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<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Marriott 12 – (2012, David, PhD in literature from the University of Sussex, Professor of the History of Consciousness at UC-Santa Cruz, “3. Black Cultural Studies,” Years Work Crit Cult Theory, 20 (1): 37-66) fulltext: In the concluding pages of Darker Than Blue, Gilroy restates why he finds the ongoing attachment to the idea of race in the US so very unsatisfactory in comparison, say, to the anti-racism of Frantz Fanon: [Fanon’s] ‘audacious commitment to an alternative conception of humanity reconstituted outside “race” […] is something that does not endear Fanon’s work to today’s practitioners of the facile antihumanism and ethnic absolutism so characteristic of life on US college campuses, where class-based homogeneity combines smoothly with deference to racial and ethic particularity and with resignation to the world as it appears. Fanon disappoints that scholastic constituency by refusing to see culture as an insurmountable obstacle between groups, even if they have been racialized. He does not accept the “strategic” award of an essential innocence to the oppressed and the wretched of the earth. Their past and present sufferings confer no special nobility upon them and are not invested with redemptive insights. Suffering is just suffering, and Fanon has no patience with those who would invoke the armour of incorrigibility around national liberation struggles or minority cultures’. (pp. 157–8, my emphasis) Whatever one might think of the cogency of these remarks (if only because the notion of a non-racial life is predicated on the idea that the human can somehow reside ‘outside’ of race, a humanism that would always then be constitutively compromised by the racism at its frontier), the question of whether US culture can ever escape racial antagonism is the primary focus of Frank B. Wilderson III’s powerful Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of US Antagonisms, as part of a more general reading of US film culture. And indeed Fanon’s anti-philosophical philosophical critique of racial ontology (historically blacks were seen as part of existence but not, as yet, part of human being, a not-yet that forces Fanon to rethink the teleological form of the human as already and essentially violent in its separation from the state of nature from which it has come) forms a major part of Wilderson’s conception of anti-blackness as the major structural antagonism of US history and culture. It is against the conception that racism could ever be simply contingent to black experience that Wilderson protests, reflecting on the fact that racial slavery has no parallel to other forms of suffering, and perhaps most strikingly social death is the constitutive essence of black existence in the US. In brief, slavery remains so originary, in the sense of what he calls its ‘accumulation and fungibility’ (terms borrowed from Saidiya Hartman), it not only has no ‘analogy’ to other forms of antagonism—Wilderson’s examples are the Holocaust and Native American genocide—there is simply no process of getting over it, of recovering from the loss (as wound, or trauma): as such, slavery remains the ultimate structure of antagonism in the US. Whether at a personal level or at the level of historical process, if ‘black slavery is foundational to modern Humanism’, then any teleological appeal to a humanism beyond racism is doomed from the start (p. 22). The problem with Wilderson’s argument, however, is that it remains of a piece with the manichean imperatives that beset it, and which by definition are structurally uppermost, which means that he can only confirm those imperatives as absolutes rather than chart a dialectical path beyond them, insofar as, structurally speaking, there is no ‘outside’ to black social death and alienation, or no outside to this outside, and all that thought can do is mirror its own enslavement by race. This is not so much ‘afro-pessimism’—a term coined by Wilderson—as thought wedded to its own despair. However, this is also not the entire story of Red, White, and Black, as I hope to show. For example, in Chapter One (‘The Structure of Antagonisms’), written as a theoretical introduction, and which opens explicitly on the Fanonian question of why ontology cannot understand the being of the Black, Wilderson is prepared to say that black suffering is not only beyond analogy, it also refigures the whole of being: ‘the essence of being for the White and non-Black position’ is non-niggerness, consequently, ‘[b]eing can thus be thought of, in the first ontological instance, as non-niggerness, and slavery then as niggerness’ (p. 37). It is not hard when reading such sentences to suspect a kind of absolutism at work here, and one that manages to be peculiarly and dispiritingly dogmatic: throughout Red, White, and Black, despite variations in tone and emphasis, there is always the desire to have black lived experience named as the worst, and the politics of such a desire inevitably collapses into a kind of sentimental moralism: for the claim that ‘Blackness is incapacity in its most pure and unadulterated form’ means merely that the black has to embody this abjection without reserve (p. 38). This logic—and the denial of any kind of ‘ontological integrity’ to the Black/Slave due to its endless traversal by force does seem to reduce ontology to logic, namely, a logic of non-recuperability—moves through the following points: (1) Black non-being is not capable of symbolic resistance and, as such, falls outside of any language of authenticity or reparation; (2) for such a subject, which Wilderson persists in calling ‘death’, the symbolic remains foreclosed (p. 43); (3) as such, Blackness is the record of an occlusion which remains ever present: ‘White (Human) capacity, in advance of the event of discrimination or oppression, is parasitic on Black incapacity’ (p. 45); (4) and, as an example of the institutions or discourses involving ‘violence’, ‘antagonisms’ and ‘parasitism’, Wilderson describes White (or non-Black) film theory and cultural studies as incapable of understanding the ‘suffering of the Black—the Slave’ (they cannot do so because they are erroneously wedded to humanism and to the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan, which Wilderson takes as two examples of what the Afro-pessimist should avoid) (p. 56); as a corrective, Wilderson calls for a new language of abstraction, and one centrally concerned with exposing ‘the structure of antagonisms between Blacks and Humans’ (p. 68). Reading seems to stop here, at a critique of Lacanian full speech: Wilderson wants to say that Lacan’s notion of the originary (imaginary) alienation of the subject is still wedded to relationality as implied by the contrast between ‘empty’ and ‘full’ speech, and so apparently cannot grasp the trauma of ‘absolute Otherness’ that is the Black’s relation to Whites, because psychoanalysis cannot fathom the ‘structural, or absolute, violence’ of Black life (pp. 74; 75). ‘Whereas Lacan was aware of how language “precedes and exceeds us”, he did not have Fanon’s awareness of how violence also precedes and exceeds Blacks’ (p. 76). The violence of such abjection—or incapacity—is therefore that it cannot be communicated or avowed, and is always already delimited by desubjectification and dereliction (p. 77). Whence the suspicion of an ontology reduced to a logic (of abjection). Leaving aside the fact that it is quite mistaken to limit Lacan’s notion of full speech to the search for communication (the unconscious cannot be confined to parole), it is clear that, according to Wilderson’s own ‘logic’, his description of the Black is working, via analogy, to Lacan’s notion of the real but, in his insistence on the Black as an absolute outside Wilderson can only duly reify this void at the heart of universality. The Black is ‘beyond the limit of contingency’—but it is worth saying immediately that this ‘beyond’ is indeed a foreclosure that defines a violence whose traces can only be thought violently (that is, analogically), and whose nonbeing returns as the theme for Wilderson’s political thinking of a non-recuperable abjection. The Black is nonbeing and, as such, is more real and primary than being per se: given how much is at stake, this insistence on a racial metaphysics of injury implies a fundamental irreconcilability between Blacks and Humans (there is really no debate to be had here: irreconcilability is the condition and possibility of what it means to be Black). This argument could be illustrated at many points in Red, White, and Black, which all interconnect. Wilderson is concerned, for example, to argue that a Marxian ontology of labour and/or commodity form is philosophically inadequate for reading black accumulation and fungibility: this idea, which is not altogether new, is supported by a lengthy reading of the film Monster’s Ball (Chapter Four (‘Monster’s Ball’) and is perhaps the most valuable part of his book in its illustration of the links between race, violence, contingency, and death). Other chapters offer critiques of what Wilderson calls ‘empathetic’ as against ‘analytical’ cinema, with the former offering ‘sentimental apologies for structural violence’, rather than ‘paradigmatic analyses’ of black suffering (p. 341). It is not at all clear how this argument differs from film theory’s opposition between a cinema of distraction and a socially engaged cinema: it seems to me that this theory of the filmwork describes quite precisely the distinction between analysis and empathy Wilderson is trying to make (and unsettle). However, unlike film theory, Wilderson’s attempt to preserve the distinction seems to work with an unquestioned notion of film spectatorship—i.e. either seduced or interrogated—which means that the theory of cinema he puts forth somewhat undermines his more general claim that film theory can never understand black suffering. It is also a little strange that a work so concerned with the chasm between ‘Human life and Black death’ should indict cinema for its ‘efforts to reassert relational logic’, but nowhere mentions how the very form of this reproach relies on reasserting the endless non-relational absence of Blackness (and thereby reducing the history and politics of race to a logic of non-relationality) (p. 340). This transcendentalizing of black suffering is fundamentally absolutist (and, once again, moralistic) in effect if not in intention. In the final sentences of the book, Wilderson asks, ‘How does one deconstruct life?’ It remains a pivotal question. But perhaps, after all, the more urgent task is not how to deconstruct life, but to grasp the necessarily-perverse logic of racial determinations of suffering? Red, White, and Black is a thought-provoking study of racial ontology which, whatever its limitations, is a powerful invocation of why blackness just is death, a death-in-life which has no analogy or synonym but which, for the same reason, must be thought differently for blackness to live.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Affirming the conditions of possibility for anti-racism is a better starting point for <u>political praxis</h4><p></u><strong>Marriott 12</strong> – (2012, David, PhD in literature from the University of Sussex, Professor of the History of Consciousness at UC-Santa Cruz, “3. Black Cultural Studies,” Years Work Crit Cult Theory, 20 (1): 37-66)</p><p>In the concluding pages of Darker Than Blue, Gilroy restates why he finds the ongoing attachment to the idea of race in the US so very unsatisfactory in comparison, say, to the anti-racism of Frantz Fanon: [Fanon’s] ‘audacious commitment to an alternative conception of humanity reconstituted outside “race” […] is something that does not endear Fanon’s work to today’s practitioners of the facile antihumanism and ethnic absolutism so characteristic of life on US college campuses, where class-based homogeneity combines smoothly with deference to racial and ethic particularity and with resignation to the world as it appears. Fanon disappoints that scholastic constituency by refusing to see culture as an insurmountable obstacle between groups, even if they have been racialized. He does not accept the “strategic” award of an essential innocence to the oppressed and the wretched of the earth. Their past and present sufferings confer no special nobility upon them and are not invested with redemptive insights. Suffering is just suffering, and Fanon has no patience with those who would invoke the armour of incorrigibility around national liberation struggles or minority cultures’. (pp. 157–8, my emphasis) Whatever one might think of the cogency of these remarks (if only because the notion of a non-racial life is predicated on the idea that the human can somehow reside ‘outside’ of race, a humanism that would always then be constitutively compromised by the racism at its frontier), <u>the question of <mark>whether US</mark> culture <mark>can</mark> ever <mark>escape racial antagonism is the</mark> primary <mark>focus</mark> of</u> Frank B. <u>Wilderson</u> III’s powerful <u>Red, White, and Black</u>: Cinema and the Structure of US Antagonisms, as part of a more general reading of US film culture. And indeed <u>Fanon’s anti-philosophical philosophical critique of racial ontology</u> (historically blacks were seen as part of existence but not, as yet, part of human being, a not-yet that forces Fanon to rethink the teleological form of the human as already and essentially violent in its separation from the state of nature from which it has come) <u>forms a major part of Wilderson’s conception of anti-blackness as the major structural antagonism of US history and culture</u>. It is against the conception that racism could ever be simply contingent to black experience that Wilderson protests, reflecting on the fact that racial slavery has no parallel to other forms of suffering, and perhaps most strikingly social death is the constitutive essence of black existence in the US. <u>In brief, <mark>slavery remains so originary</u></mark>, in the sense of what he calls its ‘accumulation and fungibility’ (terms borrowed from Saidiya Hartman), <u>it not only has no ‘analogy’</u> to other forms of antagonism—Wilderson’s examples are the Holocaust and Native American genocide—<u><strong><mark>there is</mark> simply <mark>no</mark> process of <mark>getting over it</strong></mark>, of recovering from the loss</u> (as wound, or trauma): as such, slavery remains the ultimate structure of antagonism in the US. Whether at a personal level or at the level of historical process, if ‘black slavery is foundational to modern Humanism’, then any teleological appeal to a humanism beyond racism is doomed from the start (p. 22). <u><strong><mark>The problem</mark> with Wilderson’s argument</u></strong>, however, <u><strong><mark>is that it remains of a piece with the manichean imperatives that beset it</u></strong></mark>, and which by definition are structurally uppermost, <u><mark>which</mark> means that <strong>he <mark>can only confirm those imperatives</strong> as absolutes <strong>rather than chart a dialectical path beyond them</u></strong></mark>, insofar as, structurally speaking, <u><mark>there is no ‘outside’</mark> to black social death and alienation</u>, or no outside to this outside, <u>and all that thought can do is mirror its own enslavement by race</u>. <u><strong><mark>This is not so much ‘afro-pessimism’</u></strong></mark>—a term coined by Wilderson—<u><strong><mark>as thought wedded to its own despair</u></strong></mark>. However, this is also not the entire story of Red, White, and Black, as I hope to show. For example, in Chapter One (‘The Structure of Antagonisms’), written as a theoretical introduction, and which opens explicitly on the Fanonian question of why ontology cannot understand the being of the Black, <u>Wilderson is prepared to say that black suffering is not only beyond analogy, it also refigures the whole of being</u>: ‘the essence of being for the White and non-Black position’ is non-niggerness, consequently, ‘[b]eing can thus be thought of, in the first ontological instance, as non-niggerness, and slavery then as niggerness’ (p. 37). <u>It is not hard when reading such sentences to suspect a kind of absolutism at work here, and one that manages to be peculiarly and dispiritingly dogmatic</u>: <u>throughout Red, White, and Black, despite variations in tone and emphasis, <mark>there is always the desire to have black lived experience named as the worst, and</mark> <strong>the politics of <mark>such a desire inevitably collapses into</mark> a kind of <mark>sentimental moralism</u></strong></mark>: for the claim that ‘Blackness is incapacity in its most pure and unadulterated form’ means merely that the black has to embody this abjection without reserve (p. 38). <u><mark>This</mark> logic</u>—<u>and the <strong><mark>denial of any kind of ‘ontological integrity’</strong> to the Black/Slave</mark> due to its endless traversal by force <strong><mark>does seem to reduce ontology to logic</strong>, namely</mark>, a logic <mark>of non-recuperability</u></mark>—<u>moves through the following points</u>: (1) <u>Black non-being is not capable of symbolic resistance</u> and, as such, falls outside of any language of authenticity or reparation; (2) <u>for such a subject, which Wilderson persists in calling ‘death’, the symbolic remains foreclosed</u> (p. 43); (3) <u>as such, Blackness is the record of an occlusion which remains ever present</u>: ‘White (Human) capacity, in advance of the event of discrimination or oppression, is parasitic on Black incapacity’ (p. 45); (4) <u>and, as an example of the institutions or discourses involving ‘violence’, ‘antagonisms’ and ‘parasitism’, Wilderson describes White</u> (or non-Black) film <u>theory</u> and cultural studies <u>as incapable of understanding the ‘suffering of the Black</u>—<u>the Slave’</u> (they cannot do so <u><strong>because they are erroneously wedded to humanism</u></strong> and to the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan, which Wilderson takes as two examples of what the Afro-pessimist should avoid) (p. 56); <u><mark>as a corrective, Wilderson calls for a new language of abstraction</mark>,</u> and one centrally <u><mark>concerned with exposing ‘the structure of antagonisms between Blacks and Humans’</u></mark> (p. 68). <u><strong><mark>Reading seems to stop here</u></strong></mark>, at a critique of Lacanian full speech: Wilderson wants to say that Lacan’s notion of the originary (imaginary) alienation of the subject is still wedded to relationality as implied by the contrast between ‘empty’ and ‘full’ speech, and so apparently cannot grasp the trauma of ‘absolute Otherness’ that is the Black’s relation to Whites, because psychoanalysis cannot fathom the ‘structural, or absolute, violence’ of Black life (pp. 74; 75). ‘Whereas Lacan was aware of how language “precedes and exceeds us”, he did not have Fanon’s awareness of how violence also precedes and exceeds Blacks’ (p. 76). <u>The violence of such abjection</u>—or incapacity—is therefore that it <u>cannot be communicated or avowed</u>, and is always already delimited by desubjectification and dereliction (p. 77). <u><strong>Whence the suspicion of an ontology reduced to a logic (of abjection).</u></strong> <u>Leaving aside the fact that <mark>it is</mark> <strong>quite <mark>mistaken to limit</mark> Lacan’s notion of <mark>full speech to</mark> the search for <mark>communication</u></strong></mark> (the unconscious cannot be confined to parole), it is clear that, according to Wilderson’s own ‘logic’, his description of the Black is working, via analogy, to Lacan’s notion of the real but, <u><strong>in his <mark>insistence on the Black as an absolute outside</mark> Wilderson <mark>can only</mark> duly <mark>reify this void at the heart of universality</u></strong>. <u>The Black is ‘beyond the limit of contingency’</u></mark>—<u><mark>but</u></mark> it is worth saying immediately that <u><strong><mark>this ‘beyond’</mark> is indeed a foreclosure that defines a violence whose traces <mark>can only be thought violently</u></strong></mark> (that is, analogically), and whose nonbeing returns as the theme for Wilderson’s political thinking of a non-recuperable abjection. The Black is nonbeing and, as such, is more real and primary than being per se: given how much is at stake, this insistence on a racial metaphysics of injury implies a fundamental irreconcilability between Blacks and Humans (there is really no debate to be had here: irreconcilability is the condition and possibility of what it means to be Black). This argument could be illustrated at many points in Red, White, and Black, which all interconnect. Wilderson is concerned, for example, to argue that a Marxian ontology of labour and/or commodity form is philosophically inadequate for reading black accumulation and fungibility: this idea, which is not altogether new, is supported by a lengthy reading of the film Monster’s Ball (Chapter Four (‘Monster’s Ball’) and is perhaps the most valuable part of his book in its illustration of the links between race, violence, contingency, and death). Other chapters offer critiques of what Wilderson calls ‘empathetic’ as against ‘analytical’ cinema, with the former offering ‘sentimental apologies for structural violence’, rather than ‘paradigmatic analyses’ of black suffering (p. 341). It is not at all clear how this argument differs from film theory’s opposition between a cinema of distraction and a socially engaged cinema: it seems to me that this theory of the filmwork describes quite precisely the distinction between analysis and empathy Wilderson is trying to make (and unsettle). However, unlike film theory, Wilderson’s attempt to preserve the distinction seems to work with an unquestioned notion of film spectatorship—i.e. either seduced or interrogated—which means that the theory of cinema he puts forth somewhat undermines his more general claim that film theory can never understand black suffering. <u>It is</u> also a little <u>strange that a work so concerned with the chasm between ‘Human life and Black death’ should indict cinema for its ‘efforts to reassert relational logic’, but nowhere mentions how the very form of <mark>this reproach <strong>relies on reasserting the endless non-relational absence of Blackness</u></strong></mark> (and thereby <u><strong><mark>reducing the history and politics of race to a logic of non-relationality</u></strong></mark>) (p. 340). <u><strong><mark>This transcendentalizing of black suffering is fundamentally absolutist</u></strong></mark> (<u><strong><mark>and</mark>, once again, <mark>moralistic</u></strong></mark>) <u><strong><mark>in effect if not in intention</u></strong></mark>. In the final sentences of the book, Wilderson asks, ‘How does one deconstruct life?’ It remains a pivotal question. But perhaps, after all, the more urgent task is not how to deconstruct life, but to grasp the necessarily-perverse logic of racial determinations of suffering? Red, White, and Black is a thought-provoking study of racial ontology which, whatever its limitations, is a powerful invocation of why blackness just is death, a death-in-life which has no analogy or synonym but which, for the same reason, must be thought differently for blackness to live.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Arthur Waldron, Spring 2014. Lauder Professor of International Relations in the Department of History at the University of Pennsylvania, and an FPRI Senior Fellow. “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ Enters Turbulence,” Orbis 58.2, 164–181. fulltext: Why is China, stronger and richer than she has ever been in history, making a turn toward a military posture that is at odds with her economic interests? It clearly jeopardizes the great advances she has made in the last thirty years. Yet, this is not an easy question to answer. Those with knowledge of history will recognize that being wealthy [fu ን] and militarily strong [qiang ᒝ] are conditions regularly considered both indispensable and complementary. Moreover, China today compares herself not with any real state from which she may be descended, but with an idealized, glorious China and a mythical golden age during which she was preeminent in the world. The belief is widespread that blame for the loss of this status is to be laid not so much at the feet of China or her rulers, as it is to be attributed to foreign invasions, rapaciousness, imperialistic alienation of territory, and so forth—particularly during the “century of humiliation,” that extends back from the foundation of the People’s Republic in 1949 to Anglo-Chinese wars that began in 1839.22 Adding to the magnitude of China’s imagined loss, is her forfeiture, as is widely believed in China, of a pivotal and central place in the Asian world order: As former Ambassador John Van Antwerp MacMurray put it, in a celebrated memorandum presented to the State Department in 1935, China was the “sun” to which the relations of other states were merely “planetary.”23 Just as official Chinese writing presents her territorial claims as nothing more than the recovery of lost bits of her former empire, so her political rise is simply a return to her traditional position. So, puzzling as it may be to foreign observers, schooled in ideas drawn from European history, such as “balance of power,” and “counter-hegemonic coalitions,” the idea of a “peaceful rise” fits well in Chinese thought. The true history of the states that rose and fell on the easternmost part of the Eurasian land mass, and were grouped by subsequent historians as “dynasties” legitimate or illegitimate, is quite different. However, today Chinese believe that their present polity is descended from a long line of predecessors that were leaders of Asia by virtue of their civilizational and, to a lesser degree, military superiority. It is true, moreover, that in dynastic times, various states entered into “tributary” relations with states in what today is China, though what exactly this meant is difficult to specify exactly. According to this scheme, which derives from traditional dynastic histories and was assembled as a general theory by the eminent Chinese scholar and diplomat Jiang Tingfu and his Oxford student John King Fairbank, the Chinese emperor in his capital was the highest source of political and cultural legitimacy in the world. Rulers of other states acknowledged this fact by sending tributary emissaries, who would prostrate themselves before the Chinese emperor and declare fealty, while receiving in return legitimate investiture, reign title, calendar, and lavish gifts.24 Scholars have long known that the tributary system never really existed. China dealt on equal terms with Persia, with the Mongols, and with others. The concept is, as the late Harvard Professor Lien-sheng Yang pointed out, a “myth.”25 But what kind of myth is it exactly today, and intended for whom? In traditional times it was a myth designed for a domestic audience. Internal order in China depended upon every Chinese accepting the unlimited authority of the emperor. Europe can show similar examples of authority in the past, but not in the present. For the process of democratization and constitutionalization of European regimes has shifted the basis of regime legitimacy domestically away from authority and hierarchy to popular consent. This process simultaneously has brought increasing equality in international relations to the world. For China, however, the myth arguably will not disappear so long as the domestic need for it continues: in other words, as long as Chinese regime legitimacy continues to be based on authority and hierarchy—as it is in the People’s Republic of China—and not on constitutional democracy. Today’s Chinese government sees its task as restoring the country to its natural and historical status, a process of which attaining hegemony is an important component. Indeed, in today’s China this restoration is quantified precisely. Thus, a recent academic study concluded that the state had recaptured exactly 65.3 percent of her former glory, though without stating how that figure had been determined.26 Particularly to be noted is that Chinese tradition furthermore dictates that this restoration will—or should be—peaceful. Effortless attainment has always been one aspect by which the legitimacy of rule is known. A ruler who followed the way of the true king [wang dao ₺㆏] would never need to use force. His moral example and cultural superiority would be enough to give order to his realm. The proof text is the classical account of how the Zhou dynasty [ca. 1046-256 BCE] overthrew the corrupt Shang [ca. 1600-1046 BCE] at the semi-legendary battle of the Wilderness of Mu [Muye ’㊁] in 1045 BC. According to the Classic of Documents, the Shang troops “would offer no opposition to our army. Those in front inverted their spears and attacked those behind them, till they fled, and the blood flowed [. . .].” The victory was achieved by the working of Zhou virtue on the Shang forces. The empire was restored in the same way: King Wu of Zhou “had only to let his robes fall down, and fold his hands, and the empire was orderly ruled.27 Edward L. Shaughnessy observes that this battle represented at the time perhaps only the replacement—through force of arms—of one local power by another, but for later Chinese it came to illustrate the irrepressible will of Heaven turning its mandate from one state, the rulers of which had grown distant from the people, to another state blessed with virtuous rulers.28 For an educated Chinese until the last century, Muye would have been the most familiar and paradigmatic of all battles. In China, the expectation it expresses: namely, of the attainment of maximal goals by the use of minimal means, is still influential. This expectation of minimal force is evident in traditional Chinese works on the military, as well, although these were taboo to the Confucians, and are evident in current Chinese military thinking as well. Thus, the German word Gewalt, meaning force, occurs eight times in just the two paragraphs in which Clausewitz defines war. By contrast, in the entire 13 chapters of the Chinese military classic Sun Zi’s Art of War the Chinese character meaning force [li ജ] is used only nine times. The Chinese writers about war defined not destruction but disorganization, paralysis, and psychological domination of the enemy as their goal. “To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles” as Sun Zi (ca. 544-496 BCE) famously asserted “is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.29 Today, if doctrine and propaganda are any guide, China still intuitively accepts such concepts. She envisions a series of small local wars in Asia to be won quickly and at low cost, by a combination of brilliant strategy and high-technology weapons: “fought rapidly and decided rapidly” [suzhan sujue ㅦᚩㅦ᳿] concepts closely akin to tradition.30 Arguably, then, what strategists would call a faulty “theory of victory”— meaning the story that a belligerent tells itself about what it will do, and then what the opponent will do, in a sequence that will lead the belligerent to success—is one the foundation of China’s otherwise puzzlingly optimistic approach to the use of force.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>China is pursuing a revisionist strategy despite economic ties --- their perception of their ability to win conflicts determines the likelihood of their use of force. </h4><p>Arthur <strong>Waldron</strong>, Spring <strong>2014</strong>. Lauder Professor of International Relations in the Department of History at the University of Pennsylvania, and an FPRI Senior Fellow. “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ Enters Turbulence,” Orbis<u><strong> 58.2, 164–181.</p><p></strong>Why is <mark>China</mark>, <strong>stronger and richer</strong> than she has ever been in history, <mark>making a turn toward a military posture</mark> <mark>that</mark> <strong><mark>is at odds with</strong></mark> her <mark>economic interests</mark>?</u> It clearly jeopardizes the great advances she has made in the last thirty years. Yet, this is not an easy question to answer. Those with knowledge of history will recognize that being wealthy [fu ን] and militarily strong [qiang ᒝ] are conditions regularly considered both indispensable and complementary. Moreover, <u><mark>China</mark> today <mark>compares</mark> <mark>herself</mark> not with any real state from which she may be descended, but <strong><mark>with an idealized</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>glorious China and a mythical golden age</strong></mark> during which she was preeminent in the world</u>. The belief is widespread that blame for the loss of this status is to be laid not so much at the feet of China or her rulers, as it is to be attributed to foreign invasions, rapaciousness, imperialistic alienation of territory, and so forth—particularly during the “century of humiliation,” that extends back from the foundation of the People’s Republic in 1949 to Anglo-Chinese wars that began in 1839.22 <u>Adding to the magnitude of China’s imagined loss, is her forfeiture, as is widely believed in China, of a pivotal and central place in the Asian world order</u>: As former Ambassador John Van Antwerp MacMurray put it, in a celebrated memorandum presented to the State Department in 1935, China was the “sun” to which the relations of other states were merely “planetary.”23 <u>Just as official <mark>Chinese writing presents her territorial claims as</mark> <strong>nothing more than <mark>the recovery of</strong></mark> lost bits of her former <strong><mark>empire</strong></mark>, so <strong>her political rise</strong> is simply a return to her traditional position</u>. So, puzzling as it may be to foreign observers, schooled in ideas drawn from European history, such as “balance of power,” and “counter-hegemonic coalitions,” the idea of a “peaceful rise” fits well in Chinese thought. The true history of the states that rose and fell on the easternmost part of the Eurasian land mass, and were grouped by subsequent historians as “dynasties” legitimate or illegitimate, is quite different. However, today Chinese believe that their present polity is descended from a long line of predecessors that were leaders of Asia by virtue of their civilizational and, to a lesser degree, military superiority. It is true, moreover, that in dynastic times, various states entered into “tributary” relations with states in what today is China, though what exactly this meant is difficult to specify exactly. According to this scheme, which derives from traditional dynastic histories and was assembled as a general theory by the eminent Chinese scholar and diplomat Jiang Tingfu and his Oxford student John King Fairbank, the Chinese emperor in his capital was the highest source of political and cultural legitimacy in the world. Rulers of other states acknowledged this fact by sending tributary emissaries, who would prostrate themselves before the Chinese emperor and declare fealty, while receiving in return legitimate investiture, reign title, calendar, and lavish gifts.24 Scholars have long known that the tributary system never really existed. China dealt on equal terms with Persia, with the Mongols, and with others. The concept is, as the late Harvard Professor Lien-sheng Yang pointed out, a “myth.”25 But what kind of myth is it exactly today, and intended for whom? In traditional times it was a myth designed for a domestic audience. Internal order in China depended upon every Chinese accepting the unlimited authority of the emperor. Europe can show similar examples of authority in the past, but not in the present. For the process of democratization and constitutionalization of European regimes has shifted the basis of regime legitimacy domestically away from authority and hierarchy to popular consent. This process simultaneously has brought increasing equality in international relations to the world. <u>For China</u>, however, <u><mark>the</mark> <mark>myth</mark> arguably <strong><mark>will not disappear so long as </mark>the domestic need for it continues</strong>: in other words, as long as <strong><mark>Chinese regime legitimacy continues</strong></mark> to be based on authority and hierarchy</u>—as it is in the People’s Republic of China—<u>and not on constitutional democracy. Today’s <strong><mark>Chinese government sees its task as restoring the country to its natural and historical status</u></strong></mark>, <u>a process of which attaining hegemony is an important component</u>. Indeed, in today’s China this restoration is quantified precisely. Thus, a recent academic study concluded that the state had recaptured exactly 65.3 percent of her former glory, though without stating how that figure had been determined.26 <u>Particularly to be noted is that Chinese tradition furthermore dictates that this restoration will—or should be—peaceful</u>. Effortless attainment has always been one aspect by which the legitimacy of rule is known. A ruler who followed the way of the true king [wang dao ₺㆏] would never need to use force. His moral example and cultural superiority would be enough to give order to his realm. The proof text is the classical account of how the Zhou dynasty [ca. 1046-256 BCE] overthrew the corrupt Shang [ca. 1600-1046 BCE] at the semi-legendary battle of the Wilderness of Mu [Muye ’㊁] in 1045 BC. According to the Classic of Documents, the Shang troops “would offer no opposition to our army. Those in front inverted their spears and attacked those behind them, till they fled, and the blood flowed [. . .].” The victory was achieved by the working of Zhou virtue on the Shang forces. The empire was restored in the same way: King Wu of Zhou “had only to let his robes fall down, and fold his hands, and the empire was orderly ruled.27 Edward L. Shaughnessy observes that this battle represented at the time perhaps only the replacement—through force of arms—of one local power by another, but for later Chinese it came to illustrate the irrepressible will of Heaven turning its mandate from one state, the rulers of which had grown distant from the people, to another state blessed with virtuous rulers.28 For an educated Chinese until the last century, Muye would have been the most familiar and paradigmatic of all battles. In China, the expectation it expresses: namely, of the attainment of maximal goals by the use of minimal means, is still influential. <u><mark>This expectation</mark> of minimal force <mark>is evident in</mark> traditional <strong><mark>Chinese works on the military</u></strong></mark>, as well, although these were taboo to the Confucians, and are evident in current Chinese military thinking as well. Thus, the German word Gewalt, meaning force, occurs eight times in just the two paragraphs in which Clausewitz defines war. By contrast, in the entire 13 chapters of the Chinese military classic Sun Zi’s Art of War the Chinese character meaning force [li ജ] is used only nine times. The Chinese writers about war defined not destruction but disorganization, paralysis, and psychological domination of the enemy as their goal. “To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles” as Sun Zi (ca. 544-496 BCE) famously asserted “is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.29 Today, if doctrine and propaganda are any guide, <u><strong><mark>China</u></strong></mark> still intuitively accepts such concepts. She <u><strong><mark>envisions a series of small local wars in Asia to be won quickly and at low cost</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>by a combination of brilliant strategy and high-technology weapons</u>:</mark> “<u><strong><mark>fought rapidly and decided rapidly</u></strong></mark>” [suzhan sujue ㅦᚩㅦ᳿] <u>concepts closely akin to tradition</u>.30 Arguably, then, <u>what strategists would call <strong><mark>a faulty “theory of victory</strong></mark>”— meaning the story that a belligerent tells itself about what it will do, and then what the opponent will do, in a sequence that will lead the belligerent to success—<strong><mark>is</strong></mark> one <strong><mark>the foundation of China’s</strong></mark> otherwise puzzlingly optimistic approach to the <strong><mark>use of force.</p></u></strong></mark><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Eric Gomez 15, an independent analyst and recent Master’s graduate of the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. He is working to develop expertise in regional security issues and U.S. military strategy in East Asia, with a focus on China, 8-6-2015, "Deep Accommodation: The Best Option for Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait," Center for International Maritime Security, http://cimsec.org/deep-accommodation-best-option-preventing-war-taiwan-strait/18128 *brackets for clarity* fulltext: History has shown that emerging great powers and established or declining great powers are likely to fight major wars in order to determine the balance of power in the international system. There is considerable fear that the U.S. and China are heading towards great power conflict. As Christopher Layne argues, there are “several important — and unsettling — parallels between the Anglo-Germany relationship during the run-up to 1914 and the unfolding Sino-American relationship.” The headline-grabbing dispute in the South China Sea offers an excellent example of one of the several flashpoints that could spark a larger conflict between the U.S. and China. But the probability of great power conflict between the U.S. and China can be reduced if the two states can find ways to better manage interactions in flashpoint areas. The oldest flashpoint, and the area most important for Chinese domestic politics, is the Taiwan Strait. In 1972, the Shanghai Communique stated that the so-called Taiwan question was the most important issue blocking the normalization of relations between the U.S. and China. This question has yet to be solved, mostly because Taiwan has been able to deter attack through a strong indigenous defense capability backed up by American commitment. The status quo in the Taiwan Strait will be unsustainable as China continues to improve its military capabilities and adopt more aggressive military strategies. If the U.S. wants to avert a war with China in the Taiwan Strait, it must start looking for an alternative to the status quo. Taiwan’s strategy of economic accommodation with China under the Ma Ying-jeou administration has brought about benefits. The U.S. should encourage Taiwan to deepen its military and political accommodation with China. This would be a difficult pill for Taiwan to swallow, but it could offer the most sustainable deterrent to armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait. For years, Taiwan’s de facto independence from China has relied on a qualitatively superior, defense-focused military that could prevent the landing of a large Chinese force on the island. The growing power of the Chinese military, especially its naval and missile forces, has begun eroding this qualitative advantage. Indeed, some observers have already concluded that “the days when [Taiwan] forces had a quantitative and qualitative advantage over [China] are over.” Taiwan still possesses a formidable military and could inflict high costs on an attacking Chinese force, but ultimately American intervention would likely be necessary to save Taiwan from a determined Chinese attack. Military intervention by the U.S. on the behalf of Taiwan would be met with formidable Chinese resistance. China’s anti-access/area denial [A2/AD] strategy complicates the U.S.’s ability to project power in the Taiwan Strait. China’s latest maritime strategy document, released in May of this year, states that China’s navy will start shifting its focus further offshore to include open seas protection missions. Such a shift implies an aspirational capability to keep intervening American forces away from Taiwan. American political leaders have not given up on Taiwan, and the 2015 U.S. National Military Strategy places a premium on reassuring allies of America’s commitments. However, the fact that China’s improving military capabilities will make an American military intervention on behalf of Taiwan more and more costly must not be ignored. The best option for preventing a war in the Taiwan Strait is deepening the strategy of accommodation that Beijing and Taipei have already started. According to Baohui Zhang, accommodation “relies on expanding common interests, institutionalizing dialogues, promoting security confidence-building and offering assurances to establish mutual trust.” The Ma Ying-jeou administration in Taiwan has tried to use accommodation as a way to lock in the status quo and avoid conflict, but their efforts have been met with more and more popular backlash in Taiwan. China’s military strategy document does acknowledge that “cross-Taiwan Straits relations have sustained a sound momentum of peaceful development, but the root cause of instability has not yet been removed.” If Taiwan is serious about accommodation as a means of deterring military conflict, then it should cease purchasing military equipment from the U.S. Stopping the arms purchases would send a clear message to Beijing that Taiwan is interested in deeper accommodation. A halt in arms sales would also benefit U.S.-Chinese relations by removing a “major stumbling block for developing bilateral military-to-military ties.” This is certainly a very controversial proposal, and would likely be very difficult to sell to the Taiwanese people, but as I’ve already explained the status quo is becoming more and more untenable. There are two important things to keep in mind about this proposal which mitigate fears that this is some kind of appeasement to China. First, halting U.S. arms sales does not mean that Taiwan’s self-defense forces would cease to exist. China may be gaining ground on Taiwan militarily, but the pain that Taiwan could inflict on an attacking force is still high. China may be able to defeat Taiwan in a conflict, but the losses its military would take to seize the island would significantly hamper its ability to use its military while it recovers from attacking Taiwan. Second, there is an easily identifiable off-ramp that can be used by Taiwan if the policy is not successful. Stopping arms purchases is meant to be a way of testing the water. If the Chinese respond positively to the decision by offering greater military cooperation with Taiwan or some form of political concessions then Beijing signals its commitment to the accommodation process. On the other hand, if the Chinese refuse to follow through and meet Taiwan halfway then Beijing signals that it is not actually committed to accommodation. Taiwan would then resume purchasing American weapons with the knowledge that it must find some other way to prevent conflict. Accommodation by giving up American arms sales is a tough pill for Taiwan to swallow, but it simply does not have many other viable alternatives to preventing conflict. Taiwan could pursue acquiring nuclear weapons, but this would be met by American opposition and would likely trigger a pre-emptive attack by China if the weapons program were discovered. Taiwan could try to avert conflict by increasing military spending to forestall, but this would be difficult to sustain so long as China’s economy and military spending is also growing. Analysts at CSBA have argued for deterrence through protraction, which advocates employing asymmetric guerrilla-style tactics to prevent China from achieving air and sea dominance. This has the highest likelihood of success of the three alternatives mentioned in this paragraph, but it still relies on intervention by outside powers to ultimately save the day. Taiwan’s military deterrent will not be able to prevent a Chinese attempt to change the status quo by force for much longer. Any conflict in the Taiwan Strait would likely involve a commitment of U.S. forces and could lead to a major war between the U.S. and China. Accommodation could be the best worst option that Taiwan, and the U.S., has for preventing a war with China. Announcing an end to American weapons purchases could bring Taiwan progress on negotiations with China if successful while still providing off-ramps that Taiwan could take if unsuccessful. I admit, the idea of accommodation does have its flaws, and more work needs to be done to flesh out this idea. I hope that this idea of deep accommodation will add to the discussion about the management of the Taiwan Strait issue. The status quo won’t last forever, and a vigorous debate will be needed to arrive at the best possible solution.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Ending arms sales is key---other options fail because China cares about Taiwan way more than the US does. </h4><p>Eric <strong>Gomez 15,</strong> an independent analyst and recent Master’s graduate of the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. He is working to develop expertise in regional security issues and U.S. military strategy in East Asia, with a focus on China, 8-6-2015, "Deep Accommodation: The Best Option for Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait," Center for International Maritime Security, http://cimsec.org/deep-accommodation-best-option-preventing-war-taiwan-strait/18128 *brackets for clarity*</p><p><u><strong>History has shown that emerging great powers and established or declining great powers are likely to fight major wars in order to determine the balance of power </u></strong>in the international system. There is considerable fear that the U.S. and China are heading towards great power conflict. As Christopher Layne argues, <u><strong>there are “several important — and unsettling — parallels between the Anglo-Germany relationship during the run-up to 1914 and the unfolding Sino-American relationship.”</u></strong> The headline-grabbing dispute in the South China Sea offers an excellent example of one of the several flashpoints that could spark a larger conflict between the U.S. and China. <u><strong>But the probability of great power conflict between the U.S. and China can be reduced if the two states can find ways to better manage interactions in flashpoint areas. <mark>The</mark> oldest <mark>flashpoint</mark>, and the area <mark>most important for Chinese</mark> domestic <mark>politics</mark>, <mark>is</mark> the <mark>Taiwan</mark> Strait. I</u></strong>n 1972, the Shanghai Communique stated that the so-called Taiwan question was the most important issue blocking the normalization of relations between the U.S. and China. This question has yet to be solved, mostly because Taiwan has been able to deter attack through a strong indigenous defense capability backed up by American commitment. <u><strong>The status quo in the Taiwan Strait will be unsustainable as China continues to improve its military capabilities</u></strong> <u><strong>and adopt more aggressive military strategies</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>If the U.S. wants to avert</mark> a <mark>war</mark> with China <mark>in the</mark> Taiwan <mark>Strait, it must</mark> start <mark>look</mark>ing <mark>for an</mark> <mark>alternative</mark> to the status quo</u></strong>. Taiwan’s strategy of economic accommodation with China under the Ma Ying-jeou administration has brought about benefits. The U.S. should encourage Taiwan to deepen its military and political accommodation with China. This would be a difficult pill for Taiwan to swallow, but it could offer the most sustainable deterrent to armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait. For years, Taiwan’s de facto independence from China has relied on a qualitatively superior, defense-focused military that could prevent the landing of a large Chinese force on the island. <u><strong>The growing power of the Chinese military, especially its naval and missile forces, has begun eroding this qualitative advantage. Indeed, some observers have already concluded that “the days when [Taiwan] forces had a quantitative and qualitative advantage over [China] are over</u></strong>.” Taiwan still possesses a formidable military and could inflict high costs on an attacking Chinese force, but ultimately American intervention would likely be necessary to save Taiwan from a determined Chinese attack. <u><strong>Military intervention by the U.S. on the behalf of Taiwan would be met with formidable Chinese resistance. China’s anti-access/area denial [A2/AD] strategy complicates the U.S.’s ability to project power in the Taiwan Strait.</u></strong> China’s latest maritime strategy document, released in May of this year, states that China’s navy will start shifting its focus further offshore to include open seas protection missions. Such a shift implies an aspirational capability to keep intervening American forces away from Taiwan. American political leaders have not given up on Taiwan, and the 2015 U.S. National Military Strategy places a premium on reassuring allies of America’s commitments. However, the fact that China’s improving military capabilities will make an American military intervention on behalf of Taiwan more and more costly must not be ignored. <u><strong><mark>The best option </mark>for preventing a war in the Taiwan Strait <mark>is deepening</mark> the strategy of <mark>accommodation</mark> that Beijing and Taipei have already started</u></strong>. <u><strong>According to Baohui Zhang, accommodation “relies on expanding common interests, institutionalizing dialogues, promoting security confidence-building and offering assurances to establish mutual trust</u></strong>.” The Ma Ying-jeou administration in Taiwan has tried to use accommodation as a way to lock in the status quo and avoid conflict, but their efforts have been met with more and more popular backlash in Taiwan. China’s military strategy document does acknowledge that “cross-Taiwan Straits relations have sustained a sound momentum of peaceful development, but the root cause of instability has not yet been removed.” <u><strong>If <mark>Taiwan</mark> is serious about accommodation as a means of deterring military conflict, then it <mark>should cease purchasing military equipment</mark> from the U.S</u></strong>. Stopping the arms purchases would send a clear message to Beijing that Taiwan is interested in deeper accommodation. <u><strong><mark>A halt in</mark> arms <mark>sales would</mark> also <mark>benefit</mark> U.S.-Chinese relations by removing a </u></strong>“<u><strong>major stumbling block for developing <mark>bilateral military-to-military ties</u></strong></mark>.” This is certainly a very controversial proposal, and would likely be very difficult to sell to the Taiwanese people, but as I’ve already explained the status quo is becoming more and more untenable. There are two important things to keep in mind about this proposal which mitigate fears that this is some kind of appeasement to China. First, <u><strong>halting U.S. arms sales does not mean that Taiwan’s self-defense forces would cease to exist</u></strong>. <u><strong>China may be gaining ground on Taiwan militarily, but <mark>the pain</mark> that <mark>Taiwan could inflict on an attacking force is</mark> still <mark>high</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>China may be able to defeat Taiwan in a conflict, but the losses its military would take to seize the island would significantly hamper its ability to use its military while it recovers</u></strong> from attacking Taiwan. <u><strong>Second, there is an easily identifiable off-ramp that can be used by Taiwan if the policy is not successful.</u></strong> <u><strong>Stopping arms purchases is meant to be a way of testing the water. If the Chinese respond positively</u></strong> to the decision <u><strong>by offering</u></strong> greater military <u><strong>cooperation</u></strong> with Taiwan <u><strong>or some form of political</u></strong> <u><strong>concessions</u></strong> <u><strong>then Beijing signals its commitment to the accommodation process</u></strong>. On the other hand, <u><strong>if the Chinese refuse to follow through and meet Taiwan halfway then Beijing signals that it is not actually committed to accommodation</u></strong>. Taiwan would then resume purchasing American weapons with the knowledge that it must find some other way to prevent conflict. <u><strong>Accommodation by giving up American arms sales is a tough pill for <mark>Taiwan</mark> to swallow, but it simply <mark>does not have</mark> many <mark>other viable alternatives to preventing conflict</u></strong></mark>. Taiwan could pursue acquiring nuclear weapons, but this would be met by American opposition and would likely trigger a pre-emptive attack by China if the weapons program were discovered. <u><strong>Taiwan could try to avert conflict by increasing military spending to forestall, but this would be difficult to sustain so long as China’s economy and military spending is also growing</u></strong>. Analysts at CSBA have argued for deterrence through protraction, which advocates employing asymmetric guerrilla-style tactics to prevent China from achieving air and sea dominance. This has the highest likelihood of success of the three alternatives mentioned in this paragraph, but it still relies on intervention by outside powers to ultimately save the day. <u><strong>Taiwan’s military deterrent will not be able to prevent a Chinese attempt to change the status quo by force for much longer</u></strong>. <u><strong>Any conflict in the Taiwan Strait would likely involve a commitment of U.S. forces and could lead to a major war between the U.S. and China</u></strong>. <u><strong>Accommodation could be the best worst option that Taiwan, and the U.S., has for preventing a war with China. Announcing <mark>an end to</mark> American weapons <mark>purchases could bring Taiwan progress on negotiations with China</mark> if successful while still providing off-ramps that Taiwan could take if unsuccessful</u></strong>. I admit, the idea of accommodation does have its flaws, and more work needs to be done to flesh out this idea. I hope that this idea of deep accommodation will add to the discussion about the management of the Taiwan Strait issue. The status quo won’t last forever, and a vigorous debate will be needed to arrive at the best possible solution. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Robinson 14 (William I. – Professor of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies, @ UC-Santa Barbara] [Global Capitalism: Crisis of Humanity and the Specter of 21st Century Fascism] The World Financial Review) fulltext: Cyclical, Structural, and Systemic Crises Hence my concept of global crisis is broader than financial. There are multiple and mutually constitutive dimensions – economic, social, political, cultural, ideological and ecological, not to mention the existential crisis of our consciousness, values and very being. There is a crisis of social polarisation, that is, of social reproduction. The system cannot meet the needs or assure the survival of millions of people, perhaps a majority of humanity. There are crises of state legitimacy and political authority, or of hegemony and domination. National states face spiraling crises of legitimacy as they fail to meet the social grievances of local working and popular classes experiencing downward mobility, unemployment, heightened insecurity and greater hardships. The legitimacy of the system has increasingly been called into question by millions, perhaps even billions, of people around the world, and is facing expanded counter-hegemonic challenges. Global elites have been unable counter this erosion of the system’s authority in the face of worldwide pressures for a global moral economy. And a canopy that envelops all these dimensions is a crisis of sustainability rooted in an ecological holocaust that has already begun, expressed in climate change and the impending collapse of centralised agricultural systems in several regions of the world, among other indicators. By a crisis of humanity I mean a crisis that is approaching systemic proportions, threatening the ability of billions of people to survive, and raising the specter of a collapse of world civilisation and degeneration into a new “Dark Ages.”2 This crisis of humanity shares a number of aspects with earlier structural crises but there are also several features unique to the present: 1. The system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. Global capitalism now couples human and natural history in such a way as to threaten to bring about what would be the sixth mass extinction in the known history of life on earth.3 This mass extinction would be caused not by a natural catastrophe such as a meteor impact or by evolutionary changes such as the end of an ice age but by purposive human activity. According to leading environmental scientists there are nine “planetary boundaries” crucial to maintaining an earth system environment in which humans can exist, four of which are experiencing at this time the onset of irreversible environmental degradation and three of which (climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss) are at “tipping points,” meaning that these processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries. 2. The magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as is the concentration of the means of global communication and symbolic production and circulation in the hands of a very few powerful groups. Computerised wars, drones, bunker-buster bombs, star wars, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare. Warfare has become normalised and sanitised for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. At the same time we have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication, images and symbolic production. The world of Edward Snowden is the world of George Orwell; 1984 has arrived; 3. Capitalism is reaching apparent limits to its extensive expansion. There are no longer any new territories of significance that can be integrated into world capitalism, de-ruralisation is now well advanced, and the commodification of the countryside and of pre- and non-capitalist spaces has intensified, that is, converted in hot-house fashion into spaces of capital, so that intensive expansion is reaching depths never before seen. Capitalism must continually expand or collapse. How or where will it now expand? 4. There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a “planet of slums,”4 alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and subject to sophisticated systems of social control and to destruction - to a mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion. This includes prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes, omnipresent policing, militarised gentrification, and so on; 5. There is a disjuncture between a globalising economy and a nation-state based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and have not been able to play the role of what social scientists refer to as a “hegemon,” or a leading nation-state that has enough power and authority to organise and stabilise the system. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the unprecedented militarisation of social life and conflict across the globe makes it hard to imagine that the system can come under any stable political authority that assures its reproduction. Global Police State How have social and political forces worldwide responded to crisis? The crisis has resulted in a rapid political polarisation in global society. Both right and left-wing forces are ascendant. Three responses seem to be in dispute. One is what we could call “reformism from above.” This elite reformism is aimed at stabilising the system, at saving the system from itself and from more radical responses from below. Nonetheless, in the years following the 2008 collapse of the global financial system it seems these reformers are unable (or unwilling) to prevail over the power of transnational financial capital. A second response is popular, grassroots and leftist resistance from below. As social and political conflict escalates around the world there appears to be a mounting global revolt. While such resistance appears insurgent in the wake of 2008 it is spread very unevenly across countries and regions and facing many problems and challenges. Yet another response is that I term 21st century fascism.5 The ultra-right is an insurgent force in many countries. In broad strokes, this project seeks to fuse reactionary political power with transnational capital and to organise a mass base among historically privileged sectors of the global working class – such as white workers in the North and middle layers in the South – that are now experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility. It involves militarism, extreme masculinisation, homophobia, racism and racist mobilisations, including the search for scapegoats, such as immigrant workers and, in the West, Muslims. Twenty-first century fascism evokes mystifying ideologies, often involving race/culture supremacy and xenophobia, embracing an idealised and mythical past. Neo-fascist culture normalises and glamorises warfare and social violence, indeed, generates a fascination with domination that is portrayed even as heroic. The need for dominant groups around the world to secure widespread, organised mass social control of the world’s surplus population and rebellious forces from below gives a powerful impulse to projects of 21st century fascism. Simply put, the immense structural inequalities of the global political economy cannot easily be containe d through consensual mechanisms of social control. We have been witnessing transitions from social welfare to social control states around the world. We have entered a period of great upheavals, momentous changes and uncertainties. The only viable solution to the crisis of global capitalism is a massive redistribution of wealth and power downward towards the poor majority of humanity along the lines of a 21st century democratic socialism, in which humanity is no longer at war with itself and with nature.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Capitalism causes environmental destruction– and turns case </h4><p><strong>Robinson 14</strong> (William I. – Professor of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies, @ UC-Santa Barbara] [Global Capitalism: Crisis of Humanity and the Specter of 21st Century Fascism] The World Financial Review)</p><p>Cyclical, Structural, and Systemic Crises </p><p>Hence my concept of global crisis is broader than financial. <u>There are multiple and mutually constitutive dimensions – economic, social, political, cultural, ideological and ecological, not to mention the existential crisis of our consciousness</u>, values and very being. There is a crisis of social polarisation, that is, of social reproduction. <u>The system cannot meet the needs</u> or assure the survival <u>of millions of people</u>, perhaps a majority of humanity. There are crises of state legitimacy and political authority, or of hegemony and domination. National states face spiraling crises of legitimacy as they fail to meet the social grievances of local working and popular classes experiencing downward mobility, unemployment, heightened insecurity and greater hardships. <u>The legitimacy of the system has increasingly been called into question by millions</u>, <u>perhaps</u> even <u>billions</u>, of people around the world, <u>and is facing</u> <u><strong>expanded counter-hegemonic challenges</u></strong>. Global elites have been unable counter this erosion of the system’s authority in the face of worldwide pressures for a global moral economy. <u>And a canopy that envelops all these dimensions is a crisis of sustainability rooted in</u> an ecological holocaust that has already begun, expressed in <u><mark>climate change and </mark>the</u> <u><strong>impending <mark>collapse of </mark>centralised <mark>agricultural systems</u></strong></mark> in several regions of the world, among other indicators. By <u>a crisis of humanity</u> I mean a crisis that is approaching systemic proportions, <u><mark>threatening the ability of billions of people to survive</mark>, and raising the specter of a collapse of world civilisation</u> and degeneration into a new “Dark Ages.”2 This crisis of humanity shares a number of aspects with earlier structural crises but there are also several features unique to the present: 1. <u><strong><mark>The system is fast reaching the ecological limits</u></strong></mark> <u>of its reproduction. Global capitalism now couples human and natural history in such a way as to threaten to bring about what would be <mark>the sixth mass extinction</u></mark> in the known history of life on earth.3 This mass extinction would be caused not by a natural catastrophe such as a meteor impact or by evolutionary changes such as the end of an ice age but by purposive human activity. According to leading environmental scientists <u>there are nine</u> “<u><mark>planetary boundaries</u></mark>” <u>crucial to maintaining an earth system environment in which humans can exist, <strong>four of which <mark>are experiencing</u></strong></mark> at this time <u><strong>the onset of <mark>irreversible</mark> environmental <mark>degradation</u></strong></mark> <u>and three of which</u> (<u>climate change</u>, the <u>nitrogen cycle</u>, <u>and biodiversity loss)</u> <u>are at “tipping points</u>,” meaning that these processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries. 2. <u><strong>The magnitude of the means of violence and</u></strong> social <u><strong>control is unprecedented</u></strong>, <u>as is the concentration of the means of global communication and symbolic production</u> and circulation in the hands of a very few powerful groups. <u>Computerised wars</u>, <u>drones</u>, <u>bunker-buster bombs</u>, <u>star wars</u>, and so forth, <u>have changed the face of warfare</u>. <u><strong><mark>Warfare has become normalised and sanitised</u></strong></mark> <u>for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression.</u> At the same time we have arrived at the <u><strong>panoptical surveillance society</u></strong> and the age of thought control <u>by those who control global flows of communication</u>, images and symbolic production. The world of Edward Snowden is the world of George Orwell; 1984 has arrived; 3. <u>Capitalism is reaching apparent limits to its extensive expansion. There are no longer any new territories of significance that can be integrated into world capitalism, de-ruralisation is now well advanced, and the commodification of the countryside and of pre- and non-capitalist spaces has intensified</u>, that is, converted in hot-house fashion into spaces of capital, so that intensive expansion is reaching depths never before seen. <u><strong><mark>Capitalism must continually expand or collapse</strong></mark>.</u> How or where will it now expand? 4. <u>There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a “planet of slums,”</u>4 <u><strong><mark>alienated from the productive economy</u></strong></mark>, <u>thrown into the margins, and subject to sophisticated <mark>systems of social control and</u></mark> to <u><mark>destruction</u></mark> -<u> to <mark>a mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion</u></mark>. <u>This includes prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes, omnipresent policing, militarised gentrification</u>, and so on; 5. <u>There is a disjuncture between a globalising economy and a nation-state based system of political authority.</u> <u><strong>Transnational state apparatuses</u></strong> are incipient and <u><strong>have not been able to play the role of</u></strong> what social scientists refer to as a “<u><strong>hegemon</u></strong>,” or a leading nation-state that has enough power and authority to organise and stabilise the system. <u>The spread of</u> <u><strong>w</u></strong>eapons of <u><strong>m</u></strong>ass <u><strong>d</u></strong>estruction <u>and the unprecedented militarisation of social life and conflict across the globe makes it hard to imagine that the system can come under any stable political authority that assures its reproduction. </u>Global Police State How have social and political forces worldwide responded to crisis? The crisis has resulted in a rapid political polarisation in global society. Both right and left-wing forces are ascendant. Three responses seem to be in dispute. One is what we could call “<u>reformism from above</u>.” This elite reformism is <u>aimed at stabilising the system</u>, at saving the system from itself and <u><strong>from more radical responses from below</u></strong>. Nonetheless, in the years following the 2008 collapse of the global financial system it seems <u>these reformers are unable</u> (or unwilling) <u>to prevail over the power of transnational financial capital</u>. A second response is popular, <u><strong>grassroots and leftist resistance from below</u></strong>. <u>As social and political conflict escalates</u> around the world <u>there appears to be a mounting global revolt</u>. While such resistance appears insurgent in the wake of 2008 it is spread very unevenly across countries and regions and facing many problems and challenges. Yet another response is that I term 21st century fascism.5 <u>The ultra-right is an insurgent force in many countries.</u> In broad strokes, <u>this project seeks to fuse reactionary political power with transnational capital and to organise a mass base among historically privileged sectors of the global working class</u> – <u>such as white workers</u> in the North and middle layers in the South – <u>that are now experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility. <mark>It involves militarism</u></mark>, <u><strong><mark>extreme masculinisation</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>homophobia</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>racism and racist mobilisations</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>including the search for scapegoats</u></strong></mark>, <u>such as immigrant workers and</u>, in the West, <u>Muslims. </u>Twenty-first century fascism evokes mystifying ideologies, often <u>involving race/culture supremacy</u> <u>and xenophobia</u>, embracing an idealised and mythical past. Neo-fascist culture normalises and glamorises warfare and social violence, indeed, <u>generates a fascination with domination that is portrayed even as heroic</u>. <u>The need for dominant groups</u> around the world <u>to secure</u> widespread, organised mass <u>social control of the world’s surplus population and rebellious forces from below gives a</u> <u><strong>powerful impulse</u></strong> <u>to projects of 21st century fascism</u>. Simply put, the <u>immense structural inequalities</u> of the global political economy <u>cannot easily be containe d through consensual mechanisms of social control</u>. We have been witnessing transitions from social welfare to social control states around the world. <u>We have entered a period of great upheavals, momentous changes and uncertainties. <mark>The</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>only viable solution</u></strong></mark> to the crisis of global capitalism <u><mark>is a</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>massive redistribution</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>of wealth </mark>and power downward towards the poor majority of humanity along the lines of a 21st century democratic socialism</u>, <u>in which humanity is no longer at war with itself and with nature</u>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Wallach 17 Wendell Wallach (wendell.wallach@yale.edu) is a Senior Advisor to The Hastings Center and Chairs Technology and Ethics Studies at the Yale University Interdisciplinary Center for Bioethics. His latest book is A Dangerous Master: How to Keep Technology from Slipping Beyond Our Control. Toward a Ban on Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Surmounting the Obstacles. Communications of the ACM (Association for Computing Machinery), Vol. 60, No. 5. May 2017. -CAT fulltext: Unlike most other weapons that have been banned, some uses of LAWS are perceived as morally acceptable, if not morally obligatory. The simple fact that LAWS can be substituted for and thus save the lives of one’s own soldiers is the most obvious moral good. Unfortunately, this same moral good lowers the barriers to initiating new wars. Some nations will be emboldened to start wars if they believe they can achieve political objectives without the loss of their troops. It is unclear whether armed military robots should be viewed as weapon systems or weapon platforms, a distinction that has been central to many traditional arms control treaties. Range, payload, and other features are commonly used in arms control agreements to restrict the capabilities of a weapon system. A weapon platform can be regulated by restricting where it can be located. For example, agreements to restrict nuclear weapons will specify number of warheads and the range of the missiles upon which they are mounted, and even where the missiles can be stationed. With LAWS, what is actually being banned? Arms control agreements often focus on working out modes of verification and inspection regimes to determine whether adversaries are honoring the ban. The difference between a lethal and non-lethal robotic system may be little more than a few lines of code or a switch, which would be difficult to detect and could be removed before or added after an inspection. Proposed verification regimes for LAWS6 would be extremely difficult and costly to enforce. Military strategists do not want to restrict their options, when that of bad actors is unrestricted. LAWS differ in kind from the various weapon systems that have to date been banned without requiring an inspection regime. Consider, for example, the relatively recent bans on blinding lasers or anti-personnel weapons, which are often offered as a model for arms control for LAWS. These bans rely on representatives of civil society, non-governmental organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, to monitor and stigmatize violations. So also will a ban on LAWS. However, blinding lasers and anti-personnel weapons were relatively easy to define. After the fact, the use of such weapons can be proven in a straightforward manner. Lethal autonomy, on the other hand, is not a weapon system. It is a feature set that can be added to many, if not all, weapon systems. Furthermore, the uses of autonomous killing features are likely to be masked. LAWS will be relatively easy to assemble using technologies developed for civilian applications. Thus their proliferation and availability to non-state actors cannot be effectively stopped. In forging arms-control agreements definitional distinctions have always been important. Contentions that definitional consensus cannot be reached for autonomy or meaningful human control, that LAWS depend upon advanced AI, and that such systems are merely a distant speculative possibility repeatedly arose during the April discussion at the U.N. in Geneva, and generally served to obfuscate, not clarify, the debate. A circular and particularly unhelpful debate has ensued over the meaning of autonomy, with proponents and opponents of a ban struggling to establish a definition that serves their cause. For example, the U.K. delegation insists that autonomy implies near humanlike capabilities and anything short of this is merely an automated weapon. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots favors a definition where autonomy is the ability to perform a task without immediate intervention from a human. Similarly, definitions for meaningful human control range from a military leader specifying a kill order in advance of deploying a weapon system to having the real-time engagement of a human in the loop of selecting and killing a human target. The leading military powers contend that they will maintain effective control over the LAWS they deploy. But even if we accept their sincerity, this totally misses the point. They have no means of ensuring that other states and nonstate actors will follow suit. More is at stake in these definition- al debates than whether to preemp- tively ban LAWS. Consider a Boston Dynamic’s Big Dog loaded with explo- sives, and directed through the use of a GPS to a specific location, where it is programmed to explode. Unfortunate- ly, during the time it takes to travel to that location, the site is transformed from a military outpost to a makeshift hospital for injured civilians. A strong definition for meaningful human con- trol would require the location be giv- en a last-minute inspection before the explosives could detonate. Big Dog, in this example, is a dumb LAW, which we should perhaps fear as much as specu- lative future systems with advanced intelligence. Dumb LAWS, however, do open up comparisons to widely de- ployed existing weapon systems, such as cruise missiles, whose impact on an intended target military leaders have little or no ability to alter once the missile has been launched. In other words, banning dumb LAWS quickly converges with other arms control campaigns, such as those directed at limiting cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.5 States will demand a defini- tion for LAWS that distinguishes them from existing weapon systems. Delegates at the CCW are cognizant that in the past (1990s) they failed at banning the dumbest, most indiscrim- inate, and autonomous weapons of all, anti-personnel mines. Nevertheless, anti-personnel weapons (land mines) were eventually banned during an in- dependent process that led up to the Mine Ban or Ottawa Treaty; 162 coun- tries have committed to fully comply with that treaty.g f See, for example, the U.S. Department of De- fense Directive 2000.09 entitled, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems.” The Directive is dated No- vember 21, 2012 and signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense, Ashton B. Carter, who was appoint- ed Secretary of Defense by President Obama on December 5, 2014; http://bit.ly/1myJikF g The U.S., Russia, and China are not signatories to the Ottawa Treaty, although the U.S. has pledged to largely abide by its terms. A second failure to pass restric- tions on the use of a weapon systems, whose ban has garnered popular sup- port, might damage the whole CCW ap- proach to arms control. This knowledge offers the supporters of a ban a degree of leverage presuming: the ban truly has broad and effective public support; LAWS can be distinguished from exist- ing weaponry that is widely deployed; and creative means can be forged to de- velop the framework for an agreement. A 10-Point Plan Many of the barriers to fitting a ban on LAWS into traditional approaches to arms control can be overcome by adopting the following approach. 1. Rather than focus on establishing a bright line or clear definition for lethal autonomy, first establish a high order moral principle that can garner broad support. My candidate for that principle is: Machines, even semi-intelligent machines, should not be making life and death decisions. Only moral agents should make life and death decisions about humans. Arguably, something like this principle is already implicit, but not explicit, in existing international humanitarian law, also known as the laws of armed conflict (LOAC). A higher order moral principle makes explicitly clear what is off limits, while leaving open the discussion of marginal cases where a weapon system may or may not be considered to be making life and death decisions. 2. Insist that meaningful human control and making a life and death decision requires the real-time authorization from designated military personnel for a LAW to kill a combatant or destroy a target that might harbor combatants and non-combatants alike. In other words, it is not sufficient for military personnel to merely delegate a kill order in advance to an autonomous weapon or merely be “on-the-loop” of systems that can act without a real time go-ahead. 3. Petition leaders of states to declare that LAWS violate existing IHL. In the U.S. this would entail a Presidential Order to that effect. 4. Review marginal or ambiguous cases to set guidelines for when a weapon system is truly autonomous and when its actions are clearly the extension of a military commander’s will and intention. Recognize that any definition of autonomy will leave some cases ambiguous. 5. Underscore that some present and future weapon system will occasionally act unpredictably and most LAWS will be difficult if not impossible to test adequately. 6. Present compelling cases for banning at least some, if not all, LAWS. In other words, highlight situations in which nearly all parties will support a ban. For example, no nation should want LAWS that can launch nuclear warheads. 7. Accommodate the fact that there will be necessary exceptions to any ban. For example, defensive autonomous weapons that target unmanned incoming missiles are already widely deployed. These include the U.S. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System and Israel’s Iron Dome. 8. Recognize that future technological advances may justify additional exceptions to a ban. Probably the use of LAWS to protect refugee non-combatants would be embraced as an exception. Whether the use of LAWS in a combat zone where there are no non-combatants should be treated as an exception to a ban would need to be debated. Offensive autonomous weapon systems that do not target humans, but only target, for example, unmanned submarines, might be deemed an exception. 9. Utilize the unacceptable LAWS to campaign for a broad ban, and a mechanism for adding future exceptions. 10. Demand that the onus of ensuring that LAWS will be controllable, and that those who deploy the LAWS will be held accountable, lies with those parties who petition for, and deploy, an exception to the ban.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>A ban is feasible; our solvency advocate<strong>:</h4><p>Wallach 17</p><p></strong>Wendell Wallach (wendell.wallach@yale.edu) is a Senior Advisor to The Hastings Center and Chairs Technology and Ethics Studies at the Yale University Interdisciplinary Center for Bioethics. His latest book is A Dangerous Master: How to Keep Technology from Slipping Beyond Our Control. Toward a Ban on Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Surmounting the Obstacles. Communications of the ACM (Association for Computing Machinery), Vol. 60, No. 5. May 2017. -CAT</p><p>Unlike most other weapons that have been banned, <u>some uses of LAWS are perceived as morally acceptable</u>, if not morally obligatory. The simple fact that <u>LAWS can be substituted for and thus save the lives of one’s own soldiers is the most obvious moral good. Unfortunately, this same moral good lowers the barriers to initiating new wars</u>. <u>Some nations will be emboldened to start wars if they believe they can achieve political objectives without the loss of their troops</u>. It is unclear whether armed military robots should be viewed as weapon systems or weapon platforms, a distinction that has been central to many traditional arms control treaties. Range, payload, and other features are commonly used in arms control agreements to restrict the capabilities of a weapon system. A weapon platform can be regulated by restricting where it can be located. For example, agreements to restrict nuclear weapons will specify number of warheads and the range of the missiles upon which they are mounted, and even where the missiles can be stationed. With LAWS, what is actually being banned? Arms control agreements often focus on working out modes of verification and inspection regimes to determine whether adversaries are honoring the ban. The difference between a lethal and non-lethal robotic system may be little more than a few lines of code or a switch, which would be difficult to detect and could be removed before or added after an inspection. Proposed verification regimes for LAWS6 would be extremely difficult and costly to enforce. Military strategists do not want to restrict their options, when that of bad actors is unrestricted. <u><mark>LAWS differ in kind from</mark> the various <mark>weapon systems that have to date been banned </mark>without requiring an inspection regime.</u> Consider, for example, the relatively recent bans on blinding lasers or anti-personnel weapons, which are often offered as a model for arms control for LAWS. These bans rely on representatives of civil society, non-governmental organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, to monitor and stigmatize violations.<u> So also will a ban on LAWS. However, blinding lasers and anti-personnel weapons were relatively easy to define. After the fact, the use of such weapons can be proven in a straightforward manner. <mark>Lethal autonomy</mark>, on the other hand, <mark>is not a weapon system</mark>. <mark>It is a feature set that can be added to many, if not all,</mark> <mark>weapon systems</mark>. Furthermore, the uses of autonomous killing features are likely to be masked. LAWS will be relatively easy to assemble using technologies developed for civilian applications. Thus their proliferation and availability to non-state actors cannot be effectively stopped</u>. In forging arms-control agreements definitional distinctions have always been important. Contentions that definitional consensus cannot be reached for autonomy or meaningful human control, that LAWS depend upon advanced AI, and that such systems are merely a distant speculative possibility repeatedly arose during the April discussion at the U.N. in Geneva, and generally served to obfuscate, not clarify, the debate. A circular and particularly unhelpful debate has ensued over the meaning of autonomy, with proponents and opponents of a ban struggling to establish a definition that serves their cause. For example, the U.K. delegation insists that autonomy implies near humanlike capabilities and anything short of this is merely an automated weapon. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots favors a definition where autonomy is the ability to perform a task without immediate intervention from a human. Similarly, definitions for meaningful human control range from a military leader specifying a kill order in advance of deploying a weapon system to having the real-time engagement of a human in the loop of selecting and killing a human target. <u>The leading military powers contend that they will maintain effective control over</u> the <u>LAWS</u> they deploy. <u><mark>But</mark> even if we accept their sincerity, this totally misses the point. They have no means of ensuring that other states and nonstate actors will follow suit.</u> More is at stake in these definition- al debates than whether to preemp- tively ban LAWS. Consider a Boston Dynamic’s Big Dog loaded with explo- sives, and directed through the use of a GPS to a specific location, where it is programmed to explode. Unfortunate- ly, during the time it takes to travel to that location, the site is transformed from a military outpost to a makeshift hospital for injured civilians. A strong definition for meaningful human con- trol would require the location be giv- en a last-minute inspection before the explosives could detonate. Big Dog, in this example, is a dumb LAW, which we should perhaps fear as much as specu- lative future systems with advanced intelligence. Dumb LAWS, however, do open up comparisons to widely de- ployed existing weapon systems, such as cruise missiles, whose impact on an intended target military leaders have little or no ability to alter once the missile has been launched. In other words, banning dumb LAWS quickly converges with other arms control campaigns, such as those directed at limiting cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.5 States will demand a defini- tion for LAWS that distinguishes them from existing weapon systems. Delegates at the CCW are cognizant that in the past (1990s) they failed at banning the dumbest, most indiscrim- inate, and autonomous weapons of all, anti-personnel mines. Nevertheless, anti-personnel weapons (land mines) were eventually banned during an in- dependent process that led up to the Mine Ban or Ottawa Treaty; 162 coun- tries have committed to fully comply with that treaty.g f See, for example, the U.S. Department of De- fense Directive 2000.09 entitled, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems.” The Directive is dated No- vember 21, 2012 and signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense, Ashton B. Carter, who was appoint- ed Secretary of Defense by President Obama on December 5, 2014; http://bit.ly/1myJikF g The U.S., Russia, and China are not signatories to the Ottawa Treaty, although the U.S. has pledged to largely abide by its terms. A second failure to pass restric- tions on the use of a weapon systems, whose ban has garnered popular sup- port, might damage the whole CCW ap- proach to arms control. This knowledge offers the supporters of a ban a degree of leverage presuming: the ban truly has broad and effective public support; LAWS can be distinguished from exist- ing weaponry that is widely deployed; and creative means can be forged to de- velop the framework for an agreement. A 10-Point Plan <u>Many of <mark>the barriers to</mark> fitting <mark>a ban on LAWS</mark> into traditional approaches to arms control <mark>can be overcome by</mark> adopting the following approach. <mark>1.</mark> Rather than focus on establishing a bright line or clear definition for lethal autonomy, first <mark>establish a</mark> high order <mark>moral principle that can garner broad support</mark>. My candidate for that principle is: Machines, even semi-intelligent machines, should not be making life and death decisions. Only moral agents should make life and death decisions about humans. Arguably, something like this principle is already implicit, but not explicit, in existing international humanitarian law, also known as the laws of armed conflict (LOAC). A higher order moral principle makes explicitly clear what is off limits, while leaving open the discussion of marginal cases where a weapon system may or may not be considered to be making life and death decisions. <mark>2.</mark> <mark>Insist that </mark>meaningful human control and making <mark>a life and death decision requires </mark>the <mark>real-time authorization from </mark>designated <mark>military personnel </mark>for a LAW to kill a combatant or destroy a target that might harbor combatants and non-combatants alike. In other words, it is not sufficient for military personnel to merely delegate a kill order in advance to an autonomous weapon or merely be “on-the-loop” of systems that can act without a real time go-ahead. <mark>3.</mark> Petition leaders of states to declare that LAWS violate existing IHL. In the U.S. this would entail <mark>a Presidential Order</mark> to that effect. <mark>4.</mark> <mark>Review </mark>marginal or <mark>ambiguous cases to set guidelines </mark>for when a weapon system is truly autonomous and when its actions are clearly the extension of a military commander’s will and intention. Recognize that any definition of autonomy will leave some cases ambiguous. <mark>5.</mark> <mark>Underscore that</mark> some present and future weapon system will occasionally act unpredictably and most <mark>LAWS will be difficult </mark>if not impossible <mark>to test </mark>adequately. <mark>6.</mark> <mark>Present compelling cases </mark>for banning at least some, if not all, LAWS. In other words, highlight situations in which nearly all parties will support a ban. For example, no nation should want LAWS that can launch nuclear warheads. <mark>7.</mark> <mark>Accommodate </mark>the fact that there will be necessary <mark>exceptions </mark>to any ban. For example, defensive autonomous weapons that target unmanned incoming missiles are already widely deployed. These include the U.S. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System and Israel’s Iron Dome. <mark>8.</mark> <mark>Recognize that future tech</mark>nological advances <mark>may justify additional exceptions </mark>to a ban. Probably the use of LAWS to protect refugee non-combatants would be embraced as an exception. Whether the use of LAWS in a combat zone where there are no non-combatants should be treated as an exception to a ban would need to be debated. Offensive autonomous weapon systems that do not target humans, but only target, for example, unmanned submarines, might be deemed an exception. <mark>9.</mark> Utilize the unacceptable LAWS to <mark>campaign for a broad ban, </mark>and a mechanism for adding future exceptions. <mark>10.</mark> Demand that <mark>the onus of </mark>ensuring that LAWS will be <mark>control</mark>lable, and that those who deploy the LAWS will be held accountable, <mark>lies with those </mark>parties <mark>who petition for</mark>, and deploy, <mark>an exception </mark>to the ban</u>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: John Asafu-Adjaye 15, associate professor of economics at the University of Queensland, et al., April 2015, “An Ecomodernist Manifesto,” http://www.ecomodernism.org/s/An-Ecomodernist-Manifesto.pdf fulltext: At the same time, human flourishing has taken a serious toll on natural, nonhuman environments and wildlife. Humans use about half of the planet’s ice-free land, mostly for pasture, crops, and production forestry. Of the land once covered by forests, 20 percent has been converted to human use. Populations of many mammals, amphibians, and birds have declined by more than 50 percent in the past 40 years alone. More than 100 species from those groups went extinct in the 20th century, and about 785 since 1500. As we write, only four northern white rhinos are confirmed to exist.¶ Given that humans are completely dependent on the living biosphere, how is it possible that people are doing so much damage to natural systems without doing more harm to themselves?¶ The role that technology plays in reducing humanity’s dependence on nature explains this paradox. Human technologies, from those that first enabled agriculture to replace hunting and gathering, to those that drive today’s globalized economy, have made humans less reliant upon the many ecosystems that once provided their only sustenance, even as those same ecosystems have often been left deeply damaged.¶ Despite frequent assertions starting in the 1970s of fundamental “limits to growth,” there is still remarkably little evidence that human population and economic expansion will outstrip the capacity to grow food or procure critical material resources in the foreseeable future.¶ To the degree to which there are fixed physical boundaries to human consumption, they are so theoretical as to be functionally irrelevant. The amount of solar radiation that hits the Earth, for instance, is ultimately finite but represents no meaningful constraint upon human endeavors. Human civilization can flourish for centuries and millennia on energy delivered from a closed uranium or thorium fuel cycle, or from hydrogen-deuterium fusion. With proper management, humans are at no risk of lacking sufficient agricultural land for food. Given plentiful land and unlimited energy, substitutes for other material inputs to human well-being can easily be found if those inputs become scarce or expensive.¶ There remain, however, serious long-term environmental threats to human well-being, such as anthropogenic climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, and ocean acidification. While these risks are difficult to quantify, the evidence is clear today that they could cause significant risk of catastrophic impacts on societies and ecosystems. Even gradual, non-catastrophic outcomes associated with these threats are likely to result in significant human and economic costs as well as rising ecological losses.¶ Much of the world’s population still suffers from more-immediate local environmental health risks. Indoor and outdoor air pollution continue to bring premature death and illness to millions annually. Water pollution and water-borne illness due to pollution and degradation of watersheds cause similar suffering.¶ 2¶ Even as human environmental impacts continue to grow in the aggregate, a range of long-term trends are today driving significant decoupling of human well-being from environmental impacts.¶ Decoupling occurs in both relative and absolute terms. Relative decoupling means that human environmental impacts rise at a slower rate than overall economic growth. Thus, for each unit of economic output, less environmental impact (e.g., deforestation, defaunation, pollution) results. Overall impacts may still increase, just at a slower rate than would otherwise be the case. Absolute decoupling occurs when total environmental impacts — impacts in the aggregate — peak and begin to decline, even as the economy continues to grow.¶ Decoupling can be driven by both technological and demographic trends and usually results from a combination of the two.¶ The growth rate of the human population has already peaked. Today’s population growth rate is one percent per year, down from its high point of 2.1 percent in the 1970s. Fertility rates in countries containing more than half of the global population are now below replacement level. Population growth today is primarily driven by longer life spans and lower infant mortality, not by rising fertility rates. Given current trends, it is very possible that the size of the human population will peak this century and then start to decline.¶ Trends in population are inextricably linked to other demographic and economic dynamics. For the first time in human history, over half the global population lives in cities. By 2050, 70 percent are expected to dwell in cities, a number that could rise to 80 percent or more by the century’s end. Cities are characterized by both dense populations and low fertility rates.¶ Cities occupy just one to three percent of the Earth’s surface and yet are home to nearly four billion people. As such, cities both drive and symbolize the decoupling of humanity from nature, performing far better than rural economies in providing efficiently for material needs while reducing environmental impacts.¶ The growth of cities along with the economic and ecological benefits that come with them are inseparable from improvements in agricultural productivity. As agriculture has become more land and labor efficient, rural populations have left the countryside for the cities. Roughly half the US population worked the land in 1880. Today, less than 2 percent does.¶ As human lives have been liberated from hard agricultural labor, enormous human resources have been freed up for other endeavors. Cities, as people know them today, could not exist without radical changes in farming. In contrast, modernization is not possible in a subsistence agrarian economy.¶ These improvements have resulted not only in lower labor requirements per unit of agricultural output but also in lower land requirements. This is not a new trend: rising harvest yields have for millennia reduced the amount of land required to feed the average person. The average per-capita use of land today is vastly lower than it was 5,000 years ago, despite the fact that modern people enjoy a far richer diet. Thanks to technological improvements in agriculture, during the half-century starting in the mid-1960s, the amount of land required for growing crops and animal feed for the average person declined by one-half.¶ Agricultural intensification, along with the move away from the use of wood as fuel, has allowed many parts of the world to experience net reforestation. About 80 percent of New England is today forested, compared with about 50 percent at the end of the 19th century. Over the past 20 years, the amount of land dedicated to production forest worldwide declined by 50 million hectares, an area the size of France. the “forest transition” from net deforestation to net reforestation seems to be as resilient a feature of development as the demographic transition that reduces human birth rates as poverty declines.¶ Human use of many other resources is similarly peaking. The amount of water needed for the average diet has declined by nearly 25 percent over the past half-century. Nitrogen pollution continues to cause eutrophication and large dead zones in places like the Gulf of Mexico. While the total amount of nitrogen pollution is rising, the amount used per unit of production has declined significantly in developed nations.¶ Indeed, in contradiction to the often-expressed fear of infinite growth colliding with a finite planet, demand for many material goods may be saturating as societies grow wealthier. Meat consumption, for instance, has peaked in many wealthy nations and has shifted away from beef toward protein sources that are less land intensive.¶ As demand for material goods is met, developed economies see higher levels of spending directed to materially less-intensive service and knowledge sectors, which account for an increasing share of economic activity. This dynamic might be even more pronounced in today’s developing economies, which may benefit from being late adopters of resource-efficient technologies.¶ Taken together, these trends mean that the total human impact on the environment, including land-use change, overexploitation, and pollution, can peak and decline this century. By understanding and promoting these emergent processes, humans have the opportunity to re-wild and re-green the Earth — even as developing countries achieve modern living standards, and material poverty ends.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Growth sustainable---technology removes dependence on nature and solves resource scarcity </h4><p>John Asafu-<u><strong>Adjaye 15</u></strong>, associate professor of economics at the University of Queensland, et al., April 2015, “An Ecomodernist Manifesto,” http://www.ecomodernism.org/s/An-Ecomodernist-Manifesto.pdf</p><p>At the same time, <u><strong>human flourishing has taken a serious toll on natural, nonhuman environments and wildlife</u></strong>. <u><strong>Humans use</u></strong> about <u><strong>half of the planet’s ice-free land, mostly for pasture, crops, and production forestry. Of the land once covered by forests, 20 percent has been converted to human use. </u></strong>Populations of many mammals, amphibians, and birds have declined by more than 50 percent in the past 40 years alone. More than 100 species from those groups went extinct in the 20th century, and about 785 since 1500. As we write, only four northern white rhinos are confirmed to exist.¶ Given that humans are completely dependent on the living biosphere, <u><strong>how is it possible that people are doing so much damage to natural systems without doing more harm to themselves?</u></strong>¶ <u><strong>The role that technology plays in reducing humanity’s dependence on nature explains this paradox</u></strong>. <u><strong>Human technologies,</u></strong> from those that first enabled agriculture to replace hunting and gathering, to those that drive today’s globalized economy, <u><strong>have made humans less reliant upon the many ecosystems that once provided their only sustenance, even as those same ecosystems have often been left deeply damaged.¶ Despite frequent assertions</u></strong> starting in the 1970s <u><strong>of fundamental “limits to growth,” <mark>there is </mark>still remarkably <mark>little evidence</mark> that <mark>human population and economic expansion will outstrip</mark> the capacity to grow food or procure critical material <mark>resources</u></strong></mark> in the foreseeable future.¶ <u><strong>To the degree to which there are fixed physical <mark>boundaries to </mark>human <mark>consumption</mark>, they <mark>are so theoretical as to be</mark> functionally <mark>irrelevant</u></strong></mark>. The amount of solar radiation that hits the Earth, for instance, is ultimately finite but represents no meaningful constraint upon human endeavors. Human civilization can flourish for centuries and millennia on energy delivered from a closed uranium or thorium fuel cycle, or from hydrogen-deuterium fusion. <u><strong>With proper management, <mark>humans are at no risk of lacking </mark>sufficient agricultural <mark>land</mark> for food</u></strong>. Given plentiful land and unlimited energy, <u><strong><mark>substitutes for</mark> other material <mark>inputs</mark> to human well-being <mark>can easily be found</mark> if those inputs become scarce or expensive</u></strong>.¶ <u><strong>There remain</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>serious long-term environmental threats</u></strong> to human well-being, <u><strong>such as anthropogenic climate change</u></strong>, stratospheric <u><strong>ozone depletion, and ocean acidification. While these risks are difficult to quantify</u></strong>, the evidence is clear today that <u><strong>they could cause significant risk of catastrophic impacts on societies and ecosystems</u></strong>. Even gradual, non-catastrophic outcomes associated with these threats are likely to result in significant human and economic costs as well as rising ecological losses.