorist organizations want to use proven methods to achieve desired effects. Innovations, especially in the field of CBRN weapons, often indicate terrorists are likely to be led by other factors rather than by pure curiosity and desire to experiment. For some individuals, repression and democratic and strong rule of law are positive determinants of the emergence of CBRN actions which points to a new and more complex global security environment with an increasing risk of terrorists trying to perform a CBRN attack. It is a frightening fact that <u><mark>a <strong>single</strong></mark> terrorist or isolated terrorist <mark>group could improvise a</mark> <strong>biological weapon</u></strong> <u>or use other ways to spread <strong>anthrax</u></strong>, <u><strong>smallpox</u></strong> <u>or other biological agents and thereby cause <strong>mass casualties</u></strong> <u>and destroy the health care system of a state. <mark>CBRN weapon</mark>s are <strong><mark>secretly</u></strong></mark> <u>shipped to terrorists or hostile governments and represent a significant and</u> <u><strong>growing threat</u></strong> <u>to many countries</u>. Although the threat of CBRN attacks is widely recognized as the central issue of national security, most analysts assume that <u>the primary danger is a threat of the military use of these weapons in conventional wars with traditional military means while the threat of <strong>covert attacks</strong>, which include <strong>terrorism</u></strong>, <u>is rashly and unfairly neglected. Covert attacks are <strong>difficult to deter or prevent</u></strong> <u>and CBRN <mark>weapons</mark> suitable for this type of attack <mark>are <strong>available</u></strong> <u>to a</u> <u><strong>growing number of enemy</mark> states and <mark>groups</u></strong></mark>. At the same time, <u>restrictions on their use appear to be diminishing</u>, and so-called new terrorists do not always escalate and become apparent only by using unconventional weapons. These weapons are easily spread or transmitted from person to person, have a high mortality rate and a potential impact on public health, causing mass casualties that can crush health systems and cause public panic and social disruption, thus requiring special efforts to suppress them. When assessing the threat of CBRN weapons, we should take into account the change in capacity to carry out terrorist attacks that are on the rise among countries and non-government elements. Analysts believe that the fear of chemical and biological terrorist attacks is excessive, they point out that, in the past, very few attacks involved these weapons, and even those few attempts that have occurred were mostly thwarted by the authorities. A relative ease with which biological weapons can be obtained, along with other current changes and turbulences in the world, sets the stage for another type of warfare in the 21st century. The potential for CBRN terrorism has widely grown since 11 September, when some of these materials were used. <u>The <mark>danger of terrorist use of nuclear weapons</mark> and other weapons of mass destruction <mark>represents a</u> <u><strong>very serious threat</u></strong></mark> <u>for many countries; <mark>if a terrorist</mark> group <mark>could</mark> gain <mark>access</mark> to this weapon, <mark>it is <strong>highly likely it would use</mark> it</u></strong>, or threaten to use it. Although there is very little information on terrorists and their ability to come into possession of nuclear weapons or on their intentions to get them, the risk of CBRN weapons has certainly increased since the terrorists started to become more familiar with these agents and their harmful consequences. Discovering the nature of the threat of biological weapons, as well as the appropriate response to them requires an emphasis on the biological characteristics of these instruments of war and terror. Preparing for a terrorist attack may seem daunting and there are a small number of people with practical experience and a good knowledge of CBRN weapons, because until recently there was no need to own them. In the past, most of the planning regarding emergency response to terrorism concentrated on the concerns of open attacks (bombing). However, the threats of CBRN weapons are taken seriously, especially in the USA, where media, fascinated by new weapons of mass destruction, encourage a growing fear for public safety. Terrorists who have significant human and material resources are much more likely to realize their intentions than lone perpetrators or small terrorist groups. A CBRN terrorism threat is certainly a matter of concern; however, terrorists will face many obstacles in the implementation of an attack of this kind. This includes the acquisition of materials and preparation for spreading them as well as a selection and a survey of a chosen objective and a correct dose required to achieve a desired effect. The growing threat of CBRN terrorism Terrorism can be defined as a deliberate act of violence intended to cause damage, but also to create an appropriate political and ideological situation, so that the use of these non-traditional weapons of terror outside the context is obvious, and the goals will not be military, but civilian ones (Bioterrorism, chemical weapons, and radiation terrorism, nd). Toxic substances, regardless of whether they are of animal, vegetable or mineral origin, were used throughout the history for political assassinations and sabotage; despite the risk of severe penalties, the prospects for success favoured the use of toxic substances. Such use has always been reduced, however, since only a small number of people had access to substances and possessed the ability of learn how to use them (Pascal, 1999). <u><mark>CBRN weapons are</mark> rightly viewed with <mark>a <strong>special</mark> sense of <mark>horror</u></strong></mark>, <u>their <mark>effects can be <strong>devastating</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>indiscriminating</u></strong></mark>, <u>and they take the most stringent toll among the most <strong>vulnerable population</strong>,</u> non-combatants (e.g. a biological attack cannot be detected sufficiently fast after the disease spreads through the population). Moreover, <u><strong><mark>chemical</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>biological</u></strong> <u>weapons are</mark> a particularly <strong><mark>attractive</mark> alternative</u></strong> <u>for groups that do not have the ability to produce <strong>nuclear weapons</strong>,</u> <u>and this risk raises complex but important ethical issues</u> (London, 2003). The common name for CBRN terrorism which causes the death of a large number of people, large scale damage and a strong echo worldwide is post-industrial or hyper-terrorism. This means that non-state elements possess and dispose of assets that were previously held only by states, but unlike them, which often fear reprisals after WMD attacks, terrorists, having no geographical location, are ready to use WMD with much less scrupulousness and fear (Kurmnik, Ribnikar, 2003). Some authors have described the factors that make chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorist attacks in many ways unique and demanding, such as an element of surprise, invisible agents, ordnance, the risk of repetition and new types of risks (Ruggiero, Voss, 2015). In the past 30 years, the use of CBRN weapons has become a major concern for many nations around the world. The public has become insensitive to traditional terrorist attacks that seem to be a less efficient way for terrorist organizations to achieve their goals. What causes shock and fear is actually presenting the properties of weapons which can be used by terrorist organizations to enhance their efforts and the effectiveness of attacks. CBRN terrorism is often a synonym for weapons of mass destruction, although this form of terrorism and related incidents do not require attacks and inflicting harm to large numbers of people they do not even require deadly attacks at all. The number of studies on this type of terrorism is limited due to the lack of available data on this terrorism type. There is a very small number of databases of CBRN incidents, and even the existing ones have relatively little to do with them and they are compared to conventional terrorism (Jesse, 2012). Some experts emphasize the factors that promote such attacks and these factors include the availability of information and expertise, increased frustration of terrorists, demonization of the target population, as well as a millennial, apocalyptic or messianic vision. Experts also differ in opinion when it comes to possible perpetrators of CBRN incidents, and include religious fundamentalists and cults1 as possible perpetrators of such attacks, especially when these groups address to ethereal audience, emphasizing the hatred of unbelievers (Ivanova, Sandler, 2007). Concerns about super terrorism which involves the use of CBRN weapons are mainly focused on what terrorists can do in the context of our social reality, with an emphasis on terrorist motivations, initiatives and limitations. When considering which terrorist groups may be inclined to commit CBRN terrorism, it is important to recognize the spectrum of these acts, as well as to analyze the following categorization: (a) massive casualty events produced by conventional weapons; (b) CBRN scams; (c) conventional attack on a nuclear facility; (d) limited-scale chemical or biological attack or a radiological dispersion; (e) large scale chemical or biological attack or a radiological dispersion; and (f) CBRN strikes (super terrorism) that can lead to thousands of victims. In addition to the motivation and willingness to inflict mass casualties in any way, terrorists must have technical and financial capabilities to come into possession of material and acquire skills for these types of weapons and materials and carry out a successful attack. Chemical and biological weapons can pose a risk to terrorists thus deterring them from using such weapons (Post, 2005, pp.148-151). <u>The <mark>possibility</mark> that <mark>terrorists use chemical or bio</mark>logical <mark>substances may</u> <u><strong>increase</strong></mark> over the next decade</u>, according to US intelligence agencies. According to CIA2, an <u><strong>interest</u></strong> <u>among non-state actors, including terrorists, for biological and chemical materials is real and growing, and <strong><mark>the number of</mark> potential <mark>perpetrators is increasing</u></strong></mark>. The agency also noted that <u>many of these groups had developed an international network and did not need to rely on state sponsors for financial and technical support.</u> However, it is believed that it is less likely that terrorists would choose chemical and biological weapons over conventional explosives, because these weapons are difficult to control and their results are unpredictable (Condesman, Burke, 2001). The risk of <u>CBRN <mark>weapons</u></mark> is growing since terrorists are better acquainted with these agents and their potential for causing harm3. These agents possess desirable characteristics as weapons of terror; they <u><mark>are</mark> biologically <mark>invisible</mark> to the naked eye, <strong><mark>odorless</strong></mark> and potentially <strong><mark>lethal</strong></mark> in the form of particles; natural organisms are so <strong><mark>readily available</strong>, and can be "<strong>camouflaged</strong></mark>" in natural disasters</u> and used to spread fear and various diseases. Chemical agents quickly attack the critical physiological centers of the body, disabling or killing the victim. Biological and chemical weapons require the application of huge amounts of resources and result in different effects, causing fear and panic in the contaminated areas. Often referred to as "weapons of mass destruction", but, in medical terms, they are weapons of potential mass casualties because they can lead to massive death toll in the absence of preventive measures and timely response (Meyer, Spinella, 2014, pp.645-656). "Bioterrorism is the intentional use of microorganisms or toxins derived from living organisms used for hostile purposes intended to cause disease or death in man, animals and plants, on which they depend". The threat of bioterrorist attacks is real, and each individual is a potential terrorist, when terrorists are "invisible" prior to an attack which also can be "invisible" in the form of causing infectious diseases or epidemics. Citizens who are not aware they are infected are potential safety hazard and so-called dangerous bodies (Mijalković, 2011). In the last ten years, the issue of CBRN weapons has attracted the attention of experts, but a list of priorities by the heads of states has never been established. Biological weapons almost became forgotten after they had been banned by the 1972 Convention on Biological Weapons. A significant attention was paid to them during the 90s of the last century. The important thing is that biological weapons attract much less attention than other similar weapons, but probably represent the greatest danger, and in addition to their use in war, they are available as instruments of terror in peace. Some countries showed willingness to use such weapons against defenseless populations to achieve strategic objectives, and in this regard, some analysts believe that those who attacked the World Trade Center in 1993 applied cyanide on their bombs (this was not confirmed, but a large amount of cyanide was found in possession of the perpetrators). Such a group will prove to be less inefficient, because if terrorists decide to shock and surprise the government by inflicting enormous damage, CBRN weapons will become more attractive and more accessible (Bettis, 1998). Motives and forms of behavior of individuals and groups who acquired or used CBRN weapons have existed since long ago and there is no doubt that modern society is vulnerable to such attacks (Tucker, 2000). Fear of biological terrorism is certainly greater than the fear of the conventional forms of terrorism; some of these fears are justified and some are often exaggerated. Some agents are really very contagious and deadly, and if used properly, have a potential to result in casualties similar to those in a nuclear attack. Perhaps the scariest aspect of biological weapons is that the body is attacked without warning, people are afraid of the threat as it is invisible, and cannot be heard or felt. The history of warfare, terrorism and crime involving biological agents in the last century is considerably less dangerous and more deadly than the history of conventional warfare (Parachini, 2001). Today, some states and some terrorist groups can more easily overcome technological barriers due to the increased flow of information and access to previously unavailable technologies<u>. Along with <mark>nuclear</mark> and <mark>chemical</mark> weapons, <mark>biological weapons are</mark> part of <mark>a</mark>n</u> <u><strong>unholy <mark>trinity of weapons of mass destruction</u></strong></mark> (Davis, Johnson-Winegar, 2000, pp.15-28). <u>The <mark>society is</mark> now <mark>faced with</mark> the <mark>threat of</mark> an</u> <u><strong><mark>apocalyptic</mark> and asymmetric war</u></strong> scenario <u>in which <strong><mark>kamikaze attack</mark>ers</u></strong> <u>are able to arm themselves <mark>with WMD</u>4</mark> <u>without even having to have a "physical" weapon to create fear</u>; they probably still prefer simple, proven methods: a stampede in an enclosed place, or just an explosive device, which will kill many people5 (Palmer, 2004, pp.3-9). Early detection and response to biological or chemical terrorism are crucial to solving this problem (U.S. Congress House, 2003, p.117).</p>

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Existential risks outweigh.

Farquhar et al. 17

Farquhar et al. 17 – Sebastian Farquhar, Computer Science DPhil Student at the University of Oxford. John Halstead, Political Philosophy DPhil at the University of Oxford. Dr. Owen Cotton-Barratt, Pure Math DPhil at the University of Oxford. Dr. Stefan Schubert, Philosophy PhD at Lund University. Haydn Belfield, a BA. Andrew Snyder-Beattie, Philosophy PhD Student at the University of Oxford. [Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, Global Priorities Project, 1-23-17, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf]//BPS

existential catastrophes would “destroy the future,” This future could be extremely long and full of flourishing, and have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis we work out the expected value by weighing the probability an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability has huge expected value Justifications appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations existential risk would fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing reducing existential risk has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk norms of intergenerational equity give us a strong case to reduce existential risks existential risk reduction receives less attention than is warranted a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries have strong incentives to free ride existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs Cognitive biases lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient This is the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes something is important only if it can be readily recalled Another cognitive bias is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would willing to pay to save 2,000 or 200,000 birds the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large decision-makers treat existential risks similar to problems less severe by magnitude

work out value a tiny probability has huge value ex risk fail to live up to equity catastrophe would give future gen s nothing problem is temporal free riding gen enjoys inaction while future gen s bear the costs biases lead people to underestimate ex risks This is availability heuristic assumes something is important if recalled scope neglect the size of benefits little effect on response People numbed to saving lives when numbers get too large.

In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. 74 Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75

<h4>Existential risks <u>outweigh</u>.</h4><p><strong>Farquhar et al. 17</strong> – Sebastian Farquhar, Computer Science DPhil Student at the University of Oxford. John Halstead, Political Philosophy DPhil at the University of Oxford. Dr. Owen Cotton-Barratt, Pure Math DPhil at the University of Oxford. Dr. Stefan Schubert, Philosophy PhD at Lund University. Haydn Belfield, a BA. Andrew Snyder-Beattie, Philosophy PhD Student at the University of Oxford. [Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, Global Priorities Project, 1-23-17, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf]//BPS</p><p>In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes <u>existential catastrophes</u> especially bad is that they <u>would “destroy the future,”</u> as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 <u>This future could</u> potentially <u>be <strong>extremely long</strong> and <strong>full of flourishing</strong>, and</u> would therefore <u>have <strong>extremely large value</strong>. In standard risk analysis</u>, when working out how to respond to risk, <u>we <mark>work out</mark> the expected <mark>value</u></mark> of risk reduction, <u>by weighing <strong>the probability</u></strong> that <u>an action will prevent <strong>an adverse event</strong> against <strong>the severity</strong> of the event. Because</u> the value of preventing <u>existential catastrophe is <strong>so vast</strong>, <strong>even <mark>a tiny probability</u></strong></mark> of prevention <u><mark>has <strong>huge</mark> expected <mark>value</u></strong></mark>.67</p><p>Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument.</p><p>In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 <u>Justifications</u> for this policy usually <u>appeal to principles of <strong>intergenerational equity</strong> according to which <strong>future generations</strong> ought to get <strong>as much protection</strong> as current generations</u>.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71</p><p>However, when it comes to <u><strong><mark>ex</mark>istential <mark>risk</u></strong></mark>, it <u>would</u> seem that we <u><mark>fail to live up to</mark> principles of <strong>intergenerational <mark>equity</strong></mark>. Existential <mark>catastrophe would </mark>not only <mark>give future gen</mark>eration<mark>s</mark> <strong>less than the current generations</strong>; it would give them <strong><mark>nothing</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, <u>reducing existential risk</u> plausibly <u>has <strong>a quite low cost</strong> for us in comparison with <strong>the huge expected value</strong> it has for future generations. In spite of this, <strong>relatively little</strong> is done to reduce existential risk</u>. Unless we give up on <u>norms of <strong>intergenerational equity</u></strong>, they <u>give us <strong>a strong case</u></strong> for significantly increasing our efforts <u>to reduce existential risks</u>.</p><p>1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY</p><p>In spite of the importance of <u>existential risk reduction</u>, it probably <u>receives <strong>less attention</strong> than is warranted</u>. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks.</p><p>1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in</p><p>There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, <u>a country which reduces <strong>existential risk</strong> gains <strong>only a small portion</strong> of the benefits but bears <strong>the full brunt of the costs</strong>. Countries</u> thus <u>have <strong>strong incentives</strong> to free ride</u>, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. </p><p>Secondly, as already suggested above, <u><strong>existential risk reduction</strong> is <strong>an intergenerational public good</u></strong>: most of <u>the benefits are enjoyed by <strong>future generations</strong> who have <strong>no say</strong> in the political process</u>. For these goods, <u>the <mark>problem is <strong>temporal free riding</strong></mark>: the current <mark>gen</mark>eration <mark>enjoys</mark> <strong>the benefits of <mark>inaction</strong> while future gen</mark>eration<mark>s bear <strong>the costs</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available.</p><p><u><strong>Cognitive <mark>biases</u></strong></mark> also <u><mark>lead people to underestimate ex</mark>istential <mark>risks</mark>. Since there have not been <strong>any catastrophes</strong> of this magnitude, these risks are <strong>not salient</u></strong> to politicians and the public.72 <u><mark>This is</u></mark> an example of the misapplication of <u><strong>the <mark>availability</mark> <mark>heuristic</strong></mark>, a mental shortcut which <mark>assumes</u></mark> that <u><mark>something is important</mark> <strong>only <mark>if</strong></mark> it can be <strong>readily <mark>recalled</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u><strong>Another cognitive bias</u></strong> affecting perceptions of existential risk <u>is <strong><mark>scope neglect</strong></mark>. In <strong>a seminal 1992 study</strong>, three groups were asked how much they would</u> be <u>willing to pay to save 2,000</u>, 20,000 <u>or 200,000 birds</u> from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, <u><mark>the size of</mark> the <mark>benefits </mark>had <strong><mark>little effect</strong> on</mark> the scale of the preferred <mark>response</mark>. <mark>People</mark> <strong>become <mark>numbed</strong> to</mark> the effect of <mark>saving lives when</mark> the <mark>numbers get <strong>too large</u></strong>.</mark> 74 <u>Scope neglect is <strong>a particularly acute problem</strong> for existential risk because the numbers at stake are <strong>so large</u></strong>. Due to scope neglect, <u>decision-makers</u> are prone to <u>treat existential risks</u> in a <u>similar</u> way <u>to problems</u> which are <u>less severe by</u> many orders of <u>magnitude</u>. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75</p>

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Capitalism is unsustainable and causes extinction from warming, mineral and water wars.

Reese 20 brett

Reese 20 [Ted; 9-2-20; author of Socialism or Extinction and The End of Capitalism: The Thought of Henryk Grossman, “‘Socialism or extinction’ is a scientific fact, not just a slogan”, https://grossmanite.medium.com/socialism-or-extinction-is-a-fact-not-a-slogan-3cb97b198c50, emuse)] recut brett

Socialism or extinction is a statement of scientific fact. capital’s exploitation of commodity-producing labour is the sole source of profit Therefore, capital’s evermore demanding need to accumulate is based on the continual expansion of intensive production, i.e. the extraction of fossil fuel and metals, deforestation, intensive farming, etc., that is releasing carbon making the planet warmer and threatening runaway global heating that, according to numerous scientific studies, will make the planet uninhabitable for humans, before the end of the present century. Capital’s exploitation of labour is also the root cause of alleged plummeting sperm counts further threatening extinction. The microplastics, nanoparticles and toxic chemicals damage human cells. It is not capitalism’s need for ‘infinite growth on a planet of finite resources’ that is the central problem; rather, it is the pace of production relative to nature’s ability to replenish itself Just as surplus value is converted into capital faster than it is produced — resulting in decennial recessions and, eventually, a historical limit to capital accumulation — so nature is converted into capital faster than it can be replenished. While fossil fuel may fall to 50% of the mix of energy production, its absolute production may rise output under capitalism tends to double every 20 years material use explodes: it reaches 35 billion tons by 1980, hits 50 billion tons by 2000, and then screams up to an eye-watering 92 billion tons by 2017 increase in material use tracks more or less exactly with the rise of global GDP. The two have grown together in lockstep. Every additional unit of GDP means roughly an additional unit of material extraction. As the global economy has come to rely more on these less polluting fuels, one might think that emissions would begin to decline.… [But] because GDP growth is driving total energy demand up at such a rapid pace … these new fuels aren’t replacing the older ones, they are being added on top of them. shift to oil and gas hasn’t been an energy transition, but an energy addition. The same thing is happening right now with renewable energy To keep energy flowing when the sun isn’t shining and the wind isn’t blowing will require enormous batteries This means 40 million tons of lithium — an eye-watering 2,700% increase over current levels of extraction It takes 500,000 gallons of water to produce a single ton of lithium mining companies are burning through the water tables and leaving farmers with nothing to irrigate their crops Meanwhile, chemical leaks from lithium mines have poisoned rivers from Chile to Argentina, Nevada to Tibet killing off whole freshwater ecosystems The lithium boom has barely started, and it’s already a catastrophe Today the world is producing 8 billion more megawatt hours of clean energy each year than in 2000. That’s a lot But over exactly the same period, economic growth has caused energy demand to increase by 48 billion megawatt hours. There’s also something else going on. With every year that goes by, it becomes more and more difficult to extract the same amount of materials There is no such thing as ‘green capitalism’ Under socialism, goods are produced if we deem them to be useful, via democratic regulation and demand. Rather than fossil fuel or metals we could use non-labour-intensive renewables — sunlight, wind and especially fibrous plants and mycelium And because socialism can plan production on a break-even basis, instead of having to bow to the demands of anarchic competition between private producers, we can grow economic output at the rate nature replenishes Achieving the abundant material wealth for all promised by communism is part of the solution. Fibrous plants like hemp quickly draw down and sequester CO2 while reviving the soil, reversing desertification; and the products made from them keep that carbon sequestered indefinitely. Abundant material wealth for all includes abundant vegetation, permaculture, afforestation There is also the potential for micro-organisms to supply a near-infinite source of energy. Investment in microbial fuel cells will remain seriously limited, however, until value-creation is based solely on utility instead of exploitation socialisation of the means of production, whereby the means of production are owned by humanity instead of capital, will thus be a ‘naturalising’ humanisation, plantification and microbiolisation of production Other forms of existing carbon-negative production that could be scaled up include ‘sky mining’ for diamonds another industry that only exists on a small scale because of the lack of labour exploitation Emissions-free, energy-dense nuclear power, is also an option. There is also the prospect of space-based solar power and associated wireless transmission, without the intermittency of night time or winter has proven too expensive for investors who won’t invest without the prospect of a higher return because socialist production is based on utility, socialism will also be able to invest in things like mineralising CO2 That we are not doing this is a travesty — but where it would be a productive industry under socialism, it is an unproductive industry under capitalism taxes eat into already thinning profit margins, and so these are resisted by capitalists, who anyway run the capitalist state. Capitalism is now effectively an extinction cult and can only continue to steer Earth into the sun. Socialism — which is anyway becoming an economic necessity gives humanity the chance of steer Earth to safety, in the nick of time.

