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Chapter 13 Geneva Conventions, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, to six provisions of Common Article 3. (See figure 13-1 for a list of these provisions.) (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, to include members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. (2) To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) Taking of hostages; (c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. (3) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. (4) An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. (5) The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. (6) The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict. Figure 13-1. Provisions binding high contracting parties APPLICATION OF CRIMINAL LAWS OF A HOST NATION 13-37. There is no concept of prisoner-of-war status in non-international armed conflict, as reflected in Common Article 3. Insurgents may be prosecuted by a host nation as criminals for offenses related to participation in hostilities, such as bearing arms against government forces. Similarly, U.S. forces captured by insurgents are not prisoners of war, but must be treated in accordance with Common Article 3. U.S. forces conducting counterinsurgency operations should remember that the insurgents are, as a legal matter, criminal suspects within the legal system of a host nation. To support criminal prosecution of insurgents, counterinsurgents must develop and implement procedures to carefully preserve weapons, witness statements, photographs, and other evidence collected at a scene. This evidence is used to process the insurgents into a host-nation legal system and hold them accountable for their crimes, thus promoting the rule of law. 13-38. U.S. personnel may be subject to host-nation law, depending on the terms of any existing status of forces agreement between a host nation and the U.S. Status of forces agreements establish the legal status of military personnel in foreign countries and generally provide the U.S. military some level of protection from host-nation criminal jurisdiction. In the absence of an agreement or some other arrangement with the host nation, DOD personnel in foreign countries may be subject to the criminal law of that host nation. DETENTION AND INTERROGATION 13-39. Human intelligence is essential in counterinsurgency operations. Acquiring human intelligence requires interrogation. The need for intelligence within a counterinsurgency, especially in conjunction with a third country or host-nation capture and detention scenario, can create great pressure to obtain time-sensitive information from detained individuals and suspected insurgents. Soldiers and Marines adhere to only approved detainee handling methods and interrogation techniques. In addition to complying with the law of war, U.S. forces must comply with domestic legal authorities such as the Detainee

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Legal Considerations Treatment Act of 2005, DODD 3115.09, FM 2-22.3, and other specific standards that guide U.S. forces working with detainees. DETAINEE TREATMENT ACT OF 2005 13-40. U.S. law prohibits U.S. forces, including officials from other government agencies, from using certain methods to obtain information. In response to documented instances of detainee abuse, to include maltreatment involving interrogation, Congress passed, and the President signed into law, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. (See table 13-1 for an extract of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.) Table 13-1. Extract of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 Section 1002: Uniform Standards for the Interrogation of Persons Under the Detention of the Department of Defense (a) In General.—No person in the custody or under the effective control of the Department of Defense or under detention in a Department of Defense facility shall be subject to any treatment or technique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in the United States Army Field Manuel on Intelligence Interrogation [FM 2-22.3]. (b) Applicability—Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to any person in the custody or under the effective control of the Department of Defense pursuant to a criminal law or immigration law of the United States. (c) Construction.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the rights under the United States Constitution of any person in the custody or under the physical jurisdiction of the United States. Section 1003: Prohibition on Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of Persons Under Custody or Control of the United States Government (a) In General—No individual in custody or under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. (b) Construction—Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose any geographical limitation on the applicability of the prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment under this section. (c) Limitation on Supersedure.—The provision of this section shall not be superseded, except by a provision of law enacted after the date of the enactment of this Act which specifically repeals, modifies, or supersedes the provisions of this section. (d) Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment defined.—In this section, the term “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” means the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, as defined in the United States Reservations, Declarations and Understandings to the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment done at New York, December 10, 1984. INTERROGATION FIELD MANUAL 13-41. The Detainee Treatment Act established FM 2-22.3 as the legal standard for interrogations. U.S. forces may not use any interrogation technique other than those prescribed by FM 2-22.3. Commanders ensure that interrogators receive proper training and supervision. Executive Order 13491 extends this requirement to all U.S. government agencies. STANDARDS FOR DETENTION AND INTERNMENT 13-42. Regardless of the precise legal status of those persons captured, detained, or otherwise held in custody by U.S. forces, they must receive humane treatment until properly released to host-nation authorities, who then assume legal responsibility. They must be provided the minimum protections of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions. Specially trained, organized, and equipped military police units in adequately designed and resourced facilities should accomplish prolonged detention. Such

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Chapter 13 detention must follow the detailed standards contained in Army Regulation 190-8/Marine Corps Order 3461.1. Military police operating such facilities shall not be used to assist in or set the conditions for interrogation. TRANSFER OF DETAINEES TO THE HOST NATION 13-43. There are certain conditions under which U.S. forces may not transfer the custody of detainees to the host nation or any other foreign government. U.S. forces retain custody if they have substantial grounds to believe that the detainees would be in danger in the custody of others. Such danger could include being subjected to torture or inhumane treatment. (See DODD 2310.01E for more information on transferring detainees and consult the legal advisor or staff judge advocate.) ENFORCING DISCIPLINE OF U.S. FORCES 13-44. Despite rigorous selection and training, some personnel will commit infractions requiring discipline. The Uniform Code of Military Justice is the criminal code applicable to all U.S. military members and, in time of declared war or contingency operations, other persons serving with or accompanying U.S. armed forces in the field. Commanders and general officers are responsible for their subordinates and their behavior. Commanders must give clear guidance and ensure compliance. All civilians, including contractors, working in support of operations of the U.S. forces overseas must comply with the law of war. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 13-45. Although most well-led and well-trained U.S. military personnel perform their duties honorably and lawfully, some will commit various crimes, including violations of the law of war. U.S. military personnel remain subject at all times to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Suspected criminal behavior must be investigated and, where appropriate, remedied by corrective action. This includes violations of orders, maltreatment of detainees, assaults, thefts, sexual offenses, destruction of property, and other crimes, to include homicides, which may be committed during a counterinsurgency. All reportable incidents committed by or against U.S. personnel, enemy persons, or any other individual must be reported promptly, investigated thoroughly, and, where appropriate, remedied by corrective action. A reportable incident is a possible, suspected, or alleged violation of the law of war, for which there is credible information, or conduct during any operation in the range of military operations that would constitute a violation of the law of war if it occurred during an armed conflict. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 13-46. In some cases, military commanders may be deemed responsible for crimes committed by subordinates or others subject to their control. This situation arises when the criminal acts are committed pursuant to the commander’s order. A commander is legally responsible for a war crime committed by that commander’s subordinates if that commander knew, or should have known, that the subordinates were about to commit the violation and the commander did nothing to prevent it or that the subordinates had committed the violation and the commander failed to address the violation. Commanders must know that under international law, commanders are responsible if they know, or should have known, their subordinates are about to commit or have committed a violation of the law of war. In a counterinsurgency environment, where compliance with the law of war is critical to the success of the mission, commanders should expect to be held accountable for failing to report and investigate reportable incidents. Commanders may not ignore credible information that indicates U.S. forces may have committed, intend to commit, or are in the process of committing violations of the law of war. In addition, commanders must pay close attention to the command climate within their units. Commanders must foster a climate through leadership and training that helps Soldiers and Marines understand the critical need to abide by the law of war, in particular, to distinguish between civilians and insurgents, to refrain from unnecessarily harming civilians, and to treat detainees in accordance with all applicable laws, policies, and regulations.