¶ <u><strong>Much of the world’s population still suffers from more-immediate local environmental health risks</u></strong>. Indoor and outdoor <u><strong>air pollution continue to bring premature death and illness to millions annually</u></strong>. <u><strong>Water pollution and water-borne illness due to pollution and degradation of watersheds cause similar suffering.¶ </u></strong>2¶ <u><strong><mark>Even as</mark> human <mark>environmental impacts</mark> continue to <mark>grow</mark> in the aggregate, a range of <mark>long-term trends are </mark>today <mark>driving</mark> significant <mark>decoupling</mark> of human well-being from environmental impacts.¶ Decoupling occurs in</u></strong> both <u><strong>relative and absolute terms. Relative decoupling means that human <mark>environmental impacts rise</mark> at a <mark>slower</mark> rate <mark>than</mark> overall <mark>economic growth</u></strong></mark>. Thus, <u><strong>for each unit of economic output, less environmental impact</u></strong> (e.g., deforestation, defaunation, pollution) <u><strong>results</u></strong>. Overall impacts may still increase, just at a slower rate than would otherwise be the case. <u><strong>Absolute decoupling occurs when total environmental impacts</u></strong> — impacts in the aggregate — <u><strong>peak and begin to decline, even as the economy continues to grow.¶ Decoupling can be driven by both technological and demographic trends</u></strong> and usually results from a combination of the two.¶ <u><strong><mark>The growth rate of the</mark> human <mark>population has </mark>already <mark>peaked</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Today’s population growth rate is one percent per year, down from its high point</u></strong> of 2.1 percent <u><strong>in the 1970s. Fertility rates in countries containing more than half of the global population are now below replacement level. Population growth today is primarily driven by longer life spans and lower infant mortality</u></strong>, not by rising fertility rates. Given current trends, <u><strong>it is very possible that the size of the human population will peak this century and then start to decline.¶ Trends in population are inextricably linked to other demographic and economic dynamics</u></strong>. For the first time in human history, over half the global population lives in cities. By 2050, 70 percent are expected to dwell in cities, a number that could rise to 80 percent or more by the century’s end. <u><strong>Cities are characterized by both dense populations and low fertility rates.¶ Cities occupy just one to three percent of the Earth’s surface and yet are home to nearly four billion people</u></strong>. As such, <u><strong><mark>cities</mark> both <mark>drive</mark> and symbolize the <mark>decoupling</mark> of humanity from nature, <mark>performing</u></strong></mark> far <u><strong><mark>better than rural economies in</mark> providing efficiently for material needs while <mark>reducing environmental impacts</u></strong></mark>.¶ The growth of cities along with the economic and ecological benefits that come with them are inseparable from improvements in agricultural productivity.<u><strong> As agriculture has become more land and labor efficient, rural populations have left the countryside for the cities. Roughly half the US population worked the land in 1880. Today, less than 2 percent does.¶ As human lives have been liberated from hard agricultural labor, enormous human resources have been freed up for other endeavors</u></strong>. Cities, as people know them today, could not exist without radical changes in farming. In contrast, modernization is not possible in a subsistence agrarian economy.¶ These improvements have resulted not only in lower labor requirements per unit of agricultural output but also in lower land requirements. This is not a new trend: rising harvest yields have for millennia reduced the amount of land required to feed the average person. The average per-capita use of land today is vastly lower than it was 5,000 years ago, despite the fact that modern people enjoy a far richer diet. <u><strong>Thanks to technological improvements in agriculture, during the half-century starting in the mid-1960s, the amount of land required for growing crops and animal feed for the average person declined by one-half.¶ <mark>Agricultural intensification</mark>, along with the move away from the use of wood as fuel, <mark>has allowed</mark> many parts of the world to experience <mark>net reforestation</u></strong></mark>. About 80 percent of New England is today forested, compared with about 50 percent at the end of the 19th century. Over the past 20 years, the amount of land dedicated to production forest worldwide declined by 50 million hectares, an area the size of France. the “forest transition” from net deforestation to net reforestation seems to be as resilient a feature of development as the demographic transition that reduces human birth rates as poverty declines.¶ <u><strong><mark>Human use of </mark>many <mark>other resources is </mark>similarly <mark>peaking</mark>. The amount of <mark>water need</mark>ed<mark> for the average diet has declined</mark> by nearly 25 percent over the past half-century.</u></strong> Nitrogen pollution continues to cause eutrophication and large dead zones in places like the Gulf of Mexico. While the total amount of nitrogen pollution is rising, the amount used per unit of production has declined significantly in developed nations.¶ Indeed, <u><strong>in contradiction to the often-expressed fear of infinite growth colliding with a finite planet, demand for many material goods may be saturating as societies grow wealthier</u></strong>. Meat consumption, for instance, has peaked in many wealthy nations and has shifted away from beef toward protein sources that are less land intensive.¶ <u><strong>As demand for material goods is met, developed economies see higher levels of spending directed to materially less-intensive service and knowledge sectors, which account for an increasing share of economic activity. This dynamic might be even more pronounced in today’s developing economies, which may benefit from being late adopters of <mark>resource-efficient tech</mark>nologies.¶ </u></strong>Taken together, <u><strong>these <mark>trends mean</mark> that <mark>the total </mark>human <mark>impact on the environment</mark>, including land-use change, overexploitation, and pollution, <mark>can peak and decline this century</u></strong></mark>. By understanding and promoting these emergent processes, <u><strong>humans have the opportunity to re-wild and re-green the Earth</u></strong> — <u><strong>even as developing countries achieve modern living standards, and material poverty ends.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Sherwin, 15—New York Law School (Richard, “Too Late for Thinking: The Curious Quest for Emancipatory Potential in Meaningless Affect and Some Jurisprudential Implications”, Law, Culture and the Humanities 1–13, October 13, 2015, dml) fulltext: In the history of western culture we can point to three historic moments of epistemological de-centering. The Copernican revolution taught humanity that we do not dwell at the center of the universe. The Freudian revolution taught us that the ‘‘I’’ is a lonely island besieged on all sides by a raging sea of irrational, unconscious forces. Then quantum theory taught us that the universe is indeterminate: subject to uncanny chance operations. Affect theory, perhaps as an extension of the Darwinian evolutionary account of selective adaptation, humbles rationalist pretensions further by subordinating mind to material, bio-chemical processes. If thinking is always an after-thought, an after-the-fact construction, then we can never reliably account for how we’ve actually been affected by things and others in the world around us. How oppressive never to escape the grip of contingent social constructs. How depressing, if endless deconstruction yields only more fragmentation. Surely something must abide, some Higgs Boson-like elementary particle that can withstand deconstruction’s powerful blows. Is there anything real enough to withstand critique? Is there any basis left to hope for emancipation from the destabilizing mutability of human fabrication? In Brian Massumi’s view, there is. As he puts it: “The world always already offers degrees of freedom ready for amplification.”22 This takes us to the heart of the vitalist/ liberation impulse, namely: “escape from crystallized power structures.”23 In Massumi’s writings, affect operates as a cipher – a black box into which he can pack his emancipatory ideal.24 (“‘Affect’ is the word I use for ‘hope.’”25) What Massumi does not and perhaps cannot, or simply does not care to do is formulate a coherent basis for political judgment. While he at some points expresses a preference for “caring” and “belonging,”26 he offers no basis in affect theory for why those forms of behavior are preferable to other perhaps more intense alternatives, such as “anger” and “shock,” which he also embraces.27 But choices must be made. As Martha Nussbaum has noted, a society that cultivates conditions of anger and disgust, for example, is different from one that promotes empathy, dignity, and love.28 Massumi is enamored of the anti-structural,29 the spontaneous emergent process that Deleuze called “pure immanence.” But with affective intensity as his ultimate value30 Massumi remains trapped in a double bind. No critical judgment is forthcoming so long as intensity may be amplified.31 Because of this Massumi cannot coherently critique manifestly oppressive political structures (such as futurism, Nazism, and other intensity-fueled political regimes). How could he if the masses have opted to embrace such regimes for the intensity they provide? Massumi’s resistance to making judgments is consistent with his theory, which minimizes to the vanishing point the human capacity for choice. For Massumi, the very notions of ‘‘individual will’’ and ‘‘subjective reflection’’ are a fiction. (“There is no individual outside its own trans-individual becoming.”32) Body is always conditioning mind – presumably without our conscious awareness. In the end, “events decide.”33 What could human freedom mean under such conditions? The upshot is plain: in Massumi’s politics of affect, human freedom loses its capacity to signify. Choices are a fiction, and in any event no apparent normative basis exists for affirming, much less institutionalizing a preferred set of power structures. Affective intensity lacks structure by definition. Indeed, that is its appeal. (“Intensity is a value in itself.”34) But as Anthony Kronman has eloquently argued, without coherent structures, the legal, political, and cultural conditions necessary for the meaningful exercise of freedom (including political judgment) are unlikely to emerge – and if they do, they are unlikely to be sustainable.35 The latter point is borne out by the very political events that Massumi identifies as exemplary of his theory. If the “Arab Spring” and the “Occupy Movement”36 illustrate anything it is the effervescence of political action based on spontaneous intensity. In the absence of adequate political structures, this kind of political action is destined to pass with the next day’s tide. The emancipatory cri du coeur that can be heard echoing in the work of cultural theorists like Massumi may have landed on “trans-individual” affect as the intensive Higgs Boson wave-particle of political science. Its indeconstructability promises freedom from subjective and cultural contingency – the prison house of “crystallized power structures.” But there is a price to be paid. The radical devaluation of reflective consciousness produces a species of freedom that signifies nothing. Perhaps this is what it is like to embrace a Zeitgeist of “de-humanism.”37 In Massumi’s politics of affect we can discern the impetus for ‘‘vitalist/liberation’’ ideology. As Ben Anderson writes: “There is always already an excess [affect] that power must work to recuperate but is destined and doomed to miss. It is that excess that is central to the creativity of bio-political production and thus the power of naked life.”38 Affect in this sense is “a movement of creative production” that always eludes capture. And this is what conveys a sense of its emancipatory power.39 The intensity of affect liberates us from bondage to contingent cultural entanglement. Corporeal ontology precedes cultural epistemology. This move away from the centrality of cognition marks the demise not only of identity politics, but of identity itself, perhaps even of psychology.40 Simply stated, affect theorists like Massumi romanticize the unknowable “fluid materiality of excitable networks” as a way of disrupting familiar social and cultural hierarchies.41 In so doing, they elevate raw process over social and cultural regimentation and subjugation. It is the neurobiological equivalent of Rousseau’s primitive origin of society, an updated version of the Romantics’ myth of enchantment. If only questions about freedom and responsibility for shared values, justice included, could be resolved by so simple an expedient as the vitalist/liberation category shift from human agency to ‘‘trans-individual affective process.’’ Much can be learned about the various forms of political violence that affective intensity has assumed over the course of human history. But one needn’t take the historical path to discern trouble for Massumi’s emancipatory project. One can start with neuroscience itself.42 Theorists like Massumi play down (as they must) a variety of obstacles that stand in the way of affective emancipation: from the constraints of evolution to the biological programming of the amygdala itself.43 Indeed, what constitutes ‘‘fearfulness,’’ for example, depends upon programming the amygdala based on a habituated pattern of external stimuli.44 There are other problems as well. For instance, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds the question of how communication occurs among different levels of the mind/body complex. As Steve Pile writes, for theorists like Massumi “affect is defined in opposition to cognition, reflexivity, consciousness and humanness.”45 Feelings, on the other hand, occupy a space between non-cognitive affect and highly socialized emotions. Feelings in this sense are pre-cognitive (“a response to transpersonal affects”).46 Our response to affects personalizes them. Through feelings we associate affects with the subject who experiences them. For their part, emotions reflect a shift from pre-cognitive subjectivity to the cognitive domain of socially constructed experience.47 Emotions, in this sense, are how I interpret what I’m feeling through language and other representational or cultural symbolic practices. Affect theorists like Massumi insist that my choices and perhaps even my feelings may turn out to have nothing to do with the affect my body has already processed without my knowing it. This view preserves the purity of affective intensity by keeping it free of subjective or social significance. If you are in the ‘‘vitalist/liberation’’ camp of affect theory along with Massumi, affect can never be symbolized, which means it can never be cognized. Affect, in this view, is always beyond consciousness. It’s like the dark matter that makes up the universe: we know it’s there, we just can’t say anything about it. The problem for ‘‘vitalist/liberation’’ theorists like Massumi is that they want to eat their cake and have it too. Affects for them are ciphers – free-ranging radicals incapable of signifying. Yet, at the same time, many of these same theorists engage in searing critiques of those “in power” who use mass media along with other instrumentalities of affective manipulation for purposes of enhancing social or political control.48 The difficulty is this: If affect is being actively engineered to manipulate people’s behavior – whether in the form of habits of consumption, political judgments, or jury verdicts – it is incumbent upon the theorists to account for how exactly this manipulation is being carried out. As Pile cogently notes, how are the agents of affective manipulation able to “know the unknowable” sufficiently well to control their course and impact in society?49 Thrift’s recourse to metaphors such as “pipes and cables” is hardly sufficient to bear the burden of scientific explanation. Indeed, the nomenclature that has emerged to account for the engineering of affect – ranging from “affect flow between bodies,” “transmissions,” and “contagion”50 – all seem to suffer from the same fundamental lack of explanatory power. If we cannot know what affects are, it stands to reason that we cannot know how to control their flow and impact in society.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Affect isn’t a basis for politics </h4><p><strong>Sherwin, 15<u></strong>—New York Law School (Richard, “Too Late for Thinking: The Curious Quest for Emancipatory Potential in Meaningless Affect and Some Jurisprudential Implications”, Law, Culture and the Humanities 1–13, October 13, 2015, dml)</p><p></u>In the history of western culture we can point to three historic moments of epistemological de-centering. The Copernican revolution taught humanity that we do not dwell at the center of the universe. The Freudian revolution taught us that the ‘‘I’’ is a lonely island besieged on all sides by a raging sea of irrational, unconscious forces. Then quantum theory taught us that the universe is indeterminate: subject to uncanny chance operations. <u>Affect theory</u>, perhaps as an extension of the Darwinian evolutionary account of selective adaptation, <u><strong>humbles rationalist pretensions</u></strong> further <u>by subordinating mind to material, bio-chemical processes. <mark>If thinking is always an after-thought</mark>, an after-the-fact construction, then <mark>we <strong>can never reliably account</strong> for how we’ve <strong>actually been affected</strong></mark> by things and others in the world around us</u>. How oppressive never to escape the grip of contingent social constructs. How depressing, if endless deconstruction yields only more fragmentation. Surely something must abide, some Higgs Boson-like elementary particle that can withstand deconstruction’s powerful blows. Is there anything real enough to withstand critique? Is there any basis left to hope for emancipation from the destabilizing mutability of human fabrication? In Brian Massumi’s view, there is. As he puts it: “The world always already offers degrees of freedom ready for amplification.”22 This takes us to the heart of the vitalist/ liberation impulse, namely: “escape from crystallized power structures.”23 <u>In Massumi’s writings, <mark>affect operates as <strong>a</mark> cipher</u></strong> – <u>a <mark>black box</mark> into which he can pack his emancipatory ideal</u>.24 (“‘Affect’ is the word I use for ‘hope.’”25) What <u><mark>Massumi</u></mark> does not and perhaps <u><mark>cannot</u></mark>, or simply does not care to do is <u><mark>formulate <strong>a</mark> coherent <mark>basis for political judgment</u></strong></mark>. While <u>he</u> at some points <u>expresses</u> a <u>preference for “caring” and “belonging</u>,”26 <u>he offers <strong>no basis</strong> in affect theory for why those forms of behavior are preferable to other <strong>perhaps more intense alternatives</u></strong>, such as “anger” and “shock,” which he also embraces.27 <u>But <strong>choices must be made</u></strong>. As Martha Nussbaum has noted, <u>a society that cultivates conditions of anger and disgust</u>, for example, <u>is different from one that promotes empathy, dignity, and love</u>.28 <u>Massumi is enamored of the anti-structural</u>,29 <u>the spontaneous emergent process</u> that Deleuze called “pure immanence.” But <u>with affective intensity as his ultimate value</u>30 <u>Massumi remains <strong>trapped in a double bind</strong>. No critical judgment is forthcoming <strong>so long as intensity may be amplified</u></strong>.31 <u>Because of this Massumi <strong>cannot coherently critique manifestly oppressive political structures</strong> (such as futurism, Nazism, and other intensity-fueled political regimes</u>). <u><mark>How could he if the masses have opted to embrace such regimes</mark> <strong>for the intensity they provide</strong>? </u>Massumi’s resistance to making judgments is consistent with his theory, which minimizes to the vanishing point the human capacity for choice. For Massumi, <u>the very notions of ‘‘individual will’’ and ‘‘subjective reflection’’ are a fiction</u>. (“There is no individual outside its own trans-individual becoming.”32) <u>Body is always conditioning mind – presumably without our conscious awareness. In the end, “events decide.”</u>33 <u><strong>What could human freedom mean under such conditions</strong>? </u>The upshot is plain: <u>in Massumi’s politics of affect, human freedom <strong>loses its capacity to signify</strong>. Choices are a fiction, and</u> in any event <u>no apparent normative basis exists for <strong>affirming</strong>, much less <strong>institutionalizing</strong> a preferred set of power structures. <mark>Affective intensity <strong>lacks structure by definition</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, that is its appeal. (“Intensity is a value in itself.”34) But as Anthony Kronman has eloquently argued, <u>without <strong>coherent structures</strong>, the <strong>legal</strong>, <strong>political</strong>, and <strong>cultural conditions</strong> necessary for the <strong>meaningful exercise of freedom</strong> (including <strong>political judgment</strong>) are <strong>unlikely to emerge</strong> – and if they do, they are <strong>unlikely to be sustainable</strong>.</u>35 The latter point is borne out by the very political events that Massumi identifies as exemplary of his theory. <u>If the “Arab Spring” and the “Occupy Movement</u>”36 <u>illustrate anything it is the <strong>effervescence</strong> of political action based on <strong>spontaneous intensity</strong>. In the absence of <strong>adequate political structures</strong>, this kind of political action is destined to pass with the next day’s tide</u>. The emancipatory cri du coeur that can be heard echoing in the work of cultural theorists like Massumi may have landed on “trans-individual” affect as the intensive Higgs Boson wave-particle of political science. Its indeconstructability promises freedom from subjective and cultural contingency – the prison house of “crystallized power structures.” But there is a price to be paid. <u>The radical devaluation of reflective consciousness produces a species of freedom that signifies nothing</u>. Perhaps this is what it is like to embrace a Zeitgeist of “de-humanism.”37 In Massumi’s politics of affect we can discern the impetus for ‘‘vitalist/liberation’’ ideology. As Ben Anderson writes: “There is always already an excess [affect] that power must work to recuperate but is destined and doomed to miss. It is that excess that is central to the creativity of bio-political production and thus the power of naked life.”38 <u>Affect in this sense is “a movement of creative production” that always eludes capture. And this is what conveys a sense of its emancipatory power</u>.39 The intensity of affect liberates us from bondage to contingent cultural entanglement. Corporeal ontology precedes cultural epistemology. This move away from the centrality of cognition marks the demise not only of identity politics, but of identity itself, perhaps even of psychology.40 Simply stated, <u><mark>affect theorists</u></mark> like Massumi <u><mark>romanticize the unknowable “fluid materiality</mark> of excitable networks” as a way of disrupting familiar social and cultural hierarchies</u>.41 In so doing, <u>they elevate raw process over social and cultural regimentation and subjugation</u>. It is the neurobiological equivalent of Rousseau’s primitive origin of society, an updated version of the Romantics’ myth of enchantment. <u><strong>If only</strong> questions about freedom and responsibility for shared values, justice included, could be resolved by <strong>so simple an expedient</strong> as the</u> vitalist/liberation category <u>shift from human agency to ‘‘trans-individual affective process</u>.’’ <u>Much can be learned about <strong>the various forms of political violence</strong> that affective intensity has assumed over the course of human history</u>. But one needn’t take the historical path to discern trouble for Massumi’s emancipatory project. One can start with neuroscience itself.42 <u><mark>Theorists</mark> </u>like Massumi <u><mark>play down</u></mark> (as they must) a variety of <u><strong><mark>obstacles</u></strong></mark> that stand <u>in the way of affective emancipation: from the constraints of evolution to the biological programming of the amygdala itself</u>.43 Indeed, <u>what constitutes ‘‘fearfulness</u>,’’ for example, <u>depends upon programming</u> the amygdala <u>based on</u> a habituated pattern of <u><strong>external stimuli</u></strong>.44 There are other problems as well. For instance, a great deal of <u><strong>uncertainty</strong> surrounds the question of how communication occurs among different levels of the mind/body complex</u>. As Steve Pile writes, for theorists like Massumi “affect is defined in opposition to cognition, reflexivity, consciousness and humanness.”45 Feelings, on the other hand, occupy a space between non-cognitive affect and highly socialized emotions. Feelings in this sense are pre-cognitive (“a response to transpersonal affects”).46 Our response to affects personalizes them. Through feelings we associate affects with the subject who experiences them. For their part, emotions reflect a shift from pre-cognitive subjectivity to the cognitive domain of socially constructed experience.47 Emotions, in this sense, are how I interpret what I’m feeling through language and other representational or cultural symbolic practices. <u>Affect theorists</u> like Massumi <u>insist that</u> my <u>choices and</u> perhaps even my <u>feelings may</u> turn out to <u>have <strong>nothing to do</strong> with the affect my body has already processed without my knowing it. This view preserves the <strong>purity of affective intensity</strong> by keeping it <strong>free of subjective or social significance</u></strong>. If you are in the ‘‘vitalist/liberation’’ camp of affect theory along with Massumi, <u>affect can never be symbolized, which means it can never be cognized</u>. Affect, in this view, <u>is</u> always beyond consciousness. It’s <u>like</u> the <u>dark matter</u> that makes up the universe: <u>we know it’s there, <strong>we just can’t say anything about it</u></strong>. <u>The problem for</u> ‘‘vitalist/liberation’’ <u>theorists like Massumi is that <mark>they <strong>want to eat their cake and have it too</strong></mark>. Affects for them are ciphers – free-ranging radicals incapable of signifying. Yet</u>, at the same time, many of <u>these same theorists engage in searing critiques of <mark>those “in power”</mark> who <mark>use</u></mark> mass media along with other instrumentalities of <u><mark>affective manipulation for</mark> purposes of <mark>enhancing social</mark> or political <mark>control</u></mark>.48 <u>The difficulty is this: If affect is being actively engineered to manipulate people’s behavior</u> – whether in the form of habits of consumption, political judgments, or jury verdicts – <u>it is <strong>incumbent</strong> upon the theorists to account for <strong>how exactly this manipulation is being carried out</u></strong>. As Pile cogently notes, <u>how are the agents of affective manipulation able to “know the unknowable” <strong>sufficiently well to control their course and impact in society?</u></strong>49 Thrift’s <u>recourse to metaphors</u> such as “pipes and cables” <u>is hardly sufficient to bear the burden of scientific explanation</u>. Indeed, <u>the nomenclature that has emerged to account for the engineering of affect – ranging from “affect flow between bodies,” “transmissions,” and “contagion</u>”50 – <u>all seem to suffer from <strong>the same fundamental lack of explanatory power</strong>. If we cannot know what affects are, it stands to reason that <strong>we cannot know how to control their flow</strong> and <strong>impact in society</strong>.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Winant, UC-Santa Barbara Sociology Professor, 2015 [2015, Howard, The Dark Matter: Race and Racism in the 21st Century,” Critical Sociology 2015, Vol. 41(2) 313–324] fulltext: The World-Historical Shitpile of Race Structural racism – an odious stinkpile of shit left over from the past and still being augmented in the present – has been accumulated by ‘slavery unwilling to die’,4 by empire, and indeed by the entire racialized modern world system. The immense waste (Feagin et al., 2001, drawing on Bataille) of human life and labor by these historically entrenched social structures and practices still confronts us today, in the aftermath of the post-Second World War racial ‘break’. Our antiracist accomplishments have reduced the size of the pile; we have lessened the stink. But a massive amount of waste still remains. So much racial waste is left over from the practice of racial domination in the early days of empire and conquest, to the present combination of police state and liberalism! Indeed it often seems that this enormous and odious waste pinions the social system under an immovable burden. How often have despair and hopelessness overcome those who bore this sorrow? How often have slave and native, peon and maquiladora, servant and ghetto-dweller, felt just plain ‘sick and tired’ (Nappy Roots, 2003), encumbered by this deadening inertia composed of a racial injustice that could seemingly never be budged? How often, too, have whites felt weighed down by the waste, the guilt and self-destruction built into racism and the ‘psychological wage’? Yet racial politics is always unstable and contradictory. Racial despotism can never be fully stabilized or consolidated. Thus at key historical moments, perhaps rare but also inevitable, the sheer weight of racial oppression – qua social structure – becomes insupportable. The built-up rage and inequity, the irrationality and inutility, and the explosive force of dreams denied, are mobilized politically in ways that would have seemed almost unimaginable earlier. Racism remains formidable, entrenched as a structuring feature of both US and global society and politics. Indeed it often seems impossible to overcome. Yet That’s Not the Whole Story We are so used to losing! We can’t see that the racial system is in crisis both in the US and globally. Large-scale demographic and political shifts have overtaken the modern world (racial) system, undermining and rearticulating it. During and after the Second World War a tremendous racial ‘break’ occurred, a seismic shift that swept much of the world (Winant, 2001). The US was but one national ‘case’ of this rupture, which was experienced very profoundly: racial transformations occurred that were unparalleled since at least the changes brought about by the US Civil War. Omi and I (1994) – and many, many others – have proposed that the terrain of racial politics was tremendously broadened and deepened after the War. The increased importance of race in larger political life not only grounded the modern civil rights movement but shaped a whole range of ‘new social movements’ that we take for granted today as central axes of political conflict. In earlier stages of US history it had not been so evident that ‘the personal is political’ – at least not since the end of Reconstruction. From the explicit racial despotism of the Jim Crow era to the ‘racial democracy’ (of course still very partial and truncated) of the present period … : that is a big leap, people. In the modern world there were always black movements, always movements for racial justice and racial freedom. The experience of injustice, concrete grievances, lived oppression, and resistance, both large and small, always exists. It can be articulated or not, politicized or not. These movements, these demands, were largely excluded from mainstream politics before the rise of the civil rights movement after the War. Indeed, after the Second World War, in a huge ‘break’ that was racially framed in crucial ways, this ‘politicization of the social’ swept over the world. It ignited (or reignited) major democratic upsurges. This included the explicitly anti-racist movements: the modern civil rights movement, the anti-apartheid movement, and the anti-colonial movement (India, Algeria, Vietnam, etc.). It also included parallel, and more-or-less allied, movements like ‘secondwave’ feminism, LGBTQ (née gay liberation) movements, and others. In short, the world-historical upheaval of the Second World War and its aftermath were racial upheavals in significant ways: the periphery against the center, the colored ‘others’ against ‘The Lords of Human Kind’ (Kiernan, 1995). These movements produced: • Demographic, economic, political, and cultural shifts across the planet • The destruction of the old European empires • The coming and going of the Cold War • The rise of the ‘new social movements’, led by the black movement in the US And this is only the start of what could be a much bigger list. A Crisis of Race and Racism? ‘[C]risis’, Gramsci famously wrote, ‘consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum, morbid phenomena of the most varied kind come to pass’ (Gramsci, 1971: 276). Using the Gramscian formula, I suggest that there is such a crisis of race and racism. On the one hand, the old verities of established racism and white supremacy have been officially discredited, not only in the US but fairly comprehensively around the world. On the other hand, racially-informed action and social organization, racial identity and race consciousness, continue unchecked in nearly every aspect of social life! On the one hand, the state (many states around the world) now claims to be colorblind, non-racialist, racially democratic; while on the other hand, in almost every case, those same states need race to rule. Consider in the US alone: race and electoral politics, race and social control, race and legal order … Why don’t our heads explode under the pressures of such cognitive dissonance? Why doesn’t manifest racial contradiction provoke as much uncertainty and confusion in public life and political activity as it does in everyday experience? Are we just supposed to pretend that none of this is happening? Can anyone really sustain the view that they are operating in a nonracial, ‘colorblind’ society? The ‘colorblind’ claim is that one should not ‘notice’ race. For if one ‘sees’ race, one wouldn’t be ‘blind’ to it, after all.5 But what happens to race-consciousness under the pressure (now rather intense in the US, anyway) to be ‘colorblind’? Quite clearly, racial awareness does not dry up like a raisin in the sun. Not only does it continue as a matter of course in everyday life, but in intellectual, artistic and scientific (both social and natural) life race continues to command attention.6 ‘Colorblind’ ideologies of race today serve to impede the recognition of racial difference or racial inequality based on claims that race is an archaic concept, that racial inclusion is already an accomplished fact, and so on. Just so, persistent race-consciousness highlights racial differences and particularities. ‘Noticing’ race can be linked to despotic or democratic motives, framed either in defense of coercion, privilege, and undeserved advantage, or invoked to support inclusion, human rights, and social justice (Carbado and Harris, 2008; see also Brown et al., 2003). Obama Is he a mere token, a shill for Wall Street? Or is he Neo, ‘the one’? If neither alternative is plausible, then we are in the realm of everyday 21st-century US politics. This is the territory in which, as Sam Rayburn famously said, ‘There comes a time in the life of every politician when he [sic] must rise above principle.’ Yet Barack Obama has transformed the US presidency in ways we cannot yet fully appreciate. Obama is not simply the first nonwhite (that we know of) to occupy the office. He is the first to have lived in the global South, the first to be a direct descendent of colonized people, the first to have a genuine movement background. Consider: How many community meetings, how many movement meetings did Obama attend before entering electoral politics? But he is no more powerful than any of his predecessors; he is constrained as they were by the US system of rule, by the US racial regime, by structural racism. In addition he is constrained by racism as no other US president has ever been. No other president has experienced racism directly: Moreover, while my own upbringing hardly typifies the African American experience – and although, largely through luck and circumstance, I now occupy a position that insulates me from most of the bumps and bruises that the average black man must endure – I can recite the usual litany of petty slights that during my forty-five years have been directed my way: security guards tailing me as I shop in department stores, white couples who toss me their car keys as I stand outside a restaurant waiting for the valet, police cars pulling me over for no apparent reason. I know what it’s like to have people tell me I can’t do something because of my color, and I know the bitter swill of swallowed back anger. I know as well that Michelle and I must be continually vigilant against some of the debilitating story lines that our daughters may absorb – from TV and music and friends and the streets – about who the world thinks they are, and what the world imagines they should be. (Obama, 2006: 233) On the other hand: he has a ‘kill list’. All presidents kill people, but Obama is the first systematically and publicly to take charge of these egregious and unconstitutional uses of exceptional powers. In this he echoes Carl Schmitt, the Nazi political theorist, whose famous dictum is ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ (2004 [1922]). The drones, the surveillance, and the numerous right turns of his administration all stand in sharp contradiction not only to his campaign rhetoric, but to the anti-racist legacy of the civil rights movement that arguably put him in office. Obama has not interceded for blacks against their greatest cumulative loss of wealth in US history, the ‘great recession’ of 2008. He has not explicitly criticized the glaring racial bias in the US carceral system. He has not intervened in conflicts over workers’ rights – particularly in the public sector where many blacks and other people of color are concentrated. Obama himself largely deploys colorblind racial ideology, although he occasionally critiques it as well. Beneath this ostensibly postracial view the palpable and quite ubiquitous system of racial distinction and inequality remains entrenched. Though modernized and ‘moderated’, structural racism has been fortified, not undermined, by civil rights reform; Obama is not challenging it, at least not directly. Reframing the Discussion What should we be studying and teaching now? The list of themes I have highlighted here is partial of course, and perhaps impressionistic as well. If the argument I have proposed has any validity, then the ‘dark matter’ of race, which is even more invisible now than it was in the past – in its present ‘post-civil rights’, ‘colorblind’, and even ‘presidential’ forms – continues to exercise its gravitational pull on our politics. It continues to shape what is called (and improperly deprecated as) ‘identity politics’. The ‘dark matter’ takes on new significance as a central feature of neoliberalism, which is enacted today through the deployment of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, ‘states of exception’, state violence, and exclusionary politics – all political practices that rely on racism. Yet the legacy of centuries of resistance to these depredations, the undeniable achievements of anti-racist and ant-imperialist struggles, the extension of democracy – often tortuous and always incomplete – to peoples of color, also exerts a significant political force. Race-based ‘freedom dreams’ (Kelley again) sustain the hope of democracy, inclusion, equality, and justice in the US and elsewhere.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The assumptions that racial progress is impossible is both empirically false and risks avoiding methods of political change that can decrease violence significantly </h4><p><strong>Winant, UC-Santa Barbara Sociology Professor, 2015</p><p><u>[2015, Howard, The Dark Matter: Race and Racism in the 21st Century,” Critical Sociology 2015, Vol. 41(2) 313–324]</p><p></u></strong>The World-Historical Shitpile of Race <u><strong>Structural racism – an odious stinkpile of shit left over from the past and still being augmented in the present – has been accumulated</u></strong> by ‘slavery unwilling to die’,4 by empire, and indeed by the entire racialized modern world system. The immense waste (Feagin et al., 2001, drawing on Bataille) of human life and labor by these historically entrenched social structures and practices still confronts us today, in the aftermath of the post-Second World War racial ‘break’. Our <u><strong><mark>antiracist accomplishments have reduced the size of the pile</u></strong></mark>; we have lessened the stink. But a massive amount of waste still remains. So much racial waste is left over from the practice of racial domination in the early days of empire and conquest, to the present combination of police state and liberalism! Indeed <u><strong>it</u></strong> often <u><strong>seems that this enormous and odious waste pinions the social system under an immovable burden</u></strong>. <u><strong>How often have despair</u></strong> and hopelessness <u><strong>overcome those who bore this sorrow</u></strong>? How often have slave and native, peon and maquiladora, servant and ghetto-dweller, felt just plain ‘sick and tired’ (Nappy Roots, 2003), encumbered by this deadening inertia composed of a racial injustice that could seemingly never be budged? How often, too, have whites felt weighed down by the waste, the guilt and self-destruction built into racism and the ‘psychological wage’? Yet <u><strong>racial politics is always unstable and contradictory</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Racial despotism can never be fully stabilized or consolidated</u></strong>. <u><strong>Thus at key historical moments,</mark> </u></strong>perhaps <u><strong><mark>rare but also inevitable</mark>, the sheer weight of <mark>racial oppression</mark> – qua social structure – <mark>becomes insupportable</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>The built-up <mark>rage and inequity, the irrationality and inutility, and the explosive force of dreams</mark> denied, <mark>are mobilized politically in ways that</mark> would have <mark>seemed</mark> almost <mark>unimaginable earlier.</u></strong> <u><strong>Racism remains</mark> formidable, <mark>entrenched as</mark> a structuring feature of both US and global society and <mark>politics</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Indeed it often seems impossible to overcome. Yet <mark>That’s Not the Whole Story</mark> </u></strong>We are so used to losing! We can’t see that the racial system is in crisis both in the US and globally. <u><strong>Large-scale demographic and <mark>political shifts have overtaken the modern</mark> world (<mark>racial) system</mark>, undermining and rearticulating it. <mark>During</mark> and after the <mark>Second World War a tremendous racial ‘break’ occurred, a seismic shift that swept much of the world</u></strong> (</mark>Winant, 2001). <u><strong><mark>The US was but one national ‘case’ of this rupture</u></strong></mark>, which was experienced very profoundly: racial transformations occurred that were unparalleled since at least the changes brought about by the US Civil War. Omi and I (1994) – and many, many others – have proposed that the terrain of racial politics was tremendously broadened and deepened after the War. <u><strong>The increased <mark>importance of race in</mark> larger <mark>political life not only grounded the modern civil rights movement but shaped</mark> a whole <mark>range of ‘new social movements’ that we take for granted today as central axes of political conflict</mark>.</u></strong> In earlier stages of US history it had not been so evident that ‘the personal is political’ – at least not since the end of Reconstruction. <u><strong><mark>From</mark> the explicit <mark>racial despotism of</mark> the <mark>Jim Crow</mark> era <mark>to</mark> the ‘<mark>racial democracy’</mark> (of course <mark>still</mark> very <mark>partial</mark> and truncated) <mark>of the present period … : that is a big leap</mark>, </u></strong>people. In the modern world there were always black movements, always movements for racial justice and racial freedom<u><strong>. The experience of injustice, concrete grievances, lived oppression, and resistance</u></strong>, both large and small, <u><strong>always exists. It can be articulated or not, politicized or not</u></strong>. <u><strong>These movements</u></strong>, these demands, <u><strong>were largely excluded from mainstream politics before the rise of the civil rights movement after the</u></strong> <u><strong>War</u></strong>. Indeed, <u><strong>after the Second World War, in a huge ‘break’ that was racially framed in crucial ways, this ‘politicization of the social’ swept over the world. It ignited</u></strong> (or reignited) <u><strong>major democratic upsurges</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>This included the explicitly anti-racist movements: the modern civil rights movement, the anti-apartheid movement, and the anti-colonial movement</mark> (India, Algeria, Vietnam, etc.). <mark>It</mark> also <mark>included parallel</mark>, and more-or-less allied, <mark>movements like ‘secondwave’ feminism, LGBTQ</mark> (née gay liberation) movements, <mark>and others</mark>. </u></strong>In short, <u><strong>the world-historical upheaval of the Second World War and its aftermath were racial upheavals in significant ways: the periphery against the center, the colored ‘others’ against ‘The Lords of Human Kind’</u></strong> (Kiernan, 1995<u><strong>). These movements produced: </u></strong>• <u><strong>Demographic, economic, political, and cultural shifts across the planet</u></strong> • <u><strong><mark>The destruction of the old European empires </u></strong>• <u><strong>The coming and going of the Cold War </u></strong>• <u><strong>The rise of the ‘new social movements’, led by the black movement in the US</u></strong> <u><strong>And this is only the start of what could be a much bigger list</mark>. </u></strong>A Crisis of Race and Racism? ‘[C]risis’, Gramsci famously wrote, ‘consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum, morbid phenomena of the most varied kind come to pass’ (Gramsci, 1971: 276). Using the Gramscian formula, I suggest that there is such a crisis of race and racism. <u><strong>On the one hand, the old verities of established racism and white supremacy have been officially discredited, not only in the US but fairly comprehensively around the world. On the other hand, racially-informed action and social organization, racial identity and race consciousness, continue unchecked in nearly every aspect of social life</u></strong>! On the one hand, the state (many states around the world) now claims to be colorblind, non-racialist, racially democratic; while on the other hand, in almost every case, those same states need race to rule. Consider in the US alone: race and electoral politics, race and social control, race and legal order … Why don’t our heads explode under the pressures of such cognitive dissonance? Why doesn’t manifest racial contradiction provoke as much uncertainty and confusion in public life and political activity as it does in everyday experience? Are we just supposed to pretend that none of this is happening? Can anyone really sustain the view that they are operating in a nonracial, ‘colorblind’ society? The ‘colorblind’ claim is that one should not ‘notice’ race. For if one ‘sees’ race, one wouldn’t be ‘blind’ to it, after all.5 But what happens to race-consciousness under the pressure (now rather intense in the US, anyway) to be ‘colorblind’? Quite clearly, racial awareness does not dry up like a raisin in the sun. Not only does it continue as a matter of course in everyday life, but in intellectual, artistic and scientific (both social and natural) life race continues to command attention.6 ‘Colorblind’ ideologies of race today serve to impede the recognition of racial difference or racial inequality based on claims that race is an archaic concept, that racial inclusion is already an accomplished fact, and so on. Just so, persistent race-consciousness highlights racial differences and particularities. ‘Noticing’ race can be linked to despotic or democratic motives, framed either in defense of coercion, privilege, and undeserved advantage, or invoked to support inclusion, human rights, and social justice (Carbado and Harris, 2008; see also Brown et al., 2003). Obama Is he a mere token, a shill for Wall Street? Or is he Neo, ‘the one’? If neither alternative is plausible, then we are in the realm of everyday 21st-century US politics. This is the territory in which, as Sam Rayburn famously said, ‘There comes a time in the life of every politician when he [sic] must rise above principle.’ Yet Barack Obama has transformed the US presidency in ways we cannot yet fully appreciate. Obama is not simply the first nonwhite (that we know of) to occupy the office. He is the first to have lived in the global South, the first to be a direct descendent of colonized people, the first to have a genuine movement background. Consider: How many community meetings, how many movement meetings did Obama attend before entering electoral politics? But he is no more powerful than any of his predecessors; he is constrained as they were by the US system of rule, by the US racial regime, by structural racism. In addition he is constrained by racism as no other US president has ever been. No other president has experienced racism directly: Moreover, while my own upbringing hardly typifies the African American experience – and although, largely through luck and circumstance, I now occupy a position that insulates me from most of the bumps and bruises that the average black man must endure – I can recite the usual litany of petty slights that during my forty-five years have been directed my way: security guards tailing me as I shop in department stores, white couples who toss me their car keys as I stand outside a restaurant waiting for the valet, police cars pulling me over for no apparent reason. I know what it’s like to have people tell me I can’t do something because of my color, and I know the bitter swill of swallowed back anger. I know as well that Michelle and I must be continually vigilant against some of the debilitating story lines that our daughters may absorb – from TV and music and friends and the streets – about who the world thinks they are, and what the world imagines they should be. (Obama, 2006: 233) On the other hand: he has a ‘kill list’. All presidents kill people, but Obama is the first systematically and publicly to take charge of these egregious and unconstitutional uses of exceptional powers. In this he echoes Carl Schmitt, the Nazi political theorist, whose famous dictum is ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ (2004 [1922]). The drones, the surveillance, and the numerous right turns of his administration all stand in sharp contradiction not only to his campaign rhetoric, but to the anti-racist legacy of the civil rights movement that arguably put him in office. Obama has not interceded for blacks against their greatest cumulative loss of wealth in US history, the ‘great recession’ of 2008. He has not explicitly criticized the glaring racial bias in the US carceral system. He has not intervened in conflicts over workers’ rights – particularly in the public sector where many blacks and other people of color are concentrated. Obama himself largely deploys colorblind racial ideology, although he occasionally critiques it as well. Beneath this ostensibly postracial view the palpable and quite ubiquitous system of racial distinction and inequality remains entrenched. Though modernized and ‘moderated’, structural racism has been fortified, not undermined, by civil rights reform; Obama is not challenging it, at least not directly. Reframing the Discussion What should we be studying and teaching now? The list of themes I have highlighted here is partial of course, and perhaps impressionistic as well. If the argument I have proposed has any validity, then <u><strong>the ‘dark matter’ of race, which is even more invisible now than it was in the past – in its present ‘post-civil rights’, ‘colorblind’, and even ‘presidential’ forms – continues to exercise its gravitational pull on our politics</u></strong>. <u><strong>It continues to shape</u></strong> what is called (and improperly deprecated as) ‘<u><strong>identity politics’. The ‘dark matter’ takes on new significance as a central feature of neoliberalism, which is enacted today through the deployment of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, ‘states of exception’, state violence, and exclusionary politics – all political practices that rely on racism. <mark>Yet the legacy of centuries of resistance to these depredations,</u></strong> <u><strong>the undeniable achievements of anti-racist</mark> and ant-imperialist <mark>struggles, the extension of democracy</mark> – often tortuous and always incomplete – <mark>to peoples of color, also exerts a significant political force</u></strong>. <u><strong>Race-based ‘freedom dreams’</mark> (Kelley again) <mark>sustain the hope of democracy, inclusion, equality, and justice in the US and elsewhere.</p></u></strong></mark><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Grove 15 – Jairus: Associate Professor in PoliSci fulltext: Jairus Grove, 2015, “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” The Encyclopedia of Political Thought // EO Owing its distinction to the long period of intensive scenario planning during the Cold War, the conventionality of conventional warfare meant simply that neither side had crossed the threshold to nuclear conflict. The relatively easy firebreak of “nuclear” or “not nuclear,” however, is no longer operative in policy or academic debates. The category has been further complicated by the success and failure of technological innovation. States possess conventional weapons that in their destructive capacity far exceed the destructiveness of most chemical and biological weapons, and even approach eclipsing some smaller tactical nuclear weapons. The newest generation of fuel air bombs, as used by the USA in the first stages of the 2002 Afghanistan campaign (and then including MOAB, the “Massive Ordnance Air Burst” or “Mother Of All Bombs” ), are massively destructive and rely upon an exothermic chemical reaction that for many seems exotic rather than conventional. Conversely, there have been few breakthroughs in biological weapons research that have produced highly lethal and controllable, and therefore tactical, bioweapons. Bioweapons suffer from many of the same constraints as their natural counterparts in the wild. If a pathogen is sufficiently lethal, incubation time is often short  and so people die too quickly to spread the disease. The 1990s paranoia inspired by graphic depictions of Ebola hemorrhagic fever has not found a foothold in reality. To make such a disease an effective weapon of a state or other strategically minded – not suicidal – group, one has to overcome the difficult although not insurmountable hurdles of weaponizing and delivering biological agents in a way that is not likely to affect one’s own group or constituency. There is also the curious fetishization of the destructive capacity of a singular device. There is a rational basis for thinking that it is important to consider a device as unique when it can inflict the damage of thousands or even millions of tons of TNT, but in the end it is only a matter of packaging. This is particularly true given that the vast amount of scholarly literature on WMD is focused on the rogue possession of a few devices rather than on concerns of all-out nuclear exchange between superpowers. Further, the singular deliverability of a nuclear weapon has not stopped singularly and similarly destructive events from taking place simply because more munitions and more coordination are necessary. The firebombing of Tokyo is accepted by historians as having resulted in as many deaths as the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, and nearly 30 percent more fatalities than Nagasaki. Given the  destructive capability of conventional weapons and the marked increase of urban population density, conventional bombardments could easily exceed all of the deaths from nuclear weapons in a very short period of time. So why insist on a distinct category of weapons that is, so far, indistinct in its effect? One answer is politics. WMD as a touchstone of international political and security discourses owes much of its capital to the “loose nukes” concern after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the fact that after September 11, 2001, the state was not the only game in town when it came to organizations that could wage war. This was further compounded by the  revelation that, thanks to former Soviet bioweapons director Ken Alibek, the Soviet bioweapons program was vastly larger and more destructive than the global public had known and was not verifiably destroyed at the end of the Cold War. In this respect, the existential threat of WMD is compelling. What is distinctive about some WMD is a series of concentric circles like portability, affordability, and destructiveness. The Venn diagram that results is a set of possible devices that would, because of their exotic nature, pose a significant threat to the countermeasure and deterrent capability of states that thought themselves protected. However, it is somewhat hypocritical to sustain the argument that the mere existence of WMD by this measure ought to constitute an existential threat to global security. After all, headlines rarely read “USA suspected of possessing weapons of mass destruction.” This is despite the fact that the USA, China, Russia, and others with avowed WMD programs have been found possessing chemical stockpiles or  nuclear warheads formerly outlawed by enforceable treaties. Further, extensive freedom of information requests by investigative journalists such as Eric Schlosser have revealed that the US arsenal, thought to follow the strictest safeguards and security protocols, has had hundreds of accidents and near misses with regard to transport and maintenance of nuclear weapons. Despite that now public knowledge, the US nuclear forces are never referred to as weapons of mass destruction. Instead, the USA is described in scholarly and mainstream media contexts as possessing a strategic and tactical “arsenal” of warheads and delivery vehicles. Even in instances of international legal transgression, such as the British violation of the nuclear-free zone in the Falkland Islands established under the Tlatelolco treaty, the stigma of WMD is not used to describe weapons possession by established states. Therefore it maybe be better to think of the  category of WMD as reflecting concerns regarding the ability of nation-states to predictably “control” the weapons in their possession, such as the frequent concerns over Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile, or as a category to describe less territorially bounded organizations that could inflict a level of damage once thought only possible by states. That is, the ability for nonstate organizations to compete directly with states in terms of destructive capability demands that we create a special category for the weapons that make a systemic difference in global security. Seen in this light, WMD is a highly political category in that its conceptual purchase – exotic weapons possessed by exotic actors that do lots of damage – denotes a change in the material capabilities and therefore a change in the hierarchy of actors in the international system, as much as it illustrates the intrinsic properties of the device. In this case, it is the movement from nonpossession to possession that is often more threatening or destabilizing than the existential fact of the weapons’ existence. To put it another way, the munitions and their destructive means are not sufficient to define what a WMD is. The category is dependent upon who comes to possess the weapon and their relative position in the hierarchy of the global order. However, the difference in perception regarding WMD is not exhausted by the power politics of hegemonic state interest. Despite the absolute character of death by any means, certain ways of dying have more affective capital than others. This is especially true among the privileged 3 global North, for whom low- probability, highmagnitude risks gain intensity precisely because concerns like hunger, dysentery, low-intensity warfare, aerial bombings, and drone attacks are not a concern. From the perspective of the millions of civilians on the receiving end of invasions or attacks under the pretext of pre-empting or eliminating WMD, the politicization of exotic weapons likely seems much more threatening than the weapons themselves. After all, the first invasion of Iraq, ten years of UN sanctions, and a second US-led invasion killed more Iraqi civilians than all of Saddam Hussein’s gas attacks by at least two orders of magnitude. We might consider then that the unequal distribution of global violence contributes to an aesthetic-affective dimension of WMD. The exotic nature of the devices and the seemingly unpredictable or unstoppable actors that use them tap into a vast archive of apocalyptic films, discourses, video games, comic books, public awareness campaigns, and iconic images like mushroom clouds, mutated or diseased ravaged bodies, and unknown exotic others; all  of which amplify the degree to which the  technical differences between WMD and other  weapons fall short of capturing the real difference. Real and imagined images of fallout and the bloody effects of invisible contagions all have a haptic quality. That is, they are images charged with the ability to grab us and involve the response of our whole body even if only visually or imaginatively. Whether death by genetically modified disease, nuclear explosion, or nerve agents is actually more painful than affluence-induced death like heart disease is beside the point. These excessive emotional and visceral responses give WMD the power to mobilize whole nations for war in a way that other crises like poverty or global warming are as yet incapable of doing, even if the actual numbers and potential numbers of people killed by these other crises far exceed those killed by WMD.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The plan seizes upon the affective capital of nuclear weapons which depoliticizes structural violence, normalizes conventional warfare and securitizes the global south</h4><p><strong>Grove 15</strong> – Jairus: Associate Professor in PoliSci</p><p>Jairus Grove, 2015, “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” The Encyclopedia of Political Thought // EO Owing its distinction to the long period of intensive scenario planning during the Cold War, the conventionality of conventional warfare meant simply that neither side had crossed the threshold to nuclear conflict. The relatively easy firebreak of “nuclear” or “not nuclear,” however, is no longer operative <strong>in policy or academic debates</strong>. The category has been further complicated by the success and failure of technological innovation. States possess conventional weapons that in their destructive capacity far exceed the destructiveness of most chemical and biological weapons, <strong>and even approach eclipsing some smaller tactical nuclear weapons.</strong> The newest generation of fuel air bombs, as used by the USA in the first stages of the 2002 Afghanistan campaign (and then including MOAB, the “Massive Ordnance Air Burst” or “Mother Of All Bombs” ), are massively destructive and rely upon an exothermic chemical reaction that for many seems exotic rather than conventional. Conversely, there have been few breakthroughs in biological weapons research that have produced highly lethal and controllable, and therefore tactical, bioweapons. Bioweapons suffer from many of the same constraints as their natural counterparts in the wild. If a pathogen is sufficiently lethal, incubation time is often short  and so people die too quickly to spread the disease. The 1990s paranoia inspired by graphic depictions of Ebola hemorrhagic fever has not found a foothold in reality. To make such a disease an effective weapon of a state or other strategically minded – not suicidal – group, one has to overcome the difficult although not insurmountable hurdles of weaponizing and delivering biological agents in a way that is not likely to affect one’s own group or constituency. There is also the curious fetishization of the destructive capacity of a singular device. There is a rational basis for thinking that it is important to consider a device as unique when it can inflict the damage of thousands or even millions of tons of TNT, but in the end it is only a matter of packaging<strong>. This is particularly true given that the vast amount of scholarly literature on WMD is focused on the rogue possession of a few devices rather than on concerns of all-out nuclear exchange</strong> between superpowers. Further, the singular deliverability of a nuclear weapon has not stopped singularly and similarly destructive events from taking place simply because more munitions and more coordination are necessary. The <strong>firebombing of Tokyo is accepted by historians as having resulted in as many deaths as the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, and nearly 30 percent more fatalities than Nagasaki</strong>. Given the  destructive capability of conventional weapons and the marked increase of urban population density, conventional bombardments could easily exceed all of the deaths from nuclear weapons in a very short period of time. So why insist on a distinct category of weapons that is, so far, indistinct in its effect? One answer is politics. WMD as a touchstone of international political and security discourses owes much of its capital to the “loose nukes” concern after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the fact that after September 11, 2001, the state was not the only game in town when it came to organizations that could wage war. This was further compounded by the  revelation that, thanks to former Soviet bioweapons director Ken Alibek, the Soviet bioweapons program was vastly larger and more destructive than the global public had known and was not verifiably destroyed at the end of the Cold War. In this respect, the existential threat of WMD is compelling. What is distinctive about some WMD is a series of concentric circles like portability, affordability, and destructiveness. The Venn diagram that results is a set of possible devices that would, because of their exotic nature, pose a significant threat to the countermeasure and deterrent capability of states that thought themselves protected. However, it is somewhat hypocritical to sustain the argument that the mere existence of WMD by this measure ought to constitute an existential threat to global security. After all, headlines rarely read “USA suspected of possessing weapons of mass destruction.” This is despite the fact that the USA, China, Russia, and others with avowed WMD programs have been found possessing chemical stockpiles or  nuclear warheads formerly outlawed by enforceable treaties. Further, extensive freedom of information requests by investigative journalists such as Eric Schlosser have revealed that the US arsenal, thought to follow the strictest safeguards and security protocols, has had hundreds of accidents and near misses with regard to transport and maintenance of nuclear weapons. Despite that now public knowledge, the US nuclear forces are never referred to as weapons of mass destruction. Instead, the USA is described in scholarly and mainstream media contexts as possessing a strategic and tactical “arsenal” of warheads and delivery vehicles. Even in instances of international legal transgression, such as the British violation of the nuclear-free zone in the Falkland Islands established under the Tlatelolco treaty, the stigma of WMD is not used to describe weapons possession by established states. Therefore it maybe be better to think of the  category of WMD as reflecting concerns regarding the ability of nation-states to predictably “control” the weapons in their possession, such as the frequent concerns over Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile, or as a category to describe less territorially bounded organizations that could inflict a level of damage once thought only possible by states. That is, the ability for nonstate organizations to compete directly with states in terms of destructive capability demands that we create a special category for the weapons that make a systemic difference in global security. Seen in this light, WMD is a highly political category in that its conceptual purchase – exotic weapons possessed by exotic actors that do lots of damage – denotes a change in the material capabilities and therefore a change in the hierarchy of actors in the international system, as much as it illustrates the intrinsic properties of the device. In this case, it is the movement from nonpossession to possession that is often more threatening or destabilizing than the existential fact of the weapons’ existence. To put it another way, the munitions and their destructive means are not sufficient to define what a WMD is. The category is dependent upon who comes to possess the weapon and their relative position in the hierarchy of the global order. However, the difference in perception regarding WMD is not exhausted by the power politics of hegemonic state interest. Despite the absolute character of death by any means, <strong>certain ways of dying have more affective capital than others</strong>. <strong>This is especially true among the privileged 3 global North, for whom low- probability, highmagnitude risks gain intensity precisely because concerns like hunger, dysentery, low-intensity warfare, aerial bombings, and drone attacks are not a concern</strong>. From the perspective of the millions of civilians on the receiving end of invasions or attacks under the pretext of pre-empting or eliminating WMD, the <strong>politicization of exotic weapons likely seems much more threatening than the weapons themselves</strong>. After all, the first invasion of Iraq, ten years of UN sanctions, and a second US-led invasion killed more Iraqi civilians than all of Saddam Hussein’s gas attacks by at least two orders of magnitude. We might consider then that the unequal distribution of global violence contributes to an aesthetic-affective dimension of WMD. The exotic nature of the devices and the seemingly unpredictable or unstoppable actors that use them tap into a vast archive of apocalyptic films, discourses, video games, comic books, public awareness campaigns, and iconic images like mushroom clouds, mutated or diseased ravaged bodies, and unknown exotic others; all  of which amplify the degree to which the  technical differences between WMD and other  weapons fall short of capturing the real difference. Real and imagined images of fallout and the bloody effects of invisible contagions all have a haptic quality. That is, they are images charged with the ability to grab us and involve the response of our whole body even if only visually or imaginatively. Whether death by genetically modified disease, nuclear explosion, or nerve agents is actually more painful than affluence-induced death like heart disease is beside the point. These <strong>excessive emotional and visceral responses give WMD the power to mobilize whole nations for war in a way that other crises like poverty or global warming are as yet incapable of doing, even if the actual numbers and potential numbers of people killed by these other crises far exceed those killed by WMD.</p></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Futter 18 Andrew Futter (Andrew Futter is an associate professor in the School of History, Politics, and International Relations at the University of Leicester. He is the author of The Politics of Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy, the editor of The United Kingdom and the Future of Nuclear Weapons, and co-editor of Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs), 2018, “Hacking the Bomb: Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons,” Georgetown University Press, SJBE fulltext: “What, then, might this cyber-enabled conflict, or warfare involving cyber operations, look like? And how might these pressures involve thinking about nuclear weapons? The first thing to note is that even if nuclear systems are not targeted directly or are successfully guarded against malicious hackers, it seems very likely that the use—or even the threat of use—of cyber capabilities against an opponent during a crisis will raise tensions, concerns, and perceived vulnerabilities, and that this will make nuclear crisis resolution more complicated and perhaps more dangerous." The second thing to note is that the use of cyber capabilities is likely to obfuscate and complicate the escalation ladder, and possibly lead to an inadvertent deepening of a crisis, perhaps even up to the nuclear level. It is likely to do this in different ways from those theorized in the past, and probably at a much greater speed. It could also, for example, include attacks in both civilian and military domains. Taken together, new cyber dynamics—both operations and context might even necessitate a rethinking of these established nuclear concepts altogether. Perhaps the most important thing to note about cyber operations in future crises and warfare is that they are likely to be offense-dominant. That is, in cyberspace the advantage will be held by the attackers rather than the defenders. Although this forecast is challenged by some, and is contingent on several variables—particularly the target and intention of the attack—it does have rather significant implications for the broader security dilemma, and especially for strategic stability.51 Along with creating pressures for arms racing, this also makes cyber capabilities more likely to be employed early in a crisis, particularly given the policy of active defense mentioned above.52 The result could potentially be greater insecurity for all, and possibly unintended, and in the worst-case scenario perhaps even unmanageable escalation. By way of an example, an Israeli war game conducted in 2013 demonstrated how the use and threat of cyberattacks might very quickly escalate a crisis, in this case bringing the United States and Russia to the brink of conflict in a possible Middle East war.53 Such conflicts might begin and play out in a number of different ways, but all will likely create new pressures for crisis management. First, during a crisis hackers could potentially disrupt or destroy communications channels, making it difficult to manage forces, including nuclear forces, and reducing commanders' confidence in their weapons systems and the ability of officials to communicate. Even a relatively small-scale attack could create considerable doubt about the security and reliability of communications, and particularly about the veracity of the information flowing from their computers.54 Moreover, despite often-held beliefs to the contrary, many military communications systems—including even some used for nuclear command and control—utilize commercial infrastructure or are based on networks that could be vulnerable to an attack or disruption.55 It must therefore be assumed that the linkages required for nuclear second-strike capabilities could also be unreliable, and possibly vulnerable to an opponents cyber operations.56 Aggressors might also employ distributed denial-of-service attacks to prevent communication, hamper battle management systems, magnify confusion, and make it more difficult to identify what is happening and perhaps to conduct a coordinated response. Such attacks might be particularly acute for nuclear dyads that are in close geographical proximity—and therefore face limited decision-making time—such as India and Pakistan." Second, the use of cyberattack capabilities might inadvertently escalate a crisis—very much building on the model of "inadvertent nuclear escalation" developed by Barry Posen back in the early 1990s.58 This might be due either to deliberate interference from a third-party actor—such as a terrorist group—or from an unauthorized insider, or by another state seeking to deepen the crisis through false flag operations (that is, operations conducted to look like they were carried out by someone else). Alternatively, it might involve accidentally targeting the wrong systems. This risk is amplified considerably in the cyber context because it is increasingly difficult to know which computer systems support which weapons and operations. For example, as Lawrence Cavaiola and his colleagues explain, "an attack [by the United States] on a Chinese system that is used to increase the readiness of tactical forces might also inadvertently degrade the readiness of Chinese strategic nuclear forces, with grave risks of misinterpretation and escalation, up to and including launch on warning."59 Thus, a cyberattack on computer systems thought to control conventional weapons might be mistaken (and interpreted) as a direct attack on an adversary's ability to use its nuclear forces. Moreover, even if enemy cyberattacks are detected and mitigated, this could still lead to a "spiral of mistrust" and worst-case scenario thinking.' Third, cyberattacks might reduce the ability to signal, causing flawed images of intentions and capabilities, or be used to "spoof early warning systems"—again, a particular concern given the possibility of false flag cyber interference by third parties. It is perfectly possible that the ability to clearly signal intentions could be one of the biggest challenges created by cyber operations for nuclear crisis management. The concern here is twofold. First, the cyber context will make communicating with an adversary (and your own forces) much more complicated. Second, it is far from clear that cyberattacks themselves offer a very useful way of signaling, and may in fact be worse than traditional methods. As Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay explain, this is because cyber operations "are complex, esoteric, and hard for commanders and policymakers to understand."6' Previous methods of signaling—such as seeking to indicate intentions or red lines to an adversary through limited conventional action, already a complicated and delicate endeavor—will probably be even more difficult to implement when cyberattacks are also involved.62 Moreover, given the difficulties of attribution—particularly when time is short, decision makers are under pressure, and third-party cyber activities abound—it may not be straightforward to ascertain when a conflict has actually stopped.63 In this way, cyber operations are likely to further complicate and "muddy" signaling between adversaries during a crisis or conflict, either deliberately or inadvertently." This would also, therefore, make the functioning of leadership far more complicated in any future nuclear crisis too. Fourth, the use of cyberattacks might reduce the search for viable alternatives, thereby compressing—or at least muddying —the escalation ladder, particularly the steps between conventional and nuclear use. Once hostilities begin, leaders may not feel confident that the information they are receiving is genuine; the same might also be true for commanders in the field. Each decision would be underpinned by an uneasiness about the veracity of the information and data being used, possibly leading to different types of calculations and actions.65 In addition to this, leaders would fear that cyber operations would be used early in a crisis to disable or retard their most important weapons systems and to prevent them from being used against an adversary. Unfortunately, this might create a spiral effect, and more pressure to "use them or lose them," when it comes to a state's most important military capabilities.66 In a worst-case scenario, these concerns might increase perceived time pressures to act or respond, and the option to act preemptively. Stephen Cimbala has even gone as far as to warn that a nuclear-armed state bombarded with cyberattacks—particularly on its command, control, communications, and early warning networks—might feel so vulnerable that it would opt for preemption, in the worst case with nuclear weapons.° This exacerbates the feeling that cyber operations could undermine the ability to threaten retaliation, and therefore to strike second, because cyber capabilities appear to augment conventional first-strike possibilities against key enemy systems and forces, including their nuclear weapons.68 Taken together, these dynamics raise the likelihood of unintended and potentially uncontrollable escalation and make the management of such crises more complicated and dangerous.69<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>That escalates to nuclear war</h4><p><strong>Futter 18</strong> Andrew Futter<u><strong> (Andrew Futter is an associate professor in the School of History, Politics, and International Relations at the University of Leicester. He is the author of The Politics of Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy, the editor of The United Kingdom and the Future of Nuclear Weapons, and co-editor of Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs), 2018, “Hacking the Bomb: Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons,” Georgetown University Press, SJBE</p><p></u></strong>“What, then, might this cyber-enabled conflict, or warfare involving cyber operations, look like? And how might these pressures involve thinking about nuclear weapons? <u><strong>The first thing to note is that even if nuclear systems are not targeted directly or are successfully guarded against malicious hackers, it seems very likely that <mark>the use</mark>—or even the threat of use—<mark>of cyber capabilities </mark>against an opponent during a crisis <mark>will</mark> raise tensions, concerns, and perceived vulnerabilities, and that this will make nuclear crisis resolution more complicated and perhaps more dangerous." The second thing to note is that the use of cyber capabilities is likely to obfuscate and <mark>complicate the escalation ladder</mark>, and possibly lead to an inadvertent deepening of a crisis, perhaps even up to the nuclear level</u></strong>. It is likely to do this in different ways from those theorized in the past, and probably at a much greater speed. It could also, for example, include attacks in both civilian and military domains. Taken together, new cyber dynamics—both operations and context might even necessitate a rethinking of these established nuclear concepts altogether. Perhaps the most important thing to note about cyber operations in future crises and warfare is that they are likely to be offense-dominant. That is, in cyberspace the advantage will be held by the attackers rather than the defenders. Although this forecast is challenged by some, and is contingent on several variables—particularly the target and intention of the attack—it does have rather significant implications for the broader security dilemma, and especially for strategic stability.51 Along with creating pressures for arms racing, this also makes cyber capabilities more likely to be employed early in a crisis, particularly given the policy of active defense mentioned above.52 The result could potentially be greater insecurity for all, and possibly unintended, and in the worst-case scenario perhaps even unmanageable escalation. By way of an example, an Israeli war game conducted in 2013 demonstrated how the use and threat of cyberattacks might very quickly escalate a crisis, in this case bringing the United States and Russia to the brink of conflict in a possible Middle East war.53 Such conflicts might begin and play out in a number of different ways, but all will likely create new pressures for crisis management. <u><strong>First, during a crisis <mark>hackers could</mark> potentially <mark>disrupt</mark> or destroy <mark>communications channels</mark>, making it difficult to manage forces, including nuclear forces, and <mark>reducing commanders' confidence in their weapons systems</mark> and the ability of officials to communicate.</u></strong> Even a relatively small-scale attack could create considerable doubt about the security and reliability of communications, and particularly about the veracity of the information flowing from their computers.54 Moreover, despite often-held beliefs to the contrary, many military communications systems—including even some used for nuclear command and control—utilize commercial infrastructure or are based on networks that could be vulnerable to an attack or disruption.55 It must therefore be assumed that the linkages required for nuclear second-strike capabilities could also be unreliable, and possibly vulnerable to an opponents cyber operations.56 <u><strong><mark>Aggressors might</mark> also employ distributed denial-of-service attacks to prevent communication, <mark>hamper battle management systems</mark>, magnify confusion, <mark>and make it more difficult to</mark> identify what is happening and perhaps to <mark>conduct a </mark>coordinated <mark>response</mark>.</u></strong> Such attacks might be particularly acute for nuclear dyads that are in close geographical proximity—and therefore face limited decision-making time—such as India and Pakistan." <u><strong>Second, the use of cyberattack capabilities might inadvertently escalate a crisis—very much building on the model of "inadvertent nuclear escalation" developed by Barry Posen back in the early 1990s</u></strong>.58 This might be due either to deliberate interference from a third-party actor—such as a terrorist group—or from an unauthorized insider, or by another state seeking to deepen the crisis through false flag operations (that is, operations conducted to look like they were carried out by someone else). <u><strong>Alternatively, it might involve accidentally targeting the wrong systems</u></strong>. This risk is amplified considerably in the cyber context because it is increasingly difficult to know which computer systems support which weapons and operations. For example, as Lawrence Cavaiola and his colleagues explain, "an attack [by the United States] on a Chinese system that is used to increase the readiness of tactical forces might also inadvertently degrade the readiness of Chinese strategic nuclear forces, with grave risks of misinterpretation and escalation, up to and including launch on warning."59 <u><strong>Thus, <mark>a cyberattack on</mark> computer <mark>systems</mark> thought to <mark>control </mark>conventional <mark>weapons</mark> <mark>might be</mark> mistaken (and <mark>interpreted</mark>) <mark>as a direct attack on </mark>an adversary's ability to use its <mark>nuclear forces</mark>. Moreover, even if enemy cyberattacks are detected and mitigated, <mark>this could still lead to a "spiral of mistrust" and worst-case </mark>scenario <mark>thinking.</mark>' Third, <mark>cyberattacks</mark> <mark>might</mark> reduce the ability to signal, causing flawed images of intentions and capabilities, or be used to "<mark>spoof early warning systems</mark>"—again, a particular concern given the possibility of false flag cyber interference by third parties</u></strong>. It is perfectly possible that the ability to clearly signal intentions could be one of the biggest challenges created by cyber operations for nuclear crisis management. The concern here is twofold. First, the cyber context will make communicating with an adversary (and your own forces) much more complicated. Second, it is far from clear that cyberattacks themselves offer a very useful way of signaling, and may in fact be worse than traditional methods. As Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay explain, this is because cyber operations "are complex, esoteric, and hard for commanders and policymakers to understand."6' Previous methods of signaling—such as seeking to indicate intentions or red lines to an adversary through limited conventional action, already a complicated and delicate endeavor—will probably be even more difficult to implement when cyberattacks are also involved.62 Moreover, given the difficulties of attribution—particularly when time is short, decision makers are under pressure, and third-party cyber activities abound—it may not be straightforward to ascertain when a conflict has actually stopped.63 <u><strong>In this way, cyber operations are likely to further complicate and "muddy" signaling between adversaries during a crisis or conflict, either deliberately or inadvertently."</u></strong> This would also, therefore, make the functioning of leadership far more complicated in any future nuclear crisis too. <u><strong>Fourth, the use of <mark>cyberattacks might reduce</mark> the search for <mark>viable alternatives,</mark> thereby <mark>compressing</mark>—or at least muddying —<mark>the escalation ladder</mark>, particularly the steps between conventional and nuclear use.</u></strong> Once hostilities begin, leaders may not feel confident that the information they are receiving is genuine; the same might also be true for commanders in the field. Each decision would be underpinned by an uneasiness about the veracity of the information and data being used, possibly leading to different types of calculations and actions.65 In addition to this, leaders would fear that cyber operations would be used early in a crisis to disable or retard their most important weapons systems and to prevent them from being used against an adversary. <u><strong>Unfortunately, <mark>this might create</mark> a spiral effect, and more <mark>pressure to "use them or lose them,"</mark> when it comes to a state's most important military capabilities.66 In a worst-case scenario, these concerns might increase perceived time pressures to act or respond, <mark>and the option to act preemptively</mark>. Stephen Cimbala has even gone as far as to warn that a nuclear-armed state bombarded with cyberattacks—particularly on its command, control, communications, and early warning networks—might feel so vulnerable that it would opt for preemption, in the worst case with nuclear weapons</u></strong>.° This exacerbates the feeling that cyber operations could undermine the ability to threaten retaliation, and therefore to strike second, because cyber capabilities appear to augment conventional first-strike possibilities against key enemy systems and forces, including their nuclear weapons.68 <u><strong>Taken together, these dynamics <mark>raise the likelihood</mark> <mark>of</mark> unintended and potentially <mark>uncontrollable escalation</mark> and make the management of such crises more complicated and dangerous.69</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Jackson, adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, 9/1/2015 Van, associate professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, “Alliance Military Strategy in the Shadow of North Korea’s Nuclear Futures” http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NKNF-Jackson-Alliance-09151.pdf fulltext: Improving the resilience of the US presence on the peninsula in view of North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal would be aided by a geographically dispersed military basing structure. Dispersal is one of only a limited number of ways to enhance the survivability of important forces and facilities that enable power projection, which is a crucial task in countering anti-access campaigns.26 A major alternative to dispersal—hardening—might be possible if facilities were targeted by cruise missiles with small payloads, but hardening becomes nearly impossible against nuclear-armed missiles. YRP and LPP improve the political sustainability of the US military presence in South Korea by reducing US military real estate in Seoul—one of the most expensive real estate markets in the world—and by geographically concentrating areas where US military and South Korean civilians are likely to interact. That should reduce opportunities for political friction and military accidents that affect the host nation population. Thus, it would seem that a decision to reverse YRP and LPP is an instance in which political and military strategy may contradict one another. Readiness for Unpredictable Flight Patterns Given the vulnerability of fixed bases to North Korean missile strikes, US and ROK aircraft need to be prepared to fly missions to and from many different bases—US bases, ROK bases and Japanese air bases as well. During combined military exercises, it would improve realism to direct US and South Korean aircraft not to take off and land from their assigned bases, but to treat all bases in South Korea and Japan as a single, large theater basing network, adapting where specific aircraft and squadrons physically end up based on assumptions about “suddenly” inoperable bases during exercises. This is much more difficult to do, in part because of logistical complications associated with maintenance and refueling support for specific types of aircraft, but it more closely replicates the circumstances alliance aircraft would face in a contingency. Tailored Operations for Assurance Signaling The traditional template for US war fighting, as Lieber and Press argue,27 needs to be tailored to take into account inadvertent signaling about alliance objectives. Because the North Korean leadership fears decapitation, there is a high risk of it launching nuclear first strikes during a conflict if it believes the alliance intends to change the regime. If, as a conflict unfolds, the alliance decides it does not wish to compel regime change but rather aim for a more limited objective, all alliance operations need to be sensitive to the possibility of triggering a nuclear first strike from North Korea. This implies that large-scale amphibious assaults, destruction of North Korean air defense systems, and bombing runs against either Pyongyang or nuclear and missile sites need to either be avoided or conducted with a conscientiousness about messaging to North Korean leadership. Stealth aircraft have thus become especially valuable for precision targeting, as have special operations forces. Many types of ground force capabilities, such as counterartillery fires, could also be employed without posing any kind of imminent risk to the North Korean regime. Three critical rejoinders to this discussion are possible. First, one might point out that the alliance is likely to pursue regime change in any conflict scenario, so the issue of tailored operations and assurance signaling is moot. While it may be true that the alliance could seek regime change in a conflict, it makes eminent sense to use military feints that avoid conveying such a worst-case inevitability to North Korea; pursuing regime change would lead to the very nuclear escalation the alliance seeks to avoid. Second, there is also a possibility that North Korea will believe the alliance seeks regime change in any contingency; signaling limited scope intentions may not be possible. This might be true, but there is at least a possibility that it is not, and if there is an opportunity to avoid a total nuclear war, policymakers have an obligation to try. Third, some may question whether the alliance can fight and win a war under limited conditions in which the alliance exercises self-restraint. At present, the alliance probably cannot wage a limited conflict effectively, but the reason is not self-restraint—it is a lack of training and equipping for that possibility. Whether the alliance can “win” depends on how victory is defined. If victory amounts to regime change or the destruction of Pyongyang, then victory is almost impossible against a nuclear North Korea because either of these actions is likely to trigger nuclear conflict. If victory amounts to conflict de-escalation, avoidance of nuclear conflict and a restrained North Korean foreign policy in the future, then victory is eminently possible, though it may demand a different way of thinking about and preparing for conflict than the way those are approached today.Limited War—Fighting with What You’ve Got Finally, related to the previous recommendation, the alliance needs to focus greater attention on limited war campaign scenarios. Specifically, the alliance should devise limited objectives tailored to avoid not only precipitating nuclear escalation, but also sending signals that regime change is inevitable. During the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993-94, the North Koreans told US diplomats that they had studied the US way of war during the 1990-91 Gulf War and that they were aware of how “flexible deterrent options” equated to massing large-scale US forces immediately outside the operating area before launching the invasion. The North Koreans claimed they would never allow this to happen and vowed to strike first if the United States started massing forces just outside the Korean theater of operations.28 As part of exploring limited war scenarios and developing limited war contingency plans, two considerations become crucial to adapting alliance military strategy: ammunition stockpiles and the possibility of fighting North Korea without follow-on forces. Keeping up with the pace of a military campaign, as well as quickly shifting fortunes on the battlefield, may require immediate access to vast stores of ammunition. The Korean War is instructive of how much ammunition the United States and South Korea might need in a conflict. During a single battle in the Korean War, US and South Korean forces fired more than 300,000 artillery rounds in only seven days, illustrating how quickly forces can expend ammunition.29 Ammunition superiority actually helped offset North Korea’s superior numbers of conventional forces. Stockpiles are thus a tactical consideration that can generate strategic consequences. Sufficient local ammunition stores are one variant of a larger theme for how to adapt alliance military strategy to an anti-access campaign: fighting without follow-on forces. If North Korea expects the United States to amass forces in staging areas just outside the Korean theater of operations prior to a conflict that decapitates the regime, then the US “way of war” risks triggering a North Korean nuclear first use. By only, or at least primarily, deploying within theater forces—that is, those troops and weapons systems already on the peninsula or at bases in Japan—US decisions to destroy even sensitive targets, such as North Korean air defenses, are less likely to be perceived as a step toward regime change. This, in turn, suggests optimizing the composition of the US 28,500-troop commitment to South Korea to perhaps emphasize fewer ground forces (which South Korea can primarily provide) in favor of mobile air, naval and amphibious forces. It may further be unrealistic to expect that ballistic missile defense, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, could be withheld and deployed only during a crisis.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The counterplan fundamentally alters our military strategy to counter North Korea making it more effective at crisis response and conflict de-escalation without removing presence. That’s key to solve their Korea’s advantage while avoiding deterrence and assurance. </h4><p><u><strong>Jackson, adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, 9/1/2015</u></strong> Van, associate professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, “Alliance Military Strategy in the Shadow of North Korea’s Nuclear Futures” http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NKNF-Jackson-Alliance-09151.pdf</p><p><u><strong><mark>Improving the resilience</u></strong> <u><strong>of</mark> the US <mark>presence</u></strong></mark> on the peninsula in view of North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal <u><strong><mark>would be aided by a</mark> geographically <mark>dispersed </mark>military <mark>basing structure</u></strong>. <u><strong>Dispersal is</u></strong></mark> one of only <u><strong><mark>a</u></strong></mark> limited number of <u><strong><mark>way</mark>s<mark> to enhance</mark> the survivability</u></strong> <u><strong>of important forces and facilities that enable <mark>power projection</u></strong></mark>, which is a crucial task in countering anti-access campaigns.26 A major alternative to dispersal—hardening—might be possible if facilities were targeted by cruise missiles with small payloads, but hardening becomes nearly impossible against nuclear-armed missiles. YRP and LPP improve the political sustainability of the US military presence in South Korea by reducing US military real estate in Seoul—one of the most expensive real estate markets in the world—and by geographically concentrating areas where US military and South Korean civilians are likely to interact. That should reduce opportunities for political friction and military accidents that affect the host nation population. Thus, it would seem that a decision to reverse YRP and LPP is an instance in which political and military strategy may contradict one another. Readiness for Unpredictable Flight Patterns <u><strong><mark>Given </mark>the <mark>vulnerability of </mark>fixed <mark>bases</u></strong></mark> to North Korean missile strikes, <u><strong>US and ROK <mark>aircraft need to be prepared to fly </mark>missions to and <mark>from many different bases</u></strong></mark>—US bases, ROK bases and Japanese air bases as well. <u><strong>During combined military exercises, it would improve realism to direct US and South Korean aircraft not to take off and land from their assigned bases, but to treat all bases in South Korea and Japan as a single</u></strong>, <u><strong>large theater basing network</u></strong>, adapting where specific aircraft and squadrons physically end up based on assumptions about “suddenly” inoperable bases during exercises. This is much more difficult to do, in part because of logistical complications associated with maintenance and refueling support for specific types of aircraft, but <u><strong>it more closely replicates the circumstances alliance aircraft would face in a contingency. </u></strong>Tailored Operations for Assurance Signaling The traditional template for US war fighting, as Lieber and Press argue,27 needs to be tailored to take into account inadvertent signaling about alliance objectives. <u><strong><mark>Because the North Korean leadership fears decapitation, there is </mark>a high <mark>risk of it launching nuclear first strikes during a conflict</mark> if it believes the alliance intends to change the regime. <mark>If</u></strong></mark>, as a conflict unfolds, <u><strong><mark>the alliance decides</mark> it does not wish <mark>to</mark> compel regime change but rather <mark>aim for </mark>a more <mark>limited objective</u></strong>, <u><strong>all</mark> alliance <mark>operations need to be sensitive to </mark>the possibility of <mark>triggering a </mark>nuclear <mark>first strike</mark> from North Korea.</u></strong> This implies that <u><strong>large-scale amphibious assaults, destruction of North Korean air defense systems, and bombing runs</u></strong> against either Pyongyang or nuclear and missile sites <u><strong>need to either be avoided or conducted with a conscientiousness about messaging to North Korean leadership</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Stealth aircraft have</mark> thus <mark>become</u></strong> <u><strong>especially valuable </mark>for precision targeting,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>as have</u></strong> <u><strong>spec</mark>ial <mark>op</mark>eration<mark>s</mark> forces</u></strong>. <u><strong>Many</u></strong> types of <u><strong><mark>ground force capabilities</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>such as counterartillery fires, <mark>could</mark> also <mark>be employed without posing any</mark> kind of <mark>imminent risk to the</mark> North Korean <mark>regime.</u></strong></mark> Three critical rejoinders to this discussion are possible. First, one might point out that the alliance is likely to pursue regime change in any conflict scenario, so the issue of tailored operations and assurance signaling is moot. While it may be true that the alliance could seek regime change in a conflict, it makes eminent sense to use military feints that avoid conveying such a worst-case inevitability to North Korea; <u><strong>pursuing regime change would lead to the very nuclear escalation the alliance seeks to avoid</u></strong>. Second, there is also a possibility that North Korea will believe the alliance seeks regime change in any contingency; signaling limited scope intentions may not be possible. This might be true, but there is at least a possibility that it is not, and if there is an opportunity to avoid a total nuclear war, policymakers have an obligation to try. Third, some may question whether the alliance can fight and win a war under limited conditions in which the alliance exercises self-restraint. <u><strong>At present, <mark>the alliance</mark> probably <mark>cannot wage a limited conflict</mark> effectively, but <mark>the reason</mark> is not self-restraint</u></strong>—<u><strong>it is a <mark>lack of training and equipping </mark>for that possibility<mark>.</u></strong></mark> Whether the alliance can “win” depends on how victory is defined. <u><strong>If victory amounts to regime change or the destruction of Pyongyang, then victory is almost impossible against a nuclear North Korea because either of these actions is likely to trigger nuclear conflict</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>If victory amounts to </mark>conflict <mark>de-escalation</mark>, avoidance of nuclear conflict and a restrained North Korean foreign policy in the future</u></strong>, <u><strong>then <mark>victory is</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>eminently <mark>possible</u></strong>, <u><strong>though it</mark> may <mark>demand a different way of thinking</mark> about and preparing for conflict</u></strong> than the way those are approached today.Limited War—Fighting with What You’ve Got Finally, related to the previous recommendation, the alliance needs to focus greater attention on limited war campaign scenarios. Specifically, <u><strong><mark>the alliance should devise limited</mark> <mark>objectives tailored to avoid not only precipitating nuclear escalation</u></strong>, <u><strong>but</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>sending signals that regime change is inevitable</u></strong>.</mark> During the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993-94, the North Koreans told US diplomats that they had studied the US way of war during the 1990-91 Gulf War and that they were aware of how “flexible deterrent options” equated to massing large-scale US forces immediately outside the operating area before launching the invasion. The North Koreans claimed they would never allow this to happen and vowed to strike first if the United States started massing forces just outside the Korean theater of operations.28 As part of exploring limited war scenarios and developing limited war contingency plans, two <u><strong><mark>considerations become crucial to adapting</mark> alliance military <mark>strategy</mark>:</u></strong> <u><strong>ammunition stockpiles and the possibility of fighting North Korea without follow-on forces</u></strong>. <u><strong>Keeping up with the pace of a military campaign</u></strong>, as well as quickly shifting fortunes on the battlefield, <u><strong>may require immediate access to vast stores of ammunition</u></strong>. The Korean War is instructive of how much ammunition the United States and South Korea might need in a conflict. During a single battle in the Korean War, US and South Korean forces fired more than 300,000 artillery rounds in only seven days, illustrating how quickly forces can expend ammunition.29 Ammunition superiority actually helped offset North Korea’s superior numbers of conventional forces. <u><strong>Stockpiles are thus a tactical consideration that can generate strategic consequences. <mark>Sufficient</u></strong></mark> local <u><strong><mark>ammunition stores are one variant</mark> of a larger theme for how to adapt alliance military strategy to an anti-access campaign</u></strong>: fighting without follow-on forces. If North Korea expects the United States to amass forces in staging areas just outside the Korean theater of operations prior to a conflict that decapitates the regime, then the US “way of war” risks triggering a North Korean nuclear first use. <u><strong>By only,</u></strong> or at least primarily, <u><strong>deploying within theater forces</u></strong>—that is, <u><strong>those troops</u></strong> and weapons systems already on the peninsula or at bases in Japan—<u><strong>US <mark>decisions to destroy</mark> even sensitive <mark>targets</mark>, <mark>such as North Korean air defenses, are less likely to be perceived as a step toward regime change</mark>.