Socialism or extinction is scientific fact. capital’s expansion is threatening runaway heating that make the planet uninhabitable surplus converted faster than produced resulting in decennial recessions material use tracks GDP Every unit means additional extraction driving total energy demand up new fuels are added on top of oil and gas renewable energy require 40 million tons of lithium killing freshwater a catastrophe non intensive renewables will remain limited until value-creation is based on utility carbon-negative production too expensive without higher return

Socialism or extinction is not just a slogan, though; it is a statement of scientific fact. If XR does not stand for socialism, then it must necessarily stand for extinction, rendering its own alleged purpose redundant. In short: capitalism is a profit-dependent system, and must therefore continue to expand production in order to keep investment flowing and profits rising (in absolute terms). And since profit arises from capital’s exploitation of commodity-producing labour, the intensity of the production based on fossil fuel and toxic, fuel-intensive metal mining is (increasingly) necessary. To flesh this out a bit more: capital’s exploitation of commodity-producing labour is the sole source of profit — the capitalist appropriates surplus value (surplus labour time) from the worker, i.e the worker keeps less value than they create, covering their living costs (necessary labour time), and surplus value is then realised through commodity sales. This social relation is obscured by the money-wage relation. Therefore, capital’s evermore demanding need to accumulate is based on the continual expansion of intensive production, i.e. the extraction of fossil fuel and metals, deforestation, intensive farming, etc., that is releasing carbon and other ‘greenhouse’ emissions — not to mention that they are fuel-intensive practices in the first place and toxic to the local environment — trapped in nature into the atmosphere, making the planet warmer and threatening runaway global heating that, according to numerous scientific studies, will make the planet uninhabitable for humans, probably before the end of the present century. (Capital’s exploitation of labour is therefore also the root cause of alleged plummeting sperm counts (down a reported 59% from 1973 to 2011), further threatening extinction. The microplastics, nanoparticles and toxic chemicals sourced from fossil fuels and metal mines and consumed in everyday products penetrate and damage human cells.) Although extractive industries are usually now very capital-intensive — the source of capitalism’s (now existential) economic crisis — the rate of exploitation of the remaining workers is very high. It is not capitalism’s need for ‘infinite growth on a planet of finite resources’, as most leftists seem to put it, that is the central or immediate problem; rather, it is the pace of production and its expansion — determined by the size of an ever-larger total capital and its need to expand yet further by feeding off labour — relative to nature’s ability to replenish itself (something capitalism’s dependence on intensive extraction obviously hinders). Just as surplus value is converted into capital faster than it is produced — resulting in (on average) decennial recessions and, eventually, a historical limit to capital accumulation — so nature is converted into capital faster than it can be replenished. Compound accumulation Fossil fuels (petroleum, coal, natural gas and orimulsion) would shrink to roughly half of total primary energy supply in 2050, from about 77% in 2020 — down from 81% in 2010 — if the world meets the ‘minimum’ internationally agreed target of 2 degrees Celsius warming, according to S&P Global Platts Analytics. (Even 1C has already seen a reported 400,000 people (and counting) a year dying from climate-related causes; while the Arctic permafrost — containing 1.8 trillion tonnes of carbon, more than twice as much as is currently suspended in Earth’s atmosphere — is, we are told,[2] melting 70 years sooner than previously expected. While fossil fuel may fall to 50% of the mix of energy production, its absolute production may rise, since economic output under capitalism tends to double every 20 years.[3] As Jason Hickel writes in his book Less Is More, there was “a steady rise of material use in the first half of the 1900s, doubling from 7 billion tons per year to 14 billion tons per year. But then, in the decades after 1945, something truly bewildering happens… material use explodes: it reaches 35 billion tons by 1980, hits 50 billion tons by 2000, and then screams up to an eye-watering 92 billion tons by 2017… This increase in material use tracks more or less exactly with the rise of global GDP. The two have grown together in lockstep. Every additional unit of GDP means roughly an additional unit of material extraction. “There has been a radical acceleration of fossil fuel use since 1945, rising along with the explosion in both GDP and material use. And carbon emissions have gone up right along with it. Annual emissions more than doubled from 2 billion tons per year to 5 billion tons per year during the first half of the 1900s. During the second half of the century they rose fivefold, reaching 25 billion tons by the year 2000. And they have continued to rise since then, despite a string of international climate summits, reaching 37 billion tons in 2019. Of course, there is no intrinsic relationship between energy use and CO2 emissions. It all depends on what energy source we’re using. Coal is by far the most carbon-intensive of the fossil fuels. Oil — which has grown much more quickly than coal since 1945 — emits less CO2 per unit of energy. And natural gas is less intensive still. As the global economy has come to rely more on these less polluting fuels, one might think that emissions would begin to decline.… [But] because GDP growth is driving total energy demand up at such a rapid pace … these new fuels aren’t replacing the older ones, they are being added on top of them. The shift to oil and gas hasn’t been an energy transition, but an energy addition. “The same thing is happening right now with renewable energy… To keep energy flowing when the sun isn’t shining and the wind isn’t blowing will require enormous batteries at the grid level. This means 40 million tons of lithium — an eye-watering 2,700% increase over current levels of extraction… It takes 500,000 gallons of water to produce a single ton of lithium. Even at present levels of extraction this is causing real problems. In the Andes, where most of the world’s lithium is located, mining companies are burning through the water tables and leaving farmers with nothing to irrigate their crops. Many have had no choice but to abandon their land altogether. Meanwhile, chemical leaks from lithium mines have poisoned rivers from Chile to Argentina, Nevada to Tibet, killing off whole freshwater ecosystems. The lithium boom has barely started, and it’s already a catastrophe… “Today the world is producing 8 billion more megawatt hours of clean energy each year than in 2000. That’s a lot — enough to power all of Russia. But over exactly the same period, economic growth has caused energy demand to increase by 48 billion megawatt hours. “There’s also something else going on. With every year that goes by, it becomes more and more difficult to extract the same amount of materials from the earth. Today, three times more material has to be extracted per unit of metal than a century ago.”[4] There is no such thing as ‘green capitalism’. The ‘Green New Deal’ proposed by social democrats — which actually involves privatising the last areas of common land — is species suicide. Socialism and non-intensive production Under capitalism, commodities are only produced if they are profitable, i.e. if labour is exploitable enough to expand capital. They are use-values/utilities and exchange-values. Under socialism, goods (having been decommodified) are produced if we deem them to be useful, via democratic regulation and demand. They are just use-values and socially owned, so no exchange of ownership takes place, i.e. exchange value and profit are abolished. If we deem that a good is not useful since it is damaging the environment or contributing to climate change too much, we can decide not to make it. Or we can find a way of making it that does not damage or exhaust nature. Rather than fossil fuel (which disappears into thin air and so has to be extracted anew by exploited labour, making it perfect for the needs of capital) or metals (which are finite), we could use non-labour-intensive renewables — sunlight, wind and especially (for physical products) fibrous plants (especially hemp, which can replace steel, concrete, graphene, lithium and fossil fuel) and mycelium (from which we can even make computers). And because socialism can plan and co-ordinate production as a whole on a break-even basis, instead of having to bow to the demands of capital accumulation and anarchic competition between private producers, we can grow economic output at the rate nature replenishes (or slower) — something that socialism could help instead of hinder. Achieving the abundant material wealth for all promised by communism (as it develops into its higher stage, when production becomes fully automated and, eventually, free) is part of the solution. Fibrous plants like hemp quickly draw down and sequester CO2 while reviving the soil, reversing desertification; and the products made from them (including bioplastic that is 10 times stronger than steel; batteries that outperform lithium and graphene; and highly-insulating carbon-negative hempcrete) keep that carbon sequestered indefinitely. Abundant material wealth for all includes abundant vegetation, permaculture, afforestation, etc. There is also the potential for micro-organisms to supply a near-infinite source of energy. In 2018, scientists in the US confirmed a theory first proposed by Soviet geologists when they found huge populations of bacteria living in the extreme temperatures of Earth’s crust, despite the lack of photosynthesis and nutrients, living solely from chemical reactions fuelled by geothermal energy. They estimated that up to 23 billion tonnes of micro-organisms live in this “deep biosphere”, making it the largest ecosystem on the planet and accounting for nearly 400 times the amount of carbon found in all living humans. Here lies a potential source of abundant energy (although we will have to assess whether the benefits outweigh the impacts of drilling). Other scientists have even found that the Geobacter bacteria found in human waste can convert sewage into fresh water and produce electricity in the process. It is now thought that one day microbial fuel cells could power our phones, household appliances — and even spaceships. Investment in microbial fuel cells will remain seriously limited, however, until value-creation is based solely on utility instead of exploitation and profit, since capital cannot exploit the labour time of microbes! Modern science — which is looking more and more ‘presocialist’, i.e. systematic, holistic and dialectial-materialist (the Marxist method of assessing history as moving forward through material and social interactions)— has proven that humans depend on plants and bacteria for everyday life, smashing the myth of The Individual — the world is powered by collectivism. Indeed, trees, plants and bacteria are our relatives. The world is one interconnected whole. The socialisation of the means of production, whereby the means of production are owned by humanity instead of capital, will thus be a ‘naturalising’ humanisation, plantification and microbiolisation of production. Other forms of existing carbon-negative production that could be scaled up include ‘sky mining’ for diamonds that are chemically identical to earth diamonds, another industry that only exists on a small scale under capitalism because of the lack of labour exploitation involved. Emissions-free, energy-dense nuclear power, is also an option. The initial impact of mining uranium on the environment must be re-assessed by an independent socialist state, but to prove our earlier point, nuclear has not been abandoned because of safety fears, but because its capital-intensity has become unprofitable as ever-growing total capital becomes harder and harder to expand by the relatively diminishing pool of human labour. In terms of worker safety, nuclear is the safest form of energy production. There is also the prospect of space-based solar power and associated wireless transmission, without the intermittency of night time or winter suffered by solar panels and wind turbines on Earth. This, too, however, has proven too expensive for investors who won’t invest without the prospect of a higher return. Reverting to overly local, small-scale production—which would make everything more expensive — is not an option. Sea levels are rising and we probably need to build incredibly vast dikes on every continent. Rising temperatures will also massively increase the demand for air conditioning, which will have to be powered by something abundant and emissions-free, like nuclear. But socialism never works? Clearly, we need world socialism. Countries that are arguably ‘semi-socialist’ or that are supposedly ‘working towards’ socialism, like China and Venezuela, still work to some extent on the basis of commodity-production. But even ‘fully’ socialist countries still have to trade with capitalist countries, and that means having to make concessions to capital, working within a world capitalist system and having to maintain military defences at the expense of the civilian economy. Nor can they fully plan their economies due to fluctuating, unpredictable foreign prices. The need to build up foreign currency also incentivises black markets. Again, because socialist production is based on utility, socialism will also be able to invest in things like mineralising CO2 (turning it permanently into basalt rock). This is not a silver bullet since it is water-intensive, but it could certainly be scaled up significantly where water scarcity is not an issue (or if water can be ‘artificially’ produced). That we are not doing this is a travesty — but where it would be a productive industry under socialism, it is an unproductive industry under capitalism, since it does not offer a commodity that can be sold for profit (unless it is sold to the state using public debt, thereby creating no new value and contributing to money devaluation that will eventually (imminently) cause hyperinflation). It would therefore have to be funded by taxes that eat into already thinning profit margins, and so these taxes are resisted by capitalists, who anyway run the capitalist state. They are incapable of changing the system, even as it threatens to produce an ecocidal holocaust. Capitalism is now effectively an extinction cult and can only continue to steer Earth into the sun. Socialism — which is anyway becoming an economic necessity for the first time — gives humanity the chance of steering Earth to safety, in the nick of time.

<h4>Capitalism is <u>unsustainable</u> and causes <u>extinction</u> from <u>warming</u>, <u>mineral</u> and <u>water wars</u>.</h4><p><strong>Reese 20 </strong>[Ted; 9-2-20; author of Socialism or Extinction and The End of Capitalism: The Thought of Henryk Grossman, “‘Socialism or extinction’ is a scientific fact, not just a slogan”, https://grossmanite.medium.com/socialism-or-extinction-is-a-fact-not-a-slogan-3cb97b198c50, emuse)] recut <u><strong>brett</p><p><mark>Socialism or extinction</u></strong></mark> is not just a slogan, though; it <u><strong><mark>is</mark> a statement of <mark>scientific fact.</u></strong></mark> If XR does not stand for socialism, then it must necessarily stand for extinction, rendering its own alleged purpose redundant. In short: capitalism is a profit-dependent system, and must therefore continue to expand production in order to keep investment flowing and profits rising (in absolute terms). And since profit arises from capital’s exploitation of commodity-producing labour, the intensity of the production based on fossil fuel and toxic, fuel-intensive metal mining is (increasingly) necessary. To flesh this out a bit more: <u>capital’s exploitation of commodity-producing labour is the sole source of profit</u> — the capitalist appropriates surplus value (surplus labour time) from the worker, i.e the worker keeps less value than they create, covering their living costs (necessary labour time), and surplus value is then realised through commodity sales. This social relation is obscured by the money-wage relation. <u>Therefore, <mark>capital’s</mark> evermore demanding need to accumulate is based on the <strong>continual <mark>expansion</strong></mark> of <strong>intensive production</strong>, i.e. the extraction of fossil fuel and metals, deforestation, intensive farming, etc., that <mark>is</mark> releasing carbon</u> and other<u> </u>‘greenhouse’ emissions — not to mention that they are fuel-intensive practices in the first place and toxic to the local environment — trapped in nature into the atmosphere, <u>making the planet warmer and <mark>threatening runaway</mark> <strong>global <mark>heating</strong> that</mark>, <strong>according to numerous scientific studies, will <mark>make the planet uninhabitable</mark> for humans,</strong> </u>probably <u><strong>before the end of the present century.</u></strong> (<u>Capital’s exploitation of labour is</u> therefore <u>also the root cause of alleged plummeting sperm counts</u> (down a reported 59% from 1973 to 2011), <u>further threatening extinction. The microplastics, nanoparticles and toxic chemicals </u>sourced from fossil fuels and metal mines and consumed in everyday products penetrate and <u>damage human cells.</u>) Although extractive industries are usually now very capital-intensive — the source of capitalism’s (now existential) economic crisis — the rate of exploitation of the remaining workers is very high. <u>It is not capitalism’s need for ‘infinite growth on a planet of finite resources’</u>, as most leftists seem to put it, <u>that is the central</u> or immediate <u>problem; rather, it is the pace of production</u> and its expansion — determined by the size of an ever-larger total capital and its need to expand yet further by feeding off labour — <u>relative to nature’s ability to replenish itself</u> (something capitalism’s dependence on intensive extraction obviously hinders). <u>Just as <strong><mark>surplus</mark> value</strong> is <mark>converted</mark> into <strong>capital</strong> <mark>faster than</mark> it is <mark>produced</mark> — <mark>resulting in</u></mark> (on average) <u><strong><mark>decennial recessions</strong></mark> and, eventually, a historical limit to capital accumulation — so nature is converted into capital faster than it can be replenished. </u>Compound accumulation Fossil fuels (petroleum, coal, natural gas and orimulsion) would shrink to roughly half of total primary energy supply in 2050, from about 77% in 2020 — down from 81% in 2010 — if the world meets the ‘minimum’ internationally agreed target of 2 degrees Celsius warming, according to S&P Global Platts Analytics. (Even 1C has already seen a reported 400,000 people (and counting) a year dying from climate-related causes; while the Arctic permafrost — containing 1.8 trillion tonnes of carbon, more than twice as much as is currently suspended in Earth’s atmosphere — is, we are told,[2] melting 70 years sooner than previously expected. <u>While fossil fuel may fall to 50% of the mix of energy production, its absolute production may rise</u>, since economic <u>output under capitalism tends to double every 20 years</u>.[3] As Jason Hickel writes in his book Less Is More, there was “a steady rise of material use in the first half of the 1900s, doubling from 7 billion tons per year to 14 billion tons per year. But then, in the decades after 1945, something truly bewildering happens… <u><strong>material use explodes</strong>: it reaches <strong>35 billion</strong> tons by <strong>1980</strong>, hits <strong>50 billion</strong> tons by <strong>2000</strong>, and then screams up to an eye-watering <strong>92 billion</strong> tons by <strong>2017</u></strong>… This <u><strong>increase in <mark>material use</strong> tracks</mark> more or less exactly with the rise of global <strong><mark>GDP</strong></mark>. The two have grown together in lockstep. <strong><mark>Every</mark> additional <mark>unit</mark> of GDP</strong> <mark>means</mark> roughly an <mark>additional </mark>unit of <strong>material <mark>extraction</strong></mark>. </u>“There has been a radical acceleration of fossil fuel use since 1945, rising along with the explosion in both GDP and material use. And carbon emissions have gone up right along with it. Annual emissions more than doubled from 2 billion tons per year to 5 billion tons per year during the first half of the 1900s. During the second half of the century they rose fivefold, reaching 25 billion tons by the year 2000. And they have continued to rise since then, despite a string of international climate summits, reaching 37 billion tons in 2019. Of course, there is no intrinsic relationship between energy use and CO2 emissions. It all depends on what energy source we’re using. Coal is by far the most carbon-intensive of the fossil fuels. Oil — which has grown much more quickly than coal since 1945 — emits less CO2 per unit of energy. And natural gas is less intensive still. <u>As the global economy has come to rely more on these less polluting fuels, one might think that emissions would begin to decline.… [But] because GDP growth is <mark>driving <strong>total energy demand up</strong></mark> at such a <strong>rapid pace</strong> … these <mark>new fuels</mark> aren’t replacing the older ones, they <mark>are</mark> being <strong><mark>added on top of</mark> </strong>them.</u> The <u>shift to <strong><mark>oil and gas</strong></mark> hasn’t been an energy transition, but an energy addition. </u>“<u>The same thing is happening right now with <strong><mark>renewable energy</u></strong></mark>… <u>To keep energy flowing when the sun isn’t shining and the wind isn’t blowing will <mark>require</mark> enormous batteries</u> at the grid level. <u>This means <strong><mark>40 million tons of lithium</strong></mark> — an eye-watering 2,700% increase over current levels of extraction</u>… <u>It takes 500,000 gallons of water to produce a single ton of lithium</u>. Even at present levels of extraction this is causing real problems. In the Andes, where most of the world’s lithium is located, <u><strong>mining companies are burning through the water tables and leaving farmers with nothing to irrigate their crops</u></strong>. Many have had no choice but to abandon their land altogether. <u>Meanwhile, chemical leaks from lithium mines have poisoned rivers from Chile to Argentina, Nevada to Tibet</u>, <u><mark>killing</mark> off whole <strong><mark>freshwater</mark> ecosystems</u></strong>. <u>The lithium boom has barely started, and it’s already <strong><mark>a catastrophe</u></strong></mark>… “<u>Today the world is producing 8 billion more megawatt hours of clean energy each year than in 2000. That’s a lot</u> — enough to power all of Russia. <u>But over exactly the same period, economic growth has caused energy demand to increase by 48 billion megawatt hours. </u>“<u>There’s also something else going on. With every year that goes by, it becomes more and more difficult to extract the same amount of materials</u> from the earth. Today, three times more material has to be extracted per unit of metal than a century ago.”[4] <u><strong>There is no such thing as ‘green capitalism’</u></strong>. The ‘Green New Deal’ proposed by social democrats — which actually involves privatising the last areas of common land — is species suicide. Socialism and non-intensive production Under capitalism, commodities are only produced if they are profitable, i.e. if labour is exploitable enough to expand capital. They are use-values/utilities and exchange-values. <u>Under socialism, goods</u> (having been decommodified) <u>are produced if we deem them to be useful, via <strong>democratic</strong> regulation and <strong>demand</strong>.</u> They are just use-values and socially owned, so no exchange of ownership takes place, i.e. exchange value and profit are abolished. If we deem that a good is not useful since it is damaging the environment or contributing to climate change too much, we can decide not to make it. Or we can find a way of making it that does not damage or exhaust nature. <u>Rather than <strong>fossil fuel</u></strong> (which disappears into thin air and so has to be extracted anew by exploited labour, making it perfect for the needs of capital) <u>or <strong>metals</u></strong> (which are finite), <u>we could use <mark>non</mark>-labour-<mark>intensive renewables</mark> — <strong>sunlight, wind</strong> and especially</u> (for physical products) <u><strong>fibrous plants</u></strong> (especially hemp, which can replace steel, concrete, graphene, lithium and fossil fuel) <u>and <strong>mycelium</u></strong> (from which we can even make computers). <u>And because socialism can plan </u>and co-ordinate <u>production</u> as a whole <u>on a break-even basis, instead of having to bow to the demands of</u> capital accumulation and <u>anarchic competition between private producers, we can grow economic output at the rate nature replenishes</u> (or slower) — something that socialism could help instead of hinder. <u>Achieving the abundant material wealth for all promised by communism</u> (as it develops into its higher stage, when production becomes fully automated and, eventually, free) <u>is part of the solution. Fibrous plants like <strong>hemp</strong> quickly draw down and sequester CO2 while reviving the soil, <strong>reversing desertification</strong>; and the products made from them</u> (including bioplastic that is 10 times stronger than steel; batteries that outperform lithium and graphene; and highly-insulating carbon-negative hempcrete) <u>keep that carbon sequestered indefinitely. Abundant material wealth for all includes abundant vegetation, permaculture, afforestation</u>, etc. <u>There is also the potential for <strong>micro-organisms</strong> to supply a <strong>near-infinite source of energy</strong>.</u> In 2018, scientists in the US confirmed a theory first proposed by Soviet geologists when they found huge populations of bacteria living in the extreme temperatures of Earth’s crust, despite the lack of photosynthesis and nutrients, living solely from chemical reactions fuelled by geothermal energy. They estimated that up to 23 billion tonnes of micro-organisms live in this “deep biosphere”, making it the largest ecosystem on the planet and accounting for nearly 400 times the amount of carbon found in all living humans. Here lies a potential source of abundant energy (although we will have to assess whether the benefits outweigh the impacts of drilling). Other scientists have even found that the Geobacter bacteria found in human waste can convert sewage into fresh water and produce electricity in the process. It is now thought that one day microbial fuel cells could power our phones, household appliances — and even spaceships. <u><strong>Investment</strong> in microbial fuel cells <mark>will remain</mark> <strong>seriously <mark>limited</strong></mark>, however, <mark>until value-creation is based</mark> <strong>solely <mark>on utility</strong></mark> instead of exploitation</u> and profit, since capital cannot exploit the labour time of microbes! Modern science — which is looking more and more ‘presocialist’, i.e. systematic, holistic and dialectial-materialist (the Marxist method of assessing history as moving forward through material and social interactions)— has proven that humans depend on plants and bacteria for everyday life, smashing the myth of The Individual — the world is powered by collectivism. Indeed, trees, plants and bacteria are our relatives. The world is one interconnected whole. The <u>socialisation of the means of production, whereby the means of production are owned by humanity instead of capital, will thus be a ‘naturalising’ humanisation, plantification and microbiolisation of production</u>. <u>Other forms of existing <mark>carbon-negative production</mark> that could be scaled up include ‘sky mining’ for diamonds</u> that are chemically identical to earth diamonds, <u>another industry that only exists on a small scale</u> under capitalism <u>because of the lack of labour exploitation</u> involved. <u>Emissions-free, energy-dense nuclear power, is also an option. </u>The initial impact of mining uranium on the environment must be re-assessed by an independent socialist state, but to prove our earlier point, nuclear has not been abandoned because of safety fears, but because its capital-intensity has become unprofitable as ever-growing total capital becomes harder and harder to expand by the relatively diminishing pool of human labour. In terms of worker safety, nuclear is the safest form of energy production. <u>There is also the prospect of space-based solar power and associated wireless transmission, without the intermittency of night time or winter </u>suffered by solar panels and wind turbines on Earth. This, too, however, <u><strong>has proven <mark>too expensive</mark> for investors who won’t invest <mark>without</mark> the prospect of a <mark>higher return</u></strong></mark>. Reverting to overly local, small-scale production—which would make everything more expensive — is not an option. Sea levels are rising and we probably need to build incredibly vast dikes on every continent. Rising temperatures will also massively increase the demand for air conditioning, which will have to be powered by something abundant and emissions-free, like nuclear. But socialism never works? Clearly, we need world socialism. Countries that are arguably ‘semi-socialist’ or that are supposedly ‘working towards’ socialism, like China and Venezuela, still work to some extent on the basis of commodity-production. But even ‘fully’ socialist countries still have to trade with capitalist countries, and that means having to make concessions to capital, working within a world capitalist system and having to maintain military defences at the expense of the civilian economy. Nor can they fully plan their economies due to fluctuating, unpredictable foreign prices. The need to build up foreign currency also incentivises black markets. Again, <u>because socialist production is based on utility, socialism will also be able to invest in things like mineralising CO2</u> (turning it permanently into basalt rock). This is not a silver bullet since it is water-intensive, but it could certainly be scaled up significantly where water scarcity is not an issue (or if water can be ‘artificially’ produced). <u>That we are not doing this is a travesty — but where it would be a productive industry under socialism, it is an unproductive industry under capitalism</u>, since it does not offer a commodity that can be sold for profit (unless it is sold to the state using public debt, thereby creating no new value and contributing to money devaluation that will eventually (imminently) cause hyperinflation). It would therefore have to be funded by <u>taxes</u> that <u>eat into already thinning profit margins, and so these</u> taxes <u>are resisted by capitalists, who anyway run the capitalist state.</u> They are incapable of changing the system, even as it threatens to produce an ecocidal holocaust. <u><strong>Capitalism is now effectively an extinction cult</strong> and can only continue to steer Earth into the sun. <strong>Socialism — which is anyway becoming an economic necessity</u></strong> for the first time — <u><strong>gives humanity the chance of steer</u></strong>ing <u><strong>Earth to safety, in the nick of time. </p></u></strong>

1NC – OFF

./documents/hsld22/MontaVista/EtYa/MontaVista-EtYa-Neg-TOC-Digital-Speech-and-Debate-Series-2-Round-2.docx

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TOC Digital Speech and Debate Series 2

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Lincoln East BH

Levi

1AC - Oppression 1NC - T-Implementation - No Borders CP - Util NC - Populism DA - Cap K - Case 1AR - All - Niemi - Queer IVI 2NR - 1AR Voters - Cap K - Case 2AR - Same

hsld22/MontaVista/EtYa/MontaVista-EtYa-Neg-TOC-Digital-Speech-and-Debate-Series-2-Round-2.docx

2023-02-25 02:26:15

EtYa

Monta Vista EtYa

Hi, I'm Ethan. You can email me at ethanyang380@gmail.com for disclosure. Please let me know if I'm missing something or you have any other disclosure interps you want me to meet. If I forgot a 1AR interp, please let me know - I may have forgotten to add it here. 1AR Interps - Interpretation: All neg positions must be unconditional Interpretation: PICs are a voting issue Interpretation: Agent CPs are a voting issue Interpretation: Alternatives must be ascribable to a policy-making body Interpretation: Consult CPs are a voting issue Interpretation: Consulting non-governmental agents is a voting issue

Et.....

Ya.....

MontaVista

Monta Vista

CA

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

Backing down goes nuclear.