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Legal Considerations GENERAL ORDERS 13-47. Orders issued by general officers in command during counterinsurgency will include provisions, such as a prohibition against drinking alcohol or against entering host-nation places of religious worship, important to maintaining discipline of the force. These types of orders safeguard the image of U.S. forces and promote the legitimacy of a host-nation government. These types of orders are readily enforceable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AND CONTRACTORS 13-48. Modern counterinsurgency operations involve many DOD civilians as well as civilian personnel employed by government contractors. These civilians may be made subject to general orders. They are subject to U.S. laws and to the laws of the host nation. These civilians may be prosecuted or receive adverse administrative action by the U.S. or contract employers. Article 2(a)(10) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides court-martial jurisdiction over persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field during a time of declared war or a contingency operation. Under this authority, commanders have Uniform Code of Military Justice authority to disarm, apprehend, and detain DOD civilians and contractors suspected of having committed a felony offense in violation of the rules for the use of force, or outside the scope of their authorized mission, and to conduct the basic Uniform Code of Military Justice pretrial process and trial procedures currently applicable to courts-martial of military service members. Before bringing a DOD civilian or contractor to a court-martial, however, the Department of Justice must have the opportunity to review and determine whether it will pursue the matter pursuant to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. This act extends federal criminal jurisdiction over felony offenses committed by DOD civilians, contractor personnel, and others while employed by or accompany the armed forces overseas. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act is implemented within the DOD by DODI 5525.11. Third country nationals employed by U.S. forces are covered under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, but host-nation personnel are not. TRAINING AND EQUIPPING FOREIGN FORCES 13-49. Foreign forces need training and equipment to be effective. U.S. laws require Congress to authorize such expenditures. U.S. laws require the Department of State to verify that the host nation receiving the assistance has not engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. All training and equipping of foreign security forces must be specifically authorized. Usually, DOD involvement is limited to a precise level of man-hours and materiel requested from the Department of State under the Foreign Assistance Act or Arms Export Control Act. The President may authorize deployed U.S. forces to train or advise host-nation security forces as part of an operational mission. In this case, DOD personnel and operation and maintenance appropriations provide an incidental benefit to those security forces. All other weapons, training, equipment, logistic support, supplies, and services provided to foreign forces must be paid for with funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose. Examples include the Iraq Security Forces Fund and the Afghan Security Forces Fund appropriations. Moreover, the President must give specific authority to DOD for its role in such training and equipping efforts. 13-50. In counterinsurgency, like all operations, commands require specific authority to expend funds. That authority is normally found in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), specifically, operation and maintenance funds. In recent counterinsurgency operations, Congress appropriated additional funds to commanders for the specific purpose of dealing with counterinsurgency. Recent examples include the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program, Global Train and Equip Program, and the Global Security Contingency Fund. DOD FUNDS GENERALLY NOT EXPENDABLE BY COMMANDERS FOR THIS PURPOSE 13-51. Congress specifically appropriates funds for foreign assistance. The United States Agency for International Development expends such funds under the legal authorities in Title 22. Provisions of Title 22 authorize small amounts of money. These funds are appropriated annually for commanders to provide humanitarian relief, disaster relief, or civic assistance in conjunction with military operations. These

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Chapter 13 standing authorities are narrowly defined and generally require significant advance coordination within the DOD and the Department of State. As such, they are of limited value to ongoing counterinsurgency operations. COMMANDER’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM 13-52. The Commanders’ Emergency Response Program is a statutory authorization to obligate funds from the DOD operation and maintenance appropriation for the primary purpose of authorizing U.S. military commanders to carry out small-scale projects designed to meet urgent humanitarian relief requirements or urgent reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility that provide an immediate and direct benefit to the people of Afghanistan. When authorized, Commanders’ Emergency Response Program authority is found in annual NDAAs. Notably, the authority to use Commanders’ Emergency Response Program in Iraq was specifically repealed, eliminating the use of Commanders’ Emergency Response Program in Iraq. The Commanders’ Emergency Response Program is one of the most important authorities commanders have in Afghanistan. 13-53. Some NDAAs include waiver authority for certain contracting requirements for the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program, enabling the use of streamlined contracting procedures. For example, one NDAA provided that, “[f]or purposes of the exercise of the authority provided by this section or any other provision of law making funding available for the [Commanders’ Emergency Response Program] ... the Secretary may waive any provision of law not contained in this section that would (but for the waiver) prohibit, restrict, limit, or otherwise constrain the exercise of that authority.” As a result, the Secretary of Defense has periodically waived the Competition in Contracting Act requirements for Commanders’ Emergency Response Program-funded projects. Therefore, Commanders’ Emergency Response Program-funded projects did not need to follow the competition requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. 13-54. In addition to being authorized for certain types of projects to assist the civilian population affected by an insurgency, Commanders’ Emergency Response Program funds are often available for payment to host-nation civilians in certain specified situations. For example, under the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program for Afghanistan, appropriated funds may be used to repair property damage that results from U.S., multinational, or supporting military operations that are not otherwise compensable under the Foreign Claims Act. These funds can also be used for condolence payments to individual civilians for the death or physical injury resulting from U.S., multinational, or supporting military operations that are not compensable under the Foreign Claims Act. Such payments include payments to surviving spouse or kin of defense or police personnel killed because of U.S., multinational, or supporting military operations. On the other hand, Commanders’ Emergency Response Program for Afghanistan funds may not be used to pay rewards or fund any type of weapon buy-back program. Instead, a provision in U.S. Code authorizes a rewards problem. GLOBAL TRAIN AND EQUIP OR BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY 13-55. Other NDAA provisions have recently authorized DOD to build the capacity of foreign military forces in support of overseas contingency operations. Current NDAA Train and Equip authority allows DOD to build the capacity of a foreign country's national military forces in order for that country to— * Conduct counterterrorist operations. * Participate in or support military and stability operations in which the U.S forces are a participant. This authority includes building the capacity of maritime security forces conducting counterinsurgency operations. GLOBAL SECURITY CONTINGENCY FUND 13-56. Congress has used the NDAA to authorize the Global Security Contingency Fund, which provides funds to the Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense to provide assistance to designated countries for the purposes of enhancing the country’s national military forces, and other national security forces that conduct