</u></strong> This, in turn, suggests <u><strong><mark>optimizing</u></strong></mark> the composition of the US 28,500-troop commitment to South Korea to perhaps <u><strong><mark>emphasize</u></strong></mark> fewer ground forces (which South Korea can primarily provide) in favor of <u><strong>mobile <mark>air, naval and amphibious forces</u></strong></mark>. It may further be unrealistic to expect that ballistic missile defense, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, could be withheld and deployed only during a<strong> </strong>crisis.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Buck, PhD candidate, 20 (Author, Nicholas Buck, is a PhD student in Religious Ethics at the Divinity School. He studies religion and the development of modern moral and political thought, liberal democracy, and human rights. https://divinity.uchicago.edu/sightings/articles/covid-19-and-limits-utilitarianism , 6-11) fulltext: Crafting policy decisions in response to the COVID-19 global pandemic calls for careful practical moral and political reasoning. Amid debates about next steps, Peter Singer, a prominent utilitarian ethicist, has weighed in on the matter. Wrestling with Singer’s arguments allows us to reflect on how we tend to think through these matters given that our policy deliberations often assume something of a utilitarian form. Utilitarianism is an ethical model that determines right action primarily in reference to outcomes. Generally speaking, it posits that actions are right to the extent they result (or tend to result) in the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people. To be sure, this way of thinking has strong intuitive force. Shouldn’t we always aspire to do the greatest amount of good possible? Singer recently put utilitarianism on display by publicly reasoning through how to approach reopening the U.S. economy. He joined a panel that The New York Times assembled to discuss the issue after co-authoring an article about it with Michael Plant in Project Syndicate. Outlining the nature of the situation as he sees it, and stressing the need for thinking about outcomes and trade-offs, he explained in the Times: I think the assumption… that we have to do everything to reduce the number of deaths, is not really the right assumption. Because at some point we are willing to trade off loss of life against loss of quality of life. No government puts every dollar it spends into saving lives. And we can’t really keep everything locked down until there won’t be any more deaths. So I think that’s something that needs to come into this discussion. How do we assess the overall cost to everybody in terms of loss of quality of life, loss of well-being, as well as the fact that lives are being lost? In Project Syndicate, Singer and Plant focused especially on the costs of a slowed economy and argued that these must be weighed in some way against the benefits of social distancing. They advise the use of empirical data such as the average number of “life years lost” by people who have died from COVID-19 for comparison against the steep economic toll of lockdowns. They conclude: [M]aking trade-offs requires converting different outcomes into a single unit of value. A problem with the current conversations about whether we should strangle the economy to save lives is that we cannot directly compare “lives saved” against “lost GDP.” We need to put them into some common unit… To do that, we think it’s best to measure wellbeing by using individuals’ reports of how happy and how satisfied with their lives they are.... Doing this means we can, in a principled way, weigh up otherwise hard-to-compare considerations when deciding how to respond to COVID-19—or to any other systemic risk. Some version of Singer’s approach is prominent in our public debate, and understandably so. Among utilitarianism’s strengths are its scalability, practicality, and realism. However, it can also seem crass. Surely Singer is right that there is tension between the loss of life and the diminishing quality of life, as well as between the economic and human costs of our policies. And yet, the ease with which he seems to consider all of these as finally calculable is unsettling It is important to note that Singer is not arguing in bad faith. In the Times, he readily admits of his age and of belonging to a segment of the population most vulnerable to the potentially unfortunate consequences of his reasoning. Nonetheless, Singer’s approach clearly depersonalizes the situation. On one hand, large-scale analyses and the requirements of political office surely demand an emotional distance of some kind in order to make the best decision in non-ideal circumstances. On the other, we might think that something is wrong when decisions that sacrifice many of the intuitions and values we depend on appear to come too quickly and without clear overriding arguments. The English philosopher Bernard Williams has criticized utilitarians on just this point. To my mind, Charles Taylor has exposed devastating problems with utilitarianism. In Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (1989) and elsewhere, Taylor contends that moral reasoning is an essentially qualitative task anchored in some orienting conception(s) of the good. He argues that utilitarians, who reject such a picture of morality, cannot escape relying on substantive intuitions for which they cannot account (i.e., that happiness is worth pursuing and an ideal of universal and impartial benevolence). Further, he argues that their move to quantitative analysis distorts the evaluative nature of moral reasoning by reducing what are different kinds of goods to a single one. Doing so, he claims, misses the intrinsic value belonging to many of our moral concepts and empties them of motivating power. Following Taylor, we might say that a cohering, motivating, situation-transcending source of value is necessary to maintain a properly moral perspective. In light of the features of their approach, utilitarians are unable to do so. Thinking with Singer about our present situation reveals another, related problem. In his critique, Williams draws attention to the way utilitarians frame the moral situation. Notice this in Singer’s arguments. At no point does he consider the political decisions that have shaped and continue to shape the trade-offs as he presents them. Rather, he proceeds as if these were givens, more or less stable and fixed. To be sure, there are legitimate concerns regarding the effects of economic slowdown, and Singer is right to consider the psychological and emotional effects of prolonged social distancing. But it is not at all obvious that we are left to trade-off the economic and human costs in the way implied. We might instead approach the matter by critically considering who is likely to bear the greatest burden of our decisions, particularly which racial groups and classes of people, and whether that is just. Without avoiding the need for trade-offs, we could opt to redistribute our enormous national wealth on a large scale, ensure the provision of necessary resources, and offer alternatives to unemployment. After all, perhaps the COVID-19 crisis is best understood as further revealing and exacerbating many of our current economic arrangement’s existing problems rather than generating entirely new ones of its own. Utilitarianism, in either Singer’s philosophically rigorous version or the inchoate form it often takes in our public debates, seems mostly unable to arrive at and properly consider these possibilities. Because of its narrow view of the moral situation and its reductive move to quantitative reasoning, utilitarianism appears to be hamstrung by an implicit and unwarranted status quo bias. As it turns out, utilitarianism operates at both an ideal and an empirical deficit—it lacks perspective in both dimensions. Not only is it unmoored from a motivating and cohering source of value, it tends to mistake the terms of our trade-offs for something like brute facts when at least many of them are the contingent and impermanent results of political decision. An example of this can be seen in Lieutenant Governor of Texas Dan Patrick’s recent suggestion that re-opening the economy involves a potential trade-off between the lives of people in their seventies (those most at risk of fatality due to COVID-19) and the possibility of losing “our whole country.” Setting aside the ideological reasons Patrick might have for not questioning the economic arrangements and other details implicit in his view of the “great American dream,” his framing is premised on taking these arrangements and details as givens. Not incidentally, he also does not offer clear moral values that allow for the critical consideration of these implicit elements. Even granting the validity of some of my concerns, a utilitarian could respond that the urgency of our situation prevents any major economic or political overhaul. This, however, seems like a false choice and a curiously narrow view of the problem, and it stubbornly elides the inherent limitations of such an approach. We cannot adequately respond to our situation without drawing on substantive commitments that both allow us to see our situation in its larger moral and political context and help to make proper sense of the many goods and values at stake. Only then might we be able to prudently navigate the difficult matter of trade-offs and begin to grasp what is becoming increasingly evident—that our most urgent need lies where genuine reform and proper attention to the pandemic meet.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>6. Util is politically reactionary—lack <strong>of foundational intuition masks that choices about tradeoffs aren’t natural, they’re constructed</h4><p>Buck, PhD candidate, 20</p><p></strong>(Author, Nicholas Buck, is a PhD student in Religious Ethics at the Divinity School. He studies religion and the development of modern moral and political thought, liberal democracy, and human rights. https://divinity.uchicago.edu/sightings/articles/covid-19-and-limits-utilitarianism<u> , 6-11) </p><p></u>Crafting policy decisions in response to the COVID-19 global pandemic calls for careful practical moral and political reasoning. Amid debates about next steps, Peter Singer, a prominent utilitarian ethicist, has weighed in on the matter. Wrestling with Singer’s arguments allows us to reflect on how we tend to think through these matters given that our policy deliberations often assume something of a utilitarian form. Utilitarianism is an ethical model that determines right action primarily in reference to outcomes. Generally speaking, it posits that actions are right to the extent they result (or tend to result) in the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people. To be sure, this way of thinking has strong intuitive force. Shouldn’t we always aspire to do the greatest amount of good possible? Singer recently put utilitarianism on display by publicly reasoning through how to approach reopening the U.S. economy. He joined a panel that The New York Times assembled to discuss the issue after co-authoring an article about it with Michael Plant in Project Syndicate. Outlining the nature of the situation as he sees it, and stressing the need for thinking about outcomes and trade-offs, he explained in the Times: I think the assumption… that we have to do everything to reduce the number of deaths, is not really the right assumption. Because at some point we are willing to trade off loss of life against loss of quality of life. No government puts every dollar it spends into saving lives. And we can’t really keep everything locked down until there won’t be any more deaths. So I think that’s something that needs to come into this discussion. How do we assess the overall cost to everybody in terms of loss of quality of life, loss of well-being, as well as the fact that lives are being lost? In Project Syndicate, Singer and Plant focused especially on the costs of a slowed economy and argued that these must be weighed in some way against the benefits of social distancing. They advise the use of empirical data such as the average number of “life years lost” by people who have died from COVID-19 for comparison against the steep economic toll of lockdowns. They conclude: [M]aking trade-offs requires converting different outcomes into a single unit of value. A problem with the current conversations about whether we should strangle the economy to save lives is that we cannot directly compare “lives saved” against “lost GDP.” We need to put them into some common unit… To do that, we think it’s best to measure wellbeing by using individuals’ reports of how happy and how satisfied with their lives they are.... Doing this means we can, in a principled way, weigh up otherwise hard-to-compare considerations when deciding how to respond to COVID-19—or to any other systemic risk. Some version of Singer’s approach is prominent in our public debate, and understandably so. Among <u>utilitarianism</u>’s strengths are its scalability, practicality, and realism. However, it <u>can </u>also <u>seem crass.</u> Surely <u>Singer is right that there is <mark>tension between</mark> the <mark>loss of life and</mark> the <mark>diminishing quality of life</u>,</mark> as well as between the economic and human costs of our policies. And <u>yet, the ease with which he seems <mark>to consider all of these as <strong>finally calculable is unsettling</u></strong></mark> It is important to note that Singer is not arguing in bad faith. In the Times, he readily admits of his age and of belonging to a segment of the population most vulnerable to the potentially unfortunate consequences of his reasoning. Nonetheless, Singer’s approach clearly depersonalizes the situation. On one hand, <u>large-scale analyses and the requirements of political office surely demand an emotional distance</u> of some kind in order to make the best decision in non-ideal circumstances. On the other, <u>we might think that something is wrong when <mark>decisions</mark> that <mark>sacrifice</mark> many of the intuitions and <mark>values</mark> we depend on appear to <mark>come too quickly and without clear overriding arguments</u></mark>. The English philosopher Bernard Williams has criticized utilitarians on just this point. To my mind, Charles Taylor has exposed devastating problems with utilitarianism. In Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (1989) and elsewhere, Taylor contends that <u>moral reasoning is an essentially qualitative task anchored in some orienting conception(s) of the good</u>. He argues that <u><mark>utilitarians</mark>,</u> who reject such a picture of morality, <u><strong><mark>cannot escape relying on substantive intuitions for which they cannot account</u></strong></mark> (i.e., that happiness is worth pursuing and an ideal of universal and impartial benevolence). Further, he argues that <u>their move to quantitative analysis distorts the evaluative nature of moral reasoning by reducing what are different kinds of goods to a single one. Doing so</u>, he claims, <u><mark>misses</mark> the <mark>intrinsic value</mark> belonging to many <mark>of</mark> our <mark>moral concepts</mark> and empties them of motivating power. </u>Following Taylor, <u>we might say that a cohering, motivating, situation-transcending source of value is necessary to maintain a properly moral perspective. In light of the features of their approach, utilitarians are unable to do so. Thinking</u> with Singer about our present situation reveals another, related problem. In his critique, <u>Williams draws attention to the way <strong>utilitarians frame the moral situation</u></strong>. Notice this in Singer’s arguments. <u><mark>At no point does he</mark> <mark>consider</mark> the <mark>political decisions that</mark> <strong>have <mark>shaped</mark> and continue to shape</strong> the <mark>trade-offs</mark> as he presents them</u>. Rather, <u>he proceeds as if these were givens</u>, more or less stable and fixed. To be sure, there are legitimate concerns regarding the effects of economic slowdown, and Singer is right to consider the psychological and emotional effects of prolonged social distancing. But it is not at all obvious that we are left to trade-off the economic and human costs in the way implied. <u>We might instead approach the matter by <mark>critically consider</mark>ing <mark>who</mark> is likely <mark>to <strong>bear the greatest burden</strong> of our decisions</u></mark>, <u>particularly which racial groups and classes of people, and whether that is<strong> just</u></strong>. <u>Without avoiding the need for trade-offs, we could opt to redistribute our enormous national wealth on a large scale, ensure the provision of necessary resources, and offer alternatives to unemployment</u>. After all, perhaps the COVID-19 crisis is best understood as further revealing and exacerbating many of our current economic arrangement’s existing problems rather than generating entirely new ones of its own. <u>Util</u>itarianism, <u>in either Singer’s philosophically rigorous version or the inchoate form it often takes in our public debates, seems mostly unable to arrive at and properly consider these possibilities. Because of its <mark>narrow view of the moral situation</mark> <mark>and</mark> its <mark>reductive move to quantitative </mark>reasoning, <mark>utilit</mark>arianism appears to be <strong><mark>hamstrung by</mark> an implicit and unwarranted <mark>status quo bias</mark>. </u></strong>As it turns out, <u>utili</u>tarianism <u>operates at both an ideal and an empirical deficit</u>—it lacks perspective in both dimensions. <u>Not only is it unmoored from a motivating and cohering source of value, it tends to <mark>mistake</mark> the terms of <strong>our <mark>trade-offs for</mark> something like <mark>brute facts </strong>when</mark> at least many of them are the <strong><mark>contingent</mark> and impermanent <mark>results of political decision.</mark> </u></strong>An example of this can be seen in Lieutenant Governor of Texas Dan <u>Patrick’s recent suggestion that re-opening the economy involves a potential trade-off between the lives of people in their seventies</u> (those most at risk of fatality due to COVID-19) <u>and the possibility of losing “our whole country</u>.” Setting aside the ideological reasons Patrick might have for not questioning the economic arrangements and other details implicit in his view of the “great American dream,” <u>his framing is premised on taking these arrangements and details as givens.</u> Not incidentally, he also does not offer clear moral values that allow for the critical consideration of these implicit elements. Even granting the validity of some of my concerns, <u>a <mark>util</mark>itarian could respond that the <strong>urgency of our situation</strong> prevents any major economic or political overhaul</u>. <u>This,</u> however, <u><strong><mark>seems like a false choice and a</mark> curiously <mark>narrow view</mark> of the problem</u></strong>, and <u>it stubbornly elides the inherent limitations of such an approach</u>. <u>We cannot adequately respond to our situation without drawing on substantive commitments that both allow us to see our situation in its larger moral and political context and help to make proper sense of the many goods and values at stake. Only then might we be able to prudently navigate the difficult matter of trade-offs and begin to grasp what is becoming increasingly evident—that our most urgent need lies where genuine reform and proper attention to the pandemic meet.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Hoffman, 21 fulltext: Secretary of the FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture . [Irene, "Dwindling biodiversity threatens food security," Welt Hunger Hilfe, 5-22-21, https://www.welthungerhilfe.org/news/latest-articles/2021/the-loss-of-biodiversity-threatens-world-food-security, accessed 8-27-2022] Declining Biodiversity Threatens Food Security The scale and breathtaking pace of biodiversity loss make agriculture more vulnerable to climate change, pests and diseases. Nutrition is becoming more and more unbalanced. Globally, biodiversity for food and agriculture is in decline. This poses a serious risk to global food security and makes agriculture less resilient to climate change, pests and diseases. We need more sustainable food production systems to better conserve and sustainably use biodiversity. New challenges like the digitalisation of genetic information must be addressed. The loss of biodiversity is accelerating around the world and ecosystem services are deteriorating. It is estimated that due to human-induced environmental changes and based on current trends, one million animal and plant species are threatened with extinction (IPBES, 2019). The rate in loss of biodiversity is alarming and concerns the entire humanity. Humans are dependent on biodiversity and ecosystem services it provides to meet their basic food needs. Yet while crop and livestock agriculture, forestry, fisheries and aquaculture are made up of and rely on a complex web of living organisms, they have become one of the major drivers of biodiversity loss. Biodiversity for food and agriculture is disappearing by the day The State of the World’s Biodiversity for Food and Agriculture, published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), highlights the erosion of the diversity of the plants, animals and micro-organisms that sustain food production systems (FAO, 2019). Once lost, biodiversity for food and agriculture cannot be recovered. Worldwide, farmers’ varieties and landraces are disappearing at an unprecedented speed. Consequently, global diets are becoming increasingly homogenous, a trend that risks undermining diverse and nutrient-rich diets which are essential for human health. The statistics are alarming: out of the 6,000 different plant species used as food, only nine (sugarcane, wheat, rice, maize, potatoes, sugar beet, cassava, oil palm and soybean) contribute 66% of total crop production. Livestock production is concentrated mainly on eight species (pig, chicken, cattle, sheep, goat, turkey, duck and buffalo) accounting for 97% of global meat production. Valuable wild relatives of domesticated animals and crops in natural ecosystems are dwindling too. Close to 20% of the wild species recorded in The International Union for Conservation of Nature Red List of Threatened Species (IUCN 2021) as sources of human food are classed as threatened. Almost a third of ocean fish stocks are overfished and a third of freshwater species are threatened. In addition, some of the less visible species which do not end on our plate are in decline, such as pollinators and other invertebrates and micro-organisms (such as insects, bats, birds, mangroves, corals, seagrasses, earthworms, soil-dwelling fungi and bacteria). They keep soils fertile, pollinate plants, purify water and air, keep fish and trees healthy, and fight crop and livestock pests and diseases. Without them agriculture would be impossible. Yet, their importance in food production systems has not yet been studied in detail and their potentials are unexplored. We are losing biodiversity not knowing exactly what we are losing. There is therefore an urgent need to improve our knowledge on ecosystems for food and agriculture, and in particular, to study the role of associated biodiversity. This will help us to better understand, conserve and manage the diversity that underpins our food systems. The motto must be to work with biodiversity and not against it. Farming sustainably to fight the erosion of biodiversity Population growth, climate change, urbanisation and trends in global markets and trade are the main indirect driving forces putting pressure on biodiversity. Changes in land use and water management, intensification of production systems, deforestation, overfishing, excessive use of pesticides and fertilisers, pollution and ecosystem degradation are some of the major direct threats to biodiversity for food and agriculture. Fighting the erosion of biodiversity for food and agriculture requires its more sustainable management, use and conservation. This implies a shift to more biodiversity friendly production methods, favouring a greater diversity of crop and livestock species, maintaining well connected habitats for pollinators and natural enemies of pests, practising sustainable soil management and reducing the use of pesticides and fertilisers. Farmers, livestock keepers, forest dwellers and fisherfolk are managers and custodians of biodiversity. Smallholders of less than 2 hectares make up about 84% of all farms worldwide but manage only 12% of all agricultural land (Lowder et al. 2021). On average, they have higher yields and harbour greater biodiversity than larger farms (Ricciardi et al. 2021). Agriculture practices based on local knowledge are essential in providing solutions that promote more sustainable food production systems. Agriculture producers, scientists and other stakeholders need to work more closely together to develop management practices and new technologies that have positive effects on biodiversity and the supply of ecosystem services. There is no one-size-fits all solution, relevant approaches range from agroecology to precision farming. All have a role to play The transition towards a biodiversity-friendly food system requires the political will and joint commitment of all stakeholders, including policy-makers, farmers, food companies and consumers. They all have a role to play. Agriculture producers need training and support, and an enabling policy environment encouraging and rewarding sustainable production practices to protect biodiversity, enhance the landscape, and improve the quality of water, air and soil. Incentives, like subsidies, that run counter to this transformation, need to be phased out as soon as possible. As consumers, we can choose food from biodiversity-friendly systems, such as organic agriculture or sustainable fisheries and buy products of local crop varieties and livestock breeds. In backyards and gardens, we can help to rebuild insect populations and plant flowers attracting native bee species. But the conservation of biodiversity in farms and in the wild is not sufficient. As an additional insurance, samples need to be stored in gene- and local seed banks to safeguard the diversity of plant and animal genetic resources for future research and breeding. Digitalisation of genetic information should benefit countries of origin With the introduction of modern biotechnologies, genetic resources will increasingly be sequenced and then stored in data banks. With new biotechnological methods it is possible to modify genetic material and create new organisms without having physical material at hand. All that is needed is digital sequence information that is freely available in online databases. While the digitalisation of genetic information offers amazing opportunities, it also raises new and very complex ethical and legal questions. Countries of origin of genetic resources expect that the benefits arising from research and development on their genetic resources are shared with them. In 2010, governments adopted the Nagoya Protocol, a legal framework that facilitates access to and the sharing of benefits derived from genetic resources. With the digitalisation of genetic information and its accessibility through data bases, many countries fear that the Nagoya Protocol could be undermined and benefits will no longer be shared. Biodiversity for food and agriculture is vital for food security The erosion of biodiversity will undermine the capacity of agricultural systems to adapt to changing conditions and shocks, such as climate change, and outbreaks of pests and diseases that may jeopardise food security and livelihoods. For example, in 1970, the Southern Corn Leaf Blight, a fungal disease, destroyed about 15% of the maize crop in the United States, at an estimated loss of one billion dollars (Bruns, 2017).<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>9. Species conservation is critical to <u>food security – cascading extinctions mean global food shortages</h4><p><strong>Hoffman, 21</u></strong> </p><p>Secretary of the FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture . [Irene, "Dwindling biodiversity threatens food security," Welt Hunger Hilfe, 5-22-21, https://www.welthungerhilfe.org/news/latest-articles/2021/the-loss-of-biodiversity-threatens-world-food-security, accessed 8-27-2022]</p><p><u><strong>Declining Biod</u></strong>iversity <u><strong>Threatens Food Security</u></strong> <u><strong>The</u></strong> scale and breathtaking <u><strong>pace of biod</u></strong>iversity <u><strong>loss make ag</u></strong>riculture <u><strong>more vulnerable to climate change, pests and diseases.</u></strong> Nutrition is becoming more and more unbalanced. Globally, biodiversity for food and agriculture is in decline. <u><strong>This poses a serious risk to global food security and makes ag</u></strong>riculture <u><strong>less resilient to climate change, pests and diseases.</u></strong> We need more sustainable food production systems to better conserve and sustainably use biodiversity. New challenges like the digitalisation of genetic information must be addressed. <u><strong>The loss of biod</u></strong>iversity <u><strong>is accelerating</u></strong> around the world <u><strong>and ecosystem services are deteriorating.</u></strong> It is estimated that due to human-induced environmental changes and based on current trends, one million animal and plant species are threatened with extinction (IPBES, 2019). The rate in loss of biodiversity is alarming and concerns the entire humanity. <u><strong><mark>Humans are dependent on biod</u></strong></mark>iversity <u><strong><mark>and ecosystem services it provides to meet</u></strong> </mark>their <u><strong><mark>basic food needs</mark>. </u></strong>Yet while crop and livestock agriculture, forestry, fisheries and aquaculture are made up of and rely on a complex web of living organisms, they have become one of the major drivers of biodiversity loss. Biodiversity for food and agriculture is disappearing by the day The State of the World’s Biodiversity for Food and Agriculture, published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), highlights the erosion of the diversity of the plants, animals and micro-organisms that sustain food production systems (FAO, 2019). Once lost, biodiversity for food and agriculture cannot be recovered. Worldwide, farmers’ varieties and landraces are disappearing at an unprecedented speed. Consequently, global diets are becoming increasingly homogenous, a trend that risks undermining diverse and nutrient-rich diets which are essential for human health. The statistics are alarming: out of the 6,000 different plant species used as food, only nine (sugarcane, wheat, rice, maize, potatoes, sugar beet, cassava, oil palm and soybean) contribute 66% of total crop production. Livestock production is concentrated mainly on eight species (pig, chicken, cattle, sheep, goat, turkey, duck and buffalo) accounting for 97% of global meat production. Valuable wild relatives of domesticated animals and crops in natural ecosystems are dwindling too. Close to 20% of the wild species recorded in The International Union for Conservation of Nature Red List of Threatened Species (IUCN 2021) as sources of human food are classed as threatened. Almost a third of ocean fish stocks are overfished and a third of freshwater species are threatened. In addition, some of the less visible species which do not end on our plate are in decline, such as pollinators and other invertebrates and micro-organisms (such as insects, bats, birds, mangroves, corals, seagrasses, earthworms, soil-dwelling fungi and bacteria). <u><strong><mark>They keep soils fertile, pollinate plants, purify water and air</mark>, keep fish and trees healthy, <mark>and fight crop</mark> and livestock <mark>pests </mark>and diseases. <mark>Without them ag</u></strong></mark>riculture <u><strong><mark>would be impossible</mark>.</u></strong> Yet, their importance in food production systems has not yet been studied in detail and their potentials are unexplored. We are losing biodiversity not knowing exactly what we are losing. There is therefore an urgent need to improve our knowledge on ecosystems for food and agriculture, and in particular, to study the role of associated biodiversity. This will help us to better understand, conserve and manage the <u><strong>diversity</u></strong> that <u><strong>underpins our food systems.</u></strong> The motto must be to work with biodiversity and not against it. Farming sustainably to fight the erosion of biodiversity Population growth, climate change, urbanisation and trends in global markets and trade are the main indirect driving forces putting pressure on biodiversity. Changes in land use and water management, intensification of production systems, deforestation, overfishing, excessive use of pesticides and fertilisers, pollution and ecosystem degradation are some of the major direct threats to biodiversity for food and agriculture. Fighting the erosion of biodiversity for food and agriculture requires its more sustainable management, use and conservation. This implies a shift to more biodiversity friendly production methods, favouring a greater diversity of crop and livestock species, maintaining well connected habitats for pollinators and natural enemies of pests, practising sustainable soil management and reducing the use of pesticides and fertilisers. Farmers, livestock keepers, forest dwellers and fisherfolk are managers and custodians of biodiversity. Smallholders of less than 2 hectares make up about 84% of all farms worldwide but manage only 12% of all agricultural land (Lowder et al. 2021). On average, they have higher yields and harbour greater biodiversity than larger farms (Ricciardi et al. 2021). Agriculture practices based on local knowledge are essential in providing solutions that promote more sustainable food production systems. Agriculture producers, scientists and other stakeholders need to work more closely together to develop management practices and new technologies that have positive effects on biodiversity and the supply of ecosystem services. There is no one-size-fits all solution, relevant approaches range from agroecology to precision farming. All have a role to play The transition towards a biodiversity-friendly food system requires the political will and joint commitment of all stakeholders, including policy-makers, farmers, food companies and consumers. They all have a role to play. Agriculture producers need training and support, and an enabling policy environment encouraging and rewarding sustainable production practices to protect biodiversity, enhance the landscape, and improve the quality of water, air and soil. Incentives, like subsidies, that run counter to this transformation, need to be phased out as soon as possible. As consumers, we can choose food from biodiversity-friendly systems, such as organic agriculture or sustainable fisheries and buy products of local crop varieties and livestock breeds. In backyards and gardens, we can help to rebuild insect populations and plant flowers attracting native bee species. But the conservation of biodiversity in farms and in the wild is not sufficient. As an additional insurance, samples need to be stored in gene- and local seed banks to safeguard the diversity of plant and animal genetic resources for future research and breeding. Digitalisation of genetic information should benefit countries of origin With the introduction of modern biotechnologies, genetic resources will increasingly be sequenced and then stored in data banks. With new biotechnological methods it is possible to modify genetic material and create new organisms without having physical material at hand. All that is needed is digital sequence information that is freely available in online databases. While the digitalisation of genetic information offers amazing opportunities, it also raises new and very complex ethical and legal questions. Countries of origin of genetic resources expect that the benefits arising from research and development on their genetic resources are shared with them. In 2010, governments adopted the Nagoya Protocol, a legal framework that facilitates access to and the sharing of benefits derived from genetic resources. With the digitalisation of genetic information and its accessibility through data bases, many countries fear that the Nagoya Protocol could be undermined and benefits will no longer be shared. <u><strong>Biod</u></strong>iversity for food and agriculture <u><strong>is vital for food security</u></strong> <u><strong>The <mark>erosion of biod</u></strong></mark>iversity <u><strong><mark>will undermine the capacity of ag</mark>ricultural <mark>systems to adapt to</mark> changing conditions and <mark>shocks, such as climate change</mark>, and outbreaks of <mark>pests and diseases </mark>that may jeopardise food security</u></strong> and livelihoods. For example, in 1970, the Southern Corn Leaf Blight, a fungal disease, destroyed about 15% of the maize crop in the United States, at an estimated loss of one billion dollars (Bruns, 2017).</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Adam Gaffney, 3-7-16, (Adam Gaffney is a physician, writer, a fellow in pulmonary and critical care medicine at Massachusetts General Hospital, and an adviser to the board of the Physicians for a National Health Program, “Is the Path to Racial Health Equity Paved with “Reparations”? The Politics of Health, Part II”, Los Angeles Review of Books, https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/is-the-path-to-racial-health-equity-paved-with-reparations-the-politics-of-health-part-ii/#!) fulltext: In contrast, there are reams of evidence that point to social and economic inequalities as drivers of racial inequalities. In the first part of this essay, I focused on the impact of economic injustices on health: a large body of literature has demonstrated that poverty, for instance, is associated with a panoply of poor health outcomes, and some researchers argue that inequality itself causes worse health for everyone in society (perhaps via increased psychosocial strain as well as other factors).[17] No doubt such socioeconomic factors are a major factor in racial health inequalities, given the tight association between economic status and race.[18] Similarly, differences in health care access associated with race (like being uninsured) are no doubt factors as well. But what might be said about the role of racially discriminatory treatment itself? This issue has received increased attention since the 2002 publication of an Institute of Medicine evidence report, Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial Disparities in Health Care. Tweedy quotes from the report’s conclusion: “Although myriad sources contribute to [health] disparities, some evidence suggests that bias, prejudice, and stereotyping on the part of the healthcare providers may contribute to differences in care.” Or, as he puts it, the “doctor-patient relationship itself serves as a catalyst for differing outcomes,” which is in part the result of the fact that “some doctors are prone to hold negative views about the ability of black patients to manage their health and therefore might recommend different, and possibly substandard, treatments to them.” This issue — namely, the problem of racially disparate treatment — is the central focus of Dayna Bowen Matthew’s book. She explores how “implicit bias,” as she terms it, deforms physician behavior; in her view, it constitutes the most neglected determinant of inferior health among blacks. 3. Jim Crow medicine: Past and present Matthew is a law professor with appointments at both the University of Colorado Law School and the Colorado School of Public Health. Matthew is also one of the founders of the Colorado Health Equity Project, a multidisciplinary organization that works to “remove legal barriers to equal health access and health outcomes for Colorado’s vulnerable populations,” as its website puts it. Her ambitious book lays out a case for a legal remedy for racial health inequality. Key to her argument is the historical context of civil rights law, which she sees as a swinging pendulum. Hill-Burton, as we’ve seen, legally enshrined the “separate-but-equal” standard — established in the Supreme Court case Plessy v. Ferguson — within the health care system. Legal challenges to this standard were unsuccessful, until Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, the “watershed case,” as Matthew puts it, initiated its unraveling. As she recounts it, the case was brought by black practitioners and patients against a discriminatory hospital in North Carolina that received Hill-Burton funds. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring, as quoted by Matthew, that “Racial discrimination by hospitals visits severe consequences upon Negro physicians and their patients.” She describes two consequences that flowed from this decision. First, the case helped catalyze subsequent successful health-care related civil rights litigation throughout the country. Second, the decision — which the Supreme Court importantly declined to reconsider — helped lead the way to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. According to Matthew, Congress took the Supreme Court’s decision not to accept the case as a signal that it saw hospital segregation as unconstitutional (and, indeed, several legislators explicitly cited the Simkins decision during debate over the bill). Much good came from this: “From 1963 through the early 1990s,” Matthew writes, “Title VI proved an effective weapon against the segregation and discrimination that minority patients and physicians had experienced in American health care since the colonial era.” For instance, the Johnson administration required hospitals to comply with Title VI in order to be eligible for Medicare payment. Few could afford not to, and so the age of explicit hospital segregation finally came to a close. Yet Matthew asserts that, to an extent, this more auspicious era ended abruptly in 2001, when a more conservative Supreme Court ruled in Alexander v. Sandoval, in a decision written by Justice Antonin Scalia, that Title VI was applicable only in cases of deliberate discrimination; disparate impact was not enough.[19] This new standard precluded a great deal of civil rights litigation because it required that plaintiffs produce tangible evidence that racist health care was intentional, which is made difficult when, as she notes, “few Americans are careless enough to create an evidentiary record of outright bigotry.” Thus, according to Matthew, with respect to health care discrimination, this decision effectively rendered Title VI “a dead letter.” This decision, she argues, must be undone if progress against racial health inequalities is to proceed. In short, unconscious racism in health care must, according to her, be made illegal through an act of Congress and an expansion of Title VI. This may sound Orwellian to some. Is it meaningful, after all, to talk about outlawing sentiments or attitudes that lie deep within the dark depths of our unconscious? Can we root out biases if we are, by definition, unaware of their very existence? Matthew marshals a body of literature from various disciplines to answer in the affirmative. Conscious racism, she argues, is slowly being replaced by the unconscious variety: “But while overt racism is subject to nearly universal derision, unconscious racism due to implicit bias is hidden, is tolerated, and even excused despite its destructiveness.” She persuasively explores various literatures demonstrating that physicians harbor unconscious negative perceptions of blacks. She cites studies that show that patient race affects which treatments doctors recommend, how much time they spend with patients, “the level of verbal exchange and shared decision-making in which they engage” with patients, and even the manner of their nonverbal engagement. She concludes that there is a sufficient base of evidence to conclude that these implicit biases contribute to disparities, that there is reason to believe that such biases, even though they are implicit, are remediable, and that health care providers — both on the individual and institutional level — can therefore be held legally responsible for the results of their implicit biases. The “evidence of malleability” is strong, according to Matthew. In other words, she thinks specific interventions can mitigate implicit biases and, as a result, disparate outcomes. The sorts of interventions she envisions, however, seem of mixed applicability and utility. Nonetheless, overall, she makes a strong case that clinicians make racially biased decisions, whether or not they intend to, and that this issue must be directly addressed. People like me — that is to say, white physicians who believe they are immune from racially biased thought and action — have a great deal to gain from reading this book.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Second, reversing the ruling in Alexander v. Sandoval substantially reduces the threshold for a plaintiff to win cases against physicians that act racial biases – by reducing the standard from disparate treatment to disparate impact the plan increases the number of successful cases and reduces the material impacts of implicit bias</h4><p>Adam <strong>Gaffney</strong>, 3-7-<strong>16</strong>, (Adam Gaffney is a physician, writer, a fellow in pulmonary and critical care medicine at Massachusetts General Hospital, and an adviser to the board of the Physicians for a National Health Program, “Is the Path to Racial Health Equity Paved with “Reparations”? The Politics of Health, Part II”, Los Angeles Review of Books, https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/is-the-path-to-racial-health-equity-paved-with-reparations-the-politics-of-health-part-ii/#!)</p><p>In contrast, <u><mark>there are reams of evidence that point to social</mark> and economic <mark>inequalities as drivers of racial inequalities</u></mark>. In the first part of this essay, <u>I focused on the impact of economic injustices on health: a large body of literature has demonstrated that poverty, for instance, is associated with a panoply of poor health outcomes, and some researchers argue that inequality itself causes worse health for everyone in society</u> (perhaps via increased psychosocial strain as well as other factors).[17] No doubt such socioeconomic factors are a major factor in racial health inequalities, given the tight association between economic status and race.[18] Similarly, <u><mark>differences in health care access associated with race</u></mark> (like being uninsured) <u><mark>are</mark> no doubt <mark>factors as well</u></mark>. But what might be said about the role of racially discriminatory treatment itself? This issue has received increased attention since the 2002 publication of an Institute of Medicine evidence report, Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial Disparities in Health Care. Tweedy quotes from the report’s conclusion: “<u>Although myriad sources contribute to [health] disparities, some <mark>evidence suggests that bias</mark>, prejudice, and stereotyping <mark>on the part of the healthcare providers may contribute to differences in care</mark>.”</u> Or, as he puts it, the “doctor-patient relationship itself serves as a catalyst for differing outcomes,” which is in part the result of the fact that “some doctors are prone to hold negative views about the ability of black patients to manage their health and therefore might recommend different, and possibly substandard, treatments to them.” <u>This issue — namely,</u> <u>the problem of racially disparate treatment</u> — is the central focus of Dayna Bowen Matthew’s book. She explores how <u>“<mark>implicit bias,”</u></mark> as she terms it, <u><mark>deforms physician behavior</mark>; in her view, it constitutes the most neglected determinant of inferior health among blacks</u>.</p><p>3. Jim Crow medicine: Past and present</p><p>Matthew is a law professor with appointments at both the University of Colorado Law School and the Colorado School of Public Health. Matthew is also one of the founders of the Colorado Health Equity Project, a multidisciplinary organization that works to “remove legal barriers to equal health access and health outcomes for Colorado’s vulnerable populations,” as its website puts it. Her ambitious book lays out a case for a legal remedy for racial health inequality<u>. <mark>Key to her argument is the historical context of civil rights law</mark>, which <mark>she sees as a swinging pendulum</u>. <u>Hill-Burton</u></mark>, as we’ve seen<u><strong>, <mark>legally enshrined</u></strong> </mark>the <u><mark>“separate-but-equal” </mark>standard — established in the Supreme Court case Plessy v. Ferguson</u> — <u>within</u> the <u>health care</u> system. <u><mark>Legal challenges</mark> to this standard <mark>were unsuccessful, until <strong>Simkins v. Moses</strong></mark> </u>H. Cone Memorial Hospital<u>, <mark>the “watershed case</mark>,”</u> as Matthew puts it<u>, <mark>initiated its unraveling</u></mark>. As she recounts it<u>, the case was brought by black practitioners and patients against a discriminatory hospital in North Carolina</u> that received Hill-Burton funds. <u>The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided in favor of the plaintiffs</u>, declaring, as quoted by <u>Matthew</u>, that “Racial discrimination by hospitals visits severe consequences upon Negro physicians and their patients.” She <u>describes two consequences that flowed from this decision</u>. First, <u><mark>the case helped <strong>catalyze subsequent</strong> successful health-care related civil rights <strong>litigation</strong> throughout the country</u></mark>. <u>Second, <mark>the decision</mark> —</u> which the Supreme Court importantly declined to reconsider — <u>helped <mark>lead</mark> the way <mark>to <strong>Title VI of the Civil Rights Act</strong></mark> of 1964.</u> According to Matthew, <u>Congress took the Supreme Court’s decision not to accept the case as a signal that it saw hospital segregation as unconstitutional</u> (and, indeed, <u>several legislators explicitly cited the Simkins decision during debate over the</u> <u>bill</u>). Much good came from this: “<u><strong><mark>From 1963 through the early 1990s</u></strong></mark>,” Matthew writes, “<u><strong><mark>Title VI proved an effective weapon against </strong>the<strong> segregation</strong> and discrimination that minority patients and physicians had experienced in American health care</mark> <mark>since the colonial era.”</u></mark> For instance, <u>the Johnson administration required hospitals to comply with Title VI in order to be eligible for Medicare payment.</u> Few could afford not to, and so the age of explicit hospital segregation finally came to a close. Yet Matthew asserts that, to an extent, <u><strong><mark>this more auspicious era ended abruptly in 2001</u></strong>, <u>when</mark> a more conservative Supreme Court ruled <mark>in <strong>Alexander v. Sandoval</strong>, in a decision</u></mark> written by Justice Antonin Scalia, that <u><mark>Title VI was applicable only in cases of deliberate discrimination</u>; <u>disparate impact was not enough</u>.</mark>[19] <u>This new standard precluded a great deal of civil rights litigation</u> because it required that plaintiffs produce tangible evidence that racist health care was intentional, which is made difficult when, as she notes, “few Americans are careless enough to create an evidentiary record of outright bigotry.” Thus, according to Matthew, <u>with respect to health care discrimination, <mark>this</mark> <mark>decision</mark> effectively <mark>rendered <strong>Title VI “a dead letter.”</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>This decision</u></mark>, she argues, <u><strong><mark>must be undone</strong> if progress against racial health inequalities is to proceed</u></mark>. In short, <u>unconscious racism in health</u> care <u>must</u>, according to her, <u>be made illegal through an act of Congress and an expansion of Title VI</u>. This may sound Orwellian to some. Is it meaningful, after all, to talk about outlawing sentiments or attitudes that lie deep within the dark depths of our unconscious? <u><mark>Can we root out biases</u></mark> if we are, by definition, unaware of their very existence? <u><mark>Matthew marshals a body of literature from various disciplines to answer in the affirmative</u></mark>. Conscious racism, she argues, is slowly being replaced by the unconscious variety: “But while overt racism is subject to nearly universal derision, unconscious racism due to implicit bias is hidden, is tolerated, and even excused despite its destructiveness.” <u>She persuasively explores various literatures demonstrating that physicians harbor unconscious negative perceptions of blacks</u>. She cites studies that show that patient race affects which treatments doctors recommend, how much time they spend with patients, “the level of verbal exchange and shared decision-making in which they engage” with patients, and even the manner of their nonverbal engagement. <u><mark>She concludes that there is a sufficient base of evidence to conclude</u></mark> that these implicit biases contribute to disparities, that <u><mark>there is reason to believe that such biases</mark>, even though they are implicit, <mark>are remediable</u>, <u>and that health care providers</u></mark> — both on the individual and institutional level — <u><mark>can</mark> therefore <mark>be held legally responsible</u></mark> for the results of their implicit biases. <u>The “evidence of malleability” is strong</u>, according to Matthew. In other words, she thinks <u>specific interventions can mitigate implicit biases and, as a result, disparate outcomes. The sorts of interventions she envisions, however, seem of mixed applicability and utility. Nonetheless, overall, she makes a strong case that clinicians make racially biased decisions, whether or not they intend to, and that this issue must be directly addressed. People like me — that is to say, white physicians who believe they are immune from racially biased thought and action — have a great deal to gain from reading this book.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Escalante 18 (Alyson Escalante is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/) fulltext: I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party. It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement. Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The alternative is to affirm the dual power <u>model of the Communist Party</u> – only the Party can provide <u>effective accountability mechanisms</u> to correct unproductive tendencies, educate and <u>mobilize marginalized communities</u>, and connect local struggles to a movement for international liberation</h4><p><strong>Escalante 18</strong> (Alyson Escalante is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/)</p><p>I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that <u><mark>base building and dual power</mark> strategy <mark>can be</mark> <mark>best</mark> <mark>forwarded through party organizing</mark>, <mark>and</mark> that party organizing can <mark>allow this </mark>emerging <mark>movement to solidify</mark> <mark>into a </mark>powerful <mark>revolutionary socialist tendency</mark> in the United States. </u>One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that <u>the current state of the left in the United States is one in which <mark>revolution is not</mark> <mark>currently possible</mark>.</u> There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. <u>The base building emphasis on <mark>dual</mark> <mark>power responds</mark> directly to this insight. <mark>By building institutions</mark> which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate <mark>that</mark> communists can <mark>offer</mark> the oppressed <mark>relief</mark> <mark>from</mark> the horrific conditions of <mark>capitalism</mark>.</u> Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? <u>If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? </u>Put simply: <u><strong><mark>in order to mobilize the base</mark> which base builders hope to create, <mark>we</mark> <mark>need</mark> <mark>to</mark> have already done the work of <mark>build</mark>ing <mark>a communist party</mark>.</u></strong> <u><mark>It is not enough</mark> <mark>to</mark> simply <mark>meet </mark>peoples <mark>needs.</mark> Rather, <mark>we must build</mark> the <mark>institutions of dual power</mark> in the name of communism.</u> <u><mark>We</mark> <strong><mark>must refuse</strong></mark> <strong><mark>covert</mark> <mark>front organizing and instead have</strong></mark> <mark>a public face</mark> <mark>as a communist</mark> <mark>party</mark>. </u>When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. <u>We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt <mark>party organizing</mark>. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing <mark>focuses</mark> <mark>on</mark> building a party whose <mark>membership</mark> is <mark>formally</mark> <mark>unified around a party</mark> <mark>line</mark> <mark>determined by democratic centralist decision making</mark>.</u> <u>The party model creates internal methods for <strong><mark>holding party members accountable</strong></mark>, <mark>unifying</mark> party member action around democratically determined goals, <mark>and</mark> for <mark>educating</mark> party members in communist theory and praxis.</u> A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. <u>Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. <mark>They</mark> function as the forefront of political organizing, <mark>empoweri</mark>ng local <mark>communities</mark> <mark>to</mark> <mark>theorize</mark> <mark>their</mark> <mark>liberation</mark> through communist theory <mark>while organizing</mark> communities to literally fight for their liberation.</u> A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that <u>our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The <mark>formal structures</mark> provided by a democratic centralist party model <mark>allow individual locals to have a voice</mark> in open debate, <mark>but also</mark> allow for <mark>a unified strategy </mark>to emerge from democratic consensus. </u>Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>party organizing allows for</mark> local organizations and individual <mark>organizers to be held accountable</mark> for their actions.</u></strong> <u>It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. </u>In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such <u><strong><mark>accountability is crucial</strong></mark>.</u> <u>As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, <mark>imperialist and colonial ideal</mark> frequently <mark>infect leftist organizing</mark>. Creating <mark>formal</mark> unity and <mark>party</mark> <mark>procedure</mark> for dealing with and correcting these ideas <mark>allows us to address these</mark> consistent problems within American socialist organizing. </u>Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, <u>individual base building <mark>organizations ought to adopt</mark> party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside <mark>recruitment</mark> into their organizations, <mark>education</mark> of community members <mark>in communist theory and praxis</mark>, and the establishment of armed and <mark>militant party cadres capable</mark> <mark>of defending</mark> dual power <mark>institutions from</mark> <mark>state terror</mark>.</u> Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. <u>The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. </u>The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. <u>It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party,</u> but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, <u>it ought to become clear that</u> <u><strong><mark>a</mark> <mark>unified national</mark> <mark>party</mark> <mark>will</mark> <mark>have </mark>to <mark>be the long term goal </mark>of the base building movement.</u></strong> Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. <u>I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation.</u> The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Ding et al. 17 (, Y., Liu, G. and Guo, H., 2017. Moon-based Earth observation: scientific concept and potential applications. [online] Volume 11, 2018. Available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538947.2017.1356879> [Accessed 22 January 2022] Yixing Ding - Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, People’s Republic of China Guang Liu - Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, People’s Republic of China Huadong Guo - Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, People’s Republic of China.)-rahulpenu fulltext: 4. Scientific goal of moon-based earth observation A basic question for moon-based Earth observation is, ‘What to see?’ According to the characteristics of moon-based Earth observation, the phenomena suitable for Moon-based Earth observation may have at least one of the following features: long-lasting, related to Sun–Earth–Moon motion, requires stable baseline observation, large-scale and describes multiple parameters. In the following sections, we will present several observation objectives to discuss in detail. 4.1. Solid earth dynamics Solid Earth tides, continental plate movement and glacier isostatic adjustment (GIA) are three typical large-scale solid Earth movements (Jiang et al. 2016), the measurement of which is a basic task of geodesy. For a uniform layered Earth, accurately predicting tidal movement can be done theoretically, but complex ocean tides and the inelasticity and heterogeneity of Earth’s interior material make the solid tide of the real Earth difficult to research theoretically. For GIA studies, prior knowledge about ancient ice cover evolution and a large amount of observational data are needed. Plate tectonics theory is a quantitative description of Earth plate movement (Ni et al. 2016). It may well explain the movement of most oceanic plates, but still have some problems to explain the mechanism of strong continental earthquakes, large-scale continental deformation, as well as the movements of other oceanic plates (Bird 2003). Accurately measuring solid Earth dynamics is beneficial to understanding solid Earth tides, continental plate movement and GIA, and provides further support for geodynamics and seismology. Devices such as a superconducting gravimeter and global navigation satellite system are currently used to measure small deformations of solid Earth, but these point-by-point methods are spatially limited to certain regions. Spaceborne InSAR measures deformation continuously, but the swath is not wide enough for mapping large-scale solid Earth movement. The Moon is a vast and stable platform that can provide sufficiently long and stable baseline interferometry. Its movement is easier to predict and the time interval of repeat-pass interferometry could be reduced to one day (Fornaro et al. 2010). In addition, the Moon is one of the main sources of tides on the Earth; so if we compare two measurements at different times, the lunar tide portion can be subtracted, leaving only the solar tide portion. After proper processing, it may help us learn more about the interior structure of Earth’s crust. To measure the large-scale deformation, a Moon-based repeat-pass InSAR system needs to be carefully designed. Except for the general SAR parameters, the critical baseline is a key factor that impacts its performance. The critical baseline Bc leading to a complete spatial decorrelation is given by Bc = BlDem tan ui c . (7) In this equation, the incidence angle ui is related to the observational geometry, while l and B are optional. When the bandwidth is 100 MHz and the incidence angle is 25°, the critical baselines are 14,000, 3300 and 1770 km at the L-band, C-band and X-band, respectively. In order to keep the correlation between two repeat passes, a practical baseline must be smaller than Bc. Therefore, from a practical point of view, the L-band is better than the C-band or X-band. Figure 4 shows the simulation results of one-day interval interferometry, but the side-looking constraints are not involved. In this case, the temporal decorrelation is highly reduced. It is obvious that the interferometric area is larger in the L-band than in X-band. Meanwhile, when the declination of the Moon is near the extremes, the interferometric area becomes larger. When the declination of the Moon is near the equatorial plane, one-day interval repeat-pass interferometry is not feasible, but a half month or one month interval repeat-pass interferometry is available. The magnitude of the solid Earth motion is not large. For example, the typical solid Earth tide amplitude is dozens of centimetres in one day. A resolution of hundreds of metres or even coarser will be enough if the wave is stably scattered. 4.2. Energy budget of earth Fundamentally, climate change depends on Earth’s radiation balance. Observation of both the solar radiation and Earth’s reflection and emission will depend on accurate measurement with space technology. Since the late 1970s, the United States and Europe have launched a number of missions to measure solar and terrestrial radiation, such as NASA’s Active Cavity Radiometer Irradiance Monitor Series programme (ACRIM1, 1980–1989; ACRIM2, 1991–2001; ACRIM3, 2000–present), Earth Radiation Budget Experiment (ERBE, 1984–1994), Clouds and Earth’s Radiant Energy System (CERES, 1997–present), Solar Radiation and Climate Experiment (SORCE, 2003–present) and the French Megha-Tropiques satellite on the Scanner for Radiation Budget (ScaRaB, 2011–present). These missions have greatly improved our understanding of Earth’s energy system. The Deep Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVR), placed at the earth–Sun first Lagrangian point, has been designed to measure the outgoing radiation of the sunlit Earth disk with a constant look angle. But in the outgoing radiation, the reflected shortwave radiation is highly affected by albedo and atmospheric conditions, showing obvious anisotropy. Lack of sampling in space and time is vulnerable to uncertainties. The lunar observatory provides large-scale observation with continuously changing angles, enabling it to calibrate the data of satellites in different orbits at different times. Its most important property is that it can provide a very long-term time series from a single orbit platform. In a year, the time series covers all local times, all seasons (different weather pattern) and all Earth phases for all underlying surfaces (Pallé and Goode 2009; Karalidi et al. 2012). The diversity of the surface-weatherphase combination is beneficial to improving the quality of global energy budget data and to the study of regional energy redistribution and its multi-layer coupling effects. The Moon-based data will also provide a direct connection between the data from space technology and the data from ground-based earthshine measurement series, which span almost one hundred years. The system design can consult the DSCOVR satellite, a radiometer measuring irradiance of the Earth phase and an imaging camera taking images of the Earth phase for various Earth sciences purposes. In order to take into account the needs of observing the Earth’s environmental elements, 1 km spatial resolution and 20–30 channels of the camera are suggested. 4.3. Earth’s environmental elements Vegetation is an important part of the global carbon pool and a key element of global carbon cycle. Most vegetation is distributed in middle- and low-latitude regions. A Moon-based optical camera can image global vegetation almost every day. SAR maps not only the horizontal distribution of vegetation, but also extracts forest morphological structure through tomography. The Moon provides multi-baseline accessibility within a single pass to eliminate the tomographic temporal decorrelation, but the imaging temporal decorrelation within a long synthetic aperture time hampers the focusing of forest. Therefore, to validate the feasibility of Moon-based 3D mapping of forest, more imaging methods for unstable scatterer, for example, the time reversal imaging method (Jin and Moura 2007), need to be tested and new methods are also expected. Glaciers are sensitive variables of climate change. The monitoring of glacier area, surface velocity and mass balance plays an important role in understanding the status of glaciers and their response to global change. Remote sensing techniques, such as optical sensors, SAR and altimeter data, provide regular observations of key glacial parameters. A lunar platform would provide continuous three- or four-day temporal coverage per month at the polar regions, but the observation incidence angle would typically be larger than 40° (see Figure 5) due to the relatively small inclination angle of the lunar orbit. For the High Asia area, the average coverage is about 4 h per day with proper incidence angle. The challenges may be the cost of high-resolution mapping for the optical sensor, and the layover problem (Tilley and Bonwit 1989) in heavy gradient area for SAR. Moon-based altimetry faces the same problems as LiDAR mentioned before, and is not recommended. An atmospheric observatory on the Moon can be used to evaluate the cloud fraction in an unambiguous manner, determine the composition in terms of the major trace gas and aerosols (Hamill 2016), and shed light on the relationship between lunar phases and cloudiness or precipitation. Particularly, the Moon offers a good place for occultation observation, which means observing the light or microwave changes emitted by stars or satellites when they are obstructed by atmosphere around the Earth. The Global Ozone Monitoring by Occultation of Stars (GOMOS) instrument on board the Envisat satellite is a typical system using the stellar occultation measurement principle in monitoring ozone and other trace gases in Earth’s stratosphere (Kyrola et al. 2004). Moon-based occultation was proposed in Link (1969), and was considered promising in Moon-based Earth atmosphere monitoring (Hamill 2007, 2016; Guo et al. 2014). The advantage of Moon-based occultation is that a star descends several times slower through the atmosphere than when viewed from a LEO satellite. This helps by increasing the SNR and resolution to some extent, but the practical performance also relies on the system design and the probability of finding an appropriate occultation geometry. 4.4. Earth-space environment Observing the environment of outer space surrounding Earth requires much larger FOV than only observing the solid Earth. The Moon is an ideal place to monitor the interaction between the solar wind and the magnetosphere. Moon-based observation combined with high near-polar Earth orbit or Molniya orbit observations can help us construct the three-dimensional structure of the magnetosphere by X-ray and EUV remote imaging. Images in all meridian planes of the whole plasma layer have already been captured by the EUV camera on the Chang’e 3 lander. Some initial results reflect the basic features of the plasmasphere, and also verified the accessibility of high-quality data of magnetosphere from the Moon (Feng et al. 2014). 5. Conclusion In this paper, we propose the Moon as a platform for Earth observation with long-term, dynamic capabilities, mainly focusing on large-scale geoscience phenomena. The characteristics of a lunar platform, the sensors and the scientific objectives of Moon-based Earth observation are discussed in detail. A lunar platform could observe Earth in quite a different way, and give a long-lasting disk view, a stable baseline and a unique perspective. The proposed sensors include some optical sensors and SAR. LiDAR, altimeters and scatterometers may not be functional on the lunar surface mainly because of the long viewing distance, and Moon-based radiometers may not be necessary if spaceborne radiometers are effective enough. Though the cost is not discussed in this paper, a Moon-based SAR would be extremely expensive and face too many specific technical difficulties to be implemented at the present time. On the contrary, passive optical sensors, such as spectrographs and panchromatic cameras, are much easier to realize. The scientific objectives of Moon-based Earth observation include measuring solid Earth dynamics and the global energy budget, and monitoring Earth’s environment and the surrounding environment of outer space. Moon-based Earth observation will be effective in measuring solid Earth tides, detecting outgoing radiation, and monitoring the magnetosphere and some of Earth’s environmental elements. Finally, we suggest that numerical simulations are indispensable to validate the proposals and to address specific problems.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Lunar observatory solves warming adaptation.</h4><p><strong>Ding et al. 17 </strong>(, Y., Liu, G. and Guo, H., 2017. Moon-based Earth observation: scientific concept and potential applications. [online] Volume 11, 2018. Available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538947.2017.1356879> [Accessed 22 January 2022] Yixing Ding - Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, People’s Republic of China Guang Liu - Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, People’s Republic of China Huadong Guo - Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, People’s Republic of China.)-rahulpenu</p><p>4. Scientific goal of moon-based earth observation A basic question for moon-based Earth observation is, ‘What to see?’ According to the characteristics of moon-based Earth observation, the phenomena suitable for <u>Moon-based Earth observation</u> may have at least one of the following features: <u>long-lasting</u>, related to <u>Sun–Earth–Moon motion</u>, <u>requires stable baseline observation</u>, large-scale and describes multiple parameters. In the following sections, we will present several observation objectives to discuss in detail. 4.1. <u>Solid earth dynamics</u> Solid Earth <u>tides</u>, <u>continental plate movement</u> and glacier isostatic adjustment (<u>GIA</u>) are <u>three typic</u>al large-scale <u>solid Earth movements</u> (Jiang et al. 2016), the measurement of which is a basic task of geodesy. For a uniform layered Earth, accurately predicting tidal movement can be done theoretically, but complex ocean tides and the inelasticity and heterogeneity of Earth’s interior material make the solid tide of the real Earth difficult to research theoretically. For GIA studies, prior knowledge about ancient ice cover evolution and a large amount of observational data are needed. Plate tectonics theory is a quantitative description of Earth plate movement (Ni et al. 2016). It may well explain the movement of most oceanic plates, but still have some problems to explain the mechanism of strong continental earthquakes, large-scale continental deformation, as well as the movements of other oceanic plates (Bird 2003). <u>Accurately <strong>measuring</strong> solid <strong>Earth</strong> <strong>dynamics</strong> is <strong>beneficial</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>understanding</strong> solid Earth <strong>tides</u></strong>, <u><strong>continental</strong> <strong>plate</strong> <strong>movement</u></strong> and <u><strong>GIA</u></strong>, and provides further support for geodynamics and seismology. Devices such as a <u>superconducting gravimeter</u> and global navigation satellite system are currently <u>used to measure small deformations of solid Earth</u>, <u>but these point-by-point methods are spatially limited to certain regions. Spaceborne InSAR measures deformation continuously, but the swath is not wide enough for mapping large-scale solid Earth movement. The</u> <u>Moon is a vast and stable platform that can provide sufficiently long and stable baseline interferometry</u>. Its movement is <u>easier to predict and the time interval of repeat-pass interferometry could be reduced to one day</u> (Fornaro et al. 2010). In addition, the <u>Moon is one of the main sources of tides on the Earth</u>; so if we compare two measurements at different times, the lunar tide portion can be subtracted, leaving only the solar tide portion. After proper processing, it may help us learn more about the interior structure of Earth’s crust. To measure the large-scale deformation, a Moon-based repeat-pass InSAR system needs to be carefully designed. Except for the general SAR parameters, the critical baseline is a key factor that impacts its performance. The critical baseline Bc leading to a complete spatial decorrelation is given by Bc = BlDem tan ui c . (7) In this equation, the incidence angle ui is related to the observational geometry, while l and B are optional. When the bandwidth is 100 MHz and the incidence angle is 25°, the critical baselines are 14,000, 3300 and 1770 km at the L-band, C-band and X-band, respectively. In order to keep the correlation between two repeat passes, a practical baseline must be smaller than Bc. Therefore, from a practical point of view, the L-band is better than the C-band or X-band. Figure 4 shows the simulation results of one-day interval interferometry, but the side-looking constraints are not involved. In this case, the <u>temporal decorrelation is highly reduced</u>. It is obvious that the interferometric area is larger in the L-band than in X-band. Meanwhile, when the declination of the Moon is near the extremes, the interferometric area becomes larger. When the declination of the Moon is near the equatorial plane, one-day interval repeat-pass interferometry is not feasible, but a half month or one month interval repeat-pass interferometry is available. The magnitude of the solid Earth motion is not large. For example, the typical solid Earth tide amplitude is dozens of centimetres in one day. A resolution of hundreds of metres or even coarser will be enough if the wave is stably scattered. 4.2. Energy budget of earth Fundamentally, <u><strong><mark>climate</strong> <strong>change</strong> <strong>depends</strong> <strong>on</strong> </mark>Earth’s <strong><mark>radiation</strong></mark> <strong>balance</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Observation</strong> <strong>of</strong></mark> both the <mark>solar</mark> <strong><mark>radiation</strong> <strong>and</strong> </mark>Earth’s <strong><mark>reflection</u></strong></mark> <u>and</u> <u>emission <mark>will <strong>depend</strong> <strong>on</strong> <strong></mark>accurate</strong> <strong><mark>measurement</strong> <strong>with space tech</mark>nology</u></strong>. Since the late 1970s, the United States and Europe have launched a number of missions to measure solar and terrestrial radiation, such as NASA’s Active Cavity Radiometer Irradiance Monitor Series programme (ACRIM1, 1980–1989; ACRIM2, 1991–2001; ACRIM3, 2000–present), Earth Radiation Budget Experiment (ERBE, 1984–1994), Clouds and Earth’s Radiant Energy System (CERES, 1997–present), Solar Radiation and Climate Experiment (SORCE, 2003–present) and the French Megha-Tropiques satellite on the Scanner for Radiation Budget (ScaRaB, 2011–present). These <u>missions</u> have <u>greatly improved our understanding of Earth’s energy system</u>. The Deep Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVR), placed at the earth–Sun first Lagrangian point, has been designed to <u>measure the outgoing radiation of the sunlit Earth disk with a constant look angle</u>. But in the <u>outgoing radiation</u>, the <u><mark>reflected</mark> shortwave <strong><mark>radiation</strong></mark> is <strong>highly</strong> <strong><mark>affected</strong> <strong>by</strong> <strong></mark>albedo</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong><mark>atmospher</mark>ic</strong> <strong>conditions</u></strong>, <u>showing obvious anisotropy</u>. <u><strong><mark>Lack</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>sampling</strong> in space</mark> and time is <strong>vulnerable</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>uncertainties</u></strong>. The <u><strong><mark>lunar</strong> <strong>observatory</u></strong> <u><strong>provides</strong> <strong></mark>large</strong>-<strong>scale</strong> <strong><mark>observation</strong> <strong>with</strong> </mark>continuously <strong><mark>changing</strong> <strong>angles</u></strong>, <u></mark>enabling it <mark>to</mark> <mark>calibrate</mark> the <strong><mark>data</strong></mark> of satellites in different orbits at different times</u>. Its most important property is that it <u>can <mark>provide</mark> a <strong>very</strong> <strong><mark>long</strong>-<strong>term</strong> time series </mark>from a single orbit platform</u>. <u>In a year, the time series covers all local times, all seasons</u> (different weather pattern) <u>and all Earth phases for all underlying surfaces</u> (Pallé and Goode 2009; Karalidi et al. 2012). The <u>diversity of the <strong>surface</strong>-<strong>weatherphase</strong> combination is beneficial to <mark>improving</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>quality of global energy</u></strong></mark> budget data and to the <u>study of regional energy redistribution</u> and its <u>multi-layer coupling effects.</u> The <u><mark>Moon-based data</u> <u></mark>will</u> also <u><mark>provide</mark> a direct <mark>connection between</mark> the <mark>data from space </mark>technology <mark>and</mark> the data from <mark>ground</mark>-based earthshine measurement series</u>, <u>which <strong><mark>span</strong></mark> almost <mark>one <strong>hundred years</u></strong></mark>. The system design can consult the DSCOVR satellite, a radiometer measuring irradiance of the Earth phase and an imaging camera taking images of the Earth phase for various Earth sciences purposes. In order to take into account the needs of observing the Earth’s environmental elements, 1 km spatial resolution and 20–30 channels of the camera are suggested. 4.3. Earth’s environmental elements <u>Vegetation</u> is an <u>important part of the global carbon pool</u> and a <u>key element of</u> global <u>carbon cycle</u>. Most vegetation is distributed in middle- and low-latitude regions. A <u><mark>Moon-based optical camera</u></mark> <u>can <mark>image global <strong>vegetation</strong></mark> almost every day</u>. SAR maps not only the horizontal distribution of vegetation, but also extracts forest morphological structure through tomography. The <u>Moon provides</u> <u>multi-baseline <strong>accessibility</u></strong> within a single pass to eliminate the tomographic temporal decorrelation, but the imaging temporal decorrelation within a long synthetic aperture time hampers the focusing of forest. Therefore, to <u>validate the feasibility of Moon-based <strong>3D</strong> <strong>mapping</strong> of forest</u>, more <u>imaging methods</u> for unstable scatterer, for example, the <u>time reversal imaging method</u> (Jin and Moura 2007), need to be tested and new methods are also expected. <u>Glaciers are sensitive variables of climate change</u>. The <u>monitoring of glacier area</u>, <u>surface velocity</u> and <u>mass balance plays an important role in understanding the status of glaciers and their response to global change</u>. <u>Remote sensing techniques</u>, such as <u>optical sensors</u>, <u>SAR</u> and <u>altimeter data</u>, <u>provide regular observations of key glacial parameters</u>. A lunar platform would provide continuous three- or four-day temporal coverage per month at the polar regions, but the observation incidence angle would typically be larger than 40° (see Figure 5) due to the relatively small inclination angle of the lunar orbit. For the High Asia area, the average coverage is about 4 h per day with proper incidence angle. The challenges may be the cost of high-resolution mapping for the optical sensor, and the layover problem (Tilley and Bonwit 1989) in heavy gradient area for SAR. Moon-based altimetry faces the same problems as LiDAR mentioned before, and is not recommended. An <u><strong>atmospheric</strong> <strong>observatory</strong> on the Moon</u> can be <u>used to <mark>evaluate</mark> the <mark>cloud </mark>fraction in an unambiguous manner</u>, <u><strong><mark>determine</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>composition</strong></mark> in terms <strong><mark>of</strong></mark> the major <strong>trace</strong> <strong><mark>gas</strong></mark> and aerosols </u>(Hamill 2016), and <u><mark>shed light on</mark> the relationship between</u> <u>lunar <mark>phases</mark> <mark>and <strong></mark>cloudiness</strong> or <strong><mark>precipitation</u></strong></mark>. Particularly, the <u><mark>Moon</mark> offers a <mark>good place for <strong>occultation</strong></mark> observation</u>, which <u>means observing the light or microwave changes emitted by stars or satellites</u> when they are obstructed by atmosphere around the Earth. The Global Ozone Monitoring by Occultation of Stars (GOMOS) instrument on board the Envisat satellite is a typical system using the stellar occultation measurement principle in monitoring ozone and other trace gases in Earth’s stratosphere (Kyrola et al. 2004). Moon-based occultation was proposed in Link (1969), and was considered promising in Moon-based Earth atmosphere monitoring (Hamill 2007, 2016; Guo et al. 2014). The advantage of <u>Moon-based occultation</u> is that a star descends several times slower through the atmosphere than when viewed from a LEO satellite. This helps by <u>increasing</u> the <u>SNR and resolution to some extent</u>, but the practical performance also relies on the system design and the probability of finding an appropriate occultation geometry. 4.4. Earth-space environment Observing the environment of outer space surrounding Earth requires much larger FOV than only observing the solid Earth. The <u>Moon is an ideal place to monitor the interaction between the solar wind and the magnetosphere</u>. Moon-based observation combined with high near-polar Earth orbit or Molniya orbit observations can help us construct the three-dimensional structure of the magnetosphere by X-ray and EUV remote imaging. Images in all meridian planes of the whole plasma layer have already been captured by the EUV camera on the Chang’e 3 lander. Some initial results reflect the basic features of the plasmasphere, and also verified the accessibility of high-quality data of magnetosphere from the Moon (Feng et al. 2014). 5. Conclusion In this paper, we propose the <u>Moon as a platform for</u> <u>Earth observation</u> with <u>long-term,</u> <u>dynamic capabilities</u>, mainly <u>focusing on large-scale geoscience phenomena</u>. The characteristics of a lunar platform, the sensors and the scientific objectives of Moon-based Earth observation are discussed in detail. A lunar platform could observe Earth in quite a different way, and give a long-lasting disk view, a stable baseline and a unique perspective. The proposed sensors include some optical sensors and SAR. LiDAR, altimeters and scatterometers may not be functional on the lunar surface mainly because of the long viewing distance, and Moon-based radiometers may not be necessary if spaceborne radiometers are effective enough. Though the cost is not discussed in this paper, a Moon-based SAR would be extremely expensive and face too many specific technical difficulties to be implemented at the present time. On the contrary, passive optical sensors, such as spectrographs and panchromatic cameras, are much easier to realize. The scientific objectives of Moon-based Earth observation include measuring solid Earth dynamics and the global energy budget, and monitoring Earth’s environment and the surrounding environment of outer space. Moon-based Earth observation will be effective in measuring solid Earth tides, detecting outgoing radiation, and monitoring the magnetosphere and some of Earth’s environmental elements. Finally, we suggest that <u>numerical simulations</u> are indispensable to validate the proposals and to address specific problems.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Michael Klare 20, professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, "Climate Change, Water Scarcity, and the Potential for Interstate Conflict in South Asia," Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 4, DOI: 10.5038/1944-0472.13.4.1826 fulltext: The Prospect of Interstate Conflict over Water Water scarcity continues to figure in DoD studies of the links between climate change and conflict, but analysts’ assumption that fighting over scarce water supplies would be confined to intrastate conflict has been challenged over time. This was first evident in an Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 2012. Released to the public as Global Water Security, the 2012 ICA reaffirmed the centrality of water in international security affairs but raised the specter of water conflicts arising between as well as within states. As in earlier IC reports, the 2012 ICA concluded that water issues, in combination with pre-existing factors like poverty and social discord, could contribute to internal unrest and state failure.15 However, the report went on to consider a range of circumstances in which such issues could also provoke tensions and conflict between states. Interstate conflict over water might occur, the ICA indicated, when several states rely on a shared river system for much of their water supply and one or more of the riparian states sought to maximize the river’s flow for their own benefit at the expense of other states in the basin, amplifying any scarcities already present there. “We judge that as water shortages become more acute beyond the next ten years, water in shared basins will increasingly be used as leverage,” the ICA stated. An upstream state enjoying superior control over a river’s flow might exploit its advantage, say, to extract advantage in international negotiations or to attract international aid for infrastructure projects. As the ICA further noted, “…we assess that states will also use their inherent ability to construct and support major water projects to obtain regional influence or preserve their water interests.”16 The utilization of a state’s superior position in a shared river system to extract political or economic advantage can prove especially destabilizing, the ICA suggested, when weaker states in the system (typically the downstream countries) are especially vulnerable to water scarcity because of long-standing social, economic, and political conditions. Without identifying any particular states by name, the study suggested that this could occur when downstream states suffer from endemic corruption, poor water management practices, and systemic favoritism when it comes to the allocation of scarce water supplies. In such cases, any reduction in the flow of water by an upstream country could easily combine with internal factors in a downstream country to provoke widespread unrest and conflict. “Water shortages, and government failures to manage them, are likely to lead to social disruptions, pressure on national and local leaders, and potentially political instability,” the report noted.17 Although most discussion of the climate and water security nexus has continued to emphasize the risk of internal conflict arising from warmingrelated water scarcities, some analysts have pursued the line of inquiry introduced by the 2012 ICA, focusing on interstate tensions arising within shared river basins. This was a prominent theme, for example, of a 2013 study conducted by the National Research Council (NRC) on behalf of the IC. Entitled Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis, the 2013 NRC report sought to better identify the links between global warming, pre-existing social vulnerabilities, and the likelihood of conflict. While it echoed earlier studies by the CNA and NIC in identifying internal factors like poverty, ethnic discord, and governmental ineptitude as likely pre-conditions for climate-related conflict, it also examined dangers arising from dependence on shared river systems, especially in cases where cooperation among the riparian powers in managing the system is limited and global warming is expected to reduce future water flows.18 For the NRC, the river systems of greatest concern in this respect were those that originate in the Himalayan Mountains and depend, for a significant share of the annual flow, on meltwater from the Himalayan glaciers. These glaciers are an important source of meltwater for many of Asia’s major rivers, including the Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Mekong Rivers. These rivers originate in China but travel through India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam– countries with a combined population of over 3.4 billion people, or approximately 44 percent of the world’s total population.19 A large share of the population in these countries depends on agriculture for its livelihood, so ensuring access to adequate supplies of water is a prime local and national priority. During the monsoon season, heavy rains provide these rivers with abundant water, but during dry seasons they are dependent on glacial meltwater–and, with the rise in global temperatures, the Himalayan glaciers are melting, jeopardizing future water availability in these river basins. Given a history of ethnic and social discord within many of these countries and long-standing tensions among them, analysts fear that such shortages could aggravate both internal and external tensions and ignite interstate as well as intrastate conflict.20 As was the case of previous IC-initiated studies, the authors of the 2013 NRC report were reluctant to identify specific countries in their findings, referring again to “countries of security concern” or other such euphemisms. However, they did select one of these countries in particular: Pakistan. They chose that country for special analysis, the report indicated, because “Pakistan presents a clear example of a country where social dynamics and susceptibility to harm from climate events combine to create a potentially unstable situation.”21 Pakistan was said to suffer from multiple risk factors: Its economy is largely dependent on agriculture; much of the water used for irrigation purposes comes from just one source, the Indus River; control over the allocation of irrigation waters is often exercised by privileged elites, leaving millions of Pakistanis vulnerable to water shortages; and much of the water flowing into the Indus comes from China or from tributaries originating in India, leaving Pakistan in an unfavorable (downstream) position in the system. These conditions have led, in the past, to internal squabbles over water rights and to tensions with India over control of the Indus; now, with the likelihood of diminished meltwater from the Himalayan glaciers, the risk of water scarcity triggering violent conflict of one sort or another becomes that much greater.22 Pakistan, the Indus, and U.S. Security There is no doubt that Pakistan is considered by U.S. security analysts as a “state important to U.S. national security interests,” the term used by the Defense Intelligence Agency to describe countries of concern in the 2012 ICA on water. Not only is Pakistan a critical–if not always wholehearted– partner in the global war on terror, but it also possesses a substantial arsenal of nuclear weapons whose security is a matter of enormous concern to American leaders. 23 Should those munitions wind up with rogue elements of the Pakistani military (some of whose members are believed to maintain clandestine links to radical Islamic organizations), or even worse, should Pakistan descend into civil war and the weapons fall into untrustworthy or hostile hands, the safety of India and other US allies–as well as of American forces deployed in the region–would be at grave risk.24 Ensuring Pakistan’s stability therefore, has long been a major U.S. security objective, prompting regular deliveries of American arms and other military aid. Yet, despite billions of dollars in American aid, Pakistan remains vulnerable to social and ethnic internal strife.25 As noted, farming is the principal economic activity in Pakistan, and ensuring access to water is an overarching public and government concern. This means, above all, managing the use of the Indus–the country’s main source of water for irrigation and its major source of power for electricity generation. Pakistan’s rising population and growing cities, with their rings of factories, are placing an immense strain on the Indus, leading to competition between farmers, industrialists, and urban consumers. With water and power shortages becoming an increasingly frequent aspect of daily life, public protests–sometimes turning violent– have erupted across the country. In one particularly intense bout of rioting, following a prolonged power outage in June 2012, protestors burned trains, blocked roads, looted shops, and damaged banks and gas stations.26 However bad things might be in Pakistan today, climate change is likely to make conditions far worse in the years ahead. Prolonged droughts, climate scientists believe, will occur with increasing regularity, posing a severe threat to the nation’s agricultural sector and further reducing the supply of hydroelectric power. At the same time, warming is expected to increase the intensity of monsoon downpours, resulting in massive flooding (as occurred in 2010) and the loss of valuable topsoil, further adding to Pakistan’s woes. As the Himalayan glaciers melt, moreover, water flow through the Indus will diminish. 27 With the competition for land and water resources bound to increase and with Pakistan already divided along ethnic and religious lines, widespread civil strife will become ever more likely, possibly jeopardizing the survival of the state. It is impossible to predict exactly how the United States might respond to a systemic breakdown of state governance in Pakistan. One thing is clear, however: At the earliest sign that the country’s nuclear weapons are at risk of falling into the hands of hostile parties, the American military would respond with decisive force. In fact, research conducted by the nonpartisan Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has revealed that the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and specialized Army units have been training for such contingencies for some time and have deployed all the necessary gear to the region. In the event of a coup or crisis, the NTI revealed, “U.S. forces would rush into the country, crossing borders, rappelling down from helicopters, and parachuting out of airplanes, so they can secure known or suspected nuclear-storage sites.” Recognizing that any such actions by American forces could trigger widespread resistance by the Pakistani army and/or various jihadist groups, the U.S. Central Command, which has authority over all American forces in the region, has developed plans for backing up JSOC personnel with full-scale military support.28 Another scenario that has some analysts worried is the possibility that a time of sharply reduced water flow through the Indus will coincide with efforts by India to exploit its advantageous position as the upper riparian on three key tributaries of the Indus–the Ravi, the Beas, and the Sutlej–to divert water for its own use, thereby depriving downstream Pakistan of vital supplies and provoking a war between these two countries. India was granted control over the three tributaries under the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, and various Indian leaders have threatened at times to dam the rivers or otherwise reduce their flow into Pakistan as a reprisal for Pakistani attacks on Indian bases in the disputed territory of Kashmir (through which the tributaries flow); this, in turn, has provoked counterthreats from Pakistani leaders.29 What analysts fear most, in such a situation, is that India, possessing superior conventional forces, would overpower Pakistan’s equivalent armies, leading Pakistan’s leaders to order the use of nuclear weapons against India, igniting a regional nuclear war. Such a conflict, scientists have calculated, would result in 50 to 125 million fatalities, and produce a dust cloud covering much of the Earth, decimating global agriculture–an outcome with enormous implications for American national security.30<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Water scarcity in the Indus Basin goes <u>nuclear</u>---loose nukes, US-Pak, AND Indo-Pak war.</h4><p>Michael <strong>Klare 20</strong>, professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, "Climate Change, Water Scarcity, and the Potential for Interstate Conflict in South Asia," Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 4, DOI: 10.5038/1944-0472.13.4.1826</p><p><u>The Prospect of Interstate Conflict over Water</p><p></u>Water scarcity continues to figure in DoD studies of the links between climate change and conflict, but analysts’ assumption that fighting over scarce water supplies would be confined to intrastate conflict has been challenged over time. This was first evident in <u>an Intelligence Community Assessment</u> (ICA) prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 2012. Released to the public as Global Water Security, the 2012 ICA reaffirmed the centrality of water in international security affairs but <u>raised the specter of water conflicts arising between as well as within states. </u>As in earlier IC reports, the 2012 <u>ICA concluded that <strong><mark>water issues</u></strong></mark>, in combination with pre-existing factors like poverty and social discord, <u>could <mark>contribute to <strong></mark>internal <mark>unrest</strong> and <strong></mark>state <mark>failure</strong></mark>.</u>15 However, the report went on to consider a range of circumstances in which <u>such issues could also <mark>provoke tensions and <strong>conflict</mark> between states</strong>.</p><p>Interstate conflict over water might occur</u>, the ICA indicated, <u>when several states rely on a <strong>shared river system</strong> </u>for much of their water supply <u>and one</u> or more <u>of the riparian states sought to <strong>maximize</strong> the river’s flow for their own benefit at the expense of other states in the basin</u>, amplifying any scarcities already present there. “We judge that <u>as water shortages become <strong>more acute</u></strong> beyond the next ten years, <u><mark>water</mark> in shared basins <mark>will</mark> increasingly <mark>be <strong>used as leverage</u></strong></mark>,” the ICA stated. An upstream state enjoying superior control over a river’s flow might exploit its advantage, say, to extract advantage in international negotiations or to attract international aid for infrastructure projects. As the ICA further noted, “…we assess that states will also use their inherent ability to construct and support major water projects to obtain regional influence or preserve their water interests.”16</p><p><u>The utilization of <mark>a <strong>state’s </mark>superior <mark>position</u></strong></mark> in a shared river system <u>to extract political or economic advantage <mark>can prove</mark> <strong>especially <mark>destabilizing</u></strong></mark>, the ICA suggested, <u>when weaker states in the system</u> (typically the downstream countries) <u>are <strong>especially vulnerable</strong> to water scarcity</u> because of long-standing social, economic, and political conditions. Without identifying any particular states by name, the study suggested that <u>this could occur when downstream states suffer from</u> endemic corruption, <u><strong>poor water management </strong>practices</u>, and systemic favoritism when it comes to the allocation of scarce water supplies. In such cases, <u><strong><mark>any reduction</strong> in</mark> the <mark>flow</mark> of water</u> by an upstream country <u>could easily <strong>combine with internal factors</u></strong> in a downstream country <u>to <mark>provoke</mark> <strong>widespread <mark>unrest and conflict</strong></mark>. “Water shortages</u>, and government failures to manage them, <u>are likely to lead to <strong>social disruptions</strong>, <strong>pressure</strong> on national</u> and local <u>leaders, and potentially <strong>political instability</strong>,” the report noted.17</p><p></u>Although most discussion of the climate and water security nexus has continued to emphasize the risk of internal conflict arising from warmingrelated water scarcities, some analysts have pursued the line of inquiry introduced by the 2012 ICA, focusing on interstate tensions arising within shared river basins. This was a prominent theme, for example, of a 2013 study conducted by the National Research Council (NRC) on behalf of the IC. Entitled Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis, the 2013 NRC report sought to better identify the links between global warming, pre-existing social vulnerabilities, and the likelihood of conflict. While it echoed earlier studies by the CNA and NIC in identifying internal factors like poverty, ethnic discord, and governmental ineptitude as likely pre-conditions for climate-related conflict, it also examined dangers arising from dependence on shared river systems, especially in cases where cooperation among the riparian powers in managing the system is limited and global warming is expected to reduce future water flows.18 For the NRC, <u>the river systems of <strong>greatest concern</strong> in this respect were those that originate in the Himalayan Mountains</u> and depend, for a significant share of the annual flow, on meltwater from the Himalayan glaciers. These glaciers are an important source of meltwater for many of Asia’s major rivers, including the Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Mekong Rivers. These rivers originate in China but travel through India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam– countries with a combined population of over 3.4 billion people, or approximately 44 percent of the world’s total population.19 <u>A large share of the population in these countries <strong>depends on agriculture</strong> for its livelihood, so ensuring access to <strong>adequate supplies of water</strong> is a prime local and national priority.</u> During the monsoon season, heavy rains provide these rivers with abundant water, but during dry seasons they are dependent on glacial meltwater–and, with the rise in global temperatures, the Himalayan glaciers are melting, jeopardizing future water availability in these river basins. <u><mark>Given</mark> a <strong><mark>history</mark> of ethnic and social discord</strong> within many of these countries and <strong>long-standing tensions</strong> among them, <mark>analysts fear</u></mark> that such <u><mark>shortages could</mark> aggravate both <strong>internal and external tensions</strong> and <strong><mark>ignite</strong></mark> interstate as well as <strong><mark>intrastate conflict</strong></mark>.20</p><p></u>As was the case of previous IC-initiated studies, the authors of the 2013 NRC report were reluctant to identify specific countries in their findings, referring again to “countries of security concern” or other such euphemisms. However, they did select one of these countries in particular: Pakistan. They chose that country for special analysis, the report indicated, because <u>“Pakistan presents a <strong>clear example</strong> of a country where social dynamics and susceptibility to harm from climate events combine to create a <strong>potentially unstable situation</strong>.”</u>21 <u><mark>Pakistan</mark> was said to <mark>suffer from <strong>multiple risk</mark> factor<mark>s</strong></mark>: Its <mark>economy</mark> is <strong>largely <mark>dependent</strong> on ag</mark>riculture; much of the <mark>water</mark> used for irrigation purposes <mark>comes from</mark> <strong>just <mark>one source</strong>,</mark> the Indus River; <mark>control</mark> over the allocation of irrigation waters <mark>is</mark> often <mark>exercised <strong>by</mark> privileged <mark>elites</u></strong></mark>, leaving millions of Pakistanis vulnerable to water shortages; <u><mark>and</mark> much of the <mark>water flowing into the Indus comes from China or</mark> from</u> tributaries originating in <u><mark>India</u></mark>, leaving Pakistan in an unfavorable (downstream) position in the system. <u>These conditions have led</u>, in the past, to internal squabbles over water rights and <u>to tensions with India </u>over control of the Indus; now, <u>with the likelihood of diminished meltwater</u> from the Himalayan glaciers, <u>the risk of water scarcity <strong>triggering violent conflict</u></strong> of one sort or another <u>becomes that much greater</u>.22</p><p><u>Pakistan, the Indus, and U.S. Security</p><p></u>There is no doubt that Pakistan is considered by U.S. security analysts as a “state important to U.S. national security interests,” the term used by the Defense Intelligence Agency to describe countries of concern in the 2012 ICA on water. Not only is <u><mark>Pakistan</u></mark> a critical–if not always wholehearted– partner in the global war on terror, but it also <u><mark>possesses</mark> a <strong>substantial arsenal</strong> of <strong><mark>nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s</strong></mark> whose security is a matter of <strong>enormous concern</strong> </u>to American leaders.