Zagorodnyuk 22

Zagorodnyuk 22 [Andriy; 10-18-22; chairman of the Center for Defence Strategies and Ukraine’s former minister of defense (2019–2020); “Bowing to Putin’s nuclear blackmail will make nuclear war more likely,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/bowing-to-putins-nuclear-blackmail-will-make-nuclear-war-far-more-likely/] brett

With his invasion of Ukraine rapidly unraveling Putin has recently resorted to nuclear saber-rattling has caused widespread international alarm and is fueling mounting calls for to reach a compromise The to appease Moscow reflects a shortsighted failure to appreciate the appalling security implications of bowing down to Russian intimidation Giving in would not end the war in Ukraine it would set a disastrous precedent that make nuclear war far more likely while encouraging dozens of countries to acquire nuclear arsenals of their own What comes next will determine the future role of nuclear weapons in i r and shape the security climate for decades to come If Russia’s nuclear threats succeed and Ukraine accept partial partition MAD will be torn up and a new age of instability will begin MAD worked because superpowers balanced each other out The Russian invasion of Ukraine is completely different We are currently witnessing a nuclear superpower threatening a non-nuclear state precisely because it has failed to win by conventional military means The message is both menacing and unmistakable: countries with nuclear weapons cannot be defeated by those who have none This is a recipe for nuclear proliferation If Putin is able to rescue his failing invasion through nuclear blackmail it will spark a nuclear arms race of unprecedented proportions A long list of countries Iran Saudi Arabia Nigeria South Korea will take note and scramble to join the nuclear club not having nukes could come to be seen as an invitation for invasion The only way to prevent a dark future of spiraling nuclear confrontation is to make sure Putin fails threats require an overwhelming response spelling out that any atomic aggression in Ukraine would mean defeat and ruin for Russia Unless the international community stands up to Putin now, the entire world will be plunged into a dangerous new era defined by constant threat of nuclear warfare

compromise would not end the war If nuclear threats succeed MAD will be torn up nuclear threatening a non-nuclear state because it has failed to win by conventional means spark a nuclear scramble not having nukes invit invasion spiraling nuclear confrontation plunged into nuc war

With his armies in retreat and his invasion of Ukraine rapidly unraveling, Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently resorted to nuclear saber-rattling. This has caused widespread international alarm and is fueling mounting calls for Ukraine to reach a compromise with the Kremlin in order to avert World War III. The current rush to appease Moscow is deeply unnerving and reflects a shortsighted failure to appreciate the appalling security implications of bowing down to Russian intimidation. Giving in to Putin’s nuclear blackmail would not end the war in Ukraine. What it would do is set a disastrous precedent that makes a future nuclear war far more likely while encouraging dozens of countries to acquire nuclear arsenals of their own. Putin first raised the prospect of a nuclear escalation in a September 21 address that saw him announce plans to annex large swathes of occupied Ukrainian territory and launch Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. “I’m not bluffing,” the Russian ruler declared. The following week, he accused the United States of “creating a precedent” by dropping atomic bombs on Japan in 1945 and vowed to use “all means at our disposal,” to defend Ukrainian regions annexed by Russia. The Western response has been mixed. US officials have informed the Kremlin that Russia would face “catastrophic consequences” if it moves to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, while EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell has warned Moscow that any nuclear attack would be met with “such a powerful answer that the Russian army will be annihilated.” Others have been less forthright, with French President Emmanuel Macron in particular coming under fire for unilaterally ruling out the use of nuclear weapons in response to a Russian nuclear attack on Ukraine. Meanwhile, tech billionaire Elon Musk has been one of numerous high-profile figures to promote Kremlin-friendly peace plans while arguing that the world faces possible nuclear apocalypse unless Ukraine cedes land (and millions of citizens) to Russia. What comes next will determine the future role of nuclear weapons in international relations and shape the security climate for decades to come. If Russia’s nuclear threats succeed and Ukraine is forced to accept partial partition, the entire doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD), which served so well throughout the Cold War, will be torn up and a new age of instability will begin. MAD worked because the two Cold War era superpowers balanced each other out. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is completely different. We are currently witnessing a nuclear superpower threatening a non-nuclear state precisely because it has failed to win a war by conventional military means. The message from Moscow is both menacing and unmistakable: countries with nuclear weapons cannot be defeated by those who have none. This is a recipe for nuclear proliferation. If Putin is able to rescue his failing invasion and achieve his military goals through the use of nuclear blackmail, it will spark a nuclear arms race of unprecedented proportions. A long list of countries including everyone from Iran and Saudi Arabia to Nigeria and South Korea will take note of the new rules established in Ukraine and scramble to join the nuclear club. Eventually, not having nukes could come to be seen as an invitation for invasion. This would be bitterly ironic as Ukraine was once something of a poster child for nuclear non-proliferation. In 1994, Ukraine agreed to hand over what was at the time the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for “security assurances” from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The Budapest Memorandum is now widely recognized as one of the most notorious diplomatic blunders of the modern era. It is a mistake few are eager to repeat. Indeed, given Ukraine’s current predicament, why would any country abandon their own nuclear aspirations in return for empty assurances? The only way to prevent the world from descending into a dark future of spiraling nuclear confrontation is to make sure Putin fails. His nuclear threats require an overwhelming response spelling out that any atomic aggression in Ukraine would mean defeat and ruin for Russia. There is no longer room for strategic ambiguity or talk of proportional retaliation; Putin must be made to personally understand that neither he nor his regime would survive if he chooses to cross the nuclear red line. Many NATO member states will no doubt be deeply uncomfortable with the idea of directly confronting the Kremlin in this manner. Others will warn that such posturing could easily ignite a third world war. These are valid concerns, but there are no longer any risk-free options available. Unless the international community stands up to Putin now, the entire world will be plunged into a dangerous new era defined by the constant threat of nuclear warfare.

<h4>Backing down <u>goes nuclear</u>.</h4><p><strong>Zagorodnyuk 22</strong> [Andriy; 10-18-22; chairman of the Center for Defence Strategies and Ukraine’s former minister of defense (2019–2020); “Bowing to Putin’s nuclear blackmail will make nuclear war more likely,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/bowing-to-putins-nuclear-blackmail-will-make-nuclear-war-far-more-likely/] brett</p><p><u>With his </u>armies in retreat and his <u><strong>invasion of Ukraine</u></strong> <u>rapidly unraveling</u>, Russian President Vladimir <u><strong>Putin</u></strong> <u>has recently resorted to nuclear <strong>saber-rattling</u></strong>. This <u>has caused widespread international <strong>alarm</strong> and is fueling <strong>mounting calls</strong> for</u> Ukraine <u>to reach a <strong><mark>compromise</u></strong></mark> with the Kremlin in order to avert World War III.</p><p><u>The</u> current rush <u>to <strong>appease Moscow</u></strong> is deeply unnerving and <u>reflects a <strong>shortsighted failure</strong> to appreciate the <strong>appalling security implications</strong> of bowing down to <strong>Russian intimidation</u></strong>. <u>Giving in</u> to Putin’s nuclear blackmail <u><mark>would <strong>not</strong> end the war</mark> in Ukraine</u>. What <u>it would</u> do is <u>set a <strong>disastrous precedent</strong> that make</u>s a future <u><strong>nuc</strong>lear <strong>war</u></strong> <u><strong>far more likely</strong> while encouraging <strong>dozens</strong> of <strong>countries</strong> to acquire <strong>nuclear arsenals</strong> of their own</u>.</p><p>Putin first raised the prospect of a nuclear escalation in a September 21 address that saw him announce plans to annex large swathes of occupied Ukrainian territory and launch Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. “I’m not bluffing,” the Russian ruler declared. The following week, he accused the United States of “creating a precedent” by dropping atomic bombs on Japan in 1945 and vowed to use “all means at our disposal,” to defend Ukrainian regions annexed by Russia.</p><p>The Western response has been mixed. US officials have informed the Kremlin that Russia would face “catastrophic consequences” if it moves to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, while EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell has warned Moscow that any nuclear attack would be met with “such a powerful answer that the Russian army will be annihilated.”</p><p>Others have been less forthright, with French President Emmanuel Macron in particular coming under fire for unilaterally ruling out the use of nuclear weapons in response to a Russian nuclear attack on Ukraine. Meanwhile, tech billionaire Elon Musk has been one of numerous high-profile figures to promote Kremlin-friendly peace plans while arguing that the world faces possible nuclear apocalypse unless Ukraine cedes land (and millions of citizens) to Russia.</p><p><u>What comes next will determine the <strong>future role</strong> of <strong>nuclear weapons</u></strong> <u>in</u> <u><strong>i</u></strong>nternational <u><strong>r</u></strong>elations <u>and shape the <strong>security climate</strong> for <strong>decades</strong> to come</u>. <u><mark>If</mark> Russia’s <strong><mark>nuclear threats</strong> succeed</u></mark> <u>and Ukraine</u> is forced to <u>accept partial partition</u>, the entire doctrine of mutually assured destruction (<u><strong><mark>MAD</u></strong></mark>), which served so well throughout the Cold War, <u><mark>will be <strong>torn up</strong></mark> and a <strong>new age</strong> of <strong>instability</strong> will begin</u>.</p><p><u><strong>MAD</u></strong> <u>worked because</u> the two Cold War era <u>superpowers balanced each other out</u>. <u>The <strong>Russia</strong>n invasion of Ukraine is <strong>completely different</u></strong>. <u>We are currently witnessing a <strong><mark>nuclear</strong></mark> super<strong>power</strong> <mark>threatening a <strong>non-nuclear state</strong></mark> precisely <mark>because it has <strong>failed to win</u></strong></mark> a war <u><mark>by conventional</mark> <strong>military <mark>means</u></strong></mark>. <u>The message</u> from Moscow <u>is both menacing and unmistakable: countries with <strong>nuc</strong>lear weapon<strong>s</strong> <strong>cannot be defeated</strong> by those who have <strong>none</u></strong>. <u>This is a recipe for <strong>nuclear prolif</strong>eration</u>.</p><p><u>If Putin is able to rescue his failing invasion</u> and achieve his military goals <u>through</u> the use of <u><strong>nuclear blackmail</u></strong>, <u>it will <mark>spark a <strong>nuclear</mark> arms race</strong> of <strong>unprecedented proportions</u></strong>. <u>A long list of countries</u> including everyone from <u><strong>Iran</u></strong> and <u><strong>Saudi Arabia</u></strong> to <u><strong>Nigeria</u></strong> and <u><strong>So</strong>uth <strong>Ko</strong>rea</u> <u>will take note</u> of the new rules established in Ukraine <u>and <mark>scramble</mark> to join the <strong>nuclear club</u></strong>. Eventually, <u><mark>not having nukes</mark> could come to be seen as an <strong><mark>invit</strong></mark>ation <strong>for <mark>invasion</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>This would be bitterly ironic as Ukraine was once something of a poster child for nuclear non-proliferation. In 1994, Ukraine agreed to hand over what was at the time the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for “security assurances” from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The Budapest Memorandum is now widely recognized as one of the most notorious diplomatic blunders of the modern era. It is a mistake few are eager to repeat. Indeed, given Ukraine’s current predicament, why would any country abandon their own nuclear aspirations in return for empty assurances?</p><p><u>The only way to prevent</u> the world from descending into <u>a dark future of <strong><mark>spiraling nuclear confrontation</strong></mark> is to make sure <strong>Putin fails</u></strong>. His nuclear <u>threats require an overwhelming response spelling out that any atomic aggression in Ukraine would mean defeat and ruin for Russia</u>. There is no longer room for strategic ambiguity or talk of proportional retaliation; Putin must be made to personally understand that neither he nor his regime would survive if he chooses to cross the nuclear red line.</p><p>Many NATO member states will no doubt be deeply uncomfortable with the idea of directly confronting the Kremlin in this manner. Others will warn that such posturing could easily ignite a third world war. These are valid concerns, but there are no longer any risk-free options available. <u>Unless the international community stands up to Putin now, the entire world will be <mark>plunged into</mark> a dangerous new era defined by</u> the <u><strong>constant threat of <mark>nuc</strong></mark>lear <strong><mark>war</strong></mark>fare</u>.</p>

1AC – Schengen Expansion R5

1AC—ADV—Unity

./documents/hsld22/StrakeJesuitCollegePreparatory/AySi/StrakeJesuitCollegePreparatory-AySi-Aff-49th-Harvard-National-Forensics-Tournament-Round-5.docx

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49th Harvard National Forensics Tournament

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Charlotte Latin EL

Heirigs

1AC - Schengen Expansion v2 1NC - Arms CP, Puar K, Case 1AR - All 2NR - Arms CP, Case 2AR - Same

hsld22/StrakeJesuitCollegePreparatory/AySi/StrakeJesuitCollegePreparatory-AySi-Aff-49th-Harvard-National-Forensics-Tournament-Round-5.docx

2023-02-19 15:51:37

AySi

Strake Jesuit College Preparatory AySi

Hey, I'm Ayaan! (he/him) I'm a novice and not really used to wiki norms yet, so please contact me if you have any interps you want me to meet - I will accommodate any disclosure interps if I'm missing anything on my wiki, just please message me first. Contact (best to worst): 1. ayaandebate@gmail.com 2. FB - Ayaan Singh (friend me first) 3. (832)-998-9855

Ay.....

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StrakeJesuitCollegePreparatory

Strake Jesuit College Preparatory

TX

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

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Partisanship is destroying strong international commitments and clear foreign policy objectives, unraveling the American century.

Trubowitz 19

Trubowitz 19 [Peter Trubowitz, Professor of international relations at the London Schol of economics and political science, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/will-dysfunctional-politics-finally-end-american-century#, “Will Dysfunctional Politics Finally end the American Century? ]

America is suffering from a shortage of functional or ‘usable power. the domestic political ability of US presidents to turn the country’s tremendous power and wealth into international influence is declining. This has been the case for some time now. America’s deficit of usable power did not begin with Donald Trump, but it has grown measurably on his watch as president. Presidents’ usable power depends on their ability to win the support of a broad cross-section of the voting public for their foreign policy agenda Historically, presidents have relied on three tools to gain public buy-in: bipartisanship on Capitol Hill, the leader’s ability to set the terms of debate and the design of economically inclusive policies. Today, all three are in short supply. Bipartisanship was the norm in foreign policymaking during the Cold War. Democratic presidents could count on the support of moderate eastern Republicans in Congress; Republican presidents relied on the support of conservative southern Democrats Domestic voters, who worried about presidents’ partisan motives, found such bipartisan support reassuring. So did America’s allies and friends overseas They worried that in the absence of bipartisan support, international commitments taken by one president would be reversed or soft-pedaled when the party out of power gained control of the White House. This is exactly what has happened Foreign policymaking has become increasingly partisan and erratic. Incoming presidents now look for opportunities to undo their predecessors’ legacies, something that rarely happened during the Cold War. George W Bush withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol on climate Barack Obama ended US involvement in Iraq. Donald Trump withdrew the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, pulled out of the Paris Agreement on climate change and renounced the Iran nuclear deal. these examples show decline in America’s willingness to engage and commit internationally as well as in how credible others view its international pronouncements. During the Cold War, presidents enjoyed considerable success in structuring debate over America’s role in the world. The existence of a ‘clear and present danger’ to national security helped by making it possible for to frame the case for creating and sustaining an expansive (and expensive) American-led international order in terms of national security and anti-communism. At the same time, it put internationalism on firm bipartisan footing and gave presidents considerable latitude to advance internationalist causes. Since the end of the Cold War, presidents have struggled to secure domestic support for their foreign policies. In absence of a Soviet-style threat, Bill Clinton, George W Bush and Barack Obama all found their efforts to breathe new life into internationalism buffeted by partisan division and public pressure to ‘do less internationally’

America is suffering from a shortage of usable power. the ability of presidents to turn power into influence usable power depends on ability to win support of broad cross-section three tools : bipartisanship leader’s ability to set debate Bipartisanship was the norm in the Cold War voters , found So did America’s allies in the absence of bipartisan support, international commitments would be reversed Foreign policymaking has become partisan and erratic During the Cold War, presidents enjoyed success in structuring debate over America’s role it put internationalism on firm footing Since the Cold War, presidents have struggled to secure support Clinton Bush Obam found internationalism buffeted by partisan division

America is suffering from a shortage of functional or ‘usable power.’ While relative power as measured by its military arsenal vis-à-vis those of its rivals has held steady, the domestic political ability of US presidents to turn the country’s tremendous power and wealth into international influence is declining. This has been the case for some time now. America’s deficit of usable power did not begin with Donald Trump, but it has grown measurably on his watch as president. Presidents’ usable power depends on their ability to win the support of a broad cross-section of the voting public for their foreign policy agenda. Historically, presidents have relied on three tools to gain public buy-in: bipartisanship on Capitol Hill, the leader’s ability to set the terms of debate and the design of economically inclusive policies. Each contributed mightily to the public consensus underpinning US foreign policy for decades after the Second World War. Today, all three are in short supply. Bipartisanship was the norm in foreign policymaking during the Cold War. Democratic presidents could count on the support of moderate eastern Republicans in Congress; Republican presidents relied on the support of conservative southern Democrats. Domestic voters, who worried about presidents’ partisan motives, found such bipartisan support reassuring. So did America’s allies and friends overseas. They worried that in the absence of bipartisan support, international commitments taken by one president would be reversed or soft-pedaled when the party out of power gained control of the White House. This is exactly what has happened since the end of the Cold War. Foreign policymaking has become increasingly partisan and erratic. Incoming presidents now look for opportunities to undo their predecessors’ legacies, something that rarely happened during the Cold War. George W Bush withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and opposed the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court. Barack Obama ended US involvement in Iraq. Donald Trump withdrew the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, pulled out of the Paris Agreement on climate change and renounced the Iran nuclear deal. US relative power may not have changed much since the 1990s, but these examples show decline in America’s willingness to engage and commit internationally as well as in how credible others view its international pronouncements. If hyper-partisanship has made US commitments worth less internationally, the absence of a shared vision of America’s international purpose has made bipartisanship harder to produce domestically.  To build lasting bipartisan coalitions, presidents must structure the national conversation in ways that convince voters that their administration’s preferred international policies will strengthen national security and increase economic opportunity while making it hard for their political opponents to mount an effective challenge. During the Cold War, presidents enjoyed considerable success in structuring debate over America’s role in the world. The existence of a ‘clear and present danger’ to national security helped by making it possible for to frame the case for creating and sustaining an expansive (and expensive) American-led international order in terms of national security and anti-communism. This formulation contributed to some forms of extremism (such as McCarthyism) and overreach (the Vietnam War). At the same time, it put internationalism on firm bipartisan footing and gave presidents considerable latitude to advance internationalist causes. Since the end of the Cold War, presidents have struggled to secure domestic support for their foreign policies. In absence of a Soviet-style threat, Bill Clinton, George W Bush and Barack Obama all found their efforts to breathe new life into internationalism buffeted by partisan division and public pressure to ‘do less internationally’. Mounting public disillusionment with globalization compounded matters. This disillusionment is related to the problem of (non)inclusive growth.

<h4>Partisanship is destroying strong international commitments and clear foreign policy objectives, unraveling the American century. </h4><p><u><strong>Trubowitz 19</u></strong> [Peter Trubowitz, Professor of international relations at the London Schol of economics and political science, <u>https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/will-dysfunctional-politics-finally-end-american-century#</u>, “Will Dysfunctional Politics Finally end the American Century? ]</p><p><u><strong><mark>America is suffering from a shortage of</mark> functional or ‘<mark>usable power.</u></strong></mark>’ While relative power as measured by its military arsenal vis-à-vis those of its rivals has held steady, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> domestic political <mark>ability of </mark>US<mark> presidents to turn</mark> the country’s tremendous <mark>power</mark> and wealth <mark>into </mark>international <mark>influence </mark>is declining. This has been the case for some time now. America’s deficit of usable power did not begin with Donald Trump, but it has grown measurably on his watch as president.</p><p>Presidents’ <mark>usable power depends on</mark> their <mark>ability to win </mark>the<mark> support of</mark> a <mark>broad cross-section</mark> of the voting public for their foreign policy agenda</u></strong>. <u><strong>Historically, presidents have relied on <mark>three tools</mark> to gain public buy-in<mark>:</mark> <mark>bipartisanship</mark> on Capitol Hill, the <mark>leader’s ability to set</mark> the terms of <mark>debate</mark> and the design of economically inclusive policies.</u></strong> Each contributed mightily to the public consensus underpinning US foreign policy for decades after the Second World War. <u><strong>Today, all three are in short supply. </p><p><mark>Bipartisanship was the norm in</mark> foreign policymaking during <mark>the Cold War</mark>. Democratic presidents could count on the support of moderate eastern Republicans in Congress; Republican presidents relied on the support of conservative southern Democrats</u></strong>. <u><strong>Domestic <mark>voters</mark>, who worried about presidents’ partisan motives<mark>, found</mark> such bipartisan support reassuring.</p><p><mark>So did America’s allies</mark> and friends overseas</u></strong>. <u><strong>They worried that <mark>in the absence of bipartisan support, international commitments</mark> taken by one president <mark>would be reversed </mark>or soft-pedaled when the party out of power gained control of the White House.</p><p>This is exactly what has happened</u></strong> since the end of the Cold War. <u><strong><mark>Foreign policymaking has become </mark>increasingly<mark> partisan and erratic</mark>. Incoming presidents now look for opportunities to undo their predecessors’ legacies, something that rarely happened during the Cold War.</p><p>George W Bush withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol on climate</u></strong> change and opposed the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court. <u><strong>Barack Obama ended US involvement in Iraq. Donald Trump withdrew the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, pulled out of the Paris Agreement on climate change and renounced the Iran nuclear deal. </u></strong>US relative power may not have changed much since the 1990s, but <u><strong>these examples show decline in America’s willingness to engage and commit internationally as well as in how credible others view its international pronouncements.</p><p></u></strong>If hyper-partisanship has made US commitments worth less internationally, the absence of a shared vision of America’s international purpose has made bipartisanship harder to produce domestically.  To build lasting bipartisan coalitions, presidents must structure the national conversation in ways that convince voters that their administration’s preferred international policies will strengthen national security and increase economic opportunity while making it hard for their political opponents to mount an effective challenge.</p><p><u><strong><mark>During the Cold War, presidents enjoyed</mark> considerable <mark>success in structuring debate over America’s role</mark> in the world. The existence of a ‘clear and present danger’ to national security helped by making it possible for to frame the case for creating and sustaining an expansive (and expensive) American-led international order in terms of national security and anti-communism.</p><p></u></strong>This formulation contributed to some forms of extremism (such as McCarthyism) and overreach (the Vietnam War). <u><strong>At the same time, <mark>it put internationalism on firm </mark>bipartisan <mark>footing</mark> and gave presidents considerable latitude to advance internationalist causes.</p><p><mark>Since the</mark> end of the <mark>Cold War, presidents have struggled to secure </mark>domestic <mark>support</mark> for their foreign policies. In absence of a Soviet-style threat, Bill <mark>Clinton</mark>, George W <mark>Bush</mark> and Barack <mark>Obam</mark>a all <mark>found</mark> their efforts to breathe new life into <mark>internationalism buffeted by partisan division </mark>and public pressure to ‘do less internationally’</u></strong>. Mounting public disillusionment with globalization compounded matters. This disillusionment is related to the problem of (non)inclusive growth.</p>

1AC

1AC—Advantage: Partisanship

./documents/hsld20/Kennedy/Ra/Kennedy-Rastogi-Aff-Valley-Round3.docx

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Valley

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Brett Fortier

Tarun Ratnasabapathy

1AC - Heg (US FW 1NC - Sortition CP Referendums PIC No new 2AR justifications Heg bad

hsld20/Kennedy/Ra/Kennedy-Rastogi-Aff-Valley-Round3.docx

KeRa

Kennedy KeRa

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Kennedy

Kennedy

CA

hsld20

HS LD 2020-21

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hs

The CP solves---if we kick it, it’s an alt cause to the AFF---Canadian leadership is the lynchpin of NATO solidarity.

Leuprecht et al. ‘19

Leuprecht et al. ‘19 — Christian Leuprecht (Ph.D, Queen’s) is Class of 1965 Professor in Leadership, Department of Political Science and Economics, Royal Military College and Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defence College in Rome. Joel Sokolsky is Professor, PhD (Harvard); MA (John Hopkins); BA Hons (Toronto), RMC & Political Studies. Jayson Derow is Experienced Research Analyst with a demonstrated history of working in the international affairs and public policy industry. 2019; “Paying it forward: Canada’s renewed commitment to NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence”; International Journal, Volume 74; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //HBisevac & CYang

Canada’s significant contribution to the eFP reflects its role as one of the most militarily capable NATO member states but its rather important role in political messaging and establishing credibility of the operation as a whole By example Canada’s renewal of commitment to Baltic security conveys military capability to inflict substantial costs politically and militarily crucial in signalling allied solidarity Canada lead by example others will follow suit Canada renewal sets the pace for renewal by partners Rather than the US having to corral Canada Canada continues to corral the US making sure the US recommits and stays the course on degree of commitment is unique amongst eFP Framework Nations and signals commitment well beyond rotational elements

Canada’s one of most militarily capable NATO states important establishing credibility of a whole politically and militarily crucial in signalling solidarity Canada lead others follow Canada corral the US making sure the US recommits and stays course on

No surprise, then, that Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, were quick to stick to their policy guns, claiming that what counts is not some arbitrary, hard-to-count, inconsistently applied measure of the portion of national wealth devoted to defence spending, but capacity, capability, and commitments to NATO’s collective defence posture. Canada’s significant contribution to the eFP not only reflects its role as one of the most militarily capable NATO member states, but also its rather important role in political messaging and establishing credibility of the operation as a whole. By example, Canada’s renewal of its commitment to Baltic security conveys the military capability to inflict substantial costs on an adversary, while denying it any ability to quickly achieve its objectives.13 In turn, a key feature of the eFP concept is the multinational character and interoperability capacity of the battlegroups. This is politically and militarily crucial in signalling allied solidarity and enabling burden-sharing.14 In this context, having made clear that it is not about to up its ‘‘fully costed’’ spending on defence, Canada only had capacity, capability, and commitments left to leverage. By renewing early for four years, Canada was looking to lead by example: a sustained commitment to the eFP. The hope is that others will follow suit. Canada and its member state partners in L0061tvia committing early to renewal sets the pace for renewal by Framework Nations and partners in Estonia and Lithuania. Together, these member states are sending a clear signal to the US: an unambiguous commitment to burden-sharing, at least insofar as the eFP is concerned. Rather than the US having to corral Canada to commit, as President Obama did when the Americans were looking for a member state with headquarters capacity to become the Framework Nation in Latvia, Canada continues to corral the US: making sure the US recommits as the eFP Framework Nation for Poland and stays the course on the European Deterrence Initiative, as a way of staying the course on Russia. In a show of additional commitment to the eFP, the Canadian government has signalled its intent to post Canadian Armed Forces personnel and their families to the Canadian Headquarters element in the Baltics to ensure a ‘‘consistent and continuous presence in Latvia.’’15 This degree of commitment is unique amongst eFP Framework Nations and contributing countries, and signals a level of commitment well beyond the rotational elements of the battlegroup.16

<h4>The CP solves---if we kick it, it’s an alt cause to the AFF---Canadian leadership is the lynchpin of NATO solidarity.</h4><p><strong>Leuprecht et al. ‘19</strong> — Christian Leuprecht (Ph.D, Queen’s) is Class of 1965 Professor in Leadership, Department of Political Science and Economics, Royal Military College and Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defence College in Rome. Joel Sokolsky is Professor, PhD (Harvard); MA (John Hopkins); BA Hons (Toronto), RMC & Political Studies. Jayson Derow is Experienced Research Analyst with a demonstrated history of working in the international affairs and public policy industry. 2019; “Paying it forward: Canada’s renewed commitment to NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence”; International Journal, Volume 74; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //HBisevac & CYang</p><p>No surprise, then, that Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, were quick to stick to their policy guns, claiming that what counts is not some arbitrary, hard-to-count, inconsistently applied measure of the portion of national wealth devoted to defence spending, but capacity, capability, and commitments to NATO’s collective defence posture. <u><mark>Canada’s</mark> <strong>significant contribution</strong> to the eFP</u> not only <u>reflects its role as <mark>one of </mark>the <strong><mark>most militarily capable</strong> NATO</mark> member <mark>states</u></mark>, <u>but</u> also <u>its <strong>rather <mark>important</mark> role</strong> in <strong>political messaging</strong> and <strong><mark>establishing credibility</strong> of</mark> the <strong>operation as <mark>a whole</u></strong></mark>. <u>By example</u>, <u>Canada’s renewal of</u> its <u>commitment to Baltic security conveys</u> the <u>military capability to inflict <strong>substantial costs</u></strong> on an adversary, while denying it any ability to quickly achieve its objectives.13 In turn, a key feature of the eFP concept is the multinational character and interoperability capacity of the battlegroups. This is <u><mark>politically and militarily crucial in</mark> <strong><mark>signalling</mark> allied <mark>solidarity</u></strong></mark> and enabling burden-sharing.14 In this context, having made clear that it is not about to up its ‘‘fully costed’’ spending on defence, Canada only had capacity, capability, and commitments left to leverage. By renewing early for four years, <u><mark>Canada</u></mark> was looking to <u><strong><mark>lead</mark> by example</u></strong>: a sustained commitment to the eFP. The hope is that <u><mark>others</mark> <strong>will <mark>follow</strong></mark> suit</u>. <u>Canada</u> and its member state partners in L0061tvia committing early to <u>renewal sets the pace for renewal by</u> Framework Nations and <u>partners</u> in Estonia and Lithuania. Together, these member states are sending a clear signal to the US: an unambiguous commitment to burden-sharing, at least insofar as the eFP is concerned. <u>Rather than the US having to corral Canada</u> to commit, as President Obama did when the Americans were looking for a member state with headquarters capacity to become the Framework Nation in Latvia, <u><mark>Canada</mark> <strong>continues to <mark>corral</strong> the US</u></mark>: <u><mark>making sure the US recommits</u></mark> as the eFP Framework Nation for Poland <u><mark>and stays</mark> the <mark>course on</u></mark> the European Deterrence Initiative, as a way of staying the course on Russia. In a show of additional commitment to the eFP, the Canadian government has signalled its intent to post Canadian Armed Forces personnel and their families to the Canadian Headquarters element in the Baltics to ensure a ‘‘consistent and continuous presence in Latvia.’’15 This <u>degree of commitment is <strong>unique</strong> amongst <strong>eFP Framework Nations</u></strong> and contributing countries, <u>and signals</u> a level of <u>commitment <strong>well beyond</u></strong> the <u>rotational elements</u> of the battlegroup.16</p>

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hspolicy22/RowlandHall/HaGa/RowlandHall-HaGa-Neg-Damus-Hollywood-Invitational-Round-4.docx

2022-12-19 15:13:13

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Protection of water resources secures access for capitalist growth and weaponizes control to create new markets---only through collective struggle against capitalism can water be sustainably protected.