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Legal Considerations border and maritime security, internal defense, and counterterrorism operations. Funds provided may also be used for the justice sector, including law enforcement and prisons, rule of law programs, and stabilization efforts in a country in those cases in which the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines that the conflict or instability in a country or region challenges the existing capability of civilian providers to deliver such assistance. Funds come from both DOD operation and maintenance appropriations and Department of State funds. HUMAN RIGHTS VETTING 13-57. Congress typically limits when it funds training or equipment for foreign security forces under provisions commonly known as the Leahy Amendment or Leahy vetting procedures. If the Department of State has credible information that the foreign security force unit identified to receive the training or equipment has engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, Congress prohibits funding. Such prohibitions impose a requirement upon Department of State and DOD. These departments must vet the proposed recipient units against a database of credible reports of human rights violations. CLAIMS AND SOLATIA 13-58. Under certain conditions, the U.S. government makes payments to host-nation civilians. The Foreign Claims Act permits certain claims to be filed against the U.S. government. In some countries, solatia payments are available. FOREIGN CLAIMS ACT 13-59. Under the Foreign Claims Act, claims by host-nation civilians for property losses, injury, or death caused by service members or the civilian component of the U.S. forces may be paid to promote and maintain friendly relations with a host nation. Claims that result from noncombat activities or negligent or wrongful acts or omissions are payable. Claims that are not payable under the Foreign Claims Act include losses from combat, contractual matters, domestic obligations, and claims that are either not in the best interest of the U.S. to pay or that are contrary to public policy. Because payment of claims requires adjudication of the claim and because many claims prove, upon investigation, to be not payable, U.S. forces must be careful not to raise expectations by promising payment. SOLATIA 13-60. If U.S. forces are conducting counterinsurgency in a country where payments in sympathy or recognition of loss are common, solatia payments to accident victims may be legally payable. Solatia payments are not claims payments. They are payments in money or in kind to a victim or to a victim’s family as an expression of sympathy or condolence. The payments are customarily made immediately and generally are nominal. The individual or unit involved in the damage has no legal obligation to pay; compensation is simply offered as an expression of remorse according to local custom. Solatia payments should not be made without prior coordination with the combatant command. ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW 13-61. Establishing the rule of law is a key goal and end state in counterinsurgency. Defining that end state requires extensive coordination between the instruments of U.S. power, a host nation, and multinational partners. Attaining that end state is usually the mission of host-nation authorities, international and intergovernmental organizations, the Department of State, and other U.S. government agencies, with, in some cases, support from U.S. forces. Some key aspects of the rule of law include—

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Chapter 13 * A government that derives its powers from the governed and competently manages, coordinates, and sustains collective security, as well as political, social, and economic development. This includes national, regional, and local government. * Sustainable security institutions. These include a civilian-controlled military as well as police, court, and penal institutions, all of which should be perceived by the local population as fair, just, and transparent. * Fundamental human rights. The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights and the International Convention for Civil and Political Rights provide a guide for applicable human rights. However, the latter provides for derogation from certain rights during an officially proclaimed state of public emergency that threatens the life of the nation. Respect for the full panoply of human rights should be the goal of a host nation; derogation and violation of these rights by host-nation security forces, in particular, often provides an excuse for insurgent activities. 13-62. In times of extreme unrest and insurgency, host-nation legal structures—courts, prosecutors, defense assistance, and prisons—may cease to exist or function. Under these conditions, counterinsurgents may need to undertake a significant role in the reconstruction of the host-nation judicial system to establish legal procedures and systems to deal with captured insurgents and common criminals. During judicial reconstruction, counterinsurgents can expect to be involved in providing sustainment and security support. They can expect to provide legal support and consultation to the host-nation judicial entities. Even when judicial functions are restored, counterinsurgents may still have to provide logistic and security support to judicial activities for a prolonged period. This support continues as long as insurgents continue to disrupt activities that support the legitimate rule of law. 13-63. Rule of law is a principle under which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights principles. In assessing rule of law, counterinsurgency planners should consider the end state for which the host nation should strive. While the form of the rule of law among different states may differ markedly, the effects should be similar. Some effects from the application of rule of law include the following: * The state monopolizes the use of force in the resolution of disputes. * Individuals are secure in their persons and property. * The state is itself bound by law and does not act arbitrarily. * The law can be readily determined and is stable enough to allow individuals to plan their affairs. * Individuals have meaningful access to an effective and impartial legal system. * The state protects basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. * Individuals rely on the existence of justice institutions and the content of law in the conduct of their daily lives. 13-64. While no nation achieves these effects entirely, counterinsurgent efforts should support and reinforce host-nation rule of law efforts to approach them. Rule of law operations can become a key line of effort for counterinsurgents. Because many variables—whether cultural, economic, institutional, or operational—affect rule of law and rule of law operations, no single approach to assessment or implementation can be established. 13-65. In counterinsurgency environments, it is likely that justice mechanisms will have either collapsed or be in serious need of rebuilding. Given the time and resources required to establish a fully functional judicial system, counterinsurgents may need to support interim justice mechanisms—mechanisms to provide justice in communities even while permanent judicial mechanisms are being developed. Such interim justice mechanisms may use simplified formal mechanisms or informal justice mechanisms such as traditional customs or other forms of community-based dispute resolution. Interim justice development and institutional capacity building should be mutually reinforcing. Overall, progress in the rule of law is far more rapid when building the capacity of police, prosecutors, judiciary, civil dispute resolution, and corrections occurs simultaneously rather than sequentially. 13-66. Transitional justice mechanisms (truth commissions, trials and amnesties, purges from office, and reparations) address past violations of human rights and humanitarian law. They can be effective in