</p><p>23 <u>Should those munitions wind up <strong>with rogue elements</strong> of the Pakistani military</u> (some of whose members are believed to maintain clandestine links to radical Islamic organizations), <u>or</u> even worse, <u>should <mark>Pakistan descend <strong>into </mark>civil <mark>war</strong> and</mark> the <mark>weapons fall into</mark> untrustworthy or <strong><mark>hostile hands</strong></mark>, the safety of</u> India and other US allies–as well as of American forces deployed in <u>the region–would be <strong>at grave risk</strong>.</u>24 Ensuring Pakistan’s stability therefore, has long been a major U.S. security objective, prompting regular deliveries of American arms and other military aid. Yet, <u>despite billions of dollars in American aid, Pakistan remains vulnerable to social and ethnic internal strife.</u>25</p><p>As noted, <u>farming is the <strong>principal economic activity</strong> in Pakistan, and ensuring access to water is an overarching public and government concern.</u> This means, above all, managing the use of the Indus–the country’s main source of water for irrigation and its major source of power for electricity generation. <u>Pakistan’s <strong>rising <mark>population</strong> and</mark> gr<strong>owing cities</u></strong>, with their rings of factories, <u>are placing an <strong><mark>immense strain</strong></mark> on the Indus,</u> leading to competition between farmers, industrialists, and urban consumers. <u>With water and power shortages becoming an increasingly frequent aspect of daily life</u>, <u>public protests</u>–sometimes turning violent– <u>have erupted across the country.</u> In one particularly intense bout of rioting, following a prolonged power outage in June 2012, protestors burned trains, blocked roads, looted shops, and damaged banks and gas stations.26</p><p>However bad things might be in Pakistan today, <u><mark>climate</mark> change is likely to <mark>make conditions</mark> <strong>far <mark>worse</strong></mark> in the years ahead. Prolonged droughts, climate scientists believe, will occur with increasing regularity, posing a severe threat to the nation’s agricultural sector and further reducing the supply of hydroelectric power. At the same time, warming is expected to increase the intensity of monsoon downpours, resulting in massive flooding (as occurred in 2010) and the loss of valuable topsoil, further adding to Pakistan’s woes. As the Himalayan glaciers melt, moreover, water flow through the Indus will diminish.</p><p></u>27 <u><mark>With</mark> the <mark>competition for</u></mark> land and <u><mark>water</mark> resources <strong><mark>bound to increase</u></strong></mark> and with Pakistan already divided along ethnic and religious lines, <u><strong>widespread <mark>civil strife</strong> will become</mark> ever more <mark>likely</mark>, possibly <mark>jeopardizing</mark> <strong>the survival of <mark>the state.</p><p></u></strong></mark>It is impossible to predict exactly how the United States might respond to a systemic breakdown of state governance in Pakistan. One thing is clear, however: At the earliest sign that the country’s nuclear weapons are at risk of falling into the hands of hostile parties, <u><mark>the American military would respond <strong>with </mark>decisive <mark>force</strong></mark>.</u> In fact, research conducted by the nonpartisan Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has revealed that the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and specialized Army units have been training for such contingencies for some time and have deployed all the necessary gear to the region. In the event of a coup or crisis, the NTI revealed, “U.S. forces would rush into the country, crossing borders, rappelling down from helicopters, and parachuting out of airplanes, so they can secure known or suspected nuclear-storage sites.” Recognizing that <u>any such actions by American forces could <strong><mark>trigger</mark> widespread <mark>resistance</strong> by</mark> the <mark>Pakistan</mark>i army</u> and/or various jihadist groups, the U.S. Central Command, which has authority over all American forces in the region, has developed plans for backing up JSOC personnel with full-scale military support.28</p><p>Another scenario that has some analysts worried is the possibility that <u>a time of <strong>sharply <mark>reduced water flow</strong></mark> through the Indus <mark>will coincide with efforts by India to <strong>exploit its</mark> advantageous <mark>position</strong> as the upper riparian</mark> on</u> three key <u>tributaries of the Indus–</u>the Ravi, the Beas, and the Sutlej–<u>to divert water for its own use, thereby depriving downstream Pakistan of <strong>vital supplies</strong> and <strong><mark>provoking a war</strong> between these</mark> two <mark>countries</mark>.</u> India was granted control over the three tributaries under the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, and various <u>Indian leaders have threatened</u> at times <u>to dam the rivers or otherwise <strong>reduce their flow</u></strong> into Pakistan <u>as a reprisal for Pakistani attacks</u> on Indian bases in the disputed territory of Kashmir (through which the tributaries flow); <u>this</u>, in turn, <u>has provoked <strong>counterthreats from Pakistan</strong>i leaders.</u>29 What analysts fear most, in such a situation, is that <u><mark>India</mark>, possessing <strong>superior conventional forces</strong>, <mark>would overpower <strong>Pakistan’s</mark> equivalent <mark>armies</strong></mark>, <mark>leading Pakistan’s leaders to</mark> order the <strong><mark>use</mark> of <mark>nuclear weapons</strong> against India, igniting</mark> <strong>a<mark> </mark>regional <mark>nuclear war</strong></mark>. Such a conflict</u>, scientists have calculated, <u>would</u> result in 50 to 125 million fatalities, and <u>produce <strong><mark>a dust cloud</strong> covering</mark> <strong>much of the <mark>Earth</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>decimat</mark>ing global <mark>ag</mark>riculture</u></strong>–an outcome with enormous implications for American national security.30</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Clarke 8 ---- Lee, member of a National Academy of Science committee that considered decision-making models, Anschutz Distinguished Scholar at Princeton University, Fellow of AAAS, Professor Sociology (Rutgers), Ph.D. (SUNY), “Possibilistic Thinking: A New Conceptual Tool for Thinking about Extreme Events,” Fall, Social Research 75.3, JSTOR ***Modified for ableist language fulltext: In scholarly work, the subfield of disasters is often seen as narrow. One reason for this is that a lot of scholarship on disasters is practically oriented, for obvious reasons, and the social sciences have a deep-seated suspicion of practical work. This is especially true in sociology. Tierney (2007b) has treated this topic at length, so there is no reason to repeat the point here. There is another, somewhat unappreciated reason that work on disaster is seen as narrow, a reason that holds some irony for the main thrust of my argument here: disasters are unusual and the social sciences are generally biased toward phenomena that are frequent. Methods textbooks caution against using case stud- ies as representative of anything, and articles in mainstreams journals that are not based on probability samples must issue similar obligatory caveats. The premise, itself narrow, is that the only way to be certain that we know something about the social world, and the only way to control for subjective influences in data acquisition, is to follow the tenets of probabilistic sampling. This view is a correlate of the central way of defining rational action and rational policy in academic work of all varieties and also in much practical work, which is to say in terms of probabilities. The irony is that probabilistic thinking has its own biases, which, if unacknowledged and uncorrected for, lead to a conceptual neglect of extreme events. This leaves us, as scholars, paying attention to disasters only when they happen and doing that makes the accumulation of good ideas about disaster vulnerable to issue-attention cycles (Birkland, 2007). These conceptual blinders [myopic approaches] lead to a neglect of disasters as "strategic research sites" (Merton, 1987), which results in learning less about disaster than we could and in missing opportunities to use disaster to learn about society (cf. Sorokin, 1942). We need new conceptual tools because of an upward trend in frequency and severity of disaster since 1970 (Perrow, 2007), and because of a growing intellectual attention to the idea of worst cases (Clarke, 2006b; Clarke, in press). For instance, the chief scientist in charge of studying earthquakes for the US Geological Service, Lucile Jones, has worked on the combination of events that could happen in California that would constitute a "give up scenario": a very long-shaking earthquake in southern California just when the Santa Anna winds are making everything dry and likely to burn. In such conditions, meaningful response to the fires would be impossible and recovery would take an extraordinarily long time. There are other similar pockets of scholarly interest in extreme events, some spurred by September 11 and many catalyzed by Katrina. The consequences of disasters are also becoming more severe, both in terms of lives lost and property damaged. People and their places are becoming more vulnerable. The most important reason that vulnerabilities are increasing is population concentration (Clarke, 2006b). This is a general phenomenon and includes, for example, flying in jumbo jets, working in tall buildings, and attending events in large capacity sports arenas. Considering disasters whose origin is a natural hazard, the specific cause of increased vulnerability is that people are moving to where hazards originate, and most especially to where the water is. In some places, this makes them vulnerable to hurricanes that can create devastating storm surges; in others it makes them vulnerable to earthquakes that can create tsunamis. In any case, the general problem is that people concentrate themselves in dangerous places, so when the hazard comes disasters are intensified. More than one-half of Florida's population lives within 20 miles of the sea. Additionally, Florida's population grows every year, along with increasing development along the coasts. The risk of exposure to a devastating hurricane is obviously high in Florida. No one should be surprised if during the next hurricane season Florida becomes the scene of great tragedy. The demographic pressures and attendant development are wide- spread. People are concentrating along the coasts of the United States, and, like Florida, this puts people at risk of water-related hazards. Or consider the Pacific Rim, the coastline down the west coasts of North and South America, south to Oceania, and then up the eastern coast- line of Asia. There the hazards are particularly threatening. Maps of population concentration around the Pacific Rim should be seen as target maps, because along those shorelines are some of the most active tectonic plates in the world. The 2004 Indonesian earthquake and tsunami, which killed at least 250,000 people, demonstrated the kind of damage that issues from the movement of tectonic plates. (Few in the United States recognize that there is a subduction zone just off the coast of Oregon and Washington that is quite similar to the one in Indonesia.) Additionally, volcanoes reside atop the meeting of tectonic plates; the typhoons that originate in the Pacific Ocean generate furiously fatal winds. Perrow (2007) has generalized the point about concentration, arguing not only that we increase vulnerabilities by increasing the breadth and depth of exposure to hazards but also by concentrating industrial facilities with catastrophic potential. Some of Perrow's most important examples concern chemical production facilities. These are facilities that bring together in a single place multiple stages of production used in the production of toxic substances. Key to Perrow's argument is that there is no technically necessary reason for such concentration, although there may be good economic reasons for it. The general point is that we can expect more disasters, whether their origins are "natural" or "technological." We can also expect more death and destruction from them. I predict we will continue to be poorly prepared to deal with disaster. People around the world were appalled with the incompetence of America's leaders and orga- nizations in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Day after day we watched people suffering unnecessarily. Leaders were slow to grasp the importance of the event. With a few notable exceptions, organi- zations lumbered to a late rescue. Setting aside our moral reaction to the official neglect, perhaps we ought to ask why we should have expected a competent response at all? Are US leaders and organiza- tions particularly attuned to the suffering of people in disasters? Is the political economy of the United States organized so that people, espe- cially poor people, are attended to quickly and effectively in noncri- sis situations? The answers to these questions are obvious. If social systems are not arranged to ensure people's well-being in normal times, there is no good reason to expect them to be so inclined in disastrous times. Still, if we are ever going to be reasonably well prepared to avoid or respond to the next Katrina-like event, we need to identify the barriers to effective thinking about, and effective response to, disas- ters. One of those barriers is that we do not have a set of concepts that would help us think rigorously about out-sized events. The chief toolkit of concepts that we have for thinking about important social events comes from probability theory. There are good reasons for this, as probability theory has obviously served social research well. Still, the toolkit is incomplete when it comes to extreme events, especially when it is used as a base whence to make normative judgments about what people, organizations, and governments should and should not do. As a complement to probabilistic thinking I propose that we need possibilistic thinking. In this paper I explicate the notion of possibilistic thinking. I first discuss the equation of probabilism with rationality in scholarly thought, followed by a section that shows the ubiquity of possibilis- tic thinking in everyday life. Demonstrating the latter will provide an opportunity to explore the limits of the probabilistic approach: that possibilistic thinking is widespread suggests it could be used more rigorously in social research. I will then address the most vexing prob- lem with advancing and employing possibilistic thinking: the prob- lem of infinite imagination. I argue that possibilism can be used with discipline, and that we can be smarter about responding to disasters by doing so.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>“Probability first” inverts the error – has its own biases, fails to teach about worst case scenarios, ignores trends towards disasters/population concentration, and struggles to be applied to governments</h4><p><strong>Clarke 8 ---- </strong>Lee, member of a National Academy of Science committee that considered decision-making models, Anschutz Distinguished Scholar at Princeton University, Fellow of AAAS, Professor Sociology (Rutgers), Ph.D. (SUNY), “Possibilistic Thinking: A New Conceptual Tool for Thinking about Extreme Events,” Fa<strong>ll, Social Research 75.3, JSTOR ***Modified for ableist language</p><p></strong>In scholarly work, the subfield of disasters is often seen as narrow. One reason for this is that a lot of scholarship on disasters is practically oriented, for obvious reasons, and the social sciences have a deep-seated suspicion of practical work. This is especially true in sociology. Tierney (2007b) has treated this topic at length, so there is no reason to repeat the point here. There is another, somewhat unappreciated reason that <u>work on disaster is seen as <strong>narrow</u></strong>, a reason that holds some irony <u>for</u> the main thrust of my argument here: <u>disasters are unusual and</u> the <u><mark>social sciences are</mark> </u>generally <u><strong><mark>biased</strong> to</mark>ward <mark>phenomena that are frequent</mark>. Methods textbooks caution against</u> using case stud- ies as representative of anything, and <u>articles</u> in mainstreams journals that are <u>not based on</u> <u>probability samples</u> must issue similar obligatory caveats. <u>The premise, <strong>itself narrow</strong>, is that the only way to be certain </u>that we know something about the social world, and the only way to control for subjective influences in data acquisition, <u>is to follow</u> the tenets of <u>probabilistic sampling</u>. This view is a correlate of the central way of defining rational action and rational policy in academic work of all varieties and also in much practical work, which is to say in terms of probabilities. <u><mark>The irony is that</mark> probabilistic thinking <strong>has its own biases</strong>, which, if unacknowledged and uncorrected</u> for, <u><strong><mark>lead to</mark> a <mark>conceptual neglect</strong> of extreme events</u></mark>. This leaves us, as scholars, paying attention to disasters only when they happen and doing that makes the accumulation of good ideas about disaster vulnerable to issue-attention cycles (Birkland, 2007). <u><mark>These</u></mark> conceptual blinders <u>[myopic <mark>approaches]</u> <u>lead to</mark> a <mark>neglect of disasters</u></mark> <u>as "strategic research sites</u>" (Merton, 1987), <u><mark>which results in <strong>learning less</strong> about disaster</mark> than we could <mark>and</mark> in missing opportunities to </u>use disaster to <u>learn about <mark>society</u></mark> (cf. Sorokin, 1942). <u><strong><mark>We need new conceptual tools</u></strong> <u>because of </mark>an upward trend in <mark>frequency </mark>and severity <mark>of disaster</u></mark> since 1970 (Perrow, 2007), and because of a growing intellectual attention to the idea of worst cases (Clarke, 2006b; Clarke, in press). For instance, the chief scientist in charge of studying earthquakes for the US Geological Service, Lucile Jones, has worked on the combination of events that could happen in California that would constitute a "give up scenario": a very long-shaking earthquake in southern California just when the Santa Anna winds are making everything dry and likely to burn. In such conditions, meaningful response to the fires would be impossible and recovery would take an extraordinarily long time. There are other similar pockets of scholarly interest in extreme events, some spurred by September 11 and many catalyzed by Katrina. The <u>consequences</u> of disasters <u>are also becoming more severe</u>, both in terms of lives lost and property damaged. <u><mark>People</u></mark> and their places <u><mark>are becoming</mark> more <mark>vulnerable</mark>. The <mark>most important</mark> reason </u>that vulnerabilities are increasing <u><mark>is population concentration</u></mark> (Clarke, 2006b). This is a general phenomenon and includes, for example, flying in jumbo jets, working in tall buildings, and attending events in large capacity sports arenas. <u>Considering</u> disasters whose origin is <u>a natural hazard, the</u> specific <u>cause</u> of increased vulnerability <u>is</u> that <u>people</u> are <u>moving</u> <u>to where hazards originate</u>, and most especially to where the water is. In some places, this makes them vulnerable to hurricanes that can create devastating storm surges; in others it makes them vulnerable to earthquakes that can create tsunamis. <u>In any case, the general problem is that people concentrate themselves in dangerous places, so when the hazard comes disasters are intensified.</u> More than one-half of Florida's population lives within 20 miles of the sea. Additionally, Florida's population grows every year, along with increasing development along the coasts. The risk of exposure to a devastating hurricane is obviously high in Florida. No one should be surprised if during the next hurricane season Florida becomes the scene of great tragedy. The <u>demographic pressures and attendant development are wide- spread. People are concentrating along</u> the <u>coasts</u> of the United States, <u>and</u>, like Florida, <u>this puts people at risk</u> of water-related hazards. Or consider the Pacific Rim, the coastline down the west coasts of North and South America, south to Oceania, and then up the eastern coast- line of Asia. There the hazards are particularly threatening. Maps of population concentration around the Pacific Rim should be seen as target maps, because along those shorelines are some of the most active tectonic plates in the world. The 2004 Indonesian earthquake and tsunami, which killed at least 250,000 people, demonstrated the kind of damage that issues from the movement of tectonic plates. (Few in the United States recognize that there is a subduction zone just off the coast of Oregon and Washington that is quite similar to the one in Indonesia.) Additionally, volcanoes reside atop the meeting of tectonic plates; the typhoons that originate in the Pacific Ocean generate furiously fatal winds. <u>Perrow</u> (2007) <u>has generalized </u>the point about<u> concentration, arguing </u>not only that<u> we increase vulnerabilities by increasing the breadth and depth of exposure to hazards but also by concentrating industrial facilities with catastrophic potentia</u>l. Some of Perrow's most important <u>examples concern chemical production</u> facilities. These are facilities that bring together in a single place multiple stages of production used in the production of toxic substances. Key to Perrow's argument is that there is no technically necessary reason for such concentration, although there may be good economic reasons for it. <u>The general point is that we can expect more disasters, </u>whether their origins are<u> "natural" or "technological."</u> We can also expect <u>more death and destruction</u> from them. <u>I predict <strong><mark>we will continue to be poorly prepared </mark>to deal with disaster</u></strong>. <u>People </u>around the world <u>were appalled with the incompetence of</u> America's <u>leaders </u>and orga<u>-</u> nizations <u>in</u> the wake of Hurricanes <u>Katrina</u> and Rita. Day after day we watched people suffering unnecessarily. Leaders were slow to grasp the importance of the event. With a few notable exceptions, organi- zations lumbered to a late rescue. Setting aside our moral reaction to the official neglect, perhaps <u>we ought to ask why <strong>we should have expected a competent response </strong>at all</u>? Are US leaders and organiza- tions particularly attuned to the suffering of people in disasters? Is the political economy of the United States organized so that people, espe- cially poor people, are attended to quickly and effectively in noncri- sis situations? The answers to these questions are obvious. If social systems are not arranged to ensure people's well-being in normal times, there is no good reason to expect them to be so inclined in disastrous times. Still, <u><mark>if we are <strong>ever</strong> going to be</mark> reasonably well <mark>prepared to avoid or respond to the next Katrina</mark>-like event, <strong><mark>we need to identify </mark>the <mark>barriers</strong> to effective thinking </mark>about,</u> and effective response to, <u>disas- ters</u>. <u><strong>One of those barriers</strong> is that <mark>we do not have </mark>a set of <mark>concepts that</mark> would <mark>help </mark>us <mark>think </mark>rigorously <mark>about out-sized events. The <strong>chief toolkit</strong></mark> of concepts that we have</u> for thinking about important social events <u><mark>comes from probability theory</u></mark>. There are good reasons for this, as probability theory has obviously served social research well. Still, <u><mark>the toolkit is <strong>incomplete</u></strong></mark> when it comes to extreme events, <u><mark>especially when </mark>it is <mark>used </mark>as a base whence <mark>to make</mark> normative judgments <mark>about </mark>what</u> people, organizations, and <u><mark>governments</mark> should </u>and should not <u>do</u>. <u><strong>As a complement</u></strong> to probabilistic thinking I propose that <u><mark>we need <strong>possibilistic thinking</u></strong></mark>. In this paper I explicate the notion of possibilistic thinking. I first discuss the equation of probabilism with rationality in scholarly thought, followed by a section that shows the ubiquity of possibilis- tic thinking in everyday life. Demonstrating the latter will provide an opportunity to explore the limits of the probabilistic approach: that <u>possibilistic thinking</u> is widespread suggests it <u>could be used more rigorously</u> in social research. I will then address the most vexing prob- lem with advancing and employing possibilistic thinking: the prob- lem of infinite imagination. I argue that <u>possibilism can be used <mark>with discipline</mark>, and </u>that<u> we <strong>can be smarter</strong> about responding </u>to disasters<u> by doing so</u>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Fraser Nelson 18, editor of The Spectator magazine, Trump vs Nato: the trade war is becoming a security crisis, 6-16-18, https://www.spectator.co.uk/2018/06/trump-vs-nato-the-trade-war-is-becoming-a-security-crisis/ DOA: 6-27-18, y2k fulltext: Before Trump was elected he had described Nato as ‘obsolete’, but Mrs May told her ministers he only backtracked on this because of pressure from the British government during their meeting in Washington in January last year. The big concern now is the Nato summit in Brussels next month, and that what began with Trump slapping tariffs on European and Canadian steel could turn into a trade war, which the President might then escalate by threatening to walk away from his allies. For Trump, defence and trade are very much linked: his tariffs were introduced on grounds of national security and the need to rely less on imports from supposed allies. Ivo Daalder, a former US ambassador to Nato, has been frank about what Trump’s conflation of trade and defence means for Nato. ‘The lifeblood of the alliance is trust,’ he said recently. ‘So a trade dispute based on national security — that’s what hurts.’ But it also hurts because there is so much truth in Trump’s criticism. Each of the 29 Nato members agrees to spend 2 per cent of its economic output on defence, but only four do: Greece, Estonia, the UK and the US. Germany, the richest country in Europe, spends just 1.2 per cent of its GDP on defence. Angela Merkel’s offer to raise this to 1.5 per cent is still seen by Trump (and her own defence officials) as insultingly low. Together, European governments are saving about £140 billion by skimping on defence. They do so in the knowledge that the hole will be filled by Uncle Sam. It’s not just Trump who objects to this. Successive American presidents have been losing patience. Even Barack Obama would complain about ‘the Europeans and the Arab states holding our coats while we did all the fighting’. Britain only agreed to observe the 2 per cent defence spending minimum because Obama had told David Cameron that, without the money, he could forget about a ‘special relationship’. And keeping UK defence spending at this bare minimum has left the British army with fewer soldiers than at any time since the Napoleonic wars. Still, Britain at least has a functioning military. It’s not clear that the same can be said of other Nato allies. Take Germany, the target of so much of Trump’s recent ire. While defence is a low priority among a largely pacifist German public, mindful of their country’s history, a report for the German parliament earlier this year revealed the extent of the decay of its army, navy and air force. At the end of last year, the Bundeswehr had 128 Eurofighters, of which 39 could fly. It had six submarines, none of which were working when the report was compiled. Of its 13 ageing frigates, only five could sail. Of its 93 Tornado jets, 26 were ready for action. German air force trainees struggled to qualify because so few aircraft were ready for use. Its staffing is also in crisis. Hans-Peter Bartels, armed forces commissioner to the German parliament, reported recently that 21,000 officer posts are vacant. ‘We spent 25 years cutting the defence budget,’ he said. ‘We thought everything could be solved through negotiations, agreements, co–operation and partnerships.’ Wolfgang Ischinger, a former German envoy to Washington, said it was ‘undignified’ that the most that Germany could contribute to the US-led fight against Islamic State was reconnaissance flights. ‘We take photos, but we leave the dirty business of shooting to others,’ he said. ‘We should not develop the reputation of being one of the world’s greatest freeloaders.’ The reputation of the Germany military has not quite recovered from such fiascos as when, four years ago, soldiers in the- Panzergrenadierbataillon went on an exercise with painted broomsticks instead of guns because of a shortage of weapons. They were part of Nato’s ‘Very High Readiness Joint Task Force’. Trump’s language about Nato may be vulgar and intemperate, but US officials have been running out of ways to express their frustration. Robert Gates, appointed defence secretary by George W. Bush, warned that Nato would be consigned to ‘military irrelevance’ unless European member states stumped up. Obama seethed about ‘free riders’. When James Mattis was appointed as Trump’s Defense Secretary, he lost no time in warning European leaders that ‘Americans cannot care more for your children’s security than you do.’ So Trump’s tweets are just more succinct expressions of a message that America has been trying to send to Nato for years: patience in Washington has worn thin and it’s time to pay up. If you don’t, then you’ll end up fending off Russians with your broomsticks, pretend bombs and broken helicopters. America’s focus was already shifting away from Europe and towards China. Trump tends to see foreign affairs mainly in terms with his relationship with Xi Jinping, and he is quite open about the low value he places on the alliances he inherited. ‘I believe in relationships,’ he said a few months after taking office. ‘And I believe in partnerships. But alliances have not always worked out very well for us.’ His theatrical style of leadership, on full display in Singapore, is anathema to Euro-peans — it also underlines the essential difference in worldviews now driving Nato apart. His decision to pull out of the Iran deal was made in defiance of the pleas and protests of his allies, including the UK. Trump believes in nation states, strong leaders and chemistry between leaders. He loathes the idea of committees and consensus. Especially when, as he believes, it leads to America being stiffed. Officially, Britain says it isn’t worried about Nato — given America’s longstanding commitment. Privately, ministers are in a panic and running out of options. Gavin Williamson, the new Defence Secretary, has warned ministers that Trump’s annoyance with Germany may soon spread to other countries and that Britain might not be exempt from the President’s ire. As The Spectator revealed last month, May is planning a massive cash boost for the NHS to mark its 70th birthday next month. That implies less money for defence and a military kept on the bare minimum, with declining capabilities, when threats are increasing both on land and in cyberspace. Williamson was frank with Mrs May: if she wants to protect the special relationship, extra defence spending is the only language that Trump understands. Philip Hammond, the Chancellor, dislikes expensive solutions to any problems and is proposing that Britain instead applies pressure on Germany. His latest idea is for Britain to suggest that Germany assuages Trump on the trade front: by making more BMWs in South Carolina. Trump, he believes, needs to be offered an industry-related ‘deal’ in return for at least pretending to believe in the G7, Nato, and the other institutions through which Britain and Europe try to wield power and influence. But after Singapore, the President will be harder than ever to bring to heel. Whether the summit with Kim will be remembered as a breakthrough or a stunt, he believes that his style of diplomacy has been vindicated and that it’s time to see what else he can do. If he wants to scare European nations into spending more on defence by threatening to leave them to Putin’s mercy, then he’ll probably try that too — to see how they respond. When Trump last visited the Nato headquarters in Brussels, to unveil a monument to the 9/11 victims, he took the opportunity to tear into countries who don’t ‘meet their financial obligation’ to Nato in a way that is ‘not fair to the people or taxpayers of the United States’. His speech did not include an explicit endorsement of Article 5 of the Nato treaty, a declaration that at attack on one member state is an attack on them all. This was supposed to have been the point of his speech. The White House said afterwards that it should go without saying, but diplomats were left with the impression that the omission was deliberate. The threat is not that America will choose isolation, as it did in the 1930s, or that Russia will send tanks into Europe. If Vladimir Putin did chance his luck in Estonia, or send submarines on cable-cutting sabotage operations on the Atlantic seabed, no one doubts that the US would lead the response: it still has a military designed to fight wars on two fronts at any one time. But the risk is that Nato will lose its remaining capacity to deter as a united group, making lower-level Russian adventurism more likely. When Putin spots weakness and division, he likes to prod, test and watch the reaction — as Ukraine has found out.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Causes <u>low-level</u> Russian incursion</h4><p>Fraser <strong>Nelson 18</strong>, editor of The Spectator magazine, Trump vs Nato: the trade war is becoming a security crisis, 6-16-18, https://www.spectator.co.uk/2018/06/trump-vs-nato-the-trade-war-is-becoming-a-security-crisis/<u> DOA: 6-27-18, y2k</p><p></u>Before Trump was elected he had described Nato as ‘obsolete’, but Mrs May told her ministers he only backtracked on this because of pressure from the British government during their meeting in Washington in January last year. The big concern now is the Nato summit in Brussels next month, and that what began with Trump slapping tariffs on European and Canadian steel could turn into a trade war, which the President might then escalate by threatening to walk away from his allies. <u><strong><mark>For Trump</mark>, <mark>defence and trade are</mark> very much <mark>linked</u></strong></mark>: <u>his tariffs were introduced on grounds of <strong>national security</u></strong> <u>and the need to rely <strong>less on imports from supposed allies.</strong> </u>Ivo <u><mark>Daalder</u></mark>, <u>a former US ambassador to Nato</u>, <u><mark>has been frank</u></mark> <u><mark>about</u></mark> what <u><mark>Trump’s <strong>conflation</u></strong> <u>of trade and defence means </mark>for Nato</u>. ‘<u><mark>The <strong>lifeblood</strong> of the alliance is</mark> <strong><mark>trust</u></strong></mark>,’ he said recently. ‘So <u><mark>a trade dispute <strong>based</strong> on</mark> national <mark>security</u></mark> — that’s what <u><strong><mark>hurts</u></strong></mark>.’ But it also hurts because there is so much truth in Trump’s criticism. Each of the 29 Nato members agrees to spend 2 per cent of its economic output on defence, but only four do: Greece, Estonia, the UK and the US. Germany, the richest country in Europe, spends just 1.2 per cent of its GDP on defence. Angela Merkel’s offer to raise this to 1.5 per cent is still seen by Trump (and her own defence officials) as insultingly low. Together, European governments are saving about £140 billion by skimping on defence. They do so in the knowledge that the hole will be filled by Uncle Sam. It’s not just Trump who objects to this. Successive American presidents have been losing patience. Even Barack Obama would complain about ‘the Europeans and the Arab states holding our coats while we did all the fighting’. Britain only agreed to observe the 2 per cent defence spending minimum because Obama had told David Cameron that, without the money, he could forget about a ‘special relationship’. And keeping UK defence spending at this bare minimum has left the British army with fewer soldiers than at any time since the Napoleonic wars. Still, Britain at least has a functioning military. It’s not clear that the same can be said of other Nato allies. Take Germany, the target of so much of Trump’s recent ire. While defence is a low priority among a largely pacifist German public, mindful of their country’s history, a report for the German parliament earlier this year revealed the extent of the decay of its army, navy and air force. At the end of last year, the Bundeswehr had 128 Eurofighters, of which 39 could fly. It had six submarines, none of which were working when the report was compiled. Of its 13 ageing frigates, only five could sail. Of its 93 Tornado jets, 26 were ready for action. German air force trainees struggled to qualify because so few aircraft were ready for use. Its staffing is also in crisis. Hans-Peter Bartels, armed forces commissioner to the German parliament, reported recently that 21,000 officer posts are vacant. ‘We spent 25 years cutting the defence budget,’ he said. ‘We thought everything could be solved through negotiations, agreements, co–operation and partnerships.’ Wolfgang Ischinger, a former German envoy to Washington, said it was ‘undignified’ that the most that Germany could contribute to the US-led fight against Islamic State was reconnaissance flights. ‘We take photos, but we leave the dirty business of shooting to others,’ he said. ‘We should not develop the reputation of being one of the world’s greatest freeloaders.’ The reputation of the Germany military has not quite recovered from such fiascos as when, four years ago, soldiers in the- Panzergrenadierbataillon went on an exercise with painted broomsticks instead of guns because of a shortage of weapons. They were part of Nato’s ‘Very High Readiness Joint Task Force’. Trump’s language about Nato may be vulgar and intemperate, but US officials have been running out of ways to express their frustration. Robert Gates, appointed defence secretary by George W. Bush, warned that Nato would be consigned to ‘military irrelevance’ unless European member states stumped up. Obama seethed about ‘free riders’. When James Mattis was appointed as Trump’s Defense Secretary, he lost no time in warning European leaders that ‘Americans cannot care more for your children’s security than you do.’ So Trump’s tweets are just more succinct expressions of a message that America has been trying to send to Nato for years: patience in Washington has worn thin and it’s time to pay up. If you don’t, then you’ll end up fending off Russians with your broomsticks, pretend bombs and broken helicopters. America’s focus was already shifting away from Europe and towards China. Trump tends to see foreign affairs mainly in terms with his relationship with Xi Jinping, and he is quite open about the low value he places on the alliances he inherited. ‘I believe in relationships,’ he said a few months after taking office. ‘And I believe in partnerships. But alliances have not always worked out very well for us.’ His theatrical style of leadership, on full display in Singapore, is anathema to Euro-peans — it also underlines the essential difference in worldviews now driving Nato apart. His decision to pull out of the Iran deal was made in defiance of the pleas and protests of his allies, including the UK. Trump believes in nation states, strong leaders and chemistry between leaders. He loathes the idea of committees and consensus. Especially when, as he believes, it leads to America being stiffed. Officially, Britain says it isn’t worried about Nato — given America’s longstanding commitment. Privately, ministers are in a panic and running out of options. Gavin Williamson, the new Defence Secretary, has warned ministers that Trump’s annoyance with Germany may soon spread to other countries and that Britain might not be exempt from the President’s ire. As The Spectator revealed last month, May is planning a massive cash boost for the NHS to mark its 70th birthday next month. That implies less money for defence and a military kept on the bare minimum, with declining capabilities, when threats are increasing both on land and in cyberspace. Williamson was frank with Mrs May: if she wants to protect the special relationship, extra defence spending is the only language that Trump understands. Philip Hammond, the Chancellor, dislikes expensive solutions to any problems and is proposing that Britain instead applies pressure on Germany. His latest idea is for Britain to suggest that Germany assuages Trump on the trade front: by making more BMWs in South Carolina. Trump, he believes, needs to be offered an industry-related ‘deal’ in return for at least pretending to believe in the G7, Nato, and the other institutions through which Britain and Europe try to wield power and influence. But after Singapore, the President will be harder than ever to bring to heel. Whether the summit with Kim will be remembered as a breakthrough or a stunt, he believes that his style of diplomacy has been vindicated and that it’s time to see what else he can do. If he wants to scare European nations into spending more on defence by threatening to leave them to Putin’s mercy, then he’ll probably try that too — to see how they respond. When Trump last visited the Nato headquarters in Brussels, to unveil a monument to the 9/11 victims, he took the opportunity to tear into countries who don’t ‘meet their financial obligation’ to Nato in a way that is ‘not fair to the people or taxpayers of the United States’. His speech did not include an explicit endorsement of Article 5 of the Nato treaty, a declaration that at attack on one member state is an attack on them all. This was supposed to have been the point of his speech. The White House said afterwards that it should go without saying, but diplomats were left with the impression that the omission was deliberate. <u>The threat is not that America will choose <strong>isolation</u></strong>, as it did in the 1930s, <u>or that Russia will send <strong>tanks</strong> into Europe</u>. <u><mark>If</u></mark> Vladimir <u><mark>Putin did chance</u></mark> his <u><mark>luck</mark> in Estonia</u>, or send submarines on cable-cutting sabotage operations on the Atlantic seabed, <u><strong><mark>no one doubts</u></strong></mark> <u>that <mark>the US would lead</mark> the response: it still has a military <strong>designed</strong> to fight wars</u> on two fronts at any one time. <u><strong><mark>But</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>the risk is that Nato will lose</u></mark> its <u>remaining <mark>capacity to <strong>deter as a united group</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>making</u> <u><strong></mark>lower-level <mark>Russian adventurism</mark> more <mark>likely</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>When Putin spots</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>weakness</u></strong></mark> <u>and</u> <u><strong>division</strong>, <mark>he likes to</mark> <strong>prod</u></strong>, <u><strong>test</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong><mark>watch the reaction</u></strong></mark> — <u>as Ukraine has found out.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Law & Versteeg 12—Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law @ Washington University & Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law @ University of Virginia [David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, “The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution,” New York University Law Review, Vol. 87, 2012 fulltext: The appeal of American constitutionalism as a model for other countries appears to be waning in more ways than one. Scholarly attention has thus far focused on global judicial practice: There is a growing sense, backed by more than purely anecdotal observation, that foreign courts cite the constitutional jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court less frequently than before.267 But the behavior of those who draft and revise actual constitutions exhibits a similar pattern. Our empirical analysis shows that the content of the U.S. Constitution is¶ becoming increasingly atypical by global standards. Over the last three decades, other countries have become less likely to model the rights-related provisions of¶ their own constitutions upon those found in the Constitution. Meanwhile, global adoption of key structural features of the Constitution, such as federalism, presidentialism, and a decentralized model of judicial review, is at best stable and at worst declining. In sum, rather than leading the way for global¶ constitutionalism, the U.S. Constitution appears instead to be losing its appeal as¶ a model for constitutional drafters elsewhere. The idea of adopting a constitution may still trace its inspiration to the United States, but the manner in which constitutions are written increasingly does not. If the U.S. Constitution is indeed losing popularity as a model for other countries, what—or who—is to blame? At this point, one can only speculate as to the actual causes of this decline, but four possible hypotheses suggest themselves: (1) the advent of a superior or more attractive competitor; (2) a general decline in American hegemony; (3) judicial parochialism; (4) constitutional obsolescence; and (5) a creed of American exceptionalism. With respect to the first hypothesis, there is little indication that the U.S. Constitution has been displaced by any specific competitor. Instead, the notion that a particular constitution can serve as a dominant model for other countries may itself be obsolete. There is an increasingly clear and broad consensus on the types of rights that a constitution should include, to the point that one can articulate the content of a generic bill of rights with considerable precision.269 Yet it is difficult to pinpoint a specific constitution—or regional or international human rights instrument—that is clearly the driving force behind this emerging paradigm. We find only limited evidence that global constitutionalism is following the lead of either newer national constitutions that are often cited as influential, such as those of Canada and South Africa, or leading international and regional human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. Although Canada in particular does appear to exercise a quantifiable degree of constitutional influence or leadership, that influence is not uniform and global but more likely reflects the emergence and evolution of a shared practice of constitutionalism among common law countries.270 Our findings suggest instead that the development of global constitutionalism is a polycentric and multipolar¶ process that is not dominated by any particular country.271 The result might be likened to a global language of constitutional rights, but one that has been collectively forged rather than modeled upon a specific constitution. Another possibility is that America’s capacity for constitutional leadership is at least partly a function of American “soft power” more generally.272 It is reasonable to suspect that the overall influence and appeal of the United States and its institutions have a powerful spillover effect into the constitutional arena. The popularity of American culture, the prestige of American universities, and the efficacy of American diplomacy can all be expected to affect the appeal of American constitutionalism, and vice versa. All are elements of an overall American brand, and the strength of that brand helps to determine the strength of each of its elements. Thus, any erosion of the American brand may also diminish the appeal of the Constitution for reasons that have little or nothing to do with the Constitution itself. Likewise, a decline in American constitutional influence of the type documented in this Article is potentially indicative of a broader decline in American soft power. There are also factors specific to American constitutionalism that may be¶ reducing its appeal to foreign audiences. Critics suggest that the Supreme Court has undermined the global appeal of its own jurisprudence by failing to acknowledge the relevant intellectual contributions of foreign courts on questions of common concern,273 and by pursuing interpretive approaches that lack acceptance elsewhere.274 On this view, the Court may bear some responsibility for the declining influence of not only its own jurisprudence, but also the actual U.S. Constitution: one might argue that the Court’s approach to constitutional issues has undermined the appeal of American constitutionalism more generally, to the point that other countries have become unwilling to look either to American constitutional jurisprudence or to the U.S. Constitution itself for inspiration.275 It is equally plausible, however, that responsibility for the declining appeal of American constitutionalism lies with the idiosyncrasies of the Constitution itself rather than the proclivities of the Supreme Court. As the oldest formal constitution still in force, and one of the most rarely amended constitutions in the world,276 the U.S. Constitution contains relatively few of the rights that have become popular in recent decades,277 while some of the provisions that it does contain may appear increasingly problematic, unnecessary, or even undesirable with the benefit of two hundred years of hindsight.278 It should therefore come as little surprise if the U.S. Constitution¶ strikes those in other countries–or, indeed, members of the U.S. Supreme Court279–as out of date and out of line with global practice.280 Moreover, even if the Court were committed to interpreting the Constitution in tune with global fashion, it would still lack the power to update the actual text of the document. Indeed, efforts by the Court to update the Constitution via interpretation may actually reduce the likelihood of formal amendment by rendering such amendment unnecessary as a practical matter.281 As a result, there is only so much that the U.S. Supreme Court can do to make the U.S. Constitution an¶ attractive formal template for other countries. The obsolescence of the Constitution, in turn, may undermine the appeal of American constitutional jurisprudence: foreign courts have little reason to follow the Supreme Court’s lead on constitutional issues if the Supreme Court is saddled with the interpretation of an unusual and obsolete constitution.282 No amount of ingenuity or solicitude for foreign law on the part of the Court can entirely divert attention from the fact that the Constitution itself is an increasingly atypical document. One way to put a more positive spin upon the U.S. Constitution’s status as a global outlier is to emphasize its role in articulating and defining what is unique about American national identity. Many scholars have opined that formal constitutions serve an expressive function as statements of national identity.283 This view finds little support in our own empirical findings, which suggest instead that constitutions tend to contain relatively standardized packages of rights.284 Nevertheless, to the extent that constitutions do serve such a function, the distinctiveness of the U.S. Constitution may simply reflect the uniqueness of America’s national identity. In this vein, various scholars have argued that the U.S. Constitution lies at the very heart of an “American creed of exceptionalism,” which combines a belief that the United States occupies a unique position in the world with a commitment to the qualities that set the United States apart from other countries.285 From this perspective, the Supreme Court’s reluctance to make use of foreign and international law in constitutional cases amounts not to parochialism, but rather to respect for the exceptional character of the nation and its constitution.286 Unfortunately, it is clear that the reasons for the declining influence of American constitutionalism cannot be reduced to anything as simple or attractive as a longstanding American creed of exceptionalism. Historically, American exceptionalism has not prevented other countries from following the example set by American constitutionalism. The global turn away from the American model is a relatively recent development that postdates the Cold War. If the U.S. Constitution does in fact capture something profoundly unique about the United States, it has surely been doing so for longer than the last thirty years. A complete explanation of the declining influence of American constitutionalism in other countries must instead be sought in more recent history, such as the wave of constitution-making that followed the end of the Cold War.287 During this period, America’s newfound position as lone superpower might have been expected to create opportunities for the spread of American constitutionalism. But this did not come to pass. Once global constitutionalism is understood as the product of a polycentric evolutionary process, it is not difficult to see why the U.S. Constitution is playing an increasingly peripheral role in that process. No evolutionary process favors a specimen that is frozen in time. At least some of the responsibility for the declining global appeal of American constitutionalism lies not with the Supreme Court, or with a broader penchant for exceptionalism, but rather with the static character of the Constitution itself. If the United States were to revise the Bill of Rights today—with the benefit of over two centuries of experience, and in a manner that addresses contemporary challenges while remaining faithful to the nation’s best traditions—there is no guarantee that other countries would follow its lead. But the world would surely pay close attention.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>No modeling </h4><p><strong>Law & Versteeg 12</strong>—Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law @ Washington University & Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law @ University of Virginia [David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, “The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution,” <u>New York University Law Review</u>, Vol. 87, 2012</p><p><u><mark>The appeal of American constitutionalism as a model for other countries appears to be waning</u></mark> in more ways than one. Scholarly attention has thus far focused on global judicial practice: <u>There is a growing sense, backed by more than purely anecdotal observation, that <strong><mark>foreign courts cite</strong> the</u></mark> constitutional <u>jurisprudence of the U.S. <mark>Supreme Court less frequently than before</u></mark>.267 But the behavior of those who draft and revise actual constitutions exhibits a similar pattern. <u><mark>Our <strong>empirical analysis</strong> shows</mark> that the</u> content of the <u>U.S.</u> Constitution <u>is</u>¶<u> becoming increasingly atypical by global standards</u>. <u>Over the last three decades, <mark>other countries have become <strong>less likely to model</u></strong></mark> the rights-related provisions of¶ their own constitutions upon those found in the Constitution. <u>Meanwhile, global adoption of</u> key structural features of the Constitution, such as federalism, presidentialism, and a <u>decentralized model of judicial review, is </u>at best stable and at worst<u> declining. In sum, rather than leading the way for global</u>¶<u> constitutionalism, the U.S</u>. Constitution <u>appears instead to be losing its appeal as</u>¶<u> a model</u> for constitutional drafters elsewhere. The idea of adopting a constitution may still trace its inspiration to the United States, but the manner in which<mark> constitutions are written increasingly does not.</p><p></mark>If the U.S. Constitution is indeed losing popularity as a model for other countries, what—or who—is to blame? At this point<u>, one can</u> only speculate as to <u><mark>the</mark> actual <mark>causes</u></mark> of this decline, but four possible hypotheses suggest themselves: (1) the advent of a superior or <u><mark>more attractive competitor</u></mark>; (2) <u>a <mark>general decline in</u></mark> American <u><mark>hegemony</mark>;</u> (3) <u><mark>judicial parochialism</u>;</mark> (4) <u><mark>constitutional obsolescence</u>; <u>and</u></mark> (5) <u>a creed of <mark>American exceptionalism</u>.</p><p></mark>With respect to the first hypothesis, there is little indication that the U.S. Constitution has been displaced by any specific competitor. Instead, the notion that a particular constitution can serve as a dominant model for other countries may itself be obsolete. There is an increasingly clear and broad consensus on the types of rights that a constitution should include, to the point that one can articulate the content of a generic bill of rights with considerable precision.269 Yet it is difficult to pinpoint a specific constitution—or regional or international human rights instrument—that is clearly the driving force behind this emerging paradigm. We find only limited evidence that global constitutionalism is following the lead of either newer national constitutions that are often cited as influential, such as those of Canada and South Africa, or leading international and regional human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. Although Canada in particular does appear to exercise a quantifiable degree of constitutional influence or leadership, that influence is not uniform and global but more likely reflects the emergence and evolution of a shared practice of constitutionalism among common law countries.270 <u>Our findings suggest</u> instead <u>that the development of global constitutionalism is a polycentric and multipolar</u>¶<u> process that is not dominated by any particular country.271 The result might be likened to a global language of constitutional rights, but one that has been collectively forged rather than modeled upon a specific constitution.</p><p></u>Another possibility is that <u>America’s capacity for constitutional leadership is</u> at least partly <u>a <strong>function of American “soft power</strong>” more generally</u>.272 It is reasonable to suspect that the overall influence and appeal of the United States and its institutions have a powerful spillover effect into the constitutional arena. The popularity of American culture, the prestige of American universities, and the efficacy of American diplomacy can all be expected to affect the appeal of American constitutionalism, and vice versa. All are elements of an overall American brand, and the strength of that brand helps to determine the strength of each of its elements. Thus, any <u><mark>erosion of the American brand</u></mark> may also <u><mark>diminish the appeal of the Constitution for reasons that have little or nothing to do with the Constitution itself.</u></mark> Likewise, <u>a decline in American constitutional influence</u> of the type documented in this Article <u>is potentially indicative of a broader decline in American soft power. </p><p></u>There are also factors specific to American constitutionalism that may be¶ reducing its appeal to foreign audiences. Critics suggest that<u> <mark>the Supreme Court has <strong>undermined the global appeal of its own jurisprudence by failing to acknowledge the relevant intellectual contributions of foreign courts</strong></mark> </u>on questions of common concern,273 <u>and by pursuing interpretive approaches that lack acceptance elsewhere</u>.274 On this view, <u>the Court</u> may <u>bear</u> some <u>responsibility for the declining influence of</u> not only <u>its own jurisprudence</u>, but also the actual U.S. Constitution: one might argue that <u>the Court’s approach to</u> constitutional issues <u>has undermined the appeal of American constitutionalism more generally, to the point that other countries have become unwilling to look either to American constitutional jurisprudence or to the U.S. Constitution itself</u> <u>for inspiration</u>.275</p><p>It is equally plausible, however, that <u>responsibility for the declining appeal of American constitutionalism lies with the idiosyncrasies of the Constitution itself </u>rather than the proclivities of the Supreme Court. <u>As the oldest formal constitution still in force</u>, and one of the most rarely amended constitutions in the world,276 <u>the U.S. Constitution contains relatively few of the</u> <u>rights that have become popular in recent decades</u>,277 while some of the provisions that it does contain may appear increasingly problematic, unnecessary, or even undesirable with the benefit of two hundred years of hindsight.278 <u>It should therefore come as little surprise if <mark>the U.S. Constitution</u>¶<u> strikes</u></mark> those in <u><mark>other countries</u></mark>–or, indeed, members of the U.S. Supreme Court279–<u><mark>as <strong>out of date and out of line with global practice</u></strong></mark>.280 Moreover, <u>even if the Court were committed to interpreting the Constitution in tune with global fashion, it would still lack the power to update the actual text of the document.</p><p></u>Indeed, efforts by the Court to update the Constitution via interpretation may actually reduce the likelihood of formal amendment by rendering such amendment unnecessary as a practical matter.281 As a result, <u><mark>there is only so</u> <u>much that the U.S. Supreme Court can do to make the U.S</u>.</mark> Constitution <u>an</u>¶<u> <mark>attractive</u></mark> formal <u>template for other countries</u>. <u>The obsolescence of the Constitution,</u> in turn, may <u>undermine the appeal of American constitutional jurisprudence: foreign courts have <strong>little reason to follow the Supreme Court</u></strong>’s lead on constitutional issues <u>if the Supreme Court is saddled with the</u> interpretation of an unusual and <u>obsolete constitution</u>.282 <u><mark>No amount of</u> <u>ingenuity or solicitude</mark> for foreign law on the part of the Court</u> <mark>can</mark> <u>entirely <mark>divert attention</mark> from the fact that the Constitution itself is an increasingly atypical document.</p><p></u>One way to put a more positive spin upon the U.S. Constitution’s status as a global outlier is to emphasize its role in articulating and defining what is unique about American national identity. Many scholars have opined that formal constitutions serve an expressive function as statements of national identity.283 This view finds little support in our own empirical findings, which suggest instead that constitutions tend to contain relatively standardized packages of rights.284 Nevertheless, to the extent that constitutions do serve such a function, the distinctiveness of the U.S. Constitution may simply reflect the uniqueness of America’s national identity. In this vein, various scholars have argued that the U.S. Constitution lies at the very heart of an “American creed of exceptionalism,” which combines a belief that the United States occupies a unique position in the world with a commitment to the qualities that set the United States apart from other countries.285 From this perspective, the Supreme Court’s reluctance to make use of foreign and international law in constitutional cases amounts not to parochialism, but rather to respect for the exceptional character of the nation and its constitution.286</p><p>Unfortunately, it is clear that the reasons for the declining influence of American constitutionalism cannot be reduced to anything as simple or attractive as a longstanding American creed of exceptionalism. Historically, American exceptionalism has not prevented other countries from following the example set by American constitutionalism. The global turn away from the American model is a relatively recent development that postdates the Cold War. If the U.S. Constitution does in fact capture something profoundly unique about the United States, it has surely been doing so for longer than the last thirty years. A complete explanation of the declining influence of American constitutionalism in other countries must instead be sought in more recent history, such as the wave of constitution-making that followed the end of the Cold War.287 During this period, America’s newfound position as lone superpower might have been expected to create opportunities for the spread of American constitutionalism. But this did not come to pass.</p><p><u>Once global constitutionalism is understood as the product of a polycentric evolutionary process, it is not difficult to see why the U.S.</u> Constitution <u>is playing an <strong>increasingly peripheral</strong> role in that process</u>. No evolutionary process favors a specimen that is frozen in time. At least some of the responsibility for the declining global appeal of American constitutionalism lies not with the Supreme Court, or with a broader penchant for exceptionalism, but rather with the static character of the Constitution itself. <u>If the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>were to revise the Bill of Rights today</u>—with the benefit of over two centuries of experience, and in a manner that addresses contemporary challenges while remaining faithful to the nation’s best traditions—<u>there is no guarantee that other countries would follow its lead</u>. But the world would surely pay close attention. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Romm 12 (Joe Romm is a Fellow at American Progress and is the editor of Climate Progress, which New York Times columnist Tom Friedman called "the indispensable blog" and Time magazine named one of the 25 “Best Blogs of 2010.″ In 2009, Rolling Stone put Romm #88 on its list of 100 “people who are reinventing America.” Time named him a “Hero of the Environment″ and “The Web’s most influential climate-change blogger.” Romm was acting assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy in 1997, where he oversaw $1 billion in R&D, demonstration, and deployment of low-carbon technology. He is a Senior Fellow at American Progress and holds a Ph.D. in physics from MIT., 2/26/2012, “Apocalypse Not: The Oscars, The Media And The Myth of ‘Constant Repetition of Doomsday Messages’ on Climate”, http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2012/02/26/432546/apocalypse-not-oscars-media-myth-of-repetition-of-doomsday-messages-on-climate/#more-432546) fulltext: The two greatest myths about global warming communications are 1) constant repetition of doomsday messages has been a major, ongoing strategy and 2) that strategy doesn’t work and indeed is actually counterproductive! These myths are so deeply ingrained in the environmental and progressive political community that when we finally had a serious shot at a climate bill, the powers that be decided not to focus on the threat posed by climate change in any serious fashion in their $200 million communications effort (see my 6/10 post “Can you solve global warming without talking about global warming?“). These myths are so deeply ingrained in the mainstream media that such messaging, when it is tried, is routinely attacked and denounced — and the flimsiest studies are interpreted exactly backwards to drive the erroneous message home (see “Dire straits: Media blows the story of UC Berkeley study on climate messaging“) The only time anything approximating this kind of messaging — not “doomsday” but what I’d call blunt, science-based messaging that also makes clear the problem is solvable — was in 2006 and 2007 with the release of An Inconvenient Truth (and the 4 assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and media coverage like the April 2006 cover of Time). The data suggest that strategy measurably moved the public to become more concerned about the threat posed by global warming (see recent study here). You’d think it would be pretty obvious that the public is not going to be concerned about an issue unless one explains why they should be concerned about an issue. And the social science literature, including the vast literature on advertising and marketing, could not be clearer that only repeated messages have any chance of sinking in and moving the needle. Because I doubt any serious movement of public opinion or mobilization of political action could possibly occur until these myths are shattered, I’ll do a multipart series on this subject, featuring public opinion analysis, quotes by leading experts, and the latest social science research. Since this is Oscar night, though, it seems appropriate to start by looking at what messages the public are exposed to in popular culture and the media. It ain’t doomsday. Quite the reverse, climate change has been mostly an invisible issue for several years and the message of conspicuous consumption and business-as-usual reigns supreme. The motivation for this post actually came up because I received an e-mail from a journalist commenting that the “constant repetition of doomsday messages” doesn’t work as a messaging strategy. I had to demur, for the reasons noted above. But it did get me thinking about what messages the public are exposed to, especially as I’ve been rushing to see the movies nominated for Best Picture this year. I am a huge movie buff, but as parents of 5-year-olds know, it isn’t easy to stay up with the latest movies. That said, good luck finding a popular movie in recent years that even touches on climate change, let alone one a popular one that would pass for doomsday messaging. Best Picture nominee The Tree of Life has been billed as an environmental movie — and even shown at environmental film festivals — but while it is certainly depressing, climate-related it ain’t. In fact, if that is truly someone’s idea of environmental movie, count me out. The closest to a genuine popular climate movie was the dreadfully unscientific The Day After Tomorrow, which is from 2004 (and arguably set back the messaging effort by putting the absurd “global cooling” notion in people’s heads! Even Avatar, the most successful movie of all time and “the most epic piece of environmental advocacy ever captured on celluloid,” as one producer put it, omits the climate doomsday message. One of my favorite eco-movies, “Wall-E, is an eco-dystopian gem and an anti-consumption movie,” but it isn’t a climate movie. I will be interested to see The Hunger Games, but I’ve read all 3 of the bestselling post-apocalyptic young adult novels — hey, that’s my job! — and they don’t qualify as climate change doomsday messaging (more on that later). So, no, the movies certainly don’t expose the public to constant doomsday messages on climate. Here are the key points about what repeated messages the American public is exposed to: The broad American public is exposed to virtually no doomsday messages, let alone constant ones, on climate change in popular culture (TV and the movies and even online). There is not one single TV show on any network devoted to this subject, which is, arguably, more consequential than any other preventable issue we face. The same goes for the news media, whose coverage of climate change has collapsed (see “Network News Coverage of Climate Change Collapsed in 2011“). When the media do cover climate change in recent years, the overwhelming majority of coverage is devoid of any doomsday messages — and many outlets still feature hard-core deniers. Just imagine what the public’s view of climate would be if it got the same coverage as, say, unemployment, the housing crisis or even the deficit? When was the last time you saw an “employment denier” quoted on TV or in a newspaper? The public is exposed to constant messages promoting business as usual and indeed idolizing conspicuous consumption. See, for instance, “Breaking: The earth is breaking … but how about that Royal Wedding? Our political elite and intelligentsia, including MSM pundits and the supposedly “liberal media” like, say, MSNBC, hardly even talk about climate change and when they do, it isn’t doomsday. Indeed, there isn’t even a single national columnist for a major media outlet who writes primarily on climate. Most “liberal” columnists rarely mention it. At least a quarter of the public chooses media that devote a vast amount of time to the notion that global warming is a hoax and that environmentalists are extremists and that clean energy is a joke. In the MSM, conservative pundits routinely trash climate science and mock clean energy. Just listen to, say, Joe Scarborough on MSNBC’s Morning Joe mock clean energy sometime. The major energy companies bombard the airwaves with millions and millions of dollars of repetitious pro-fossil-fuel ads. The environmentalists spend far, far less money. As noted above, the one time they did run a major campaign to push a climate bill, they and their political allies including the president explicitly did NOT talk much about climate change, particularly doomsday messaging Environmentalists when they do appear in popular culture, especially TV, are routinely mocked. There is very little mass communication of doomsday messages online. Check out the most popular websites. General silence on the subject, and again, what coverage there is ain’t doomsday messaging. Go to the front page of the (moderately trafficked) environmental websites. Where is the doomsday? If you want to find anything approximating even modest, blunt, science-based messaging built around the scientific literature, interviews with actual climate scientists and a clear statement that we can solve this problem — well, you’ve all found it, of course, but the only people who see it are those who go looking for it. Of course, this blog is not even aimed at the general public. Probably 99% of Americans haven’t even seen one of my headlines and 99.7% haven’t read one of my climate science posts. And Climate Progress is probably the most widely read, quoted, and reposted climate science blog in the world. Anyone dropping into America from another country or another planet who started following popular culture and the news the way the overwhelming majority of Americans do would get the distinct impression that nobody who matters is terribly worried about climate change. And, of course, they’d be right — see “The failed presidency of Barack Obama, Part 2.” It is total BS that somehow the American public has been scared and overwhelmed by repeated doomsday messaging into some sort of climate fatigue. If the public’s concern has dropped — and public opinion analysis suggests it has dropped several percent (though is bouncing back a tad) — that is primarily due to the conservative media’s disinformation campaign impact on Tea Party conservatives and to the treatment of this as a nonissue by most of the rest of the media, intelligentsia and popular culture.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>a. We’re right – our impact cards are written by scientists who are peer-reviewed – it really is try or die – the alt locks in climate denial</h4><p>Romm 12 </strong>(Joe Romm is a Fellow at American Progress and is the editor of Climate Progress, which New York Times columnist Tom Friedman called "the indispensable blog" and Time magazine named one of the 25 “Best Blogs of 2010.″ In 2009, Rolling Stone put Romm #88 on its list of 100 “people who are reinventing America.” Time named him a “Hero of the Environment″ and “The Web’s most influential climate-change blogger.” Romm was acting assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy in 1997, where he oversaw $1 billion in R&D, demonstration, and deployment of low-carbon technology. He is a Senior Fellow at American Progress and holds a Ph.D. in physics from MIT., 2/26/2012, “Apocalypse Not: The Oscars, The Media And The Myth of ‘Constant Repetition of Doomsday Messages’ on Climate”, http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2012/02/26/432546/apocalypse-not-oscars-media-myth-of-repetition-of-doomsday-messages-on-climate/#more-432546)</p><p><u><mark>The</mark> two <mark>greatest myths about</mark> global <mark>warming communications are</mark> 1) <mark>constant repetition of <strong>doomsday messages</strong></mark> has been a major, ongoing strategy and 2) that strategy <mark>doesn’t work</mark> and indeed is actually counterproductive</u>! These myths are so deeply ingrained in the environmental and progressive political community that when we finally had a serious shot at a climate bill, the powers that be decided not to focus on the threat posed by climate change in any serious fashion in their $200 million communications effort (see my 6/10 post “Can you solve global warming without talking about global warming?“). <u>These myths are so deeply ingrained in the mainstream media that such messaging, when it is tried, is routinely attacked and denounced — and the flimsiest studies are interpreted exactly backwards to drive the erroneous message home</u> (see “Dire straits: Media blows the story of UC Berkeley study on climate messaging“)<u> </u>The only time anything approximating this kind of messaging — not “doomsday” but what I’d call blunt, science-based messaging that also makes clear the problem is solvable — was in 2006 and 2007 with the release of An Inconvenient Truth (and the 4 assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and media coverage like the April 2006 cover of Time). The data suggest that strategy measurably moved the public to become more concerned about the threat posed by global warming (see recent study here). You’d think it would be pretty obvious that <u><mark>the public <strong>is not going to be concerned</strong></mark> about an issue <mark>unless one explains why they should be</mark> concerned about an issue</u>. <u>And <mark>the </mark>social science <mark>lit</mark>erature,</u> including the vast literature on advertising and marketing, <u><strong><mark>could not be clearer that only repeated messages have any chance of</mark> sinking in and <mark>moving the needle</u></strong></mark>. Because <u><mark>I doubt any serious movement</mark> of public opinion or mobilization of political action <mark>could possibly occur until these myths are shattered</u></mark>, I’ll do a multipart series on this subject, featuring public opinion analysis, quotes by leading experts, and the latest social science research. Since this is Oscar night, though, it seems appropriate to start by looking at what messages the public are exposed to in popular culture and the media. It ain’t doomsday. Quite the reverse, <u><mark>climate change has been</mark> mostly an <mark>invisible</mark> issue for several years and the message of conspicuous consumption and business-as-usual reigns supreme</u>. The motivation for this post actually came up because I received an e-mail from a journalist commenting that the “constant repetition of doomsday messages” doesn’t work as a messaging strategy. I had to demur, for the reasons noted above. But it did get me thinking about what messages the public are exposed to, especially as I’ve been rushing to see the movies nominated for Best Picture this year. I am a huge movie buff, but as parents of 5-year-olds know, it isn’t easy to stay up with the latest movies. That said, good luck finding a popular movie in recent years that even touches on climate change, let alone one a popular one that would pass for doomsday messaging. Best Picture nominee The Tree of Life has been billed as an environmental movie — and even shown at environmental film festivals — but while it is certainly depressing, climate-related it ain’t. In fact, if that is truly someone’s idea of environmental movie, count me out. The closest to a genuine popular climate movie was the dreadfully unscientific The Day After Tomorrow, which is from 2004 (and arguably set back the messaging effort by putting the absurd “global cooling” notion in people’s heads! Even Avatar, the most successful movie of all time and “the most epic piece of environmental advocacy ever captured on celluloid,” as one producer put it, omits the climate doomsday message. One of my favorite eco-movies, “Wall-E, is an eco-dystopian gem and an anti-consumption movie,” but it isn’t a climate movie. I will be interested to see The Hunger Games, but I’ve read all 3 of the bestselling post-apocalyptic young adult novels — hey, that’s my job! — and they don’t qualify as climate change doomsday messaging (more on that later). So, no, the movies certainly don’t expose the public to constant doomsday messages on climate. Here are the key points about what repeated messages the American public is exposed to: <u><mark>The</mark> broad American <mark>public is exposed to</mark> virtually <strong><mark>no doomsday messages</u></strong></mark>, <u>let alone constant ones, on climate change</u> in popular culture (TV and the movies and even online). There is not one single TV show on any network devoted to this subject, which is, arguably, more consequential than any other preventable issue we face. <u>The same goes for the news media, whose coverage of climate change has collapsed</u> (see “Network News Coverage of Climate Change Collapsed in 2011“). <u>When the media do cover climate change in recent years, the overwhelming majority of coverage is devoid of any doomsday messages </u>— <u>and many outlets still feature hard-core deniers</u>. Just <u><mark>imagine what the public’s view of climate would be</mark> <mark>if it got the same coverage as</mark>, say, <mark>unemployment</mark>, the <mark>housing</mark> crisis <mark>or</mark> even <mark>the deficit</u></mark>? When was the last time you saw an “employment denier” quoted on TV or in a newspaper? <u>The public is exposed to constant messages promoting business as usual and indeed idolizing conspicuous consumption</u>. See, for instance, “Breaking: The earth is breaking … but how about that Royal Wedding? <u>Our political elite and intelligentsia</u>, including MSM pundits and the supposedly “liberal media” like, say, MSNBC, <u>hardly even talk about climate change and when they do, it isn’t doomsday</u>. Indeed, <u>there isn’t even a single national columnist for a major media outlet who writes primarily on climate. Most “liberal” columnists rarely mention it</u>. At least a quarter of the public chooses media that devote a vast amount of time to the notion that global warming is a hoax and that environmentalists are extremists and that clean energy is a joke. In the MSM, conservative pundits routinely trash climate science and mock clean energy. Just listen to, say, Joe Scarborough on MSNBC’s Morning Joe mock clean energy sometime. <u>The major energy companies bombard the airwaves with millions and millions of dollars of repetitious pro-fossil-fuel ads</u>. The <u>environmentalists spend far, far less money.</u> As noted above, <u>the one time they did run a major campaign to push a climate bill, they and their political allies including the president explicitly did NOT talk much about climate change, particularly doomsday messaging</u> <u>Environmentalists</u> when they do appear in popular culture, especially TV, <u>are routinely mocked</u>. <u>There is very little mass communication of doomsday messages online</u>. Check out the most popular websites. General silence on the subject, and again, what coverage there is ain’t doomsday messaging. Go to the front page of the (moderately trafficked) environmental websites. Where is the doomsday? <u>If you want to find anything approximating </u>even modes<u>t, blunt, science-based messaging built around the scientific literature, interviews with actual climate scientists and a clear statement that we can solve this problem</u> — well, you’ve all found it, of course, <u>but the only people who see it are those who go looking for it</u>. Of course, this blog is not even aimed at the general public. Probably 99% of Americans haven’t even seen one of my headlines and 99.7% haven’t read one of my climate science posts. And Climate Progress is probably the most widely read, quoted, and reposted climate science blog in the world. <u>Anyone dropping into America from another country or another planet who started following popular culture and the news the way the overwhelming majority of Americans do would get the distinct impression that <strong><mark>nobody who matters is terribly worried about climate change</u></strong></mark>. And, of course, they’d be right — see “The failed presidency of Barack Obama, Part 2.” <u><mark>It is <strong>total BS</strong> that</mark> somehow <mark>the </mark>American <mark>public <strong>has been scared </mark>and overwhelmed by repeated doomsday messaging <mark>into</mark> some sort of <mark>climate fatigue</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>If the public’s concern has dropped</u></mark> — and public opinion analysis suggests it has dropped several percent (though is bouncing back a tad) — <u><mark>that is <strong>primarily due to the conservative media’s disinformation</strong> <strong>campaign</strong></mark> impact on Tea Party conservatives and to the treatment of this as a nonissue by most of the rest of the media, intelligentsia and popular culture</u>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Campbell 2012 (Fiona Kumari Campbell, Associate Professor in Law for Griffith Law School, and a Adjunct Professor in Disability Studies at the University of Kelaniya. "Stalking Ableism: Using Disability to Expose 'Abled' Narcissism." In the book "Disability and Social Theory: New Developments and Directions." Chapter 13. Palgrave McMillan, 2012. Brackets in article) fulltext: Difference can be a vexed issue even within modern liberal societies. The tendency for many people is still to emulate or at least appear to refashion normative ways of being. Much of the intellectual traffic for the rethinking of disability in terms of anti-sociality has emerged through debates about the merits of social inclusion and liberal notions of equality and resilience strategies to break the abled stranglehold. Legal theorists like Ruth Colker who argues that anti-subordination rather than integration should be the measure of equality are the exception (Colker, 2006). There is limited work within disability studies, especially in approaches influenced by the social model of disability or social role valorisation theory, that take a trans-integration or post-normalisation perspective. What if we turned our backs on ‘fitting in’ – what would be the opportunities, the consequences and maybe dangers, to give ‘attention to the lived intricacies of embodiment offer[ing] alternatives to normalization efforts aimed at homogenizing social outsiders (Snyder & Mitchell, 2010, 113)’? For this imaginative undertaking it is necessary to turn to the theoretical work by other ‘outsider’ groups – queer theorists. Spearheading the critique of the ‘different but same’ stance of social justice formulations are ‘anti-social’ queer theorists (Bersani, 1986, 1996; Edelman, 2004; Halberstam, 2005, 2008; Muñoz, 2007). This section will outline some of the conceptual drivers of the anti-social argument and their adoption for developing an anti-sociality posture of disability. Leo Bersani’s seminal work (1986, 1996) formulated an anti-social, negative and anti-relational theory of sexuality. These works along with the writings of Edelman (2004), Halberstam (2005, 2008) and Muñoz (2007) set the stage for the decoupling of queer marginality from the liberal projects of tolerance and social inclusion. Before moving into a consideration of how certain conceptual renderings may be applied to the disability situation, it is useful to familiarise ourselves with how the neologism queer is understood by anti-social theorists. Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive does not indicate the parameters of queer, but concludes that ‘queerness can never define an identity; it can only ever disturb one’ (2004: 17). Queer, while originating from the purview of diverse sexualities, easily extends to other kindred forms of ontological and corporeal aberrancies and ambiguities (such as disability). So it is right for Halberstam (2005: 6) to embrace a more elastic connotation of queer which refers to ‘non-normative logics and organizations of community, sexual identity, embodiment and activity in space and time’. From this reckoning, the disabled person is already queered. Queer, then is antitheoretical to the regime of ableist translation. In a world that makes claims to integrity using the argument based on equality as sameness (we are normal, we are everyday people), it would seem a bit bold or offensive to suggest that people with disability are different from the run-of-mill ableist norm emulators. Ahmed (2006) points to an alternate prism, a ‘migrant orientation’ to capture a disorientation faced by queer folk which I extend to include disabled people. The disorientation, a form of radical estrangement propels a lived experience of facing at least two directions: towards a home that has been lost (the desire to emulate ableist norms), and to a place that is not yet home. Regimes of ableism have produced a depth of disability negation that reaches into the caverns of collective subjectivity to the extent that disability negativity is seen as a ‘naturalized’ reaction to an aberration. Not negating queerness or disability can cultivate alternate kinds of liberty that de-identify with the rhetoric of social inclusion. A key marker of the anti-social turn is temporality – contemporarity and futurity – an explication of the current marginal stance and the vision for future. It is this orientation of predicament and utopianism that can speak to the disability realm. For disability, utopianism is a conflicted zone – there is no future existence, disability dreaming is expunged and the utopian drive is a device for promise (of curability), hence extinction of the impairment state. Jose Esteban Muñoz (2007: 453) in speculating about the absence of a queer imagination elicits a desire to engage in a queer horizon, a utopian hermeneutics where re-imagining futurity requires that ‘the not quite conscious is the realm of potentiality that must be called upon’. The distance between imagination and potentiality means that ‘queerness is not quite here’. Our imaginations are not yet exhausted. Muñoz explains: to argue that we are not quite queer yet, that queerness, what we will know as queerness, does not yet exist. I suggest that holding queerness, in a sort of ontologically humble state, under a conceptual grid wherein we do not claim to always already know queerness in the world, potentially staves off the ossifying effects of neoliberal ideology. (Muñoz, 2007: 454) How does an alternative horizon for disabled people come to be formulated? Living in the now and not yet, as outsiders, not quite inside, requires a disposition or habit of contemporariness. Contemporariness signifies a relationship with the present but also a distance, a critical space from it. As Agamben explains: Those who are truly contemporary, who truly belong to their time, are those who neither perfectly coincide with it nor adjust themselves to its demands. They are in this sense irrelevant [inattuale]. But precisely because of this condition, precisely through this disconnection and this anachronism, they are more capable than others of perceiving and grasping their own time. (2009: 40) Disabled people are called to live as contemporaries. The queering or cripping of contemporariness is the grasping and holding tight to ambivalence and obscurity so fundamental to the alternate lifestyle which is obtained through fixing the gaze not on our era’s light but the underbelly, or in Agamben’s language ‘darkness’ – which shines into the staree. In this sense, the contemporary queered and cripped person, in touching an elusive imaginary, sees the now and the emergent not as a death drive, but in terms of unlivedness: The present is nothing other than this unlived element in everything that is lived. That which impedes access to the present is precisely the mass of what for some reason … we have not managed to live. The attention to this ‘unlived’ is the life of the contemporary. (Agamben, 2009: 51) The matter of re-imagining a disability or cripped horizon, a future without the stain of ableism, although elusive and out of grasp, is nonetheless fundamental in order to move to hopefulness and capture that unlived possibility in the lives of many with disability. Can the so-called shadows of a disabled life be sites of invigoration? What is ‘unlived’ in our lives? Crippin’ the human involves a differential gaze – where sometimes signs and gestures predominate, where there is a different mind style such as Tourette’s syndrome or autism, or a centring on visuality or tactility. A grounded earthiness can be ‘different’ through echolocation and waist heightedness. Halberstam (2008) speaks of acts of unbecoming. Through what she describes as ‘wilfully eccentric modes of being’, it is worth conjuring and queering concepts of passivity held against disabled people, as a refusal to live up to ableist expectations of performativity: [I]n a performance of radical passivity, we witness the willingness of the subject to actually come undone, to dramatise unbecoming for the other so that the viewer does not have to witness unbecoming as a function of her own body. (Halberstam, 2008: 151) This radical passivity, for disabled people, would indeed have to be radical, as disabled people already live under the enormous weight of being characterised as passive. It is a tough ask to claw back and produce a cripped notion of passivity. Sunny Taylor does this in her quest for the right not to work: I have a confession to make: I do not work. I am on SSI [social security benefit]. I have very little work value (if any), and I am a drain on our country’s welfare system. I have another confession to make: I do not think this is wrong, and to be honest, I am very happy not working. Instead I spend the majority of my time doing the activity I find the most rewarding and valuable, painting. (Taylor, 2004: 30) Such strange temporalities, imaginative life schedules present alternative temporalities which disability studies scholars have all along known, disrupt the parameters of the human (Halberstam, 2005; Campbell, 2009; McRuer, 2006). Having said this, it is all the more extraordinary that disabled people have not yielded to this repression but have resisted docility and engaged in transgressive ways of living disability. Ableism is founded on a utopian hermeneutics of the desirable and the disgusting and therefore it is, as Halberstam (2008: 153) puts it, necessary to inculcate alternative political imaginaries. McRuer (2008) drew my attention to the way Halberstam’s perspective can incorporate disability as also outside the lifecycle: I try to use the concept of queer time to make clear how respectability, and notions of the normal on which it depends, may be upheld by a middle-class logic of reproductive temporality. And so, in Western cultures, we chart the emergence of the adult from the dangerous and unruly period of adolescence as a desired process of maturation; and we create longevity as the most desirable future, applaud the pursuit of long life (under any circumstances), and pathologize modes of living that show little or no concern for longevity. Within the life cycle of the Western human subject, long periods of stability are considered to be desirable, and people who live in rapid bursts (drug addicts, for example) are characterized as immature and even dangerous. (Halberstam, 2005: 4–5) Cripped time can be staggered, frenzied, coded, meandering and be the distance between two events. Some of our time is shaped according to another’s doing – service time – the segmenting and waiting on assistive agencies. Aside from service time, there is a transient time whereby our cripped selves rub up against biology, environmental barriers and relationality. Like queerness, the lifecycle refuses patterning – there is a different vision with localised goals. Instead of proposing argument based on normalisation and similarity to the heteronormative (and by extension ableist normativity), Edelman (2004) proposes a politics of negativity, on the basis that queers, as outsiders, are embodied differently having counter-intuitive, queered forms of negative knowing (Halberstam, 2008: 141). Edelman implores queers to be norm resisters, to come out from normative shadows and fess up to futurist ‘inability’: ‘instead of fighting this characterization by dragging queerness into recognition, he proposes that we embrace the negativity’ (Halberstam, 2008: 141). Relinquishing the norm as a lost cause enables an outlaw flowering of beingness that is anti-social.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Vote negative to affirm radical failure and total pessimism – to affirm the idea that the failure of disability to conform to normative standards is something that is beautiful which is in opposition to the world’s biopolitical portrayal of disability.</h4><p><strong>Campbell</strong> 20<strong>12</strong> (Fiona Kumari Campbell, Associate Professor in Law for Griffith Law School, and a Adjunct Professor in Disability Studies at the University of Kelaniya. "Stalking Ableism: Using Disability to Expose 'Abled' Narcissism." In the book "Disability and Social Theory: New Developments and Directions." Chapter 13. Palgrave McMillan, 2012. Brackets in article) </p><p>Difference can be a vexed issue even within modern liberal societies. The tendency for many people is still to emulate or at least appear to refashion normative ways of being. Much of the intellectual traffic for the rethinking of disability in terms of anti-sociality has emerged through debates about the merits of social inclusion and liberal notions of equality and resilience strategies to break the abled stranglehold. Legal theorists like Ruth Colker who argues that anti-subordination rather than integration should be the measure of equality are the exception (Colker, 2006). There is limited work within disability studies, especially in approaches influenced by the social model of disability or social role valorisation theory, that take a trans-integration or post-normalisation perspective. <u><strong><mark>What if we turned our backs on ‘fitting in’</u></strong></mark> – what would be the opportunities, the consequences and maybe dangers, to give ‘attention to the lived intricacies of embodiment offer[ing] alternatives to normalization efforts aimed at homogenizing social outsiders (Snyder & Mitchell, 2010, 113)’? For this imaginative undertaking it is necessary to turn to the theoretical work by other ‘outsider’ groups – queer theorists. Spearheading the critique of the ‘different but same’ stance of social justice formulations are ‘anti-social’ queer theorists (Bersani, 1986, 1996; Edelman, 2004; Halberstam, 2005, 2008; Muñoz, 2007). This section will outline some of the conceptual drivers of the anti-social argument and their adoption for developing an anti-sociality posture of disability. Leo Bersani’s seminal work (1986, 1996) formulated an anti-social, negative and anti-relational theory of sexuality. <u>These works along with the writings of Edelman (2004), Halberstam (2005, 2008) and Muñoz (2007) set the stage for the decoupling of queer marginality from the liberal projects of tolerance and social inclusion.</u> Before moving into a consideration of how certain conceptual renderings may be applied to the disability situation, it is useful to familiarise ourselves with how the neologism queer is understood by anti-social theorists. Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive does not indicate the parameters of queer, but concludes that ‘queerness can never define an identity; it can only ever disturb one’ (2004: 17). Queer, while originating from the purview of diverse sexualities, easily extends to other kindred forms of ontological and corporeal aberrancies and ambiguities (such as disability). So it is right for Halberstam (2005: 6) to embrace a more elastic connotation of queer which refers to ‘non-normative logics and organizations of community, sexual identity, embodiment and activity in space and time’. From this reckoning, <u><strong><mark>the disabled person is already queered</u></strong></mark>. Queer, then is antitheoretical to the regime of ableist translation<u>. <mark>In a world that makes claims to integrity</mark> using the argument <mark>based on equality as sameness</mark> (we are normal, we are everyday people), it would seem a bit bold or offensive to suggest that people with disability are different from the run-of-mill ableist norm emulators.</u> Ahmed (2006) points to an alternate prism, a ‘migrant orientation’ to capture a disorientation faced by queer folk which I extend to include disabled people. The disorientation, a form of radical estrangement propels a lived experience of facing at least two directions: towards a home that has been lost (the desire to emulate ableist norms), and to a place that is not yet home. Regimes of ableism have produced a depth of disability negation that reaches into the caverns of collective subjectivity to the extent that disability negativity is seen as a ‘naturalized’ reaction to an aberration. <u><strong>Not negating queerness or disability can cultivate alternate kinds of liberty that de-identify with the rhetoric of social inclusion. A key marker of the anti-social turn is temporality – contemporarity and futurity – an explication of the current marginal stance and the vision for future.</u></strong> It is this orientation of predicament and utopianism that can speak to the disability realm. For disability, utopianism is a conflicted zone – <u><strong><mark>there is no future existence</u></strong></mark>, <u>disability dreaming is expunged and <mark>the utopian drive is a device for promise</mark> (of curability), hence <mark>extinction of the impairment state</mark>.</u> Jose Esteban Muñoz (2007: 453) in speculating about the absence of a queer imagination elicits a desire to engage in a queer horizon, a utopian hermeneutics where re-imagining futurity requires that ‘the not quite conscious is the realm of potentiality that must be called upon’. The distance between imagination and potentiality means that ‘queerness is not quite here’. Our imaginations are not yet exhausted. Muñoz explains: to argue that we are not quite queer yet, that queerness, what we will know as queerness, does not yet exist. I suggest that holding queerness, in a sort of ontologically humble state, under a conceptual grid wherein we do not claim to always already know queerness in the world, potentially staves off the ossifying effects of neoliberal ideology. (Muñoz, 2007: 454) How does an alternative horizon for disabled people come to be formulated? Living in the now and not yet, as outsiders, not quite inside, requires a disposition or habit of contemporariness. Contemporariness signifies a relationship with the present but also a distance, a critical space from it. As Agamben explains: Those who are truly contemporary, who truly belong to their time, are those who neither perfectly coincide with it nor adjust themselves to its demands. They are in this sense irrelevant [inattuale]. But precisely because of this condition, precisely through this disconnection and this anachronism, they are more capable than others of perceiving and grasping their own time. (2009: 40) Disabled people are called to live as contemporaries. The queering or cripping of contemporariness is the grasping and holding tight to ambivalence and obscurity so fundamental to the alternate lifestyle which is obtained through fixing the gaze not on our era’s light but the underbelly, or in Agamben’s language ‘darkness’ – which shines into the staree. In this sense, the contemporary queered and cripped person, in touching an elusive imaginary, sees the now and the emergent not as a death drive, but in terms of unlivedness: The present is nothing other than this unlived element in everything that is lived. That which impedes access to the present is precisely the mass of what for some reason … we have not managed to live. The attention to this ‘unlived’ is the life of the contemporary. (Agamben, 2009: 51) The matter of re-imagining a disability or cripped horizon, a future without the stain of ableism, although elusive and out of grasp, is nonetheless fundamental in order to move to hopefulness and capture that unlived possibility in the lives of many with disability. Can the so-called shadows of a disabled life be sites of invigoration? What is ‘unlived’ in our lives? Crippin’ the human involves a differential gaze – where sometimes signs and gestures predominate, where there is a different mind style such as Tourette’s syndrome or autism, or a centring on visuality or tactility. A grounded earthiness can be ‘different’ through echolocation and waist heightedness. Halberstam (2008) speaks of acts of unbecoming. Through what she describes as ‘wilfully eccentric modes of being’, it is worth conjuring and queering concepts of passivity held against disabled people, as a refusal to live up to ableist expectations of performativity: [I]n a performance of radical passivity, we witness the willingness of the subject to actually come undone, to dramatise unbecoming for the other so that the viewer does not have to witness unbecoming as a function of her own body. (Halberstam, 2008: 151) This radical passivity, for disabled people, would indeed have to be radical, as disabled people already live under the enormous weight of being characterised as passive. It is a tough ask to claw back and produce a cripped notion of passivity. Sunny Taylor does this in her quest for the right not to work: I have a confession to make: I do not work. I am on SSI [social security benefit]. I have very little work value (if any), and I am a drain on our country’s welfare system. I have another confession to make: I do not think this is wrong, and to be honest, I am very happy not working. Instead I spend the majority of my time doing the activity I find the most rewarding and valuable, painting. (Taylor, 2004: 30) Such strange temporalities, imaginative life schedules present alternative temporalities which disability studies scholars have all along known, disrupt the parameters of the human (Halberstam, 2005; Campbell, 2009; McRuer, 2006). Having said this, it is all the more extraordinary that disabled people have not yielded to this repression but have resisted docility and engaged in transgressive ways of living disability. <u><strong><mark>Ableism is founded on a utopian hermeneutics of the desirable and the disgusting</mark> </strong>and therefore it is, as Halberstam (2008: 153) puts it, necessary to inculcate alternative political imaginaries. McRuer (2008) drew my attention to the way Halberstam’s perspective can incorporate disability as also outside the lifecycle: I try to use the concept of queer time to make clear how respectability, and notions of the normal on which it depends, may be upheld by a middle-class logic of reproductive temporality.</u> <u>And so, <mark>in Western cultures</mark>, <mark>we chart the emergence</mark> of the adult <mark>from the</mark> dangerous and <mark>unruly period of adolescence as a desired process</mark> of maturation; and we create longevity as the most desirable future, <mark>applaud the pursuit of long life</mark> (under any circumstances), <mark>and pathologize modes of living that show little or no concern for longevity</mark>. Within the life cycle of the Western human subject, long periods of stability are considered to be desirable, and <mark>people who live in rapid bursts</mark> (drug addicts, for example<mark>) are characterized as </mark>immature and even <mark>dangerous</mark>. </u>(Halberstam, 2005: 4–5) Cripped time can be staggered, frenzied, coded, meandering and be the distance between two events. Some of our time is shaped according to another’s doing – service time – the segmenting and waiting on assistive agencies. Aside from service time, there is a transient time whereby our cripped selves rub up against biology, environmental barriers and relationality. Like queerness, the lifecycle refuses patterning – there is a different vision with localised goals. Instead of proposing argument based on normalisation and similarity to the heteronormative (and by extension ableist normativity), Edelman (2004) proposes <u><mark>a politics of negativity</u></mark>, on the basis that queers, as outsiders, are embodied differently having counter-intuitive, queered forms of negative knowing (Halberstam, 2008: 141). Edelman implores queers to be norm resisters, <u><mark>to come out from normative shadows and fess up to futurist ‘inability’</u></mark>: <u><strong><mark>‘instead of fighting this characterization by dragging queerness into recognition, </mark>he proposes that<mark> we embrace the negativity’</u></strong></mark> (Halberstam, 2008: 141). Relinquishing the norm as a lost cause enables an outlaw flowering of beingness that is anti-social.