Hill '19

Hill '19 [Meg; 10/6/19; writer for Red Flag, a publication of Socialist Alternative; "Under capitalism, even water is a tool of oppression," https://mronline.org/2019/10/11/under-capitalism-even-water-is-a-tool-of-oppression/]

under capitalism, even water is a tool of social domination. That is the logic of a system of class rule. Capitalism turns material abundance into socially constructed scarcity. No resource–not even water–is exempt from that violent process. Resources like water are commodified and weaponised, through the workings of the market and through state violence. The human need for water makes it a potential weapon for the ruling class opening of new markets and potential profits presupposes dispossession and destruction of traditional forms of property, particularly collective ones Human need for water is a weapon in the service of imperialism and settler colonialism. Water can be not just a commodity, but a means of ethnic cleansing Where the needs of capitalism are met through imperialism and ethnic cleansing, places like Palestine are made deserts Resources are never ordered in accordance with human need under capitalism. While competition and the profit motive reign, rational planning and allocation are inconceivable. So water use is also separated from human need in wealthy places like the US Indigenous people have long been subject to the same brutal processes of dispossession. But capitalist forms of water management developed and spread as the commodity-based economy took control The most recent catalysts for that development have been neoliberalism and climate change. The neoliberal era removed water from the mostly illusory special status News reports of the changes emphasised the differences between Trump and Obama, but they have more in common than not. While measures against some pollution were taken under Obama, his approach was striking a different balance than Trump Obama’s wars over water proved that the ongoing development of capitalism never stops targeting Indigenous populations Capitalism distorts our relationship with every resource, no matter its abundance or its importance to human survival. Those in charge are conscious of how the impending climate crisis affects those needs and are increasingly anxious to protect their control over resources, especially water, Capitalists are increasingly worried both that those they’ve deprived of water will rise up against them, and that the climate catastrophe they’ve created will start to impede their business and security remedies are being experimented with capitalists are hiring firms to protect them and their water supply if we come for it. Others are securing getaway strategies in the meantime, scarcity exacerbated by climate change is driving up water prices, and with them profits, everywhere. if left unchallenged, our enemies can wait out the climate crisis on islands or sustain their rule through violent authoritarianism. The right side of history will win only through a collective struggle to the final victory of humanity Only then can water, nature and our wealth be used for human need and not for social control.

under capitalism water is weaponised, through the market and state a potential weapon for the ruling class opening new markets presupposes dispossession Human need for water is a weapon in service of imperialism and settler colonialism under capitalism. While competition and profit motive reign water use is separated from need capitalist water management developed as the commodity economy took recent catalysts have been neoliberalism and climate change Capitalism distorts our relationship with every resource, no matter its importance to survival left unchallenged, our enemies sustain rule through authoritarianism only through collective struggle can water, nature and wealth be used for need not control

All life depends on water. It covers 71 percent of the Earth’s surface, makes up 60 percent of our bodies and literally falls from the sky. It’s abundant and indispensable. But under capitalism, even water is a tool of social domination. That is the logic of a system of class rule. Capitalism turns material abundance into socially constructed scarcity. No resource–not even water–is exempt from that violent process. Resources like water are commodified and weaponised, through the workings of the market and through state violence. The human need for water makes it a potential weapon for the ruling class. Nigeria: a study in imposed water scarcity Nigeria’s Rivers state is home to the Ogoni people, an ethnic minority in Nigeria. Their dialect has a special term for water that denotes collective ownership–reflecting that it’s seen as a resource to be shared for the benefit of humanity. But the Ogoni were forcibly removed from their traditional water sources through both long-term groundwater pollution by oil companies and state violence and privatisation in the 1990s. By 2012, the lack of drinkable water had become so severe that the Nigerian government declared a “water emergency” and was supplying rationed water to the affected communities. “However, quantities of water supplied both during the water emergency and post-water emergency have been insufficient to prevent water scarcity”, argued a 2018 research article by Victor Ogbonnaya Okorie published in Africa Spectrum. “As a result, residents of the affected communities, including owners of the polluted wells, who were once water-sufficient, became water-insufficient and have been integrated as customers into the burgeoning water market in the region.” The opening of new markets and potential profits presupposes dispossession and destruction of traditional forms of property, particularly collective ones. In Nigeria, the new water market needed more consumers and workers than were provided by dispossession through privatisation. Groundwater pollution provided that extra nudge by rendering the remaining collective water sources poisonous. Ogoni activist Kenule Saro-Wiwa accused the oil companies of practising genocide against his people and led a mass movement against them. Three hundred thousand people marched against the ecological destruction. The response was repression. Saro-Wiwa was executed in 1995 by Nigeria’s military dictatorship. In his “Statement Before Execution”, Saro-Wiwa asserted that the oil companies and the military government were allies in ecological warfare against the Ogoni: “Victory is assessed by profits, and in this sense, Shell’s victory in Ogoni has been total”. Last year, Shell celebrated 60 years of operation in Nigeria. Water privatisation and pollution were the two pillars used to force on the Ogoni a system premised on scarcity. Dr Okorie concluded: “What has eroded as the local wells turn black has been a set of social relations that were enabled by the fact that water was part of the commons and had more than monetary value”. Imperialism and water in Palestine Human need for water is a weapon in the service of imperialism and settler colonialism. Water can be not just a commodity, but a means of ethnic cleansing. In occupied Palestine, Israel-as-oasis is a prominent part of the state’s national mythology. The military occupation, expanding illegal settlements and apartheid are accompanied by assertions that Israel has brought life–human, animal and plant–to what was a barren, inhospitable landscape. Desolate-looking Palestinian villages are contrasted to thriving, green Israeli settlements. Halamish, an Israeli settlement in the occupied West Bank, sits above the Palestinian village of Nabi Saleh. In the documentary Thank God It’s Friday, a Halamish resident is filmed watering her garden while boasting, “There were no birds before we came”. In reality, it’s through violent dispossession–of houses, land, resources and life–that every Israeli settlement is built, and water theft has played a key role in that dispossession. When Palestinians had access to water, their agricultural communities thrived. Israel forced Palestinians off the arable land and took it under Israeli control. Palestinian access to water is increasingly restricted as settlements continue to be built on freshly stolen land. In Nabi Saleh, residents receive 12 hours of running water a week. In Halamish it’s provided 24 hours a day. A huge pool sits as a centrepiece in the settlement, probably filled with water from the village’s water spring that was confiscated for use by the settlement in 2009. Nabi Saleh is under constant siege by the Israeli military, which raids homes, murders civilians and destroys water tanks on the villagers’ roofs. With villagers forced off their land to make way for the Halamish settlement, and with their water spring confiscated, the targeting of water tanks ensures that they are reliant on water provided by the Israeli state. The village and settlement are located within Area C of the West Bank. An Al Jazeera article outlined Israel’s strategy in the area: “The lack of water and other basic services resulting from Israeli policies has created a coercive environment that often leaves Palestinians with no choice but to leave their communities in Area C, allowing Israel’s land takeover and further expansion of its settlements”. But it’s not just Area C. Since Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967, it has instituted water-sharing agreements that force all Palestinians in the region into dependence on Israel. Palestinians have refused to sit on the Joint Water Committee–within which Israel has a veto–since 2010. Water control is a key part of Israel’s ongoing process of dispossession: hence the myth of Palestine as a water-scarce region. The West Bank is not naturally short of water. It’s bordered by the Jordan River and sits above the Mountain Aquifer. United Nations data show that Ramallah gets more rainfall than London. But Israel’s policies ensure that it’s siphoned away from Palestinians. And it’s not just the West Bank. The 2 million Palestinians living in Gaza, the world’s biggest open-air prison, have access to virtually nothing that is not provided by Israel. The United Nations has predicted Gaza could be uninhabitable by 2020, partly due to its water crisis. There is nothing accidental about that crisis. Where the needs of capitalism are met through imperialism and ethnic cleansing, places like Palestine are made deserts. Water in the West Resources are never ordered in accordance with human need under capitalism. While competition and the profit motive reign, rational planning and allocation are inconceivable. So water use is also separated from human need in wealthy places like Australia and the US. Indigenous people in both the U.S. and Australia, more developed capitalist nations than Israel and Nigeria, have long been subject to the same brutal processes of dispossession. But capitalist forms of water management developed and spread as the commodity-based economy took control. The most recent catalysts for that development have been neoliberalism and climate change. The neoliberal era has removed water from the mostly illusory special status offered by state ownership–where a sector or resource is seemingly shielded from market pressures–in the postwar West, while across the world the escalating climate crisis is bringing to a head tensions associated with apparent scarcity. Some light has been shed on the scale of water management corruption in Australia this year by mass fish kills in the Murray-Darling Basin. Although the immediate cause was a toxic algae bloom, there was no hiding the social nature of the disaster: for years water has been systematically pulled from all over the basin for use by agribusiness, leaving downstream communities and the basin itself prone to crisis. Another flash point in Australia is the Adani coal mine. The monstrous project had polluted wetlands in Queensland before it was even approved. Its operations will require billions of litres of groundwater while almost certainly polluting the Great Artesian Basin, the largest of its kind in the world. And Adani, thanks to both the federal and Queensland governments, will get its water for free. For the rest of us, the water that comes out of our taps and that we need to survive comes with a bill. What’s left after priority is given to corporations like Adani is sold to us for profit. Meanwhile, in the US, Trump has just rolled back a mild water reform won under Obama. Regulations to the Clean Water Act established some federal oversight that would lessen the severity of local water pollution. Trump has rescinded those measures to the benefit of a range of profiteers. News reports of the changes have emphasised the differences between Trump and Obama, but they have more in common than not. While measures against some pollution were taken under Obama, his approach was simply striking a different balance than Trump. In fact, Obama’s wars over water proved that the ongoing development of capitalism never stops targeting Indigenous populations. In 2016 the world watched battles between the Native American Sioux and their supporters and the Obama administration over the Dakota Access oil pipeline. One of the major issues was the destruction of the Standing Rock Sioux reservation’s water supply. Under Obama’s watch, the military was sent in to break up a protest camp, dubbed the “water protectors”, of more than 10,000 people. The pipeline, now built, runs for almost 2,000 kilometres. According to the Intercept, it leaked oil at least five times in 2017 alone. Capitalism distorts our relationship with every resource, no matter its abundance or its importance to human survival. Those in charge are conscious of how the impending climate crisis affects those needs and are increasingly anxious to protect their control over resources, especially water, into the tumultuous future. Capitalists are increasingly worried both that those they’ve deprived of water will rise up against them, and that the climate catastrophe they’ve created will start to impede their business and security. A few remedies are being experimented with. Some capitalists are hiring firms of trained killers to protect them and their water supply if we come for it. Others are securing getaway strategies–like buying up remote land in New Zealand complete with the world’s freshest water sources–to wait out the apocalypse. And in the meantime, scarcity exacerbated by climate change is driving up water prices, and with them profits, everywhere. In Nigeria, a walled city is being built off the country’s coast to shelter the rich and powerful in the event of a climate apocalypse. The project is bankrolled by the Chagoury Group. Its founder, Gilbert Chagoury, was a Nigerian billionaire and adviser to the dictatorship that murdered Kenule Saro-Wiwa. Before he was executed, Saro-Wiwa said that history would put his murderers on trial. But if left unchallenged, our enemies can wait out the climate crisis on islands or sustain their rule through violent authoritarianism. The right side of history will win only through a collective struggle to the final victory of humanity over the rule of profit. Only then can water, nature and our wealth be used for human need and not for social control.

<h4>Protection of water resources <u>secures access</u> for capitalist growth and <u>weaponizes control</u> to <u>create new markets</u>---only through <u>collective struggle</u> against capitalism can water be <u>sustainably protected</u>.</h4><p><strong>Hill '19 </strong>[Meg; 10/6/19; writer for Red Flag, a publication of Socialist Alternative; "Under capitalism, even water is a tool of oppression," https://mronline.org/2019/10/11/under-capitalism-even-water-is-a-tool-of-oppression/]</p><p>All life depends on water. It covers 71 percent of the Earth’s surface, makes up 60 percent of our bodies and literally falls from the sky. It’s abundant and indispensable. But <u><mark>under <strong>capitalism</strong></mark>, even <strong><mark>water</strong> is</mark> a <strong>tool</strong> of social domination. That is the <strong>logic</strong> of a system of <strong>class rule</strong>. Capitalism turns <strong>material abundance</strong> into socially <strong>constructed scarcity</strong>. No resource–not even water–is exempt from that <strong>violent process</strong>. Resources like water are <strong>commodified</strong> and <strong><mark>weaponised</strong>, through</mark> the workings of <mark>the <strong>market</strong> and</mark> through <strong><mark>state</mark> violence</strong>. The human need for water makes it <mark>a <strong>potential weapon</strong> for the <strong>ruling class</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Nigeria: a study in imposed water scarcity</p><p>Nigeria’s Rivers state is home to the Ogoni people, an ethnic minority in Nigeria. Their dialect has a special term for water that denotes collective ownership–reflecting that it’s seen as a resource to be shared for the benefit of humanity. But the Ogoni were forcibly removed from their traditional water sources through both long-term groundwater pollution by oil companies and state violence and privatisation in the 1990s. By 2012, the lack of drinkable water had become so severe that the Nigerian government declared a “water emergency” and was supplying rationed water to the affected communities.</p><p>“However, quantities of water supplied both during the water emergency and post-water emergency have been insufficient to prevent water scarcity”, argued a 2018 research article by Victor Ogbonnaya Okorie published in Africa Spectrum. “As a result, residents of the affected communities, including owners of the polluted wells, who were once water-sufficient, became water-insufficient and have been integrated as customers into the burgeoning water market in the region.”</p><p>The <u><mark>opening</mark> of <strong><mark>new markets</strong></mark> and <strong>potential profits</strong> <mark>presupposes <strong>dispossession</strong></mark> and <strong>destruction</strong> of traditional forms of property, particularly collective ones</u>. In Nigeria, the new water market needed more consumers and workers than were provided by dispossession through privatisation. Groundwater pollution provided that extra nudge by rendering the remaining collective water sources poisonous.</p><p>Ogoni activist Kenule Saro-Wiwa accused the oil companies of practising genocide against his people and led a mass movement against them. Three hundred thousand people marched against the ecological destruction. The response was repression. Saro-Wiwa was executed in 1995 by Nigeria’s military dictatorship. In his “Statement Before Execution”, Saro-Wiwa asserted that the oil companies and the military government were allies in ecological warfare against the Ogoni: “Victory is assessed by profits, and in this sense, Shell’s victory in Ogoni has been total”. Last year, Shell celebrated 60 years of operation in Nigeria.</p><p>Water privatisation and pollution were the two pillars used to force on the Ogoni a system premised on scarcity. Dr Okorie concluded: “What has eroded as the local wells turn black has been a set of social relations that were enabled by the fact that water was part of the commons and had more than monetary value”.</p><p>Imperialism and water in Palestine</p><p><u><mark>Human need for water is a <strong>weapon</strong> in</mark> the <mark>service of <strong>imperialism</strong> and <strong>settler colonialism</strong></mark>. Water can be not just a commodity, but a means of <strong>ethnic cleansing</u></strong>. In occupied Palestine, Israel-as-oasis is a prominent part of the state’s national mythology. The military occupation, expanding illegal settlements and apartheid are accompanied by assertions that Israel has brought life–human, animal and plant–to what was a barren, inhospitable landscape. Desolate-looking Palestinian villages are contrasted to thriving, green Israeli settlements.</p><p>Halamish, an Israeli settlement in the occupied West Bank, sits above the Palestinian village of Nabi Saleh. In the documentary Thank God It’s Friday, a Halamish resident is filmed watering her garden while boasting, “There were no birds before we came”. In reality, it’s through violent dispossession–of houses, land, resources and life–that every Israeli settlement is built, and water theft has played a key role in that dispossession. When Palestinians had access to water, their agricultural communities thrived. Israel forced Palestinians off the arable land and took it under Israeli control. Palestinian access to water is increasingly restricted as settlements continue to be built on freshly stolen land.</p><p>In Nabi Saleh, residents receive 12 hours of running water a week. In Halamish it’s provided 24 hours a day. A huge pool sits as a centrepiece in the settlement, probably filled with water from the village’s water spring that was confiscated for use by the settlement in 2009.</p><p>Nabi Saleh is under constant siege by the Israeli military, which raids homes, murders civilians and destroys water tanks on the villagers’ roofs. With villagers forced off their land to make way for the Halamish settlement, and with their water spring confiscated, the targeting of water tanks ensures that they are reliant on water provided by the Israeli state.</p><p>The village and settlement are located within Area C of the West Bank. An Al Jazeera article outlined Israel’s strategy in the area: “The lack of water and other basic services resulting from Israeli policies has created a coercive environment that often leaves Palestinians with no choice but to leave their communities in Area C, allowing Israel’s land takeover and further expansion of its settlements”.</p><p>But it’s not just Area C. Since Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967, it has instituted water-sharing agreements that force all Palestinians in the region into dependence on Israel. Palestinians have refused to sit on the Joint Water Committee–within which Israel has a veto–since 2010. Water control is a key part of Israel’s ongoing process of dispossession: hence the myth of Palestine as a water-scarce region. The West Bank is not naturally short of water. It’s bordered by the Jordan River and sits above the Mountain Aquifer. United Nations data show that Ramallah gets more rainfall than London. But Israel’s policies ensure that it’s siphoned away from Palestinians.</p><p>And it’s not just the West Bank. The 2 million Palestinians living in Gaza, the world’s biggest open-air prison, have access to virtually nothing that is not provided by Israel. The United Nations has predicted Gaza could be uninhabitable by 2020, partly due to its water crisis.</p><p>There is nothing accidental about that crisis. <u>Where the <strong>needs</strong> of capitalism are met through <strong>imperialism</strong> and <strong>ethnic cleansing</strong>, places like Palestine are <strong>made deserts</u></strong>.</p><p>Water in the West</p><p><u>Resources are never ordered in accordance with <strong>human need</strong> <mark>under capitalism. While <strong>competition</strong> and</mark> the <strong><mark>profit motive</strong> reign</mark>, <strong>rational planning</strong> and <strong>allocation</strong> are <strong>inconceivable</strong>. So <mark>water use is</mark> also <strong><mark>separated from</mark> human <mark>need</strong></mark> in wealthy places like</u> Australia and <u>the US</u>.</p><p><u>Indigenous people</u> in both the U.S. and Australia, more developed capitalist nations than Israel and Nigeria, <u>have long been subject to the same brutal processes of dispossession. But <mark>capitalist </mark>forms of <strong><mark>water management</strong> developed</mark> and spread <mark>as the <strong>commodity</mark>-based <mark>economy</strong> took</mark> control</u>.</p><p><u>The most <strong><mark>recent catalysts</strong></mark> for that development <mark>have been <strong>neoliberalism</strong> and <strong>climate change</strong></mark>. The neoliberal era</u> has <u>removed water from the mostly illusory special status</u> offered by state ownership–where a sector or resource is seemingly shielded from market pressures–in the postwar West, while across the world the escalating climate crisis is bringing to a head tensions associated with apparent scarcity.</p><p>Some light has been shed on the scale of water management corruption in Australia this year by mass fish kills in the Murray-Darling Basin. Although the immediate cause was a toxic algae bloom, there was no hiding the social nature of the disaster: for years water has been systematically pulled from all over the basin for use by agribusiness, leaving downstream communities and the basin itself prone to crisis.</p><p>Another flash point in Australia is the Adani coal mine. The monstrous project had polluted wetlands in Queensland before it was even approved. Its operations will require billions of litres of groundwater while almost certainly polluting the Great Artesian Basin, the largest of its kind in the world. And Adani, thanks to both the federal and Queensland governments, will get its water for free. For the rest of us, the water that comes out of our taps and that we need to survive comes with a bill. What’s left after priority is given to corporations like Adani is sold to us for profit.</p><p>Meanwhile, in the US, Trump has just rolled back a mild water reform won under Obama. Regulations to the Clean Water Act established some federal oversight that would lessen the severity of local water pollution. Trump has rescinded those measures to the benefit of a range of profiteers. <u>News reports of the changes</u> have <u>emphasised the differences between Trump and Obama, but they have <strong>more in common than not</strong>. While measures against some pollution were taken under Obama, his approach was</u> simply <u>striking a different balance than Trump</u>.</p><p>In fact, <u>Obama’s <strong>wars over water</strong> proved that the <strong>ongoing development</strong> of <strong>capitalism</strong> never stops targeting Indigenous populations</u>. In 2016 the world watched battles between the Native American Sioux and their supporters and the Obama administration over the Dakota Access oil pipeline. One of the major issues was the destruction of the Standing Rock Sioux reservation’s water supply. Under Obama’s watch, the military was sent in to break up a protest camp, dubbed the “water protectors”, of more than 10,000 people. The pipeline, now built, runs for almost 2,000 kilometres. According to the Intercept, it leaked oil at least five times in 2017 alone.</p><p><u><mark>Capitalism <strong>distorts our relationship</strong> with <strong>every resource</strong>, no matter</mark> its <strong>abundance</strong> or <mark>its <strong>importance</strong> to</mark> <strong>human <mark>survival</strong></mark>. Those in charge are conscious of how the impending climate crisis affects those needs and are <strong>increasingly anxious</strong> to <strong>protect their control</strong> over resources, especially water,</u> into the tumultuous future. <u>Capitalists are <strong>increasingly worried</strong> both that <strong>those they’ve deprived</strong> of water will <strong>rise up against them</strong>, and that the <strong>climate catastrophe</strong> they’ve created will start to <strong>impede</strong> their <strong>business</strong> and <strong>security</u></strong>. A few <u>remedies are being experimented with</u>. Some <u>capitalists are hiring firms</u> of trained killers <u>to <strong>protect them</strong> and their <strong>water supply</strong> if we come for it. Others are securing <strong>getaway strategies</u></strong>–like buying up remote land in New Zealand complete with the world’s freshest water sources–to wait out the apocalypse. And <u>in the meantime, scarcity exacerbated by climate change is driving up water prices, and with them profits, everywhere.</p><p></u>In Nigeria, a walled city is being built off the country’s coast to shelter the rich and powerful in the event of a climate apocalypse. The project is bankrolled by the Chagoury Group. Its founder, Gilbert Chagoury, was a Nigerian billionaire and adviser to the dictatorship that murdered Kenule Saro-Wiwa. Before he was executed, Saro-Wiwa said that history would put his murderers on trial. But <u>if <strong><mark>left unchallenged</strong>, our enemies</mark> can <strong>wait out the climate crisis</strong> on islands or <strong><mark>sustain</mark> their <mark>rule</strong> through</mark> <strong>violent <mark>authoritarianism</strong></mark>. The right side of history will <strong>win <mark>only through</mark> a <mark>collective struggle</strong></mark> to the <strong>final victory</strong> of humanity</u> over the rule of profit. <u>Only then <mark>can <strong>water</strong>, <strong>nature</strong> and</mark> our <strong><mark>wealth</strong> be used for</mark> <strong>human <mark>need</strong></mark> and <mark>not</mark> for social <mark>control</mark>.</p></u>

1NC Round 1 GDS

OFF

1NC—OFF

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2 - Georgetown Day School

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Unionville WP

Joseph Tierney

1AC - CAFOs 1NC - T-Utilities v1 P-ASPEC v2 DA-Infrastructure v2 CP-NEPA v3 K-Capitalism v1 2NC - Capitalism K v1 1NR - T-Utilities v1 2NR - T-Utilities v1

hspolicy21/PineCrestSchool/YaGr/Pine%20Crest%20School-Yatak-Greenberg-Neg-2%20-%20Georgetown%20Day%20School-Round1.docx

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Topical fairness requirements are key to meaningful dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

Galloway 7

Ryan Galloway 7, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007

Debate as a dialogue The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative When competitive equity suffers However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue Far from a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation a case might defend neither state nor action yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy

Debate as a dialogue is set by topic requirements When competitive equity suffers it denies the personhood of the other participant this is a fundamental condition of dialogue Far from a banal request for links fairness is a demand for respect that months of preparation not be silenced. cases that suspend fairness exclude strategies one side comes unable to participate Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation a case might defend neither state nor action yet claim to be germane to the topic the aff subverts any meaningful role to the neg undermining the value of exchange Germaneness and substitutes for topical action do not accrue dialogical benefits

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.