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Legal Considerations building the rule of law and reducing support for an insurgency. Trials and amnesties are important components of reconciliation and reintegration. Truth commissions can serve the same function, and can simultaneously expose the legal and humanitarian violations of an insurgency to a population and the world. Counterinsurgency forces should coordinate with civilian leaders and consider including these processes in their operations. 13-67. In some parts of the world, formal state-sanctioned and state-run courts are not the primary method for resolving disputes. Instead, people resolve disputes through traditional customs and processes. For example, many Afghans rely on shura and jirga, councils of community leaders who mediate conflicts. In seeking to establish the rule of law, counterinsurgents need to understand what traditional forms of justice already exist in a community. Counterinsurgents should consider whether these systems should be integrated into the formal legal system, and they should also consider whether they can rely on those traditional systems of justice as interim mechanisms while more formal court systems are being developed. 13-68. Counterinsurgents must be attentive to both civil and criminal justice. The criminal justice system includes police, court systems, and corrections facilities. Its goal is to incapacitate, punish, deter, and rehabilitate criminals. The civil justice system addresses disputes that are not of a criminal nature, such as contract or property disputes. When the institutions of justice have collapsed or need to be rehabilitated, the absence of both civil and criminal justice can cause instability and frustration in local communities. The rule of law requires functioning systems for addressing both criminal and civil justice. 13-69. Helping a society develop a functioning civil and criminal legal system can be essential to counter an insurgency. A knowledge of the host-nation legal system may help a commander determine the best means to aid that development. Because a legal system develops over time within each society, understanding its development and history helps explain its relevance to society. Laws and norms that make little sense on the outside may have deep cultural and historic roots. The Army and the Marine Corps legal communities can help a commander better understand the legal environment and how to help reestablish and reinforce the rule of law. 13-70. Counterinsurgents should inform and educate the media, local community, host nation, and public at large about applicable law of war provisions, U.S. and host-nation laws, and the obligations of those participating in hostilities. Providing this information can help build trust and legitimacy by helping locals and the media understand the rules U.S. forces follow and the safeguards they apply in operations. Legal preparation of the battlefield can also help delegitimize the insurgents, as locals and the media will better understand the insurgents’ violation of the laws.

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Source Notes These are the sources used, quoted, or paraphrased in this publication. They are listed by page number. Where material appears in a paragraph, both page and paragraph number are listed. Boldface indicates the titles of historical vignettes. 1-3 The Laos Insurgency: Christopher Paul. “Laos, 1959-1975” in Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies. Rand National Defense Research Institute. 2013, 147-156. 2-2 The Anbar Province Operational Environment: Dr. William Knarr. “Al-Sahawa: An Awakening in Al Qaim.” in The Combating Terrorism Exchange Journal. May 2013, 5-30. 4-4. para 4-44. Mao Zedong. On Guerrilla War. London: Cassel, 1965. 4-12 External Support for the Tamil Tigers: Colin P. Clarke. “Sri Lanka, 1976-2009” in Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies. Rand National Defense Research Institute. 2013, 423-439. 6-2 Command in Counterinsurgency: Excerpt from Chapter 5, “Regimental Command in Counterinsurgency” in Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond. Marine Corps University Press, Quantico, Virginia. 2011, 51-54. 7-3 If a Tactic Works in This Province, it Might Not Work in The Next: The Case of the Dan Aw Patan District, Afghanistan, 2010: Donald P. Wright, unpublished article, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 2013. 8-1 Intelligence and the Shining Path: Christopher Paul. Rand National Defense Research Institute. 2013. 9-2 Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition: The Huks: Molly Dunigan. “Philippines (Huk Rebellion) 1946-1956” in Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies. Rand National Defense Research Institute. 2013, 31-39. 10-4 para 10-47. Afghanistan Youth National and Social Organization. www.aynso.org 11-2 Security Cooperation in El Salvador: Christopher Paul. Rand National Defense Research Institute. 2013. 12-5 Measuring Effectiveness and Performance in Vietnam: Christopher Paul. “South Vietnam, 1960-1975” in Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies. Rand National Defense Research Institute. 2013, 177-197.

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Glossary The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army, multi-Service, or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army) precedes the definition. The proponent manual for terms is listed in parentheses after the definition. Terms for which the Army and Marine Corps have agreed on a common definition are followed by (Army-Marine Corps). SECTION I—ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ABCA American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand ADP Army doctrine publication ADRP Army doctrine reference publication ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events ATTP Army tactics, techniques, and procedures COIN counterinsurgency DA Department of the Army DOD Department of Defense DODD Department of Defense directive DODI Department of Defense instruction FM field manual JP joint publication G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam MCDP Marine Corps doctrine publication MCO Marine Corps order MCRP Marine Corps reference publication MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication MOE measure of effectiveness MOP measure of performance NDAA National Defense Authorization Act NGO nongovernmental organization S-2 intelligence staff officer S-3 operations staff officer SOF special operations forces STANAG standardization agreement TC training circular U.S. United States USC United States Code

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Glossary SECTION II—TERMS all-source intelligence Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information in the production of finished intelligence. (JP 2-0) area of interest That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 3-0) area of operations An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 3-0) assessment 1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities during military operations. 2.Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. (JP 3-0) base A locality from which operations are projected or supported. (JP 4-0) biometrics The process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics. (JP 2-0) center of gravity The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. (JP 5-0) clear A tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area. (FM 3-90-1) combat outpost A reinforced observation post capable of conducting limited combat operations. (FM 3-90-2) command The authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. (JP 1) control (Army) The regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent. (ADP 6-0) counterinsurgency Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. (JP 3-24) country team The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission. (JP 3-07.4) cyberspace A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. (JP 1-02)

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Glossary end state The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives. (JP 3-0) foreign internal defense Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22) human intelligence (joint) A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. (JP 2-0) (Army) The collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, and capabilities. (FM 2-22.3) information environment The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. (JP 3-13) information fratricide The result of employing information-related capabilities in a way that causes effects in the information environment that impede the conduct of friendly operations or adversely affect friendly forces. (FM 3-13) information operations The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decisionmaking of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. (JP 3-13) information-related capability A tool, technique, or activity employed within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to create effects and operationally desirable conditions. (JP 3-13) insurgency The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 3-24) intelligence The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. (JP 2-0) intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace (Army-Marine Corps) A systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the portions of the mission variables of threat/adversary, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest and for a specific mission. By applying intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace, commanders gain the information necessary to selectively apply and maximize operational effectiveness at critical points in time and space. (FM 2-01.3/ MCRP 2-3A) intergovernmental organization An organization created by a formal agreement between two or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. (JP 3-08) internal defense and development The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22) irregular warfare A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). (JP 1)