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Miller 17, Gina Miller, She has written articles and provided interviews on the subject of nanotechnology and created digital artwork, videos and animations to illustrate future applications. Her work has been featured in various media including the History Channel, Japanese television, international documentaries, Wired, PC Magazine, Fast Company, and various books such as “Nanofuture” by J. Storrs Hall, the inventor of the “utility fog” concept. Miller has collaborated with other nanotechnology pioneers such as Robert A. Freitas Jr., author of “Nanomedicine,” and is a frequent collaborator of the Foresight Institute co-founded by K. Eric Drexler the “founding father of nanotechnology”.. 2-26-2017, accessed on 1-28-2021, Nanotechnology Industries, "Nanotechnology, the real science of miracles, the end of disease, aging, poverty and pollution - Nanotechnology Industries", http://nanoindustries.com/nanotechnology_science_of_miracles/ //Adam fulltext: The current status of disease and death is staggering. We do know that in the documented world 56 million people die every year. Dissecting the statistics of disease provided by the World Health Organization is overwhelming to weed through. There is a solution. Or there may be in the future. One day there could be a cure for all disease, and you may be able to live forever, in a healthy youthful state. One day it may be possible that scientists will be able to create nanorobots using nanotechnology. Nanotechnology is the ability to see and move atoms around. Everything is made of atoms, the chair you are sitting in, your food, your body, the air we breathe, everything. Atoms are so small they cannot be seen by the human eye. Atoms are on the nanoscale, that's a teeny, tiny size. There are 25,400,000 nanometers in an inch, a sheet of newspaper is 100,000 nanometers thick, human hair is about 80,000 nanometers in diameter. Atoms are the building blocks. Different atoms, arranged in different ways, make molecules that make the different things you see and experience. In the human body atoms come together to make many things, for example water, fats, hair, bones, and DNA. DNA and other molecules build cells; sometimes cells malfunction and cause disease. Where does nanotechnology fit in? That's a self realizing question, that's how, it fits in! Think of it this way, if you were King Kong, could you grab one grain of sand easily? Your hands would be too big. That's how medicine is currently treating disease. Nanotechnology is on the same size and scale as disease. A nanorobot can grab a cell and repair it. This will allow us to cure diseases that have never been cured before. Nanorobots could be released into the blood stream via pill or injection to find and repair damage and then break down and disintegrate. Or nanorobots could remain in the body at all times, perpetually monitoring, identifying and repairing problems immediately, without any external treatment. Nanorobots would cure the aliment so early on that you would never even know you were going to get sick. Chemotherapy releases toxic chemicals throughout the entire body rather than just the affected area, such as a tumor. This process destroys the cancer but also the immune system. Chemotherapy makes patients very sick, and there is risk of permanent damage or death from the treatment itself. There is also a risk of the cancer returning. A nanorobot could have radiation inside of it, locate the tumor, inject it and destroy it directly. Molecular nanorobots wouldn't leave one cancerous cell behind. That's one of the benefits of getting down to the molecular level. Doctors cannot see on the molecular level and could easily miss some cancer cells, which is often the case and the cancer returns. A nanotech gene therapy has successfully killed ovarian cancer in mice; if successful in human clinical trials it could save the lives of 15000 women a year. But it doesn't stop with cancer. Every disease is made out of the same atoms that everything else is. All medical conditions are a result of atoms being out of place; a nanorobot could put them back where they belong, thus immediately alleviating the problem without the side effects that current day medication and treatments cause. What else can be repaired in the human body? EVERYTHING. From cancer to the common cold. There is nothing that nanotechnology could not repair. The injuries or illnesses you have right now will have the capability to be repaired or cured by nanotechnology. Nanotechnology could eliminate diseases, disabilities, and illnesses such as diabetes, malaria, HIV, cardiovascular disease, damage from injuries and accidents, heal wounds, reduce child mortality, regenerate limbs and organs, eliminate inflammatory/infectious diseases, and so on and so forth. Nanotechnology offers hope to people suffering from Alzheimer’s, Parkinson's, brain injuries, tumors and neurological disorders. Nanoconstructs could deliver neuroprotective molecules directly to the brain to recover or protect nerve cells from damage or degeneration. Nanotechnology has been emerging in this field in the form of nanoengineered scaffolds that could one day result in a tool for rewiring the intricate neuronal network. Research by Dr. Samuel I. Stupp designed molecules using nanomaterials and injected them into mice who were paralyzed due to spinal cord injury. After 6 weeks the mice regained the ability to walk. Research like this could one day evolve into real cures for people. 65 billion dollars is wasted every year due to low bioavailability. Meaning that the drug or treatment used is not absorbed into or accessed by the body properly due to a multitude of reasons. For example drug interactions, different molecular arrangements and manufacturing processes by different brands. Drugs with more moisture may form lumps in the stomach which decreases absorption, and a highly compressed pill will slow absorption. Different level changes in the body at any given time may cause drug toxicity. Metabolism, age, activity, stress, previous surgery and syndromes are also factors. These are huge challenges that can be alleviated by using nanotechnology to target the specific areas. Nanorobots can take their cues from mother nature; she is the first nanotechnologist. She is an expert at creating molecular machines. Geneticists have been taking advantage of viruses for use in gene therapy for some time. They modify a virus by removing the viral gene so it doesn't cause disease. They replace it with healthy genes to transport to the faulty cell and cure diseases. This strategy of hacking viruses could be exploited by nanotech. Viruses are biological molecular machines that could be modified into becoming nanorobots or they could become transportation for a nanorobot. Another means is a nanorobot could attach itself to a traveling white blood cell and ride shotgun to assist in the tissue repair of injured tissue. Nanotechnology could even be involved in tissue engineering, creating scaffolds for artificial organs and implants. Tissue from your own body could be used to make new tissue, which assures that your body doesn't reject it. The surgeries of today are painful, costly, can leave scars and can even be life threatening. Repairing nanorobots would eliminate the need for surgeries, incisions, side effects and recovery time. According to the American Academy of Periodontology there are links to poor dental health and stroke, heart disease, respiratory disease, osteoporosis, some cancers and diabetes. Nanorobots as nanodentistry could repair damage without large needles or drills. Nanorobots could also constantly and invisibly maintain and clean your teeth to avoid any dental problems. Hygiene is important for good health; your skin and hair could be cleaned by nanorobots eliminating the need for showers. Spider bites and ticks carrying lyme disease would be detected by nanorobots, blocking penetration. Other skin problems such as eczema would be repaired by dermal nanorobots. Is aging a disease? Could aging be cured? Yes. Since nanorobots would be able to repair single cells on the molecular level they would be able to repair damages created by aging. It's all the same to a nanorobot. Nanotechnology could repair damaged cells. Dead cells are the primary reason for aging and death; nanorobots could replace senescent (old) cells with non-senescent cells, or reprogram cells so they do not senescensce, which would keep the body from aging. Not only would the inside of your body never get sick or age, but neither will the outside. Your skin will be young, elastic, dewy and wrinkle-free. Your hair will be thick, without gray, and intact. Your hearing, your eyesight and memory will be in perfect shape. You wouldn't get arthritis, turkey neck, or saggy parts. You could go out dancing when you are 93 and not worry about sore feet, low energy or suffering any consequences. Unless you party too hard, but that's on you, not the nano. So if you never get sick and never get old could you live forever? Yes. nanorobots could be programmed to rebuild older cells into younger copies on a regular basis thereby the human body could become immortal. You could live a disease-free youthful life, forever. Of course immortality isn't for everyone and everyone should have the right to decide what they want or don't want for their own body. Death will be a choice rather than a requirement. There are well funded countries that have access to researchers and high tech equipment that would love to figure out how to create the nanotechnology that will repair bodies and end disease. In the US despite having a lot of financial resources it's not always easy to get funding. If you are at a university, you need to write a grant, go through a lot of red tape, and there are a lot more near-term projects that seem to get prioritized when it comes to funding. For companies looking for investors, unfortunately not all investors can foresee the amazing future that nano will have because they are used to funding things they can see. For example a company that makes desks seeking an investor can show the investor the money they need for each piece of wood, bolt, and the quantity of desks that will be manufactured within a specific time frame. Nanotechnology is in development and isn't readily available like a piece of wood, the piece of wood has to be built. And the individual processes of each emerging development will have their own variables. Once the recipe has been figured out and formulated, the investment we have made will then be very inexpensive and easy to reproduce. Third world countries would have easy access to nanomedicine. Mother nature puts atoms together all the time and it doesn't cost her anything. The raw materials for making nanorobots would be essentially cost-free because they will be made mostly of carbon. Because nanotechnology would be created on the very small atomic level, traveling to provide treatment would not require large equipment. The size and portability would make treatment easily accessible across the world. The environment and living conditions also impact health. Since nanotechnology is on the atomic level and atoms are everywhere, it can be beneficial to the world all around us, as well as our bodies. Nanotechnology could enrich depleted soil in places like Africa, which is currently facing a food crisis. Vitamins, nutrients and minerals could be delivered to rebuild soil to a fertile state and thus have the ability to grow food. Hunger could one day be a solvable problem. Nanotechnology would make it possible to provide meat and animal products inexpensively without killing animals. E.coli and other pathogens could be detected in soil and eliminated so that food is not harmful. Currently nanomaterials are in development to release fertilizers for plants and nutrients for livestock, nano sensors for monitoring the health of crops and farm animals, and magnetic nanoparticles to remove soil contaminants. According to water.org 750 million people around the world lack access to safe water; approximately one in nine people. 840,000 people die each year from water-related disease. A portable non-chemical nano-filtration water purification device has been developed by Micheal Pritchard. It creates safe and sterile water out of dirty water and would make the cost of water per household an estimated 3 dollars a year. His company has provided clean water to countries who have gone through natural disasters, such as Haiti and the Philippines. In the future nanotechnology particles could destroy bacteria that often cause fatal disease. Pollution in general, global warming, nuclear waste, oil spills, smog, and acid rain, could be remedied and prevented by nanotechnological advances. Large quantities of nanorobots could come together to remove pollutant atoms from the atmosphere, earth and water. These groups of nanorobots could swim in contaminated waters and be released into the polluted atmosphere to destroy or remove contaminating molecules. Nanorobots could pull apart the bad molecules and reassemble the atoms into good molecules for other positive purposes. As a first indicator of the possibility, Brian Mercer created a new pollution control technology using nanofibres that greatly reduce industrial pollution by trapping and removing the pollutants. Currently nanotech is being used to reduce emissions from car fuels. Since nanotechnology builds atom by atom; the process is pollution free. Nanotechnology will not be manufactured in the way we use manufacturing plants today. There will be no chemical by product, no emission, hazardous waste and no pollution.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Transhumanism enables immortality</h4><p><strong>Miller 17,</strong> Gina Miller, She has written articles and provided interviews on the subject of nanotechnology and created digital artwork, videos and animations to illustrate future applications. Her work has been featured in various media including the History Channel, Japanese television, international documentaries, Wired, PC Magazine, Fast Company, and various books such as “Nanofuture” by J. Storrs Hall, the inventor of the “utility fog” concept. Miller has collaborated with other nanotechnology pioneers such as Robert A. Freitas Jr., author of “Nanomedicine,” and is a frequent collaborator of the Foresight Institute co-founded by K. Eric Drexler the “founding father of nanotechnology”.. 2-26-2017, accessed on 1-28-2021, Nanotechnology Industries, "Nanotechnology, the real science of miracles, the end of disease, aging, poverty and pollution - Nanotechnology Industries", http://nanoindustries.com/nanotechnology_science_of_miracles/ //Adam</p><p><u>The current status of disease and death is staggering.</u> We do know that in the documented world <u><strong>56 million people die every year</strong>.</u> Dissecting the statistics of disease provided by the World Health Organization is overwhelming to weed through. There is a solution. Or there may be in the future. One day <u>there <strong><mark>could be a cure for all disease</mark>, and you may be able to live forever</strong>, in a healthy youthful state. One day it may be possible that <mark>scientists will</mark> be able to <mark>create nanorobots</mark> using nanotechnology.</u> Nanotechnology is the ability to see and move atoms around. <u>Everything is made of atoms, the chair you are sitting in, your food, your body, the air we breathe, everything. </u>Atoms are so small they cannot be seen by the human eye. Atoms are on the nanoscale, that's a teeny, tiny size. There are 25,400,000 nanometers in an inch, a sheet of newspaper is 100,000 nanometers thick, human hair is about 80,000 nanometers in diameter. <u>Atoms are the building blocks. Different atoms, arranged in different ways, make molecules that make the different things you see and experience.</u> In the human body atoms come together to make many things, for example water, fats, hair, bones, and DNA. <u>DNA and other molecules build cells; sometimes cells malfunction and cause disease.</u> Where does nanotechnology fit in? That's a self realizing question, that's how, it fits in! Think of it this way, if you were King Kong, could you grab one grain of sand easily? Your hands would be too big. That's how medicine is currently treating disease. Nanotechnology is on the same size and scale as disease<u>. A <mark>nanorobot can grab a cell and repair it</mark>. This will <strong><mark>allow us to cure diseases</strong></mark> that have <mark>never</mark> been <mark>cured before</mark>. Nanorobots could be <mark>released into</mark> the <mark>blood stream</mark> via pill or injection <mark>to</mark> find and <mark>repair damage</mark> and then break down and disintegrate.</u> Or nanorobots <u>could remain in the body at all times, <mark>perpetually</mark> monitoring, identifying and <strong><mark>repairing problems immediately</u></strong></mark>, without any external treatment. Nanorobots would cure the aliment so early on that <u>you would <strong>never even know you were going to get sick.</u></strong> Chemotherapy releases toxic chemicals throughout the entire body rather than just the affected area, such as a tumor. This process destroys the cancer but also the immune system. Chemotherapy makes patients very sick, and there is risk of permanent damage or death from the treatment itself. There is also a risk of the cancer returning. <u>A nanorobot could have radiation inside of it, locate the tumor, inject it and destroy it directly.</u> Molecular nanorobots wouldn't leave one cancerous cell behind. That's one of the benefits of getting down to the molecular level. <u>Doctors cannot see on the molecular level and could easily miss some cancer</u> cells, which is often the case and the cancer returns. <u>A nanotech gene therapy <strong>has successfully killed ovarian cancer in mice</u></strong>; if successful in human clinical trials it <u>could save the lives of 15000 women a year.</u> But it <u>doesn't stop with cancer. <mark>Every disease is made</mark> out <mark>of</mark> the same <mark>atoms</mark> that everything else is.</u> <u>All medical conditions are a result of atoms being out of place; a nanorobot could put them back where they belong</u>, thus immediately alleviating the problem without the side effects that current day medication and treatments cause. <u>What else can be repaired in the human body? EVERYTHING. From cancer to the common cold. <mark>There is nothing</mark> that <mark>nanotechnology</mark> <mark>could not repair.</mark> </u>The injuries or illnesses you have right now will have the capability to be repaired or cured by nanotechnology. <u>Nanotechnology could <strong><mark>eliminate diseases,</mark> <mark>disabilities</strong></mark>, and illnesses such as diabetes, malaria, HIV, cardiovascular disease, damage from injuries and accidents, <strong><mark>heal wounds</mark>,</strong> reduce child mortality, <strong><mark>regenerate limbs</strong></mark> and organs, eliminate inflammatory/<mark>infectious diseases</mark>, and so on and so forth.</u> Nanotechnology offers hope to people suffering from Alzheimer’s, Parkinson's, brain injuries, tumors and neurological disorders. <u>Nanoconstructs could <mark>deliver</mark> <mark>neuroprotective molecules</mark> directly to the brain <mark>to</mark> recover or <mark>protect nerve cells from damage</mark> or degeneration. </u>Nanotechnology has been emerging in this field in the form of nanoengineered scaffolds that could one day result in a tool for rewiring the intricate neuronal network. Research by Dr. Samuel I. Stupp designed molecules using nanomaterials and injected them into mice who were paralyzed due to spinal cord injury. After 6 weeks the mice regained the ability to walk. Research like this could one day evolve into real cures for people. 65 billion dollars is wasted every year due to low bioavailability. Meaning that the drug or treatment used is not absorbed into or accessed by the body properly due to a multitude of reasons. For example drug interactions, different molecular arrangements and manufacturing processes by different brands. Drugs with more moisture may form lumps in the stomach which decreases absorption, and a highly compressed pill will slow absorption. Different level changes in the body at any given time may cause drug toxicity. Metabolism, age, activity, stress, previous surgery and syndromes are also factors. These are huge challenges that can be alleviated by using nanotechnology to target the specific areas. Nanorobots can take their cues from mother nature; she is the first nanotechnologist. She is an expert at creating molecular machines. Geneticists have been taking advantage of viruses for use in gene therapy for some time. They <u>modify a virus by removing the viral gene so it doesn't cause disease. </u>They <u>replace it with healthy genes to transport to the faulty cell and cure diseases. </u>This strategy of hacking viruses could be exploited by nanotech. Viruses are biological molecular machines that could be modified into becoming nanorobots or they could become transportation for a nanorobot. Another means is a <u>nanorobot could attach itself to a traveling white blood cell and ride shotgun to assist in the tissue repair of injured tissue</u>. Nanotechnology could even be involved in tissue engineering, creating scaffolds for artificial organs and implants. Tissue from your own body could be used to make new tissue, which assures that your body doesn't reject it. The surgeries of today are painful, costly, can leave scars and can even be life threatening. Repairing <u>nanorobots would eliminate the need for surgeries, incisions, side effects and recovery time</u>. According to the American Academy of Periodontology there are links to poor dental health and stroke, heart disease, respiratory disease, osteoporosis, some cancers and diabetes. Nanorobots as nanodentistry could repair damage without large needles or drills. Nanorobots could also constantly and invisibly maintain and clean your teeth to avoid any dental problems. Hygiene is important for good health; your skin and hair could be cleaned by nanorobots eliminating the need for showers. <u>Spider bites and ticks carrying lyme disease would be detected by nanorobots, blocking penetration</u>. Other skin problems such as eczema would be repaired by dermal nanorobots. Is aging a disease? <u>Could aging be cured? Yes. Since nanorobots would be able to repair single cells on the molecular level they would be able to repair damages created by aging. </u>It's all the same to a nanorobot. Nanotechnology could repair damaged cells. <u><strong><mark>Dead cells are the</mark> primary <mark>reason for aging and death</strong></mark>; nanorobots <mark>could replace</mark> senescent <mark>(old) cells</mark> <mark>with non-senescent cells</mark>, or reprogram cells so they do not senescensce, <mark>which</mark> would <strong><mark>keep the body from aging</strong></mark>. </u>Not only would the inside of your body never get sick or age, but neither will the outside. Your skin will be young, elastic, dewy and wrinkle-free. Your hair will be thick, without gray, and intact. <u>Your hearing, your eyesight and memory will be in perfect shape. </u>You wouldn't get arthritis, turkey neck, or saggy parts. You could go out dancing when you are 93 and not worry about sore feet, low energy or suffering any consequences. Unless you party too hard, but that's on you, not the nano. <u>So if you never get sick and never get old could you live forever? Yes.</u> nanorobots could be programmed to rebuild older cells into younger copies on a regular basis <u>thereby the <strong><mark>human</mark> body could <mark>become immortal</strong>.</u></mark> You could live a disease-free youthful life, forever. Of course immortality isn't for everyone and everyone should have the right to decide what they want or don't want for their own body. <u>Death will be a choice rather than a requirement</u>. There are well funded countries that have access to researchers and high tech equipment that would love to figure out how to create the nanotechnology that will repair bodies and end disease. In the US despite having a lot of financial resources it's not always easy to get funding. If you are at a university, you need to write a grant, go through a lot of red tape, and there are a lot more near-term projects that seem to get prioritized when it comes to funding. For companies looking for investors, unfortunately not all investors can foresee the amazing future that nano will have because they are used to funding things they can see. For example a company that makes desks seeking an investor can show the investor the money they need for each piece of wood, bolt, and the quantity of desks that will be manufactured within a specific time frame. Nanotechnology is in development and isn't readily available like a piece of wood, the piece of wood has to be built. And the individual processes of each emerging development will have their own variables. Once the recipe has been figured out and formulated, the investment we have made will then be very inexpensive and easy to reproduce. Third world countries would have easy access to nanomedicine. Mother nature puts atoms together all the time and it doesn't cost her anything. The raw materials for making nanorobots would be essentially cost-free because they will be made mostly of carbon. Because nanotechnology would be created on the very small atomic level, traveling to provide treatment would not require large equipment. The size and portability would make treatment easily accessible across the world. The environment and living conditions also impact health. Since nanotechnology is on the atomic level and atoms are everywhere, it can be beneficial to the world all around us, as well as our bodies. Nanotechnology could enrich depleted soil in places like Africa, which is currently facing a food crisis. Vitamins, nutrients and minerals could be delivered to rebuild soil to a fertile state and thus have the ability to grow food. Hunger could one day be a solvable problem. Nanotechnology would make it possible to provide meat and animal products inexpensively without killing animals. E.coli and other pathogens could be detected in soil and eliminated so that food is not harmful. Currently nanomaterials are in development to release fertilizers for plants and nutrients for livestock, nano sensors for monitoring the health of crops and farm animals, and magnetic nanoparticles to remove soil contaminants. According to water.org 750 million people around the world lack access to safe water; approximately one in nine people. 840,000 people die each year from water-related disease<u>. A portable non-chemical <mark>nano-filtration water purification</mark> device <mark>has been developed</mark> by Micheal Pritchard</u>. It <u><strong><mark>creates safe </mark>and sterile <mark>water</strong></mark> out of dirty water</u> and would make the cost of water per household an estimated 3 dollars a year. His company has provided clean water to countries who have gone through natural disasters, such as Haiti and the Philippines. In the <u>future nanotechnology particles could destroy bacteria that often cause fatal disease. <strong><mark>Pollution</mark> in general, <mark>global warming</strong></mark>, nuclear waste, oil spills, smog, and acid rain, <mark>could be remedied</mark> and prevented <mark>by nanotechnological advances</u></mark>. <u>Large quantities of nanorobots could <mark>come together to remove pollutant atoms</mark> from the atmosphere, earth and water</u>. These groups of nanorobots could swim in contaminated waters and be released into the polluted atmosphere to destroy or remove contaminating molecules. <u>Nanorobots could <mark>pull apart</mark> the <mark>bad molecules and</mark> <mark>reassemble</mark> the atoms <mark>into good molecules</mark> for other positive purposes</u>. As a first indicator of the possibility, Brian Mercer created a new pollution control technology using nanofibres that greatly reduce industrial pollution by trapping and removing the pollutants. Currently nanotech is being used to reduce emissions from car fuels. Since nanotechnology builds atom by atom; the process is pollution free. Nanotechnology will not be manufactured in the way we use manufacturing plants today. There will be no chemical by product, no emission, hazardous waste and no pollution.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Fraihat and Issaev 18 – Fraihat is an associate professor in international conflict resolution at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies Leonid Issaev (PhD) is a senior lecturer at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. (Ibrahim and Leonid, 6/12, “Russia Doesn’t Solve Conflicts, It Silences Them,” [accessed 9/12/19], https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Leonid_Issaev, see) fulltext: From 1917 until the late 1980s, Moscow’s interventions in conflicts around the world were driven by a desire to promote communist ideology. Since the fall of Soviet Union, the Kremlin has failed to make clear what added value, if any, Russian intervention could bring to the international scene. Since the fall of Soviet Union, the Kremlin has failed to make clear what added value, if any, Russian intervention could bring to the international scene. To better establish itself as a world leader today, Russia knows it needs to rebrand itself. Whereas the West tends to justify its interest-based intervention in the Middle East by explaining its efforts as democracy promotion, Russia has pursued its interests in the region by trying to present itself as a problem solver. While it has been successful in reducing tensions in Syria, Russia’s conflict-mediation approach tends to be effective in freezing conflicts rather than resolving them. Russia’s involvement in Syria provides the best example of its efforts to emerge as a Middle East problem solver. Since the beginning of Russia’s Syrian military operation in 2015, Moscow has noticeably stepped up its participation in the negotiation process. Moscow’s efforts led to the creation of a powerful triple alliance of Russia, Iran, and Turkey, which formed the basis of the Astana negotiation process, as well as the Syrian people’s congress in Sochi. In 2017, Moscow began to look for alternative venues to launch a specific dialogue with Syrian opposition groups in Cairo (with Jaysh al-Islam and Jaysh al-Tawhid) and Geneva (with Faylaq al-Rahman), as well as to negotiate with the United States and Jordan in Amman. Russia has also tried its hand at mediating the impasse between the two main rival governments in Libya. While receiving eastern strongman Khalifa Haftar on three occasions and printing money for his parallel central bank in Bayda, Russia likewise received his Tripoli-based rival, hoping to play an intermediary role and bridge the divide between the Haftar and Fayez al-Serraj, who leads Libya’s internationally recognized Government of National Accord. Furthermore, Russia presented itself as a mediator in other intra-Libyan conflicts including launching a dialogue between the GNA and the tribes that control the southwestern city of Ubari. As a diplomatic crisis and blockade has divided the Gulf countries, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has visited both Saudi Arabia and Qatar several times, announcing Moscow’s full support for Kuwait’s mediation and a negotiated resolution to the crisis. This soft intervention led to the first-ever visit to Russia by a Saudi king, an important signal that the two countries are finally overcoming a long-troubled relationship dating back to their confrontation in Afghanistan in 1979. Moscow is even wading into Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy. Immediately after U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to move the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas cut relations with the White House and paid a state visit to Moscow. While receiving Abbas in Moscow, Putin called Trump to encourage Washington to pursue peace efforts while also offering Moscow’s help. Furthermore, during the Arab League summit — also dubbed the Al-Quds summit to emphasize the rejection of the U.S. Embassy move — Putin sent a letter to the Arab leaders stating that “Russia is ready to develop cooperation with the League of Arab States by all possible means to ensure regional safety.” In theory, Russia’s mediation should help resolve the Middle East’s conflicts. Russia’s involvement could potentially end the monopoly of unilateral American mediation that has traditionally failed to resolve regional disputes — such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict — and instead exacerbated them. However, Russia’s approach to conflict resolution is better at freezing conflicts than ending them. This dynamic is evident in several conflicts that Russia has attempted to tackle, namely in Crimea, Ukraine, Georgia, and Chechnya. By using force, Moscow was able to impose unilateral solutions to these conflicts but failed to address their underlying causes. Unless the root causes of these conflicts are addressed, the most this approach will ever achieve is a fragile peace, or what Johan Galtung calls a “negative peace.” In fact, what Russian military intervention achieved in these conflicts was to structurally transform them by creating a severe imbalance of power between the parties which, in turn, left no room for resolution. Russia has done the same in Syria, where it enabled the Assad regime to achieve a decisive victory in the Battle of Aleppo, thereby leaving no incentives for the government to engage in talks and no hope for the opposition to achieve some of their demands through negotiated solutions. It’s no wonder that most of the Syrian opposition refused to participate in the Russian-brokered Sochi peace talks. Solutions achieved under a severe power imbalance, especially those achieved through massive military might, are difficult to sustain. Solutions achieved under a severe power imbalance, especially those achieved through massive military might, are difficult to sustain. Conflicts can be suppressed for a while but will likely erupt again once those power relations change. Since the beginning of Russia’s military presence in Syria, Moscow has managed to reduce the scope of the conflict. Nonetheless, the Russian presence in Syria has failed to improve the lives of Syrians so that they can be partners in achieving a lasting resolution to their civil war. Rather, it has prevented them from holding a national dialogue and seeking some form of reconciliation. By helping Bashar al-Assad eliminate nearly all opposition to the Syrian regime, Russia has not allowed any opportunities for transitional justice in Syria, which is a key factor for the durable resolution of any conflict. To date, Assad seems like an absolute winner in the war, and he is not constrained by any obligations, either domestic or international, to the militarily defeated opposition. Russia’s solutions are also imposed from the top down in partnership with entrenched regimes and brutal dictatorships rather than with bottom-up forces that aim to change the status quo. Moscow has prevented the ruthless Assad regime from collapsing, supported Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s regime in Egypt, and Haftar’s in Libya. Russia’s military and diplomatic involvement generally rewards dictators who are seen to serve Russia’s interests rather than supporting citizens’ calls for freedom and justice, thereby exacerbating the tensions that led to these revolutions in the first place. Since the mass protests at Moscow’s Bolotnaya Square in 2011 and 2012, the Russian political establishment has actively promoted the idea that stability should serve as the key measure of the effectiveness of any political regime. The events of the Arab Spring seemed to confirm this thesis: Assad’s dictatorship fended off the Islamic State; Sisi’s military regime prevented rule by the Muslim Brotherhood; and post-Arab Spring realities in Libya and Yemen are similarly bleak. Vladimir Putin has used this as evidence that stability matters more than justice. Resolving conflicts in a lasting manner generally requires a serious financial commitment, something that Russia’s interventions lack. Resolving conflicts in a lasting manner generally requires a serious financial commitment, something that Russia’s interventions lack. Russia cannot finance a reconstruction process or offer a Marshall Plan for Syria. Silencing conflicts, however, has allowed Russia to hedge its bets, maintaining its own interests (such as the military bases in Tartus) while engaging with the various warring parties. Russia does not have any clear long-term strategy in the Middle East. It has situational interests, and the desire to take advantage of the current political moment, but it lacks a coherent, long-term vision of what a new regional order should look like. Unlike in the heyday of communism, Russian foreign policy today suffers from an ideological vacuum. This lack of any guiding principles has led to an extremely reactionary approach. Russia is not yet able to formulate a clear agenda of its own, so its actions are primarily a reaction to the West. The most important message that Russian foreign policy sends to the Middle East and the world is that Moscow will fill a vacuum wherever the West has failed, even if this means producing situations where conflicts are suppressed rather than resolved.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>US-Russia relations don’t solve conflicts </h4><p><strong>Fraihat and Issaev 18</strong> – Fraihat is an associate professor in international conflict resolution at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies Leonid Issaev (PhD) is a senior lecturer at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow.</p><p>(Ibrahim and Leonid, 6/12, “Russia Doesn’t Solve Conflicts, It Silences Them,” [accessed 9/12/19], https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Leonid_Issaev, see)</p><p><u>From 1917 until the late 1980s, Moscow’s interventions in conflicts around the world were driven by a desire to promote communist ideology. Since the fall of Soviet Union, the Kremlin has failed to make clear what added value, if any, Russian intervention could bring to the international scene.</u> Since the fall of Soviet Union, the Kremlin has failed to make clear what added value, if any, Russian intervention could bring to the international scene. To better establish itself as a world leader today, Russia knows it needs to rebrand itself. Whereas the West tends to justify its interest-based intervention in the Middle East by explaining its efforts as democracy promotion, Russia has pursued its interests in the region by trying to present itself as a problem solver. While it has been successful in reducing tensions in Syria, Russia’s conflict-mediation approach tends to be effective in freezing conflicts rather than resolving them. Russia’s involvement in Syria provides the best example of its efforts to emerge as a Middle East problem solver. Since the beginning of Russia’s Syrian military operation in 2015, Moscow has noticeably stepped up its participation in the negotiation process. Moscow’s efforts led to the creation of a powerful triple alliance of Russia, Iran, and Turkey, which formed the basis of the Astana negotiation process, as well as the Syrian people’s congress in Sochi. In 2017, Moscow began to look for alternative venues to launch a specific dialogue with Syrian opposition groups in Cairo (with Jaysh al-Islam and Jaysh al-Tawhid) and Geneva (with Faylaq al-Rahman), as well as to negotiate with the United States and Jordan in Amman. Russia has also tried its hand at mediating the impasse between the two main rival governments in Libya. While receiving eastern strongman Khalifa Haftar on three occasions and printing money for his parallel central bank in Bayda, Russia likewise received his Tripoli-based rival, hoping to play an intermediary role and bridge the divide between the Haftar and Fayez al-Serraj, who leads Libya’s internationally recognized Government of National Accord. Furthermore, Russia presented itself as a mediator in other intra-Libyan conflicts including launching a dialogue between the GNA and the tribes that control the southwestern city of Ubari. As a diplomatic crisis and blockade has divided the Gulf countries, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has visited both Saudi Arabia and Qatar several times, announcing Moscow’s full support for Kuwait’s mediation and a negotiated resolution to the crisis. This soft intervention led to the first-ever visit to Russia by a Saudi king, an important signal that the two countries are finally overcoming a long-troubled relationship dating back to their confrontation in Afghanistan in 1979. Moscow is even wading into Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy. Immediately after U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to move the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas cut relations with the White House and paid a state visit to Moscow. While receiving Abbas in Moscow, Putin called Trump to encourage Washington to pursue peace efforts while also offering Moscow’s help. Furthermore, during the Arab League summit — also dubbed the Al-Quds summit to emphasize the rejection of the U.S. Embassy move — Putin sent a letter to the Arab leaders stating that “Russia is ready to develop cooperation with the League of Arab States by all possible means to ensure regional safety.” <u>In theory, <mark>Russia’s mediation should help resolve</mark> the Middle East’s <mark>conflicts</mark>. <mark>Russia’s involvement</mark> could potentially end the monopoly of unilateral American mediation that <mark>has traditionally failed to resolve </mark>regional <mark>disputes</mark> — such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict — <strong><mark>and instead exacerbated them</u></strong></mark>. However, <u><mark>Russia’s approach</mark> to conflict resolution is better at freezing conflicts than ending them</u>. This dynamic is evident in several conflicts that Russia has attempted to tackle, namely in Crimea, Ukraine, Georgia, and Chechnya. <u>By using force, <mark>Moscow</mark> was able to impose unilateral solutions to these conflicts but <mark>failed to address</mark> their <mark>underlying causes<strong>. Unless the root</mark> causes of these conflicts <mark>are addressed, the most this approach wil</mark>l ever <mark>achieve is a fragile peace</mark>, or what Johan Galtung calls a “negative peace</u></strong>.” In fact, what Russian military intervention achieved in these conflicts was to structurally transform them by creating a severe imbalance of power between the parties <u>which, in turn, left no room for resolution.</u> Russia has done the same in Syria, where it enabled the Assad regime to achieve a decisive victory in the Battle of Aleppo, thereby leaving no incentives for the government to engage in talks and no hope for the opposition to achieve some of their demands through negotiated solutions.<u> It’s no wonder that most of the Syrian opposition refused to participate in the Russian-brokered Sochi peace talks.</u> <u>Solutions achieved under a severe power imbalance, especially those achieved through massive military might, are difficult to sustain</u>. Solutions achieved under a severe power imbalance, especially those achieved through massive military might, are difficult to sustain. <u><strong><mark>Conflicts can be suppressed</mark> for a while <mark>but will likely erupt again</mark> once those power relations change.</u></strong> Since the beginning of Russia’s military presence in Syria, Moscow has managed to reduce the scope of the conflict. Nonetheless, the Russian presence in Syria has failed to improve the lives of Syrians so that they can be partners in achieving a lasting resolution to their civil war. Rather, it has prevented them from holding a national dialogue and seeking some form of reconciliation. By helping Bashar al-Assad eliminate nearly all opposition to the Syrian regime, Russia has not allowed any opportunities for transitional justice in Syria, which is a key factor for the durable resolution of any conflict. To date, Assad seems like an absolute winner in the war, and he is not constrained by any obligations, either domestic or international, to the militarily defeated opposition. <u>Russia’s solutions are also imposed from the top down in partnership with entrenched regimes and brutal dictatorships rather than with bottom-up forces that aim to change the status quo</u>. Moscow has prevented the ruthless Assad regime from collapsing, supported Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s regime in Egypt, and Haftar’s in Libya. <u><mark>Russia’s military and diplomatic involvement generally rewards dictators</mark> who are seen to serve Russia’s interests rather than supporting citizens’ calls for freedom and justice, <strong><mark>thereby exacerbating the tensions</mark> that led to these revolutions in the first place</u></strong>. Since the mass protests at Moscow’s Bolotnaya Square in 2011 and 2012, the Russian political establishment has actively promoted the idea that stability should serve as the key measure of the effectiveness of any political regime. The events of the Arab Spring seemed to confirm this thesis: Assad’s dictatorship fended off the Islamic State; Sisi’s military regime prevented rule by the Muslim Brotherhood; and post-Arab Spring realities in Libya and Yemen are similarly bleak. Vladimir Putin has used this as evidence that stability matters more than justice. <u>Resolving conflicts in a lasting manner generally requires a serious financial commitment, something that Russia’s interventions lack.</u> Resolving conflicts in a lasting manner generally requires a serious financial commitment, something that Russia’s interventions lack. Russia cannot finance a reconstruction process or offer a Marshall Plan for Syria. <u><mark>Silencing conflicts</mark>, however, has <mark>allowed Russia to hedge its bets</mark>, maintaining its own interests (such as the military bases in Tartus) while engaging with the various warring parties. Russia does not have any clear long-term strategy in the Middle East. It has situational interests, and the desire to take advantage of the current political moment, but it lacks a coherent, long-term vision of what a new regional order should look like</u>. Unlike in the heyday of communism, Russian foreign policy today suffers from an ideological vacuum. <u><mark>This</mark> lack of any guiding principles <mark>has led to an extremely reactionary approach</mark>.</u> Russia is not yet able to formulate a clear agenda of its own, so its actions are primarily a reaction to the West. The most important message that Russian foreign policy sends to the Middle East and the world is that Moscow will fill a vacuum wherever the West has failed, even if this means producing situations where conflicts are suppressed rather than resolved.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Ferguson 14, Susan S. and William H. Hindle Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences, and Professor in the Department of Anthropology @ Stanford, “From Antipolitics to Post-Neoliberalism: A Conversation With James Ferguson”, interview between Ferguson and Humanity co-editors Nils Gilman and Miriam Ticktin, Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, Volume 5, Number 2, Summer 2014, Project Muse fulltext: It is important to recognize that this thing we call neoliberalism is an intellectually complex field, and that there is not a single politics that we can neatly and unproblematically attach to the style of reasoning that we identify as neoliberal. This is a point that Stephen Collier has recently made well. He identifies a series of what he calls “minor traditions” within neoliberalism that are actually attached to a very different kind of politics than we are usually used to associating with the word.8 So it is partly a matter of careful intellectual history and scholarship.¶ But there is also a political issue. I think it is important for us to acknowledge that Hayek and company were importantly right about something. I sometimes remind my students that one of the biggest fans of The Road to Serfdom was Keynes, who spoke very effusively in praise of the book. The reason is that it was not principally an attack on the welfare state; it was an attack on central planning, on Soviet-style centrally planned economies. And Hayek got that mostly right. Now, that Hayekian critique contains an important point of agreement with what anthropologists have always said, which is that ordinary people actually know a lot about their own lives. They are often better positioned than experts from on high to make decisions that affect their own lives. The point is: where does the information lie? Who has enough information to actually know what social good is? Anthropologists very easily assimilate these arguments: we have been saying the same thing for a long time.¶ The problem is that this observation can degenerate into a simplistic antistatism, [End Page 250] which it does in the rightist politics of many neoliberals. In a similar way, in anthropology, it can also degenerate into a simplistic antistatism, which takes the form of a romanticism that suggests that the grassroots are virtuous and that if only the state were not there then everyone would be egalitarian and nature-loving. So those dangers are undeniably there: of taking a modality of thinking critically about state power and turning it into a simplistic anti-statist politics. But I would rather think of this as one route into a discussion of the problem of government. That is the spirit in which Foucault talks about neoliberalism, which is quite different from most of our discussions of neoliberalism, which tend to be ideological and based on a “for or against” model. Foucault looks at discussions within neoliberalism in the same way that he looks at other discussions of the problem of government. Which is to say that it is a mode of reasoning that takes place within the context of a set of problems. He is both sympathetic with and critical of the problem of governing. He does not think we want to live in a world in which there is no government. But he knows that government always involves the exercise of power, it always involves possibilities for abuse and exploitation.¶ But his solution is not to say that therefore we should be against power. For him that is silly: you cannot be against power; power is an integral problem of the social world. The question is: how do we want to be governed? That is a very important discussion and I do not think you get anywhere by saying, simply, “We’re against neoliberalism.”¶ H: Your new work describes in depth how neoliberalism forms a complex field. When you wrote The Anti-Politics Machine, was neoliberalism already in your head? Was it something that somehow haunted you then that you have felt a need to revisit? In other words, how has your thinking on neoliberalism evolved in the two decades since?¶ JF: I had never heard the word “neoliberalism” when I wrote The Anti-Politics Machine! In that book I was writing about a prestructural adjustment world. I was writing it just as structural adjustment was beginning to kick in all across Africa. That is when we first started hearing about neoliberalism—in the context of structural adjustment in Africa. And like everyone else, I thought it was terrible, and I was against it. It was a necessary ideological moment, of saying these are actually disastrous policies, being justified on the basis of spurious arguments, and that nobody has really thought what the long-term costs are going to be.¶ But that work was done, that critique was made. We reached a point where it did not seem like it was accomplishing much to say, yet again, to an audience full of people who already believe it, “Aha! Look: structural adjustment is bad for the poor!” You got to the point where even the World Bank itself was saying it. So who the hell cares whether I condemn neoliberalism: it is an empty political act! It is not that I disagree with those critiques—I agree with them absolutely—but simply reiterating them does not get us any further at this point.¶ I have become more interested in thinking not so much about what we are against as about what we’re for, thinking about positive political goals and strategies, which to me leads to the question of government. To see what I mean by that, let me give [End Page 251] an example of a different kind of question. There’s a program in Zambia to take care of AIDS orphans. Zambia has a massive number of AIDS orphans, and the state recognizes that there is a public responsibility to take care of these orphans. Most of these orphans have been taken in by older women, and the state acknowledges that this is a valuable thing and has committed to supporting it. The program that has been in place involves providing these households with food. Once a month a truck comes through and they have a list of names of all the households where AIDS orphans are being minded, and they give each of these old women a bag full of maize meal, which is the local staple.¶ Now, the new thinking comes in, and says, “You know, it’s good that you’re supporting these women, but this isn’t the right way to do it. Instead of giving them a bag of maize meal once a month, why don’t you give them an amount of money that would enable them to go to the local shop and buy the equivalent amount of maize meal if that’s what they want, but that would also give them the choice to do other things with the money, things you might not know they need. The old woman may realize that what she needs this month, for example, is to use the money for bus fare so that she can go get that lingering infection treated. She knows her own problems, she knows her own circumstances, she knows her own resources to solve those problems much better than some planner in Lusaka does. So give her the ability to make her own choices about how those resources should be allocated.”¶ Now, what are we to make of this? On the one hand, we can say this is classic neoliberalism: using markets to deliver social services—getting government out of the way of delivering those services, and letting the market provide them instead. But on the other hand, you can also say that this is trusting rural women to understand and address their own needs in ways that planners cannot. A lot of anthropologists find that a very attractive idea.¶ I do not think it is very helpful to insert this into a left-versus-right ideological frame. It is a different question—about the how of government, about governmental technique. I want to linger over those questions. I do not want to have a deductive politics where we say, “Ah, so this is neoliberalism, so now we know we’re against it!” I want to stop and say, “Hm. Well, what do I think about that? Let us think this through. What social services can be delivered through markets? What role can cash transfers play in redistributive social programs?” We should allow the political judgments to emerge out of the investigation rather than being the thing that drives it.¶ H: This question of politics connects to the key thesis of The Anti-Politics Machine, concerning the depoliticizing effect of development. The idea of depoliticization has become the lodestone of much current historiography of development. Now, twenty years on from the initial publication of the book, does the success of this thesis surprise you? Specifically, Nicolas Guilhot has discussed in these pages how the idea of depoliticization has taken on a life of its own, to become a common theme not just in critiques of development but also in critiques of other fields rooted supposedly in sympathy for the oppressed, such as humanitarianism.9 What do you make of this broadening of the “depoliticization” narrative? [End Page 252]¶ JF: It remains an important move, to be able to take procedures that are described as purely technical and to demonstrate how and where they involve things that are more than just technical, how and where they may involve a politics that requires digging in order to bring it into visibility. I have no problem with that kind of work, but I am increasingly dissatisfied with work that treats such critique as the end of the project, as if to say that now we have done our job: “We’ve exposed this as political, we’ve revealed that there are relations of power and inequality behind it all, and we’ve denounced it. Now we know we’re in the right and they’re in the wrong. Gotcha!” But a lot of times, this simply demonstrates what everyone knows already. Any sophisticated observer is already well aware of the politics that are going on. I do not see that as a very powerful end point. What is more interesting is if you treat that as a beginning. OK, so there is a politics going on here, but where is that going? What are our possible points of alliance and engagement with that politics? In other words, we need a substantive analysis: given that it is a politics, what do we think of that? What do we do about that? That seems a more substantial discussion than the denunciatory one. It leads into the question of government.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Criticism alone is <u>ineffective</u> and can <u>never spur change</u> --- prioritize scholarship that develops <u>plans of action</u> to address <u>particular problems</h4><p></u><strong>Ferguson 14</strong>, Susan S. and William H. Hindle Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences, and Professor in the Department of Anthropology @ Stanford, “From Antipolitics to Post-Neoliberalism: A Conversation With James Ferguson”, interview between Ferguson and Humanity co-editors Nils Gilman and Miriam Ticktin, Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, Volume 5, Number 2, Summer 2014, Project Muse</p><p>It is important to recognize that this thing we call <u><strong>neoliberalism is an intellectually complex field</u></strong>, and that <u><strong>there is not a single politics that we can neatly and unproblematically attach to the style of reasoning that we identify as neoliberal</u></strong>. This is a point that Stephen Collier has recently made well. He identifies <u><strong>a series of</u></strong> what he calls “<u><strong>minor traditions” within neoliberalism</u></strong> that <u><strong>are actually attached to a very different kind of politics than we are usually used to associating with the word</u></strong>.8 So it is partly a matter of careful intellectual history and scholarship.¶ But there is also a political issue. I think it is important for us to acknowledge that Hayek and company were importantly right about something. I sometimes remind my students that one of the biggest fans of The Road to Serfdom was Keynes, who spoke very effusively in praise of the book. The reason is that it was not principally an attack on the welfare state; it was an attack on central planning, on Soviet-style centrally planned economies. And Hayek got that mostly right. Now, that Hayekian critique contains an important point of agreement with what anthropologists have always said, which is that ordinary people actually know a lot about their own lives. They are often better positioned than experts from on high to make decisions that affect their own lives. The point is: where does the information lie? Who has enough information to actually know what social good is? Anthropologists very easily assimilate these arguments: we have been saying the same thing for a long time.¶ The problem is that <u><strong>this observation can degenerate into a <mark>simplistic antistatism</u></strong></mark>, [End Page 250] which it does in the rightist politics of many neoliberals. In a similar way, in anthropology, it can also degenerate into <u><strong>a simplistic antistatism</u></strong>, which <u><strong><mark>takes the form of a romanticism that suggests</mark> that the <mark>grassroots are virtuous and</mark> that <mark>if only the state were not there</mark> then <mark>everyone would be egalitarian</mark> and nature-loving</u></strong>. So those dangers are undeniably there: of taking a modality of thinking critically about state power and turning it into a simplistic anti-statist politics. But I would rather think of this as one route into a discussion of the problem of government. That is the spirit in which Foucault talks about neoliberalism, which is quite different from <u><strong><mark>most</mark> of our <mark>discussions of neolib</mark>eralism</u></strong>, which <u><strong><mark>tend to be</mark> ideological and <mark>based on a “for or against” model</u></strong></mark>. Foucault looks at discussions within neoliberalism in the same way that he looks at other discussions of the problem of government. Which is to say that it is a mode of reasoning that takes place within the context of a set of problems. He is both sympathetic with and critical of the problem of governing. He does not think we want to live in a world in which there is no government. But he knows that government always involves the exercise of power, it always involves possibilities for abuse and exploitation.¶ But his solution is not to say that therefore we should be against power. For him that is silly: <u><strong><mark>you</mark> cannot be against power; power is an integral problem of the social world. The question is: how do we want to be governed? That is a very important discussion and I <mark>do not </mark>think you <mark>get anywhere </mark>by <mark>saying</mark>, simply, “<mark>We’re against neolibe</mark>ralism</u></strong>.”¶ H: Your new work describes in depth how neoliberalism forms a complex field. When you wrote The Anti-Politics Machine, was neoliberalism already in your head? Was it something that somehow haunted you then that you have felt a need to revisit? In other words, how has your thinking on neoliberalism evolved in the two decades since?¶ JF: I had never heard the word “neoliberalism” when I wrote The Anti-Politics Machine! In that book I was writing about a prestructural adjustment world. I was writing it just as structural adjustment was beginning to kick in all across Africa. That is when we first started hearing about neoliberalism—in the context of structural adjustment in Africa. And like everyone else, I thought it was terrible, and I was against it. It was a necessary ideological moment, of saying these are actually disastrous policies, being justified on the basis of spurious arguments, and that nobody has really thought what the long-term costs are going to be.¶ But that work was done, that critique was made. We reached a point where <u><strong>it did not seem like it was accomplishing much to say, yet again, to an audience full of people who already believe it, “Aha! Look: structural adjustment is bad for the poor!”</u></strong> You got to the point where even the World Bank itself was saying it. So <u><strong><mark>who the hell cares whether I condemn neolib</mark>eralism: <mark>it is an empty political act! It is not that I disagree with</u></strong></mark> those <u><strong><mark>critiques</u></strong></mark>—I agree with them absolutely—<u><strong><mark>but</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>simply <mark>reiterating them does not get us any further</mark> at this point</u></strong>.¶ <u><strong><mark>I have become more interested in thinking not so much</mark> about <mark>what we are against as</mark> about what we’re for, <mark>thinking about positive political goals and strategies</mark>, which to me leads to the question of government</u></strong>. To see what I mean by that, let me give [End Page 251] an example of a different kind of question. There’s a program in Zambia to take care of AIDS orphans. Zambia has a massive number of AIDS orphans, and the state recognizes that there is a public responsibility to take care of these orphans. Most of these orphans have been taken in by older women, and the state acknowledges that this is a valuable thing and has committed to supporting it. The program that has been in place involves providing these households with food. Once a month a truck comes through and they have a list of names of all the households where AIDS orphans are being minded, and they give each of these old women a bag full of maize meal, which is the local staple.¶ Now, the new thinking comes in, and says, “You know, it’s good that you’re supporting these women, but this isn’t the right way to do it. Instead of giving them a bag of maize meal once a month, why don’t you give them an amount of money that would enable them to go to the local shop and buy the equivalent amount of maize meal if that’s what they want, but that would also give them the choice to do other things with the money, things you might not know they need. The old woman may realize that what she needs this month, for example, is to use the money for bus fare so that she can go get that lingering infection treated. She knows her own problems, she knows her own circumstances, <u><strong>she knows her own resources to solve those problems much better than some planner in Lusaka does. So give her the ability to make her own choices about how those resources should be allocated</u></strong>.”¶ Now, what are we to make of this? <u><strong>On the one hand, we can say this is classic neoliberalism: using markets to deliver social services</u></strong>—getting government out of the way of delivering those services, and letting the market provide them instead. <u><strong>But on the other hand, you can also say that this is trusting rural women to understand and address their own needs in ways that planners cannot</u></strong>. A lot of anthropologists find that a very attractive idea.¶ I do not think it is very helpful to insert this into a left-versus-right ideological frame. It is a different question—about the how of government, about governmental technique. I want to linger over those questions. <u><strong><mark>I do not want to have a deductive politics where we say, “Ah,</mark> so <mark>this is neoliberalism, so now we know we’re against it!</u></strong>”</mark> I want to stop and say, “Hm. Well, what do I think about that? Let us think this through. <u><strong>What social services can be delivered through markets? What role can cash transfers play in redistributive social programs?” <mark>We should allow the political judgments to emerge out of the investigation rather than being the thing that drives it</u></strong></mark>.¶ H: This question of politics connects to the key thesis of The Anti-Politics Machine, concerning the depoliticizing effect of development. The idea of depoliticization has become the lodestone of much current historiography of development. Now, twenty years on from the initial publication of the book, does the success of this thesis surprise you? Specifically, Nicolas Guilhot has discussed in these pages how the idea of depoliticization has taken on a life of its own, to become a common theme not just in critiques of development but also in critiques of other fields rooted supposedly in sympathy for the oppressed, such as humanitarianism.9 What do you make of this broadening of the “depoliticization” narrative? [End Page 252]¶ JF: It remains an important move, to be able to take procedures that are described as purely technical and to demonstrate how and where they involve things that are more than just technical, how and where they may involve a politics that requires digging in order to bring it into visibility. I have no problem with that kind of work, but <u><strong><mark>I am</mark> increasingly <mark>dissatisfied with work that treats</mark> such <mark>critique as the end of the project, as if to say</mark> that now <mark>we have done our job: “We’ve exposed this as political, we’ve revealed </mark>that <mark>there are relations of </mark>power and <mark>inequality</mark> behind it all, <mark>and we’ve denounced it</mark>.</u></strong> Now we know we’re in the right and they’re in the wrong. <u><strong><mark>Gotcha!”</u></strong> <u><strong>But</u></strong></mark> a lot of times, <u><strong><mark>this</mark> simply <mark>demonstrates what everyone knows already</u></strong></mark>. Any sophisticated observer is already well aware of the politics that are going on. <u><strong><mark>I do not see that as a very powerful end point</u></strong></mark>. What is more interesting is if you treat that as a beginning. <u><strong>OK, so there is a politics going on here, but where is that going? What are our possible points of alliance and engagement with that politics?</u></strong> <u><strong>In other words, we need a substantive analysis: given that it is a politics, what do we think of that? <mark>What do we do about that</mark>? That <mark>seems a more substantial discussion than the denunciatory one</u></strong></mark>. It leads into the question of government.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Davis, Geography Prof @ U. of Hawaii, 15 fulltext: (Sasha, “The Empires' Edge: Militarization, Resistance, and Transcending Hegemony in the Pacific,” pg. 130-135) Pursuing decolonization through affinity is also a far stronger strategy because it invites inclusion. By rejecting both militarization and coloniza-tion-which are fundamentally about dominating others through the use (or credible threat) of violence social movements in the Pacific can expand supportive networks based on affinity and fueled in part by the philosophy's ethical nature. Namely, the philosophy is one not of chauvinism for a particular nation¬ality or in-group ( or for the "exceptionalism" of one imperial power or another), but one of inclusion, equality, and self-determination that lends it universal appeal and legitimacy. In other words, the political goal is for island groups "to recover, establish or enhance their ability to determine the conditions of their own existence, while allowing and encouraging others to do the same'' (Day, 2005, p. 13, emphasis in original). Several factors need to be taken into account when examining the growth of this regional (and global) movement for transcending hegemony. First, the ethics of self-determination and international affinity are historically deep projects. Hegemony-seeking power that aims to build hierarchy and affinity-seeking power that aims to level it are not creatures of different epochs in human his-tory. Rather, they have both always existed, they continue to exist, and they will always exist (see, for instance, James Scott's [2009] brilliant work in Southeast Asia). There is no moment or "revolution" to end the contest between affinity and hegemony. The quest for both is always present. In any social milieu there are always social practices that enhance affinity and ones that enhance domina¬tion and hegemony. Therefore, to produce a global politics based on affinity you do not have to start from scratch and find something new. Social relations based on affinity exist now: in our daily lives, in homes and schools, and in globe¬spanning networks. Even if it appears, over many scales, to be subordinate to the flows of hegemony-seeking power, it is there. The goal, then, for those who seek an affinity-based international order is not to "start" something, but to seek out, valorize, and promote affinity-growing social processes and make them thrive, grow, and expand the spaces in which their principles dominate. As mentioned in the introduction to this book, there is a legacy to draw from for imagining geopolitics according to the principles of equality and mutual aid. While theorists like Kropotkin (1885), who espouse European concepts of anar¬chism and mutual aid, are one source, there is also a rich theoretical tradition from indigenous Pacific scholars who draw upon Pacific cultural practices of aloha and island connectivity and solidarity (Hau'ofa, 1994; Lilomaiava-Doktor, 2009; Teaiwa, 2000; Shigematsu & Camacho, 2010; Wilson, 2000). There is also a strong tradition of networked regional activism, as demonstrated by the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific movement and the "Moana Nui'' confer¬ences in 2011 and 2013 (http://mnaa-ca.org/). Another factor to take into account when examining the project of transcending hegemony is the role of destroying old myths and producing new ones. As I have tried to demonstrate throughout this book, supported by the scholarship of others (Agnew, 2009; Shields, 1991; Wright, 2006), myths are powerful forces for governing actions and for determining what is imaginable and allowable. To produce a different kind of politics in the region, different myths for the Pacific need to be developed and promoted. A rhetorical battle must be waged that takes a hatchet to many myths in the Pacific. The Pacific is not empty. The Pacific is not paradise. The Pacific is not a wasteland. The Pacific is not already postcolonial. The Pacific is not small. The Pacific is not dependent. The Pacific is not the tip of someone else's spear. The Pacific is not someone else's borderland. In place of these old, mistaken myths, new myths must be sown. The Pacific is big. Affinity and solidarity can triumph. Self-determination and self-governance are possible and practical. The islands in the Pacific are not just the edges of someone else's empire, but their own center. To transcend hegemony in the region, there is a need not only to nurture and promote the values of affinity within the region but to geographically expand them as well. This is part of Richard Day's (2005) concept of "infinite responsibility" Given that the primary states involved in the contest for hegemony are the United States and China (see chapter 1), to successfully supplant hegemonic battle between those powers on the edges of the Pacific, there is urgent need for Pacific social movements to reach out with education and solidarity to groups in China, the United States, and beyond. The Pacific needs to be represented as a place of life, not just as a militarized logistics space of trade or the site of someone else's profit-seeking "vital system;' so that citizens, policy makers, politicians, and others around the world come to see and the space differently. Concurrently, solid social movement organizing reach out to people on both sides of the Pacific. Pacific groups attempting to reach out to civil society groups in China and the United States face challenges, but doing so in both places is critical activists I have spoken with have commented that it is sometimes •· make linkages with women's and peace groups from China because the1! ties of some purportedly activist groups are controlled and surveilled ·" Chinese government. Change may be on the horizon, however. Communist Party of China (CCP) remains firmly in political power. grip over civil society has gradually loosened over the past decades (4 2008). While the Chinese state still retains strong censorship capabilities and militarized institutions of social control, there have been tremendous in Chinese society that could lead to a substantial erosion of state open a crucial window for linkages of affinity and solidarity between Chinese citizens. While it may be challenging for American audiences to recognize this, from the Pacific perspective the more difficult and intractable problem government in the region has historically been not China but the United States. China may have a nondemocratic government with a long history of human rights abuses, buC;.hat has China done to the people and landscapes of the island Pacific compared with the United States? There may be reason to fear the dictatorial nature of the Chinese state run by the CCP, but if the United States were to draw down military forces in the region, there is no evidence that China would engage the islands with similar colonial policies as those of the United States, fascist-era Japan, or former European colonial powers. The United States, on the other hand, is a known entity. The nation has a century-long history of colonial control and militarization in the region as well as an unambiguous stated desire to continue it indefinitely. Furthermore, unlike in China, there are few signs that substantial political change is on the horizon in the United States-at least change that is relevant to the islands on the empires' edge. U.S. policy toward the island Pacific has been remarkably consistent for over a hundred years. From McKinley to Teddy Roosevelt, from Truman to Reagan, from George W Bush to Barack Obama: few U.S. administrations have sought to rein in the U.S. military's global operations, and none have se¬riously made moves to dismantle U.S. colonial and military control over the island Pacific. The few contemporary American politicians who have suggested dismantling the U.S. Pacific Baseworld tend to be on either the right or left mar¬gins of American politics (for example, Ron Paul and Dennis Kucinich). While these views may be politically marginal, they do demonstrate that there is some public support for curbing U.S. militarization in the Pacific ( even if mostly due to concerns over the extensive financial costs). Activists in the Pacific have been keenly aware that decolonization and demilitarization in the region depend on solidarity and support from outside the region. As I described in chapter 2, one of the problems with getting the U.S. government to change its activities in the Pacific is that so few U.S. citizens are aware of what is occurring in the region. Many of the activists I have met over the course of my research have noted that one of the most important first steps toward a demilitarized future is educating people both inside and outside the region about what is happening here. It has certainly been my personal experience that once people are aware of what is occurring in the region, they are more likely to be supportive of the aims of self-determination and demilitarization. While there are challenges in building bridges within the Pacific region and with citizens in the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, and other Pacific Rim countries, doing so is really the only long-term solution to the current tensions and militarization of the region. What is needed is an ever-expanding circle of affinity that focuses on the common desires we have as people, whether in Hawai'i, Okinawa, Guam, New York, Shanghai, or Hiroshima. How, though, does the region move from a bristling militarized borderland to a region of affinity? How does the politically fractured region move toward an integration that goes beyond merely a shared integration into the capitalist world market? With such a dynamic and broad region, the answer lies not so much in a rigid political program as in the fluid creation of strategies driven by the insight that hegemony is an outdated political mode of thinking that can be transcended. In other words, to create a region organized by a geopolitics of peace, there is not so much a road map to follow as a guiding ethic: the ethic of universal affinity. Is this vision of a more peaceful, demilitarized, decolonized Pacific just a utopian dream? While it will obviously take some effort to make the vision real, discounting the possibility of an affinity-based geopolitics in the Pacific is wrong for two reasons: one moral and one analytical. First, it is difficult to defend the morality of "realist" views that consider inevitable the status quo of a world organized hierarchically and premised on violence, domination, exploita¬tion, and the continued creation of whole populations of sacrificial "bare life:' Following from J. K. Gibson-Graham's (2008) argument that scholars need to be more focused on discovering possibilities for emancipatory political projects than on explaining why larger structural forces will always crush them, I believe that there is a moral imperative for scholars, teachers, activists, and citizens to explore new, alternative visions when current ones are causing misery. Analytically, it is also a mistake to discount the possibility of an affinity-seeking geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific region. The idea may be practiced only in small pockets surrounded by a larger system of hegemony-seeking violence produced by powerful states {backed by the legitimizing power of think tanks, planners, pundits, and politicians), but history shows that these are the condi¬tions under which most new social orders have begun. Capitalism was once just an idea in a sea of other forms of social relations. So too was the idea of the nation-state. So too was the idea that human races are equal. As David Harvey (2005) convincingly details, even neoliberalism-the dominant political eco¬nomic paradigm of the early twenty-first century-was only decades ago a "utopian'' idea. The idea of an affinity-seeking geopolitics in the Pacific should not be dis-counted because of the supposed "smallness" of where it comes from, either. What happens in small places can have big effects. History has amply shown that what happens in the islands of the Pacific affects global balances of power and can tip the scales of planetary hegemony. The islands of Asia and the Pacific have been the sites of epic battles and conflicts between empires. From World War II to the Cold War to current standoffs between the United States, China, and North Korea, these islands have been the staging grounds for intense mili¬tarization, nuclear experimentation, and potentially planet-decimating warfare of all kinds. Is it so hard to believe that they can also be the sites where the seeds can be planted for an international politics that rejects relationships of domination? Or is it easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of hegemony?<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>Starting with <u>policy action in the US</u> is critical to <u>dismantling systems of colonization and militarism</u> – the plan is key to <u>stopping myths</u> about the Pacific and <u>empowering local resistance</u> – prefer <u>affirmation to pessimist critique</h4><p></u>Davis, Geography Prof @ U. of Hawaii, 15 </p><p><u>(Sasha, “The Empires' Edge: Militarization, Resistance, and Transcending Hegemony in the Pacific,” pg. 130-135)</p><p></strong><mark>Pursuing decolonization <strong>through affinity</u></strong> <u>is</u></mark> also <u><mark>a</mark> <strong>far <mark>strong</mark>er <mark>strategy</strong> because it invites inclusion</u></mark>. <u><mark>By rejecting</u></mark> both <u><mark>militarization and coloniza-tion</mark>-</u>which are fundamentally about dominating others through the use (or credible threat) of violence social <u><mark>movements</u></mark> in the Pacific <u><mark>can expand</mark> supportive <mark>networks <strong>based on affinity</strong></mark> a</u>nd fueled in part by the philosophy's ethical nature. Namely, the philosophy is one not of chauvinism for a particular nation¬ality or in-group ( or for the "exceptionalism" of one imperial power or another), but one of inclusion, equality, and self-determination that lends it universal appeal and legitimacy. In other words, <u>the political goal is for island groups "to recover, establish or enhance their ability to determine the conditions of their own existence, while allowing and encouraging others to do the same''</u> (Day, 2005, p. 13, emphasis in original). Several factors need to be taken into account when examining the growth of this regional (and global) movement for transcending hegemony. First, the ethics of self-determination and international affinity are historically deep projects. <u>Hegemony-seeking power that aims to build hierarchy and affinity-seeking power that aims to level it are not creatures of different epochs in human his-tory</u>. Rather, <u><strong>they have both always existed, they continue to exist, and they will always exist</u></strong> (see, for instance, James Scott's [2009] brilliant work in Southeast Asia). There is no moment or "revolution" to end the contest between affinity and hegemony. The quest for both is always present. In any social milieu there are always social practices that enhance affinity and ones that enhance domina¬tion and hegemony. Therefore, to produce a global politics based on affinity you do not have to start from scratch and find something new. Social relations based on affinity exist now: in our daily lives, in homes and schools, and in globe¬spanning networks. Even if it appears, over many scales, to be subordinate to the flows of hegemony-seeking power, it is there. The goal, then, for those who seek an affinity-based international order is not to "start" something, but to seek out, valorize, and promote affinity-growing social processes and make them thrive, grow, and expand the spaces in which their principles dominate. As mentioned in the introduction to this book, there is a legacy to draw from for imagining geopolitics according to the principles of equality and mutual aid. While theorists like Kropotkin (1885), who espouse European concepts of anar¬chism and mutual aid, are one source, there is also a rich theoretical tradition from indigenous Pacific scholars who draw upon Pacific cultural practices of aloha and island connectivity and solidarity (Hau'ofa, 1994; Lilomaiava-Doktor, 2009; Teaiwa, 2000; Shigematsu & Camacho, 2010; Wilson, 2000). There is also a strong tradition of networked regional activism, as demonstrated by the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific movement and the "Moana Nui'' confer¬ences in 2011 and 2013 (http://mnaa-ca.org/). <u><mark>Another factor to take into account when examining the project of transcending hegemony is the role of <strong>destroying old myths</strong> and <strong>producing new ones</strong></mark>.</u> As I have tried to demonstrate throughout this book, supported by the scholarship of others (Agnew, 2009; Shields, 1991; Wright, 2006), myths are powerful forces for governing actions and for determining what is imaginable and allowable. <u>To produce a different kind of politics in the region, <strong>different myths for the Pacific need to be developed and promoted</u></strong>. A rhetorical battle must be waged that takes a hatchet to many myths in the Pacific. <u><strong>The Pacific is not empty</u></strong>. The Pacific is not paradise. The Pacific is not a wasteland. The Pacific is not already postcolonial. The Pacific is not small. <u><strong>The Pacific is not dependent.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The Pacific is not the tip of someone else's spear</u></strong></mark>. The Pacific is not someone else's borderland. In place of these old, mistaken myths, new myths must be sown. The Pacific is big. Affinity and solidarity can triumph. Self-determination and self-governance are possible and practical. <u>The islands in the Pacific are not just the edges of someone else's empire, <strong>but their own center. </strong>To transcend hegemony</u> in the region, <u>there is a need not only to nurture and promote the values of affinity</u> within the region but to geographically expand them as well. This is part of Richard Day's (2005) concept of "infinite responsibility" Given that the primary states involved in the contest for hegemony are the United States and China (see chapter 1), to successfully supplant hegemonic battle between those powers on the edges of the Pacific, there is urgent need for Pacific social movements to reach out with education and solidarity to groups in China, the United States, and beyond. The Pacific needs to be represented as a place of life, not just as a militarized logistics space of trade or the site of someone else's profit-seeking "vital system;' so that citizens, policy makers, politicians, and others around the world come to see and the space differently. Concurrently, solid social movement organizing reach out to people on both sides of the Pacific. Pacific groups attempting to reach out to civil society groups in China and the United States face challenges, but doing so in both places is critical activists I have spoken with have commented that it is sometimes •· make linkages with women's and peace groups from China because the1! ties of some purportedly activist groups are controlled and surveilled ·" Chinese government. Change may be on the horizon, however. Communist Party of China (CCP) remains firmly in political power. grip over civil society has gradually loosened over the past decades (4 2008). While the Chinese state still retains strong censorship capabilities and militarized institutions of social control, there have been tremendous in Chinese society that could lead to a substantial erosion of state open a crucial window for linkages of affinity and solidarity between Chinese citizens. While it may be challenging for American audiences to recognize this, from the Pacific perspective the more difficult and intractable problem government in the region has historically been not China but the United States. China may have a nondemocratic government with a long history of human rights abuses, buC;.hat has China done to the people and landscapes of the island Pacific compared with the United States? There may be reason to fear the dictatorial nature of the Chinese state run by the CCP, but if the United States were to draw down military forces in the region, there is no evidence that China would engage the islands with similar colonial policies as those of the United States, fascist-era Japan, or former European colonial powers. <u>The United States</u>, on the other hand, is a known entity. The nation <u>has a century-long history of colonial control and militarization in the region as well as an unambiguous stated desire to <strong>continue it indefinitely</strong>.</u> Furthermore, unlike in China, there are few signs that substantial political change is on the horizon in the United States-at least change that is relevant to the islands on the empires' edge. U.S. policy toward the island Pacific has been remarkably consistent for over a hundred years. From McKinley to Teddy Roosevelt, from Truman to Reagan, from George W Bush to Barack Obama: few U.S. administrations have sought to rein in the U.S. military's global operations, and none have se¬riously made moves to dismantle U.S. colonial and military control over the island Pacific. <u>The few</u> contemporary <u>American politicians</u> who <u>have suggested dismantling the U.S. Pacific Baseworld</u> <u>tend to be on either the right or left mar¬gins of American politics</u> (for example, Ron Paul and Dennis Kucinich). <u>While these views may be politically marginal<strong>, they do demonstrate that there is some public support for curbing U.S. militarization in the Pacific</u></strong> ( even if mostly due to concerns over the extensive financial costs). Activists in the Pacific have been keenly aware that <u><mark>decolonization and demilitarization</u></mark> in the region <u><strong><mark>depend on solidarity and support from outside the region</u></strong></mark>. As I described in chapter 2, one of <u><mark>the problems with getting the U.S. government to change</mark> its activities</u> in the Pacific <u><mark>is that <strong>so few U.S. citizens are aware of what is occurring</mark> in the region.</u></strong> Many of the activists I have met over the course of my research have noted that one of <u><mark>the most important first steps <strong>toward a demilitarized future</strong> is educating people</mark> both <strong>inside and outside</strong> the region about what is happening here.</u> It has certainly been my personal experience that once people are aware of what is occurring in the region, they are more likely to be supportive of the aims of self-determination and demilitarization. <u>While there are challenges in building bridges within the Pacific region and with citizens in the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, and other Pacific Rim countries, doing so <strong>is really the only long-term solution</u></strong> <u>to the <strong>current tensions and militarization of the region.</u></strong> <u><mark>What is needed is <strong>an ever-expanding circle of affinity</u></strong> <u>that focuses on the common desires</mark> we have as people,</u> <u><strong>whether in Hawai'i, Okinawa, Guam, New York, Shanghai, or Hiroshima</u></strong>. How, though, does the region move from a bristling militarized borderland to a region of affinity? How does the politically fractured region move toward an integration that goes beyond merely a shared integration into the capitalist world market? With such a dynamic and broad region, the answer lies not so much in a rigid political program as in the fluid creation of strategies driven by the insight that hegemony is an outdated political mode of thinking that can be transcended. In other words, to create a region organized by a geopolitics of peace, there is not so much a road map to follow as a guiding ethic: the ethic of universal affinity. <u>Is this vision of a more peaceful, demilitarized, decolonized Pacific just a utopian dream</u>? While it will obviously take some effort to make the vision real, discounting the possibility of an affinity-based geopolitics in the Pacific is wrong for two reasons: one moral and one analytical. First, <u>it is difficult to defend the morality of "realist" views that consider inevitable the status quo of a world organized hierarchically and premised on violence, domination, exploita¬tion, and the continued creation of <strong>whole populations of sacrificial "bare life</u></strong>:' <u>Following</u> from J. K. <u>Gibson-Graham's</u> (2008) <u>argument that <strong><mark>scholars need to be more focused</strong> on discovering <strong>possibilities for emancipatory political projects</u></strong> <u>than on explaining</u> <u><strong>why larger structural forces will always crush them</mark>,</u></strong> I believe that <u><mark>there is a moral imperative for</u></mark> scholars, teachers, <u><mark>activists</u></mark>, <u>and citizens</u> <u><mark>to explore new, <strong>alternative visions</mark> when current ones are causing misery</strong>.</u> Analytically, <u>it is</u> also <u>a mistake to discount the possibility of an <strong>affinity-seeking geopolitics</u></strong> in the Asia-Pacific region. <u>The idea may be practiced only in small pockets surrounded by a larger system of hegemony-seeking violence produced by powerful states</u> {backed by the legitimizing power of think tanks, planners, pundits, and politicians), <u>but history shows that these are the <strong>condi¬tions under which most new social orders have begun</u></strong>. Capitalism was once just an idea in a sea of other forms of social relations. So too was the idea of the nation-state. So too was the idea that human races are equal. As David Harvey (2005) convincingly details, even neoliberalism-the dominant political eco¬nomic paradigm of the early twenty-first century-was only decades ago a "utopian'' idea. The idea of an affinity-seeking geopolitics in the Pacific should not be dis-counted because of the supposed "smallness" of where it comes from, either. <u><strong>What happens in small places can have big effects</u></strong>. <u><strong>History has amply shown that what happens in the islands of the Pacific affects global balances of power and can tip the scales of planetary hegemony</u></strong>. <u>The islands of Asia and the Pacific have been the sites of epic battles and conflicts between empires. From World War II to the Cold War to current standoffs between the United States, China, and North Korea, these islands have been the staging grounds for intense mili¬tarization, nuclear experimentation, and <strong>potentially planet-decimating warfare of all kinds</u></strong>. <u>Is it so hard to believe that they can also be the sites where the <mark>seeds</u> <u><strong>can be planted for an international politics that rejects relationships of domination</mark>?</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Or is it easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of hegemony?</mark> </p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Reid 10 – T. R. Reid, Longtime Correspondent for The Washington Post and Former Chief of its Tokyo and London Bureaus, Commentator for National Public Radio, The Healing of America: A Global Quest for Better, Cheaper, and Fairer Health Care, p. Google Books fulltext: Fortunately, for all the local variations, health care systems tend to follow general patterns. In some models, government is both the provider of health care and the payer. In others, doctors and hospitals are in the private sector but government pays the bills. In still other countries, both the providers and the payers are private. There are four basic arrangements: The Beveridge Model Named after William Beveridge, the daring social reformer who designed Britain's National Health Service. In this system, health care is provided and financed by the government through tax payments, just like the police force or the public library. Many, but not all, hospitals and clinics are owned by the government; some doctors are government employees, but there are also private doctors who collect their fees from the government. In Britain, you never get a doctor bill. These systems tend to have low costs per capita, because the government, as the sole payer, controls what doctors can do and what they can charge. Countries using the Beveridge plan or variations on it include its birthplace Great Britain, Spain, most of Scandinavia and New Zealand. Hong Kong still has its own Beveridge-style health care, because the populace simply refused to give it up when the Chinese took over that former British colony in 1997. Cuba represents the extreme application of the Beveridge approach; it is probably the world's purest example of total government control. The Bismarck Model Named for the Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who invented the welfare state as part of the unification of Germany in the 19th century. Despite its European heritage, this system of providing health care would look fairly familiar to Americans. It uses an insurance system -- the insurers are called "sickness funds" -- usually financed jointly by employers and employees through payroll deduction. Unlike the U.S. insurance industry, though, Bismarck-type health insurance plans have to cover everybody, and they don't make a profit. Doctors and hospitals tend to be private in Bismarck countries; Japan has more private hospitals than the U.S. Although this is a multi-payer model -- Germany has about 240 different funds -- tight regulation gives government much of the cost-control clout that the single-payer Beveridge Model provides. The Bismarck model is found in Germany, of course, and France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Japan, Switzerland, and, to a degree, in Latin America. The National Health Insurance Model This system has elements of both Beveridge and Bismarck. It uses private-sector providers, but payment comes from a government-run insurance program that every citizen pays into. Since there's no need for marketing, no financial motive to deny claims and no profit, these universal insurance programs tend to be cheaper and much simpler administratively than American-style for-profit insurance. The single payer tends to have considerable market power to negotiate for lower prices; Canada's system, for example, has negotiated such low prices from pharmaceutical companies that Americans have spurned their own drug stores to buy pills north of the border. National Health Insurance plans also control costs by limiting the medical services they will pay for, or by making patients wait to be treated. The classic NHI system is found in Canada, but some newly industrialized countries -- Taiwan and South Korea, for example -- have also adopted the NHI model. The Out-of-Pocket Model Only the developed, industrialized countries -- perhaps 40 of the world's 200 countries -- have established health care systems. Most of the nations on the planet are too poor and too disorganized to provide any kind of mass medical care. The basic rule in such countries is that the rich get medical care; the poor stay sick or die. In rural regions of Africa, India, China and South America, hundreds of millions of people go their whole lives without ever seeing a doctor. They may have access, though, to a village healer using home-brewed remedies that may or not be effective against disease. In the poor world, patients can sometimes scratch together enough money to pay a doctor bill; otherwise, they pay in potatoes or goat's milk or child care or whatever else they may have to give. If they have nothing, they don't get medical care. These four models should be fairly easy for Americans to understand because we have elements of all of them in our fragmented national health care apparatus. When it comes to treating veterans, we're Britain or Cuba. For Americans over the age of 65 on Medicare, we're Canada. For working Americans who get insurance on the job, we're Germany. For the 15 percent of the population who have no health insurance, the United States is Cambodia or Burkina Faso or rural India, with access to a doctor available if you can pay the bill out-of-pocket at the time of treatment or if you're sick enough to be admitted to the emergency ward at the public hospital. The United States is unlike every other country because it maintains so many separate systems for separate classes of people. All the other countries have settled on one model for everybody. This is much simpler than the U.S. system; it's fairer and cheaper, too. These four models should be fairly easy for Americans to understand, because we have elements of all of them in our convoluted national health care apparatus: • For most working people under sixty-five, we're Germany or Japan In standard Bismarck Model fashion, the worker and the employer share the premiums for a health insurance policy. The insurer picks up most of the tab for treatment, with the patient either making a co-payment or paying a percentage. • For Native Americans, military personnel, and veterans, we're Britain, or Cuba. The VA and much of the Pentagon's Tri-Star system involve doctors who are government employees working in government-owned clinics and hospitals. Following the Beveridge Model, Americans in these systems never get a medical bill. The Indian Health Service also provides free care in government clinics. • For those over sixty-five, we're Canada. U.S. Medicare is essentially a National Health Insurance scheme, with the near-universal participation and the low administrative costs that characterize such systems. Americans with end-stage renal disease, regardless of age, are also covered by Medicare; this group had enough political clout to get what it wanted from Congress, and the "dialysis community" opted for coverage under the government-run NHI system. • For the 45 million uninsured Americans, we're Cambodia, or Burkina Faso, or rural India. These people have access to medical care if they can pay the bill out of pocket at the time of treatment, or if they're sick enough to be admitted to the emergency ward at a public hospital, or if they have access to a charity clinic. • And yet we're like no other country, because the United States maintains so many separate systems for separate classes of people, and because it relies so heavily on for-profit private insurance plans to pay the bills. All the other countries have settled on one model for everybody, on the theory that this is simpler, cheaper, and fairer. With its fragmented array of providers and payers and overlapping systems, the U.S. health care system doesn't fit into any of the recognized models. Understanding the four basic models significantly narrows down the global study of health care systems. When I set out looking for ideas and approaches we could borrow to fix American health care, I didn't have to go to two hundred different countries. I didn't even have to go to all thirty-six of the countries that rated higher than the United States when the World Health Organization compiled its rankings of the world's best health care systems. As admirable as medicine may be in places like San Marino (No. 11 on the WHO list) and Andorra (No. 21), it didn't seem particularly useful to study nations with populations smaller than Pittsburgh's.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><mark>“NHI” must be single payer</h4><p><strong>Reid 10 –<u></strong></mark> T. R. Reid, Longtime Correspondent for The Washington Post and Former Chief of its Tokyo and London Bureaus, Commentator for National Public Radio, The Healing of America: A Global Quest for Better, Cheaper, and Fairer Health Care, p. Google Books</p><p></u>Fortunately, for all the local variations, <u>health care <mark>systems</mark> tend to <mark>follow <strong>general patterns</strong></mark>. In some models, government is</u> both the provider of health care and <u>the payer</u>. In others, doctors and hospitals are in the private sector but government pays the bills. In still other countries, both the providers and the payers are private. <u><mark>There are <strong>four</strong></mark> basic arrangements:</p><p>The Beveridge Model</p><p></u>Named after William Beveridge, the daring social reformer who designed Britain's National Health Service. In this system, <u>health care is provided and financed by the government through tax payments</u>, just like the police force or the public library. <u>Many, but not all, hospitals and clinics are owned by the government; some doctors are government employees, but there are also private doctors who collect their fees from the government</u>. In Britain, you never get a doctor bill. These systems tend to have low costs per capita, because the government, as the sole payer, controls what doctors can do and what they can charge. Countries using the Beveridge plan or variations on it include its birthplace Great Britain, Spain, most of Scandinavia and New Zealand. Hong Kong still has its own Beveridge-style health care, because the populace simply refused to give it up when the Chinese took over that former British colony in 1997. Cuba represents the extreme application of the Beveridge<u> approach; it is probably the world's purest example of total government control.</p><p>The Bismarck Model</p><p></u>Named for the Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who invented the welfare state as part of the unification of Germany in the 19th century. Despite its European heritage, this system of providing health care would look fairly familiar to Americans. <u>It uses an insurance system</u> -- the insurers are called "sickness funds" -- <u>usually financed jointly by employers and employees through payroll deduction</u>. Unlike the U.S. insurance industry, though, <u>Bismarck-type health insurance plans have to cover everybody, and they don't make a profit</u>. Doctors and hospitals tend to be private in Bismarck countries; Japan has more private hospitals than the U.S. Although this is a multi-payer model -- Germany has about 240 different funds -- tight regulation gives government much of the cost-control clout that the single-payer Beveridge<u> Model provides. The Bismarck model is found in Germany, of course, and France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Japan, Switzerland, and, to a degree, in Latin America.</p><p>The <strong><mark>N</strong></mark>ational <strong><mark>H</strong></mark>ealth <strong><mark>I</strong></mark>nsurance Model</p><p></u>This system has elements of both Beveridge and Bismarck. <u>It <mark>uses private</mark>-sector <mark>providers, but <strong>payment comes from a government</mark>-run insurance <mark>program</strong></mark> that every citizen pays into</u>. Since there's no need for marketing, no financial motive to deny claims and no profit, these universal insurance programs tend to be cheaper and much simpler administratively than American-style for-profit insurance. <u><mark>The <strong>single payer</strong></mark> tends to have considerable market power to <mark>negotiate</mark> for <mark>lower prices</u></mark>; Canada's system, for example, has negotiated such low prices from pharmaceutical companies that Americans have spurned their own drug stores to buy pills north of the border. National Health Insurance plans also control costs by limiting the medical services they will pay for, or by making patients wait to be treated. <u>The classic NHI system is found in Canada, but</u> some newly industrialized countries -- <u>Taiwan and South Korea</u>, for example -- <u>have also adopted the NHI model.