<h4>Topical fairness requirements are key to <u>meaningful</u> dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and <u>subverts any meaningful neg role</h4><p></u>Ryan<strong> Galloway 7</strong>, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007</p><p><u><mark>Debate as a dialogue </u></mark>sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. <u>The affirmative side <mark>is set by </mark>the <mark>topic </mark>and fairness <mark>requirements</u></mark>. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ <u>Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative</u>. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ <u><mark>When </u></mark>one side takes more than its share,<u> <mark>competitive equity suffers</u></mark>. <u>However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, <mark>it </mark>fundamentally <strong><mark>denies the personhood of the other participant</u></strong></mark> (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). <u>A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes <mark>this</mark> respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair<mark> is a fundamental condition of </mark>a <mark>dialogue</mark> </u>that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. <u><strong><mark>Far from</strong> </u></mark>being<u> <strong><mark>a banal request for links</strong> </mark>to a disadvantage, <mark>fairness is a demand for respect</mark>, a demand to be heard, a demand <mark>that</mark> a voice backed by literally months upon <strong><mark>months of preparation</strong></mark>, research, and critical thinking<mark> not be silenced</u>.</mark>¶ <u>Affirmative <mark>cases that suspend </mark>basic <mark>fairness</mark> norms <strong>operate to <mark>exclude</strong> </mark>particular negative <mark>strategies</mark>. Unprepared, <mark>one side comes</mark> to the argumentative table <mark>unable to </mark>meaningfully <mark>participate </mark>in a dialogue.</u> <u>They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power</u> (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ <u>Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions</u>. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because <u>it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions</u> (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ <u><strong><mark>Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation</strong></mark> </u>(Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, <u><mark>a</u></mark>n affirmative<u> <mark>case</u></mark> on the 2007-2008 college topic <u><mark>might defend neither state nor</mark> </u>international <u><mark>action </u></mark>in the Middle East, and<u><mark> <strong>yet claim to be germane to the topic</strong></mark> in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions </u>in the international arena <u>are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response,<mark> the aff</mark>irmative <strong><mark>subverts any meaningful role to the neg</strong></mark>ative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and <mark>undermining the value of </mark>a meaningful <mark>exchange</mark> of speech acts. <strong><mark>Germaneness and</mark> other <mark>substitutes for topical action do not accrue </mark>the <mark>dialogical benefits</strong></mark> of topical advocacy</u>.</p>

1NR

FW

Impact

./documents/ndtceda14/Northwestern/OBWo/Northwestern-OBrien-Worku-Neg-Harvard-Round7.docx

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Harvard

7

Texas CM

Kevin Hirn

1NC T Legalize and US and Sale Worker Protections CP Biotech and HC Costs DA Case 2NR CP and DA

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Stable U.S. ag key to prevent great power wars—multiple hotspots

Castellaw 17

Castellaw 17 (John – 36-year veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps and the Founder and CEO of Farmspace Systems LLC, “Opinion: Food Security Strategy Is Essential to Our National Security,” 5/1/17, https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/9203-opinion-food-security-strategy-is-essential-to-our-national-security)

The United States faces many threats to our National Security. These threats include continuing wars with extremist elements such as ISIS and potential wars with rogue state North Korea or regional nuclear power Iran. The heated economic and diplomatic competition with Russia and a surging China could spiral out of control. An American Food Security Strategy is an imperative factor in reducing the multiple threats impacting our National wellbeing. Recent history has shown that reliable food supplies and stable prices produce more stable and secure countries. Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to instability, unrest, and violence. Food insecurity drives mass migration around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, destabilizing neighboring populations, generating conflicts, and threatening our own security by disrupting our economic, military, and diplomatic relationships. Food system shocks from extreme food-price volatility can be correlated with protests and riots. Rising income, in addition to reducing the opportunities for an upsurge in extremism, leads to changes in diet, producing demand for more diverse and nutritious foods provided, in many cases, from American farmers and ranchers. Emerging markets currently purchase 20 percent of U.S. agriculture exports and that figure is expected to grow as populations boom. these situations deteriorate into shooting wars Our active support for food security, including agriculture development, has helped stabilize key regions over the past 60 years. A robust food security strategy, as a part of our overall security strategy, can mitigate the growth of terrorism, build important relationships, and support continued American economic and agricultural prosperity while materially contributing to our Nation’s and the world’s security.

The U S faces threats such as ISIS and wars with North Korea or Iran. competition with Russia and China could spiral out of control. reliable food supplies and stable prices produce stable countries. Food insecurity drives mass migration generating conflicts disrupting economic, military, and diplomatic relationships. Rising income producing demand for foods provided from American farmers Emerging markets purchase 20 percent of U.S. ag exports and that is expected to grow these deteriorate into shooting wars

The United States faces many threats to our National Security. These threats include continuing wars with extremist elements such as ISIS and potential wars with rogue state North Korea or regional nuclear power Iran. The heated economic and diplomatic competition with Russia and a surging China could spiral out of control. Concurrently, we face threats to our future security posed by growing civil strife, famine, and refugee and migration challenges which create incubators for extremist and anti-American government factions. Our response cannot be one dimensional but instead must be a nuanced and comprehensive National Security Strategy combining all elements of National Power including a Food Security Strategy. An American Food Security Strategy is an imperative factor in reducing the multiple threats impacting our National wellbeing. Recent history has shown that reliable food supplies and stable prices produce more stable and secure countries. Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to instability, unrest, and violence. Food insecurity drives mass migration around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, destabilizing neighboring populations, generating conflicts, and threatening our own security by disrupting our economic, military, and diplomatic relationships. Food system shocks from extreme food-price volatility can be correlated with protests and riots. Food price related protests toppled governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and grievances related to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings. Repeatedly, history has taught us that a strong agricultural sector is an unquestionable requirement for inclusive and sustainable growth, broad-based development progress, and long-term stability. The impact can be remarkable and far reaching. Rising income, in addition to reducing the opportunities for an upsurge in extremism, leads to changes in diet, producing demand for more diverse and nutritious foods provided, in many cases, from American farmers and ranchers. Emerging markets currently purchase 20 percent of U.S. agriculture exports and that figure is expected to grow as populations boom. Moving early to ensure stability in strategically significant regions requires long term planning and a disciplined, thoughtful strategy. To combat current threats and work to prevent future ones, our national leadership must employ the entire spectrum of our power including diplomatic, economic, and cultural elements. The best means to prevent future chaos and the resulting instability is positive engagement addressing the causes of instability before it occurs. This is not rocket science. We know where the instability is most likely to occur. The world population will grow by 2.5 billion people by 2050. Unfortunately, this massive population boom is projected to occur primarily in the most fragile and food insecure countries. This alarming math is not just about total numbers. Projections show that the greatest increase is in the age groups most vulnerable to extremism. There are currently 200 million people in Africa between the ages of 15 and 24, with that number expected to double in the next 30 years. Already, 60% of the unemployed in Africa are young people. Too often these situations deteriorate into shooting wars requiring the deployment of our military forces. We should be continually mindful that the price we pay for committing military forces is measured in our most precious national resource, the blood of those who serve. For those who live in rural America, this has a disproportionate impact. Fully 40% of those who serve in our military come from the farms, ranches, and non-urban communities that make up only 16% of our population. Actions taken now to increase agricultural sector jobs can provide economic opportunity and stability for those unemployed youths while helping to feed people. A recent report by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs identifies agriculture development as the core essential for providing greater food security, economic growth, and population well-being. Our active support for food security, including agriculture development, has helped stabilize key regions over the past 60 years. A robust food security strategy, as a part of our overall security strategy, can mitigate the growth of terrorism, build important relationships, and support continued American economic and agricultural prosperity while materially contributing to our Nation’s and the world’s security.

<h4>Stable U.S. ag key to prevent great power wars—multiple hotspots</h4><p><strong>Castellaw 17<u></strong> (John – 36-year veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps and the Founder and CEO of Farmspace Systems LLC, “Opinion: Food Security Strategy Is Essential to Our National Security,” 5/1/17, https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/9203-opinion-food-security-strategy-is-essential-to-our-national-security)</p><p><mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>faces</mark> many <mark>threats</mark> to our National Security. These threats include continuing wars with extremist elements <mark>such as <strong>ISIS</strong> and</mark> potential <mark>wars with</mark> rogue state <strong><mark>North Korea</strong> or</mark> regional nuclear power <strong><mark>Iran.</u></strong></mark> <u>The heated economic and diplomatic <mark>competition with <strong>Russia</strong> and</mark> a surging <strong><mark>China</strong> could spiral out of control.</u></mark> Concurrently, we face threats to our future security posed by growing civil strife, famine, and refugee and migration challenges which create incubators for extremist and anti-American government factions. Our response cannot be one dimensional but instead must be a nuanced and comprehensive National Security Strategy combining all elements of National Power including a Food Security Strategy. <u>An <strong>American Food Security Strategy</strong> is an imperative factor in <strong>reducing the multiple threats impacting our National wellbeing.</u></strong> <u>Recent history has shown that <strong><mark>reliable food supplies and stable prices produce</mark> more <mark>stable</mark> and secure <mark>countries.</strong></mark> Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to instability, unrest, and violence. <strong><mark>Food insecurity</strong> drives mass migration</mark> around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, destabilizing neighboring populations, <strong><mark>generating conflicts</strong></mark>, and threatening our own security by <mark>disrupting</mark> our <mark>economic, military, and diplomatic relationships.</u></mark> <u>Food system shocks from extreme food-price volatility can be correlated with protests and riots.</u> Food price related protests toppled governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and grievances related to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings. Repeatedly, history has taught us that a strong agricultural sector is an unquestionable requirement for inclusive and sustainable growth, broad-based development progress, and long-term stability. The impact can be remarkable and far reaching. <u><mark>Rising income</mark>, in addition to reducing the opportunities for an upsurge in extremism, leads to changes in diet, <mark>producing demand for</mark> more diverse and nutritious <mark>foods provided</mark>, in many cases, <mark>from <strong>American farmers</strong></mark> and ranchers.</u> <u><strong><mark>Emerging markets</strong></mark> currently <mark>purchase 20 percent of U.S. ag</mark>riculture <mark>exports and that</mark> figure <mark>is <strong>expected to grow</strong></mark> as populations boom. </u>Moving early to ensure stability in strategically significant regions requires long term planning and a disciplined, thoughtful strategy. To combat current threats and work to prevent future ones, our national leadership must employ the entire spectrum of our power including diplomatic, economic, and cultural elements. The best means to prevent future chaos and the resulting instability is positive engagement addressing the causes of instability before it occurs. This is not rocket science. We know where the instability is most likely to occur. The world population will grow by 2.5 billion people by 2050. Unfortunately, this massive population boom is projected to occur primarily in the most fragile and food insecure countries. This alarming math is not just about total numbers. Projections show that the greatest increase is in the age groups most vulnerable to extremism. There are currently 200 million people in Africa between the ages of 15 and 24, with that number expected to double in the next 30 years. Already, 60% of the unemployed in Africa are young people. Too often <u><strong><mark>these</mark> situations <mark>deteriorate into shooting wars</u></strong></mark> requiring the deployment of our military forces. We should be continually mindful that the price we pay for committing military forces is measured in our most precious national resource, the blood of those who serve. For those who live in rural America, this has a disproportionate impact. Fully 40% of those who serve in our military come from the farms, ranches, and non-urban communities that make up only 16% of our population. Actions taken now to increase agricultural sector jobs can provide economic opportunity and stability for those unemployed youths while helping to feed people. A recent report by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs identifies agriculture development as the core essential for providing greater food security, economic growth, and population well-being. <u>Our active support for food security, including agriculture development, has helped stabilize key regions over the past 60 years. A robust food security strategy, as a part of our overall security strategy, can mitigate the growth of terrorism, build important relationships, and support continued American economic and agricultural prosperity while materially contributing to our Nation’s and the world’s security.</p></u>

Off

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Wake Forest

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Mary WashingtonMinnesota HK

Derek Hiligoss

1ac- trade Energy Econ 1nc- ESR CP Farm Bill LNG on case Pres Powers Fem K 2nr- Fem K

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Refusing a telos-driven politics in favor of proliferating refusal is a disaster they assume a transformative potential from everyday moments of resistance that simply does not exist

Reed 16

Reed 16 [Adolph, Jr., Prof. of Political Science @ Penn., “Splendors and Miseries of the Antiracist “Left”” Nonsite, http://nonsite.org/editorial/splendors-and-miseries-of-the-antiracist-left-2]

a decade and a half ago I criticized infrapolitics understood as the domain of pre-political acts of everyday “resistance undertaken by subordinated populations, which was then all the rage in cultural studies Proponents of the political importance of this domain insisted that, because insurgent movements emerge within such cultures of quotidian resistance examining them could help in understanding the processes through which insurgencies develop and/or they therefore ought to be considered as expressions of an insurgent politics themselves Several factors accounted for the popularity of that version of the argument, which mainly had to do to with the political economy of academic life, including the self-propulsion of academic trendiness and the atrophy of the left outside the academy, which encouraged flights into fantasy for the sake of optimism. infrapolitics resonated with the substantive but generally unadmitted group essentialism underlying claims that esoteric insider knowledge is necessary to decipher the “hidden transcripts of the subordinate populations elevating infrapolitics to the domain on which the oppressed express their politics most authentically increased its interpreters’ academic capital.8 those who romanticize everyday resistance read the evolution of political movements teleologically they presume that those conditions necessarily, or even typically, lead to political action They don’t Not any more than the presence of carbon and water necessarily leads to the Homo sapiens Think about it: infrapolitics is ubiquitous, developed political movements are rare

infrapolitics as pre-political acts all the rage in cultural studies Proponents insisted that movements emerge within resistance examining could help in understanding insurgencies develop and ought to be expressions of politics themselves. trendiness and the atrophy of the left encouraged flights into fantasy infrapolitics resonated with group essentialism claims that insider knowledge is necessary to decipher subordinate populations those who romanticize everyday resistance read movements teleologically they presume conditions lead to political action. They don’t any more than carbon and water leads to Homo sapiens infrapolitics is ubiquitous, developed movements are rare

More than a decade and a half ago I criticized similar formulations of a notion of “infrapolitics,” understood as the domain of pre-political acts of everyday “resistance” undertaken by subordinated populations, which was then all the rage in cultural studies programs. Proponents of the political importance of this domain insisted that, because insurgent movements emerge within such cultures of quotidian resistance, a) examining them could help in understanding the processes through which insurgencies develop and/or b) they therefore ought to be considered as expressions of an insurgent politics themselves. Several factors accounted for the popularity of that version of the argument, which mainly had to do to with the political economy of academic life, including the self-propulsion of academic trendiness and the atrophy of the left outside the academy, which encouraged flights into fantasy for the sake of optimism. The infrapolitics idea also resonated with the substantive but generally unadmitted group essentialism underlying claims that esoteric, insider knowledge is necessary to decipher the “hidden transcripts” of the subordinate populations; put more bluntly, elevating infrapolitics to the domain on which the oppressed express their politics most authentically increased its interpreters’ academic capital.8 I discussed those factors in my critique. However, the point in that argument most pertinent for evaluating Birch and Heideman’s confidence that the contradictions they acknowledge in BLM should be seen only as growing pains of a “new movement” is the following: At best, those who romanticize “everyday resistance” or “cultural politics” read the evolution of political movements teleologically; they presume that those conditions necessarily, or even typically, lead to political action. They don’t. Not any more than the presence of carbon and water necessarily leads to the evolution of Homo sapiens. Think about it: infrapolitics is ubiquitous, developed political movements are rare.9

<h4>Refusing a telos-driven politics in favor of <u>proliferating</u> refusal is a <u>disaster</u> they assume a <u>transformative potential</u> from <u>everyday moments of resistance</u> that simply does not exist</h4><p><strong>Reed 16</strong> [Adolph, Jr., Prof. of Political Science @ Penn., “Splendors and Miseries of the Antiracist “Left”” Nonsite, http://nonsite.org/editorial/splendors-and-miseries-of-the-antiracist-left-2]</p><p>More than <u>a decade and a half ago I criticized</u> similar formulations of a notion of “<u><strong><mark>infrapolitics</u></strong></mark>,” <u>understood <mark>as</mark> the domain of <strong><mark>pre-political acts</u></strong></mark> <u>of everyday “<strong>resistance</u></strong>” <u>undertaken by subordinated populations, which was then <mark>all the rage in <strong>cultural studies</strong></mark> </u>programs. <u><mark>Proponents</mark> of the political importance of this domain <mark>insisted that</mark>, because insurgent <mark>movements emerge within</mark> such <strong>cultures</strong> of quotidian <strong><mark>resistance</u></strong></mark>, a) <u><mark>examining</mark> them <mark>could help in <strong>understanding</u></strong></mark> <u>the processes through which</u> <u><strong><mark>insurgencies develop</u></strong> <u>and</mark>/or</u> b) <u>they therefore <mark>ought to be</mark> considered as <strong><mark>expressions</strong> of</mark> an <strong>insurgent <mark>politics themselves</u></strong>.</mark> <u>Several factors accounted for the popularity of that version of the argument, which mainly had to do to with the political economy of academic life, including the self-propulsion of <strong>academic <mark>trendiness</u></strong> <u>and the</u> <u><strong>atrophy</u></strong> <u>of the left</mark> outside the academy, which <mark>encouraged</u> <u><strong>flights into fantasy</u></strong></mark> <u>for the sake of optimism.</u> The <u><strong><mark>infrapolitics</u></strong></mark> idea also <u><mark>resonated with</mark> the substantive but generally unadmitted <strong><mark>group essentialism</strong></mark> underlying <mark>claims</u> <u>that</mark> <strong>esoteric</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>insider knowledge</u></strong> <u>is necessary to decipher</mark> the “<strong>hidden transcripts</u></strong>” <u>of the <strong><mark>subordinate populations</u></strong></mark>; put more bluntly, <u>elevating infrapolitics to the domain on which the oppressed express their politics most authentically increased its <strong>interpreters’ academic capital</strong>.8 </u>I discussed those factors in my critique. However, the point in that argument most pertinent for evaluating Birch and Heideman’s confidence that the contradictions they acknowledge in BLM should be seen only as growing pains of a “new movement” is the following: At best, <u><mark>those who romanticize</u></mark> “<u><strong><mark>everyday resistance</u></strong></mark>” or “cultural politics” <u><mark>read</mark> the evolution of political <mark>movements</u> <u><strong>teleologically</u></strong></mark>; <u><mark>they presume</mark> that those <mark>conditions</mark> necessarily, or even typically, <mark>lead to political action</u>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>They don’t</u></strong></mark>. <u>Not <mark>any more than</mark> the presence of <strong><mark>carbon</strong> and <strong>water</strong></mark> necessarily <mark>leads to</mark> the</u> evolution of <u><strong><mark>Homo sapiens</u></strong></mark>. <u>Think about it: <mark>infrapolitics is ubiquitous, <strong>developed</strong></mark> political <strong><mark>movements are rare</u></strong></mark>.9</p>

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Disads are systematically underestimated in debates.

Wiener 16

Wiener 16 – Jonathan B. Wiener, Law and Public Policy Professor at Duke University, University Fellow at the Resources for the Future, Past President of the Society for Risk Analysis, the scientific committee member at the International Risk Governance Council. [The Tragedy of the Uncommons: On the Politics of Apocalypse, Global Policy, 7(S1): Too Big to Handle: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Question of Why Societies Ignore Looming Disasters, 6-6-16, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12319]//BPS

that rare risks outweigh other risks depends on their probability and consequence compared to other risks the appropriate response will depend on policy options Research in psychology and political economy indicates why extreme mega‐catastrophic risks are systematically neglected. Here I seek to bring greater clarity to the causes of rare catastrophic uncommons risks by identifying three main sources. Unavailability Extensive research shows people exhibit heightened concern about risks that are ‘available’ to the mind ‘available’ risks are seen as more worrisome for the future The ‘availability heuristic’ helps explain why people express greater concern about airplane accidents than automobile accidents, even though the statistical risk of airplane accidents is lower difference in perspectives corresponds to debates commenters suggested the public exhibits exaggerated paranoia about remote risks This may be the case for unusual but experienced events that are ‘available’ in the public mind and induce strong feelings such as dread But with regard to ultra‐low‐frequency catastrophic risks, events that perhaps only occur once in eons, and are not experienced it is experts, applying their quantitative methods while the public seems less interested if it takes these extreme risks seriously at all ‘tragedies of the uncommons’ add a twist to the typical debate It predicts people become concerned about recent, visible, salient events that trigger strong feelings the rare mega‐catastrophic risks are not recent, visible or salient. They have not been experienced, so the trigger for mental availability is lacking Describing such rare risks in a speech is less effective in stimulating public reaction Although people may envision humans going extinct at some point centuries in the future that viewpoint may not translate into concern about specific risks warranting policy responses in the present the prefrontal cortex, when it envisions hypothetical scenarios of the future, appears to draw on experienced events to construct a collage or pastiche of the future – a ‘prospection’ the human brain relies on ‘available’ experienced events even for its analytic prospection about future scenarios the ‘unavailability’ of rare extreme risks contributes to being neglected in public concern The neglect of rare uncommons risks in public psychology may yield neglect in politics Individual neglect of rare global catastrophic risk may compounded by societal disdain for such warnings the person warning ‘the end is near’ is viewed as insane That most doomsday stories are unfounded does not mean that all rare catastrophic risks are illusory second source is magnitude a surprising finding of recent psychology research is large or ‘mass’ impact yields ‘numbing’ psychic numbing’ or ‘mass numbing’ explain public neglect mass catastrophic impacts face undervaluation as the number of lives rises, respondents feel overwhelmed and doubt their contribution can really make a difference to such a large problem. The ‘end of the world’ may be too much for people to act on; it may feel disabling rather than mobilizing people have limited capacity to worry and deflect problems so large that they would consume all of that capacity. The public may be eager to save the refugee child drowned on the beach but less willing to save a large and unidentified population of victims extreme mega‐catastrophic risks lack a single identified individual The public may be more eager to combat an identified villain than a faceless natural disaster This may explain public outcry at Osama Bin Laden compared with global climate change or large asteroids hitting the earth

that rare risks outweigh depends on probability and consequence response will depend on policy psych indicates ex risks are neglected ultra risks are not experienced it is experts, applying quant methods while public seems less interested mega‐ risks are not salient not experienced, so availability is lacking Describing risks in a speech is less effective in stimulating reaction people may envision humans going extinct that may not translate to concern about specific risks warranting responses the prefrontal cortex, when it envisions scenarios draw on experience brain relies on ‘available’ events even for analytic about scenarios unavailability’ neglect may compound disdain for warnings the person is viewed as insane second is magnitude psych large impact yields ‘numbing’ as lives rise respondents feel overwhelmed The ‘end of the world’ may be too much disabling rather than mobilizing people deflect problems so large they would consume capacity. public may be eager to save the refugee less willing to save a large unidentified population ex risks lack a single individual