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Glossary line of effort In the context of joint operation planning, using the purpose (cause and effect) to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions. (JP 5-0) line of operation A line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). (JP 5-0) measure of effectiveness A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (JP 3-0) measure of performance A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 3-0) mission command The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. (ADP 6-0) mission orders Directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them. (ADP 6-0) nation assistance Assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (JP 3-0) nongovernmental organization A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 3-08) operational approach A description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state. (JP 3-0) operational environment A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0) public affairs Those public information, command information, and community engagement activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. (JP 3-61) rules of engagement Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-04) running estimate The continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable. (ADP 5-0)

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Glossary security cooperation All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (JP 3-22) security force assistance The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-22) site exploitation A series of activities to recognize, collect, process, preserve, and analyze information, personnel, and/or materiel found during the conduct of operations. (JP 3-31) strike An attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability. (JP 3-0) target audience An individual or group selected for influence. (JP 3-13) unified action The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1) unity of command The operation of all forces under a single responsible commander who has the requisite authority to direct and employ those forces in pursuit of a common purpose. (JP 3-0) unity of effort Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action. (JP 1)

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References All URLs accessed on 1 May 2014. REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS These documents must be available to intended users of this publication. ADRP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 24 September 2013. JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 8 November 2010. RELATED PUBLICATIONS These documents contain relevant supplemental information. MULTINATIONAL PUBLICATIONS Most ABCA publications are available at http://www.abca-armies.org. The ABCA web site requires a user ID and password. ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook. 10 August 2010. JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS Most joint publications are available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm. DODD 2310.01E. The Department of Defense Detainee Program. 5 September 2006. DODD 3115.09. DoD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning. 11 October 2012. DODD 5205.14. DoD Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy. 19 August 2010. DODI 5525.11. Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed By or Accompanying the Armed Forces Outside the United States, Certain Service Members, and Former Service Members. 3 March 2005. JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 25 March 2013. JP 1-04. Legal Support to Military Operations. 17 August 2011. JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 22 October 2013. JP 2-01.3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 16 June 2009. JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 11 August 2011. JP 3-05. Special Operations. 18 April 2011. JP 3-07.4. Joint Counterdrug Operations. 14 August 2013. JP 3-08. Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 24 June 2011. JP 3-13. Information Operations. 27 November 2012. JP 3-16. Multinational Operations. 16 July 2013. JP 3-22. Foreign Internal Defense. 12 July 2010. JP 3-24. Counterinsurgency. 22 November 2013. JP 3-31. Command and Control for Joint Land Operations. 24 February 2014. JP 3-57. Civil-Military Operations. 11 September 2013. JP 3-61. Public Affairs. 25 August 2010. JP 4-0. Joint Logistics. 16 October 2013. JP 5-0. Joint Operation Planning. 11 August 2011. ARMY PUBLICATIONS Most Army doctrinal publications are available at http://www.apd.army.mil/.

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References ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012. ADP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012. ADRP 1. The Army Profession. 14 June 2013. ADRP 2-0. Intelligence. 31 August 2012. ADRP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012. ADRP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012. ADRP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012. AR 190-8/MCO 3461.1 Military Police: Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees. 1 October 1997. ATP 3-07.20/MCRP 3-33.1G. IMSO Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Integrated Monetary Shaping Operations. 26 April 2013. ATP 5-19. Risk Management. 14 April 2014. ATTP 2-91.6. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support to Site Exploitation. 27 December 2010. ATTP 3-39.20. Police Intelligence Operations. 29 July 2010. FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace. 15 October 2009. FM 2-22.3. Human Intelligence Collector Operations. 6 September 2006. FM 3-05. Army Special Operations. 9 January 2014. FM 3-07. Stability Operations. 6 October 2008. FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1. Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations. 1 July 2011. FM 3-13. Inform and Influence Activities. 25 January 2013. FM 3-22. Army Support to Security Cooperation. 22 January 2013. FM 3-55. Information Collection. 3 May 2013. FM 3-57. Civil Affairs Operations. 31 October 2011. FM 3-90-1. Offense and Defense Volume 1. 22 March 2013. FM 3-90-2. Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks Volume 2. 22 March 2013. FM 4-92. Contracting Support Brigade. 12 February 2010. FM 6-05/MCWP 3-36.1. CF-SOF Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence. 13 March 2014. FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956. TC 2-19.63. Company Intelligence Support Team. 9 November 2010. TC 2-22.82. Biometrics-Enabled Intelligence. 21 March 2011. TC 2-33.4. Intelligence Analysis. 1 July 2009. MARINE CORPS PUBLICATIONS Most Marine Corps publications are available at http://www.marines.mil/News/Publications/ELECTRONICLIBRARY.aspx. MCDP 1-0. Marine Corps Operations. 9 August 2011. MCDP 1-1. Strategy. 12 November 1997. MCDP 5. Planning. 21 July 1997. MCDP 6. Command and Control. 4 October 1996. MCO 5530.17. Marine Corps Identity Operations (IdOps). 13 November 2012. MCWP 3-33.1. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations. 28 September 2011. MCWP 5-1. Marine Corps Planning Process. 24 August 2010.