</p><p>The Out-of-Pocket Model</p><p></u>Only the developed, industrialized countries -- perhaps 40 of the world's 200 countries -- have established health care systems. Most of the nations on the planet are too poor and too disorganized to provide any kind of mass medical care. The basic rule in such countries is that the rich get medical care; the poor stay sick or die. In rural regions of Africa, India, China and South America, hundreds of millions of people go their whole lives without ever seeing a doctor. They may have access, though, to a village healer using home-brewed remedies that may or not be effective against disease. In the poor world, patients can sometimes scratch together enough money to pay a doctor bill; otherwise, they pay in potatoes or goat's milk or child care or whatever else they may have to give. If they have nothing, they don't get medical care. These four models should be fairly easy for Americans to understand because we have elements of all of them in our fragmented national health care apparatus. When it comes to treating veterans, we're Britain or Cuba. For Americans over the age of 65 on Medicare, we're Canada. For working Americans who get insurance on the job, we're Germany. For the 15 percent of the population who have no health insurance, the United States is Cambodia or Burkina Faso or rural India, with access to a doctor available if you can pay the bill out-of-pocket at the time of treatment or if you're sick enough to be admitted to the emergency ward at the public hospital. The United States is unlike every other country because it maintains so many separate systems for separate classes of people. All the other countries have settled on one model for everybody. This is much simpler than the U.S. system; it's fairer and cheaper, too.</p><p><u><mark>These</mark> four models <mark>should be</mark> <strong>fairly <mark>easy</u></strong></mark> for Americans <u><mark>to understand</u></mark>, because we have elements of all of them in our convoluted national health care apparatus:</p><p>• For most working people under sixty-five, we're Germany or Japan In standard Bismarck Model fashion, the worker and the employer share the premiums for a health insurance policy. The insurer picks up most of the tab for treatment, with the patient either making a co-payment or paying a percentage.</p><p>• For Native Americans, military personnel, and veterans, we're Britain, or Cuba. The VA and much of the Pentagon's Tri-Star system involve doctors who are government employees working in government-owned clinics and hospitals. Following the Beveridge Model, Americans in these systems never get a medical bill. The Indian Health Service also provides free care in government clinics.</p><p>• For those over sixty-five, we're Canada. U.S. Medicare is essentially a National Health Insurance scheme, with the near-universal participation and the low administrative costs that characterize such systems. Americans with end-stage renal disease, regardless of age, are also covered by Medicare; this group had enough political clout to get what it wanted from Congress, and the "dialysis community" opted for coverage under the government-run NHI system.</p><p>• For the 45 million uninsured Americans, we're Cambodia, or Burkina Faso, or rural India. These people have access to medical care if they can pay the bill out of pocket at the time of treatment, or if they're sick enough to be admitted to the emergency ward at a public hospital, or if they have access to a charity clinic.</p><p>• And yet we're like no other country, because the United States maintains so many separate systems for separate classes of people, and because it relies so heavily on for-profit private insurance plans to pay the bills. All the other countries have settled on one model for everybody, on the theory that this is simpler, cheaper, and fairer. With its fragmented array of providers and payers and overlapping systems, the U.S. health care system doesn't fit into any of the recognized models.</p><p><u><mark>Understanding</mark> the four <mark>basic models <strong>significantly narrows down</strong></mark> the <strong>global <mark>study</strong> of health care</mark> systems</u>. When I set out looking for ideas and approaches we could borrow to fix American health care, I didn't have to go to two hundred different countries. I didn't even have to go to all thirty-six of the countries that rated higher than the United States when the World Health Organization compiled its rankings of the world's best health care systems. As admirable as medicine may be in places like San Marino (No. 11 on the WHO list) and Andorra (No. 21), it didn't seem particularly useful to study nations with populations smaller than Pittsburgh's.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Dr. Chris Conover, PhD, Research Scholar at the Center for Health Policy & Inequalities Research at Duke University, “The #1 Reason Bernie Sanders' Medicare-for-All Single-Payer Plan Is A Singularly Bad Idea”, Forbes, Sept 18th 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2017/09/28/the-1-reason-bernie-sanders-medicare-for-all-single-payer-plan-is-a-singularly-bad-idea/#31320ca85502 fulltext: This may sound complicated, but it's actually quite simple. With one exception, every tax known to man shrinks the economy to some extent resulting in a loss of welfare for consumers and producers [1]. That is, “whatever you tax, you get less of,” whether that be labor, consumption of various products, capital or anything else policymakers have figured out how to tax. The exact amount the economy shrinks (which in turn determines the size of the associated welfare losses to consumers and producers) depends upon exactly what is taxed. How Big Are the Deadweight Losses from Taxation? Deadweight losses are the #1 reason single-payer is a bad idea simply because of their sheer size. Such losses are typically expressed as a fraction of revenue raised. The excess burden does not include the entire dollar amount that the economy shrinks as a consequence of a tax, but simply the consumer and producer surpluses associated with that lost output. The average excess burden represents the entire amount of such losses as a fraction of the entire amount of tax revenue raised. But it is well established the excess burdens rise with the tax rate: thus the excess burden associated with increasing income taxes from 35% to 40% is much larger than increasing them from 10% to 15%, for example. Since we already have an established tax system and rates that raise trillions of dollars a year, what matters for policy purposes is the marginal excess burden associated with the tax increases that would be needed on top of what we already collect. I have estimated that at the margin, deadweight losses for the federal tax system amount to 44 cents for every dollar of revenue raised. That means that if we financed the entire $3.5 trillion American health economy using federal taxes, we'd have to be prepared to accept welfare losses amounting to $1.5 trillion a year! That certainly should at least give pause to anyone who thinks letting Uncle Sam bankroll all health spending is good idea. As I noted earlier, the actual degree to which the economy would shrink depends heavily on how Senator Sanders plans to bankroll what would constitute by far the biggest free lunch in American history (easily dwarfing Medicare, Medicaid or even Social Security in terms of annual spending). Note that there are plenty of alternative ways to raise revenue. Some of these others have smaller excess burdens. Custom duties, for example, may have excess burdens as low as 2.6%, but such duties also constitute a mere penny of every dollar in federal taxes collected. There is no realistic prospect such duties could ever generate trillions of dollars in annual tax revenues. Skeptics need not rely on my own (literature-based) estimates of the size of these excess burdens. To account for these excess burdens in cost-benefit analyses, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget for the last quarter century has required federal agencies to assign a shadow cost of 25 cents to each dollar of expenditures financed out of tax revenues (Circular A-94: p. 13). So whether the figure is 25% or 44%, it is far too high to simply ignore in discussions about the merits of single-payer health care. Can Deadweight Losses be Avoided? The only way to avoid deadweight losses entirely would be to impose a uniform head tax (even economists are not cynical enough to believe people would commit suicide to avoid such a tax). But it is ludicrous to expect progressives to support an additional annual tax on all Americans of $7,800 per person, which is the amount that would be required in 2017 [2]. Of course, precisely because of deadweight losses, it is lunacy for us to be bankrolling Medicare expenses for people such as Warren Buffett and his wife. Such a couple in the same income bracket as Warren Buffett but who turned 65 in 2015 would be expected to collect $427,000 in lifetime Medicare benefits despite having paid only $111,000 in lifetime taxes into Medicare. So the net amount financed by taxes for such a couple is $316,000. This is transparently indefensible on equity grounds since this couple could easily afford to pay for their own post-retirement health expenses. but it also implies that we're willing to accept $139,000 in deadweight losses simply for the privilege of saying that the wealthiest among us has the same Medicare card as everyone else. How crazy is that? From where I sit, we would be much better off restricting the use of tax dollars to finance a safety net for the poor rather than any sort of universal entitlement (including Medicare). Consider Switzerland, which provides universal coverage, but restricts government subsidies only to families who would otherwise spend more than 10% of family income paying for mandatory health insurance. The consequence is that the Swiss government pays for only 31% of health spending (compared to about 65% in the U.S.). How Large Would the Deadweight Losses Be Under Medicare-for-All? There is no way to answer this question with precision since Senator Sanders has refused to endorse a single approach to bankrolling his fantastically expensive plan (the left-of-center think tank, Urban Institute, has calculated this plan would add $32 trillion--yes trillion--to federal health spending just in its first 10 years; by way of comparison, Uncle Sam is expected to collect a mere $3.6 trillion in federal revenues during the upcoming fiscal year). Payroll Tax Increases? That said, Senator Sanders has offered a variety of options for financing his plan, including a payroll tax of 7.5%. This approach would have the advantage of reducing the excess burden, but not by much: 38% (read: $1.33 trillion) still would represent an enormous loss of potential GDP--including jobs and wages most likely to benefit the working class workers that single payer health care is supposed to help. Income Tax Increases? Moreover, since this approach would require roughly doubling the amount workers now see deducted from their paychecks, it seems much more likely that single-payer enthusiasts would champion any of the several "Options to Make the Wealthy Pay Their Fair Share" that have been proposed by Senator Sanders. But as you can see, raising income taxes would increase deadweight losses the most. This is especially true if tax increases are targeted at the highest-income taxpayers since the "maximum" estimates shown in Fig. 1 generally represent what the literature says about the magnitude of excess burdens arising from higher taxes on in the highest income brackets. All of the Above? Here's a harsh reality for progressives. According to Senator Sanders' own staff's estimates, a 7.5% payroll tax would raise only $3.9 trillion over 10 years, eliminating the tax exclusion (which I admittedly highly favor) raises another $4.2 trillion, and making the personal income tax more progressive (taking the highest tax rate north of 50%) adds a mere $1.9 trillion. Even adopting all three would fall very far short of the $32 trillion in new federal tax revenues needed to fund Medicare-for-All according to the Urban Institute. As an illustration, the Urban Institute analysis suggests that if the Sanders single-payer plan were currently the law of the land, an added $2.5 trillion in federal revenues would be required to finance it just in 2017. This compares to expected federal tax receipts in FY2017 of $3.46 trillion (Table S-1). In short, we'd need an increase in federal tax revenues of 72.2%! Worse, Sanders' Medicare-for-All plan would have a hidden cost of $625 million to $1.1 trillion in deadweight losses in 2017 alone. Per year! (for readers who might be wondering, that's $1, 900 to $3,400 per U.S. resident or $7,700 to $13,600 for a family of 4).<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>6. Turn – plan spikes taxes – crushes GDP – turns jobs and wages</h4><p>Dr. Chris <strong>Conover</strong>, PhD, Research Scholar at the Center for Health Policy & Inequalities Research at Duke University, “The #1 Reason Bernie Sanders' Medicare-for-All Single-Payer Plan Is A Singularly Bad Idea”, Forbes, Sept 18th 20<strong>17</strong>, https://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2017/09/28/the-1-reason-bernie-sanders-medicare-for-all-single-payer-plan-is-a-singularly-bad-idea/#31320ca85502</p><p>This may sound complicated, but it's actually quite simple. With one exception, <u><mark>every</mark> <mark>tax</u></mark> known to man <u><mark>shrinks the economy</u></mark> to some extent resulting in a loss of welfare for consumers and producers [1]. That is, “<u>whatever you tax<mark>, you get less </mark>of</u>,” <u>whether that be <mark>labor</mark>, consumption of various <mark>products, capital</mark> or anything else policymakers have figured out how to tax. The exact amount the economy shrinks</u> (which in turn determines the size of the associated welfare losses to consumers and producers) <u>depends upon exactly what is taxed. </u>How Big Are the Deadweight Losses from Taxation? <u><mark>Deadweight losses</mark> are</u> <u><strong>the <mark>#1 reason single-payer is a bad idea</u></strong></mark> <u>simply because of their</u> <u><strong>sheer size</u></strong><mark>.</mark> Such losses are typically expressed as a fraction of revenue raised. The excess burden does not include the entire dollar amount that the economy shrinks as a consequence of a tax, but simply the consumer and producer surpluses associated with that lost output. <u>The average excess burden represents the entire amount of such losses as a fraction of the entire amount of tax revenue raised</u>. But it is well established <u>the excess burdens rise with the tax rate</u>: thus <u>the excess burden associated with increasing income taxes from 35% to 40% is much larger than increasing them from 10% to 15%, </u>for example. Since we already have an established tax system and rates that raise trillions of dollars a year, what matters for policy purposes is the marginal excess burden associated with the tax increases that would be needed on top of what we already collect. I have estimated that <u>at the margin, <mark>deadweight losses for</mark> the <mark>federal tax</mark> system <mark>amount to 44 cents for every dollar</mark> of revenue raised.</u> That means that <u><mark>if we financed</u></mark> the entire <u><mark>$3.5</mark> <mark>trillion</u></mark> American <u>health economy <mark>using federal taxes, we'd have</mark> to be prepared to accept <mark>welfare losses</u> <u><strong>amounting to $1.5 trillion a year</u></strong></mark>! <u>That</u> <u><strong>certainly should</u></strong> at least <u><strong>give pause to anyone who thinks</u></strong> letting Uncle Sam bankroll <u><strong>all health spending is good idea. </u></strong>As I noted earlier, the actual degree to which the economy would shrink depends heavily on how Senator Sanders plans to bankroll what would constitute by far the biggest free lunch in American history (easily dwarfing Medicare, Medicaid or even Social Security in terms of annual spending). Note that there are plenty of alternative ways to raise revenue. Some of these others have smaller excess burdens. Custom duties, for example, may have excess burdens as low as 2.6%, but such duties also constitute a mere penny of every dollar in federal taxes collected. There is no realistic prospect such duties could ever generate trillions of dollars in annual tax revenues. <u>Skeptics need not rely on my own (literature-based) estimates of the size of these excess burdens. To account for these excess burdens in cost-benefit analyses, <mark>the</u></mark> U.S. <u><mark>O</u></mark>ffice of <u><mark>M</u></mark>anagement and <u><mark>B</u></mark>udget for the last quarter century <u>has <mark>required</mark> federal <mark>agencies to assign a shadow</mark> <mark>cost</mark> of 25 cents to each dollar of expenditures financed out of tax revenues</u> (Circular A-94: p. 13). So <u>whether the figure is 25% or 44%,</u> <u><strong>it is far too high to simply ignore in discussions about the merits of <mark>single-payer</mark> health care. </u></strong>Can Deadweight Losses be Avoided? The only way to avoid deadweight losses entirely would be to impose a uniform head tax (even economists are not cynical enough to believe people would commit suicide to avoid such a tax). But it is ludicrous to expect progressives to support an additional annual tax on all Americans of $7,800 per person, which is the amount that would be required in 2017 [2]. Of course, precisely because of deadweight losses, it is lunacy for us to be bankrolling Medicare expenses for people such as Warren Buffett and his wife. Such a couple in the same income bracket as Warren Buffett but who turned 65 in 2015 would be expected to collect $427,000 in lifetime Medicare benefits despite having paid only $111,000 in lifetime taxes into Medicare. So the net amount financed by taxes for such a couple is $316,000. This is transparently indefensible on equity grounds since this couple could easily afford to pay for their own post-retirement health expenses. but it also implies that we're willing to accept $139,000 in deadweight losses simply for the privilege of saying that the wealthiest among us has the same Medicare card as everyone else. How crazy is that? From where I sit, we would be much better off restricting the use of tax dollars to finance a safety net for the poor rather than any sort of universal entitlement (including Medicare). Consider Switzerland, which provides universal coverage, but restricts government subsidies only to families who would otherwise spend more than 10% of family income paying for mandatory health insurance. The consequence is that the Swiss government pays for only 31% of health spending (compared to about 65% in the U.S.). How Large Would the Deadweight Losses Be Under <u>Medicare-for-All</u>? There is no way to answer this question with precision since Senator Sanders has refused to endorse a single approach to bankrolling his fantastically expensive plan (the left-of-center think tank, Urban Institute, has calculated this plan<u> <mark>would add $32 trillion</u></mark>--yes trillion--<u><mark>to</mark> federal health <mark>spending</u></mark> just in its first 10 years; by way of comparison, <u><mark>Uncle Sam</mark> is expected to <mark>collect</u></mark> a mere <u><mark>$3.6 trillion</mark> <mark>in</mark> federal <mark>revenues</mark> during the upcoming fiscal year</u>). <u><mark>Payroll Tax Increases</u></mark>? That said, Senator Sanders has offered a variety of options for financing his plan, including a payroll tax of 7.5%. This approach would have the advantage of <u>reducing the excess burden</u>, but not <u>by</u> much: <u>38%</u> (read: <u>$1.3</u>3 <u>trillion</u>) still <u><mark>would</mark> <mark>represent</u> <u><strong>an enormous loss of</u></strong></mark> potential <u><strong><mark>GDP</u></strong></mark>--<u><mark>including</u> <u><strong>jobs and wages</u></strong></mark> most likely to benefit the working class workers that single payer health care is supposed to help. <u><mark>Income Tax Increases</u></mark>? Moreover, since this approach <u><mark>would</mark> require roughly <strong><mark>doubl</mark>ing</strong> the amount workers now see deducted from their paychecks</u>, it seems much more likely that single-payer enthusiasts would champion any of the several "<u>Options to <mark>Make the Wealthy Pay</u></mark> Their Fair Share" that have been proposed by Senator Sanders. But as you can see, raising income taxes <u><mark>would increase deadweight losses</u> <u><strong>the most</u></strong></mark>. <u>This is especially true if tax increases are targeted at the highest-income taxpayers since the "maximum" estimates</u> shown in Fig. 1 generally represent what the literature says about the magnitude of excess burdens arising from higher taxes on in the highest income brackets. All of the Above? <u>Here's a <mark>harsh reality</u></mark> for progressives. According to Senator Sanders' own staff's estimates, <u>a 7.5% payroll tax would raise only $3.9 trillion over 10 years, eliminating the tax exclusion</u> (which I admittedly highly favor) <u>raises another $4.2 trillion</u>, and <u>making the personal income tax more progressive</u> (taking the highest tax rate north of 50%) <u>adds a mere $1.9 trillion</u>. Even <u>adopting<mark> all three would fall</u> <u><strong>very far short</u></strong> <u>of the $32 trillion in</mark> new federal <mark>tax revenues needed</u></mark> to fund Medicare-for-All according to the Urban Institute. As an illustration, <u>the Urban Institute analysis suggests that if the Sanders single-payer plan were currently the law of the land, an added $2.5 trillion in federal revenues would be required to finance it</u> <u><strong>just in 2017</u></strong>. This compares to expected federal tax receipts in FY2017 of $3.46 trillion (Table S-1). <u>In short, <mark>we'd need an increase in</mark> federal <mark>tax revenues of <strong>72.2%!</u></strong></mark> Worse, Sanders' Medicare-for-All plan would have a hidden cost of $625 million to $1.1 trillion in deadweight losses in 2017 alone. Per year! (for readers who might be wondering, that's $1, 900 to $3,400 per U.S. resident or $7,700 to $13,600 for a family of 4).</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Jeffrey Lewis, in the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Study Program- Worked In the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Center for Defense Information, ‘4, "What if Space Were Weaponized," July 2004 pg online @ www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf) fulltext: Accidental Nuclear War Scenario Crisis Over Kalningrad (2010) This is the second of two scenarios that consider how U.S. space weapons might create incentives for America’s opponents to behave in dangerous ways. The previous scenario looked at the systemic risk of accidents that could arise from keeping nuclear weapons on high alert to guard against a space weapons attack. This section focuses on the risk that a single accident in space, such as a piece of space debris striking a Russian early-warning satellite, might be the catalyst for an accidental nuclear war. As we have noted in an earlier section, the United States canceled its own ASAT program in the 1980s over concerns that the deployment of these weapons might be deeply destabilizing. For all the talk about a “new relationship” between the United States and Russia, both sides retain thousands of nuclear forces on alert and configured to fight a nuclear war. When briefed about the size and status of U.S. nuclear forces, President George W. Bush reportedly asked “What do we need all these weapons for?” 43 The answer, as it was during the Cold War, is that the forces remain on alert to conduct a number of possible contingencies, including a nuclear strike against Russia. This fact, of course, is not lost on the Russian leadership, which has been increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for the country’s declining military might. In the mid-1990s, Russia dropped its pledge to refrain from the “first use” of nuclear weapons and conducted a series of exercises in which Russian nuclear forces prepared to use nuclear weapons to repel a NATO invasion. In October 2003, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov reiterated that Moscow might use nuclear weapons “preemptively” in any number of contingencies, including a NATO attack. 44 So, it remains business as usual with U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. And business as usual includes the occasional false alarm of a nuclear attack. There have been several of these incidents over the years. In September 1983, as a relatively new Soviet early-warning satellite moved into position to monitor U.S. missile fields in North Dakota, the sun lined up in just such a way as to fool the Russian satellite into reporting that half a dozen U.S. missiles had been launched at the Soviet Union. Perhaps mindful that a brand new satellite might malfunction, the officer in charge of the command center that monitored data from the early-warning satellites refused to pass the alert to his superiors. He reportedly explained his caution by saying: “When people start a war, they don’t start it with only five missiles. You can do little damage with just five missiles.” 45 In January 1995, Norwegian scientists launched a sounding rocket on a trajectory similar to one that a U.S. Trident missile might take if it were launched to blind Russian radars with a high 26 What if Space Were Weaponized? altitude nuclear detonation. The incident was apparently serious enough that, the next day, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated that he had activated his “nuclear football” – a device that allows the Russian president to communicate with his military advisors and review his options for launching his arsenal. In this case, the Russian early-warning satellites could clearly see that no attack was under way and the crisis passed without incident. 46 In both cases, Russian observers were confident that what appeared to be a “small” attack was not a fragmentary picture of a much larger one. In the case of the Norwegian sounding rocket, space-based sensors played a crucial role in assuring the Russian leadership that it was not under attack. The Russian command system, however, is no longer able to provide such reliable, early warning. The dissolution of the Soviet Union cost Moscow several radar stations in newly independent states, creating “attack corridors” through which Moscow could not see an attack launched by U.S. nuclear submarines. 47 Further, Russia’s constellation of early-warning satellites has been allowed to decline – only one or two of the six satellites remain operational, leaving Russia with early warning for only six hours a day. Russia is attempting to reconstitute its constellation of early-warning satellites, with several launches planned in the next few years. But Russia will still have limited warning and will depend heavily on its space-based systems to provide warning of an American attack. 48 As the previous section explained, the Pentagon is contemplating military missions in space that will improve U.S. ability to cripple Russian nuclear forces in a crisis before they can execute an attack on the United States. Anti-satellite weapons, in this scenario, would blind Russian reconnaissance and warning satellites and knock out communications satellites. Such strikes might be the prelude to a full-scale attack, or a limited effort, as attempted in a war game at Schriever Air Force Base, to conduct “early deterrence strikes” to signal U.S. resolve and control escalation. 49 By 2010, the United States may, in fact, have an arsenal of ASATs (perhaps even on orbit 24/7) ready to conduct these kinds of missions – to coerce opponents and, if necessary, support preemptive attacks. Moscow would certainly have to worry that these ASATs could be used in conjunction with other space-enabled systems – for example, long-range strike systems that could attack targets in less than 90 minutes – to disable Russia’s nuclear deterrent before the Russian leadership understood what was going on. What would happen if a piece of space debris were to disable [hit] a Russian early-warning satellite under these conditions? Could the Russian military distinguish between an accident in space and the first phase of a U.S. attack? Most Russian early-warning satellites are in elliptical Molniya orbits (a few are in GEO) and thus difficult to attack from the ground or air. At a minimum, Moscow would probably have some tactical warning of such a suspicious launch, but given the sorry state of Russia’s warning, optical imaging and signals intelligence satellites there is reason to ask the question. Further, the advent of U.S. on-orbit ASATs, as now envisioned 50 could make both the more difficult orbital plane and any warning systems moot. The unpleasant truth is that the Russians likely would have to make a judgment call. No state has the ability to definitively determine the cause of the satellite’s failure. Even the Accidental Nuclear War Scenarios 27 United States does not maintain (nor is it likely to have in place by 2010) a sophisticated space surveillance system that would allow it to distinguish between a satellite malfunction, a debris strike or a deliberate attack – and Russian space surveillance capabilities are much more limited by comparison. Even the risk assessments for collision with debris are speculative, particularly for the unique orbits in which Russian early-warning satellites operate. During peacetime, it is easy to imagine that the Russians would conclude that the loss of a satellite was either a malfunction or a debris strike. But how confident could U.S. planners be that the Russians would be so calm if the accident in space occurred in tandem with a second false alarm, or occurred during the middle of a crisis? What might happen if the debris strike occurred shortly after a false alarm showing a missile launch? False alarms are appallingly common – according to information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) experienced 1,172 “moderately serious” false alarms between 1977 and 1983 – an average of almost three false alarms per week. Comparable information is not available about the Russian system, but there is no reason to believe that it is any more reliable. 51 Assessing the likelihood of these sorts of coincidences is difficult because Russia has never provided data about the frequency or duration of false alarms; nor indicated how seriously earlywarning data is taken by Russian leaders. Moreover, there is no reliable estimate of the debris risk for Russian satellites in highly elliptical orbits. 52 The important point, however, is that such a coincidence would only appear suspicious if the United States were in the business of disabling satellites – in other words, there is much less risk if Washington does not develop ASATs. The loss of an early-warning satellite could look rather ominous if it occurred during a period of major tension in the relationship. While NATO no longer sees Russia as much of a threat, the same cannot be said of the converse. Despite the warm talk, Russian leaders remain wary of NATO expansion, particularly the effect expansion may have on the Baltic port of Kaliningrad. Although part of Russia, Kaliningrad is separated from the rest of Russia by Lithuania and Poland. Russia has already complained about its decreasing lack of access to the port, particularly the uncooperative attitude of the Lithuanian government. 53 News reports suggest that an edgy Russia may have moved tactical nuclear weapons into the enclave. 54 If the Lithuanian government were to close access to Kaliningrad in a fit of pique, this would trigger a major crisis between NATO and Russia. Under these circumstances, the loss of an early-warning satellite would be suspicious. It is any military’s nature during a crisis to interpret events in their worst-case light. For example, consider the coincidences that occurred in early September 1956, during the extraordinarily tense period in international relations marked by the Suez Crisis and Hungarian uprising. 55 On one evening the White House received messages indicating: 1. the Turkish Air Force had gone on alert in response to unidentified aircraft penetrating its airspace; 2. one hundred Soviet MiG-15s were flying over Syria; 3. a British Canberra bomber had been shot down over Syria, most likely by a MiG; and 4. The Russian fleet was moving through the Dardanelles. Gen. Andrew 28 What if Space Were Weaponized? Goodpaster was reported to have worried that the confluence of events “might trigger off … the NATO operations plan” that called for a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. Yet, all of these reports were false. The “jets” over Turkey were a flock of swans; the Soviet MiGs over Syria were a smaller, routine escort returning the president from a state visit to Moscow; the bomber crashed due to mechanical difficulties; and the Soviet fleet was beginning long-scheduled exercises. In an important sense, these were not “coincidences” but rather different manifestations of a common failure – human error resulting from extreme tension of an international crisis. As one author noted, “The detection and misinterpretation of these events, against the context of world tensions from Hungary and Suez, was the first major example of how the size and complexity of worldwide electronic warning systems could, at certain critical times, create momentum of its own.” Perhaps most worrisome, the United States might be blithely unaware of the degree to which the Russians were concerned about its actions and inadvertently escalate a crisis. During the early 1980s, the Soviet Union suffered a major “war scare” during which time its leadership concluded that bilateral relations were rapidly declining. This war scare was driven in part by the rhetoric of the Reagan administration, fortified by the selective reading of intelligence. During this period, NATO conducted a major command post exercise, Able Archer, that caused some elements of the Soviet military to raise their alert status. American officials were stunned to learn, after the fact, that the Kremlin had been acutely nervous about an American first strike during this period. 56 All of these incidents have a common theme – that confidence is often the difference between war and peace. In times of crisis, false alarms can have a momentum of their own. As in the second scenario in this monograph, the lesson is that commanders rely on the steady flow of reliable information. When that information flow is disrupted – whether by a deliberate attack or an accident – confidence collapses and the result is panic and escalation. Introducing ASAT weapons into this mix is all the more dangerous, because such weapons target the elements of the command system that keep leaders aware, informed and in control. As a result, the mere presence of such weapons is corrosive to the confidence that allows national nuclear forces to operate safely.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Space debris causes <u>Russia war </h4><p></u>Jeffrey <strong>Lewis</strong>, in the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Study Program- Worked In the <strong>Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy</strong>, Center for Defense Information, <strong>‘4</strong>, "What if Space Were Weaponized," July 2004 pg online @ www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf)</p><p>Accidental Nuclear War Scenario Crisis Over Kalningrad (2010) This is the second of two scenarios that consider how U.S. space weapons might create incentives for America’s opponents to behave in dangerous ways. The previous scenario looked at the systemic risk of accidents that could arise from keeping nuclear weapons on high alert to guard against a space weapons attack. This section focuses on the risk that a single accident in space, such as a piece of space debris striking a Russian early-warning satellite, might be the catalyst for an accidental nuclear war. As we have noted in an earlier section, th<u>e United States canceled its own ASAT program in the 1980s over concerns that the deployment of these weapons might be deeply destabilizi</u>ng. For all the talk about a “new relationship” between the United States and Russia, both sides retain thousands of nuclear forces on alert and configured to fight a nuclear war. When briefed about the size and status of U.S. nuclear forces, President George W. Bush reportedly asked “What do we need all these weapons for?” 43 The answer, as it was during the Cold War, is that <u>the forces remain on alert to conduct a number of possible contingencies, including a nuclear strike against Russia. This fact, of course, is not lost on the Russian leadership, which has been increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for the country’s declining military might</u>. In the mid-1990s, <u><mark>Russia dropped its pledge to refrain from</u></mark> the “<u><mark>first use</u></mark>” of nuclear weapons and conducted a series of exercises in which Russian nuclear forces prepared to use nuclear weapons to repel a NATO invasion. In October 2003, <u><strong>Russian Defense Minister</u></strong> <u>Sergei <mark>Ivanov reiterated that Moscow might use nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s</mark> “<mark>preemptively</mark>” in any number of contingencies, </u>including a NATO attack. 44 So, it remains business as usual with U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. And business as usual includes the occasional false alarm of a nuclear attack. There have been several of these incidents over the years. In September 1983, as a relatively new Soviet early-warning satellite moved into position to monitor U.S. missile fields in North Dakota, the sun lined up in just such a way as to fool the Russian satellite into reporting that half a dozen U.S. missiles had been launched at the Soviet Union. Perhaps mindful that a brand new satellite might malfunction, the officer in charge of the command center that monitored data from the early-warning satellites refused to pass the alert to his superiors. He reportedly explained his caution by saying: “When people start a war, they don’t start it with only five missiles. You can do little damage with just five missiles.” 45 In January 1995, Norwegian scientists launched a sounding rocket on a trajectory similar to one that a U.S. Trident missile might take if it were launched to blind Russian radars with a high 26 What if Space Were Weaponized? altitude nuclear detonation. The incident was apparently serious enough that, the next day, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated that he had activated his “nuclear football” – a device that allows the Russian president to communicate with his military advisors and review his options for launching his arsenal. In this case, the Russian early-warning satellites could clearly see that no attack was under way and the crisis passed without incident. 46 In both cases, <u>Russian observers were confident that what appeared to be a “small” attack was not a fragmentary picture of a much larger one.</u> In the case of the Norwegian sounding rocket, <u>space-based sensors played a crucial role in assuring the Russian leadership that it was not under attack. The Russian command system, however, is no longer able to provide such reliable, early warning. The dissolution of the Soviet Union cost Moscow several radar stations in newly independent states, creating “attack corridors” through which Moscow could not see an attack launched by U.S. nuclear submarines</u>. 47 Further, <u>Russia’s constellation of early-warning satellites has been allowed to decline</u> – <u>only one or two of the six satellites remain operational</u>, <u>leaving Russia with early warning for only <strong>six hours a day</u></strong>. Russia is attempting to reconstitute its constellation of early-warning satellites, with several launches planned in the next few years. But <u>Russia will still have limited warning and will depend heavily on its space-based systems to provide warning of an American attack.</u> 48 As the previous section explained, the Pentagon is contemplating military missions in space that will improve U.S. ability to cripple Russian nuclear forces in a crisis before they can execute an attack on the United States. Anti-satellite weapons, in this scenario, would blind Russian reconnaissance and warning satellites and knock out communications satellites. Such strikes might be the prelude to a full-scale attack, or a limited effort, as attempted in a war game at Schriever Air Force Base, to conduct “early deterrence strikes” to signal U.S. resolve and control escalation. 49 By 2010, the United States may, in fact, have an arsenal of ASATs (perhaps even on orbit 24/7) ready to conduct these kinds of missions – to coerce opponents and, if necessary, support preemptive attacks. <u>Moscow would certainly have to worry that these ASATs could be used in conjunction with other space-enabled systems</u> – for example, long-range strike systems that could attack targets in less than 90 minutes – <u>to disable Russia’s nuclear deterrent before the Russian leadership understood what was going on. <strong><mark>What would happen if</mark> a piece of space <mark>debris were to</mark> </u></strong>disable <u><strong><mark>[hit] a Russian early-warning satellite</mark> under these conditions</u></strong>? <u>Could the Russian military distinguish between an accident in space and the first phase of a U.S. attack?</u> Most Russian early-warning satellites are in elliptical Molniya orbits (a few are in GEO) and thus difficult to attack from the ground or air. At a minimum, Moscow would probably have some tactical warning of such a suspicious launch, but <u>given the sorry state of Russia’s warning, optical imaging and signals intelligence satellites there is reason to ask the question</u>. Further, the <u>advent of U.S. on-orbit ASATs</u>, as now envisioned 50 could <u>make both the more difficult orbital plane and any warning systems moot</u>. The unpleasant truth is that the <u><mark>Russians</mark> likely <mark>would</mark> have to <strong><mark>make a judgment call</u></strong></mark>. No <u>state has the ability to definitively determine the cause of the satellite’s failure. </u>Even the Accidental Nuclear War Scenarios 27 <u><mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>does not maintain</u></mark> (nor is it likely to have in place by 2010) <u><mark>a</mark> sophisticated space surveillance <mark>system that would allow it to distinguish between</mark> a satellite malfunction, <mark>a debris strike or</mark> a deliberate <mark>attack</u></mark> – <u>and Russian space surveillance capabilities are much more limited by comparison. </u>Even the risk assessments for collision with debris are speculative, particularly for the unique orbits in which Russian early-warning satellites operate. During peacetime, it is easy to imagine that the Russians would conclude that the loss of a satellite was either a malfunction or a debris strike. But <u>how confident could U.S. planners be that the Russians would be so calm if the accident in space occurred in tandem with a second false alarm, or occurred during the middle of a crisis? What might happen if the debris strike occurred shortly after a false alarm showing a missile launch? False alarms are appallingly common</u> – according to information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (<u>NORAD</u>) <u>experienced 1,172 “moderately serious” false alarms between 1977 and 1983</u> – an average of almost three false alarms per week. Comparable information is not available about the Russian system, but there is no reason to believe that it is any more reliable. 51 Assessing the likelihood of these sorts of coincidences is difficult because Russia has never provided data about the frequency or duration of false alarms; nor indicated how seriously earlywarning data is taken by Russian leaders. Moreover, there is no reliable estimate of the debris risk for Russian satellites in highly elliptical orbits. 52 The important point, however, is that such a coincidence would only appear suspicious if the United States were in the business of disabling satellites – in other words, there is much less risk if Washington does not develop ASATs. <u>The loss of an early-warning satellite could look rather ominous if it occurred during a period of major tension in the relationship.</u> While NATO no longer sees Russia as much of a threat, the same cannot be said of the converse. Despite the warm talk, Russian leaders remain wary of NATO expansion, particularly the effect expansion may have on the Baltic port of Kaliningrad. Although part of Russia, Kaliningrad is separated from the rest of Russia by Lithuania and Poland. Russia has already complained about its decreasing lack of access to the port, particularly the uncooperative attitude of the Lithuanian government. 53 News reports suggest that an edgy Russia may have moved tactical nuclear weapons into the enclave. 54 <u>If the Lithuanian government were to close access to Kaliningrad in a fit of pique, this would trigger a major crisis between NATO and Russia. Under these circumstances, the loss of an early-warning satellite would be suspicious. <strong><mark>It is any military’s nature during a crisis to interpret events in their worst-case</mark> light</u></strong>. For example, consider the coincidences that occurred in early September 1956, during the extraordinarily tense period in international relations marked by the Suez Crisis and Hungarian uprising. 55 On one evening the White House received messages indicating: 1. the Turkish Air Force had gone on alert in response to unidentified aircraft penetrating its airspace; 2. one hundred Soviet MiG-15s were flying over Syria; 3. a British Canberra bomber had been shot down over Syria, most likely by a MiG; and 4. The Russian fleet was moving through the Dardanelles. Gen. Andrew 28 What if Space Were Weaponized? Goodpaster was reported to have worried that the confluence of events “might trigger off … the NATO operations plan” that called for a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. Yet, all of these reports were false. The “jets” over Turkey were a flock of swans; the Soviet MiGs over Syria were a smaller, routine escort returning the president from a state visit to Moscow; the bomber crashed due to mechanical difficulties; and the Soviet fleet was beginning long-scheduled exercises. In an important sense, these were not “coincidences” but rather different manifestations of a common failure – human error resulting from extreme tension of an international crisis. As one author noted, “The detection and misinterpretation of these events, against the context of world tensions from Hungary and Suez, was the first major example of how the size and complexity of worldwide electronic warning systems could, at certain critical times, create momentum of its own.” Perhaps most worrisome, the United States might be blithely unaware of the degree to which the Russians were concerned about its actions and inadvertently escalate a crisis. During the early 1980s, the Soviet Union suffered a major “war scare” during which time its leadership concluded that bilateral relations were rapidly declining. This war scare was driven in part by the rhetoric of the Reagan administration, fortified by the selective reading of intelligence. During this period, NATO conducted a major command post exercise, Able Archer, that caused some elements of the Soviet military to raise their alert status. American officials were stunned to learn, after the fact, that the Kremlin had been acutely nervous about an American first strike during this period. 56 All of these incidents have a common theme – that <u>confidence is often the difference between war and peace. In times of crisis, false alarms can have a momentum of their own</u>. As in the second scenario in this monograph, the lesson is that commanders rely on the steady flow of reliable information. <u><mark>When</u></mark> that <u><mark>information flow is disrupted</u></mark> – <u>whether <mark>by</mark> a deliberate <mark>attack or</mark> an <mark>accident</u></mark> – <u>confidence collapses and <mark>the result is</mark> panic and <mark>escalation</u></mark>. Introducing ASAT weapons into this mix is all the more dangerous, because such weapons target the elements of the command system that keep leaders aware, informed and in control. As a result, the mere presence of such weapons is corrosive to the confidence that allows national nuclear forces to operate safely. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Deudney and Ikenberry 18 (Daniel and John, July/August, professor of political theory at Johns Hopkins University. IR prof at Georgetown University. "Liberal World" Foreign Affairs; New York Vol. 97 Iss. 4. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-06-14/liberal-world) The recent rise of illiberal forces and leaders is certainly worrisome. Yet it is too soon to write the obituary of liberalism as a theory of international relations, liberal democracy as a system of government, or the liberal order as the overarching framework for global politics. The liberal vision of nation-states cooperating to achieve security and prosperity remains as vital today as at any time in the modern age. In the long course of history, liberal democracy has hit hard times before, only to rebound and gain ground. It has done so thanks to the appeal of its basic values and its unique capacities to effectively grapple with the problems of modernity and globalization. fulltext: The order will endure, too. Even though the United States' relative power is waning, the international system that the country has sustained for seven decades is remarkably durable. As long as interdependence- economic, security related, and environmental- continues to grow, peoples and governments everywhere will be compelled to work together to solve problems or suffer grievous harm. By necessity, these efforts will build on and strengthen the institutions of the liberal order. THE LIBERAL VISION Modern liberalism holds that world politics requires new levels of political integration in response to relentlessly rising interdependence. But political orders do not arise spontaneously, and liberals argue that a world with more liberal democratic capitalist states will be more peaceful, prosperous, and respectful of human rights. It is not inevitable that history will end with the triumph of liberalism, but it is inevitable that a decent world order will be liberal. The recent rise of illiberal forces and the apparent recession of the liberal international order may seem to call this school of thought into question. But despite some notable exceptions, states still mostly interact through well-worn institutions and in the spirit of selfinterested, pragmatic accommodation. Moreover, part of the reason liberalism may look unsuited to the times is that many of its critics assail a strawman version of the theory. Liberals are often portrayed as having overly optimistic- even utopian-assumptions about the path of human history. In reality, they have a much more conditional and tempered optimism that recognizes tragic tradeoffs, and they are keenly attentive to the possibilities for large-scale catastrophes. Like realists, they recognize that it is often human nature to seek power, which is why they advocate constitutional and legal restraints. But unlike realists, who see history as cyclical, liberals are heirs to the Enlightenment project of technological innovation, which opens new possibilities both for human progress and for disaster. Liberalism is essentially pragmatic. Modern liberals embrace democratic governments, market-based economic systems, and international institutions not out of idealism but because they believe these arrangements are better suited to realizing human interests in the modern world than any alternatives. Indeed, in thinking about world order, the variable that matters most for liberal thinkers is interdependence. For the first time in history, global institutions are now necessary to realize basic human interests; intense forms of interdependence that were once present only on a smaller scale are now present on a global scale. For example, whereas environmental problems used to be contained largely within countries or regions, the cumulative effect of human activities on the planet's biospheric life-support system has now been so great as to require a new geologic name for the current time period-the Anthropocene. Unlike its backward looking nationalist and realist rivals, liberalism has a pragmatic adaptability and a penchant for institutional innovations that are vital for responding to such emerging challenges as artificial intelligence, cyberwarfare, and genetic engineering. Overall, liberalism remains perennially and universally appealing because it rests on a commitment to the dignity and freedom of individuals. It enshrines the idea of tolerance, which will be needed in spades as the world becomes increasingly interactive and diverse. Although the ideology emerged in the West, its values have become universal, and its champions have extended to encompass Mahatma Gandhi, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Nelson Mandela. And even though imperialism, slavery, and racism have marred Western history, liberalism has always been at the forefront of efforts-both peaceful and militant-to reform and end these practices. To the extent that the long arc of history does bend toward justice, it does so thanks to the activism and moral commitment of liberals and their allies. DEMOCRATIC DECLINE IN PERSPECTIVE In many respects, today's liberal democratic malaise is a byproduct of the liberal world order's success. After the Cold War, that order became a global system, expanding beyond its birthplace in the West. But as free markets spread, problems began to crop up: economic inequality grew, old political bargains between capital and labor broke down, and social supports eroded. The benefits of globalization and economic expansion were distributed disproportionately to elites. Oligarchic power bloomed. A modulated form of capitalism morphed into winnertake-all casino capitalism. Many new democracies turned out to lack the traditions and habits necessary to sustain democratic institutions. And large flows of immigrants triggered a xenophobic backlash. Together, these developments have called into question the legitimacy of liberal democratic life and created openings for opportunistic demagogues. Just as the causes of this malaise are clear, so is its solution: a return to the fundamentals of liberal democracy. Rather than deeply challenging the first principles of liberal democracy, the current problems call for reforms to better realize them. To reduce inequality, political leaders will need to return to the social democratic policies embodied in the New Deal, pass more progressive taxation, and invest in education and infrastructure. To foster a sense of liberal democratic identity, they will need to emphasize education as a catalyst for assimilation and promote national and public service. In other words, the remedy for the problems of liberal democracy is more liberal democracy; liberalism contains the seeds of its own salvation. Indeed, liberal democracies have repeatedly recovered from crises resulting from their own excesses. In the 1930s, overproduction and the integration of financial markets brought about an economic depression, which triggered the rise of fascism. But it also triggered the New Deal and social democracy, leading to a more stable form of capitalism. In the 1950s, the success of the Manhattan Project, combined with the emerging U.S.-Soviet rivalry, created the novel threat of a worldwide nuclear holocaust. That threat gave rise to arms control pacts and agreements concerning the governance of global spaces, deals forged by the United States in collaboration with the Soviet Union. In the 1970s, rising middle-class consumption led to oil shortages, economic stagnation, and environmental decay. In response, the advanced industrial democracies established oil coordination agreements, invested in clean energy, and struck numerous international environmental accords aimed at reducing pollutants. The problems that liberal democracies face today, while great, are certainly not more challenging than those that they have faced and overcome in these historically recent decades. Of course, there is no guarantee that liberal democracies will successfully rise to the occasion, but to count them out would fly in the face of repeated historical experiences. Today's dire predictions ignore these past successes. They suffer from a blinding presentism. Taking what is new and threatening as the master pattern is an understandable reflex in the face of change, but it is almost never a very good guide to the future. Large-scale human arrangements such as liberal democracy rarely change as rapidly or as radically as they seem to in the moment. If history is any guide, today's illiberal populists and authoritarians will evoke resistance and countermovements.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The liberal world order is <u>inevitable</u> and <u>good</u> – democratic institutions are <u>revisable</u> and critical to solving a <u>host of problems</u>. </h4><p><strong>Deudney and Ikenberry 18</strong> (Daniel and John, July/August, professor of political theory at Johns Hopkins University. IR prof at Georgetown University. "Liberal World" Foreign Affairs; New York Vol. 97 Iss. 4. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-06-14/liberal-world) </p><p>The recent rise of illiberal forces and leaders is certainly worrisome. Yet <u><mark>it is too soon to write the obituary of</mark> liberalism as a theory of international relations</u>, liberal democracy as a system of government, <u>or <mark>the liberal order</mark> as the overarching framework for global politics.</u> <u>The liberal vision of nation-states cooperating to achieve security and prosperity remains as vital today as at any time in the modern age.</u> In the long course of history<u>, liberal democracy has hit hard times before, only to rebound and gain ground<strong>. It has done so thanks to the appeal of its basic values and its unique capacities to effectively grapple with the problems of modernity and globalization.</p><p></u></strong>The order will endure, too. Even though the United States' relative power is waning, the international system that the country has sustained for seven decades is remarkably durable. <u><mark>As long as interdependence</mark>- economic, security related, and environmental- <mark>continues to grow</u></mark>, <u><mark>peoples</mark> and governments everywhere <mark>will be compelled to work together to <strong>solve problems</strong></mark> or suffer grievous harm</u>. By necessity, <u>these efforts will build on and strengthen the institutions of the liberal order.</p><p>THE LIBERAL VISION</p><p></u>Modern liberalism holds that <u>world politics requires new levels of political integration in response to relentlessly rising interdependence</u>. But political orders do not arise spontaneously, and liberals argue that a world with more liberal democratic capitalist states will be more peaceful, prosperous, and respectful of human rights. It is not inevitable that history will end with the triumph of liberalism, but it is inevitable that <u>a decent world order will be liberal.</p><p></u>The recent rise of illiberal forces and the apparent recession of the liberal international order may seem to call this school of thought into question. But despite some notable exceptions, states still mostly interact through well-worn institutions and in the spirit of selfinterested, pragmatic accommodation.</p><p>Moreover, <u>part of the reason liberalism may look unsuited to the times is that many of its <mark>critics assail <strong>a strawman version</strong></mark> of the theory</u>. <u><mark>Liberals</mark> are often portrayed as having overly optimistic- even utopian-assumptions about the path of human history.</u> In reality,<u> they <mark>have</mark> a much more <mark>conditional and tempered</mark> <mark>optimism</mark> that recognizes tragic tradeoffs,</u> and they are keenly attentive to the possibilities for large-scale catastrophes. Like realists, they recognize that it is often human nature to seek power, which is why they advocate constitutional and legal restraints. But unlike realists, who see history as cyclical, <u>liberals are heirs to the Enlightenment project of technological innovation, which opens new possibilities both for human progress and for disaster.</p><p>Liberalism is essentially pragmatic</u>. <u><mark>Modern liberals embrace</mark> democratic governments, market-based <mark>economic systems</mark>, and international institutions <mark>not out of idealism but because they</mark> believe these arrangements <mark>are better</mark> suited to realizing human interests </u>in the modern world <u><strong><mark>than any alternatives</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, in thinking about world order, <u>the variable that matters most for liberal thinkers is interdependence.</u> For the first time in history, <u><mark>global institutions are</mark> now <strong><mark>necessary to realize basic human interests</u></strong></mark>; <u>intense forms of interdependence that were once present only on a smaller scale are now present on a global scale.</u> For example, whereas environmental problems used to be contained largely within countries or regions, the cumulative effect of human activities on the planet's biospheric life-support system has now been so great as to require a new geologic name for the current time period-the Anthropocene. Unlike its backward looking nationalist and realist rivals, <u><mark>liberalism has</mark> a <mark>pragmatic adaptability</mark> and a penchant for institutional innovations that are <mark>vital for responding to</mark> such <mark>emerging challenges</mark> <mark>as</mark> <strong><mark>a</mark>rtificial <mark>i</mark>ntelligence, cyberwarfare, and genetic engineering.</p><p></u></strong>Overall, <u>liberalism remains perennially and universally appealing because it rests on a commitment to the <strong>dignity and freedom of individuals</u></strong>. <u>It enshrines the idea of tolerance,</u> <u>which will be needed in spades as the world becomes increasingly interactive and diverse</u>. <u>Although the ideology emerged in the West, <strong>its values have become universal</u></strong>, and its champions have extended to encompass Mahatma Gandhi, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Nelson Mandela. And <u><mark>even though imperialism</mark>, slavery, <mark>and racism</mark> have <mark>marred</mark> Western <mark>history</mark>, <strong><mark>liberalism has always been at the forefront of efforts</mark>-both peaceful and militant-<mark>to</mark> reform and <mark>end these practices</strong></mark>.</u> To the extent that the long arc of history does bend toward justice, it does so thanks to the activism and moral commitment of liberals and their allies.</p><p>DEMOCRATIC DECLINE IN PERSPECTIVE</p><p>In many respects, today's liberal democratic malaise is a byproduct of the liberal world order's success. After the Cold War, that order became a global system, expanding beyond its birthplace in the West. But as free markets spread, problems began to crop up: economic inequality grew, old political bargains between capital and labor broke down, and social supports eroded. <u>The <mark>benefits</mark> of globalization and economic expansion <mark>were distributed disproportionately</mark> to elites. Oligarchic power bloomed.<strong> A modulated form of capitalism morphed into winnertake-all casino capitalism. Many new democracies turned out to lack the traditions and habits necessary to sustain democratic institutions. And large flows of immigrants triggered a xenophobic backlash. Together, these developments have called into question the legitimacy of liberal democratic life and created openings for opportunistic demagogues.</p><p></strong>Just as the causes of this malaise are clear, so is its solution</u>: <u><strong>a return to the fundamentals of liberal democracy.</u></strong> <u>Rather than deeply challenging the first principles of liberal democracy,</u> the current problems call for reforms to better realize them. <u>To reduce inequality, political leaders will need to return to the social democratic policies embodied in the New Deal</u>, pass more progressive taxation, and invest in education and infrastructure. To foster a sense of liberal democratic identity, they will need to emphasize education as a catalyst for assimilation and promote national and public service. In other words, <u>the remedy for the problems of liberal democracy is more liberal democracy</u>;<u><strong> <mark>liberalism contains the seeds of its own salvation</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>Indeed, <u><mark>liberal democracies</mark> have <mark>repeatedly recovered from crises</mark> resulting from their own excesses</u>. In the 1930s, overproduction and the integration of financial markets brought about an economic depression, which triggered the rise of fascism. But <u><mark>it also triggered the New Deal and social democracy</mark>, <mark>leading to </mark>a <mark>more stable</mark> form of <mark>capitalism</u></mark>. In the 1950s, the success of the Manhattan Project, combined with the emerging U.S.-Soviet rivalry, created the novel threat of a worldwide nuclear holocaust. That threat gave rise to arms control pacts and agreements concerning the governance of global spaces, deals forged by the United States in collaboration with the Soviet Union. In the 1970s, rising middle-class consumption led to oil shortages, economic stagnation, and environmental decay. In response, the advanced industrial democracies established oil coordination agreements, invested in clean energy, and struck numerous international environmental accords aimed at reducing pollutants. <u><mark>The problems</mark> that liberal democracies face <mark>today</u></mark>, while great, <u><mark>are</mark> certainly <mark>not more challenging</mark> than those that they have faced and overcome in these historically recent decades.</u> Of course, there is no guarantee that liberal democracies will successfully rise to the occasion, but to count them out would fly in the face of repeated historical experiences.</p><p><u>Today's dire predictions ignore these past successes. They suffer from a blinding presentism.</u> Taking what is new and threatening as the master pattern is an understandable reflex in the face of change, but it is almost never a very good guide to the future. <u>Large-scale human arrangements such as liberal democracy rarely change as rapidly or as radically as they seem to in the moment</u>. If history is any guide, today's illiberal populists and authoritarians will evoke resistance and countermovements.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Hamid 16 [Shadi Hamid; senior fellow at the Project on US Relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution’s Center for Middle East Policy; 4-5-2016; "Everyone says the Libya intervention was a failure. They’re wrong."; Vox; https://www.vox.com/2016/4/5/11363288/libya-intervention-success; KL] fulltext: Libya and the 2011 NATO intervention there have become synonymous with failure, disaster, and the Middle East being a "shit show" (to use President Obama’s colorful descriptor). It has perhaps never been more important to question this prevailing wisdom, because how we interpret Libya affects how we interpret Syria and, importantly, how we assess Obama’s foreign policy legacy. Of course, Libya, as anyone can see, is a mess, and Americans are reasonably asking if the intervention was a mistake. But just because it’s reasonable doesn’t make it right. Most criticisms of the intervention, even with the benefit of hindsight, fall short. It is certainly true that the intervention didn’t produce something resembling a stable democracy. This, however, was never the goal. The goal was to protect civilians and prevent a massacre. Critics erroneously compare Libya today to any number of false ideals, but this is not the correct way to evaluate the success or failure of the intervention. To do that, we should compare Libya today to what Libya would have looked like if we hadn’t intervened. By that standard, the Libya intervention was successful: The country is better off today than it would have been had the international community allowed dictator Muammar Qaddafi to continue his rampage across the country. Critics further assert that the intervention caused, created, or somehow led to civil war. In fact, the civil war had already started before the intervention began. As for today’s chaos, violence, and general instability, these are more plausibly tied not to the original intervention but to the international community’s failures after intervention. The very fact that the Libya intervention and its legacy have been either distorted or misunderstood is itself evidence of a warped foreign policy discourse in the US, where anything short of success — in this case, Libya quickly becoming a stable, relatively democratic country — is viewed as a failure. NATO intervened to protect civilians, not to set up a democracy As stated in the UN Security Council resolution authorizing force in Libya, the goal of intervention was "to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack." And this is what was achieved. In February 2011, anti-Qaddafi demonstrations spread across the country. The regime responded to the nascent protest movement with lethal force, killing more than 100 people in the first few days, effectively sparking an armed rebellion. The rebels quickly lost momentum, however. I still remember how I felt in those last days and hours as Qaddafi’s forces marched toward Benghazi. In a quite literal sense, every moment mattered, and the longer we waited, the greater the cost. It was frightening to watch. I didn’t want to live in an America where we would stand by silently as a brutal dictator — using that distinct language of genocidaires — announced rather clearly his intentions to kill. In one speech, Qaddafi called protesters "cockroaches" and vowed to cleanse Libya "inch by inch, house by house, home by home, alleyway by alleyway." Already, on the eve of intervention, the death toll was estimated at somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000. (This was when the international community’s tolerance for Arab Spring–related mass killings was still fairly low.) As Obama’s advisers saw it, there were two options for military action: a no-fly zone (which, on its own, wouldn’t do much to stop Qaddafi’s tanks) or a broader resolution that would allow the US and its allies to take further measures, including establishing what amounted to a floating no-drive zone around rebel forces. The president went with the latter option. The NATO operation lasted about seven months, with an estimated death toll of around 8,000, apparently most of them combatants on both sides (although there is some lack of clarity on this, since the Libyan government doesn’t clearly define "revolutionaries" or "rebel supporters"). A Human Rights Watch investigation found that at least 72 civilians were killed as a result of the NATO air campaign, definitively contradicting speculative claims of mass casualties from the Qaddafi regime. Claims of "mission creep" have become commonplace, most forcefully articulated by the Micah Zenko of the Council on Foreign Relations. Zenko may be right, but he asserts rather than explains why mission creep is always a bad thing. It may be that in some circumstances, the scope of a mission should be defined more broadly, rather than narrowly. If anything, it was the Obama administration’s insistence of minimizing the mission — including the absurd claim that it would take "days, not weeks" — that was the problem from the very start. Zenko and others never make clear how civilians could have been protected as long as Qaddafi was waging war on them. What Libya would look like today if NATO hadn’t intervened It’s helpful to engage in a bit of counterfactual history here. As Niall Ferguson notes in his book Virtual Alternatives, “To understand how it actually was, we therefore need to understand how it actually wasn’t.” Applied to the Libyan context, this means that we’re not comparing Libya, during or after the intervention, with some imagined ideal of stable, functioning democracy. Rather, we would compare it with what we judge, to the best of our ability, the most likely alternative outcome would have been had the US not intervened. Here’s what we know: By March 19, 2011, when the NATO operation began, the death toll in Libya had risen rapidly to more than 1,000 in a relatively short amount of time, confirming Qaddafi’s longstanding reputation as someone who was willing to kill his countrymen (as well as others) in large numbers if that’s what his survival required. There was no end in sight. After early rebel gains, Qaddafi had seized the advantage. Still, he was not in a position to deal a decisive blow to the opposition. (Nowhere in the Arab Spring era has one side in a military conflict been able to claim a clear victory, even with massive advantages in manpower, equipment, and regional backing.) Any Libyan who had opted to take up arms was liable to be captured, arrested, or killed if Qaddafi “won,” so the incentives to accept defeat were nonexistent, to say nothing of the understandable desire to not live under the rule of a brutal and maniacal strongman. The most likely outcome, then, was a Syria-like situation of indefinite, intensifying violence. Even President Obama, who today seems unsure about the decision to intervene, acknowledged in an August 2014 interview with Thomas Friedman that “had we not intervened, it’s likely that Libya would be Syria. … And so there would be more death, more disruption, more destruction.” What caused the current Libyan civil war? Critics charge that the NATO intervention was responsible for or somehow caused Libya’s current state of chaos and instability. For instance, after leaving the Obama administration, Philip Gordon, the most senior US official on the Middle East in 2013-'15, wrote: "In Iraq, the U.S. intervened and occupied, and the result was a costly disaster. In Libya, the U.S. intervened and did not occupy, and the result was a costly disaster. In Syria, the U.S. neither intervened nor occupied, and the result is a costly disaster." The problem here is that US intervention did not, in fact, result in a costly disaster, unless we are using the word "result" to simply connote that one thing happened after a previous thing. The NATO operation ended in October 2011. The current civil war in Libya began in May 2014 — a full two and a half years later. The intervention and today’s violence are of course related, but this does not necessarily mean there is a causal relationship. To argue that the current conflict in Libya is a result of the intervention, one would basically need to assume that the outbreak of civil war was inevitable, irrespective of anything that happened in the intervening 30 months.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>NATO’s involvement in Libya prevented massacres. </h4><p>Hamid 16</strong> [Shadi Hamid; senior fellow at the Project on US Relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution’s Center for Middle East Policy; 4-5-2016; "<u>Everyone says the Libya intervention was a failure. <strong>They’re wrong</u></strong>."; Vox; https://www.vox.com/2016/4/5/11363288/libya-intervention-success; KL]</p><p>Libya and the 2011 NATO intervention there have become synonymous with failure, disaster, and the Middle East being a "shit show" (to use President Obama’s colorful descriptor). It has perhaps never been more important to question this prevailing wisdom, because how we interpret Libya affects how we interpret Syria and, importantly, how we assess Obama’s foreign policy legacy.</p><p><u>Of course, Libya</u>, as anyone can see, <u>is a mess</u>, <u>and Americans are reasonably asking if the intervention was a mistake</u>. <u>But just because it’s reasonable doesn’t make it right</u>.</p><p><u>Most criticisms of the intervention</u>, even with the benefit of hindsight, <u><strong>fall short</u></strong>. <u>It is certainly true that the intervention didn’t</u> produce something resembling <u>a stable democracy</u>. <u>This, however, was never the goal</u>. <u>The goal was to <strong>protect civilians</strong> and <strong>prevent a massacre</u></strong>.</p><p><u>Critics <strong>erroneously compare</strong> Libya today to any number of <strong>false ideals</u></strong>, <u>but this is not the correct way to evaluate</u> the <u>success or failure</u> of the intervention. <u>To do that, <mark>we should compare Libya</mark> <mark>today to what</mark> Libya would have looked like <mark>if we hadn’t intervened</u></mark>. By that standard, the Libya intervention was successful: <u><mark>The country is <strong>better off</strong></mark> today than it would have been had the international community allowed <strong>dictator Muammar Qaddafi</strong> to continue his <strong>rampage</u></strong> <u>across the country</u>.</p><p><u>Critics</u> further <u>assert that the intervention caused</u>, created, or somehow led to <u>civil war</u>. In fact, <u>the civil war had <strong>already started</strong> before the intervention began</u>. As for today’s chaos, violence, and general instability, these are more plausibly tied not to the original intervention but to the international community’s failures after intervention.</p><p><u><mark>The</mark> very fact that the <mark>Libya</mark> intervention and its <mark>legacy</mark> have been either <strong><mark>distorted</strong></mark> or misunderstood <mark>is</mark> itself <mark>evidence of</mark> a</u> <u><strong><mark>warped</mark> foreign policy <mark>discourse</strong></mark> in the US, <mark>where anything short of success</u></mark> — <u>in this case, Libya quickly becoming a stable</u>, relatively democratic <u>country</u> — <u><mark>is viewed as a failure</u></mark>.</p><p>NATO intervened to protect civilians, not to set up a democracy</p><p>As stated in the UN Security Council resolution authorizing force in Libya, the goal of intervention was "to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack." And this is what was achieved.</p><p><u>In February 2011, <mark>anti-Qaddafi demonstrations spread</u></mark> across the country. <u><mark>The regime responded</u></mark> to the nascent protest movement <u><mark>with <strong>lethal force</strong></mark>, <mark>killing</mark> <strong>more than <mark>100</strong> people in</mark> the first few <mark>days</u></mark>, effectively sparking an armed rebellion. The rebels quickly lost momentum, however.</p><p>I still remember how I felt in those last days and hours <u>as Qaddafi’s forces marched toward Benghazi</u>. In a quite literal sense, every moment mattered, and <u>the longer we waited, the greater the cost</u>.</p><p>It was frightening to watch. I didn’t want to live in an America where we would stand by silently as <u>a <strong><mark>brutal dictator</u></strong></mark> — <u><mark>using that</mark> distinct <mark>language of</mark> <strong><mark>genocidaires</u></strong></mark> — <u><mark>announced</mark> rather clearly <mark>his intentions to <strong>kill</u></strong></mark>. In one speech, <u><mark>Qaddafi called protesters</u></mark> "<u><strong><mark>cockroaches</u></strong></mark>" <u><mark>and vowed to cleanse Libya</mark> </u>"<u><strong><mark>inch by inch</strong></mark>, house by house, <strong><mark>home by home</strong></mark>, alleyway by alleyway</u>."</p><p>Already, <u>on the eve of intervention, the death toll was estimated at somewhere between 1,000 and <strong>2,000</u></strong>. (This was when the international community’s tolerance for Arab Spring–related mass killings was still fairly low.)</p><p>As Obama’s advisers saw it, there were two options for military action: a no-fly zone (which, on its own, wouldn’t do much to stop Qaddafi’s tanks) or a broader resolution that would allow the US and its allies to take further measures, including establishing what amounted to a floating no-drive zone around rebel forces. The president went with the latter option.</p><p>The NATO operation lasted about seven months, with an estimated death toll of around 8,000, apparently most of them combatants on both sides (although there is some lack of clarity on this, since the Libyan government doesn’t clearly define "revolutionaries" or "rebel supporters"). A Human Rights Watch investigation found that at least 72 civilians were killed as a result of the NATO air campaign, definitively contradicting speculative claims of mass casualties from the Qaddafi regime.</p><p>Claims of "mission creep" have become commonplace, most forcefully articulated by the Micah Zenko of the Council on Foreign Relations. Zenko may be right, but he asserts rather than explains why mission creep is always a bad thing. It may be that in some circumstances, the scope of a mission should be defined more broadly, rather than narrowly.</p><p><u>If anything, it was the Obama administration’s insistence of minimizing the mission — including the absurd claim that it would take "days, not weeks" — that was the problem from the very start. Zenko and others never make clear how civilians could have been protected as long as Qaddafi was waging war on them.</p><p>What Libya would look like today if NATO hadn’t intervened</p><p>It’s helpful to engage in a bit of <strong>counterfactual history</u></strong> here. As Niall Ferguson notes in his book Virtual Alternatives, “<u>To understand how it actually was, we therefore need to understand how it actually wasn’t</u>.”</p><p>Applied to the Libyan context, this means that <u>we’re not comparing Libya, during or after the intervention, with some imagined ideal of stable, functioning democracy</u>. <u>Rather, we would compare it with</u> what we judge, to the best of our ability, <u><mark>the</mark> <strong>most likely <mark>alternative</strong></mark> outcome would have been <mark>had the US not intervened</u></mark>.</p><p>Here’s what we know: By March 19, 2011, when the NATO operation began, the death toll in Libya had risen rapidly to more than 1,000 in a relatively short amount of time, confirming Qaddafi’s longstanding reputation as someone who was willing to kill his countrymen (as well as others) in large numbers if that’s what his survival required.</p><p><u>There was <strong>no end in sight</u></strong>. After early rebel gains, Qaddafi had seized the advantage. Still, he was not in a position to deal a decisive blow to the opposition. (Nowhere in the Arab Spring era has one side in a military conflict been able to claim a clear victory, even with massive advantages in manpower, equipment, and regional backing.)</p><p><u>Any Libyan who had opted to take up arms <mark>was</mark> liable to be</u> captured, arrested, or <u>killed</u> if Qaddafi “won,” <u>so the incentives to accept defeat were nonexistent, to say nothing of the understandable desire to not live under the <mark>rule of a <strong>brutal</strong></mark> and <strong>maniacal <mark>strongman</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>The most likely outcome</u>, then, <u>was <mark>a</u></mark> Syria-like <u><mark>situation of <strong>indefinite</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>intensifying violence</u></strong></mark>. Even President Obama, who today seems unsure about the decision to intervene, acknowledged in an August 2014 interview with Thomas Friedman that “<u>had we not intervened</u>, it’s likely that Libya would be Syria. … And so <u>there would be <strong>more death</strong>, more disruption, more destruction</u>.”</p><p>What caused the current Libyan civil war?</p><p>Critics charge that the NATO intervention was responsible for or somehow caused Libya’s current state of chaos and instability. For instance, after leaving the Obama administration, Philip Gordon, the most senior US official on the Middle East in 2013-'15, wrote: "In Iraq, the U.S. intervened and occupied, and the result was a costly disaster. In Libya, the U.S. intervened and did not occupy, and the result was a costly disaster. In Syria, the U.S. neither intervened nor occupied, and the result is a costly disaster."</p><p>The problem here is that US intervention did not, in fact, result in a costly disaster, unless we are using the word "result" to simply connote that one thing happened after a previous thing. <u>The NATO operation ended in October 2011</u>. <u>The current civil war in Libya began in May 2014</u> — <u>a full <strong>two and a half years</strong> later</u>. The intervention and today’s violence are of course related, but this does not necessarily mean there is a causal relationship.</p><p><u>To argue that the current conflict in Libya is a result of the intervention, one would basically need to assume that the outbreak of civil war was <strong>inevitable</strong>, irrespective of anything that happened in the intervening <strong>30 months</u>.</p></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Evans & Reid 14 (Brad Evans is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Bristol, Julian Reid is Professor of International Relations at the University of Lapland, Finland, 2014, Resilient Life, pp. 116-119) fulltext: Writing in the nineteenth century, Nietzsche argued that nothing was more deeply characteristic of the modern world than the power of nihilism.43 Nietzsche’s intervention here allowed us to move beyond the well-rehearsed attack upon Platonic reason or Christian faith, to focus instead upon ‘the radical repudiation of value, meaning and desirability’.44 Nihilism, thus understood, referred to the triumph of reactive thinking. It was all about the negation of life as it appeared to be incapable of affirming that which is properly and creatively different to human existence. Hence, for Nietzsche, nihilism was not simply reducible to some historical event in time, i.e. an exceptional moment in history which could be shamefully written into annals of human suffering. Nihilism was the recurring motor of history as the operation of power leads to a will to nothingness that strips life of any purposeful meaning. Crucially, as Nietzsche understood, this repudiation of the affirmative realm of experience is something we create for ourselves. 45 Nihilism, in other words, is to be understood through a sophisticated manipulation of desires such that the individual subject depreciates itself to such an extent that it actively participates in a custom of political self-annihilation. Central to Nietzsche’s thinking on the perpetuation of nihilism is the notion of ressentiment. In his On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche explains this in terms of the slave mentality. This produces a feeling of impotence which not only translates into vengefulness, but more problematic still, teaches the slave that the only way it can become free is to give over to the prevailing reason mastery has set in place. Sloterdijk equates this ressentiment with rage, the basis of all great theisms.46 Such a condition, as Nietzsche understood, was ‘paralysing’ insomuch as it annuls the possibility of thinking and acting otherwise, and it was ‘exhausting’ insomuch as life was forced to compromise with the very lethality that put its condition originally into question. Through a ‘spirit of revenge’ what is lacking is therefore produced in a double movement, for lack is not some original gesture, it derives out of the ressentiment to deny us the opportunity to bring something different into the world. This raises a number of pressing questions: Could it be that not only have we become slaves to our biological existence, but in claiming false mastery of the earth we have given to ourselves an illusionary sovereignty? For how can we have mastery if that which we claim to be able to dominate as the principle force makes us increasingly vulnerable with each passing moment? Have we not, then, become slaves to ourselves and slaves to the earth, and resentful of them as a result? Nihilism has never been alien to liberal biopolitics. It is arguably its most potent expression. Its early development can be traced to Kant’s Copernican revolution of the mind. Placing life at the centre of its universe, Kant forced us to look for meaning beyond the realms of theological destiny. Whilst this moved us beyond the suffering and lament of the Christian subject which so irked Nietzsche, Kant’s universal substitute proved to be no substitute at all. The universal was actually denied to us due to the limits of our reason and our imperfections as finite beings – imperfections that significantly proved incapable of moving us beyond the reductionism of metaphysical idealism and its crude representations, towards a more affirmative form of metaphysics that worked in practice. As Drucilla Cornell writes, ‘Martin Heidegger famously wrote that Kant takes us to the limit of the very notion of critique and ultimately raises, but does not fully address, the question of ‘who’ is this finite being that must think through the transcendental imagination’.47 In a remarkably potent yet tragic stroke, Kant wrote the death of the omnipotent God and the types of docile subjects it produced who were rendered immobile due to its vengeance and fury, while putting in its place a fallen subject that was fated to be forever incomplete because of the burdens of its own actions. While Kant’s thinking paved the way for new eschatological forms of power to emerge that took leave of traditional sovereign moorings, the fallen subject was compelled to become resentful of its biological existence. Bios were to remain forever imperfect by design and fated to be judged accordingly. With life fated to live a biologically endowed existence, it is stripped of its capacity to have a meaningful existence beyond the limits of its bodily formations, while political strategies operate by governing through the problem of finitude, even though the finite inevitably became a philosophical problem too difficult to comprehend. As a result, forced to endure a growing resentment of its unfolding drama, liberalism slowly became morally equipped to continually intervene upon the souls of the living simply by offering to prolong the subject’s existence better than any other political rationality. Such was the realization of our finite entrapment in the bodily form that the ability to philosophically transgress the injunction between life death became increasingly impossible. Indeed, as and we shall point out later, while liberal societies have a particular relationship to the question of dying as our existence is continually put into question, such that with each passing second we learn to survive until we become truly meaningless in the end, the idea of death remains incommensurable to the liberal subject. No longer does the resilient subject solely project its resentfulness onto the souls of ‘Others’. It resents the living world, for it too is radically endangering. It is here that catastrophic imaginaries begin to truly thrive. The resilient subject is shaped and anxiously mobilized by the prospect of the coming catastrophe. It fears the transformation of the subject, just as it fears the transformation of the ecosystem that gives sustenance to life. Our rage as such, to borrow from Sloterdijk, has become truly limitless. As everything becomes the source of our endangerment, we internalize the ressentiment and proliferate our impotence with unrivalled intensity and absolute necessity. Hence this produces a form of nihilism which is ‘unbounded’. For no longer do we simply resent the teleological unfolding of history as we phase shift from masters to slaves to masters; there is no mastery to speak of and as a result all our lament filters into a politics of ressentiment as we are left to simply govern through our continually unfolding state of unending emergency. This brings us to an important conceptual point that must be addressed in our critique. Adaptation in the face of the catastrophic is not the same as political transformation. The former accepts its conditions of insecurity and vulnerability. Adaptation conflates resistance with resilience such that politics becomes a sheer matter of survivability. Without challenging the fundamental tenets of a catastrophic existence, to adapt is to concede defeat to the avatars of liberal reason which continue to proclaim no political alternative except the pathological. Transformation, in contrast, finds enough reasons to believe in the irreducible spirit of the world such that we may affirm a different sensual and aesthetic relationship to its natural forces. This has nothing to do with a fatalism that accepts the inevitability of human extinction (even though it is inevitable). Nor does it seek to make light of the real experiences of oppression, destitution and daily struggle faced by the majority of the world’s inhabitants. On the contrary, it has everything to do with reintroducing political meaning back into the world, such that our relations do not dismiss the sense of wonder of experience one enjoys in those poetic moments with fellow humans and the earth which cannot be reduced to the techno-scientific conceit of biopolitical rule. And it has everything to do with a willingness to challenge indifferences to the political with more affirmative expressions that demand replacing the vulnerability of catastrophic rule with a poetic confidence in the creation of worlds to come.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The impact is terminal impotence, aggression, and subjective self-annihilation – filters their offense</h4><p><strong>Evans & Reid 14</strong> (Brad Evans is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Bristol, Julian Reid is Professor of International Relations at the University of Lapland, Finland, 2014, Resilient Life, pp. 116-119)</p><p>Writing in the nineteenth century, Nietzsche argued that nothing was more deeply characteristic of the modern world than the power of nihilism.43 Nietzsche’s intervention here allowed us to move beyond the well-rehearsed attack upon Platonic reason or Christian faith, to focus instead upon ‘the radical repudiation of value, meaning and desirability’.44<u> <mark>Nihilism</mark>, thus understood, referred to the triumph of reactive thinking.</u> <u>It was all about <mark>the negation of life</mark> as it appeared to be incapable of affirming that which is properly and creatively different to human existence</u>. Hence, for Nietzsche, <u>nihilism was not simply reducible to some historical event in time, i.e. an exceptional moment in history which could be shamefully written into annals of human suffering.</u> <u><strong>Nihilism was the recurring motor of history as the operation of power leads to <mark>a will to nothingness that strips life of </mark>any purposeful <mark>meaning</u></strong></mark>. Crucially, as Nietzsche understood, <u>this repudiation of the affirmative realm of experience is something we create for ourselves</u>. 45 <u><strong>Nihilism</strong>, in other words, <strong>is to be understood through a sophisticated manipulation of desires such that <mark>the</mark> individual <mark>subject</mark> depreciates itself to such an extent that it actively <mark>participates in </mark>a custom of <mark>political</mark> <mark>self-annihilation.</u></strong> <u></mark>Central to Nietzsche’s thinking on the perpetuation of nihilism is the notion of <strong><mark>ressentiment</u></strong></mark>. In his On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche explains this in terms of the slave mentality. This <u><mark>produces </mark>a feeling of <mark>impotence </mark>which not only translates into <mark>vengefulness</mark>, but more problematic still, teaches</u> the slave <u>that the only way it can become free is to give over to the prevailing reason mastery has set in place. <strong>Sloterdijk equates this ressentiment with <mark>rage</strong></mark>, the basis of all great theisms</u>.46 <u>Such a condition</u>, as Nietzsche understood, was ‘paralysing’ insomuch as it <u>annuls the possibility of thinking and acting otherwise, and it was ‘exhausting’ insomuch as life was forced to compromise with the very lethality that put its condition originally into question</u>. Through a ‘spirit of revenge’ what is lacking is therefore produced in a double movement, for lack is not some original gesture, it derives out of the ressentiment to deny us the opportunity to bring something different into the world. This raises a number of pressing questions: <u>Could it be that not only have we become slaves to our biological existence, but in claiming false mastery of the earth we have given </u>to<u> ourselves </u>an<u> illusionary sovereignty? For how can we have mastery if that which we claim to be able to dominate as the principle force makes us increasingly vulnerable with each passing moment? Have we not, then, become slaves to ourselves and slaves to the earth, and resentful of them as a result?</u> <u>Nihilism has never been alien to liberal biopolitics<strong>. It is arguably its most potent expression. </u></strong>Its early development can be traced to Kant’s Copernican revolution of the mind. <u>Placing life at the centre of its universe, Kant forced us to look for meaning beyond the realms of theological destiny</u>. Whilst this moved us beyond the suffering and lament of the Christian subject which so irked Nietzsche, Kant’s universal substitute proved to be no substitute at all. The universal was actually denied to us due to the limits of our reason and our imperfections as finite beings – imperfections that significantly proved incapable of moving us beyond the reductionism of metaphysical idealism and its crude representations, towards a more affirmative form of metaphysics that worked in practice. As Drucilla Cornell writes, ‘Martin Heidegger famously wrote that Kant takes us to the limit of the very notion of critique and ultimately raises, but does not fully address, the question of ‘who’ is this finite being that must think through the transcendental imagination’.47 In a remarkably potent yet tragic stroke, Kant wrote the death of the omnipotent God and the types of docile subjects it produced who were rendered immobile due to its vengeance and fury, while putting in its place a fallen subject that was fated to be forever incomplete because of the burdens of its own actions. <u>While Kant’s thinking paved the way for new eschatological forms of power to emerge that took leave of traditional sovereign moorings, the fallen subject was compelled to become resentful of </u>its<u> biological existence</u>. Bios were to remain forever imperfect by design and fated to be judged accordingly. <u>With life fated to live a biologically endowed existence, it is stripped of its capacity to have a meaningful existence beyond the limits of its bodily formations, while political strategies operate by governing through the problem of finitude, even though the finite inevitably became a philosophical problem too difficult to comprehend.</u> As a result, <u>forced to endure a growing resentment of its unfolding drama, liberalism slowly became morally equipped to continually intervene upon the souls of the living <strong>simply by offering to prolong the subject’s existence better than any other political rationality</u></strong>. Such was the realization of our finite entrapment in the bodily form that <u><strong><mark>the ability to</mark> </strong>philosophically <strong><mark>transgress the injunction between life death became </strong></mark>increasingly <strong><mark>impossible</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, as <u><strong>and </u></strong>we shall point out later, <u>while liberal societies have a particular relationship to the question of dying as our existence is continually put into question, such that with each passing second we learn to survive until we become truly meaningless in the end, <strong>the idea of death remains incommensurable to the liberal subject</strong>. <mark>No longer does</mark> <mark>the resilient subject</mark> <mark>solely</mark> <mark>project</mark> its <mark>resentfulness onto</mark> the souls of ‘<mark>Others’. <strong>It resents the living</strong> <strong>world</strong></mark>, for it too is radically endangering</u>. <u>It is here that <mark>catastrophic imaginaries</mark> begin to truly <mark>thrive</mark>. The resilient subject is shaped and anxiously mobilized</u> <u>by</u> the prospect of the coming <u>catastrophe</u>. It fears the transformation of the subject, just as it fears the transformation of the ecosystem that gives sustenance to life. Our rage as such, to borrow from Sloterdijk, has become truly limitless. As everything becomes the source of our endangerment, we internalize the ressentiment and proliferate our impotence with unrivalled intensity and absolute necessity. Hence this produces a form of nihilism which is ‘unbounded’. For no longer do we simply resent the teleological unfolding of history as we phase shift from masters to slaves to masters; there is no mastery to speak of and as a result all our lament filters into a politics of ressentiment as we are left to simply govern through our continually unfolding state of unending emergency. This brings us to an important conceptual point that must be addressed in our critique. Adaptation in the face of the catastrophic is not the same as political transformation. The former accepts its conditions of insecurity and vulnerability. Adaptation conflates resistance with resilience such that politics becomes a sheer matter of survivability. Without challenging the fundamental tenets of a catastrophic existence, to adapt is to concede defeat to the avatars of liberal reason which continue to proclaim no political alternative except the pathological. Transformation, in contrast, finds enough reasons to believe in the irreducible spirit of the world such that we may affirm a different sensual and aesthetic relationship to its natural forces. This has nothing to do with a fatalism that accepts the inevitability of human extinction (even though it is inevitable). Nor does it seek to make light of the real experiences of oppression, destitution and daily struggle faced by the majority of the world’s inhabitants. On the contrary, it has everything to do with reintroducing political meaning back into the world, such that our relations do not dismiss the sense of wonder of experience one enjoys in those poetic moments with fellow humans and the earth which cannot be reduced to the techno-scientific conceit of biopolitical rule. And it has everything to do with a willingness to challenge indifferences to the political with more affirmative expressions that demand replacing the vulnerability of catastrophic rule with a poetic confidence in the creation of worlds to come.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Santoro 15 [David, senior fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS, and John K. Warden is a WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age,” https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring2015_Santoro-Warden.pdf] fulltext: Discussions about the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance are making a comeback. During the Cold War, U.S. analysts focused primarily on Western Europe, but in recent years the challenges of extended deterrence and assurance have been starker in Northeast Asia. Discussing the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance involves asking how the United States can deter its adversaries and assure its allies. In both cases, the critical factor is perception. According to analysts Clark Murdock and Jessica Yeats, “In the same way that deterrence must be tailored to each actor, situation, and form of warfare, assurance must be tailored to the strategic culture, threat perceptions, values, and specific concerns of each ally.”1 In this paper, we primarily address the requirements of the latter, focusing on U.S. efforts to assure its two Northeast Asian treaty allies: Japan and South Korea. After analyzing the current security environment—specifically the assurance requirements in Northeast Asia in this second, post-Cold War nuclear age—we turn to the initial steps that the United States has taken to strengthen assurance. Finally, we explore the current assurance agenda with Japan and South Korea, highlighting key challenges and opportunities. Dubbed the second nuclear age,2 the current context has been widely discussed for its differences with the Cold War, or the world’s first nuclear age. During this first age, two nuclear superpowers were locked in a competition for global dominance with allies on each side, a handful of which developed small nuclear arsenals. U.S.–Soviet competition was intense, but remained cold in part because Washington and Moscow developed arms-control and crisismanagement mechanisms to regulate their behavior. Stability endured because even though Washington and Moscow did not control all the triggers, they had sufficient authority to keep bloc discipline and avoid becoming entrapped in a nuclear war. The security environment was always extremely dangerous because the possibility of global nuclear annihilation was omnipresent, but per the notorious formula, “a stable balance of terror” endured.3 The end of the Cold War gave rise to hopes—mainly in Western quarters— that nuclear weapons would be relegated to the dustbin of history.4 This belief led the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to downsize their arsenals and assist a financially-strapped Russia to do the same. Meanwhile, several states across Asia—in Western Asia (the Middle East), South Asia, and East Asia—developed nuclear and long-range missile programs.5 China’s efforts to modernize its nuclear and missile forces continued steadily. India and Pakistan pushed forward with their own programs and, after exploding nuclear devices in 1998, became nuclear-armed states. North Korea conducted several rocket tests during the late 1990s and tested its first nuclear device in 2006. Iran, Syria, and others also developed nuclear and missile programs. By the early 21st century, the Cold War order tightly controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union was replaced by a multiplayer arena with several less experienced nuclear decision-making parties and an epicenter in Asia. As a result, today, while there is less risk of global annihilation— both because major-power relations have improved and because important firebreaks against conflict are in place, including robust crisis management mechanisms and enhanced economic interdependence—the potential for war, and even nuclear use, is growing.6 Not surprisingly, these developments have led U.S. allies to seek strengthened assurances that the United States, their main security guarantor, will continue to protect them from coercion and attack. The assurance challenge is particularly difficult because it turns on more than effective deterrence. Deterrence primarily requires the United States to influence an adversary’s calculus at critical moments during a crisis. For allies to be fully assured, however, the United States must, during peacetime, convince them 1) that U.S. extended deterrence will succeed in preventing adversaries from challenging their core interests, and 2) that should deterrence fail, the United States can and will provide for their defense. Hence former British defense minister Denis Healey’s formulation that during the Cold War it took “only five percent credibility of U.S. retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five percent credibility to reassure the Europeans.”7 In the second nuclear age, it is more difficult for the United States to assure its Northeast Asian allies than it was during the Cold War. James Schoff notes that during the Cold War “the U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little.”8 Today, the United States must convince allies that it can deter multiple nuclear-armed adversaries, some of whom have less adversarial relations with the United States than the Soviet Union did. Just as important, the United States also faces an equally difficult task of convincing its allies that it could and would respond should extended deterrence fail. North Korea continues to develop long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, and China is modernizing its military and acting increasingly assertively. The United States’ relationship with China is also more complex than its Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union, featuring varying degrees of competition and cooperation. At the same time, the United States has shifted from a 1960s deterrent posture of deploying thousands of nuclear weapons, including 3,000 forward deployed in the Asia–Pacific (1,200 in Okinawa), to one with far fewer deployed nuclear weapons and none forward-deployed in Asia.9 U.S. assurance of allies exists along a spectrum, and Washington must carefully balance its desire to reduce allied anxiety against other interests. There are some allied interests that the United States—rightly—does not deem worthy of risking war. But if the gap between the United States and its allies becomes too large, allies will lose faith in U.S. assurance, which could have disruptive consequences. In the worst case scenario for the United States, Japan or South Korea might choose to bandwagon with U.S. competitors in the region. Another slightly better, but still deeply troublesome, possibility is for Tokyo and Seoul to develop nuclear arsenals of their own, which would likely eviscerate the remaining credibility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In either case, a loss of confidence in the United States as a reliable security guarantor in Northeast Asia would send reverberations across the entire U.S. alliance system. Development of nuclear weapons by Japan or South Korea is not a farfetched scenario. Both possess the latent capability to develop weapons programs relatively quickly, and some in South Korea and to a lesser extent Japan have advocated that their countries should go nuclear if the Northeast Asian security environment deteriorates or they lose confidence in the United States as a reliable guarantor.10 In South Korea, there are also signs of public support for nuclearization. After North Korea’s third nuclear test, for example, an Asan Institute poll revealed that 66 percent of people in South Korea wanted nuclear weapons.11<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Security guarantees sustain US leverage to coerce global adherence to the NPT – backing away unleashes wildfire proliferation</h4><p><strong>Santoro 15</strong> [David, senior fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS, and John K. Warden is a WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age,” https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring2015_Santoro-Warden.pdf]</p><p>Discussions about the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance are making a comeback. During the Cold War, U.S. analysts focused primarily on Western Europe, but in recent years <u>the</u> <u><mark>challenges of</mark> extended deterrence and <mark>assurance</u> <u>have been <strong>starker in Northeast Asia</strong></mark>.