My point is not that rare global catastrophic ‘uncommons’ risks outweigh other risks. That depends on their probability and consequence compared to other risks, and the appropriate response to each will depend on the merits of the policy options. And I do not mean to say that uncommons risks are now (or should be) replacing or superseding commons risks, or that the two types necessarily proceed in sequence through time. Both types of tragedies may be occurring at the same time in different settings, or combined in the same setting. For example, extreme climate change may exhibit both a tragedy of the commons (free‐riding by multiple actors who would share the benefits of abatement, hence a need for collective action) and a tragedy of the uncommons (rare extreme risk of global catastrophe that remains underappreciated, regardless of the number of actors). Nor are uncommons risks an inevitable result of new technology. The main point here is that tragedies of the uncommons are a distinct problem from tragedies of the commons, with distinct causes and potential solutions. 2 The tragedy of neglect Tragedies of the commons arise when multiple rational actors, perceiving their options and individual payoffs, choose actions that are collectively undesirable (Hardin, 1968, p. 1244; Barrett, 2007). Tragedies of the uncommons, by contrast, can arise when even one actor neglects to appreciate a looming risk or mass damage, and mismanages the risk. Research in psychology and political economy indicates several reasons why extreme mega‐catastrophic risks are systematically neglected. Here I seek to bring greater clarity to the causes of rare catastrophic uncommons risks by identifying three main sources. Unavailability One important source of the neglect of uncommons risks is their very rare or ultra‐low‐frequency character. Extensive research shows that people exhibit heightened concern about risks that are ‘available’ to the mind, both in the sense of awareness and affect – the ability to envision and feel the importance of the event. These are often recent, visible, salient events that trigger strong visual images (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982; Kuran and Sunstein, 1999; Weber, 2006; Pinker, 2011, p. 220). Such ‘available’ risks are then seen as more worrisome for the future. The ‘availability heuristic’ helps explain why so much regulation is crisis‐driven, adopted only after a crisis event spurs public outcry and mobilizes collective political action to overcome interest group opposition (Percival, 1998; Kuran and Sunstein, 1999; Birkland, 2006; Repetto, 2006; Wiener and Richman, 2010; Wuthnow, 2010; Barrett, 2016; Balleisen et al., 2016). A standard depiction of this phenomenon is that the public is more concerned about unusual dramatic risks, and less concerned about familiar routine risks, than are experts who take a quantitative approach combining likelihood and consequence (Breyer, 1993; Sunstein, 2005). This relationship is illustrated conceptually in Figure 1. The ‘availability heuristic’ helps explain why people appear to express greater concern about airplane accidents than automobile accidents, even though the statistical risk of airplane accidents (per km traveled, and possibly per trip) is lower: airplane accidents are shocking and dramatic and make news headlines, while automobile accidents are routine and familiar and become ordinary.2 Similarly, public concern may be greater regarding coal mining accidents than the (larger) public health risks from coal combustion air pollution, and regarding ebola than the (larger) toll from malaria. Figure 1, ‘Availability’ in expert vs public perceptions of risk, omitted. This difference in perspectives, depicted in Figure 1, also corresponds to many debates over the proper role of expert vs public appraisal of risk. Early studies showed significant differences between public vs expert appraisals of risk (Slovic, 1987; EPA, 1987; EPA, 1990). Some argued that these differences occur because the public makes errors about risks, such as exaggerating concern over unusual risks, while experts are more accurate, and that therefore policy should be based more on experts’ views in order to avoid overregulating small (but unusual) risks while underregulating large (but routine) risks (Breyer, 1993). Others argued that public appraisals were based not on factual errors but on value choices, such as preferring to avoid involuntary risks, which should govern public policy (Shrader‐Frechette, 1991). Still others argued that public values about risk might reflect prejudice and bias and should not necessarily be the direct basis for public policy (Cross, 1997). A typical assumption in these debates was that the public favored more regulation (at least of unusual risks) and the experts favored less. Thus this relationship might suggest that the public would also be more worried than experts about rare ‘uncommons’ risks. Indeed, some commenters have suggested that the public exhibits exaggerated paranoia about remote risks, overstating the likelihood and calling for precautionary policies that would be (in experts’ views) an overreaction (Efron, 1984; Wildavsky, 1997; Mazur, 2004). This may be the case for unusual but experienced events that are ‘available’ in the public mind and induce strong feelings such as dread; in response to experienced calamities, people are often highly motivated to take action, even if that action is ineffective or excessively costly (Wuthnow, 2010). For example, public reactions to the tragic 9/11 terrorist attacks included shifting from flying to driving with potentially greater injury risk (Deonandan and Backwell, 2011; Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer, 2012), and supporting two wars that were costly in money and lives (Stern and Wiener, 2008; Wuthnow, 2010). But with regard to ultra‐low‐frequency catastrophic risks, events that perhaps only occur once in eons, and hence are not experienced, it is not the case that the public is calling for overreaction while experts urge calm (Weber, 2006). Rather, it is experts, applying their quantitative methods, who are warning about future rare extreme risks such as abrupt climate change, artificial intelligence and large asteroid collisions (Posner, 2004; Bostrom and Cirkovic, 2008; Weitzman, 2009), while the public seems less interested if it takes these extreme risks seriously at all. My conjecture, supported by the evidence cited above (but worth further study and refinement), is that ‘tragedies of the uncommons’ add a twist to the typical debate about public vs expert risk appraisal. Adding ultra‐low‐frequency (not experienced) risks to the picture shows that it is not the case that the public always favors more regulation and experts less. For both routine risks and ultra‐rare risks, it is often experts who favor more regulation than the public. My conjecture of this twist in relative concern is depicted conceptually in Figure 2. Here, public concern is higher than experts’ concern for unusual and experienced (hence available) risks, in the middle region of the frequency dimension; but public concern is lower than experts’ concern both for routine familiar risks, and for ultra‐low‐frequency rare extreme risks. Figure 2, ‘Unavailability’ of extreme risks in expert vs public perceptions of risk, omitted. The reason for this reversal in relative appraisal at the very low end of the frequency spectrum is again related to the ‘availability’ heuristic. It predicts that people become concerned about recent, visible, salient events that trigger strong feelings. But the rare mega‐catastrophic risks are not recent, visible or salient. They have not been experienced, so the trigger for mental availability is lacking (Weber, 2006). Describing such rare risks, such as in a speech or in an opinion survey, is less effective in stimulating public reaction than an experienced risk (Weber, 2006). Relatedly, a longer time interval without experiencing a recurrence of a damaging event can lead to complacency (neglect due to unavailability) and increased vulnerability to a recurrence (which can then trigger new availability and alarm) (Turner, 1976). Although people may envision humans going extinct at some point centuries in the future (Tonn, 2009), and express pessimism about the future direction of humanity (Randle and Eckersley, 2015), that viewpoint may not translate into concern about specific risks warranting policy responses in the present (nor did these studies compare public with expert perceptions). Movies depicting rare unexperienced risks (e.g. the large asteroid collision in Deep Impact or Armageddon ; alien pathogens in The Andromeda Strain ; the rise of the machines in The Matrix ) may be viewed as humorous entertainment and even elicit laughter – though perhaps that is nervous laughter rather than neglect. There is some evidence that those who watched the film The Day After Tomorrow were more concerned about climate change afterward (Leiserowitz, 2004), though the audience was not randomly selected and may have been more concerned going in. It is unclear whether films can effectively ‘synthesize availability’; perhaps new techniques of virtual reality can do better, but they still may not call public attention to the most important uncommons risks, nor to the best policy responses. The role of experience in triggering the availability heuristic, and raising concern about available events in public appraisals of future risks, may be rooted in the ways the brain processes information. Humans process immediate risk stimuli in part through the amygdala, which manages fear and the instant choice to flee or fight (Ledoux, 2007). At the same time, using the prefrontal cortex, humans are able to envision hypothetical future scenarios and analyze choices among them (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). These two neural pathways are sometimes dubbed ‘system 1’ and ‘system 2’ (Kahneman, 2011). One possibility is that the faster processing of system 1 is generating fear before the slower processing of system 2 can develop a more analytic appraisal; but the two systems may also be interacting, and system 2 can also generate fear after its analysis. Even if system 2 analysis is applied, the prefrontal cortex, when it envisions hypothetical scenarios of the future, appears to draw on experienced events (from the brain's memory centers) in order to construct a collage or pastiche of the future – a ‘prospection’ (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007; Schachter et al., 2008). Thus the human brain typically relies on ‘available’ experienced events even for its analytic prospection about future scenarios.3 If so, the ‘unavailability’ of rare extreme risks contributes importantly to their being neglected in public concern. A mid‐level example is the increase in parents seeking exemptions from vaccines for their children: past success in controlling a disease may create unavailability and neglect (though subsequent disease outbreaks may revive concern). A more extreme example is that a very large asteroid (> 10 km diameter) has not hit the earth for about 65 million years (Reinhardt et al., 2016), evidently causing the demise of the dinosaurs and about 75 per cent of all life on earth (a 15 km asteroid hit Chicxulub, off the Yucatan peninsula of Mexico, and another dubbed Shiva may have hit near the Indian land mass about 40,000 years later (Lerbekmo, 2014)). Smaller objects hit the earth frequently, and regional damage was caused by the impacts at Tunguska (1908) and Chelyabinsk (2013) (about 19 m in diameter, see Borovicka et al., 2013). The Chelyabinsk impact prompted calls for increased detection efforts. Early detection enables a longer lead time to devise new deflection methods. Improved probabilistic analysis indicates that rare asteroid impacts, even < 1000 m diameter, may be more risky than commonly thought (Reinhardt et al., 2016). The neglect of rare uncommons risks in public psychology may in turn yield neglect in politics. This is a distinct additional factor on top of others that may also contribute to such neglect, such as free‐riding (if the problem is also a ‘commons’ problem requiring collective action by multiple actors); short‐term costs vs long‐term benefits (if the risk would occur in the long‐term future) mismatched with the short‐term election cycles; inattention to the plight of people far away in other countries and cultures; and others. Individual neglect of rare global catastrophic risk may be compounded by societal disdain for such warnings; despite the prevalence of apocalyptic scenarios in religion and literature (Lisboa, 2011), the person warning that ‘the end is near’ is often viewed as insane (and might be). That most doomsday stories are unfounded, though, does not mean that all rare catastrophic risks are illusory. Mass numbing A second source of the neglect of uncommons risks is their large magnitude of impact. It might seem that larger impacts should prompt more, not less, concern. For experts applying quantitative analytic methods, this appears to be the case. But for the general public, a surprising finding of recent psychology research is that a large or ‘mass’ impact yields ‘numbing’ (Slovic, 2007; Slovic et al., 2013). In these studies, people are asked in opinion polls (stated preference surveys) their willingness to pay (WTP) to save different numbers of other people from some risk. One might expect people to offer more money to save more people (a linear relationship, with each life valued the same), or even an increasing amount to reflect the greater value of averting a catastrophe (supra‐linear). Or, one might expect people to offer amounts that rise but at a declining rate, such as if willingness to pay (WTP) reaches some plateau when the risk becomes large (diminishing marginal value of life saving). (In stated preference surveys, ability to pay may not be a strong constraint on responses.) These relationships are illustrated in Figure 3. Figure 3, ‘Mass numbing’ in valuation of risk, omitted. Surprisingly, Slovic recounts several studies finding that none of these depicts public attitudes; rather, in these studies, willingness to pay rises at first, but then as the number of people at risk grows, willingness to pay declines – not just marginally (as in the plateau relationship) but absolutely, to levels below the amount people were willing to pay to save one or two individuals. And the number of people at which the stated willingness to pay peaks and begins to decline is not very high – sometimes fewer than ten people at risk. Slovic (2007) terms this ‘psychic numbing’ or ‘mass numbing’, and argues that it helps explain public neglect of genocide and other mass calamities (for further evidence, see Rheinberger and Treich, 2015). There is also evidence that it occurs for valuing nonhuman life (environmental conservation) (Markowitz et al., 2013). Hence the mass catastrophic impacts of uncommons risks may face undervaluation. One reason for this response may be feelings of personal inefficacy (Vastfjall et al., 2015): as the number of lives rises, respondents may feel overwhelmed and doubt that their contribution can really make a difference to such a large problem. The ‘end of the world’ may be too much for people to act on; it may feel disabling rather than mobilizing. Relatedly, people may have a limited capacity to worry (Weber, 2006), and thus may deflect problems so large that they would consume all of that capacity. A second reason for mass numbing may be the stronger public response to an identified individual – such as an identified victim or an identified villain. The public may be eager to save the baby who fell down the well, or the refugee child drowned on the beach, or the three whales stuck in the ice, but less willing to save a large and unidentified population of victims (Kogut and Ritov, 2005; Small and Loewenstein, 2005; Small, Loewenstein and Slovic, 2007). Kogut and Ritov (2005) and Slovic (2007) report that WTP to save a single victim also increases if the victim is described in more detail, and even more if the victim is given a face. Vastfjall et al. (2014) find that compassion is highest for a single child, and may decline after just one. Slovic (2007, p.79) quotes Mother Teresa: ‘If I look at the mass I will never act. If I look at the one, I will.’ These studies explain why charitable organizations try to feature a ‘poster child’ for a broader cause. But extreme mega‐catastrophic risks typically lack a single identified individual, unless rendered in fiction (e.g. a movie). The public may also be more eager to combat an identified villain than a faceless natural disaster or a ubiquitous social problem (Sunstein, 2007, p. 63, on the ‘Goldstein effect’). This may help explain public outcry at villains highlighted in the news media, such as Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, compared with the apparently lesser public outcry regarding tsunamis (Indian Ocean 2006, killing 200,000 people; Japan 2011, killing 20,000 people), global climate change harming large populations, or large asteroids hitting the earth.

<h4>Disads are <u>systematically underestimated</u> in <u>debates</u>.</h4><p><strong>Wiener 16</strong> – Jonathan B. Wiener, Law and Public Policy Professor at Duke University, University Fellow at the Resources for the Future, Past President of the Society for Risk Analysis, the scientific committee member at the International Risk Governance Council. [The Tragedy of the Uncommons: On the Politics of Apocalypse, Global Policy, 7(S1): Too Big to Handle: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Question of Why Societies Ignore Looming Disasters, 6-6-16, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12319]//BPS</p><p>My point is not <u><mark>that rare</u></mark> global catastrophic ‘uncommons’ <u><mark>risks outweigh</mark> other risks</u>. That <u><mark>depends on</mark> <strong>their <mark>probability and consequence</strong></mark> compared to <strong>other risks</u></strong>, and <u>the appropriate <mark>response</u></mark> to each <u><mark>will depend on</u></mark> the merits of the <u><strong><mark>policy</mark> options</u></strong>. And I do not mean to say that uncommons risks are now (or should be) replacing or superseding commons risks, or that the two types necessarily proceed in sequence through time. Both types of tragedies may be occurring at the same time in different settings, or combined in the same setting. For example, extreme climate change may exhibit both a tragedy of the commons (free‐riding by multiple actors who would share the benefits of abatement, hence a need for collective action) and a tragedy of the uncommons (rare extreme risk of global catastrophe that remains underappreciated, regardless of the number of actors). Nor are uncommons risks an inevitable result of new technology. The main point here is that tragedies of the uncommons are a distinct problem from tragedies of the commons, with distinct causes and potential solutions.</p><p>2 The tragedy of neglect</p><p>Tragedies of the commons arise when multiple rational actors, perceiving their options and individual payoffs, choose actions that are collectively undesirable (Hardin, 1968, p. 1244; Barrett, 2007). Tragedies of the uncommons, by contrast, can arise when even one actor neglects to appreciate a looming risk or mass damage, and mismanages the risk.</p><p><u>Research in <strong><mark>psych</mark>ology</strong> and <strong>political economy</strong> <mark>indicates</u></mark> several reasons <u>why <strong><mark>ex</mark>treme mega‐catastrophic <mark>risks</strong> are</mark> <strong>systematically <mark>neglected</strong></mark>. Here I seek to bring greater clarity to the causes of rare catastrophic uncommons risks by identifying three main sources.</p><p>Unavailability</p><p></u>One important source of the neglect of uncommons risks is their very rare or ultra‐low‐frequency character. <u><strong>Extensive research</strong> shows</u> that <u>people exhibit <strong>heightened concern</strong> about risks that are <strong>‘available’ to the mind</u></strong>, both in the sense of awareness and affect – the ability to envision and feel the importance of the event. These are often recent, visible, salient events that trigger strong visual images (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982; Kuran and Sunstein, 1999; Weber, 2006; Pinker, 2011, p. 220). Such <u><strong>‘available’ risks</strong> are</u> then <u>seen as more worrisome for the future</u>. The ‘availability heuristic’ helps explain why so much regulation is crisis‐driven, adopted only after a crisis event spurs public outcry and mobilizes collective political action to overcome interest group opposition (Percival, 1998; Kuran and Sunstein, 1999; Birkland, 2006; Repetto, 2006; Wiener and Richman, 2010; Wuthnow, 2010; Barrett, 2016; Balleisen et al., 2016).</p><p>A standard depiction of this phenomenon is that the public is more concerned about unusual dramatic risks, and less concerned about familiar routine risks, than are experts who take a quantitative approach combining likelihood and consequence (Breyer, 1993; Sunstein, 2005). This relationship is illustrated conceptually in Figure 1. <u><strong>The ‘availability heuristic’</strong> helps explain why people</u> appear to <u>express <strong>greater concern</strong> about airplane accidents than automobile accidents, <strong>even though</strong> the statistical risk of airplane accidents</u> (per km traveled, and possibly per trip) <u>is lower</u>: airplane accidents are shocking and dramatic and make news headlines, while automobile accidents are routine and familiar and become ordinary.2 Similarly, public concern may be greater regarding coal mining accidents than the (larger) public health risks from coal combustion air pollution, and regarding ebola than the (larger) toll from malaria.</p><p>Figure 1, ‘Availability’ in expert vs public perceptions of risk, omitted.</p><p>This <u>difference in perspectives</u>, depicted in Figure 1, also <u>corresponds to</u> many <u>debates</u> over the proper role of expert vs public appraisal of risk. Early studies showed significant differences between public vs expert appraisals of risk (Slovic, 1987; EPA, 1987; EPA, 1990). Some argued that these differences occur because the public makes errors about risks, such as exaggerating concern over unusual risks, while experts are more accurate, and that therefore policy should be based more on experts’ views in order to avoid overregulating small (but unusual) risks while underregulating large (but routine) risks (Breyer, 1993). Others argued that public appraisals were based not on factual errors but on value choices, such as preferring to avoid involuntary risks, which should govern public policy (Shrader‐Frechette, 1991). Still others argued that public values about risk might reflect prejudice and bias and should not necessarily be the direct basis for public policy (Cross, 1997).</p><p>A typical assumption in these debates was that the public favored more regulation (at least of unusual risks) and the experts favored less. Thus this relationship might suggest that the public would also be more worried than experts about rare ‘uncommons’ risks. Indeed, some <u>commenters</u> have <u>suggested</u> that <u>the public exhibits <strong>exaggerated paranoia</strong> about remote risks</u>, overstating the likelihood and calling for precautionary policies that would be (in experts’ views) an overreaction (Efron, 1984; Wildavsky, 1997; Mazur, 2004). <u>This may be the case for <strong>unusual but experienced events</strong> that are ‘available’ in the public mind and induce strong feelings such as dread</u>; in response to experienced calamities, people are often highly motivated to take action, even if that action is ineffective or excessively costly (Wuthnow, 2010). For example, public reactions to the tragic 9/11 terrorist attacks included shifting from flying to driving with potentially greater injury risk (Deonandan and Backwell, 2011; Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer, 2012), and supporting two wars that were costly in money and lives (Stern and Wiener, 2008; Wuthnow, 2010). <u>But with regard to <strong><mark>ultra</mark>‐low‐frequency catastrophic <mark>risks</strong></mark>, events that perhaps <strong>only occur once in eons</strong>, and</u> hence <u><mark>are not <strong>experienced</u></strong></mark>, it is not the case that the public is calling for overreaction while experts urge calm (Weber, 2006). Rather, <u><mark>it is experts, applying</mark> <strong>their <mark>quant</mark>itative <mark>methods</u></strong></mark>, who are warning about future rare extreme risks such as abrupt climate change, artificial intelligence and large asteroid collisions (Posner, 2004; Bostrom and Cirkovic, 2008; Weitzman, 2009), <u><mark>while</mark> the <mark>public seems <strong>less interested</strong></mark> if it takes these extreme risks <strong>seriously at all</u></strong>.</p><p>My conjecture, supported by the evidence cited above (but worth further study and refinement), is that <u>‘tragedies of the uncommons’ add a twist to <strong>the typical debate</u></strong> about public vs expert risk appraisal. Adding ultra‐low‐frequency (not experienced) risks to the picture shows that it is not the case that the public always favors more regulation and experts less. For both routine risks and ultra‐rare risks, it is often experts who favor more regulation than the public. My conjecture of this twist in relative concern is depicted conceptually in Figure 2. Here, public concern is higher than experts’ concern for unusual and experienced (hence available) risks, in the middle region of the frequency dimension; but public concern is lower than experts’ concern both for routine familiar risks, and for ultra‐low‐frequency rare extreme risks.</p><p>Figure 2, ‘Unavailability’ of extreme risks in expert vs public perceptions of risk, omitted.</p><p>The reason for this reversal in relative appraisal at the very low end of the frequency spectrum is again related to the ‘availability’ heuristic. <u>It predicts</u> that <u>people become concerned about <strong>recent</strong>, <strong>visible</strong>, <strong>salient events</strong> that trigger <strong>strong feelings</u></strong>. But <u>the rare <mark>mega‐</mark>catastrophic <mark>risks are not</mark> <strong>recent</strong>, <strong>visible</strong> or <strong><mark>salient</strong></mark>. They have <mark>not</mark> been <mark>experienced, so</mark> the trigger for <strong>mental <mark>availability</strong> is <strong>lacking</u></strong></mark> (Weber, 2006).</p><p><u><mark>Describing</mark> <strong>such rare <mark>risks</u></strong></mark>, such as <u><strong><mark>in a speech</u></strong></mark> or in an opinion survey, <u><mark>is <strong>less effective</strong> in stimulating</mark> <strong>public <mark>reaction</u></strong></mark> than an experienced risk (Weber, 2006). Relatedly, a longer time interval without experiencing a recurrence of a damaging event can lead to complacency (neglect due to unavailability) and increased vulnerability to a recurrence (which can then trigger new availability and alarm) (Turner, 1976). <u>Although <mark>people may envision humans going extinct</mark> at some point centuries in the future</u> (Tonn, 2009), and express pessimism about the future direction of humanity (Randle and Eckersley, 2015), <u><strong><mark>that</mark> viewpoint</strong> <mark>may not translate</mark> in<mark>to <strong>concern</strong> about <strong>specific risks</strong> warranting</mark> <strong>policy <mark>responses</strong></mark> in the present</u> (nor did these studies compare public with expert perceptions).</p><p>Movies depicting rare unexperienced risks (e.g. the large asteroid collision in Deep Impact or Armageddon ; alien pathogens in The Andromeda Strain ; the rise of the machines in The Matrix ) may be viewed as humorous entertainment and even elicit laughter – though perhaps that is nervous laughter rather than neglect. There is some evidence that those who watched the film The Day After Tomorrow were more concerned about climate change afterward (Leiserowitz, 2004), though the audience was not randomly selected and may have been more concerned going in. It is unclear whether films can effectively ‘synthesize availability’; perhaps new techniques of virtual reality can do better, but they still may not call public attention to the most important uncommons risks, nor to the best policy responses.</p><p>The role of experience in triggering the availability heuristic, and raising concern about available events in public appraisals of future risks, may be rooted in the ways the brain processes information. Humans process immediate risk stimuli in part through the amygdala, which manages fear and the instant choice to flee or fight (Ledoux, 2007). At the same time, using the prefrontal cortex, humans are able to envision hypothetical future scenarios and analyze choices among them (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). These two neural pathways are sometimes dubbed ‘system 1’ and ‘system 2’ (Kahneman, 2011). One possibility is that the faster processing of system 1 is generating fear before the slower processing of system 2 can develop a more analytic appraisal; but the two systems may also be interacting, and system 2 can also generate fear after its analysis.</p><p>Even if system 2 analysis is applied, <u><strong><mark>the prefrontal cortex</strong>, when it envisions</mark> <strong>hypothetical <mark>scenarios</mark> of the future</strong>, appears to <mark>draw on <strong>experience</mark>d events</u></strong> (from the brain's memory centers) in order <u>to construct <strong>a collage or pastiche</u></strong> <u>of the future – a ‘prospection’</u> (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007; Schachter et al., 2008). Thus <u><strong>the human <mark>brain</u></strong></mark> typically <u><mark>relies on <strong>‘available’</mark> experienced <mark>events</strong> even for</mark> <strong>its <mark>analytic</mark> prospection</strong> <mark>about</mark> <strong>future <mark>scenarios</u></strong></mark>.3</p><p>If so, <u><strong>the ‘<mark>unavailability’</mark> of rare extreme risks</strong> contributes</u> importantly <u>to</u> their <u>being neglected in public concern</u>. A mid‐level example is the increase in parents seeking exemptions from vaccines for their children: past success in controlling a disease may create unavailability and neglect (though subsequent disease outbreaks may revive concern). A more extreme example is that a very large asteroid (> 10 km diameter) has not hit the earth for about 65 million years (Reinhardt et al., 2016), evidently causing the demise of the dinosaurs and about 75 per cent of all life on earth (a 15 km asteroid hit Chicxulub, off the Yucatan peninsula of Mexico, and another dubbed Shiva may have hit near the Indian land mass about 40,000 years later (Lerbekmo, 2014)). Smaller objects hit the earth frequently, and regional damage was caused by the impacts at Tunguska (1908) and Chelyabinsk (2013) (about 19 m in diameter, see Borovicka et al., 2013). The Chelyabinsk impact prompted calls for increased detection efforts. Early detection enables a longer lead time to devise new deflection methods. Improved probabilistic analysis indicates that rare asteroid impacts, even < 1000 m diameter, may be more risky than commonly thought (Reinhardt et al., 2016).</p><p><u>The neglect of rare uncommons risks in <strong>public psychology</strong> may</u> in turn <u>yield <strong>neglect in politics</u></strong>. This is a distinct additional factor on top of others that may also contribute to such neglect, such as free‐riding (if the problem is also a ‘commons’ problem requiring collective action by multiple actors); short‐term costs vs long‐term benefits (if the risk would occur in the long‐term future) mismatched with the short‐term election cycles; inattention to the plight of people far away in other countries and cultures; and others. <u><strong>Individual <mark>neglect</strong></mark> of rare global catastrophic risk <mark>may</u></mark> be <u><mark>compound</mark>ed by <strong>societal <mark>disdain</strong> for</mark> such <mark>warnings</u></mark>; despite the prevalence of apocalyptic scenarios in religion and literature (Lisboa, 2011), <u><mark>the person</mark> warning</u> that <u>‘the end is near’ <mark>is</u></mark> often <u><strong><mark>viewed as insane</u></strong></mark> (and might be). <u>That most doomsday stories are unfounded</u>, though, <u>does not mean that all rare catastrophic risks are illusory</u>.</p><p>Mass numbing</p><p>A <u><mark>second</mark> source</u> of the neglect of uncommons risks <u><mark>is</u></mark> their large <u><strong><mark>magnitude</u></strong></mark> of impact. It might seem that larger impacts should prompt more, not less, concern. For experts applying quantitative analytic methods, this appears to be the case. But for the general public, <u><strong>a surprising finding</strong> of <strong>recent <mark>psych</mark>ology research</strong> is</u> that a <u><strong><mark>large</mark> or ‘mass’ <mark>impact</strong> yields ‘<strong>numbing’</u></strong></mark> (Slovic, 2007; Slovic et al., 2013). In these studies, people are asked in opinion polls (stated preference surveys) their willingness to pay (WTP) to save different numbers of other people from some risk. One might expect people to offer more money to save more people (a linear relationship, with each life valued the same), or even an increasing amount to reflect the greater value of averting a catastrophe (supra‐linear). Or, one might expect people to offer amounts that rise but at a declining rate, such as if willingness to pay (WTP) reaches some plateau when the risk becomes large (diminishing marginal value of life saving). (In stated preference surveys, ability to pay may not be a strong constraint on responses.) These relationships are illustrated in Figure 3.</p><p>Figure 3, ‘Mass numbing’ in valuation of risk, omitted.</p><p>Surprisingly, Slovic recounts several studies finding that none of these depicts public attitudes; rather, in these studies, willingness to pay rises at first, but then as the number of people at risk grows, willingness to pay declines – not just marginally (as in the plateau relationship) but absolutely, to levels below the amount people were willing to pay to save one or two individuals. And the number of people at which the stated willingness to pay peaks and begins to decline is not very high – sometimes fewer than ten people at risk.</p><p>Slovic (2007) terms this ‘<u><strong>psychic numbing’ or ‘mass numbing’</u></strong>, and argues that it helps <u>explain <strong>public neglect</u></strong> of genocide and other mass calamities (for further evidence, see Rheinberger and Treich, 2015). There is also evidence that it occurs for valuing nonhuman life (environmental conservation) (Markowitz et al., 2013). Hence the <u><strong>mass catastrophic impacts</u></strong> of uncommons risks may <u>face <strong>undervaluation</u></strong>.</p><p>One reason for this response may be feelings of personal inefficacy (Vastfjall et al., 2015): <u><mark>as</mark> <strong>the number of <mark>lives</strong> rise</mark>s, <mark>respondents</u></mark> may <u><mark>feel</mark> <strong><mark>overwhelmed</strong></mark> and <strong>doubt</u></strong> that <u>their contribution can <strong>really make a difference</strong> to such <strong>a large problem</strong>. <mark>The ‘end of the world’ may be <strong>too much</strong></mark> for people to act on; it may feel <strong><mark>disabling rather than mobilizing</u></strong></mark>. Relatedly, <u><mark>people</u></mark> may <u>have</u> a <u><strong>limited capacity to worry</u></strong> (Weber, 2006), <u>and</u> thus may <u><strong><mark>deflect</strong> problems so large</mark> that <mark>they would consume</u></mark> <u><strong>all of that <mark>capacity</strong>.</p><p></u></mark>A second reason for mass numbing may be the stronger public response to an identified individual – such as an identified victim or an identified villain. <u>The <mark>public</p><p> may be <strong>eager</strong> to save</u></mark> the baby who fell down the well, or <u><strong><mark>the refugee</mark> child</strong> drowned on the beach</u>, or the three whales stuck in the ice, <u>but <mark>less willing to save <strong>a large</mark> and <mark>unidentified population</mark> of victims</u></strong> (Kogut and Ritov, 2005; Small and Loewenstein, 2005; Small, Loewenstein and Slovic, 2007). Kogut and Ritov (2005) and Slovic (2007) report that WTP to save a single victim also increases if the victim is described in more detail, and even more if the victim is given a face. Vastfjall et al. (2014) find that compassion is highest for a single child, and may decline after just one. Slovic (2007, p.79) quotes Mother Teresa: ‘If I look at the mass I will never act. If I look at the one, I will.’ These studies explain why charitable organizations try to feature a ‘poster child’ for a broader cause. But <u><strong><mark>ex</mark>treme mega‐catastrophic <mark>risks</u></strong></mark> typically <u><mark>lack <strong>a single</mark> identified <mark>individual</u></strong></mark>, unless rendered in fiction (e.g. a movie). <u>The public may</u> also <u>be <strong>more eager</strong> to combat <strong>an identified villain</strong> than a <strong>faceless natural disaster</u></strong> or a ubiquitous social problem (Sunstein, 2007, p. 63, on the ‘Goldstein effect’). <u>This may</u> help <u>explain public outcry at</u> villains highlighted in the news media, such as <u>Osama Bin Laden</u> and Saddam Hussein, <u>compared with</u> the apparently lesser public outcry regarding tsunamis (Indian Ocean 2006, killing 200,000 people; Japan 2011, killing 20,000 people), <u><strong>global climate change</u></strong> harming large populations, <u>or <strong>large asteroids</strong> hitting the earth</u>.</p>

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Reinhart 21

Reinhart 21 – Tara Reinhart, head of the Antitrust/Competition Group in Skadden’s Washington, D.C. office, “Lina Khan’s Appointment as FTC Chair Reflects Biden Administration’s Aggressive Stance on Antitrust Enforcement,” 6/18/21, https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2021/06/lina-khans-appointment-as-ftc-chair

the FTC will face resource constraints. Bringing antitrust litigation is an expensive and laborious process requiring millions of dollars for expert fees and a large army of FTC staff attorneys and taking many months or even years to accomplish. Typically, the FTC can only litigate a handful of antitrust matters at a time the FTC will still have to pick its cases carefully

the FTC face resource constraints antitrust litigation is expensive and laborious requiring millions and a large army of attorneys and taking years the FTC can only litigate a handful of matters at a time the FTC will have to pick carefully

Second, like all antitrust enforcers, Ms. Khan and the FTC will face resource constraints. Bringing antitrust litigation is an expensive and laborious process, often requiring millions of dollars for expert fees and a large army of FTC staff attorneys and taking many months or even years to accomplish. Typically, the FTC can only litigate a handful of antitrust matters at a time. It seems likely that Congress will provide more funding to the FTC in the current environment, but even with these extra resources, the FTC will still have to pick its cases carefully and cannot challenge every deal or every instance of alleged unlawful conduct.