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References UNITED STATES LAW Most acts and public laws are available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. Executive Order 13491. Ensuring Lawful Interrogation. Available at http://www.archives.gov/federal- register/executive-orders/2009-obama.html. National Defense Authorization Act. Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces. Title 22. United States Code. Foreign Relations and Intercourse. The Uniform Code of Military Justice. Available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/subtitle-A/part-II/chapter-47. OTHER PUBLICATIONS Geneva Conventions. Available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/lawwar.asp . The Hague Conventions. Available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/lawwar.asp. Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, United States Department of State. July 2008. Available online: http://toolkit.ineesite.org/toolkit/INEEcms/uploads/1151/Conflict_Assessment_Framework.pdf. Mao Zedong. On Guerrilla War. London: Cassel, 1965. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION PUBLICATIONS North Atlantic Treaty Organization publications are available at http://www.nato.int. Allied Joint Publication 3.4.4. Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN). 4 February 2011. STANAG 2611. Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN). 4 February 2011. PRESCRIBED FORMS None REFERENCED FORMS Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) Web site (http://www.apd.army.mil/). DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

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Index Entries are by paragraph number A biometric-enabled intelligence, context, understanding the 8-22–8-24 strategic, 1-1–1-92 accountability, 10-71 biometrics, defined, 8-22 contractors, and civilian activities, and disposition, 5-2– 5-17 border considerations, 7-71–7-79 personnel, 13-48 political, 5-4–5-9 broad indicators of progress, control, and legitimacy, 1-27–1-33 support, 5-18–5-29 12-28–12-29 defined, 6-2 acts, terrorist, 5-12–5-13 build, 9-31–9-33 conventional tactics, 5-14–5-17 adaptability, 4-36–4-37 building, capacity, 10-65 conventional forces and special operations forces, advising, 11-26 building partner capacity, or global synchronization, 6-15–6-21 all-source intelligence, 8-7–8-11 train and equip, 13-55 coordination, 1-52–1-58 defined, 8-7 C countering an insurgency, U.S. analytical frameworks, other, capabilities, intelligence-related, strategy and policy for, 1-10– 4-104–4-105 8-21–8-31 1-13 application of criminal laws, of a capacity, building, 10-65 countering insurgencies, direct host nation, 13-37–13-38 cell, assessment, 12-30–12-32 methods for, 9-1–9-57 approaches, insurgent, 4-40–4-45 indirect methods for, 10-1– center of gravity, 7-20–7-22 area of interest, defined, 2-14 10-71 defined, 7-20 area of operations, defined, 2-12 counterinsurgency, command, civil considerations, and mission 6-2–6-6 armed conflict, non-international, variables, 2-45–2-46 defined, 1-3 13-33–13-38 civilian personnel, and headquarters use in, 6-7–6-14 assessing, a cultural situation, contractors, 13-48 money usage principles in, 3-9–3-15 claims, and solatia, 13-58–13-60 10-63–10-71 and developing a host-nation paradoxes, 7-2–7-12 force, 11-6–11-19 clear, 9-17–9-22 counterinsurgent forces must assessment, cell, 12-30–12-32 clear, defined, 9-17 understand the environment, considerations, 12-9–12-18 cognitive, dimension, 2-34 1-79 defined, 12-1 combat outpost, defined, 7-83 counterinsurgent forces should frameworks, 12-5 command, defined, 6-2 prepare for a long-term methods, 12-6–12-8 in counterinsurgency, 6-2–6-6 commitment, 1-85 assessments, 12-1–12-37 responsibility, 13-46 counterintelligence, 8-18 assist a foreign government, command and control, and counter threat finance, 4-25, 5-21, authority to, 13-3–13-5 mission command, 6-1–6-21 7-30, 9-49, 10-39, 10-40, 10-54, assistance to police, general commander’s emergency country team, 1-65–1-66 prohibition on, 13-5 response program, 13-52– defined, 1-65 associated threats, 5-30–5-48 13-57 criminal organizations, 5-42–5-45 attack, the network, 7-47–7-55 Common Article 3, Geneva cultural advisor, and green cell, authority, for foreign internal Convention, 13-34–13-36 3-17–3-22 defense, 13-4 communications, 5-24 cultural situation, assessing a, to assist a foreign government, comprehensive, effort, 1-47–1-48 3-9–3-15 13-3–13-5 conceptual, planning, 7-13–7-34 culture, 3-1–3-25 auxiliary forces, 4-81–4-84 considerations, assessment, organizing to understand, B 12-9–12-18 3-16–3-24 border, 7-71–7-79 understanding, 3-4–3-8 base, defined, 7-80 legal, 13-1–13-70 cyberspace, defined, 8-6 basic rules, Soldier’s and operational, 7-46–7-83 Marine’s, 13-30–13-32 demographic and urbanization other operational, 7-62–7-83 trends, 2-3–2-7 basing, 7-80–7-83 remote area, 7-63–7-70

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Index Entries are by paragraph number. D emergency response program, global train and equip or building commander’s, 13-52–13-57 partner capacity, 13-55 Department of State, 1-63–1-68 empower the lowest levels, 1-91 globalization, 2-5 designing measures of effectiveness and performance, end state, defined, 7-23 government and forces, host 12-22–12-27 enforcing discipline of U.S. forces, nation, 1-60 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 13-44–13-48 green cell and cultural advisor, 13-40 environment and geography, 3-17–3-22 detention, and internment fourth dynamic, 4-59–4-61 guerilla units, 4-80 standards, 13-42 establishing the rule of law, H and interrogation, 13-39–13-43 13-61–13-70 headquarters use, in develop simple, flexible plans, ethical application of landpower in counterinsurgency, 6-7–6-14 through mission orders, 7-31– unified action, 1-36–1-40 7-34 hold, 9-23–9-30 external support, fifth dynamic, developing, and assessing a 4-62–4-64 honor, 13-29 host-nation security force, host nation, application of criminal 11-6–11-19 F laws, 13-37–13-38 host-nation security forces, failing or failed states, 2-7 government and forces, 1-60 11-32–11-40 fifth dynamic, external support, ownership, 10-64 measurement criteria, 12-19– 4-62–4-64 transfer of detainees to, 13-43 12-37 working with forces, 11-1– first dynamic, leadership, 4-49– dimension, cognitive, 2-34 11-45 4-53 informational, 2-34 host-nation security forces, physical, 2-34 flexibility, 10-70 developing, 11-32–11-40 diplomacy, and negotiation, forces, auxiliary, 4-81–4-84 human intelligence, 8-14–8-17 10-20–10-24 multinational, 1-67–1-68 defined, 8-14 direct action, 1-5, 1-12, 6-5, 6-16, Foreign Claims Act, 13-59 human rights vetting, 13-57 direct enablers, other, 9-41–9-57 foreign forces, training and human terrain system, 3-23–3-25 equipping, 13-49–13-51 direct methods for countering humanity, unnecessary suffering insurgencies, 9-1–9-57 foreign internal defense, authority or superfluous injury, 13-16– for, 13-4 directed telescope technique, 13-18 defined, 11-27 12-33–12-37 forensic-enabled intelligence, I discrimination, 13-19–13-25 8-25–8-27 identify, 10-28–10-30 disposition and activities, 5-2– fourth dynamic, environment and identify, separate, isolate, 5-17 geography, 4-59–4-61 influence, and reintegrate, DOD funds generally not framework, 10-25–10-53 expendable by commanders for shape-clear-hold-build-transitio ideology, second dynamic, 4-54– this purpose, 13-51 n, 9-5–9-40 4-55 doing nothing is sometimes the frameworks, assessment, 12-5 if a tactic works this week, it might best action, 7-7 fundamentals, and prerequisites, not work next week; if it works dynamics of insurgency, 4-46– insurgency, 4-1–4-105 in this province, it might not 4-105 insurgency, 4-29–4-105 work in the next, 7-10–7-11 E intelligence, 8-2–8-6 indirect enablers, other, 10-54– economic, variable, 2-25–2-31 fusion centers, 8-12–8-13 10-71 indirect methods for countering effort, and unity of command, G insurgencies, 10-1–10-71 1-49–1-51 general orders, 13-47 comprehensive, 1-47–1-48 indoctrination, and training, 5-22– lines of and operation, 7-23– general prohibition on assistance 5-23 7-30 to police, 13-5 influence, 10-41–10-45 whole-of-government, 1-41– generational engagement, 10-7– influence neutral, networks, 7-58 1-46 10-19 information, operations, 7-84–7-96 eighth dynamic, organizational Geneva Convention, Common variable, 2-33–2-36 and operational patterns, 4-76– Article 3, 13-34–13-36 4-77 information collection and global security contingency fund, intelligence, surveillance, and elements, organizational, 4-78 13-56 reconnaissance, 8-19–8-20