</u> <u>Discussing the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance involves asking how the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>can deter its adversaries and assure its allies</u>. In both cases, <u><strong><mark>the critical factor is perception</u></strong></mark>. According to analysts Clark Murdock and Jessica Yeats, “In the same way that deterrence must be tailored to each actor, situation, and form of warfare, assurance must be tailored to the strategic culture, threat perceptions, values, and specific concerns of each ally.”1 In this paper, we primarily address the requirements of the latter, focusing on U.S. efforts to assure its two Northeast Asian treaty allies: Japan and South Korea. After analyzing the current security environment—specifically the assurance requirements in Northeast Asia in this second, post-Cold War nuclear age—we turn to the initial steps that the United States has taken to strengthen assurance. Finally, we explore the current assurance agenda with Japan and South Korea, highlighting key challenges and opportunities. Dubbed the second nuclear age,2 the current context has been widely discussed for its differences with the Cold War, or the world’s first nuclear age. During this first age, two nuclear superpowers were locked in a competition for global dominance with allies on each side, a handful of which developed small nuclear arsenals. U.S.–Soviet competition was intense, but remained cold in part because Washington and Moscow developed arms-control and crisismanagement mechanisms to regulate their behavior. Stability endured because even though Washington and Moscow did not control all the triggers, they had sufficient authority to keep bloc discipline and avoid becoming entrapped in a nuclear war. The security environment was always extremely dangerous because the possibility of global nuclear annihilation was omnipresent, but per the notorious formula, “a stable balance of terror” endured.3 The end of the Cold War gave rise to hopes—mainly in Western quarters— that nuclear weapons would be relegated to the dustbin of history.4 This belief led the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to downsize their arsenals and assist a financially-strapped Russia to do the same. Meanwhile, several states across Asia—in Western Asia (the Middle East), South Asia, and East Asia—developed nuclear and long-range missile programs.5 China’s efforts to modernize its nuclear and missile forces continued steadily. India and Pakistan pushed forward with their own programs and, after exploding nuclear devices in 1998, became nuclear-armed states. North Korea conducted several rocket tests during the late 1990s and tested its first nuclear device in 2006. Iran, Syria, and others also developed nuclear and missile programs. By the early 21st century, the Cold War order tightly controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union was replaced by a multiplayer arena with several less experienced nuclear decision-making parties and an epicenter in Asia. As a result, today, while there is less risk of global annihilation— both because major-power relations have improved and because important firebreaks against conflict are in place, including robust crisis management mechanisms and enhanced economic interdependence—<u><mark>the <strong>potential</u></strong></mark> for war, and even <u><strong><mark>nuc</mark>lear <mark>use, is growing</strong></mark>.</u>6 Not surprisingly, <u><mark>these</mark> developments have <mark>led</mark> U.S. <mark>allies to seek</mark> strengthened <mark>assurances that</mark> the <strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates, <u>their main security guarantor</u>, <u><strong><mark>will</mark> continue to <mark>protect them</mark> from coercion</u></strong> and attack. The assurance challenge is particularly difficult because it turns on more than effective deterrence. Deterrence primarily requires the United States to influence an adversary’s calculus at critical moments during a crisis. For allies to be fully assured, however, the United States must, during peacetime, convince them 1) that U.S. extended deterrence will succeed in preventing adversaries from challenging their core interests, and 2) that should deterrence fail, the United States can and will provide for their defense. Hence former British defense minister Denis Healey’s formulation that during the Cold War it took “only five percent credibility of U.S. retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five percent credibility to reassure the Europeans.”7 In the second nuclear age, it is more difficult for the United States to assure its Northeast Asian allies than it was during the Cold War. James Schoff notes that during the Cold War “the U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little.”8 Today, <u>the United States must convince allies that it can deter <strong>multiple nuclear-armed adversaries</u></strong>, some of whom have less adversarial relations with the United States than the Soviet Union did. Just as important, the United States also faces an equally difficult task of convincing its allies that it could and would respond should extended deterrence fail. <u>North <mark>Korea continues to develop</mark> long-range missiles and nuclear weapons,</u> and <u><mark>China is modernizing</mark> its military</u> <u>and acting</u> increasingly <u>assertively</u>. The United States’ relationship with China is also more complex than its Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union, featuring varying degrees of competition and cooperation. At the same time, the United States has shifted from a 1960s deterrent posture of deploying thousands of nuclear weapons, including 3,000 forward deployed in the Asia–Pacific (1,200 in Okinawa), to one with far fewer deployed nuclear weapons and none forward-deployed in Asia.9 U.S. assurance of allies exists along a spectrum, and <u><strong>Washington must carefully balance its desire to reduce allied anxiety against other interests</u></strong>. There are some allied interests that the United States—rightly—does not deem worthy of risking war. But if the gap between the United States and its allies becomes too large, allies will lose faith in U.S. assurance, which could have disruptive consequences. In the worst case scenario for the United States, <u><mark>Japan or South Korea</mark> <mark>might</u></mark> choose to <u>bandwagon</u> <u>with</u> U.S. <u>competitors</u> in the region. Another slightly better, but still deeply troublesome, <u>possibility</u> is for <u><strong>Tokyo and Seoul</u></strong> to <u><mark>develop</u> <u>nuclear arsenals</u></mark> of their own, <u><mark>which would</u></mark> likely <u><strong><mark>eviscerate</mark> the remaining <mark>credibility of the</u></strong></mark> Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (<u><strong><mark>NPT</u></strong></mark>). In either case, <u>a <mark>loss of confidence</mark> in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>as a reliable security guarantor in Northeast Asia</u> <u><mark>would send reverberations across</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>the entire</mark> U.S. <mark>alliance system</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Development</mark> of nuc</u>lear weapon<u>s</u> <u>by</u> <u>Japan</u> or South Korea <u><mark>is not</mark> a <mark>farfetched</mark> scenario</u>. <u><mark>Both possess</u></mark> the <u><mark>latent capability</u></mark> <u><mark>to develop</u></mark> weapons <u>programs</u> relatively <u><strong><mark>quickly</u></strong></mark>, and some in South Korea and to a lesser extent Japan have advocated that their countries should go nuclear if the Northeast Asian security environment deteriorates or they lose confidence in the United States as a reliable guarantor.10 In South Korea, there are also signs of public support for nuclearization. After North Korea’s third nuclear test, for example, an Asan Institute poll revealed that 66 percent of people in South Korea wanted nuclear weapons.11</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Latour 5 (Bruno Latour – v qual’d – expansive work in philosophy, history, sociology anthropology, science policy and research management including field studies in Africa and California and more than 20 books and 150 articles, École des mines de Paris, Sciences Po Paris, Cornell University, Karlsruhe University, and University of Cologne professor, Université de Montréal, University of Edinburgh, University of Lund, University of Goteborg, University of Warwick, and University of Lausanne honorary doctorate recipient, Zentrum fur Media Kunst and Cambridge American Academy of Arts and Sciences fellow, University of Amsterdam Spinoza Chair, Holberg Memorial Prize – equivalent of nobel prize for humanities and social science, 4S Society Bernal Prize, Compiègne University of Technology Roberval Prize, University of Bologna Institute of Advanced Studies Medal of Honor, Siegfried Unseld Prize, University of Munich Kulturpreiz, Nam June Paik Center Award, European Research Council Senior grant, and Legion of Honour recipient, Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, British Academy, Royal Academy of Belgium foreign correspondant, 2005, “Reassembling the Social – An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory”, http://droit-public.ulb.ac.be/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Latour_Reassembling.pdf, accessed 9/7/18, DL) fulltext: If sociology has been marked from the start by the discovery that action was overtaken by other agencies, it has been spurred even more forcefully by the ethical, political, and empirical discovery that there exist hierarchies, asymmetries, and inequalities; that the social world is just as differentiated a landscape as a rugged and mountainous terrain; that no amount of enthusiasm, free will, or ingenuity can make those asymmetries go away; that they all seem to weigh as heavily as the pyramids, which hampers individual action and explains why society should be considered as a specific sui generis entity; that any thinker who denies those inequalities and differences is either gullible or somewhat reactionary; and, finally, that ignoring social asymmetry is as ridiculous as claiming that Newtonian gravitation does not exist. How could we be faithful to this intuition and still maintain, as I just did with the first two sources of uncertainty, that groups are ‘constantly’ being performed and that agencies are ‘ceaselessly’ debated? Has the choice of those two departure points not been inspired by a naive attitude that has smoothed the highly unequal social domain into a level playing field where everyone, it seems, has the same chance to generate one’s own metaphysics? Is ANT not one of the symptoms of this market spirit that claims, against all evidence, that everyone has the same chance—and too bad for the losers?69 ‘What have you done’, people could ask in exasperation, ‘with power and domination?’ But it is just because we wish to explain those asymmetries that we don’t want to simply repeat them—and even less to transport them further unmodified. Once again, we don’t want to confuse the cause and the effect, the explanandum with the explanans. This is why it’s so important to maintain that power, like society, is the final result of a process and not a reservoir, a stock, or a capital that will automatically provide an explanation. Power and domination have to be produced, made up, composed.70 Asymmetries exist, yes, but where do they come from and what are they made out of? To provide an explanation, sociologists of associations must make the same radical decision as when they wanted to feed off the second source of uncertainty. It is because they wanted to keep the original intuition of social sciences that they had to adamantly reject the impossible solution that was proposed, namely that society is unequal and hierarchical; that it weighs disproportionably on some parts; and that it has all the character of inertia. To state that domination breaks down bodies and souls is one thing whereas concluding that these hierarchies, dissymmetry, inertia, powers, and cruelties are made of social stuff is a different argument altogether. Not only the second point has no logical continuity with the first, but it is also, as we shall see, in complete contradiction with it. In the same way as the overtaking of action by other agencies does not mean that society is taking over, the flagrant asymmetry of resources does not mean that they are generated by social asymmetries. It just leads to the opposite conclusion: if inequalities have to be generated, this is proof that other types of actors than the social ones are coming into play. As Marx did with Hegel’s dialectics, it’s time we put social explanation back on its feet. The type of actors at work should be increased So far, I have insisted mostly on the difference between ‘social’ as in ‘social ties’ and ‘social’ as in ‘associations’—bearing in mind that the second meaning is closer to the original etymology. I have argued that most often in social sciences, ‘social’ designates a type of link: it’s taken as the name of a specific domain, a sort of material like straw, mud, string, wood, or steel. In principle, you could walk into some imaginary supermarket and point at a shelf full of ‘social ties’, whereas other aisles would be stocked with ‘material’, ‘biological’, ‘psychological’, and ‘economical’ connections. For ANT, as we now understand, the definition of the term is different: it doesn’t designate a domain of reality or some particular item, but rather is the name of a movement, a displacement, a transformation, a translation, an enrollment. It is an association between entities which are in no way recognizable as being social in the ordinary manner, except during the brief moment when they are reshuffled together. To pursue the metaphor of the supermarket, we would call ‘social’ not any specific shelf or aisle, but the multiple modifications made throughout the whole place in the organization of all the goods—their packaging, their pricing, their labeling—because those minute shifts reveal to the observer which new combinations are explored and which paths will be taken (what later will be defined as a ‘network’).71 Thus, social, for ANT, is the name of a type of momentary association which is characterized by the way it gathers together into new shapes.72 Once this second meaning of social as association is in place, we can understand what was so confusing about the sociologists of the social. They use the adjective to designate two entirely different types of phenomena: one of them is the local, face-to-face, naked, unequipped, and dynamic interactions; and the other is a sort of specific force that is supposed to explain why those same temporary face-to-face interactions could become far-reaching and durable. While it’s perfectly reasonable to designate by ‘social’ the ubiquitous phenomenon of face-to-face relations, it cannot provide any ground for defining a ‘social’ force that is nothing more than a tautology, a sleight of hand, a magical invocation, since it begs the question of how and through which means this increase in durability has been practically achieved. To jump from the recognition of interactions to the existence of a social force is, once again, an inference that does not follow from the premise. This distinction is especially crucial since what could be called the basic social skills are actually difficult to isolate in human societies. As we will see in Part II when criticizing the notion of ‘local interactions’, it’s mostly in non-human societies (ants, monkeys, and apes) that it’s possible to generate a social world understood as an entanglement of interactions. In humans, the basic social skills, although still present, offer an ever-present but nonetheless restricted repertoire. Most of the far-reaching and long-lasting associations are made by something else that could not be detected as long as the notion of social force was not submitted to scrutiny. With ANT, one needs to place the first definition within a very limited sphere and do away with the second, apart from using it as a kind of shorthand to describe what has been already assembled together.73 In summary, no tie can be said to be durable and made of social stuff. The main advantage of dissolving the notion of social force and replacing it either by short-lived interactions or by new associations is that it’s now possible to distinguish in the composite notion of society what pertains to its durability and what pertains to its substance.74 Yes, there may exist durable ties, but this does not count as proof that they are made of social material—quite the opposite. It’s now possible to bring into the foreground the practical means to keep ties in place, the ingenuity constantly invested in enrolling other sources of ties, and the cost to be paid for the extension of any interaction. If we consider the basic social skills, it’s easy to understand that the connections they are able to weave are always too weak to sustain the sort of weight that social theorists would like to grant to their definition of social. Left to its own devices, a power relationship that mobilizes nothing but social skills would be limited to very shortlived, transient interactions. But where has this situation ever been observed? Even baboon troops, although they are closest to the ideal world invented by many social theorists, cannot provide such an extreme case. As Hobbes and Rousseau have remarked long ago, no giant is strong enough not to be easily overcome in his sleep by a dwarf; no coalition is solid enough not to be run over by an even larger coalition. When power is exerted for good, it is because it is not made of social ties; when it has to rely only on social ties, it is not exerted for long. So, when social scientists appeal to ‘social ties’ they should always mean something that has great trouble spreading in time and space, that has no inertia and is to be ceaselessly renegotiated. It’s precisely because it’s so difficult to maintain asymmetries, to durably entrench power relations, to enforce inequalities, that so much work is being constantly devoted in shifting the weak and fast-decaying ties to other types of links. If the social world was made of local interactions, it will retain a sort of provisional, unstable, and chaotic aspect and never this strongly differentiated landscape that the appeals to power and domination purport to explain. As soon as the distinction between the basic social skills and the non-social means mobilized to expand them a bit longer is not carefully kept, analysts run the risk of believing that it’s the invocation of social forces that will provide an explanation. Sociologists will claim that when they appeal to the durability of social ties they bring in something that really possesses the necessary durability, solidity, and inertia. It is ‘society’, or ‘social norm’, or ‘social laws’, or ‘structures’, or ‘social customs’, or ‘culture’, or ‘rules’, etc., they argue, which have enough steel in them to account for the way it exerts its grip over all of us and accounts for the unequal landscape in which we are toiling. It is, indeed, a convenient solution but does not explain where their ‘steely’ quality is coming from that reinforces the weak connections of social skills. And sociologists, in a careless move, might take a wrong turn and say that durability, solidity, and inertia are provided by the durability, solidity, and inertia of society itself. They might go even further and take this tautology not for the starkest of contradictions, but from what should be admired most in the miraculous force of a society that is, as they say, sui generis, by which they mean that it is generated out of itself.75 Even if this way of talking is innocuous enough when taken as some shorthand to describe what is already bundled together, the consequences of such an argument are disastrous. The temptation is too strong to act as if there now existed some formidable force that could provide all the short-lived asymmetries with the durability and expansion that social skills could not manage to produce by their own impetus. At which point the causes and effects would be inverted and the practical means for making the social hold would vanish from view. What had begun as a mere confusion of adjectives has become a wholly different project: to this base world has been added a world which is just as intractable as the heaven of ancient Christian theology—except it does not offer any hope of redemption. Are sociologists of the social so foolish that they are unable to detect such a tautology in their reasoning? Are they really stuck in the mythical belief of another world behind the real world? Do they really believe in this strange bootstrapping of a society born out of itself?76 Of course not, since they never really use it in practice and so are never confronted by the contradiction inherent in the notion of a ‘self-production’ of society. The reason why they never draw the logical conclusion that their argument is contradictory is that they use it somewhat more loosely. When they invoke the durability of some social aggregates they always, wittingly or unwittingly, lend to the weak social ties the heavy load coming from the masses of other nonsocial things. It is always things—and I now mean this last word literally—which, in practice, lend their ‘steely’ quality to the hapless ‘society’. So, in effect, what sociologists mean by the ‘power of society’ is not society itself—that would be magical indeed—but some sort of summary for all the entities already mobilized to render asymmetries longer lasting.77 This use of a shorthand is not tautological, but it is dangerously misleading since there is no empirical way to decide how all that stuff has been mobilized any longer—and worst of all, there is no way to know if such a load is still active. The idea of a society has become in the hands of later-day ‘social explainers’ like a big container ship which no inspector is permitted to board and which allows social scientists to smuggle goods across national borders without having to submit to public inspection. Is the cargo empty or full, healthy or rotten, innocuous or deadly, newly made or long disused? It has become anyone’s guess, much like the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>prefer contingent explanations – society is a web of shifting relations – totalizing social explanations are tautological and produce a politics of violent interventionism</h4><p><strong>Latour 5</strong> (Bruno Latour – v qual’d – expansive work in philosophy, history, sociology anthropology, science policy and research management including field studies in Africa and California and more than 20 books and 150 articles, École des mines de Paris, Sciences Po Paris, Cornell University, Karlsruhe University, and University of Cologne professor, Université de Montréal, University of Edinburgh, University of Lund, University of Goteborg, University of Warwick, and University of Lausanne honorary doctorate recipient, Zentrum fur Media Kunst and Cambridge American Academy of Arts and Sciences fellow, University of Amsterdam Spinoza Chair, Holberg Memorial Prize – equivalent of nobel prize for humanities and social science, 4S Society Bernal Prize, Compiègne University of Technology Roberval Prize, University of Bologna Institute of Advanced Studies Medal of Honor, Siegfried Unseld Prize, University of Munich Kulturpreiz, Nam June Paik Center Award, European Research Council Senior grant, and Legion of Honour recipient, Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, British Academy, Royal Academy of Belgium foreign correspondant, 2005, “Reassembling the Social – An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory”, http://droit-public.ulb.ac.be/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Latour_Reassembling.pdf, accessed 9/7/18, DL)</p><p><u>If <mark>sociology</mark> has been marked from the start by the discovery that action was overtaken by other agencies, it <mark>has been spurred</mark> even more forcefully <mark>by</mark> the ethical, political, and empirical <mark>discovery that</mark> there exist hierarchies, asymmetries, and <mark>inequalities</u></mark>; that <u>the social world is just as differentiated a landscape as a rugged and mountainous terrain</u>; that no amount of enthusiasm, free will, or ingenuity can make those asymmetries go away; that <u>they all seem to weigh as heavily as the pyramids, which <mark>hampers</mark> individual <mark>action and explains</mark> why <mark>society</mark> should be considered as a specific sui generis entity</u>; that <u><mark>any thinker who denies those</mark> inequalities and differences <mark>is</mark> either <mark>gullible or</u></mark> somewhat <u><mark>reactionary</u></mark>; and, finally, that <u>ignoring social asymmetry is as ridiculous as claiming that Newtonian gravitation does not exist. <mark>How could we be faithful</mark> to this intuition <mark>and</mark> still <mark>maintain</mark>, as I just did with the first two sources of uncertainty, that groups are ‘constantly’ being performed and <mark>that agencies are</mark> ‘ceaselessly’ <mark>debated</mark>?</u> Has the choice of those two departure points not been inspired by a naive attitude that has smoothed the highly unequal social domain into a level playing field where everyone, it seems, has the same chance to generate one’s own metaphysics? <u>Is ANT not one of the symptoms of this market spirit that claims</u>, against all evidence, that everyone has the same chance—and too bad for the losers?69 ‘<u>What have you done’</u>, <u>people could ask in exasperation</u>, ‘<u>with power and domination?</u>’ But it is <u><mark>just because we wish to explain</mark> those <mark>asymmetries</u></mark> that <u>we <mark>don’t</u></mark> want to <u><mark>simply repeat them</u></mark>—and even less to <u>transport them</u> further <u>unmodified</u>. Once again, we <u><strong>don’t</u></strong> want to <u><strong>confuse the cause and the effect</u></strong>, the explanandum with the explanans. This is why it’s so important to maintain that <u><strong><mark>power</u></strong></mark>, like society, <u><strong><mark>is the</mark> final <mark>result of a process</mark> </strong>and not a reservoir</u>, a stock, or a capital <u>that will automatically provide an explanation. Power and <strong><mark>domination have to be produced</mark>, made up, composed</strong>.70 Asymmetries exist, yes, but where do they come from and what are they made out of? </u>To provide an explanation, <u>sociologists of associations must</u> make the same radical decision as when they wanted to feed off the second source of uncertainty. It is because they wanted to keep the original intuition of social sciences that they had to <u>adamantly <mark>reject the impossible solution</u></mark> that was proposed, <u>namely <mark>that society</mark> is unequal and hierarchical</u>; that it weighs disproportionably on some parts; and <u>that it <mark>has</mark> all the character of <mark>inertia</mark>. <mark>To state</mark> that <mark>domination breaks down bodies and</mark> souls is one thing whereas concluding</u> that these <u><mark>hierarchies</u></mark>, dissymmetry, inertia, <u>powers, and cruelties <mark>are made of social stuff</mark> is a different argument altogether.</u> Not only <u><strong>the second point <mark>has no logical continuity</strong></mark> with the first, but <mark>it is</mark> also, as we shall see, <mark>in complete contradiction</mark> with it. In the same way as the overtaking of <mark>action by</mark> other <mark>agencies does not mean</mark> that <mark>society is taking over</mark>, the flagrant asymmetry of resources does not mean that they are generated by social asymmetries.</u> It just leads to the opposite conclusion: <u><strong>if <mark>inequalities</mark> have to be generated, this <mark>is proof</mark> that <mark>other</mark> types of <mark>actors</mark> than the social ones <mark>are</mark> coming <mark>in</strong></mark>to<strong> <mark>play</u></strong></mark>. As Marx did with Hegel’s dialectics, it’s time we put social explanation back on its feet. The type of actors at work should be increased So far, I have insisted mostly on the difference between ‘social’ as in ‘social ties’ and ‘social’ as in ‘associations’—bearing in mind that the second meaning is closer to the original etymology. I have argued that <u><mark>most often</mark> in social sciences, ‘<mark>social</mark>’<strong> </strong><mark>designates a</mark> type of <mark>link</u></mark>: it’s taken as the name of a specific domain, a sort of material like straw, mud, string, wood, or steel. In principle, you could walk into some imaginary supermarket and point at a shelf full of ‘social ties’, whereas other aisles would be stocked with ‘material’, ‘biological’, ‘psychological’, and ‘economical’ connections. <u><mark>For ANT</u></mark>, as <u>we now understand, the definition of the term is different</u>: it doesn’t designate a domain of reality or some particular item, but rather is the name of a movement, a displacement, a transformation, a translation, an enrollment. <u><mark>It is</mark> an <mark>association</mark> between entities</u> which are in no way recognizable as being social in the ordinary manner, except during the brief moment when they are reshuffled together. To pursue the metaphor of the supermarket, we would call ‘social’ not any specific shelf or aisle, but the multiple modifications made throughout the whole place in the organization of all the goods—their packaging, their pricing, their labeling—because those minute shifts reveal to the observer which new combinations are explored and which paths will be taken (what later will be defined as a ‘network’).71 <u>Thus, social, for ANT, is the name of a type of momentary association</u> which is characterized by the way it gathers together into new shapes.72 <u>Once this second meaning of social as association is in place, we can understand what was so confusing about the <strong><mark>sociologists</strong></mark> of the social. They <strong><mark>use the adjective</strong></mark> to designate two entirely different types of phenomena: one of them is the local, face-to-face, naked, unequipped, and dynamic interactions; and the other is a sort of specific force that is supposed <strong><mark>to explain why</strong></mark> those same <strong><mark>temporary</mark> face-to-face <mark>interactions</strong></mark> could <strong><mark>become</mark> far-reaching and <mark>durable</u></strong></mark>. While it’s perfectly reasonable to designate by ‘social’ the ubiquitous phenomenon of face-to-face relations, <u>it cannot provide any ground for defining a ‘social’ force that is nothing more than a tautology</u>, a sleight of hand, a magical invocation, <u>since it begs the question of how and through which means this increase in durability has been practically achieved. To <mark>jump from</mark> the recognition of <mark>interactions to</mark> the existence of a <mark>social force is</u></mark>, once again,<strong> <u></strong><mark>an inference</mark> that does not follow from the premise.</u> This distinction is especially crucial since what could be called the basic social skills are actually difficult to isolate in human societies. As we will see in Part II when criticizing <u>the notion of ‘local <mark>interactions</mark>’</u>, it’s mostly <u><mark>in non-human societies</mark> (ants, monkeys, and apes)</u> that it’s possible to <u><mark>generate a social world</mark> understood <mark>as</mark> an <mark>entanglement of interactions</u></mark>. In humans, the basic social skills, although still present, offer an ever-present but nonetheless restricted repertoire. Most of the far-reaching and long-lasting associations are made by something else that could not be detected as long as the notion of social force was not submitted to scrutiny. <u>With ANT, one needs to place the first definition within a very limited sphere</u> and do away with the second, apart from using it as a kind of shorthand to describe what has been already assembled together.73 In summary, <u>no tie can be said to be durable and made of social stuff. The main advantage of dissolving the notion of social force and replacing it either by short-lived interactions or by new associations is that it’s now possible to distinguish in the composite notion of society what pertains to its durability and what pertains to its substance</u>.74 Yes,<strong> <u></strong>there may exist durable ties, but this does not count as proof that they are made of social material—quite the opposite. It’s now possible to bring into the foreground the practical means to keep ties in place, the ingenuity constantly invested in enrolling other sources of ties, and the cost to be paid for the extension of any interaction</u>. If we consider the basic social skills, it’s <u>easy to understand that the connections</u> they are able to weave <u>are always too weak to sustain the sort of weight that social theorists would like to grant to their definition of social.</u> Left to its own devices, a power relationship that mobilizes nothing but social skills would be limited to very shortlived, transient interactions. But where has this situation ever been observed? Even baboon troops, although they are closest to the ideal world invented by many social theorists, cannot provide such an extreme case. As Hobbes and Rousseau have remarked long ago, no giant is strong enough not to be easily overcome in his sleep by a dwarf; no coalition is solid enough not to be run over by an even larger coalition. When power is exerted for good, it is because it is not made of social ties; when it has to rely only on social ties, it is not exerted for long. So, <u>when social scientists appeal to ‘social ties’ they should always mean something that has great trouble spreading in time and space, that has no inertia and is to be ceaselessly renegotiated. It’s precisely because <mark>it’s so difficult to</mark> maintain asymmetries, to <mark>durably entrench power relations</mark>, to enforce inequalities, that so much work is being constantly devoted in shifting the weak and fast-decaying ties to other types of links. <mark>If the social</mark> world <mark>was made of local interactions</mark>, <mark>it will retain a</mark> sort of provisional, <mark>unstable</mark>, and chaotic <mark>aspect</u></mark> and never this strongly differentiated landscape that the appeals to power and domination purport to explain. <u>As soon as the distinction between the basic social skills and the non-social means mobilized to expand them a bit longer is not carefully kept, <mark>analysts run</mark> the <mark>risk of believing</mark> that it’s the <mark>invocation of social forces</mark> that will <mark>provide</mark> an <mark>explanation</mark>. Sociologists will claim that when they appeal to the durability of social ties they bring in something that really possesses the necessary durability</u>, solidity, and inertia. <u>It is</u> ‘society’, or ‘social norm’, or ‘<u>social</u> laws’, or ‘<u>structures’</u>, or ‘social customs’, or ‘culture’, or ‘rules’, etc., <u><mark>they argue</mark>, which have enough steel in them to account for the way it exerts its grip over all of us and accounts for the unequal landscape in which we are toiling</u>.<strong> </strong>It is, indeed,<strong> <u></strong>a convenient solution but does not explain where their ‘steely’ quality is coming from</u> that reinforces the weak connections of social skills. And <u>sociologists, in a careless move</u>, might take a wrong turn and <u>say</u> that <u><mark>durability</mark>, solidity, and inertia <mark>are provided by</mark> the durability, solidity, and <mark>inertia of society</mark> itself</u>. They might go even further and take <u><mark>this tautology</u></mark> not for the starkest of contradictions, but from what should be admired most in the miraculous force of a society that is, as they say, sui generis, by which they mean that it is generated out of itself.75 Even if this way of talking is innocuous enough when taken as some shorthand to describe what is already bundled together, the consequences of such an argument are disastrous. <u>The temptation <mark>is</mark> too strong to act as if there now existed some formidable force that could provide all the short-lived asymmetries with the durability and expansion that social skills could not manage to produce by their own impetus. At which point the causes and effects would be inverted and the practical means for making the social hold would vanish from view</u>. What had begun as a mere confusion of adjectives has become a wholly different project: to this base world has been added a world which is just as intractable as the heaven of ancient Christian theology—except it does not offer any hope of redemption. <u>Are sociologists of the social so <mark>foolish</mark> that they are unable to detect such a tautology in their reasoning? Are they really stuck in the mythical belief of another world behind the real world?</u> Do they really believe in this strange bootstrapping of a society born out of itself?76 Of course not, since <u>they never really use it in practice and so are never confronted by the contradiction inherent in the notion of a ‘self-production’ of society. The reason why they never draw the logical conclusion that their argument is contradictory is that they use it somewhat more loosely</u>. When <u>they invoke</u> the durability of some social aggregates they always, wittingly or unwittingly, lend to the weak social ties the heavy load coming from the masses of other nonsocial things. It is always things—and I now mean this last word literally—which, in practice, lend their ‘steely’ quality to the hapless ‘society’. So, in effect, what sociologists mean by the ‘<u>power of society</u>’ <u>is</u> not society itself—that would be magical indeed—but some sort of summary for all the entities already mobilized to render asymmetries longer lasting.77 <u>This use of a shorthand is not tautological, but <strong><mark>it is dangerously misleading</strong></mark> since <strong><mark>there is no empirical way to decide how</mark> </strong>all that<strong> <mark>stuff has been mobilized</strong></mark> any longer</u>—and worst of all, <u>there is no way to know if such a load is still active. <mark>The idea of</mark> a <mark>society has become</mark> in the hands of later-day ‘social explainers’ <mark>like a</mark> big <mark>container ship which no inspector is permitted to board</mark> and which allows social scientists to smuggle goods</u> across national borders <u>without</u> having to submit to public <u>inspection. <mark>Is the cargo empty or full</mark>, healthy or rotten, <mark>innocuous or deadly</mark>, newly made or long disused? <mark>It has become anyone’s guess</mark>, <mark>much like</mark> the presence of <strong><mark>w</u></strong></mark>eapons of <u><strong><mark>m</u></strong></mark>ass <u><strong><mark>d</u></strong></mark>e<u><mark>s</u></mark>truction <u><mark>in</mark> Saddam Hussein’s <mark>Iraq</mark>.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Garrido 19 – Faculty Member of Hebei Normal University and a collaborator at the Centre for Peruvian and Latin American Studies. Daniel Rueda Garrido, “Deaths of the Subject and Negated Subjectivity in the Era of Neoliberal Capitalism,” tripleC, 6/24/19, https://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/1068 fulltext: From this short review of the historical formation of neoliberalism, I would like to emphasise that the passage from organised capitalism to neoliberalism proper took place due to a depletion of previous policies to produce wealth and stability, which provided the trigger for Thatcher’s and Reagan’s policies with the promotion by the British Prime Minister of the well-known slogan TINA: “there is no alternative”. The situation, as McGuigan mentions, was uniquely the oil export crisis in 1973, declared by the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries), and the deficiencies shown by the Fordist production system (Fordism) to be able to create and satisfy increasing demand as well as to get rid of machinery and part of the national production chain and find cheaper markets to produce and place their products (McGuigan 2006, 73). However, as Agnew has remarked, those changes were supported by the implementations of certain approaches of the US in terms of economic policies pointing to globalisation; for instance, the increased levels of international trade in the 1960s and the US abrogation of the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944, which liberated currencies from a fixed exchange rate to the US dollar, thus making possible, by deteriorating their own economy, the construction of an international market where currencies “could float against one another”, which is today’s globalised financial system (Agnew 2005, 169). Since 1980, the implementation of neoliberalism has managed to impose itself as a hegemonic mode of development, and with greater intensity since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989. With the coming of the 21st century and new technologies of digital communication, new modes of exploitation and expansion of capital have arisen, in what has been called global and digital capitalism. This hegemony of neoliberalism knows no boundaries and can be defined by what Harvey (2005, 3-4) and Agnew (2005, 165) understand as a time-space compression of the market; the global market, already identified with the daily life of the citizen, is within reach of the computer mouse: people, countries, transactions and things seem to be omnipresent when this new digital citizen connects to the network. This citizen, produced by neoliberal policies and exacerbated by digital technologies, has been identified with a certain positive subjectivity; that is, a way of being and of understanding oneself by affirming one’s intrinsic qualities. McGuigan draws on Weber’s ideal type to cast the type of neoliberal self; ideal types “are abstract formulations that do not exactly conform to any particular empirical instance. They are defined, in the Weberian sense, by essential features that are accentuated in order to bring out the most salient aspects of a given form of life” (2014, 233). These ideal types, according to the same author, must necessarily be proposed in contrast to their historical context, in Simmel’s historicist mode. This means that the ideal type of the self or neoliberal subject has to emerge from the same social and political organisation that the neoliberal order has established. It is important to underline this notion to understand how the ideal type of neoliberal subject being cast here is the product of the social structures determined by the evolution of capitalism as a whole. I will return to this in the following sections. Most studies on neoliberal subjectivity mention at least the characteristics of compulsory freedom, individualism, self-realisation (creation) and hedonism (narcissism) in relation to the market or consumerism. 2.1. Condemned to Freedom and Self-Responsibility It is usually agreed that the neoliberal self is a self that is condemned to freedom and to be responsible for its actions. Of course, the major premise in this argumentation is the assumption that the self is free, or has been liberated from past ties of a religious, moral or philosophical nature. This responsibility does not imply moral values; one is responsible because one is free. Freedom implies responsibility and this involves blame for failure or praise for success in both consuming rationally and enterprising effectively, or in McGuigan’s words: “such a self – condemned to freedom and lonely responsibility – is exactly the kind of self cultivated by neoliberalism, combining freewheeling consumer sovereignty with enterprising business acumen” (McGuigan 2014, 234). 2.2. Individuality (Egotism) The literature on this subject (Blühdorn 2017; Dean J. 2017; McGuigan 2014) tends to reinforce the feature of individualism in the neoliberal self, though in relation to previous generations within capitalism. This individualism is concerned more sharply with young people and materialises as passivity regarding social issues, as social atomicity, as communication through new technologies, and so on. This individualism seems to be equally imposed structurally, because the neoliberal subject is obliged to take care of him/herself and procure the means that lead him/her to success in a society that is always more aggressively competitive: “in a viciously competitive job market we have no choice but to work on ourselves, constantly, just to keep up” (Dean J. 2017, 3). And yet, as Castells pointed out years ago, in the ‘information age’, from the 1990s onwards and above all with digital communication technologies, this individualistic subjectivity clearly enters into conflict with the interconnectivity of the masses in the network (McGuigan 2014, 231).This first discordant note makes us wonder if there is truly a clearly-defined neoliberal subjectivity and if, in any case, individualism is a characteristic of this subjectivity or a product of the global market in which the subject has necessarily been incorporated as an individual entity that, in terms of the consumer, reproduces the logic of the market. 2.3. Self-Realisation (Liquidity) It seems as if, in the era of neoliberalism, everything solid has melted, as per a metaphor borrowed from Zygmunt Bauman (2000). And the truth is that this is one of the characteristics that this period shares with so-called postmodernism, a label whose value overlaps with that of neoliberal policies after the 1970s; and in such a way that we could refer to it as the cultural face of what would otherwise be the political and economic order. This connection between the culture and the economy of the decades that concern us has been prominently stated by Fredric Jameson (1998, 73). The identity of the subject, the self, like everything else, is considered volatile, ephemeral, opening a tendency to self-invention or creation of oneself. Individuals are constantly driven by social media and labour pressure to work on themselves, adopting different patterns of personal and professional success, as well as being encouraged to adopt different identities (perhaps latent or asleep, perhaps repressed) by consuming products with which they identify themselves. And, as Jodi Dean puts it, “each is told, repeatedly, that she is unique and encouraged to cultivate this uniqueness. We learn to insist on and enjoy our difference, intensifying processes of self-individuation. No one else is like us (like me)” (2017, 3). Perhaps it is in the digital age that this feature attributed to neoliberal subjectivity is best observed. The individual invents himself or projects his identity, perhaps his most intimate convictions, through the network set by the digital filter. 2.4. Hedonism (Narcissism) According to McGuigan and other references (Blühdorn 2017; Dean J. 2017; Harvey 2005), the neoliberal self is hedonistic and flexible, in instant transformations, with a cool-capitalist detachment or disaffection: “Such hedonism is connected to a ‘cool- capitalist’ cultural formation that performs an astonishing ideological trick [...] by incorporating signs and symbols of disaffection, affecting a rebellious posture, as in the case of Apple, to popular and extremely profitable effect” (McGuigan 2014, 232). Hedonism is seen as the way in which the individual expresses her social dissatisfaction, which to some extent can be considered part of the politically correct; the hedonist is the one who seeks pleasure and satisfaction but complains when she does not find it and claims it as a violated right. This dissatisfaction leads to a socially accepted attitude of protest, at least as a rebellious posture, because it is estimated that the consumer and welfare society cannot afford dissatisfaction. Ingolfur Blühdorn has established a relationship between neoliberal subjectivity and the modern project of emancipation, referring to it as a second-order emancipation that “implies, firstly, the rejection of earlier ideals of subjectivity which are now experienced as too restrictive and, secondly, a much more open-minded reassessment of aspirations, practices and lifestyles which had formerly been portrayed as corrupting character, mutilating the authentic Self, repressive or as false consciousness” (2017, 10). Precisely what seems to be rejected in this second order emancipation is the modern subject with its characteristics of identity, unity, autonomy, plenitude, and so on. That is, in this attempt to overcome rigid schemes of subjectification of the past (a past that refers not only to history but to the political- economic regime of the modernity in which it emerged), that very subject survives as a negativity, a sort of living dead. This will be the content of the following sections of this article.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Only the alternative’s analysis of subject formation is capable of combatting their impacts and producing new subjects</h4><p><strong>Garrido 19 </strong>– Faculty Member of Hebei Normal University and a collaborator at the Centre for Peruvian and Latin American Studies.</p><p>Daniel Rueda Garrido, “Deaths of the Subject and Negated Subjectivity in the Era of Neoliberal Capitalism,” tripleC, 6/24/19, https://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/1068</p><p>From this short review of the historical formation of neoliberalism, I would like to emphasise <u>that the passage from organised capitalism to neoliberalism proper took place due to a depletion of previous policies to produce wealth and stability, which provided the trigger for Thatcher’s and Reagan’s policies</u> with the promotion by the British Prime Minister of the well-known slogan TINA: <u><strong>“there is no alternative”.</u></strong> The situation, as McGuigan mentions, was uniquely the oil export crisis in 1973, declared by the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries), and the deficiencies shown by the Fordist production system (Fordism) to be able to create and satisfy increasing demand as well as to get rid of machinery and part of the national production chain and find cheaper markets to produce and place their products (McGuigan 2006, 73). However, as Agnew has remarked, <u>those changes were supported by the implementations of certain approaches of the US in terms of economic policies pointing to globalisation;</u> for instance, the increased levels of international trade in the 1960s and the US abrogation of the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944, which liberated currencies from a fixed exchange rate to the US dollar, thus making possible, by deteriorating their own economy, the construction of an international market where currencies “could float against one another”, which is today’s globalised financial system (Agnew 2005, 169). Since 1980, <u>the <strong>implementation of <mark>neoliberalism</strong></mark> has <mark>managed</mark> to impose itself as <mark>a</mark> <strong><mark>hegemonic mode of development</strong></mark>, and with greater intensity since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989</u>. With the coming of the 21st century and new technologies of digital communication, <u><strong>new modes of exploitation and expansion</strong> of capital have arisen</u>, in what has been called global and digital capitalism. <u><mark>This <strong>hegemony of neoliberalism</mark> knows no boundaries</strong> and</u> can be defined by what Harvey (2005, 3-4) and Agnew (2005, 165) understand as a time-space compression of the market; the global market, <u>already <strong><mark>identified with the daily life of the citizen</strong></mark>, is within reach of the computer mouse: people, countries, transactions and things seem to be omnipresent when this new digital citizen connects to the network.</p><p><strong><mark>This citizen, produced by neoliberal policies</strong></mark> and exacerbated by digital technologies, <mark>has been <strong>identified with a certain</mark> positive <mark>subjectivity</strong></mark>; <mark>that is, a</mark> <strong>way of being and of understanding</strong> oneself by affirming one’s intrinsic qualities</u>. McGuigan draws on Weber’s ideal type to cast the type of <u><strong>neoliberal self</strong>; ideal types “are abstract formulations that do not exactly conform to any particular empirical instance. They are defined</u>, in the Weberian sense<u>, by essential features that are accentuated in order to bring out the most salient aspects of a given form of life”</u> (2014, 233). <u>These ideal types</u>, according to the same author, <u>must necessarily be <strong>proposed in contrast to their historical context</u></strong>, in Simmel’s historicist mode. This means that <u><mark>the</mark> ideal type of the self or <mark>neoliberal subject has to <strong>emerge from the</mark> same <mark>social and political organisation that the neoliberal order</mark> has <mark>established</u></strong></mark>. It is important to underline this notion to understand how <u><mark>the</mark> ideal type of <mark>neoliberal subject</mark> being cast here <mark>is the <strong>product of the social structures</strong> <strong>determined by</mark> the evolution of <mark>capitalism</strong></mark> as a whole</u>. I will return to this in the following sections. Most <u>studies on neoliberal subjectivity mention at least the characteristics of compulsory freedom, <strong>individualism</strong>, self-realisation (creation) and hedonism (<strong>narcissism</strong>) in relation to the market or consumerism.</p><p></u>2.1. Condemned to Freedom and Self-Responsibility</p><p>It is usually agreed that <u>the neoliberal self is a self that is condemned to freedom and to be responsible for its actions</u>. Of course, <u>the major premise in this argumentation is the assumption that the self is free,</u> or has been liberated from past ties of a religious, moral or philosophical nature. This responsibility does not imply moral values; one is responsible because one is free. Freedom implies responsibility and this involves blame for failure or praise for success in both consuming rationally and enterprising effectively, or in McGuigan’s words: “<u>such a self</u> – condemned to freedom and lonely responsibility <u>– is exactly the kind of self cultivated by neoliberalism</u>, combining freewheeling consumer sovereignty with enterprising business acumen” (McGuigan 2014, 234).</p><p><u>2.2. Individuality (Egotism)</p><p></u>The literature on this subject (Blühdorn 2017; Dean J. 2017; McGuigan 2014) tends to reinforce <u><strong>the feature of <mark>individualism in the neoliberal self</strong></mark>, though in relation to previous generations within capitalism</u>. This <u>individualism</u> is concerned more sharply with young people and <u><mark>materialises as <strong>passivity</mark> regarding social issues</strong>, as social atomicity, as communication through new technologies, <mark>and</mark> so on. This individualism <mark>seems to be</mark> <strong>equally <mark>imposed structurally</strong></mark>, because the neoliberal subject is obliged to take care of him/herself and procure the means that lead him/her to success in a society that is always more aggressively competitive</u>: “in a viciously competitive job market we have no choice but to work on ourselves, constantly, just to keep up” (Dean J. 2017, 3). And yet, as Castells pointed out years ago, in the ‘information age’, from the 1990s onwards and above all with digital communication technologies, this individualistic subjectivity clearly enters into conflict with the interconnectivity of the masses in the network (McGuigan 2014, 231).This first discordant note makes us wonder if there is truly a clearly-defined neoliberal subjectivity and if, in any case, <u>individualism is a <strong>characteristic of this subjectivity</strong> or a <strong>product of the global market</strong> in which the subject has necessarily been incorporated as an individual entity that, in terms of the consumer, reproduces the logic of the market.</p><p></u>2.3. Self-Realisation (Liquidity)</p><p>It seems as if, <u>in the era of neoliberalism, everything solid has melted</u>, as per a metaphor borrowed from Zygmunt Bauman (2000). And the truth is that this is one of the characteristics that this period shares with so-called postmodernism, a label whose value overlaps with that of neoliberal policies after the 1970s; and in such a way that we could refer to it as the cultural face of what would otherwise be the political and economic order. This connection between the culture and the economy of the decades that concern us has been prominently stated by Fredric Jameson (1998, 73). The identity of the subject, the self, like everything else, is considered volatile, ephemeral, opening a tendency to self-invention or creation of oneself<u>. Individuals are constantly driven by social media and labour pressure to work on themselves, adopting different patterns of personal and professional success, as well as being <strong>encouraged to adopt different identities</u></strong> (perhaps latent or asleep, perhaps repressed) by consuming products with which they identify themselves. And, as Jodi Dean puts it, “each is told, repeatedly, that she is unique and encouraged to cultivate this uniqueness. We learn to insist on and enjoy our difference, intensifying processes of self-individuation. No one else is like us (like me)” (2017, 3). Perhaps it is in the digital age that this feature attributed to neoliberal subjectivity is best observed. The individual invents himself or projects his identity, perhaps his most intimate convictions, through the network set by the digital filter.</p><p>2.4. Hedonism (Narcissism)</p><p>According to McGuigan and other references (Blühdorn 2017; Dean J. 2017; Harvey 2005), <u><mark>the neoliberal self is</u></mark> hedonistic and <u><mark>flexible</mark>, in instant transformations, <mark>with a <strong>cool-capitalist detachment</mark> or disaffection</u></strong>: “Such hedonism is connected to a ‘cool- capitalist’ cultural formation that performs an astonishing ideological trick [...] by incorporating signs and symbols of disaffection, affecting a rebellious posture, as in the case of Apple, to popular and extremely profitable effect” (McGuigan 2014, 232). Hedonism is seen as the way in which the individual expresses her social dissatisfaction, which to some extent can be considered part of the politically correct; the hedonist is the one who seeks pleasure and satisfaction but complains when she does not find it and claims it as a violated right. This dissatisfaction leads to a socially accepted attitude of protest, at least as a rebellious posture, because it is estimated that the consumer and welfare society cannot afford dissatisfaction.</p><p>Ingolfur <u>Blühdorn has established a relationship between neoliberal subjectivity and the modern project of emancipation</u>, referring to it as a second-order emancipation that “<u>implies</u>, firstly, the rejection of earlier ideals of subjectivity which are now experienced as too restrictive and, secondly, a much more open-minded reassessment of aspirations, <u>practices and lifestyles which had formerly been portrayed as corrupting character, mutilating the authentic Self</u>, repressive or as false consciousness” (2017, 10). Precisely what seems to be rejected in this second order emancipation is the modern subject with its characteristics of identity, unity, autonomy, plenitude, and so on. That is, <u>in this attempt to overcome rigid schemes of subjectification of the past </u>(a past that refers not only to history but to the political- economic regime of the modernity in which it emerged), <u><mark>that very <strong>subject survives as a negativity</mark>,</strong> a sort of living dead.</u> This will be the content of the following sections of this article.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Simmler and Markwalder 19, *Postdoctoral Fellow and Lecturer in Criminal Law, Criminology and the Sociology of Law at University of St. Gallen. **Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law and Criminology with a special focus on Commercial Criminal Law at University of St. Gallen. (Moniker & Nora, 2019, “Guilty Robots? – Rethinking the Nature of Culpability and Legal Personhood in an Age of Artificial Intelligence,” Criminal Law Forum, Vol. 30, Iss. 1, pg. 1-31, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10609-018-9360-0) fulltext: According to Jakobs, the boundaries of the concept of criminal liability cannot be defined according to the opinion of good citizens’ as addressees of criminal responsibility and of punishment based on responsibility, but instead they have to be defined by asking which boundaries are necessary to maintain trust in the norms.122 Thus, it is the aim of punishment that shapes the concept of criminal responsibility. Therefore, the concept of criminal responsibility is neither sacrosanct nor unchangeable and, as a consequence, criminal responsibility of machines is not excluded from the beginning.123 4.2 Criminal Responsibility as Attribution in the System of Criminal Law The question of what criminal responsibility is and of who can be criminally responsible depends on society. The same applies to the question of what constitutes wrongdoing in the first place.124 Hence, the present analysis of the elements of criminal responsibility and their application in the context of the question of whether robots can be criminally responsible, is carried out in a sociologically informed manner. The question is whether there are social mechanisms that allow for such an attribution of criminal responsibility.125 Due to the social relativity of the content and concept of criminal responsibility, it is the society of the future and the way it functions and operates that will determine whether robots will be recognized as persons and whether the actions’ of robots will have the potential to destabilize norms. In case they do, society will have to develop mechanisms to prevent such a destabilization of norms in order to secure the continued stability of expectations. It is highly possible that the tool society employs for this task will be criminal law and it is also highly possible that, consequently, the idea of a guilty robot’ will become a part of day to day life. This scenario requires a process of attribution in the social system. The humanization of robots would have to have gone far enough so that we recognize robots as actors in social interaction and that we do not just have cognitive, but also normative expectations towards them, with the result that their action can be perceived as demonstrations of a lack of compliance with the law.126 The increasing humanization of robots would further have to lead to the mechanism that, in case of conflicts in the coordination of behavior, we don’t just adjust our expectations and learn’ from our disappointment in the sense that we would not rely on norm-conforming behavior of the robot’ in the future. Instead, we would have to refuse to give up’ and continue (normatively) to expect that the robot behaves in accordance with the law. This means that, due to the capacities socially attributed to the robot, there is an expectation that it can adjust its behavior in the light of norms and that it will behave differently in the future or that the insistence on the expectations will reassure the rest of society that they can still insist on their expectations. The essential question in the context of a possible responsibility of robots thus will be whether robots can destabilize norms due to the capacities attributed to them and due to their personhood and if they produce a conflict that requires a reaction of criminal law, without which the norm would first be destabilized and then disappear. Criminal responsibility is attributed if persons cannot create sufficient distance between them and the injustice of their actions.127 Responsibility as attribution is a process, a social operation, and not a real substrate within the person.128 To deem someone guilty’ means nothing else than that we impute a fault, the disappointment of a normative expectation, to a person.129 This way, society can externalize the conflict, resolve it, and stabilize the norm put into question and thus secure the survival of said norm.130 We can assume that we involuntarily attribute human traits, motivation, and behavioral patterns especially to robots that can read, process, and react to human emotions. In the future, this may allow us to also attribute them responsibility for their actions.131 Such a humanization’ of robots is already starting to take place in everyday language. This can be seen in the fact that the use of anthropological terminology (as in the case of terms like movements’, actions’, autonomy’, and thinking’) is common in the field of robotics.132 The disappointment of legally secured expectations does not occur by way of individualized and subjective misconduct, but by way of an objective misconduct breaking character’, i.e. not meeting the expectations accompanying the role assigned to someone by the system.133 The decisive question thus will be what kind of role we attribute to robots rather than questions regarding their actual individual capacities. Already today, we don’t generate an individual standard of responsibility for humans and legal persons, but we refer to objective criteria, ie we only refer to the social phenomena that are apparent and therefore relevant for the stabilization of norms. The process of assessing questions of criminal responsibility is about whether a conflict can be resolved by other means besides punishment, whether the disappointment regarding the respective behavior can be explained not by an individual mistake, but by other circumstances and whether it can thus be socially processed in another manner. Also in this context, the decisive question is whether the aim of criminal law can be met or whether stabilization of the norm in question requires punishment. Individual capacities are only relevant to the extent that they are apparent and explicable. The same would apply in the case of artificial intelligence. Along the same lines, Gless and Weigend state that criminal responsibility of robots has to be ruled out as long as they have not become moral agents’.134 Criminal responsibility of robots can thus be excluded today, due to sociological fact that they have not yet acquired personhood, but it cannot be excluded for the future. It is not just a functional approach to criminal law doctrine which leads to this conclusion, but it is a consequence of a criminal law that does not and cannot function independently of its aim. In such a future, in which a robot would count as a moral agent’, criminal responsibility of robots would not be different from criminal responsibility of humans today: a socially attributed liability due to an offence against a rule of criminal law, which exposes a lack of compliance and therefore demands opposition, because the arisen conflict cannot be resolved in another manner. This liability, however, would not be similar to a strict liability. Mens rea, a guilty mind’, would still be a requirement for punishment, even if this is just functionally and objectively attributed, just as it is covertly already the case today. An argument frequently raised against criminal responsibility of robots is further that punishment of robots that would have the same aim as punishment of humans is hardly imaginable today.135 According to Wohlers, criminal responsibility of robots would require that the subject of punishment can experience this punishment as a personal evil.136 This punishability’ as a personal capacity is supposed to be necessary if criminal responsibility is to make sense at all.137 Leaving aside the fact that also corporate entities would hardly be punishable’ in this sense and that therefore the punishment of such legal persons, which is practiced in many legal orders, would be pointless, it is highly questionable whether this punishability’ should really be a requirement for criminal responsibility, given that it can be presupposed that punishment is mainly constituted by its symbolic force as a reaction to the disappointment of expectations and not by its actual effects on the punished subject. If it were the case that criminal responsibility only makes sense if the punishment actually has an impact on the offender, our current legal system would already be paralyzed by unresolvable empirical debates, since the potential deterrent effect of punishment on an individual offender is a highly controversial topic in criminology.138 In any case, criminal responsibility as such can hardly depend on this question. However, it is of course true that it would constitute a problem to determine the punishment as a legal consequence in case one would someday attribute criminal responsibility to robots.139 A fine could be imposed using the aforementioned construct of an e-person’ in an analogy to civil law. Contrary to civil law, however, the aim of criminal law is not to compensate for damages caused, which is why it has to be presupposed that the payment of the respective sum would have to have certain consequences’ for the robot. This is of course unthinkable today, but it cannot be excluded that in the future robots with artificial intelligence will be able to earn’ and therefore also lose’ money. Similarly, it is possible to think of scenarios in which there can be found analogies to incarceration or to other criminal sanctions. A reprogramming’ or the infliction of an evil’, which would have consequences for the self-learning system is absolutely possible.140 Of course, these ideas for punishing robots may seem like science fiction and a little absurd today. However, they mainly show the variability and relativity of our concepts of guilt’, responsibility’, and also punishment’.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Criminalization is important for socialization---without attribution the system of law will collapse</h4><p><strong>Simmler </strong>and Markwalder <strong>19</strong>, *Postdoctoral Fellow and Lecturer in Criminal Law, Criminology and the Sociology of Law at University of St. Gallen. **Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law and Criminology with a special focus on Commercial Criminal Law at University of St. Gallen. (Moniker & Nora, 2019, “Guilty Robots? – Rethinking the Nature of Culpability and Legal Personhood in an Age of Artificial Intelligence,” Criminal Law Forum, Vol. 30, Iss. 1, pg. 1-31, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10609-018-9360-0)</p><p>According to Jakobs, the <u>boundaries of the concept of criminal liability</u> cannot be defined according to the opinion of good citizens’ as addressees of criminal responsibility and of punishment based on responsibility, but instead they <u>have to be defined by asking which boundaries are necessary to maintain trust in the norms</u>.122 <u>Thus</u>, <u>it is the aim of punishment that shapes the concept of criminal responsibility</u>. <u>Therefore</u>, <u>the concept of criminal responsibility is <strong>neither sacrosanct nor unchangeable</strong> and</u>, as a consequence, <u>criminal responsibility of machines is <strong>not excluded</strong> from the beginning</u>.123</p><p>4.2 Criminal Responsibility as Attribution in the System of Criminal Law</p><p>The question of what criminal responsibility is and of who can be criminally responsible depends on society. The same applies to the question of what constitutes wrongdoing in the first place.124 Hence, the present analysis of the elements of criminal responsibility and their application in the context of the question of whether robots can be criminally responsible, is carried out in a sociologically informed manner. <u>The question is whether there are <strong>social mechanisms</strong> that allow for such an <strong>attribution of criminal responsibility</u></strong>.125 Due to the social relativity of the content and concept of criminal responsibility, it is the society of the future and the way it functions and operates that will determine whether robots will be recognized as persons and whether the actions’ of robots will have the potential to destabilize norms. In case they do, <u>society will have to develop mechanisms to <strong>prevent</strong> such a <strong>destabilization of norms</strong> in order to secure the <strong>continued stability</strong> of <strong>expectations</u></strong>. I<u>t is highly possible that the tool society employs for this task will be criminal law and it is also highly possible that</u>, consequently, <u>the idea of a <strong>guilty robot</strong>’ will become a part of day to day life</u>.</p><p><u>This scenario requires a <strong>process of attribution</strong> in the social system</u>. The <u>humanization of robots would have to have gone far enough so that we recognize robots as actors in social interaction and that we do not just have cognitive</u>, <u>but also <strong>normative expectations</strong> towards them</u>, <u>with the result that their action can be perceived as demonstrations of a <strong>lack of compliance with the law</u></strong>.126 The increasing humanization of robots would further have to lead to the mechanism that, in case of conflicts in the coordination of behavior, we don’t just adjust our expectations and learn’ from our disappointment in the sense that we would not rely on norm-conforming behavior of the robot’ in the future. Instead, we would have to refuse to give up’ and continue (normatively) to expect that the robot behaves in accordance with the law. This means that, <u>due to the capacities socially attributed to the robot</u>, <u>there is an expectation that it <strong>can adjust its behavior in the light of norms</strong> and that <strong>it will behave differently in the future</strong> or that the insistence on the expectations will <strong>reassure the rest of society</strong> that they can still insist on their expectations</u>. <u>The essential question in</u> the context of a possible <u>responsibility of robots thus will be whether robots can <strong>destabilize norms</strong> due to the capacities attributed to them and due to their personhood and if they produce a conflict that requires a reaction of criminal law</u>, <u>without which the norm would first be <strong>destabilized</strong> and then <strong>disappear</u></strong>.</p><p><u>Criminal responsibility is attributed if persons <strong>cannot create sufficient distance</strong> between them and the injustice of their actions</u>.127 <u>Responsibility as attribution is a <strong>process</u></strong>, a social operation, <u>and not a real <strong>substrate</strong> within the person</u>.128 <u>To deem someone guilty’ means nothing else than that we <strong>impute a fault</u></strong>, <u>the disappointment of a normative expectation</u>, <u>to a person</u>.129 This way, <u>society can externalize the conflict</u>, <u><strong>resolve it</u></strong>, <u>and <strong>stabilize the norm</strong> put into question and thus <strong>secure the survival of said norm</u></strong>.130 <u>We can assume that we involuntarily attribute human traits</u>, motivation, and behavioral patterns especially <u>to robots</u> that can read, process, and react to human emotions. In the future, t<u>his may allow us to also attribute them responsibility for their actions</u>.131 Such a humanization’ of robots is already starting to take place in everyday language. This can be seen in the fact that the use of anthropological terminology (as in the case of terms like movements’, actions’, autonomy’, and thinking’) is common in the field of robotics.132</p><p>The <u>disappointment of legally secured expectations does not occur by way of individualized and subjective misconduct</u>, <u>but by way of an <strong>objective misconduct breaking character</u></strong>’, i.e. not meeting the expectations accompanying the role assigned to someone by the system.133 The decisive question thus will be what kind of role we attribute to robots rather than questions regarding their actual individual capacities. Already today, <u>we don’t generate an individual standard of responsibility for humans and legal persons</u>, <u>but we refer to <strong>objective criteria</u></strong>, ie <u>we only refer to the social phenomena that are apparent and therefore relevant for the <strong>stabilization of norms</u></strong>. The process of assessing questions of criminal responsibility is about whether a conflict can be resolved by other means besides punishment, whether the disappointment regarding the respective behavior can be explained not by an individual mistake, but by other circumstances and whether it can thus be socially processed in another manner. Also in this context, <u>the decisive question is whether the aim of criminal law can be met or whether stabilization of the norm in question requires punishment</u>. <u>Individual capacities are only relevant to the extent that they are <strong>apparent</strong> and <strong>explicable</u></strong>. <u>The same would apply in the case of <strong>a</strong>rtificial <strong>i</strong>ntelligence</u>.</p><p>Along the same lines, Gless and Weigend state that criminal responsibility of robots has to be ruled out as long as they have not become moral agents’.134 Criminal responsibility of robots can thus be excluded today, due to sociological fact that they have not yet acquired personhood, but it cannot be excluded for the future. It is not just a functional approach to criminal law doctrine which leads to this conclusion, but it is a consequence of a criminal law that does not and cannot function independently of its aim. <u>In such a future</u>, <u>in which a robot would count as a moral agent’, criminal responsibility of robots would not be different from criminal responsibility of humans today</u>: <u>a <strong>socially attributed liability</strong> due to an offence against a rule of criminal law</u>, <u>which exposes a lack of compliance and therefore <strong>demands opposition</u></strong>, <u>because the arisen conflict cannot be resolved in another manner</u>. <u>This liability</u>, however, <u><strong>would not be similar to a strict liability</u></strong>. <u>Mens rea</u>, a guilty mind’, <u>would still be a requirement for punishment</u>, <u>even if this is just functionally and objectively attributed</u>, just as it is covertly already the case today.</p><p>An argument frequently raised against criminal responsibility of robots is further that punishment of robots that would have the same aim as punishment of humans is hardly imaginable today.135 According to Wohlers, <u>criminal responsibility of robots would require that the subject of punishment can <strong>experience this punishment</strong> as a personal evil</u>.136 This punishability’ as a personal capacity is supposed to be necessary if criminal responsibility is to make sense at all.137 <u>Leaving aside the fact that also corporate entities would hardly be punishable’ in this sense and that therefore the punishment of such legal persons</u>, <u>which is practiced in <strong>many legal orders</u></strong>, would be pointless, <u>it is highly questionable whether this punishability’ should really be a requirement for criminal responsibility</u>, <u>given that it can be presupposed that <strong>punishment is mainly constituted by its symbolic force</strong> as a reaction to the disappointment of expectations and not by its actual effects on the punished subject</u>. <u>If it were the case that criminal responsibility only makes sense if the punishment actually has an impact on the offender</u>, <u>our current legal system would already be <strong>paralyzed by unresolvable empirical debates</u></strong>, <u>since the potential deterrent effect of punishment on an individual offender is a highly controversial topic in criminology</u>.138 In any case, criminal responsibility as such can hardly depend on this question.</p><p>However, it is of course true that it would constitute a problem to determine the punishment as a legal consequence in case one would someday attribute criminal responsibility to robots.139 A fine could be imposed using the aforementioned construct of an e-person’ in an analogy to civil law. Contrary to civil law, however, <u>the aim of criminal law is <strong>not to compensate</strong> for damages caused</u>, <u>which is why it has to be presupposed that the payment of the respective sum would have to have certain <strong>consequences’ for the robot</u></strong>. This is of course unthinkable today, but <u>it cannot be excluded that in the future robots with <strong>a</strong>rtificial <strong>i</strong>ntelligence will be able to earn’ and therefore also lose’ money</u>. Similarly, it is possible to think of scenarios in which there can be found analogies to incarceration or to other criminal sanctions. <u>A <strong>reprogramming</strong>’ or the <strong>infliction of an evil</strong>’, which would have consequences for the self-learning system is <strong>absolutely possible</u></strong>.140 Of course, these ideas for punishing robots may seem like science fiction and a little absurd today. However, they mainly show the variability and relativity of our concepts of guilt’, responsibility’, and also punishment’.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: GCODP 14, Global Commission On Drug Policy, September, “Taking Control: Pathways To Drug Policies That Work” The purpose of the Global Commission on Drug Policy is to bring to the international level an informed, science based discussion about humane and effective ways to reduce the harm caused by drugs to people and societies. Committee includes: Kofi Annan - former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Louise Arbour former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Pavel Bém former mayor of Prague, Richard Branson entrepreneur, advocate for social causes, founder of the Virgin Group, Fernando Henrique Cardoso former President of Brazil (chair) Maria Cattaui former Secretary-General of the International Chamber of Commerce, Ruth Dreifuss former Minister of Social Affairs and former President of Switzerland, Cesar Gaviria former President of Colombia, Asma Jahangir human rights activist, former UN Special Rapporteur on Arbitrary, Extrajudicial and Summary Executions, Pakistan, Michel Kazatchkine UN Secretary-General Special Envoy on HIV/AIDS in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Aleksander Kwasniewski former President of Poland, Ricardo Lagos former President of Chile, George Papandreou former Prime Minister of Greece, Jorge Sampaio former President of Portugal, George Shultz former Secretary of State, United States, Javier Solana former European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Thorvald Stoltenberg former Minister of Foreign Affairs and UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Mario Vargas Llosa writer and public intellectual, Paul Volcker former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve and of the Economic Recovery Board, John Whitehead former Deputy Secretary of State, former Co-Chairman Goldman Sachs & Co., Ernesto Zedillo former President of Mexico http://www.gcdpsummary2014.com/ fulltext: The shift of drug policy toward principles of health, security, human rights and development requires honest reflection by United Nations member states and agencies. It demands systematically reviewing the institutional and legal reforms required to bring the international drug control system’s original goal of securing ‘the health and welfare of mankind’ closer to reality. The system’s inability to deliver on this goal has ultimately led to the convening of the 2016 UNGASS. This represents a unique opportunity for an open and critical review, and the exploration of ‘all options’ urged by the Secretary-General and world leaders. The Commission hopes that the recommendations issued in this report can usefully inform and support the process. As the appetite for reform gathers pace around the world, many new questions are emerging. For one, is the international drug policy regime sufficiently flexible to accommodate reforms that are being proposed or are already underway? What institutional or legal reforms at national and international level are necessary to make the system ‘fit for purpose’? Does today’s existing drug control regime adequately reflect twenty-first century realities? There are at least three considerations to make when tackling these pressing questions. First, the international drug control regime offers some degree of flexibility. There are some positive reforms that can occur within the existing treaty framework, including ending the criminalization of people who use drugs and low level participants in the drug trade, and implementing harm reduction interventions.112 For states that have yet to implement such measures, the drug treaties offer no excuse for inaction. Indeed, UN human rights monitors have clearly identified that the failure to provide key harm reduction services constitutes a violation of the right to health.114 Second, the concept of flexibility should not be used to justify or condone repressive or abusive practices that have often characterized drug policy over the past half century.115 While it is true that there are limits to what is permissible under the drugs conventions in terms of reform,116 it is also the case that there are clear constraints as to what is allowable with respect to international human rights law. The development of ‘international standards on human rights while countering the world drug problem’ is a necessary step forward. An agreement to develop such standards – which may be modeled on existing guidelines on how to ensure counter-terrorism117 activities or business practices118 comply with human rights — should be a key outcome of the General Assembly Special Session process in 2016. This will require input from UN human rights mechanisms and civil society in relation to applicable human rights standards, such as proportionate infringements of rights; fair trials and sentencing; the use of force; extradition; equality and non-discrimination; indigenous peoples’ rights, cultural rights and religious freedom; the rights of the child; and the right to the highest attainable standard of health. Third, there are limits to the flexibility available within the existing system. Different states naturally face distinct challenges, and have varying priorities in moving forward. But any progress requires experimentation and innovation, and the system needs to support and evaluate these new approaches, rather than trying to suppress them. While some reforms are possible, the current regime explicitly prohibits experimentation with legal regulatory models, acting as a straightjacket on a key area of innovative policy development. The strength of the UN treaty system is based on the consensus of support from member states and the legitimacy of its goals. For the drug control treaties this consensus has fractured,120 and their legitimacy is weakening owing to their negative consequences. More and more states are viewing the core punitive elements of the drug treaties as not merely inflexible, but outdated, counterproductive and in urgent need of reform. If this growing dissent is not accommodated through a meaningful formal process to explore reform options, the drug treaty system risks becoming even more ineffectual and redundant, as more reform-minded member states unilaterally opt to distance themselves from it. A weakened drug control system in turn jeopardizes the important role of a United Nations framework for regulating access to essential medicines, providing guidance, and monitoring compliance with recommended best practice and minimum rights standards. Rather than slipping into irrelevance, the ambitions of the treaties to regulate medical and scientific uses of drugs need to be extended to embrace the regulation of drugs for non-medical uses, in pursuit of the same set of UN goals. Unilateral defections from the drug treaties are undesirable from the perspective of international relations and a system built on consensus. Yet the integrity of that very system is not served in the long run by dogmatic adherence to an outdated and dysfunctional normative framework. ¶ The evolution of legal systems to account for changing circumstances is fundamental to their survival and utility, and the regulatory experiments being pursued by various states are acting as a catalyst for this process. Indeed, respect for the rule of law requires challenging those laws that are generating harm or that are ineffective.¶ A lynchpin of the current debate is cannabis policy. Reforms in this area – particularly those involving regulatory experiments – are swiftly progressing due to the widespread use of cannabis, the way which it is cultivated, its moderate risk profile compared to most other drugs, and its ongoing regulatory experimentation. ¶ Although the inevitability of further cannabis reforms looks set to be the issue that opens the debate around a wider treaty system renegotiation,122 longer term questions around potential regulation models for other drugs must not be overlooked or sidelined. It is important that short-term reforms focused on cannabis are not the end of the story, but instead act as the catalyst for a more fundamental review of the international drug control system. Member states and UN agencies have an unprecedented opportunity to demonstrate leadership, using the 2016 UNGASS to initiate a meaningful multilateral reform process. This will require openness to greater flexibility for experimentation, as well as a willingness to reconsider the dated punitive paradigm. At an institutional level, the necessary realignment of the system towards the core health, human rights and security priorities of the UN can begin by recognizing the responsibility of the WHO (and ensuring it is funded to fulfill its existing or expanded mandate).<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Lack of reform makes <u>treaty collapse inevitable</u>---the plan’s approach towards harm reduction is necessary</h4><p><strong>GCODP 14</strong>, Global Commission On Drug Policy, September, “Taking Control: Pathways To Drug Policies That Work” The purpose of the Global Commission on Drug Policy is to bring to the international level an informed, science based discussion about humane and effective ways to reduce the harm caused by drugs to people and societies. Committee includes: Kofi Annan - former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Louise Arbour former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Pavel Bém former mayor of Prague, Richard Branson entrepreneur, advocate for social causes, founder of the Virgin Group, Fernando Henrique Cardoso former President of Brazil (chair) Maria Cattaui former Secretary-General of the International Chamber of Commerce, Ruth Dreifuss former Minister of Social Affairs and former President of Switzerland, Cesar Gaviria former President of Colombia, Asma Jahangir human rights activist, former UN Special Rapporteur on Arbitrary, Extrajudicial and Summary Executions, Pakistan, Michel Kazatchkine UN Secretary-General Special Envoy on HIV/AIDS in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Aleksander Kwasniewski former President of Poland, Ricardo Lagos former President of Chile, George Papandreou former Prime Minister of Greece, Jorge Sampaio former President of Portugal, George Shultz former Secretary of State, United States, Javier Solana former European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Thorvald Stoltenberg former Minister of Foreign Affairs and UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Mario Vargas Llosa writer and public intellectual, Paul Volcker former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve and of the Economic Recovery Board, John Whitehead former Deputy Secretary of State, former Co-Chairman Goldman Sachs & Co., Ernesto Zedillo former President of Mexico http://www.gcdpsummary2014.com/</p><p><u>The shift of drug policy</u> toward principles of health, security, human rights and development requires honest reflection by United Nations member states and agencies. It <u>demands systematically reviewing the institutional and legal reforms required to bring the international drug control system’s original goal of securing ‘the health and welfare of mankind’ closer to reality</u>.<u> The system’s inability to deliver on this goal has ultimately led to the convening of the 2016 UNGASS.<strong> This represents a unique opportunity for an open and critical review,</u></strong> and the exploration of ‘all options’ urged by the Secretary-General and world leaders. The Commission hopes that the recommendations issued in this report can usefully inform and support the process. <u>As the appetite for reform gathers pace around the world, many new questions are emerging. </u>For one, <u>is the international drug policy regime sufficiently flexible to accommodate reforms </u>that are being proposed or are already underway<u>? What institutional or legal reforms</u> at national and international level<u> are necessary to make the system ‘fit for purpose’? </u>Does today’s existing drug control regime adequately reflect twenty-first century realities? There are at least three considerations to make when tackling these pressing questions. First, the international drug control regime offers some degree of flexibility. There are some positive reforms that can occur within the existing treaty framework, including ending the criminalization of people who use drugs and low level participants in the drug trade, and implementing harm reduction interventions.112 For states that have yet to implement such measures, the <u><strong>drug treaties offer no excuse for inaction. </u></strong>Indeed, <u><mark>UN </mark>human <mark>rights monitors have clearly identified</mark> that the <mark>failure to provide key harm reduction services constitutes a violation of the right to health</mark>.</u>114 <u>Second, the concept of flexibility should not be used to justify or condone repressive or abusive practices</u> that have often characterized drug policy over the past half century.115 <u>While it is true that there are limits to what is permissible under the drugs conventions in terms of reform</u>,116 <u>it is also the case that <mark>there are clear constraints as to what is allowable with</mark> respect to <mark>i</mark>nternational <mark>h</mark>uman <mark>r</mark>ights <mark>l</mark>aw.</u> The development of ‘international standards on human rights while countering the world drug problem’ is a necessary step forward. An agreement to develop such standards – which may be modeled on existing guidelines on how to ensure counter-terrorism117 activities or business practices118 comply with human rights — should be a key outcome of the General Assembly Special Session process in 2016. This will require input from UN human rights mechanisms and civil society in relation to applicable human rights standards, such as proportionate infringements of rights; fair trials and sentencing; the use of force; extradition; equality and non-discrimination; indigenous peoples’ rights, cultural rights and religious freedom; the rights of the child; and the right to the highest attainable standard of health. Third, <u>there are limits to the flexibility available within the existing system.</u> Different states naturally face distinct challenges, and have varying priorities in moving forward<u>. But any <mark>progress requires experimentation</mark> and innovation, and the system needs to support and evaluate these new approaches, rather than trying to suppress them</u>. While some reforms are possible, t<u>he current regime explicitly prohibits experimentation with legal regulatory models, acting as a straightjacket on a key area of innovative policy development. <mark>The strength of the UN treaty system is based on</mark> the consensus of <mark>support from </mark>member <mark>states and</mark> the <mark>legitimacy of</mark> its <mark>goals</u>.</mark> For the drug control treaties <u><strong><mark>this consensus has fractured</u></strong></mark>,120 <u><strong>and their <mark>legitimacy is weakening</u></strong></mark> owing to their negative consequences. <u>More and more <mark>state</mark>s are <mark>viewi</mark>ng the core <mark>punitive elements</mark> of the drug treaties <mark>as </mark>not merely inflexible, but outdated, <mark>counterproductive and in </mark>urgent <mark>need of reform. <strong>If this </mark>growing dissent <mark>is not accommodated</mark> </strong>through a meaningful formal process to explore reform options</u>, <u><mark>the </mark>drug treaty <mark>system risks becoming </mark>even <strong><mark>more ineffectual</strong></mark> and redundant, <mark>as </mark>more reform-minded member <mark>states <strong>unilaterally </mark>opt to <mark>distance themselves from it.</u></strong></mark> <u>A weakened drug control system in turn jeopardizes the important role of a United Nations framework for regulating access to essential medicines, providing guidance, and monitoring</u> compliance with recommended best practice <u>and</u> <u>minimum rights standards. Rather than slipping into irrelevance, the ambitions of the treaties to regulate medical and scientific uses of drugs need to be extended to embrace the regulation of drugs for non-medical uses, in pursuit of the same set of UN goals. Unilateral <mark>defections</mark> from the drug treaties <mark>are undesirable from the perspective of</mark> international relations and a system built on <mark>consensus. <strong>Yet the integrity of that </mark>very <mark>system is not served </mark>in the long run <mark>by dogmatic adherence to an outdated </mark>and dysfunctional normative <mark>framework.</u></strong></mark> ¶ <u><mark>The evolution</u> <u>of legal systems</u> <u>to account for chang</mark>ing circumstances <mark>is <strong>fundamental to their survival</mark> and utility,</u></strong> and the <u>regulatory experiments being pursued by various states are acting as a catalyst </u>for this process. Indeed, <u><strong>respect for <mark>the rule of law requires challenging </mark>those <mark>laws that </mark>are generating harm or that <mark>are ineffective</mark>.</u>¶<u> </strong><mark>A <strong>lynchpin</strong> of the </mark>current <mark>debate is cannabis </mark>policy.</u> Reforms in this area – particularly those involving regulatory experiments – are swiftly progressing due to the widespread use of cannabis, the way which it is cultivated, its moderate risk profile compared to most other drugs, and its ongoing regulatory experimentation. ¶ <u>Although the inevitability of </u>further <u>cannabis reforms looks set to be the issue that opens the debate </u>around a wider treaty system renegotiation,122 longer term questions around potential regulation models for other drugs must not be overlooked or sidelined. It is important that short-term <u><strong>reforms focused on cannabis are not the end of the story</strong>,</u> <u>but</u> <u>instead<strong> act as the catalyst for a more fundamental review of the international drug control system.</u></strong> <u>Member states</u> and UN agencies<u> have an unprecedented opportunity to demonstrate leadership, using the 2016 UNGASS to initiate a meaningful multilateral reform process</u>. This will require openness to greater flexibility for experimentation, as well as a willingness to reconsider the dated punitive paradigm. At an institutional level, the necessary realignment of the system towards the core health, human rights and security priorities of the UN can begin by recognizing the responsibility of the WHO (and ensuring it is funded to fulfill its existing or expanded mandate).</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Howard I. Browman 16, Institute of Marine Research, Marine Ecosystem Acoustics Disciplinary Group, Austevoll Research Station, Norway, “Applying organized scepticism to ocean acidification research,” ICES Journal of Marine Science, Volume 73, Number 3, February/March 2016, pp. 529-536 fulltext: [OA = Ocean Acidification] The first articles on OA were descriptions of the process itself (CO2-driven changes in the biogeochemistry of seawater and sediments) and its implications. This was followed by an explosion of work (mainly laboratory-based) on the possible effects of OA on various marine organisms, at first mainly calcifiers or the calcified hard parts of organisms without calcarious shells. These were mostly restricted to part of one generation (a limited number of life history stages), or at most a single complete life cycle, with one or a small number of biological endpoints measured as effect indicators. In early work, treatment exposure levels often greatly exceeded those predicted to occur hundreds of years into the future even without any reduction in CO2 emissions. The majority of these early works reported significant negative effects of high CO2, from which it was inferred that there would be a detrimental effect of OA over the coming decades–centuries. Thereafter, longer-term effect studies began to appear, which first included single-generation carry-overs and then multiple generations. By necessity, these have been on organisms with short generation times. As the approach to CO2 exposures matured, very high treatment levels became less common. More studies that showed no effect of high CO2 (predicted for the next century)—and even beneficial effects (e.g. for some phytoplankton and macrophytes)—appeared. Upwelling and vent systems were used as in situ case studies of natural future OA-like conditions. Some in situ work mimics such systems by injecting CO2 and following the response of organisms/communities locally. Results of experiments that included multiple stressors in addition to CO2 were published. The most common of these has been temperature, but salinity, oxygen, and a variety of others have also been included (in a global climate change context). Such studies typically report that the additional driver(s) has a stronger effect than CO2, although it is difficult to isolate the effect of the individual variables. The reality that the functional response curve of each driver will likely differ, as will the organism's ability to adapt to them, further complicates interpretations of multiple driver experiments. Studies on the effect of CO2 on trophic interactions (indirect effects) are sparse—such experiments are logistically complex and difficult to interpret. A small number of recent studies integrate the results of the preceding body of work into risk assessments and scenario modelling, typically on economically important species of fish and shellfish; most conclude that the prognosis is dire, although in the context of what follows, that conclusion might be premature. The preceding describes how OA research has matured. The following describes how it still has a way to go. Applying organized scepticism to research on the effects of OA Scientific or academic scepticism calls for critical scrutiny of research outputs before they are accepted as new knowledge (Merton, 1973). Duarte et al. (2014) stated that “…there is a perception that scientific skepticism has been abandoned or relaxed in many areas…” of marine science. They argue that OA is one such area, and conclude that there is, at best, weak evidence to support an OA-driven decline of calcifiers. Below, I raise some of the aspects of OA research to which I contend an insufficient level of organized scepticism has been applied (in some cases, also to the articles in this theme issue). I arrived at that conclusion after reading hundreds of articles on OA (including, to be fair, some that also raise these issues) and overseeing the peer-review process for the very large number of submissions to this themed issue. Importantly, and as Duarte et al. (2014) make clear, a retrospective application of scientific scepticism such as the one that follows could—and should—be applied to any piece of/body of research. Exposure levels, water chemistry, and limits to making inferences about the effect of a long-term driver from a short-term experiment Many early studies on OA applied treatment levels that greatly exceeded even worst-case climate change scenarios and did not report water chemistry in sufficient detail to determine if the treatment mimicked future OA-driven seawater conditions. Although most recent work has improved with respect to treatment levels, mimicking future water chemistry remains tricky. A rationale commonly used to justify high CO2/low pH treatments is the need to identify at what levels organisms are affected. However, the limits to making inferences about how an organism or ecosystem will respond to a climate-change scale variable (i.e. one that changes over decades–centuries) from their response during a short-term challenge experiment (i.e. hours–days–weeks) has not been adequately addressed—or even mentioned—in most studies. This is reflected in a confusion of terms common in OA studies—when describing the outcome of a short-term CO2 challenge, authors often make the inferential leap and use “OA” when discussing their results, without any caveats. Oddly, incorporation of the extensive toxicology literature is almost entirely missing from OA studies, either when it comes to adopting established exposure protocols or to framing the inferences that can/cannot be drawn from short-term experiments. Also missing from most studies is anything more than a superficial statement about the possibility for acclimation, adaptation, or evolution, something that is necessary to extend the outcome of a short-term challenge experiment into an inference about the effect of a long-term driver (see below). Spatio-temporal variability in CO2 and pH Biogeochemists are well aware of the spatio-temporal variability in CO2 and pH—daily (high productivity areas), seasonal (blooms), interannual (higher temperatures), horizontal (coastal upwelling areas, high turbidity zones), and vertical (deep vs. surface waters) ranges in these can be extensive (e.g. Wootton et al., 2008; Hofmann et al., 2011; Waldbusser and Salisbury, 2014; Kapsenberg et al., 2015). Biologists have struggled to incorporate this variability into experiments designed to test the effects of OA, and into their interpretations of the outcomes (Eriander et al., 2016). Some researchers have pointed out that organisms that are exposed to large ranges in CO2 and pH during their daily lives (e.g. vertical migrators), life cycles (e.g. organisms that reside offshore as larvae but move to the coast as juveniles or adults), or somewhere in their distributional ranges, should be more tolerant of OA (e.g. Lewis et al., 2013). Imbalanced focus on individuals that are affected and insufficient focus on inter-individual variability and within-experiment selection bias interpretations of ecological impacts Almost all CO2 challenge experiments produce a range of responses in the test organism—some individuals are badly affected, others less, and some not at all. There are several issues associated with all such experiments that it is important to be cognizant of and account for: (i) analyses and interpretations should not ignore or minimize individuals that are little affected or unaffected (after all, these are the ones whose genes will be passed on to the next generation); (ii) inter-individual variability should be highlighted; (iii) the longer that the experiment runs the more likely it is that an internal selection process for the tolerant individuals has occurred. All of these are important in the context of the next section. Acclimation, generational carry-over effects, adaptation, epigenetics, and evolution Almost all experiments conducted to assess OA are short-term toxicity challenges. Therefore, using them as the basis from which to make inferences about a process that will occur slowly over the next decades–centuries must be made with appropriate caution. That is, the experiments and the interpretations made from them must consider how populations might acclimatize, adapt, and evolve to climate change, in cluding OA (e.g. Donelson et al., 2011; Hoffmann and Sgrò, 2011; Sunday et al., 2013; Harvey et al., 2014). Recent studies indicate that even the effects of OA that are considered most worrisome—various behavioural impairments resulting from short-term exposure to high CO2 (see Nagelkerken and Munday, 2016)—might be reduced or overcome through adaptation and evolution (Regan et al., 2016). More knowledge of the mechanisms of direct action of OA-related drivers—higher concentrations of CO2, hydrogen ions (=lower pH), and/or carbonate chemistry (less carbonate ions)—and of indirect drivers such as the effects of OA on food quality, are essential to understand what degree of adaption is possible. Readers should be duly sceptical of studies that completely ignore the possibility of adaptation when presenting their inferences about OA, particularly scenario modelling of socio-economic impacts. We must also do better to incorporate analogous work in other fields, for example, rapid evolution of tolerance to envirotoxins (e.g. Whitehead et al., 2012) and environmental change (e.g. Collins et al., 2014; Stoks et al., 2015; Thibodeau et al., 2015) via a combination of genetic and epigenetic mechanisms (Yona et al., 2015). Publication bias Negative results—those that do not support a research hypothesis (e.g. OA will have detrimental effects on marine organisms)—can provide more balance for a subject area for which most published research reports positive results. Negative results can indicate that a subject area is not mature or clearly enough defined, or that our current methods and approaches are insufficient to produce a definitive result. Gould (1993) asserted that positive results tell more interesting stories than negative results and are, therefore, easier to write about and more interesting to read. He calls this a privileging of the positive. This privileging leads to a bias that acts against the propagation of negative results in the scholarly literature (see also Browman, 1999). Further, it is also important to recognize that studies showing no effect of OA are less equivocal than those that do, for all of the reasons noted above. Following from this, it is essential that authors writing about possible effects of OA present and discuss research that is inconsistent with their results and/or their interpretations—openly, honestly, and rigorously. Readers should be duly sceptical of articles that do not do this.