<h4>Plan trades off with FTC resources in other areas</h4><p><strong>Reinhart 21</strong> – Tara Reinhart, head of the Antitrust/Competition Group in Skadden’s Washington, D.C. office, “Lina Khan’s Appointment as FTC Chair Reflects Biden Administration’s Aggressive Stance on Antitrust Enforcement,” 6/18/21, https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2021/06/lina-khans-appointment-as-ftc-chair</p><p>Second, like all antitrust enforcers, Ms. Khan and <u><mark>the FTC</mark> will <mark>face <strong>resource constraints</strong></mark>. Bringing <mark>antitrust litigation is</mark> an <strong><mark>expensive</strong> and <strong>laborious</strong></mark> process</u>, often <u><mark>requiring millions</mark> of dollars for expert fees <mark>and a large army of</mark> FTC staff <mark>attorneys and taking</mark> many months or even <mark>years</mark> to accomplish. Typically, <mark>the FTC can only litigate <strong>a handful of</mark> antitrust <mark>matters</strong> at a time</u></mark>. It seems likely that Congress will provide more funding to the FTC in the current environment, but even with these extra resources, <u><mark>the FTC will</mark> still <mark>have to</mark> <strong><mark>pick</mark> its cases <mark>carefully</u></mark> and cannot challenge every deal or every instance of alleged unlawful conduct.</p></strong>

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Millett & Snyder-Beattie ‘17. Millett, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford; and Snyder-Beattie, M.S., Director of Research, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. 08-01-2017. “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity,” Health Security, 15(4), PubMed

Millett & Snyder-Beattie ‘17. Millett, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford; and Snyder-Beattie, M.S., Director of Research, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. 08-01-2017. “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity,” Health Security, 15(4), PubMed

advanced bioweapons could threaten human existence though probability may be low, the expected value of reducing risk could still be large, since risks jeopardize all future generations Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens While these arguments do not rule out species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett Quiripi-Unquachog and the Western Abenaki In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a long historical track record ofstate-run bioweapon research applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature the logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments The possibility of a war between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents Non-state actors may also pose a risk, especially those with explicitly omnicidal aims. While rare, there are examples. The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan sought biological weapons for the express purpose of causing extinction Environmental groups, such as the Gaia Liberation Front, have argued that “we can ensure Gaia's survival only through the extinction of the Humans as a species … we now have the specific technology for doing the job … several different [genetically engineered] viruses could be released Groups such as R.I.S.E. also sought to protect nature by destroying most of humanity with bioweapons to date, non-state actors have lacked the capabilities needed to pose a catastrophic bioweapons threat, but this could change in future decades as biotechnology becomes more accessible and the pool of experienced users grows What is the appropriate response to these speculative extinction threats? might include investments that reduce a mix of proven and speculative risks, but striking this balance is still difficult given the massive uncertainties around the low-probability, high-consequence risks even with the most conservative models, we find that reduction of low-probability, high-consequence risks can be more cost-effective, as measured by quality-adjusted life year despite the low

advanced bioweapons threaten human existence though probability may be low expected value still large, since risks jeopardize all future generations Historically responsible for the greatest death tolls skeptic think unlikely to spread to remote populations overcome genetic resistances evade detection and countermeasures Virulence and transmission trade-off and evolutionary pressures these arguments do not rule out species going extinct due to disease There are historical examples of human populations wiped out many diseases are proof each worst-case attribute can be realized biotech might combine such traits experiments resulted in enhanced transmissibility, lethality overcome therapeutics even conservative models find despite low

In the decades to come, advanced bioweapons could threaten human existence. Although the probability of human extinction from bioweapons may be low, the expected value of reducing the risk could still be large, since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future generations. We provide an overview of biotechnological extinction risk, make some rough initial estimates for how severe the risks might be, and compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing these extinction-level risks with existing biosecurity work. We find that reducing human extinction risk can be more cost-effective than reducing smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. This suggests that the risks are not low enough to ignore and that more ought to be done to prevent the worst-case scenarios. How worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives. Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).9 In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-21 Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a long historical track record ofstate-run bioweapon research applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes.22 Delivery capabilities have also been subject to the cutting edge of technical development, with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology.23,24 While there is no evidence of state-run bioweapons programs directly attempting to develop or deploy bioweapons that would pose an existential risk, the logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention.25 The possibility of a war between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI,26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII.27 Non-state actors may also pose a risk, especially those with explicitly omnicidal aims. While rare, there are examples. The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan sought biological weapons for the express purpose of causing extinction.28 Environmental groups, such as the Gaia Liberation Front, have argued that “we can ensure Gaia's survival only through the extinction of the Humans as a species … we now have the specific technology for doing the job … several different [genetically engineered] viruses could be released”(quoted in ref. 29). Groups such as R.I.S.E. also sought to protect nature by destroying most of humanity with bioweapons.30 Fortunately, to date, non-state actors have lacked the capabilities needed to pose a catastrophic bioweapons threat, but this could change in future decades as biotechnology becomes more accessible and the pool of experienced users grows.31,32 What is the appropriate response to these speculative extinction threats? A balanced biosecurity portfolio might include investments that reduce a mix of proven and speculative risks, but striking this balance is still difficult given the massive uncertainties around the low-probability, high-consequence risks. In this article, we examine the traditional spectrum of biosecurity risks (ie, biocrimes, bioterrorism, and biowarfare) to categorize biothreats by likelihood and impact, expanding the historical analysis to consider even lower-probability, higher-consequence events (catastrophic risks and existential risks). In order to produce reasoned estimates of the likelihood of different categories of biothreats, we bring together relevant data and theory and produce some first-guess estimates of the likelihood of different categories of biothreat, and we use these initial estimates to compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing existential risks with more traditional biosecurity measures. We emphasize that these models are highly uncertain, and their utility lies more in enabling order-of-magnitude comparisons rather than as a precise measure of the true risk. However, even with the most conservative models, we find that reduction of low-probability, high-consequence risks can be more cost-effective, as measured by quality-adjusted life year per dollar, especially when we account for the lives of future generations. This suggests that despite the low

<h4>That causes extinction – </h4><p><strong>Millett & Snyder-Beattie ‘17<u>. Millett, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford; and Snyder-Beattie, M.S., Director of Research, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. 08-01-2017. “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity,” Health Security, 15(4), PubMed</p><p></u></strong>In the decades to come, <u><mark>advanced bioweapons</mark> could <strong><mark>threaten human existence</u></strong></mark>. Al<u><mark>though</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>probability</u></strong></mark> of human extinction from bioweapons <u><strong><mark>may</strong> be low</mark>, the <strong><mark>expected value</strong></mark> of <strong>reducing</u></strong> the <u>risk could <strong><mark>still</strong></mark> be <strong><mark>large</strong>, since</u></mark> such <u><mark>risks jeopardize</u></mark> the existence of <u><strong><mark>all future generations</u></strong></mark>. We provide an overview of biotechnological extinction risk, make some rough initial estimates for how severe the risks might be, and compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing these extinction-level risks with existing biosecurity work. We find that reducing human extinction risk can be more cost-effective than reducing smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. This suggests that the risks are not low enough to ignore and that more ought to be done to prevent the worst-case scenarios. How worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives. <u><strong><mark>Historically</mark>, disease events have been <mark>responsible for the greatest death tolls</strong></mark> on humanity</u>. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time.4 It is an open question whether <u>a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization</u>. <u>A <mark>skeptic</mark> would have many good reasons to <mark>think</mark> that existential risk from disease is <mark>unlikely</mark>. Such a disease would need <mark>to spread</mark> worldwide <mark>to <strong>remote populations</strong></mark>, <mark>overcome</mark> <strong>rare <mark>genetic resistances</strong></mark>, and <strong><mark>evade detection</strong></mark>, cures, <mark>and <strong>countermeasures</strong></mark>. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: <strong><mark>Virulence and transmission</mark> is often a <mark>trade-off</strong></mark>, <mark>and</mark> so <strong><mark>evolutionary pressures</strong></mark> could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens</u>.5,6 <u>While <mark>these arguments</u></mark> point to a very small risk of human extinction, they <u><strong><mark>do not rule</u></strong></mark> the possibility <u><strong><mark>out</u></strong></mark> entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of <u><strong><mark>species going extinct due to disease</strong></mark>—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island</u>.7,8 <u><mark>There are</mark> also <strong><mark>historical examples of</mark> large <mark>human populations</mark> being almost entirely <mark>wiped out</strong></mark> by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include <strong>native American tribes</strong> exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett</u> (86% loss of population), <u>Quiripi-Unquachog</u> (95% loss of population), <u>and the Western Abenaki</u> (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).9 <u>In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But <strong><mark>many diseases are proof</strong></mark> of principle that <strong><mark>each worst-case attribute can be realized</mark> independently</u></strong>. For example, <u>some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment</u>, such as rabies or septicemic plague. <u>Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu</u>,10 <u>and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population</u>.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, <u><strong>natural evolution</strong> would be an <strong>unlikely</strong> source for pathogens with the <strong>highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach</strong>. But <strong>advances in <mark>biotech</strong></mark>nology <mark>might</mark> allow the creation of diseases that <strong><mark>combine such traits</u></strong></mark>. <u>Recent controversy has <strong>already emerged</strong> over a number of <strong>scientific <mark>experiments</strong></mark> that <mark>resulted in</mark> viruses with <mark>enhanced <strong>transmissibility</strong>, <strong>lethality</strong></mark>, and/or the ability to <mark>overcome <strong>therapeutics</u></strong></mark>.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-21 <u>Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a <strong>long historical track record</strong> of<strong>state-run bioweapon research</strong> applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature</u>. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes.22 Delivery capabilities have also been subject to the cutting edge of technical development, with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology.23,24 While there is no evidence of state-run bioweapons programs directly attempting to develop or deploy bioweapons that would pose an existential risk, <u>the logic of deterrence and <strong>m</strong>utually <strong>a</strong>ssured <strong>d</strong>estruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments</u> or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention.25 <u>The <strong>possibility of a war</strong> between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents</u>, with Germany targeting animals in WWI,26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII.27 <u><strong>Non-state actors</strong> may also pose a risk, especially those with <strong>explicitly omnicidal aims</strong>. While rare, there are examples. The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan sought biological weapons for the express purpose of causing extinction</u>.28 <u>Environmental groups, such as the Gaia Liberation Front, have argued that “we can ensure Gaia's survival only through the extinction of the Humans as a species … we now have the specific technology for doing the job … several different [genetically engineered] viruses could be released</u>”(quoted in ref. 29). <u>Groups such as R.I.S.E. also sought to protect nature by destroying most of humanity with bioweapons</u>.30 Fortunately, <u>to date, non-state actors have <strong>lacked the capabilities</strong> needed to pose a catastrophic bioweapons threat, but this could change in future decades as <strong>biotech</strong>nology becomes <strong>more accessible</strong> and the <strong>pool of experienced users grows</u></strong>.31,32 <u>What is the appropriate response to these speculative extinction threats?</u> A balanced biosecurity portfolio <u>might include investments that reduce a mix of proven and speculative risks, but striking this balance is still difficult given the massive uncertainties around the low-probability, high-consequence risks</u>. In this article, we examine the traditional spectrum of biosecurity risks (ie, biocrimes, bioterrorism, and biowarfare) to categorize biothreats by likelihood and impact, expanding the historical analysis to consider even lower-probability, higher-consequence events (catastrophic risks and existential risks). In order to produce reasoned estimates of the likelihood of different categories of biothreats, we bring together relevant data and theory and produce some first-guess estimates of the likelihood of different categories of biothreat, and we use these initial estimates to compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing existential risks with more traditional biosecurity measures. We emphasize that these models are highly uncertain, and their utility lies more in enabling order-of-magnitude comparisons rather than as a precise measure of the true risk. However, <u><strong><mark>even</mark> with the most <mark>conservative models</strong></mark>, we <mark>find</mark> that reduction of <strong>low-probability, high-consequence risk</strong>s can be more cost-effective, as measured by <strong>quality-adjusted life year</u></strong> per dollar, especially when we account for the lives of future generations. This suggests that <u><strong><mark>despite</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>low </p></u></strong></mark>

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That escalates to nuclear war

Futter 18 Andrew Futter (Andrew Futter is an associate professor in the School of History, Politics, and International Relations at the University of Leicester. He is the author of The Politics of Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy, the editor of The United Kingdom and the Future of Nuclear Weapons, and co-editor of Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs), 2018, “Hacking the Bomb: Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons,” Georgetown University Press, SJBE

Futter 18 Andrew Futter (Andrew Futter is an associate professor in the School of History, Politics, and International Relations at the University of Leicester. He is the author of The Politics of Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy, the editor of The United Kingdom and the Future of Nuclear Weapons, and co-editor of Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs), 2018, “Hacking the Bomb: Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons,” Georgetown University Press, SJBE

The first thing to note is that even if nuclear systems are not targeted directly or are successfully guarded against malicious hackers, it seems very likely that the use—or even the threat of use—of cyber capabilities against an opponent during a crisis will raise tensions, concerns, and perceived vulnerabilities, and that this will make nuclear crisis resolution more complicated and perhaps more dangerous." The second thing to note is that the use of cyber capabilities is likely to obfuscate and complicate the escalation ladder, and possibly lead to an inadvertent deepening of a crisis, perhaps even up to the nuclear level First, during a crisis hackers could potentially disrupt or destroy communications channels, making it difficult to manage forces, including nuclear forces, and reducing commanders' confidence in their weapons systems and the ability of officials to communicate. Aggressors might also employ distributed denial-of-service attacks to prevent communication, hamper battle management systems, magnify confusion, and make it more difficult to identify what is happening and perhaps to conduct a coordinated response. Second, the use of cyberattack capabilities might inadvertently escalate a crisis—very much building on the model of "inadvertent nuclear escalation" developed by Barry Posen back in the early 1990s Alternatively, it might involve accidentally targeting the wrong systems Thus, a cyberattack on computer systems thought to control conventional weapons might be mistaken (and interpreted) as a direct attack on an adversary's ability to use its nuclear forces. Moreover, even if enemy cyberattacks are detected and mitigated, this could still lead to a "spiral of mistrust" and worst-case scenario thinking.' Third, cyberattacks might reduce the ability to signal, causing flawed images of intentions and capabilities, or be used to "spoof early warning systems"—again, a particular concern given the possibility of false flag cyber interference by third parties In this way, cyber operations are likely to further complicate and "muddy" signaling between adversaries during a crisis or conflict, either deliberately or inadvertently." Fourth, the use of cyberattacks might reduce the search for viable alternatives, thereby compressing—or at least muddying —the escalation ladder, particularly the steps between conventional and nuclear use. Unfortunately, this might create a spiral effect, and more pressure to "use them or lose them," when it comes to a state's most important military capabilities.66 In a worst-case scenario, these concerns might increase perceived time pressures to act or respond, and the option to act preemptively. Stephen Cimbala has even gone as far as to warn that a nuclear-armed state bombarded with cyberattacks—particularly on its command, control, communications, and early warning networks—might feel so vulnerable that it would opt for preemption, in the worst case with nuclear weapons Taken together, these dynamics raise the likelihood of unintended and potentially uncontrollable escalation and make the management of such crises more complicated and dangerous.

the use of cyber capabilities will complicate the escalation ladder hackers could disrupt communications channels reducing commanders' confidence in their weapons systems Aggressors might hamper battle management systems and make it more difficult to conduct a response a cyberattack on systems control weapons might be interpreted as a direct attack on nuclear forces this could still lead to a "spiral of mistrust" and worst-case thinking. cyberattacks might spoof early warning systems this might create pressure to "use them or lose them," and the option to act preemptively raise the likelihood of uncontrollable escalation

“What, then, might this cyber-enabled conflict, or warfare involving cyber operations, look like? And how might these pressures involve thinking about nuclear weapons? The first thing to note is that even if nuclear systems are not targeted directly or are successfully guarded against malicious hackers, it seems very likely that the use—or even the threat of use—of cyber capabilities against an opponent during a crisis will raise tensions, concerns, and perceived vulnerabilities, and that this will make nuclear crisis resolution more complicated and perhaps more dangerous." The second thing to note is that the use of cyber capabilities is likely to obfuscate and complicate the escalation ladder, and possibly lead to an inadvertent deepening of a crisis, perhaps even up to the nuclear level. It is likely to do this in different ways from those theorized in the past, and probably at a much greater speed. It could also, for example, include attacks in both civilian and military domains. Taken together, new cyber dynamics—both operations and context might even necessitate a rethinking of these established nuclear concepts altogether. Perhaps the most important thing to note about cyber operations in future crises and warfare is that they are likely to be offense-dominant. That is, in cyberspace the advantage will be held by the attackers rather than the defenders. Although this forecast is challenged by some, and is contingent on several variables—particularly the target and intention of the attack—it does have rather significant implications for the broader security dilemma, and especially for strategic stability.51 Along with creating pressures for arms racing, this also makes cyber capabilities more likely to be employed early in a crisis, particularly given the policy of active defense mentioned above.52 The result could potentially be greater insecurity for all, and possibly unintended, and in the worst-case scenario perhaps even unmanageable escalation. By way of an example, an Israeli war game conducted in 2013 demonstrated how the use and threat of cyberattacks might very quickly escalate a crisis, in this case bringing the United States and Russia to the brink of conflict in a possible Middle East war.53 Such conflicts might begin and play out in a number of different ways, but all will likely create new pressures for crisis management. First, during a crisis hackers could potentially disrupt or destroy communications channels, making it difficult to manage forces, including nuclear forces, and reducing commanders' confidence in their weapons systems and the ability of officials to communicate. Even a relatively small-scale attack could create considerable doubt about the security and reliability of communications, and particularly about the veracity of the information flowing from their computers.54 Moreover, despite often-held beliefs to the contrary, many military communications systems—including even some used for nuclear command and control—utilize commercial infrastructure or are based on networks that could be vulnerable to an attack or disruption.55 It must therefore be assumed that the linkages required for nuclear second-strike capabilities could also be unreliable, and possibly vulnerable to an opponents cyber operations.56 Aggressors might also employ distributed denial-of-service attacks to prevent communication, hamper battle management systems, magnify confusion, and make it more difficult to identify what is happening and perhaps to conduct a coordinated response. Such attacks might be particularly acute for nuclear dyads that are in close geographical proximity—and therefore face limited decision-making time—such as India and Pakistan." Second, the use of cyberattack capabilities might inadvertently escalate a crisis—very much building on the model of "inadvertent nuclear escalation" developed by Barry Posen back in the early 1990s.58 This might be due either to deliberate interference from a third-party actor—such as a terrorist group—or from an unauthorized insider, or by another state seeking to deepen the crisis through false flag operations (that is, operations conducted to look like they were carried out by someone else). Alternatively, it might involve accidentally targeting the wrong systems. This risk is amplified considerably in the cyber context because it is increasingly difficult to know which computer systems support which weapons and operations. For example, as Lawrence Cavaiola and his colleagues explain, "an attack [by the United States] on a Chinese system that is used to increase the readiness of tactical forces might also inadvertently degrade the readiness of Chinese strategic nuclear forces, with grave risks of misinterpretation and escalation, up to and including launch on warning."59 Thus, a cyberattack on computer systems thought to control conventional weapons might be mistaken (and interpreted) as a direct attack on an adversary's ability to use its nuclear forces. Moreover, even if enemy cyberattacks are detected and mitigated, this could still lead to a "spiral of mistrust" and worst-case scenario thinking.' Third, cyberattacks might reduce the ability to signal, causing flawed images of intentions and capabilities, or be used to "spoof early warning systems"—again, a particular concern given the possibility of false flag cyber interference by third parties. It is perfectly possible that the ability to clearly signal intentions could be one of the biggest challenges created by cyber operations for nuclear crisis management. The concern here is twofold. First, the cyber context will make communicating with an adversary (and your own forces) much more complicated. Second, it is far from clear that cyberattacks themselves offer a very useful way of signaling, and may in fact be worse than traditional methods. As Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay explain, this is because cyber operations "are complex, esoteric, and hard for commanders and policymakers to understand."6' Previous methods of signaling—such as seeking to indicate intentions or red lines to an adversary through limited conventional action, already a complicated and delicate endeavor—will probably be even more difficult to implement when cyberattacks are also involved.62 Moreover, given the difficulties of attribution—particularly when time is short, decision makers are under pressure, and third-party cyber activities abound—it may not be straightforward to ascertain when a conflict has actually stopped.63 In this way, cyber operations are likely to further complicate and "muddy" signaling between adversaries during a crisis or conflict, either deliberately or inadvertently." This would also, therefore, make the functioning of leadership far more complicated in any future nuclear crisis too. Fourth, the use of cyberattacks might reduce the search for viable alternatives, thereby compressing—or at least muddying —the escalation ladder, particularly the steps between conventional and nuclear use. Once hostilities begin, leaders may not feel confident that the information they are receiving is genuine; the same might also be true for commanders in the field. Each decision would be underpinned by an uneasiness about the veracity of the information and data being used, possibly leading to different types of calculations and actions.65 In addition to this, leaders would fear that cyber operations would be used early in a crisis to disable or retard their most important weapons systems and to prevent them from being used against an adversary. Unfortunately, this might create a spiral effect, and more pressure to "use them or lose them," when it comes to a state's most important military capabilities.66 In a worst-case scenario, these concerns might increase perceived time pressures to act or respond, and the option to act preemptively. Stephen Cimbala has even gone as far as to warn that a nuclear-armed state bombarded with cyberattacks—particularly on its command, control, communications, and early warning networks—might feel so vulnerable that it would opt for preemption, in the worst case with nuclear weapons.° This exacerbates the feeling that cyber operations could undermine the ability to threaten retaliation, and therefore to strike second, because cyber capabilities appear to augment conventional first-strike possibilities against key enemy systems and forces, including their nuclear weapons.68 Taken together, these dynamics raise the likelihood of unintended and potentially uncontrollable escalation and make the management of such crises more complicated and dangerous.