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Index Entries are by paragraph number. information environment, defined, internment, and detention measure of performance, defined, 2-33 standards, 13-42 12-20 information fratricide, defined, interrogation, and detention, measurement criteria, developing, 7-95 13-39–13-43 12-19–12-37 information operations, defined, interrogation field manual, 13-41 measures of effectiveness , 7-84 designing, 12-22–12-27 intrastate, war, 4-2–4-9 informational dimension, 2-34 measures of performance, irregular warfare, defined, 1-2 information-related capability, designing, 12-22–12-27 isolate, 10-35–10-40 defined, 7-84 methods, assessment, 12-6–12-8 J-K infrastructure, targeted threat, military tactics, 5-11–5-17 9-44–9-49 joint force, 1-61–1-62 variable, 2-20–2-24 variable, 2-37–2-40 joint phasing mode, 11-29–11-31 Military Justice, Uniform Code of, insurgencies, networked, 4-88– 13-45 L 4-103 military necessity, 13-14–13-15 land forces and the range of insurgency, defined, 1-3 militias, nongovernment, 5-46– military operations, 1-14–1-26 dynamics of, 4-46–4-105 5-48 fundamentals, 4-29–4-105 large scale combat, 1-2, 1-18, mission command and command prerequisites, 4-10–4-28 1-19, 1-20 and control, 6-1–6-21 prerequisites and law of war, 13-10–13-13 defined, 6-2 fundamentals, 4-1–4-105 lead nation, 11-23 threat characteristics, 5-1–5-48 mission orders, defined, 7-34 leadership, 4-79 develop simple, flexible plans insurgent, approaches, 4-38–4-45 first dynamic, 4-49–4-53 through, 7-31–7-34 legitimacy and control, 4-31 organizational structure, 4-34 learn and adapt, 1-90 mission variables and civil strategies, 4-30–4-39 legal considerations, 13-1–13-70 considerations, 2-45–2-46 strengths and weaknesses, legitimacy, 1-2, 1-24, 1-36, 1-38, mission-specific rules of 5-25–5-29 1-53, 1-78, 1-82–1-84, 1-88, engagement, 13-7–13-8 integrated, 11-25 2-33, 2-40, 3-1, 3-13, 4-21, money usage principles in integrated monetary shaping 4-24, 4-30, 4-31, 4-34, 4-43, counterinsurgency, 10-63– operations, 10-56–10-71 4-49, 4-51, 4-53, 4-73, 4-80, 10-71 5-4, 5-6, 5-8, 5-10, 5-12, 5-17, intelligence, 8-1–8-31 motive, 4-14–4-22 5-47, 6-19, 7-4, 7-8, 7-9, 7-36, all-source, 8-7–8-11 multinational, forces, 1-67–1-68 7-37, 7-38, 7-42, 7-58, 8-14, biometric-enabled, 8-22–8-24 rules of engagement, 13-9 8-24, 9-18, 9-33, 9-43–9-46, defined, 8-2 forensic-enabled, 8-25–8-27 9-48, 9-57, 10-5, 10-9, 10-16, N 10-31, 10-71, 11-2, 11-16, fundamentals, 8-2–8-6 nation assistance, and security 12-13, 12-24, 13-47, 13-70 human, 8-14–8-17 cooperation, 10-3–10-6 legitimacy and control, 1-27–1-33 intelligence drives operations, defined, 10-3 insurgent, 4-31 1-80–1-82 negotiation and diplomacy, 10-20– legitimacy is the main objective, intelligence preparation of the 10-24 1-78 battlefield/battlespace, defined, network, attack the, 7-47–7-55 8-3 line of effort, defined, 7-25 networked insurgencies, 4-88– intelligence, surveillance, and line of operation, defined, 7-24 4-103 reconnaissance, and lines of operation and effort, 7-23– networks, influence neutral, 7-58 information collection, 8-19– 7-30 neutralize threat, 7-59–7-61 8-20 M support friendly, 7-56–7-57 intelligence-related capabilities, neutralize threat networks, 7-59– 8-21–8-31 manage information and 7-61 expectations, 1-86–1-87 intergovernmental organization, nongovernment militias, 5-46– defined, 1-74 many important decisions are not 5-48 made by generals, 7-12 internal defense and nongovernmental organization, development, defined, 1-35 Marine’s basic rules, 13-30–13-32 defined, 1-69 internal support, sixth dynamic, means, 4-23–4-28 nongovernmental organizations, 4-65–4-69 measure of effectiveness, defined, 1-69–1-73 12-20