<h4>That escalates to nuclear war</h4><p><strong>Futter 18</strong> <u><strong>Andrew Futter (Andrew Futter is an associate professor in the School of History, Politics, and International Relations at the University of Leicester. He is the author of The Politics of Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy, the editor of The United Kingdom and the Future of Nuclear Weapons, and co-editor of Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs), 2018, “Hacking the Bomb: Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons,” Georgetown University Press, SJBE</p><p></u></strong>“What, then, might this cyber-enabled conflict, or warfare involving cyber operations, look like? And how might these pressures involve thinking about nuclear weapons? <u><strong>The first thing to note is that even if nuclear systems are not targeted directly or are successfully guarded against malicious hackers, it seems very likely that <mark>the use</mark>—or even the threat of use—<mark>of cyber capabilities </mark>against an opponent during a crisis <mark>will</mark> raise tensions, concerns, and perceived vulnerabilities, and that this will make nuclear crisis resolution more complicated and perhaps more dangerous." The second thing to note is that the use of cyber capabilities is likely to obfuscate and <mark>complicate the escalation ladder</mark>, and possibly lead to an inadvertent deepening of a crisis, perhaps even up to the nuclear level</u></strong>. It is likely to do this in different ways from those theorized in the past, and probably at a much greater speed. It could also, for example, include attacks in both civilian and military domains. Taken together, new cyber dynamics—both operations and context might even necessitate a rethinking of these established nuclear concepts altogether. Perhaps the most important thing to note about cyber operations in future crises and warfare is that they are likely to be offense-dominant. That is, in cyberspace the advantage will be held by the attackers rather than the defenders. Although this forecast is challenged by some, and is contingent on several variables—particularly the target and intention of the attack—it does have rather significant implications for the broader security dilemma, and especially for strategic stability.51 Along with creating pressures for arms racing, this also makes cyber capabilities more likely to be employed early in a crisis, particularly given the policy of active defense mentioned above.52 The result could potentially be greater insecurity for all, and possibly unintended, and in the worst-case scenario perhaps even unmanageable escalation. By way of an example, an Israeli war game conducted in 2013 demonstrated how the use and threat of cyberattacks might very quickly escalate a crisis, in this case bringing the United States and Russia to the brink of conflict in a possible Middle East war.53 Such conflicts might begin and play out in a number of different ways, but all will likely create new pressures for crisis management. <u><strong>First, during a crisis <mark>hackers could</mark> potentially <mark>disrupt</mark> or destroy <mark>communications channels</mark>, making it difficult to manage forces, including nuclear forces, and <mark>reducing commanders' confidence in their weapons systems</mark> and the ability of officials to communicate.</u></strong> Even a relatively small-scale attack could create considerable doubt about the security and reliability of communications, and particularly about the veracity of the information flowing from their computers.54 Moreover, despite often-held beliefs to the contrary, many military communications systems—including even some used for nuclear command and control—utilize commercial infrastructure or are based on networks that could be vulnerable to an attack or disruption.55 It must therefore be assumed that the linkages required for nuclear second-strike capabilities could also be unreliable, and possibly vulnerable to an opponents cyber operations.56 <u><strong><mark>Aggressors might</mark> also employ distributed denial-of-service attacks to prevent communication, <mark>hamper battle management systems</mark>, magnify confusion, <mark>and make it more difficult to</mark> identify what is happening and perhaps to <mark>conduct a </mark>coordinated <mark>response</mark>.</u></strong> Such attacks might be particularly acute for nuclear dyads that are in close geographical proximity—and therefore face limited decision-making time—such as India and Pakistan." <u><strong>Second, the use of cyberattack capabilities might inadvertently escalate a crisis—very much building on the model of "inadvertent nuclear escalation" developed by Barry Posen back in the early 1990s</u></strong>.58 This might be due either to deliberate interference from a third-party actor—such as a terrorist group—or from an unauthorized insider, or by another state seeking to deepen the crisis through false flag operations (that is, operations conducted to look like they were carried out by someone else). <u><strong>Alternatively, it might involve accidentally targeting the wrong systems</u></strong>. This risk is amplified considerably in the cyber context because it is increasingly difficult to know which computer systems support which weapons and operations. For example, as Lawrence Cavaiola and his colleagues explain, "an attack [by the United States] on a Chinese system that is used to increase the readiness of tactical forces might also inadvertently degrade the readiness of Chinese strategic nuclear forces, with grave risks of misinterpretation and escalation, up to and including launch on warning."59 <u><strong>Thus, <mark>a cyberattack on</mark> computer <mark>systems</mark> thought to <mark>control </mark>conventional <mark>weapons</mark> <mark>might be</mark> mistaken (and <mark>interpreted</mark>) <mark>as a direct attack on </mark>an adversary's ability to use its <mark>nuclear forces</mark>. Moreover, even if enemy cyberattacks are detected and mitigated, <mark>this could still lead to a "spiral of mistrust" and worst-case </mark>scenario <mark>thinking.</mark>' Third, <mark>cyberattacks</mark> <mark>might</mark> reduce the ability to signal, causing flawed images of intentions and capabilities, or be used to "<mark>spoof early warning systems</mark>"—again, a particular concern given the possibility of false flag cyber interference by third parties</u></strong>. It is perfectly possible that the ability to clearly signal intentions could be one of the biggest challenges created by cyber operations for nuclear crisis management. The concern here is twofold. First, the cyber context will make communicating with an adversary (and your own forces) much more complicated. Second, it is far from clear that cyberattacks themselves offer a very useful way of signaling, and may in fact be worse than traditional methods. As Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay explain, this is because cyber operations "are complex, esoteric, and hard for commanders and policymakers to understand."6' Previous methods of signaling—such as seeking to indicate intentions or red lines to an adversary through limited conventional action, already a complicated and delicate endeavor—will probably be even more difficult to implement when cyberattacks are also involved.62 Moreover, given the difficulties of attribution—particularly when time is short, decision makers are under pressure, and third-party cyber activities abound—it may not be straightforward to ascertain when a conflict has actually stopped.63 <u><strong>In this way, cyber operations are likely to further complicate and "muddy" signaling between adversaries during a crisis or conflict, either deliberately or inadvertently."</u></strong> This would also, therefore, make the functioning of leadership far more complicated in any future nuclear crisis too. <u><strong>Fourth, the use of cyberattacks might reduce the search for viable alternatives, thereby compressing—or at least muddying —the escalation ladder, particularly the steps between conventional and nuclear use.</u></strong> Once hostilities begin, leaders may not feel confident that the information they are receiving is genuine; the same might also be true for commanders in the field. Each decision would be underpinned by an uneasiness about the veracity of the information and data being used, possibly leading to different types of calculations and actions.65 In addition to this, leaders would fear that cyber operations would be used early in a crisis to disable or retard their most important weapons systems and to prevent them from being used against an adversary. <u><strong>Unfortunately, <mark>this might create</mark> a spiral effect, and more <mark>pressure to "use them or lose them,"</mark> when it comes to a state's most important military capabilities.66 In a worst-case scenario, these concerns might increase perceived time pressures to act or respond, <mark>and the option to act preemptively</mark>. Stephen Cimbala has even gone as far as to warn that a nuclear-armed state bombarded with cyberattacks—particularly on its command, control, communications, and early warning networks—might feel so vulnerable that it would opt for preemption, in the worst case with nuclear weapons</u></strong>.° This exacerbates the feeling that cyber operations could undermine the ability to threaten retaliation, and therefore to strike second, because cyber capabilities appear to augment conventional first-strike possibilities against key enemy systems and forces, including their nuclear weapons.68 <u><strong>Taken together, these dynamics <mark>raise the likelihood</mark> <mark>of</mark> unintended and potentially <mark>uncontrollable escalation</mark> and make the management of such crises more complicated and dangerous.</p></u></strong>

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The Plan solves Evergreening.

Feldman 3

Feldman 3 Robin Feldman 2-11-2019 "‘One-and-done’ for new drugs could cut patent thickets and boost generic competition" https://www.statnews.com/2019/02/11/drug-patent-protection-one-done/ (Arthur J. Goldberg Distinguished Professor of Law, Albert Abramson ’54 Distinguished Professor of Law Chair, and Director of the Center for Innovation)//SidK + Elmer

I believe that one period of protection should be enough. We should make the legal changes necessary to prevent companies from building patent walls and piling up mountains of rights. This could be accomplished by a “one-and-done” approach for patent protection. Under it, a drug would receive just one period of exclusivity, and no more Perhaps development of the drug went swiftly and smoothly, so the remaining life of one of the drug’s patents is of greatest value The choice would be up to the company itself, based on its own calculation of the maximum benefit. The result, however, is that a pharmaceutical company chooses whether its period of exclusivity would be a patent, an orphan drug designation, a period of data exclusivity (in which no generic is allowed to use the original drug’s safety and effectiveness data), or something else — but not all of the above and more The drug’s maker has extended its protection cliff eight times, including obtaining an orphan drug designation, which is intended for drugs that serve only a small number of patients That makes almost two additional decades in which the public has borne the burden of monopoly pricing, and access to the medicine may have been constrained Implementing one-and-done That way, one-and-done could be implemented through legislative changes to the FDA’s drug approval system, and would apply to patents granted going forward. Pharmaceutical companies have become adept at maneuvering through the system of patent and non-patent rights to create mountains of rights that can be applied, one after another.

one period of protection should be enough make legal changes to prevent companies from building patent walls accomplished by a “one-and-done” approach The result is that a company chooses whether exclusivity would be a patent orphan drug designation data exclusivity but not all of the above Implementing one-and-done through legislative changes to the FDA’s drug approval system

I believe that one period of protection should be enough. We should make the legal changes necessary to prevent companies from building patent walls and piling up mountains of rights. This could be accomplished by a “one-and-done” approach for patent protection. Under it, a drug would receive just one period of exclusivity, and no more. The choice of which “one” could be left entirely in the hands of the pharmaceutical company, with the election made when the FDA approves the drug. Perhaps development of the drug went swiftly and smoothly, so the remaining life of one of the drug’s patents is of greatest value. Perhaps development languished, so designation as an orphan drug or some other benefit would bring greater reward. The choice would be up to the company itself, based on its own calculation of the maximum benefit. The result, however, is that a pharmaceutical company chooses whether its period of exclusivity would be a patent, an orphan drug designation, a period of data exclusivity (in which no generic is allowed to use the original drug’s safety and effectiveness data), or something else — but not all of the above and more. Consider Suboxone, a combination of buprenorphine and naloxone for treating opioid addiction. The drug’s maker has extended its protection cliff eight times, including obtaining an orphan drug designation, which is intended for drugs that serve only a small number of patients. The drug’s first period of exclusivity ended in 2005, but with the additions its protection now lasts until 2024. That makes almost two additional decades in which the public has borne the burden of monopoly pricing, and access to the medicine may have been constrained. Implementing a one-and-done approach in conjunction with FDA approval underscores the fact that these problems and solutions are designed for pharmaceuticals, not for all types of technologies. That way, one-and-done could be implemented through legislative changes to the FDA’s drug approval system, and would apply to patents granted going forward. One-and-done would apply to both patents and exclusivities. A more limited approach, a baby step if you will, would be to invigorate the existing patent obviousness doctrine as a way to cut back on patent tinkering. Obviousness, one of the five standards for patent eligibility, says that inventions that are obvious to an expert or the general public can’t be patented. Either by congressional clarification or judicial interpretation, many pile-on patents could be eliminated with a ruling that the core concept of the additional patent is nothing more than the original formulation. Anything else is merely an obvious adaptation of the core invention, modified with existing technology. As such, the patent would fail for being perfectly obvious. Even without congressional action, a more vigorous and robust application of the existing obviousness doctrine could significantly improve the problem of piled-up patents and patent walls. Pharmaceutical companies have become adept at maneuvering through the system of patent and non-patent rights to create mountains of rights that can be applied, one after another. This behavior lets drug companies keep competitors out of the market and beat them back when they get there. We shouldn’t be surprised at this. Pharmaceutical companies are profit-making entities, after all, that face pressure from their shareholders to produce ever-better results. If we want to change the system, we must change the incentives driving the system. And right now, the incentives for creating patent walls are just too great.

<h4>The Plan <u>solves Evergreening</u>.</h4><p><strong>Feldman 3</strong> Robin Feldman 2-11-2019 "‘One-and-done’ for new drugs could cut patent thickets and boost generic competition" https://www.statnews.com/2019/02/11/drug-patent-protection-one-done/ (Arthur J. Goldberg Distinguished Professor of Law, Albert Abramson ’54 Distinguished Professor of Law Chair, and Director of the Center for Innovation)//SidK + Elmer </p><p><u>I believe that <mark>one period of protection <strong>should be enough</strong></mark>. We should <mark>make </mark>the <mark>legal changes </mark>necessary <mark>to prevent companies <strong>from building patent walls</strong> </mark>and piling up mountains of rights. This could be <mark>accomplished <strong>by a “one-and-done” approach</strong> </mark>for patent protection. Under it, a drug would receive just one period of exclusivity, and no more</u>. The choice of which “one” could be left entirely in the hands of the pharmaceutical company, with the election made when the FDA approves the drug. <u>Perhaps development of the drug went swiftly and smoothly, so the remaining life of one of the drug’s patents is of greatest value</u>. Perhaps development languished, so designation as an orphan drug or some other benefit would bring greater reward. <u>The choice would be up to the company itself, based on its own calculation of the maximum benefit.</u> <u><mark>The result</mark>, however, <mark>is that a </mark>pharmaceutical <mark>company chooses whether </mark>its period of <mark>exclusivity would be a patent</mark>, an <mark>orphan drug designation</mark>, a period of <mark>data exclusivity </mark>(in which no generic is allowed to use the original drug’s safety and effectiveness data), or something else — <mark>but <strong>not all of the above </strong></mark>and more</u>. Consider Suboxone, a combination of buprenorphine and naloxone for treating opioid addiction. <u>The drug’s maker has extended its protection cliff eight times, including obtaining an orphan drug designation, which is intended for drugs that serve only a small number of patients</u>. The drug’s first period of exclusivity ended in 2005, but with the additions its protection now lasts until 2024. <u>That makes almost two additional decades in which the public has borne the burden of monopoly pricing, and access to the medicine may have been constrained</u>. <u><mark>Implementing</u> </mark>a <u><mark>one-and-done</u> </mark>approach in conjunction with FDA approval underscores the fact that these problems and solutions are designed for pharmaceuticals, not for all types of technologies. <u>That way, one-and-done could be implemented <mark>through <strong>legislative changes to the FDA’s drug approval system</strong></mark>, and would apply to patents granted going forward.</u> One-and-done would apply to both patents and exclusivities. A more limited approach, a baby step if you will, would be to invigorate the existing patent obviousness doctrine as a way to cut back on patent tinkering. Obviousness, one of the five standards for patent eligibility, says that inventions that are obvious to an expert or the general public can’t be patented. Either by congressional clarification or judicial interpretation, many pile-on patents could be eliminated with a ruling that the core concept of the additional patent is nothing more than the original formulation. Anything else is merely an obvious adaptation of the core invention, modified with existing technology. As such, the patent would fail for being perfectly obvious. Even without congressional action, a more vigorous and robust application of the existing obviousness doctrine could significantly improve the problem of piled-up patents and patent walls. <u>Pharmaceutical companies have become adept at maneuvering through the system of patent and non-patent rights to create mountains of rights that can be applied, one after another.</u> This behavior lets drug companies keep competitors out of the market and beat them back when they get there. We shouldn’t be surprised at this. Pharmaceutical companies are profit-making entities, after all, that face pressure from their shareholders to produce ever-better results. If we want to change the system, we must change the incentives driving the system. And right now, the incentives for creating patent walls are just too great.</p>

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Immigration kills the economy – wage deflation, government spending, and inequality more than offset any gains

Borjas 16

George J. Borjas 16 {professor of economics and social policy at the Harvard Kennedy School} - ("Yes, Immigration Hurts American Workers," POLITICO Magazine, published September/October 2016, accessed 12-17-2022, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/trump-clinton-immigration-economy-unemployment-jobs-214216/)//marlborough-wr/

anyone who tells you that immigration doesn’t have any negative effects doesn’t understand how it really works. When the supply of workers goes up, the price that firms have to pay to hire workers goes down. Wage trends over the past half-century suggest that a 10 percent increase in the number of workers with a particular set of skills probably lowers the wage of that group by at least 3 percent. Even after the economy has fully adjusted, those skill groups that received the most immigrants will still offer lower pay relative to those that received fewer immigrants. because a disproportionate percentage of immigrants have few skills, it is low-skilled workers who have suffered most from this wage dip. The monetary loss is sizable. The typical high school dropout earns about $25,000 annually. According to census data, immigrants admitted in the past two decades lacking a high school diploma have increased the size of the low-skilled workforce by roughly 25 percent. As a result, the earnings of this particularly vulnerable group dropped by between $800 and $1,500 each year. A decade ago, Crider Inc was raided by immigration agents, and 75 percent of its workforce vanished over a single weekend. Shortly after, Crider placed an ad in the local newspaper announcing job openings at higher wages. abuse of the H-1B visa program shows that firms will quickly dismiss their current tech workforce when they find cheaper immigrant workers. immigration redistributes wealth from those who compete with immigrants to those who use immigrants—from the employee to the employer The total wealth redistribution from the native losers to the native winners is enormous, roughly a half-trillion dollars a year. Immigrants, too, gain substantially; their total earnings far exceed what their income would have been had they not migrated. Immigrants receive government assistance at higher rates than natives. The higher cost of all the services provided to immigrants and the lower taxes they pay (because they have lower earnings) inevitably implies that on a year-to-year basis immigration creates a fiscal hole of at least $50 billion—a burden that falls on the native population. The fiscal burden offsets the gain from the $50 billion immigration surplus changed how the pie is split, with the losers—the workers who compete with immigrants, many of those being low-skilled sending a roughly $500 billion check annually to the winners. Those winners are primarily their employers immigration turns out to be just another income redistribution program.

When supply of workers goes up price to hire goes down a 10 percent increase lowers wage at least 3 percent Even after the economy fully adjusted low-skilled workers suffered most The monetary loss is sizable abuse of 1B shows firms will dismiss current workforce when they find cheaper immigrant workers. immigration redistributes wealth from those who compete to those who use from the employee to the employer total wealth redistribution is enormous half-trillion dollars a year Immigrants receive government assistance at higher rates higher cost and lower taxes implies immigration creates a fiscal hole The fiscal burden offsets gain winners are primarily employers immigration turns out to be income redistribution

This second message might be hard for many Americans to process, but anyone who tells you that immigration doesn’t have any negative effects doesn’t understand how it really works. When the supply of workers goes up, the price that firms have to pay to hire workers goes down. Wage trends over the past half-century suggest that a 10 percent increase in the number of workers with a particular set of skills probably lowers the wage of that group by at least 3 percent. Even after the economy has fully adjusted, those skill groups that received the most immigrants will still offer lower pay relative to those that received fewer immigrants. Both low- and high-skilled natives are affected by the influx of immigrants. But because a disproportionate percentage of immigrants have few skills, it is low-skilled American workers, including many blacks and Hispanics, who have suffered most from this wage dip. The monetary loss is sizable. The typical high school dropout earns about $25,000 annually. According to census data, immigrants admitted in the past two decades lacking a high school diploma have increased the size of the low-skilled workforce by roughly 25 percent. As a result, the earnings of this particularly vulnerable group dropped by between $800 and $1,500 each year. We don’t need to rely on complex statistical calculations to see the harm being done to some workers. Simply look at how employers have reacted. A decade ago, Crider Inc., a chicken processing plant in Georgia, was raided by immigration agents, and 75 percent of its workforce vanished over a single weekend. Shortly after, Crider placed an ad in the local newspaper announcing job openings at higher wages. Similarly, the flood of recent news reports on abuse of the H-1B visa program shows that firms will quickly dismiss their current tech workforce when they find cheaper immigrant workers. But that’s only one side of the story. Somebody’s lower wage is always somebody else’s higher profit. In this case, immigration redistributes wealth from those who compete with immigrants to those who use immigrants—from the employee to the employer. And the additional profits are so large that the economic pie accruing to all natives actually grows. I estimate the current “immigration surplus”—the net increase in the total wealth of the native population—to be about$50 billion annually. But behind that calculation is a much larger shift from one group of Americans to another: The total wealth redistribution from the native losers to the native winners is enormous, roughly a half-trillion dollars a year. Immigrants, too, gain substantially; their total earnings far exceed what their income would have been had they not migrated. When we look at the overall value of immigration, there’s one more complicating factor: Immigrants receive government assistance at higher rates than natives. The higher cost of all the services provided to immigrants and the lower taxes they pay (because they have lower earnings) inevitably implies that on a year-to-year basis immigration creates a fiscal hole of at least $50 billion—a burden that falls on the native population. What does it all add up to? The fiscal burden offsets the gain from the $50 billion immigration surplus, so it’s not too farfetched to conclude that immigration has barely affected the total wealth of natives at all. Instead, it has changed how the pie is split, with the losers—the workers who compete with immigrants, many of those being low-skilled Americans—sending a roughly $500 billion check annually to the winners. Those winners are primarily their employers. And the immigrants themselves come out ahead, too. Put bluntly, immigration turns out to be just another income redistribution program. Focus of econ promotes capitalism which is the root issue for all impacts.

<h4>Immigration kills the economy – wage deflation, government spending, and inequality more than offset any gains</h4><p>George J. <strong>Borjas 16</strong> {professor of economics and social policy at the Harvard Kennedy School} - ("Yes, Immigration Hurts American Workers," POLITICO Magazine, published September/October 2016<u>, accessed 12-17-2022, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/trump-clinton-immigration-economy-unemployment-jobs-214216/)//marlborough-wr/</p><p></u>This second message might be hard for many Americans to process, but <u>anyone who tells you that immigration doesn’t have any negative effects doesn’t understand how it really works. <mark>When</mark> the <mark>supply</mark> <mark>of workers goes up</mark>, <strong>the <mark>price</mark> that firms have to pay <mark>to hire</mark> workers <mark>goes down</strong></mark>. Wage trends over the past half-century suggest that <mark>a 10 percent increase</mark> in the number of workers with a particular set of skills probably <mark>lowers</mark> the <mark>wage</mark> of that group by <mark>at least 3 percent</mark>. <strong><mark>Even after the economy</mark> has <mark>fully</mark> <mark>adjusted</strong></mark>, those skill groups that received the most immigrants will still offer lower pay relative to those that received fewer immigrants.</p><p></u>Both low- and high-skilled natives are affected by the influx of immigrants. But <u>because a disproportionate percentage of immigrants have few skills, it is <mark>low-skilled</u></mark> American <u><mark>workers</u></mark>, including many blacks and Hispanics, <u>who have <mark>suffered</mark> <mark>most</mark> from this wage dip. <strong><mark>The monetary loss is sizable</strong></mark>. The typical high school dropout earns about $25,000 annually. According to census data, immigrants admitted in the past two decades lacking a high school diploma have increased the size of the low-skilled workforce by roughly 25 percent. As a result, the earnings of this particularly vulnerable group dropped by between $800 and $1,500 each year.</p><p></u>We don’t need to rely on complex statistical calculations to see the harm being done to some workers. Simply look at how employers have reacted. <u>A decade ago, Crider Inc</u>., a chicken processing plant in Georgia, <u>was raided by immigration agents, and 75 percent of its workforce vanished over a single weekend. Shortly after, Crider placed an ad in the local newspaper announcing job openings at higher wages.</u> Similarly, the flood of recent news reports on <u><mark>abuse of</mark> the H-<mark>1B</mark> visa program <mark>shows</mark> that <mark>firms</mark> <mark>will</mark> quickly <mark>dismiss</mark> their <mark>current</mark> tech <mark>workforce</mark> <mark>when they find cheaper immigrant workers.</p><p></u></mark>But that’s only one side of the story. Somebody’s lower wage is always somebody else’s higher profit. In this case, <u><mark>immigration</mark> <mark>redistributes</mark> <mark>wealth</mark> <mark>from those who compete</mark> with immigrants <mark>to those who use</mark> immigrants—<strong><mark>from the employee to the employer</u></strong></mark>. And the additional profits are so large that the economic pie accruing to all natives actually grows. I estimate the current “immigration surplus”—the net increase in the total wealth of the native population—to be about$50 billion annually. But behind that calculation is a much larger shift from one group of Americans to another: <u>The <mark>total wealth redistribution</mark> from the native losers to the native winners <mark>is</mark> <mark>enormous</mark>, roughly a <mark>half-trillion dollars a year</mark>. Immigrants, too, gain substantially; their total earnings far exceed what their income would have been had they not migrated.</p><p></u>When we look at the overall value of immigration, there’s one more complicating factor: <u><mark>Immigrants</mark> <mark>receive <strong>government assistance</strong></mark> <mark>at</mark> <mark>higher rates</mark> than natives. The <mark>higher cost</mark> of all the services provided to immigrants <mark>and</mark> the <mark>lower taxes</mark> they pay (because they have lower earnings) inevitably <mark>implies</mark> that on a year-to-year basis <mark>immigration creates a fiscal hole<strong></mark> of at least $50 billion—a burden that falls on the native population.</p><p></u></strong>What does it all add up to? <u><mark>The fiscal burden offsets</mark> the <mark>gain</mark> from the $50 billion immigration surplus</u>, so it’s not too farfetched to conclude that immigration has barely affected the total wealth of natives at all. Instead, it has <u>changed how the pie is split, with the losers—the workers who compete with immigrants, many of those being low-skilled</u> Americans—<u>sending a roughly $500 billion check annually to the winners. <strong>Those <mark>winners are</mark> <mark>primarily</mark> their <mark>employers</u></strong></mark>. And the immigrants themselves come out ahead, too. Put bluntly, <u><mark>immigration</mark> <mark>turns out to be</mark> just another <strong><mark>income redistribution</mark> program.</p><p></u></strong>Focus of econ promotes capitalism which is the root issue for all impacts. </p>

ECON

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Prior questions are infinite — prioritizing action essential to marginalized groups.

Cochran 99 —

Cochran 99 — Molly, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute for Technology, “Normative Theory in International Relations”, 1999, pg. 272

while postmodernist debates continue, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately identify as a ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the relationship between discourse and experience, it is important that we proceed with analysis of the material This holds for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty. Important political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered. Those answers may be unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an alternative order to appear before an agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a question of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision. The two can and should be pursued together, and can be via imagination

while debates continue it is important that we proceed with analysis of the material This holds for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending moral inclusion in the present climate of epistemological uncertainty. Important political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for meta questions to be answered Nor can we wait for a credible alternative order to appear before an agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a question of which comes first: sorting out metatheoretical issues or working out a credible institutional vision. The two can be pursued together via imagination

To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates continue, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the relationship between discourse and experience, it is particularly important for feminists that we proceed with analysis of both the material (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This holds not only for feminists, but for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty. Important ethical/political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered. Those answers may be unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an alternative institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision. The two questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.

<h4>Prior questions are infinite — prioritizing action essential to marginalized groups.</h4><p><strong>Cochran 99 — </strong>Molly, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute for Technology, “Normative Theory in International Relations”, 1999, pg. 272</p><p>To conclude this chapter, <u><mark>while</u></mark> modernist and <u>postmodernist <mark>debates continue</mark>, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately identify as a</u> feminist <u>ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the relationship between discourse and experience<strong>, <mark>it is</u></strong></mark> particularly <u><strong><mark>important</u></strong></mark> for feminists <u><strong><mark>that we proceed with analysis of</u></strong></mark> both <u><strong><mark>the material</u></strong></mark> (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. <u><mark>This holds</mark> </u>not only for feminists, but <u><mark>for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending</mark> further <mark>moral inclusion in the present</mark> social sciences <mark>climate of epistemological uncertainty. <strong>Important</u></strong></mark> ethical/<u><strong><mark>political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for</mark> the <mark>meta</mark>-theoretical <mark>questions to be</mark> conclusively <mark>answered</strong></mark>. Those answers may be unavailable.</u> <u><mark>Nor can we wait for a credible</mark> vision of an <strong><mark>alt</strong>ernative</u></mark> institutional <u><mark>order to appear before an</u></mark> emancipatory <u><mark>agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a</u></mark> chicken and egg <u><mark>question of which comes first: sorting out</mark> the <mark>metatheoretical issues or working out</mark> which practices contribute to <mark>a credible institutional vision. The two</u></mark> questions <u><mark>can</mark> and should <mark>be pursued together</mark>, and can be <mark>via</u></mark> moral <u><mark>imagination</u></mark>. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.</p>

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They Say: “Reps Prior Question”

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