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Index Entries are by paragraph number. non-international armed conflict, physical dimension, 2-34 security force assistance, defined, 13-33–13-38 11-27 physical environment, variable, 2-41–2-42 security under the rule of law is O essential, 1-83–1-84 planning, and operational objectives, third dynamic, 4-56– considerations, 7-1–7-96 selectivity, 10-67–10-68 4-58 conceptual, 7-13–7-34 sense of time, 4-35 operation, lines of and effort, parallel, 11-41–11-45 7-23–7-30 separate, 10-31–10-34 security cooperation, 11-27– operational, and planning 11-45 seventh dynamic, phasing and considerations, 7-1–7-96 timing, 4-70–4-75 political activities, 5-4–5-9 considerations, 7-46–7-83 variable, 2-16–2-19 shape, 9-15–9-16 variables, 2-8–2-44 political, economic, and shape-clear-hold-build-transition, operational approach, 1-9, 1-12, violence-centered insurgencies, framework, 9-5–9-40 1-13, 1-20, 1-77, 6-5, 6-7, 6-9, 4-32 site exploitation, 8-28–8-31 6-12, 7-13, 7-14, 7-15, 7-16, population control, 5-10 defined, 8-28 7-18, 7-19, 7-23, 7-27, 7-46, 7-84, 9-3, 9-5, 9-7, 11-11, prerequisites, and fundamentals, sixth dynamic, internal support, defined, 1-13 insurgency, 4-1–4-105 4-65–4-69 operational environment, defined, insurgency, 4-10–4-28 social, variable, 2-32 2-8 progress, broad indicators of, solatia, 13-60 understanding an , 2-1–2-46 12-28–12-29 and claims, 13-58–13-60 operations, information, 7-84–7-96 proliferation of weapons, 2-6 Soldier’s basic rules, 13-30–13-32 integrated monetary shaping, proportionality, 13-26–13-28 some of the best weapons for 10-56–10-71 public affairs, defined, 7-94 counterinsurgents do not shoot, opportunists, 5-31–5-41 7-8 R opportunity, 4-11–4-13 sometimes, the more force is orders, general, 13-47 reintegrate, 10-46–10-53 used, the less effective it is, 7-5 organizational elements, 4-78 relationship of an insurgency to sometimes, the more you protect the economy, 4-33 your force, the less secure you organizational and operational relationships, 11-20–11-26 may be, 7-4 patterns, eighth dynamic, 4-76– 4-77 remote area, considerations, special operations forces, 1-57, 7-63–7-70 8-8, 9-16, 6-13, 6-15–6-17, organizations, criminal, 5-42–5-45 6-19–6-21 nongovernmental, 1-69–1-73 responsibility, command, 13-46 other, 1-74–1-76 root cause, 1-1–1-3, 1-26, 1-42, standards for detention and internment, 13-42 organizing to understand culture, 1-47, 1-79, 2-2, 4-9, 4-14– 3-16–3-25 4-22, 4-27, 4-38, 4-49, 4-54, states, failing or failed, 2-7 other, analytical frameworks, 5-7, 5-39, 5-43, 9-12, 9-15, strategic principles, 1-77–1-92 9-17, 9-21, 9-31, 9-33, 9-57, 4-104–4-105 strategies, insurgent, 4-30–4-39 10-4, 10-9, 10-20–10-24, 10-26, direct enablers, 9-41–9-57 11-5, 12-10, 12-14 strengths, insurgent, 5-25–5-29 indirect enablers, 10-54–10-71 operational considerations, rule of law, establishing, 13-61– strike, 9-50–9-57 7-62–7-83 13-70 defined, 9-50 organizations, 1-74–1-76 rules of engagement, 13-6–13-9 support activities, 5-18–5-29 ownership, host nation, 10-64 defined, 13-6 support friendly networks, 7-56– mission-specific, 13-7–13-8 7-57 P multinational, 13-9 support the host nation, 1-92 paradoxes, counterinsurgency, running estimate, defined, 8-20 sustainability, 10-66 7-2–7-12 S synchronization, conventional parallel, 11-22 forces and special operations planning, 11-41–11-45 second dynamic, ideology, 4-54– forces, 6-15–6-21 4-55 partnered, 11-24 security cooperation, defined, T partners, unified action, 1-59–1-76 10-5 tactics, conventional, 5-14–5-17 partnership, 10-69 nation assistance, 10-3–10-6 military, 5-11–5-17 phasing and timing, seventh planning, 11-27–11-45 target audience, defined, 7-85 dynamic, 4-70–4-75

3-24

Index Entries are by paragraph number. targeted threat infrastructure, use the appropriate level of force, 9-44–9-49 1-88–1-89 technique, directed telescope, V 12-33–12-37 variable, economic, 2-25–2-31 terrorist acts, 5-12–5-13 information, 2-33–2-36 the host nation doing something infrastructure, 2-37–2-40 tolerably is normally better than military, 2-20–2-24 us doing it well, 7-9 physical environment, 2-41– the more successful the 2-42 counterinsurgency is, the less political, 2-16–2-19 force can be used and the more social, 2-32 risk must be accepted, 7-6 time, 2-43–2-44 the range of military operations, variables, operational, 2-8–2-44 land forces and, 1-14–1-26 vetting, human rights, 13-57 third dynamic, objectives, 4-56– W-X-Y-Z 4-58 war, intrastate, 4-2–4-9 threat characteristics, insurgency, 5-1–5-48 weaknesses, insurgent, 5-25–5-29 threats, associated, 5-30–5-48 weapons proliferation, 2-6 time, variable, 2-43–2-44 whole-of-government effort, 1-41– 1-46 training and indoctrination, 5-22– 5-23 working with host-nation forces, 11-1–11-45 training and equipping foreign forces, 13-49–13-51 transfer of detainees to the host nation, 13-43 transition, 9-34–9-40 transitions, 7-35–7-45 trends, demographic and urbanization, 2-3–2-7 U U.S. strategy and policy to counter an insurgency, 1-10–1-13 unconventional warfare, 5-23 underground, 4-85–4-87 understanding, an operational environment, 2-1–2-46 culture, 3-4–3-8 the strategic context, 1-1–1-92 unified action, 1-34–1-76 unified action, defined, 1-34 ethical application of landpower in, 1-36–1-40 partners, 1-59–1-76 understanding, 1-34–1-76 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 13-45 unity of command and effort, 1-49–1-51 unity of command, defined, 1-49 unity of effort, defined, 1-51 urbanization, trends, 2-3–2-7

3-24

FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 By Order of the Secretary of the Army: RAYMOND T. ODIERNO General, United States Army Chief of Staff Official: GERALD B. O’KEEFE Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 1412701 BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS: DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number 121724, requirements for FM 3-24.