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>No ocean acidification impact---their evidence assumes <u>far higher</u> CO2 levels than we’ll ever reach, adaptation solves, and research is systemically biased toward alarmism</h4><p>Howard I. <strong>Browman 16</strong>, Institute of Marine Research, Marine Ecosystem Acoustics Disciplinary Group, Austevoll Research Station, Norway, “Applying organized scepticism to ocean acidification research,” ICES Journal of Marine Science, Volume 73, Number 3, February/March 2016, pp. 529-536</p><p>[OA = Ocean Acidification]</p><p><u><mark>The first articles on OA</u></mark> were descriptions of the process itself (CO2-driven changes in the biogeochemistry of seawater and sediments) and its implications. This was followed by an explosion of work (mainly laboratory-based) on the possible effects of OA on various marine organisms, at first mainly calcifiers or the calcified hard parts of organisms without calcarious shells. These were mostly restricted to part of one generation (a limited number of life history stages), or at most a single complete life cycle, with one or a small number of biological endpoints measured as effect indicators. <u>In early work, <mark>treatment</mark> exposure <mark>levels</mark> often <strong><mark>greatly exceeded</strong> those</mark> <mark>predicted</mark> to occur <mark>hundreds of years into the future</mark> even without any reduction in CO2 emissions</u>. <u>The majority of these early works reported significant negative effects of high CO2</u>, from which <u>it was inferred that there would be a detrimental effect of OA</u> over the coming decades–centuries. Thereafter, <u><mark>longer-term effect studies</mark> began to <mark>appear</u></mark>, which first included single-generation carry-overs and then multiple generations. By necessity, these have been on organisms with short generation times. As the approach to CO2 exposures matured, very high treatment levels became less common. <u><mark>More</mark> studies that <mark>showed no effect of high CO2</u></mark> (predicted for the next century)—<u><mark>and even <strong>beneficial effects</u></strong></mark> (e.g. <u>for some phytoplankton and macrophytes</u>)—appeared. Upwelling and vent systems were used as in situ case studies of natural future OA-like conditions. Some in situ work mimics such systems by injecting CO2 and following the response of organisms/communities locally. <u>Results of <mark>experiments that</mark> <mark>included multiple stressors</mark> in addition to CO2 were published</u>. The most common of these has been temperature, but salinity, oxygen, and a variety of others have also been included (in a global climate change context). <u>Such studies typically <mark>report</mark> that the <strong><mark>additional driver(s) has a stronger effect than CO2</u></strong></mark>, although it is difficult to isolate the effect of the individual variables. The reality that <u>the functional response curve of each driver will likely differ</u>, as will the organism's ability to adapt to them, further complicates interpretations of multiple driver experiments. Studies on the effect of CO2 on trophic interactions (indirect effects) are sparse—such experiments are logistically complex and difficult to interpret. A small number of recent studies integrate the results of the preceding body of work into risk assessments and scenario modelling, typically on economically important species of fish and shellfish; most conclude that the prognosis is dire, although in the context of what follows, that conclusion might be premature. The preceding describes how OA research has matured. The following describes how it still has a way to go. Applying organized scepticism to research on the effects of OA Scientific or academic scepticism calls for critical scrutiny of research outputs before they are accepted as new knowledge (Merton, 1973). Duarte et al. (2014) stated that “…there is a perception that scientific skepticism has been abandoned or relaxed in many areas…” of marine science. They argue that OA is one such area, and conclude that <u><mark>there is</u></mark>, <u><strong><mark>at best</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>weak evidence to support</mark> an <mark>OA-driven decline</mark> of calcifiers.</u> Below, I raise some of the aspects of OA research to which I contend an insufficient level of organized scepticism has been applied (in some cases, also to the articles in this theme issue). <u><mark>I arrived at that</mark> conclusion <mark>after reading</mark> <strong><mark>hundreds of articles</mark> on OA</strong> </u>(including, to be fair, some that also raise these issues) and overseeing the peer-review process for the very large number of submissions to this themed issue. Importantly, and as Duarte et al. (2014) make clear, a retrospective application of scientific scepticism such as the one that follows could—and should—be applied to any piece of/body of research. Exposure levels, water chemistry, and limits to making inferences about the effect of a long-term driver from a short-term experiment Many <u><mark>early studies on OA</mark> applied treatment levels that <strong>greatly exceeded</strong> even worst-case climate change scenarios and <strong><mark>did not report water chemistry</strong></mark> in sufficient detail <mark>to determine if</mark> the <mark>treatment mimicked future</mark> OA-driven seawater <mark>conditions</u></mark>. Although most recent work has improved with respect to treatment levels, mimicking future water chemistry remains tricky. A rationale commonly used to justify high CO2/low pH treatments is the need to identify at what levels organisms are affected. However, the limits to making inferences about how an organism or ecosystem will respond to a climate-change scale variable (i.e. one that changes over decades–centuries) from their response during a short-term challenge experiment (i.e. hours–days–weeks) has not been adequately addressed—or even mentioned—in most studies. This is reflected in a confusion of terms common in OA studies—when describing the outcome of a short-term CO2 challenge, authors often make the inferential leap and use “OA” when discussing their results, without any caveats. Oddly, incorporation of the extensive toxicology literature is almost entirely missing from OA studies, either when it comes to adopting established exposure protocols or to framing the inferences that can/cannot be drawn from short-term experiments. Also <u>missing from most studies is anything more than a superficial statement about the possibility for <strong>acclimation</strong>, <strong>adaptation</strong>, or <strong>evolution</u></strong>, something that is <u>necessary to extend the outcome of a short-term challenge experiment</u> <u>into</u> an inference about the effect of <u>a long-term driver</u> (see below). Spatio-temporal variability in CO2 and pH Biogeochemists are well aware of the spatio-temporal variability in CO2 and pH—daily (high productivity areas), seasonal (blooms), interannual (higher temperatures), horizontal (coastal upwelling areas, high turbidity zones), and vertical (deep vs. surface waters) ranges in these can be extensive (e.g. Wootton et al., 2008; Hofmann et al., 2011; Waldbusser and Salisbury, 2014; Kapsenberg et al., 2015). Biologists have struggled to incorporate this variability into experiments designed to test the effects of OA, and into their interpretations of the outcomes (Eriander et al., 2016). Some researchers have pointed out that organisms that are exposed to large ranges in CO2 and pH during their daily lives (e.g. vertical migrators), life cycles (e.g. organisms that reside offshore as larvae but move to the coast as juveniles or adults), or somewhere in their distributional ranges, should be more tolerant of OA (e.g. Lewis et al., 2013). Imbalanced focus on individuals that are affected and insufficient focus on inter-individual variability and within-experiment selection bias interpretations of ecological impacts Almost all <u>CO2 challenge experiments produce a <strong>range of responses</strong> in the test organism</u>—some individuals are badly affected, others less, and some not at all. There are several issues associated with all such experiments that it is important to be cognizant of and account for: (i) analyses and interpretations should not ignore or minimize individuals that are little affected or unaffected (after all, these are the ones whose genes will be passed on to the next generation); (ii) inter-individual variability should be highlighted; (iii) the longer that the experiment runs the more likely it is that an internal selection process for the tolerant individuals has occurred. All of these are important in the context of the next section. Acclimation, generational carry-over effects, adaptation, epigenetics, and evolution <u>Almost all <mark>experiments</mark> conducted <mark>to assess OA are <strong>short-term toxicity challenges</u></strong></mark>. Therefore, <u>using them as the basis from which to make inferences about <mark>a process</mark> that <mark>will occur <strong>slowly over</mark> the next <mark>decades</u></strong></mark>–centuries <u>must be made with appropriate caution</u>. That is, the experiments and the interpretations made from them must consider how <u><mark>populations</mark> <mark>might acclimatize</mark>, adapt, <mark>and evolve</mark> <mark>to climate change</u></mark>, in cluding OA (e.g. Donelson et al., 2011; Hoffmann and Sgrò, 2011; Sunday et al., 2013; Harvey et al., 2014). Recent studies indicate that even the effects of OA that are considered most worrisome—various behavioural impairments resulting from short-term exposure to high CO2 (see Nagelkerken and Munday, 2016)—might be reduced or overcome through adaptation and evolution (Regan et al., 2016). More knowledge of the mechanisms of direct action of OA-related drivers—higher concentrations of CO2, hydrogen ions (=lower pH), and/or carbonate chemistry (less carbonate ions)—and of indirect drivers such as the effects of OA on food quality, are essential to understand what degree of adaption is possible. Readers should <u><mark>be <strong>duly sceptical</u></strong> <u>of studies that</mark> completely <mark>ignore</mark> the possibility of <mark>adaptation</mark> when presenting their inferences about OA</u>, particularly scenario modelling of socio-economic impacts. We must also do better to incorporate analogous work in other fields, for example, rapid evolution of tolerance to envirotoxins (e.g. Whitehead et al., 2012) and environmental change (e.g. Collins et al., 2014; Stoks et al., 2015; Thibodeau et al., 2015) via a combination of genetic and epigenetic mechanisms (Yona et al., 2015). Publication bias <u><mark>Negative results</u></mark>—those that do not support a research hypothesis (e.g. OA will have detrimental effects on marine organisms)—<u>can <mark>provide more balance</mark> for a subject area for which most published research reports positive results</u>. Negative results can indicate that a subject area is not mature or clearly enough defined, or that <u>our current <mark>methods and approaches are <strong>insufficient to produce</mark> <mark>a definitive result</u></strong></mark>. Gould (1993) asserted that <u><mark>positive results tell more interesting stories</u></mark> than negative results <u>and are</u>, therefore, <u>easier to write about and more interesting to read</u>. He calls this a privileging of the positive. <u><strong><mark>This</mark> privileging <mark>leads to a bias</strong> </mark>that acts <mark>against</mark> the propagation of <mark>negative results in</mark> the scholarly <mark>literature</u></mark> (see also Browman, 1999). Further, it is also important to recognize that studies showing no effect of OA are less equivocal than those that do, for all of the reasons noted above. Following from this, it is essential that authors writing about possible effects of OA present and discuss research that is inconsistent with their results and/or their interpretations—openly, honestly, and rigorously. Readers should be duly sceptical of articles that do not do this.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Kumar 17 Vinod Kumar (Associate Fellow Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India), 2017, The Expectant Global Nuclear Energy Renaissance: Movers, Shakers and Spoilers. Resurgence of Nuclear Power, 39–70. doi:10.1007/978-981-10-5029-9_3 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-10-5029-9_3 WJ fulltext: What are the trends that indicate the prospects of a renaissance happening, especially since earlier signs, like in the USA, did not end in fruitful outcomes? A handful of global indicators could be highlighted to support the assumption that a renaissance might be in the offing in the global nuclear industry, though with inherent challenges. First, the hopes of revival in many established nuclear bases such as USA and Russia even as some European nations such as UK, France and the Scandinavians have reposed faith in nuclear power, which also indicates a revisiting of phase-out policies in the industrial world. Second, the massive confidence that the developing world has placed on nuclear energy as evident from the numerous expansion plans of those nations with the existing nuclear energy infrastructure, as also the decision of many small and emerging economies to make their plunge into nuclear energy. Third is a host of systematic factors that has the potential to drive the renaissance, including the galloping pace of reactor technology development, best practices emerging in civil nuclear liability laws, increasing access of insurance and risk management tools, and above all the imperative of nations to promote clean fuel to meet climate change mitigation targets. 3.3.1 Industrial World Still Relies on Nuclear Energy While the US revival efforts have been ongoing since the beginning of the mil- lennium despite numerous constraints, Russia is on a faster pace in expanding its nuclear energy infrastructure with notable advances made in launching its Generation-III fast neutron reactors as well as in ensuring its technological footprint in emerging markets through exports of its VVER light water reactors (NewEurope 2016). Besides its existing tally of 36 operating reactors with a total capacity of 27,000 MW, Russia plans to add one large reactor per year till 2028, with around 22 planned units running up to around 21,000 MW capacity, alongside an equal number earmarked for exports (WNA 2016f). As for Europe, where feasibility of nuclear power continues to remain in popular debate, countries that have preferred to retain nuclear power are announcing new projects or seeking to replace ageing ones with new units. The UK, with plans to retire half of 15 operational reactors by middle of next decade, has opted for a foreign-funded consortium model to kick off its Hinkley Point nuclear project, with Chinese and French state-run energy firms as collaborators (BBC 2016; Riley and Mullen 2016). This is beside an intended plan to allow the China General Nuclear Corporation to build a nuclear plant at Bradwell, as agreed during the Chinese President’s visit in October 2015. France, which is heavily nuclear energy-dependent, is seemingly weighing on Areva’s Generation-III European Pressurised Reactors (EPR) not just to display its continuing reliance on nuclear energy but also to establish its international standing as a nuclear supplier and technology incubator. Despite reported timeline delays and cost outruns (Guardian 2016), the EPRs at Flamanville plant in France, Olkiluoto-3 in Finland as well as the proposed project at UK’s Hinkley symbolise a renewed thrust across Europe for nuclear power, as also the role played by other new-generation reactors in this renewal. On the other hand, the actual relevance of the nuclear industry in Europe is in the comparatively nascent economies in Scandinavia, especially Finland and Sweden, which have preferred to retain nuclear as a power source and probably delay or avoid a total transition to renewable means. Along with unit 5, which is currently under con- struction, Finland is planning further expansion for units 6 and 7 in Olkiluoto (WNA 2016d). Another project, run by Fennovoima, is under construction to set up a VVER-1200 reactor and has a unique model of co-ownership by Rusatom Overseas (Milne 2016b). Sweden, on the other hand, produces 40% of its electricity from nine existing reactors and plans to replace the ageing ones with an ambitious plan of 10 new reactors (Milne 2016a). However, Sweden’s contribution to the nuclear revival is more significant. The nation not just revised its earlier plan, finalised in 1980s, to close nuclear and forego life extension of reactors, but removed a tax from 2017 that discriminates against nuclear power while subsides wind and biomass to progress towards the goal to total renewable energy by 2040. A certain fillip to nuclear energy, this reversal also means that stringent anti-nuclear sentiments that prevailed in Scandinavia following the Fukushima incident, and phase-out models like Germany’s Energiewende, has given way to more realistic approaches towards nuclear energy. In Europe, these revival signs could be signs of an impending renaissance as it ignites fresh life into the industry. 3.3.2 Developing World as the Catalyst At the other end of the spectrum, an expectant renaissance in nuclear energy is all about ‘a great leap forward’ for many countries in the developing world for whom access to sustainable means of energy is closely linked to the economic progress and upliftment of their societies. Nuclear energy has traditionally been an elitist preserve with the developed and the industrial world always controlling the technology and restricting access through non-proliferation structures including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and supplier cartels like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Even those countries in underdeveloped regions with major uranium deposits, like in some African countries, could not harness the economic potential of their natural resources owing to the domination and control of advanced nations over the affairs of the atom, and its normative structures. Consequently, very few countries in the third world have been successful in establishing a nuclear industry that could be on par with their peers in the developed world. Even those who managed to set up a comparatively active base—such as India, China or Brazil—had perennial struggles with the development of reactor and reprocessing technologies, access to fissile materials or in dealing with denial regimes over attempts to develop indigenous capabilities or gaining strategic autonomy that mismatched with the global norms perpetuated by the Western-oriented liberal security community. The renaissance, therefore, for the developing world is about the establishment of robust nuclear industries, uninterrupted access to nuclear fuel cycles and fissile materials, and meeting major developmental, economic and climate change targets by placing nuclear at the centre of their energy security missions. In practice, this could also mean that the epicentre of the global nuclear industry could be shifting to the developing world, especially the bases in Asia, who could shape the future norms, best practices and structures for this domain. According to estimates of the World Nuclear Association, around 45 countries are at various stages or plans for nuclear energy programmes, with 32 of them being in Asian region (WNA 2016e). This includes Albania, Italy, Serbia, Croatia, Portugal, Poland, Belarus, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Turkey and Ireland (in Europe); Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Namibia (in Africa); and Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay (in Americas). The gravity of the Asian shift is marked by the fact that nuclear projects in some subregions in Asia such as the Middle East and East Asia will be almost the same number or more than those planned in the above two regions. For example, 14 states in the Middle East (UAE and Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Yemen, Israel, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, and Sudan) have plans for setting up nuclear plants.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>Nuclear zero stops it -- strong anti-proliferation norms block access to nuclear material and reactor development</h4><p>Kumar 17</p><p><u></strong>Vinod Kumar (Associate Fellow Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India), 2017, The Expectant Global Nuclear Energy Renaissance: Movers, Shakers and Spoilers. Resurgence of Nuclear Power, 39–70. doi:10.1007/978-981-10-5029-9_3 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-10-5029-9_3 WJ</p><p><mark>What</mark> are the <mark>trends</mark> that <mark>indicate</mark> the prospects of <mark>a renaissance</mark> happening</u>, especially since earlier signs, like in the USA, did not end in fruitful outcomes? A handful of <u>global indicators could be highlighted to support the assumption that a renaissance might be in the offing in the global nuclear industry</u>, though <u>with inherent challenges</u>. First, the hopes of <u><mark>revival in many</mark> established nuclear <mark>bases</mark> such as USA and Russia</u> even as some European nations such as UK, France and the Scandinavians <u><mark>have reposed faith</mark> in nuclear power</u>, which also indicates a revisiting of phase-out policies in the industrial world. Second, the <u>massive confidence that the developing world has placed on nuclear energy as evident from the numerous expansion plans of those nations with the existing nuclear energy infrastructure</u>, as also the decision of many small and emerging economies to make their plunge into nuclear energy. Third is <u><mark>a host of systematic factors</mark> that <mark>has the potential to drive the renaissance</u></mark>, <u>including the galloping pace of reactor technology development</u>, best practices emerging in civil nuclear liability laws, increasing access of insurance and risk management tools, and <u>above all the imperative of nations to promote clean fuel to meet climate change mitigation targets.</p><p></u>3.3.1 Industrial World Still Relies on Nuclear Energy</p><p>While the US revival efforts have been ongoing since the beginning of the mil- lennium despite numerous constraints, <u>Russia is on a faster pace in expanding its nuclear energy infrastructure</u> with notable advances made in launching its Generation-III fast neutron reactors as well as in ensuring its technological footprint in emerging markets through exports of its VVER light water reactors (NewEurope 2016). Besides its existing tally of 36 operating reactors with a total capacity of 27,000 MW, Russia plans to add one large reactor per year till 2028, with around 22 planned units running up to around 21,000 MW capacity, alongside an equal number earmarked for exports (WNA 2016f).</p><p>As <u>for Europe, where feasibility of nuclear power continues to remain in popular debate, countries that have preferred to retain nuclear power are announcing new projects</u> or seeking to replace ageing ones with new units. The UK, with plans to retire half of 15 operational reactors by middle of next decade, has opted for a foreign-funded consortium model to kick off its Hinkley Point nuclear project, with Chinese and French state-run energy firms as collaborators (BBC 2016; Riley and Mullen 2016). This is beside an intended plan to allow the China General Nuclear Corporation to build a nuclear plant at Bradwell, as agreed during the Chinese President’s visit in October 2015. <u>France</u>, which is heavily nuclear energy-dependent, <u>is seemingly weighing on Areva’s Generation-III European Pressurised Reactors</u> (EPR) not just to display its continuing reliance on nuclear energy but also <u>to establish its international standing as a nuclear supplier and technology incubator</u>.</p><p>Despite reported timeline delays and cost outruns (Guardian 2016), the EPRs at Flamanville plant in France, Olkiluoto-3 in Finland as well as the proposed project at UK’s Hinkley symbolise a renewed thrust across Europe for nuclear power, as also the role played by other new-generation reactors in this renewal. On the other hand, the actual relevance of the nuclear industry in Europe is in the comparatively nascent economies in Scandinavia, especially Finland and Sweden, which have preferred to retain nuclear as a power source and probably delay or avoid a total transition to renewable means. Along with unit 5, which is currently under con- struction, Finland is planning further expansion for units 6 and 7 in Olkiluoto (WNA 2016d). Another project, run by Fennovoima, is under construction to set up a VVER-1200 reactor and has a unique model of co-ownership by Rusatom Overseas (Milne 2016b).</p><p>Sweden, on the other hand, produces 40% of its electricity from nine existing reactors and plans to replace the ageing ones with an ambitious plan of 10 new reactors (Milne 2016a). However, Sweden’s contribution to the nuclear revival is more significant. The nation not just revised its earlier plan, finalised in 1980s, to close nuclear and forego life extension of reactors, but removed a tax from 2017 that discriminates against nuclear power while subsides wind and biomass to progress towards the goal to total renewable energy by 2040. A certain fillip to nuclear energy, this reversal also means that stringent anti-nuclear sentiments that prevailed in Scandinavia following the Fukushima incident, and phase-out models like Germany’s Energiewende, has given way to more realistic approaches towards nuclear energy. In Europe, these revival signs could be signs of an impending renaissance as it ignites fresh life into the industry.</p><p>3.3.2 Developing World as the Catalyst</p><p>At the other end of the spectrum, <u>an expectant renaissance in nuclear energy is all about ‘a <strong>great leap forward</u></strong>’ <strong>for</strong> many <strong>countries in the developing world for whom access to sustainable means of energy is closely linked to the economic progress and upliftment of their societies.</strong> <strong><mark>Nuclear energy has traditionally been</strong></mark> an <strong><mark>elitist</strong></mark> preserve <strong><mark>with the developed and the industrial world</mark> always <mark>controlling the tech</mark>nology <mark>and restricting</strong></mark> <u><mark>access through non</u><strong>-proliferation</mark> structures</strong> including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) <strong><mark>and supplier cartels</strong></mark> like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Even those countries in <strong><mark>underdeveloped regions</strong></mark> <u>with <strong>major uranium deposits</strong>, like in some African countries,</u> <strong><mark>could not harness</mark> the <mark>economic potential</mark> of their natural resources <mark>owing to the domination</mark> and control <mark>of advanced nations over the</mark> affairs <u></strong>of the <mark>atom, and its <strong>normative structures</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Consequently, very few countries in the third world have been successful in establishing a nuclear industry that could be on par with their peers in the developed world. <u>Even <mark>those who managed</mark> to set up a comparatively active base</u>—such as India, China or Brazil—<u><mark>had perennial struggles with the development of</mark> reactor and reprocessing <mark>technologies</u>, <u><strong>access to fissile materials</strong> or</mark> in <mark>dealing with <strong>denial regimes</strong></mark> <mark>over attempts to develop indigenous capabilities</mark> or gaining strategic autonomy <mark>that mismatched with the global norms</mark> perpetuated <mark>by the Western-oriented liberal security community</u></mark>. <u><mark>The renaissance</u></mark>, therefore, for the developing world <u><mark>is about</mark> the establishment of robust nuclear industries, <strong><mark>uninterrupted access to nuclear fuel</mark> <mark>cycles and fissile materials</strong></mark>, and meeting major developmental, economic and climate change targets</u> by placing nuclear at the centre of their energy security missions. In practice, this could also mean that <u><mark>the epicentre</mark> of the global nuclear industry <mark>could be shifting to the developing world</mark>, especially the bases in Asia, who could shape the future norms</u>, best practices and structures for this domain. According to estimates of the World Nuclear Association, around 45 countries are at various stages or plans for nuclear energy programmes, with 32 of them being in Asian region (WNA 2016e). This includes Albania, Italy, Serbia, Croatia, Portugal, Poland, Belarus, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Turkey and Ireland (in Europe); Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Namibia (in Africa); and Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay (in Americas). The gravity of the Asian shift is marked by the fact that nuclear projects in some subregions in Asia such as the Middle East and East Asia will be almost the same number or more than those planned in the above two regions. For example, 14 states in the Middle East (UAE and Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Yemen, Israel, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, and Sudan) have plans for setting up nuclear plants.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Grove ‘19 fulltext: [Jarius, PoliSci at the University of Hawai’i. 2019. “Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics in the Anthropocene.”] pat – ask me for the PDF! Failed ir affirms the power of this kind of negative thinking as an alternative to the endless rehearsing of moralizing insights and strategic foresight. The negative is not “against” or reacting to something. Rather, it is the affirmation of a freedom beyond the limits of life and death. That is, it is making a life by continuing to think about the world, even if that thinking is not recuperative, and even if nothing we think can save us. In the face of it all, one celebrates useless thinking, useless scholarship, and useless forms of life at the very moment we are told to throw them all under the bus in the name of survival at all costs. This is a logic referred to lately as hope and it is as cruel as it is anxiety inducing. Hope is a form of extortion. We are told that it is our obligation to bear the weight of making things better while being chided that the failure of our efforts is the result of not believing in the possibility of real change. In such an environment, pessimism is often treated as a form of treason, as if only neoliberals and moral degenerates give up—or so goes the op-ed’s insisting upon the renewed possibility of redemption. In response to these exhortations, pessimism offers a historical atheism, both methodologically and morally. The universe does not bend toward justice. Sometimes the universe bends toward the indifference of gravity wells and black holes. Affirming negativity, inspired by Achille Mbembe, is grounds for freedom, even if that freedom or relief is only fleeting and always insecure. I am not arrogant enough to think a book can attain freedom of this sort, but this book is inspired by refusals of critique as redemption in favor of useless critique and critique for its own sake. That the pursuit of knowledge without immediate application is so thoroughly useless, even profane, is a diagnosis of our current moment. The neoliberal assault on the university is evidence of this condition, as is the current pitch of American politics. Our indifference as intellectuals to maximizing value has not gone unnoticed. We are still dangerous, worthy of vilification, of attack, sabotage, and derision because we fail so decadently. We are parasites according to Scott Walker, Donald Trump, and the rest. So be it. We are and shall remain irascible irritants to a worldwide assault on thinking that is well underway and facing few obstacles in other jurisdictions. What would failed scholarship do? Learn to die, learn to live, learn to listen, learn to be together, and learn to be generous. These virtues are useless in that they do not prevent or manage things. They do not translate into learning objectives or metrics. Virtues of this order are selfsame, nontransferable experiences. They are meaningful but not useful. These are luxurious virtues. Like grieving or joy, they are ends unto themselves. But how will these ideas seek extramural grants, contribute to an outcomes-based education system, or become a policy recommendation? They will not, and that is part of their virtue. Even if there is no straight line to where we are and where we ought to be, I think we should get over the idea that somehow the U.S. project of liberal empire is conflicted, or “more right than it is wrong,” or pragmatically preferable to the alternatives. I hope this book can contribute to the urgent necessity to get out of the way by reveling in the catastrophic failure that should inspire humility but instead seems to embolden too many to seek global control yet again. Demolition may be an affirmative act if it means insurgents and others can be better heard. And yet this may fail too. If we can accomplish nothing at all, we can at least, as Ta-Nehisi Coates and other pessimists have said, refuse to suborn the lie of America any longer. Telling the truth, even if it cannot change the outcome of history, is a certain kind of solace. In Coates’s words, there is a kind of rapture “when you can no longer be lied to, when you have rejected the dream.” Saying the truth out loud brings with it the relief that we are not crazy. Things really are as bad as we think. If there are those of us who want to break from this one-hundred-year-old race to be the next Henry Kissinger, then why do we continue to seek respect in the form of recognizable standards of excellence? I am not sure where the answer finally lies, but I do know that professionalization will not save us. To appear as normal and recognizably rigorous will not be enough to stave off the neoliberal drive to monetize scholarship, or to demand of us strategically useful insights. The least we can do in the face of such a battle is to find comfort in meaningful ideas and the friendships they build rather than try to perform for those we know are the problem. Some will ask, who is this “we” or is that “they”—where is your evidence? More will know exactly what I am talking about. The virtues I seek are oriented toward an academy of refuge, a place we can still live, no matter how dire the conditions of the university and the classroom. It is not the think tank, boardroom, or command center. We are, those of us who wish to be included, the last of the philosophers, the last of the lovers of knowledge, the deviants who should revel in what Harney and Moten have called the undercommons. In one of his final lectures, Bataille speaks of the remnants of a different human species, something not quite so doomed, something that wasted its newly discovered consciousness and tool-being on the art that still marks the walls of prehistoric caves. This lingering minor or vestigial heritage is philosophy’s beginning. Philosophy survives war, atrocity, famine, and crusades. Thinking matters in a very unusual way. Thinking is not power or emancipation. Thinking matters for a sense of belonging to the world, and for believing in the fecundity of the world despite evidence to the contrary. How do you get all this from pessimism, from failure? Because willing failure is a temptation, a lure to think otherwise, to think dangerous thoughts. Pessimism is a threat to indifferentism and nihilism in the sense of the phenomenon of Donald Trump. Pessimism is a provocation and an enemy of skepticism, particularly of the metaphysical variety. It is not redemption from these afflictions, but in pessimism there is solace in the real. To put it another way, to study the world as it is means to care for it. The exhortation that our care or interest should be contingent on how useful the world is and how much of it conforms to our designs is as much opposed to care as it is to empiricism. We can study airports, poetry, endurance races, borders, bombs, plastic, and warfare, and find them all in the world. To consider the depth of their existence can be an invitation to the world rather than a prelude to another policy report. One cannot make a successful political career out of such pursuits, but you might be able to make a life out of it, a life worth repeating even if nothing else happens. At the end of Jack Halberstam’s The Queer Art of Failure, we are presented with the Fantastic Mr. Fox’s toast as an exemple of something meaningful in these dark times of ours. They say all foxes are slightly allergic to linoleum, but it’s cool to the paw—try it. They say my tail needs to be dry cleaned twice a month, but now it’s fully detachable—see? They say our tree may never grow back, but one day, something will. Yes, these crackles are made of synthetic goose and these giblets come from artificial squab and even these apples look fake—but at least they’ve got stars on them. I guess my point is, we’ll eat tonight, and we’ll eat together. And even in this not particularly flattering light, you are without a doubt the five and a half most wonderful wild animals I’ve ever met in my life. So let’s raise our boxes—to our survival. Halberstam says of this queer moment: Not quite a credo, something short of a toast, a little less than a speech, but Mr. Fox gives here one of the best and most moving—both emotionally and in stop-motion terms—addresses in the history of cinema. Unlike Coraline, where survival is predicated upon a rejection of the theatrical, the queer, and the improvised, and like Where the Wild Things Are, where the disappointment of deliverance must be leavened with the pragmatism of possibility, Fantastic Mr. Fox is a queerly animated classic in that it teaches us, as Finding Nemo, Chicken Run, and so many other revolting animations before it, to believe in detachable tails, fake apples, eating together, adapting to the lighting, risk, sissy sons, and the sheer importance of survival for all those wild souls that the farmers, the teachers, the preachers, and the politicians would like to bury alive. Although not as much fun as Halberstam’s monument to low theory, Savage Ecology is for all the other wild animals out there studying global politics. May we be buried alive together.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Voting negative adopts <u>failed IR</u> for a healthy dose of pessimism – at the end of the world, all we can do is hope to be buried alive <u>together</u><strong>.</h4><p>Grove ‘19</p><p></strong>[Jarius, PoliSci at the University of Hawai’i. 2019. “Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics in the Anthropocene.”] pat – ask me for the PDF!</p><p><u><strong><mark>Failed ir</strong> affirms</mark> the power of this kind of <mark>negative thinking as an alternative</mark> to the endless rehearsing of moralizing insights and strategic foresight</u>. The negative is not “against” or reacting to something. Rather, it is the affirmation of a freedom beyond the limits of life and death. That is, it is making a life by continuing to think about the world, even if that thinking is not recuperative, and even if nothing we think can save us. In the face of it all, one celebrates useless thinking, useless scholarship, and useless forms of life at the very moment we are told to throw them all under the bus in the name of survival at all costs. This is a logic referred to lately as hope and it is as cruel as it is anxiety inducing. <u><mark>Hope is</mark> a form of <mark>extortion</u></mark>. We are told that it is our obligation to bear the weight of making things better while being chided that the failure of our efforts is the result of not believing in the possibility of real change. In such an environment, pessimism is often treated as a form of treason, as if only neoliberals and moral degenerates give up—or so goes the op-ed’s insisting upon the renewed possibility of redemption.</p><p>In response to these exhortations, pessimism offers a historical atheism, both methodologically and morally. The universe does not bend toward justice. Sometimes the universe bends toward the indifference of gravity wells and black holes. <u>Affirming <mark>negativity</u></mark>, inspired by Achille Mbembe, <u><mark>is</mark> grounds for <mark>freedom</u></mark>, even if that freedom or relief is only fleeting and always insecure. I am not arrogant enough to think a book can attain freedom of this sort, but this book is inspired by refusals of critique as redemption in favor of useless critique and critique for its own sake.</p><p><u><mark>That</mark> the pursuit of <mark>knowledge</mark> without immediate application <mark>is</mark> so thoroughly <mark>useless</u></mark>, even profane, <u><mark>is a diagnosis</mark> of our current moment</u>. The neoliberal assault on the university is evidence of this condition, as is the current pitch of American politics. Our indifference as intellectuals to maximizing value has not gone unnoticed. We are still dangerous, worthy of vilification, of attack, sabotage, and derision because we fail so decadently. We are parasites according to Scott Walker, Donald Trump, and the rest. So be it. We are and shall remain irascible irritants to a worldwide assault on thinking that is well underway and facing few obstacles in other jurisdictions.</p><p>What would failed scholarship do? <u><strong><mark>Learn to die</mark>, learn to <mark>live</mark>, learn to <mark>listen</mark>, learn to <mark>be together, and</mark> learn to <mark>be generous</u></strong></mark>. These virtues are useless in that they do not prevent or manage things. They do not translate into learning objectives or metrics. Virtues of this order are selfsame, nontransferable experiences. They are meaningful but not useful. These are luxurious virtues. Like grieving or joy, they are ends unto themselves. <u>But <mark>how will these ideas</mark> seek extramural grants</u>, contribute to an outcomes-based education system, <u>or <mark>become a policy recommendation? <strong>They will not</u></strong></mark>, and that is part of their virtue.</p><p>Even if there is no straight line to where we are and where we ought to be, <u>I think we should <mark>get over the idea</mark> that somehow the U.S. project of <mark>liberal empire is</mark> conflicted</u>, or “more right than it is wrong,” <u>or <mark>pragmatically preferable</mark> to the alternatives</u>. I hope this book can contribute to the urgent necessity to get out of the way by reveling in the catastrophic failure that should inspire humility but instead seems to embolden too many to seek global control yet again. <u><mark>Demolition may be</mark> an <mark>affirmative</mark> act <mark>if</mark> it means <mark>insurgents</mark> and others <mark>can be</mark> better <mark>heard</u></mark>. And yet this may fail too. If we can accomplish nothing at all, we can at least, as Ta-Nehisi Coates and other pessimists have said, refuse to suborn the lie of America any longer. Telling the truth, even if it cannot change the outcome of history, is a certain kind of solace. In Coates’s words, there is a kind of rapture “when you can no longer be lied to, when you have rejected the dream.” Saying the truth out loud brings with it the relief that we are not crazy. Things really are as bad as we think.</p><p>If there are those of us who want to break from this one-hundred-year-old race to be the next Henry Kissinger, then why do we continue to seek respect in the form of recognizable standards of excellence? I am not sure where the answer finally lies, but I do know that professionalization will not save us. To appear as normal and recognizably rigorous will not be enough to stave off the neoliberal drive to monetize scholarship, or to demand of us strategically useful insights. The least we can do in the face of such a battle is to find comfort in meaningful ideas and the friendships they build rather than try to perform for those we know are the problem. Some will ask, who is this “we” or is that “they”—where is your evidence? More will know exactly what I am talking about.</p><p>The virtues I seek are oriented toward an academy of refuge, a place we can still live, no matter how dire the conditions of the university and the classroom. It is not the think tank, boardroom, or command center. <u>We are</u>, those of us who wish to be included, the last of the philosophers, the last of the lovers of knowledge, <u>the <mark>deviants</mark> who should revel <mark>in</mark> what Harney and Moten have called <mark>the undercommons</u></mark>.</p><p>In one of his final lectures, Bataille speaks of the remnants of a different human species, something not quite so doomed, something that wasted its newly discovered consciousness and tool-being on the art that still marks the walls of prehistoric caves. This lingering minor or vestigial heritage is philosophy’s beginning. Philosophy survives war, atrocity, famine, and crusades. Thinking matters in a very unusual way. Thinking is not power or emancipation. Thinking matters for a sense of belonging to the world, and for believing in the fecundity of the world despite evidence to the contrary. </p><p>How do you get all this from pessimism, from failure? <u>Because willing <mark>failure is</mark> a temptation</u>, a lure to think otherwise, <u><strong><mark>to think dangerous thoughts</u></strong></mark>. Pessimism is a threat to indifferentism and nihilism in the sense of the phenomenon of Donald Trump. Pessimism is a provocation and an enemy of skepticism, particularly of the metaphysical variety. It is not redemption from these afflictions, but <u>in <mark>pessimism</mark> there <mark>is solace in the real</u></mark>. To put it another way, to study the world as it is means to care for it.</p><p>The exhortation that our care or interest should be contingent on how useful the world is and how much of it conforms to our designs is as much opposed to care as it is to empiricism. We can study airports, poetry, endurance races, borders, bombs, plastic, and warfare, and find them all in the world. To consider the depth of their existence can be an invitation to the world rather than a prelude to another policy report. <u><mark>One cannot make a</mark> successful <mark>political career</mark> out of such pursuits</u>, <u><mark>but you might</mark> be able to <mark>make</mark> a life out of it</u>, <u><mark>a life worth repeating</mark> even if nothing else happens</u>.</p><p>At the end of Jack Halberstam’s The Queer Art of Failure, we are presented with the Fantastic Mr. Fox’s toast as an exemple of something meaningful in these dark times of ours.</p><p>They say all foxes are slightly allergic to linoleum, but it’s cool to the paw—try it. They say my tail needs to be dry cleaned twice a month, but now it’s fully detachable—see? They say our tree may never grow back, but one day, something will. Yes, these crackles are made of synthetic goose and these giblets come from artificial squab and even these apples look fake—but at least they’ve got stars on them. I guess my point is, we’ll eat tonight, and we’ll eat together. And even in this not particularly flattering light, you are without a doubt the five and a half most wonderful wild animals I’ve ever met in my life. So let’s raise our boxes—to our survival.</p><p>Halberstam says of this queer moment:</p><p>Not quite a credo, something short of a toast, a little less than a speech, but Mr. Fox gives here one of the best and most moving—both emotionally and in stop-motion terms—addresses in the history of cinema. Unlike Coraline, where survival is predicated upon a rejection of the theatrical, the queer, and the improvised, and like Where the Wild Things Are, where the disappointment of deliverance must be leavened with the pragmatism of possibility, Fantastic Mr. Fox is a queerly animated classic in that it teaches us, as Finding Nemo, Chicken Run, and so many other revolting animations before it, to believe in detachable tails, fake apples, eating together, adapting to the lighting, risk, sissy sons, and the sheer importance of survival for all those wild souls that the farmers, the teachers, the preachers, and the politicians would like to bury alive.</p><p>Although not as much fun as Halberstam’s monument to low theory, Savage Ecology is for all the other wild animals out there studying global politics. <u><strong><mark>May we be buried alive together</strong></mark>.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Mooney and Dennis 18 Chris Mooney and Brady Dennis, Reporters for the Washington Post, “The world has barely 10 years to get climate change under control, U.N. scientists say.” The Washington Post. October 7, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/10/08/world-has-only-years-get-climate-change-under-control-un-scientists-say/?utm_term=.25de27d0202d fulltext: --Also an answer to CCS! The world stands on the brink of failure when it comes to holding global warming to moderate levels, and nations will need to take “unprecedented” actions to cut their carbon emissions over the next decade, according to a landmark report by the top scientific body studying climate change. With global emissions showing few signs of slowing and the United States — the world’s second-largest emitter of carbon dioxide — rolling back a suite of Obama-era climate measures, the prospects for meeting the most ambitious goals of the 2015 Paris agreement look increasingly slim. To avoid racing past warming of 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit) over preindustrial levels would require a “rapid and far-reaching” transformation of human civilization at a magnitude that has never happened before, the group found. “There is no documented historic precedent” for the sweeping change to energy, transportation and other systems required to reach 1.5 degrees Celsius, the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) wrote in a report requested as part of the 2015 Paris climate agreement. At the same time, however, the report is being received with hope in some quarters because it affirms that 1.5 degrees Celsius is still possible — if emissions stopped today, for instance, the planet would not reach that temperature. It is also likely to galvanize even stronger climate action by focusing on 1.5 degrees Celsius, rather than 2 degrees, as a target that the world cannot afford to miss. “Frankly, we’ve delivered a message to the governments,” said Jim Skea, a co-chair of the IPCC panel and professor at Imperial College London, at a press event following the document’s release. “It’s now their responsibility … to decide whether they can act on it.” He added, “What we’ve done is said what the world needs to do.” The transformation described in the document is breathtaking, and the speed of change required raises inevitable questions about its feasibility. Most strikingly, the document says the world’s annual carbon dioxide emissions, which amount to more than 40 billion tons per year, would have to be on an extremely steep downward path by 2030 to either hold the world entirely below 1.5 degrees Celsius, or allow only a brief “overshoot” in temperatures. Overall reductions in emissions in the next decade would probably need to be more than 1 billion tons per year, larger than the current emissions of all but a few of the very largest emitting countries. By 2050, the report calls for a total or near-total phaseout of the burning of coal. 'Understanding the Arctic is really a key to understanding the whole global system' Mark Furze, a geoscientist and professor at MacEwan University, discusses the importance of understanding how climate change is impacting the Arctic. (Alice Li/TWP) “It’s like a deafening, piercing smoke alarm going off in the kitchen. We have to put out the fire,” said Erik Solheim, executive director of the U.N. Environment Program. He added that the need to either stop emissions entirely by 2050 or find some way to remove as much carbon dioxide from the air as humans put there “means net zero must be the new global mantra.” The radical transformation also would mean that, in a world projected to have more than 2 billion additional people by 2050, large swaths of land currently used to produce food would instead have to be converted to growing trees that store carbon and crops designated for energy use. The latter would be used as part of a currently nonexistent program to get power from trees or plants and then bury the resulting carbon dioxide emissions in the ground, leading to a net subtraction of the gas from the air — bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, or BECCS. “Such large transitions pose profound challenges for sustainable management of the various demands on land for human settlements, food, livestock feed, fibre, bioenergy, carbon storage, biodiversity and other ecosystem services,” the report states. The document in question was produced relatively rapidly for the cautious and deliberative IPCC, representing the work of nearly 100 scientists. It went through an elaborate peer-review process involving tens of thousands of comments. The final 34-page “summary for policymakers” was agreed to in a marathon session by scientists and government officials in Incheon, South Korea, over the past week. (none) The report says the world will need to develop large-scale “negative emissions” programs to remove significant volumes of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Although the basic technologies exist, they have not caught on widely, and scientists have strongly questioned whether such a program can be scaled up in the brief period available. The bottom line, Sunday’s report found, is that the world is woefully off target. Current promises made by countries as part of the Paris climate agreement would lead to about 3 degrees Celsius (5.4 degrees Fahrenheit) of warming by the end of the century, and the Trump administration recently released an analysis assuming about 4 degrees Celsius (7.2 degrees Fahrenheit) by 2100 if the world takes no action. The IPCC is considered the definitive source on the state of climate science, but it also tends to be conservative in its conclusions. That’s because it is driven by a consensus-finding process, and its results are the product of not only science, but negotiation with governments over its precise language. In Sunday’s report, the body detailed the magnitude and unprecedented nature of the changes that would be required to hold warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, but it held back from taking a specific stand on the feasibility of meeting such an ambitious goal. (An early draft had cited a “very high risk” of warming exceeding 1.5 degrees Celsius; that language is now gone, even if the basic message is still easily inferred.) “If you’re expecting IPCC to jump up and down and wave red flags, you’re going to be disappointed,” said Phil Duffy, president of the Woods Hole Research Center. “They’re going to do what they always do, which is to release very cautious reports in extremely dispassionate language.” Some researchers, including Duffy, are skeptical of the scenarios that the IPCC presents that hold warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, particularly the reliance on negative-emissions technologies to keep the window open. “Even if it is technically possible, without aligning the technical, political and social aspects of feasibility, it is not going to happen,” added Glen Peters, research director of the Center for International Climate Research in Oslo. “To limit warming below 1.5 C, or 2 C for that matter, requires all countries and all sectors to act.” Underscoring the difficulty of interpreting what’s possible, the IPCC gave two separate numbers in the report for Earth’s remaining “carbon budget,” or how much carbon dioxide humans can emit and still have a reasonable chance of remaining below 1.5 degrees Celsius. The upshot is that humans are allowed either 10 or 14 years of current emissions, and no more, for a two-thirds or better chance of avoiding 1.5 degrees Celsius. The already limited budget would shrink further if other greenhouse gases, such as methane, aren’t controlled or if and when Arctic permafrost becomes a major source of new emissions. But either way — in a move that may be contested — researchers have somewhat increased the carbon budget in comparison with where the IPCC set it in 2013, giving another reason for hope. The new approach buys some time and “resets the clock for 1.5 degrees Celsius to ‘five minutes to midnight,’ ” said Oliver Geden, head of the research division of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. The report is sure to be the central focus of attention this December in Poland when the next meeting of the parties to the Paris climate agreement is held, and countries begin to contemplate how they can up their ambition levels, as the agreement requires them to do over time. Meanwhile, the report clearly documents that a warming of 1.5 degrees Celsius would be very damaging and that 2 degrees — which used to be considered a reasonable goal — could approach intolerable in parts of the world. “1.5 degrees is the new 2 degrees,” said Jennifer Morgan, executive director of Greenpeace International, who was in Incheon for the finalization of the report. Specifically, the document finds that instabilities in Antarctica and Greenland, which could usher in sea-level rise measured in feet rather than inches, “could be triggered around 1.5°C to 2°C of global warming.” Moreover, the total loss of tropical coral reefs is at stake because 70 to 90 percent are expected to vanish at 1.5 degrees Celsius, the report finds. At 2 degrees, that number grows to more than 99 percent. The report found that holding warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius could save an Alaska-size area of the Arctic from permafrost thaw, muting a feedback loop that could lead to still more global emissions. The occurrence of entirely ice-free summers in the Arctic Ocean goes from one per century to one per decade between 1.5 and 2 degrees, it found — one of many ways in which the mere half a degree has large real-world consequences. Risks of extreme heat and weather events just rise and rise as temperatures do, meaning these would be worse worldwide the more it warms. To avoid that, in barely more than 10 years, the world’s percentage of electricity from renewables such as solar and wind power would have to jump from the current 24 percent to something more like 50 or 60 percent. Coal and gas plants that remain in operation would need to be equipped with technologies, collectively called carbon capture and storage (CCS), that prevent them from emitting carbon dioxide into the air and instead funnel it to be buried underground. By 2050, most coal plants would shut down. Cars and other forms of transportation, meanwhile, would need to be shifting strongly toward being electrified, powered by these same renewable energy sources. At present, transportation is far behind the power sector in the shift to low-carbon fuel sources. Right now, according to the International Energy Agency, only 4 percent of road transportation is powered by renewable fuels, and the agency has projected only a 1 percent increase by 2022.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Warming is <u>inevitable</u> absent a shift to <u>zero emissions</u><strong> --- we’re busting through the carbon budget and renewables and CCS don’t arrive in time</h4><p>Mooney and Dennis 18</p><p></strong>Chris Mooney and Brady Dennis, Reporters for the Washington Post, “The world has barely 10 years to get climate change under control, U.N. scientists say.” The Washington Post. October 7, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/10/08/world-has-only-years-get-climate-change-under-control-un-scientists-say/?utm_term=.25de27d0202d</p><p>--Also<u> an answer to CCS!</p><p><mark>The world stands on <strong>the brink of failure</strong> </mark>when it comes <mark>to holding</mark> global <mark>warming to moderate levels, and nations will need</mark> to take “<mark>unprecedented” actions to cut</mark> their carbon <mark>emissions</mark> over the next decade, according to a landmark report by the top scientific body studying climate change.</p><p><mark>With</mark> global emissions showing few signs of slowing and <mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates — <u><mark>the world’s <strong>second-largest emitter</strong></mark> of carbon dioxide — <mark>rolling back</mark> a suite of Obama<mark>-era climate measures, the prospects for meetin</mark>g </u>the most ambitious goals of the 2015 <u><mark>Paris</u></mark> agreement <u><strong><mark>look increasingly slim.</u></strong> <u>To avoid</u></mark> racing past warming of <u><mark>1.5 degrees</u></mark> Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit) <u>over preindustrial levels <mark>would</mark> <mark>require</mark> a “rapid and far-reaching” <mark>transformation</mark> of human civilization <strong><mark>at a magnitude that has never happened before</strong></mark>, the group found.</p><p></u>“<u><mark>There is no documented historic precedent” for the sweeping change</mark> to energy, transportation and other systems required to reach 1.5 degrees Celsius, the</u> U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (<u>IPCC) wrote in a report requested as part of the 2015 Paris climate agreement.</p><p></u>At the same time, however, the report is being received with hope in some quarters because it affirms that 1.5 degrees Celsius is still possible — <u><mark>if emissions <strong>stopped today</strong></mark>, for instance, <mark>the planet would not reach that temperature</u></mark>. It is also likely to galvanize even stronger climate action by focusing on 1.5 degrees Celsius, rather than 2 degrees, as a target that the world cannot afford to miss.</p><p>“Frankly, we’ve delivered a message to the governments,” said Jim Skea<u>, a co-chair of the IPCC panel and professor at Imperial College London, at a press event following the document’s release. “It’s now their responsibility … to decide whether they can act on it.” He added, “What we’ve done is said what the world needs to do.”</p><p>The transformation described in the document is breathtaking, and <mark>the <strong>speed of change required</strong> raises i</mark>nevitable <mark>questions about</mark> its <mark>feasibility</mark>.</p><p></u>Most strikingly, <u>the document says the world’s annual carbon dioxide emissions, which amount to more than 40 billion tons per year, would have to be on an extremely steep downward path by 2030 to either hold the world entirely below 1.5 degrees Celsius, or allow only a brief “overshoot” in temperatures.</p><p>Overall reductions in emissions in the next decade would probably need to be more than 1 billion tons per year, larger than the current emissions of all but a few of the very largest emitting countries</u>. By 2050, <u>the report calls <strong>for <mark>a total</mark> or near-total <mark>phaseout</strong> of</mark> the burning of <mark>coal</mark>.</p><p></u>'Understanding the Arctic is really a key to understanding the whole global system'</p><p>Mark Furze, a geoscientist and professor at MacEwan University, discusses the importance of understanding how climate change is impacting the Arctic. (Alice Li/TWP)</p><p>“<u>It’s like a deafening, piercing smoke alarm going off in the kitchen. <mark>We have to put out the fire</u>,”</mark> said Erik Solheim, executive director of the U.N. Environment Program. He added that <u>the need <mark>to</mark> either <mark>stop emissions entirely by 2050</u></mark> or find some way to remove as much carbon dioxide from the air as humans put there “<u><strong><mark>means net zero must be the new global mantra</u></strong></mark>.”</p><p>The radical transformation also would mean that, in a world projected to have more than 2 billion additional people by 2050, large swaths of land currently used to produce food would instead have to be converted to growing trees that store carbon and crops designated for energy use. The latter would be used as part of <u><strong><mark>a currently nonexistent program</strong> to get power</u></mark> from trees or plants and then bury the resulting carbon dioxide emissions in the ground, <u><mark>leading to</mark> a net <mark>subtraction of </mark>the <mark>gas</mark> from the air</u> — bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, or BECCS.</p><p>“Such large transitions pose profound challenges for sustainable management of the various demands on land for human settlements, food, livestock feed, fibre<u>, bioenergy, carbon storage, biodiversity and other ecosystem services,” the report states.</p><p></u>The document in question was produced relatively rapidly for the cautious and deliberative IPCC, <u>representing <mark>the work</mark> of nearly 100 scientists</u>. It <u><mark>went through an elaborate peer-review process involving tens of thousands of comments</mark>. The final 34-page “summary for policymakers” was agreed to in a marathon session by scientists and government officials in Incheon, South Korea, over the past week.</p><p></u>(none)</p><p>The report says the world will need to develop large-scale “<u><mark>negative emissions</u></mark>” programs to remove significant volumes of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Although the basic <u>technologies</u> exist, they <u><strong><mark>have not caught on widely</strong></mark>, and <mark>scientists</mark> have strongly <mark>questioned whether</mark> such <mark>a program <strong>can be scaled up</mark> in the brief period available.</p><p></strong>The bottom line</u>, Sunday’s report found, <u>is that</u> <u>the world is woefully off target.</p><p></u>Current promises made by countries as part of the <u>Paris</u> climate agreement <u>would lead to about 3 degrees Celsius</u> (5.4 degrees Fahrenheit) <u>of warming by the end of the century, and the Trump administration recently released an analysis assuming about 4 degrees Celsius (7.2 degrees Fahrenheit) by 2100 if the world takes no action.</p><p><mark>The IPCC</mark> is considered <strong>the definitive source</strong> on the state of climate science, but it also <mark>tends to be <strong>conservative</strong></mark> in its conclusions.</u> That’s because <u>it is driven by a consensus-finding process, and its results are the product of not only science, but negotiation with governments over its precise language.</p><p></u>In Sunday’s report, the body detailed the magnitude and unprecedented nature of the changes that would be required to hold warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, but it held back from taking a specific stand on the feasibility of meeting such an ambitious goal. (An early draft<u> had cited a “very high risk” of warming exceeding 1.5 degrees Celsius; that language is now gone, even if the basic message is still easily inferred.)</p><p></u>“<u>If you’re expecting IPCC to jump up and down and wave red flags, you’re going to be disappointed</u>,” said Phil Duffy, president of the Woods Hole Research Center. “<u>They’re going to do what they always do, which is to release very cautious reports in extremely dispassionate language.”</p><p></u>Some researchers, including Duffy, are skeptical of the scenarios that the IPCC presents that hold warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, particularly the reliance on <u>negative-emissions technologies</u> to keep the window open.</p><p>“Even if it is technically possible, <u>without aligning the technical, political and social aspects of feasibility, it is not going to happen</u>,” added Glen Peters, research director of the Center for International Climate Research in Oslo. “To limit warming below 1.5 C, or 2 C for that matter, requires all countries and all sectors to act.”</p><p>Underscoring the difficulty of interpreting what’s possible, the IPCC gave two separate numbers in the report <u>for <mark>Earth’s remaining “carbon budget</u></mark>,” or how much carbon dioxide humans can emit and still have a reasonable chance of remaining below 1.5 degrees Celsius. The upshot <u><mark>is</u></mark> that humans are allowed either <u><mark>10</mark> or 14 <mark>years of current emissions, and <strong>no more</mark>,</strong> for a two-thirds or better chance of avoiding 1.5 degrees Celsius.</p><p>The already limited budget would shrink further if other greenhouse gases, such as methane, aren’t controlled or if and when Arctic permafrost becomes a major source of new emissions.</p><p></u>But either way — in a move that may be contested — researchers have somewhat increased the carbon budget in comparison with where the IPCC set it in 2013, giving another reason for hope.</p><p>The new approach buys some time and “resets the clock for 1.5 degrees Celsius to ‘five minutes to midnight,’ ” said Oliver Geden, head of the research division of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.</p><p><u>The report is sure to be the central focus of attention this December in Poland when the next meeting of the parties to the Paris climate agreement is held, and countries begin to contemplate how they can up their ambition levels, as the agreement requires them to do over time.</p><p></u>Meanwhile, the report clearly documents that <u>a warming of <mark>1.5 degrees</mark> Celsius would be very damaging and that 2 degrees — which used to be considered a reasonable goal — <strong><mark>could approach intolerable</strong></mark> in parts of the world.</p><p></u>“<u>1.5 degrees is the new 2 degrees</u>,” said Jennifer Morgan, executive director of Greenpeace International, who was in Incheon for the finalization of the report.</p><p>Specifically, the document finds that instabilities in Antarctica and Greenland, which could usher in sea-level rise measured in feet rather than inches, “could be triggered around 1.5°C to 2°C of global warming.” Moreover, the total loss of tropical coral reefs is at stake because 70 to 90 percent are expected to vanish at 1.5 degrees Celsius, the report finds. At 2 degrees, that number grows to more than 99 percent.</p><p><u>The report found that holding warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius could save an Alaska-size area of the Arctic from permafrost thaw, muting a feedback loop that could lead to still more global emissions. The occurrence of entirely ice-free summers in the Arctic Ocean goes from one per century to one per decade between 1.5 and 2 degrees, it found — one of many ways in which the mere half a degree has large real-world consequences.</p><p>Risks of extreme heat and weather events just rise and rise as temperatures do, meaning these would be worse worldwide the more it warms.</p><p></u>To avoid that, in barely more than 10 years, <u>the world’s percentage of electricity from renewables such as solar and wind power would have to jump from the current 24 percent to something more like 50 or 60 percent. Coal and gas plants that remain in operation would need to be equipped with</u> technologies, collectively called carbon capture and storage (<u>CCS), that prevent them from emitting carbon dioxide into the air and instead funnel it to be buried underground. By 2050, most coal plants would shut down.</p><p></u>Cars and other forms of transportation, meanwhile, would need to be shifting strongly toward being electrified, powered by these same renewable energy sources. At present, <u>transportation is far behind the power sector in the shift to low-carbon fuel sources</u>. Right now, according to the International Energy Agency, <u><mark>only 4 percent of</mark> road <mark>transportation is powered by renewable fuels</mark>, and the agency has projected only a 1 percent increase by 2022.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Vladimir Lenin; badass motherfucker, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky; Bourgeois And Proletarian Democracy; 1919; https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1918/prrk/democracy.htm; CE fulltext: If we are not to mock at common sense and history, it is obvious that we cannot speak of “pure democracy” as long as different classes exist; we can only speak of class democracy. (Let us say in parenthesis that “pure democracy” is not only an ignorant phrase, revealing a lack of understanding both of the class struggle and of the nature of the state, but also a thrice-empty phrase, since in communist society democracy will wither away in the process of changing and becoming a habit, but will never be “pure” democracy.) “Pure democracy” is the mendacious phrase of a liberal who wants to fool the workers. History knows of bourgeois democracy which takes the place of feudalism, and of proletarian democracy which takes the place of bourgeois democracy. When Kautsky devotes dozens of pages to “proving” the truth that bourgeois democracy is progressive compared with medievalism, and that the proletariat must unfailingly utilise it in its struggle against the bourgeoisie, that in fact is just liberal twaddle intended to fool the workers. This is a truism, not only for educated Germany, but also for uneducated Russia. Kautsky is simply throwing “learned” dust in the eyes of the workers when, with a pompous mien, he talks about Weitling and the Jesuits of Paraguay and many other things, in order to avoid telling about the bourgeois essence of modern, i.e., capitalist, democracy. Kautsky takes from Marxism what is acceptable to the liberals, to the bourgeoisie (the criticism of the Middle Ages, and the progressive historical role of capitalism in general and of capitalist democracy in particular), and discards, passes over in silence, glosses over all that in Marxism which is unacceptable to the bourgeoisie (the revolutionary violence of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie for the latter’s destruction). That is why Kautsky, by virtue of his objective position and irrespective of what his subjective convictions may be, inevitably proves to be a lackey of the bourgeoisie. Bourgeois democracy, although a great historical advance in comparison with medievalism, always remains, and under capitalism is bound to remain, restricted, truncated, false and hypocritical, a paradise for the rich and a snare and deception for the exploited, for the poor. It is this truth, which forms a most essential part of Marx’s teaching, that Kautsky the “Marxist” has failed to understand. On this—the fundamental issue—Kautsky offers “delights” for the bourgeoisie instead of a scientific criticism of those conditions which make every bourgeois democracy a democracy for the rich. Let us first remind the most learned Mr. Kautsky of the theoretical propositions of Marx and Engels which that pedant has so disgracefully “forgotten” (to please the bourgeoisie), and then explain the matter as popularly as possible. Not only the ancient and feudal, but also “the modern representative state is an instrument of exploitation of wage-labour by capital” (Engels, in his work on the state).[8] “As, therefore, the state is only a transitional institution which is used in the struggle, in the revolution, to hold down one’s adversaries by force, it is sheer nonsense to talk of a ’free people’s state’; so long as the proletariat still needs the state, it does not need it in the interests of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state as such ceases to exist” (Engels, in his letter to Bebel, March 28, 1875). “In reality, however, the state is nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by another, and indeed in the democratic republic no less than in the monarchy” (Engels, Introduction to The Civil War in France by Marx).[9]; Universal suffrage is “the gauge of the maturity of the work ing class. It cannot and never will be anything more in the present-day state”. (Engels, in his work on the state.[10] Mr. Kautsky very tediously chews over the cud in the first part of this proposition, which is acceptable to the bourgeoisie. But the second part, which we have italicised and which is not acceptable to the bourgeoisie, the renegade Kautsky passes over in silence!) “The Commune was to be a working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time. . . . Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to represent and suppress (ver- und zertreten) the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes, as individual suffrage serves every other employer in the search for workers, foremen and accountants for his business” (Marx, in his work on the Paris Commune, The Civil War in France).[11] Every one of these propositions, which are excellently known to the most learned Mr. Kautsky, is a slap in his face and lays bare his apostasy. Nowhere in his pamphlet does Kautsky reveal the slightest understanding of these truths. His whole pamphlet is a sheer mockery of Marxism! Take the fundamental laws of modern states, take their administration, take freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, or “equality of all citizens before the law,” and you will see at every turn evidence of the hypocrisy of bourgeois democracy with which every honest and class-conscious worker is familiar. There is not a single state, however democratic, which has no loopholes or reservations in its constitution guaranteeing the bourgeoisie the possibility of dispatching troops against the workers, of proclaiming martial law, and so forth, in case of a “violation of public order,” and actually in case the exploited class “violates” its position of slavery and tries to behave in a non-slavish manner. Kautsky shamelessly embellishes bourgeois democracy and omits to mention, for instance, how the most democratic and republican bourgeoisie in America or Switzerland deal with workers on strike. The wise and learned Kautsky keeps silent about these things! That learned politician does not realise that to remain silent on this matter is despicable. He prefers to tell the workers nursery tales of the kind that democracy means “protecting the minority”. It is incredible, but it is a fact! In the year of our Lord 1918, in the fifth year of the world imperialist slaughter and the strangulation of internationalist minorities (i.e., those who have not despicably betrayed socialism, like the Renaudels and Longuets, the Scheidemanns and Kautskys, the Hendersons and Webbs et al.) in all “democracies” of the world, the learned Mr. Kautsky sweetly, very sweetly, sings the praises of “protection of the minority”. Those who are interested may read this on page 15 of Kautsky’s pamphlet. And on page 16 this learned . . . individual tells you about the Whigs and Tories in England in the eighteenth century! What wonderful erudition! What refined servility to the bourgeoisie! What civilised belly-crawling before the capitalists and boot-licking! If I were Krupp or Scheidemann, or Clemenceau or Renaudel, I would pay Mr. Kautsky millions, reward him with Judas kisses, praise him before the workers and urge “socialist unity” with “honourable” men like him. To write pamphlets against the dictatorship of the proletariat, to talk about the Whigs and Tories in England in the eighteenth century, to assert that democracy means “protecting the minority,” and remain silent about pogroms against internationalists in the “democratic” republic of America—isn’t this rendering lackey service to the bourgeoisie? The learned Mr. Kautsky has “forgotten” — accidentally forgotten, probably—a “trifle,” namely, that the ruling party in a bourgeois democracy extends the protection of the minority only to another bourgeois party, while the proletariat, on all serious, profound and fundamental issues, gets martial law or pogroms, instead of the “protection of the minority”. The more highly developed a democracy is, the more imminent are pogroms or civil war in connection with any profound political divergence which is dangerous to the bourgeoisie. The learned Mr. Kautsky could have studied this “law” of bourgeois democracy in connection with the Dreyfus case[12] in republican France, with the lynching of Negroes and internationalists in the democratic republic of America, with the case of Ireland and Ulster in democratic Britain,[13] with the baiting of the Bolsheviks and the staging of pogroms against them in April 1917 in the democratic republic of Russia. I have purposely chosen examples not only from wartime but also from pre-war time, peacetime. But mealy-mouthed Mr. Kautsky prefers to shut his eyes to these facts of the twentieth century, and instead to tell the workers wonderfully new, remarkably interesting, unusually edifying and incredibly important things about the Whigs and Tories of the eighteenth century! Take the bourgeois parliament. Can it be that the learned Kautsky has never heard that the more highly democracy is developed, the more the bourgeois parliaments are subjected by the stock exchange and the bankers? This does not mean that we must not make use of bourgeois parliament (the Bolsheviks made better use of it than probably any other party in the world, for in 1912–14 we won the entire workers’ curia in the Fourth Duma). But it does mean that only a liberal can forget the historical limitations and conventional nature of the bourgeois parliamentary system as Kautsky does. Even in the most democratic bourgeois state the oppressed people at every step encounter the crying contradiction between the formal equality proclaimed by the “democracy” of the capitalists and the thousands of real limitations and subterfuges which turn the proletarians into wage-slaves. It is precisely this contradiction that is opening the eyes of the people to the rottenness, mendacity and hypocrisy of capitalism. It is this contradiction that the agitators and propagandists of socialism are constantly exposing to the people, in order to prepare them for revolution! And now that the era of revolution has begun, Kautsky turns his back upon it and begins to extol the charms of moribund bourgeois democracy. Proletarian democracy, of which Soviet government is one of the forms, has brought a development and expansion of democracy unprecedented in the world, for the vast majority of the population, for the exploited and working people. To write a whole pamphlet about democracy, as Kautsky did, in which two pages are devoted to dictatorship and dozens to “pure democracy,” and fail to notice this fact, means completely distorting the subject in liberal fashion. Take foreign policy. In no bourgeois state, not even in the most democratic, is it conducted openly. The people are deceived everywhere, and in democratic France, Switzerland, America and Britain this is done on an incomparably wider scale and in an incomparably subtler manner than in other countries. The Soviet government has torn the veil of mystery from foreign policy in a revolutionary manner. Kautsky has not noticed this, he keeps silent about it, although in the era of predatory wars and secret treaties for the “division of spheres of influence” (i.e., for the partition of the world among the capitalist bandits) this is of cardinal importance, for on it depends the question of peace, the life and death of tens of millions of people. Take the structure of the state. Kautsky picks at all manner of “trifles,” down to the argument that under the Soviet Constitution elections are “indirect,” but he misses the point. He fails to see the class nature of the state apparatus, of the machinery of state. Under bourgeois democracy the capitalists, by thousands of tricks—which are the more artful and effective the more “pure” democracy is developed—drive the people away from administrative work, from freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, etc. The Soviet government is the first in the world (or strictly speaking, the second, because the Paris Commune began to do the same thing) to enlist the people, specifically the exploited people, in the work of administration. The working people are barred from participation in bourgeois parliaments (they never decide important questions under bourgeois democracy, which are decided by the stock exchange and the banks) by thousands of obstacles, and the workers know and feel, see and realise perfectly well that the bourgeois parliaments are institutions alien to them, instruments for the oppression of the workers by the bourgeoisie, institutions of a hostile class, of the exploiting minority. The Soviets are the direct organisation of the working and exploited people themselves, which helps them to organise and administer their own state in every possible way. And in this it is the vanguard of the working and exploited people, the urban proletariat, that enjoys the advantage of being best united by the large enterprises; it is easier for it than for all others to elect and exercise control over those elected. The Soviet form of organisation automatically helps to unite all the working and exploited people around their vanguard, the proletariat. The old bourgeois apparatus—the bureaucracy, the privileges of wealth, of bourgeois education, of social connections, etc. (these real privileges are the more varied the more highly bourgeois democracy is developed)—all this disappears under the Soviet form of organisation. Freedom of the press ceases to be hypocrisy, because the printing-plants and stocks of paper are taken away from the bourgeoisie. The same thing applies to the best buildings, the palaces, the mansions and manorhouses. Soviet power took thousands upon thousands of these best buildings from the exploiters at one stroke, and in this way made the right of assembly—without which democracy is a fraud—a million times more democratic for the people. Indirect elections to non-local Soviets make it easier to hold congresses of Soviets, they make the entire apparatus less costly, more flexible, more accessible to the workers and peasants at a time when life is seething and it is necessary to be able very quickly to recall one’s local deputy or to delegate him to a general congress of Soviets<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>Liberal democracies are an illusion created to justify bourgeois control of the worker, where “the rights” of a democracy are a method of control to favor the wealthy. Lenin 1919</h4><p></strong>Vladimir Lenin; badass motherfucker, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky; Bourgeois And Proletarian Democracy; 1919; https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1918/prrk/democracy.htm; CE</p><p>If we are not to mock at common sense and history, it is obvious that <u><strong>we cannot speak of “pure democracy” as long as different classes exist;</u></strong> we can only speak of class democracy. (Let us say in parenthesis that “pure democracy” is not only an ignorant phrase, revealing a lack of understanding both of the class struggle and of the nature of the state, but also a thrice-empty phrase, since <u><strong>in communist society democracy will wither away in the process of changing and becoming a habit</u></strong>, but will never be “pure” democracy.) <u><mark>“Pure democracy” is the<strong></mark> mendacious <mark>phrase of a liberal who wants to fool the workers.</mark> History knows of bourgeois democracy which takes the place of feudalism, and of proletarian democracy which takes the place of bourgeois democracy. When Kautsky devotes dozens of pages to “proving” the truth that bourgeois democracy is progressive compared with medievalism, and <mark>that the proletariat must </mark>unfailingl<mark>y utilise it in its struggle </mark>against the bourgeoisie, that in fact <mark>is</mark> just liberal <mark>twaddle</mark> intended to fool the workers. </u></strong>This is a truism, not only for educated Germany, but also for uneducated Russia. Kautsky is simply throwing “learned” dust in the eyes of the workers when, with a pompous mien, he talks about Weitling and the Jesuits of Paraguay and many other things, in order to avoid telling about the bourgeois essence of modern, i.e., capitalist, democracy. Kautsky takes from Marxism what is acceptable to the liberals, to the bourgeoisie (the criticism of the Middle Ages, and the progressive historical role of capitalism in general and of capitalist democracy in particular), and discards, passes over in silence, glosses over all that in Marxism which is unacceptable to the bourgeoisie (the revolutionary violence of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie for the latter’s destruction). That is why Kautsky, by virtue of his objective position and irrespective of what his subjective convictions may be, inevitably proves to be a lackey of the bourgeoisie. <u><strong><mark>Bourgeois democracy</u></strong></mark>, although a great historical advance in comparison with medievalism<u><strong>, always remains, and under capitalism <mark>is</mark> bound to remain, restricted, truncated, false and hypocritical<mark>, a paradise for the rich and a snare</mark> and deception for the exploited, <mark>for the poor</mark>. It is this truth, which forms a most essential part of Marx’s teaching</u></strong>, that Kautsky the “Marxist” has failed to understand. On this—the fundamental issue—Kautsky offers “delights” for the bourgeoisie instead of a scientific criticism of those conditions which make every bourgeois democracy a democracy for the rich. Let us first remind the most learned Mr. Kautsky of the theoretical propositions of Marx and Engels which that pedant has so disgracefully “forgotten” (to please the bourgeoisie), and then explain the matter as popularly as possible. Not only the ancient and feudal, but also <u><strong>“<mark>the </mark>modern representative <mark>state is an instrument of exploitation </mark>of wage-labour by capital</u></strong>” (Engels, in his work on the state).[8] “As, therefore<u><strong>, the state is only a transitional institution which is used in the struggle, in the revolution, to hold down one’s adversaries by force, it is sheer nonsense to talk of a ’free people’s state’; so long as the proletariat still needs the state, it does not need it in the interests of freedom</u></strong> but in order to hold down its adversaries, and <u><strong><mark>as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state </mark>as such <mark>ceases to exist”</u></strong></mark> (Engels, in his letter to Bebel, March 28, 1875). “In reality, however<u><strong><mark>, the state is</mark> nothing but <mark>a machine for </mark>the<mark> oppression </mark>of one class by another, and indeed in <mark>the democratic republic no less than</mark> in the <mark>monarchy</mark>”</u></strong> (Engels, Introduction to The Civil War in France by Marx<u><strong>).[9]; Universal suffrage is “the gauge of the maturity of the work ing class. It cannot and never will be anything more in the present-day state”.</u></strong> (Engels, in his work on the state.[10] Mr. Kautsky very tediously chews over the cud in the first part of this proposition, which is acceptable to the bourgeoisie. But the second part, which we have italicised and which is not acceptable to the bourgeoisie, the renegade Kautsky passes over in silence!) “The Commune was to be a working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time. . . . Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to represent and suppress (ver- und zertreten) the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes, as individual suffrage serves every other employer in the search for workers, foremen and accountants for his business” (Marx, in his work on the Paris Commune, The Civil War in France).[11] Every one of these propositions, which are excellently known to the most learned Mr. Kautsky, is a slap in his face and lays bare his apostasy. Nowhere in his pamphlet does Kautsky reveal the slightest understanding of these truths. His whole pamphlet is a sheer mockery of Marxism! <u><strong><mark>Take the </mark>fundamental<mark> laws of modern states</mark>, take <mark>their administration</mark>, take freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, or “equality of all citizens before the law,” and you will see at every turn evidence of <mark>the hypocrisy of bourgeois democracy</mark> with which every honest and class-conscious worker is familiar. <mark>There is not a single state, </mark>however democratic,<mark> which has no </mark>loopholes or <mark>reservations in its constitution guaranteeing the bourgeoisie the possibility of dispatching troops against </mark>the <mark>workers,</mark> of proclaiming martial law, and so forth, in case of a “violation of public order,” and actually in case the exploited class “violates” its position of slavery and tries to behave in a non-slavish manner</u></strong>. Kautsky shamelessly embellishes bourgeois democracy and omits to mention, for instance, how the most democratic and republican bourgeoisie in America or Switzerland deal with workers on strike. The wise and learned Kautsky keeps silent about these things! That learned politician does not realise that to remain silent on this matter is despicable. He prefers to tell the workers nursery tales of the kind that democracy means “protecting the minority”. It is incredible, but it is a fact! In the year of our Lord 1918, in the fifth year of the world imperialist slaughter and the strangulation of internationalist minorities (i.e., those who have not despicably betrayed socialism, like the Renaudels and Longuets, the Scheidemanns and Kautskys, the Hendersons and Webbs et al.) in all “democracies” of the world, the learned Mr. Kautsky sweetly, very sweetly, sings the praises of “protection of the minority”. Those who are interested may read this on page 15 of Kautsky’s pamphlet. And on page 16 this learned . . . individual tells you about the Whigs and Tories in England in the eighteenth century! <u><strong>What wonderful erudition! What refined servility to the bourgeoisie! What civilised belly-crawling before the capitalists and boot-licking</u></strong>! If I were Krupp or Scheidemann, or Clemenceau or Renaudel, I would pay Mr. Kautsky millions, reward him with Judas kisses, praise him before the workers and urge “socialist unity” with “honourable” men like him. To write pamphlets against the dictatorship of the proletariat, to talk about the Whigs and Tories in England in the eighteenth century, to assert that democracy means “protecting the minority,” and remain silent about pogroms against internationalists in the “democratic” republic of America—isn’t this rendering lackey service to the bourgeoisie? The learned Mr. Kautsky has “forgotten” — accidentally forgotten, probably—a “trifle,” namely, that <u><strong><mark>the ruling party in </mark>a bourgeois democracy <mark>extends </mark>the<mark> protection</mark> of the minority only <mark>to another bourgeois party, while the proletariat</mark>, on all serious, profound and fundamental issues<mark>, gets martial law </mark>or pogroms<mark>,</mark> instead of the “protection of the minority”. The more highly developed a democracy is, the more imminent are pogroms or civil war in connection with any profound political divergence which is dangerous to the bourgeoisie. </u></strong>The learned Mr. Kautsky could have studied this “law” of bourgeois democracy in connection with the Dreyfus case[12] in republican France, with the lynching of Negroes and internationalists in the democratic republic of America, with the case of Ireland and Ulster in democratic Britain,[13] with the baiting of the Bolsheviks and the staging of pogroms against them in April 1917 in the democratic republic of Russia. I have purposely chosen examples not only from wartime but also from pre-war time, peacetime. But mealy-mouthed Mr. Kautsky prefers to shut his eyes to these facts of the twentieth century, and instead to tell the workers wonderfully new, remarkably interesting, unusually edifying and incredibly important things about the Whigs and Tories of the eighteenth century! Take the bourgeois parliament. Can it be that the learned Kautsky has never heard that<mark> <u><strong>the more highly democracy is developed, the more</mark> the <mark>bourgeois parliaments are subjected by</mark> the stock exchange and the <mark>bankers</mark>?</u></strong> This does not mean that we must not make use of bourgeois parliament (the Bolsheviks made better use of it than probably any other party in the world, for in 1912–14 we won the entire workers’ curia in the Fourth Duma). But it does mean that <u><strong>only a liberal can forget the historical limitations and conventional nature of the bourgeois parliamentary system as Kautsky does. Even in the most democratic bourgeois state the oppressed people at every step encounter the crying contradiction between the formal equality proclaimed by the “democracy” of the capitalists and the thousands of real limitations and subterfuges which turn the proletarians into wage-slaves. It is precisely this contradiction that is opening the eyes of the people to the rottenness, mendacity and hypocrisy of capitalism</u></strong>. It is this contradiction that the agitators and propagandists of socialism are constantly exposing to the people, in order to prepare them for revolution! And now that the era of revolution has begun, Kautsky turns his back upon it and begins to extol the charms of moribund bourgeois democracy. Proletarian democracy, of which Soviet government is one of the forms, has brought a development and expansion of democracy unprecedented in the world, for the vast majority of the population, for the exploited and working people. To write a whole pamphlet about democracy, as Kautsky did, in which two pages are devoted to dictatorship and dozens to “pure democracy,” and fail to notice this fact, means completely distorting the subject in liberal fashion. Take foreign policy<u><strong>. In <mark>no bourgeois state</mark>, not <mark>even in the most democratic, is</mark> it <mark>conducted openly.</mark> The people are deceived everywhere, and <mark>in</mark> democratic France, Switzerland<mark>, America </mark>and Britain <mark>this is done on an incomparably wider scale</mark> and <mark>in </mark>an incomparably <mark>subtler manner</mark> than in other countries.</u></strong> The Soviet government has torn the veil of mystery from foreign policy in a revolutionary manner. Kautsky has not noticed this, he keeps silent about it, although in the era of predatory wars and secret treaties for the “division of spheres of influence” (i.e., for the partition of the world among the capitalist bandits) this is of cardinal importance, for on it depends the question of peace, the life and death of tens of millions of people. Take the structure of the state. Kautsky picks at all manner of “trifles,” down to the argument that under the Soviet Constitution elections are “indirect,” but he misses the point. He fails to see the class nature of the state apparatus, of the machinery of state. <u><strong>Under bourgeois democracy the capitalists, by thousands of tricks—which are the more artful and effective the more “pure” democracy is developed—drive the people away from administrative work, from freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, etc.</u></strong> The Soviet government is the first in the world (or strictly speaking, the second, because the Paris Commune began to do the same thing) to enlist the people, specifically the exploited people, in the work of administration. The working people are barred from participation in bourgeois parliaments (they never decide important questions under bourgeois democracy, which are decided by the stock exchange and the banks) by thousands of obstacles, and the workers know and feel, see and realise perfectly well that the bourgeois parliaments are institutions alien to them, instruments for the oppression of the workers by the bourgeoisie, institutions of a hostile class, of the exploiting minority. The Soviets are the direct organisation of the working and exploited people themselves, which helps them to organise and administer their own state in every possible way. And in this it is the vanguard of the working and exploited people, the urban proletariat, that enjoys the advantage of being best united by the large enterprises; it is easier for it than for all others to elect and exercise control over those elected. The Soviet form of organisation automatically helps to unite all the working and exploited people around their vanguard, the proletariat. The old bourgeois apparatus—the bureaucracy, the privileges of wealth, of bourgeois education, of social connections, etc. (these real privileges are the more varied the more highly bourgeois democracy is developed)—all this disappears under the Soviet form of organisation. Freedom of the press ceases to be hypocrisy, because the printing-plants and stocks of paper are taken away from the bourgeoisie. The same thing applies to the best buildings, the palaces, the mansions and manorhouses. Soviet power took thousands upon thousands of these best buildings from the exploiters at one stroke, and in this way made the right of assembly—without which democracy is a fraud—a million times more democratic for the people. Indirect elections to non-local Soviets make it easier to hold congresses of Soviets, they make the entire apparatus less costly, more flexible, more accessible to the workers and peasants at a time when life is seething and it is necessary to be able very quickly to recall one’s local deputy or to delegate him to a general congress of Soviets</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Dr. Peter Kareiva 18, Ph.D. in Ecology and Applied Mathematics from Cornell University, Director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA, et al., September 2018, “Existential Risk Due To Ecosystem Collapse: Nature Strikes Back”, Futures, Volume 102, p. 39-50 fulltext: In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (climate change, global freshwater cycle, and ocean acidification) do pose existential risks. This is because of intrinsic positive feedback loops, substantial lag times between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield surprises. In addition, climate, freshwater, and ocean acidification are all directly connected to the provision of food and water, and shortages of food and water can create conflict and social unrest. Climate change has a long history of disrupting civilizations and sometimes precipitating the collapse of cultures or mass emigrations (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields). Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to exacerbate drought and water scarcity, as well as flooding. Climate change can even impair water quality because it is associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. Ample clean water is not a luxury—it is essential for human survival. Consequently, cities, regions and nations that lack clean freshwater are vulnerable to social disruption and disease. Finally, ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of the world’s protein coming from oceans (FAO, 2016), the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. Acidification is known to interfere with oyster reef building and coral reefs. Climate change also increases storm frequency and severity. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy (Spalding et al., 2014). If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises, coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge—and may be ravaged by recurrent storms. A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). Society will have a hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three extreme events. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al., 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people. 4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes. Humans are remarkably ingenious, and have adapted to crises throughout their history. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). However, the many stories of human ingenuity successfully addressing existential risks such as global famine or extreme air pollution represent environmental challenges that are largely linear, have immediate consequences, and operate without positive feedbacks. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm. In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans. The consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, unlike past environmental challenges, the Earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback loops. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that very warming can cause more CO2 release which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri, Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios. Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002). Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that forest fires will become more frequent and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). This catastrophic fire embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that could catch humanity off-guard and produce a true apocalyptic event. Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming. Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967). Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, & Norris, 2009). The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that runaway climate change, and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered positive feedbacks portends even greater existential risks. The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Warming will become <u>rapid</u> and <u>overwhelm</u> adaptation</h4><p>Dr. Peter <strong>Kareiva 18</strong>, Ph.D. in Ecology and Applied Mathematics from Cornell University, Director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA, et al., September 2018, “Existential Risk Due To Ecosystem Collapse: Nature Strikes Back”, Futures, Volume 102, p. 39-50</p><p>In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (<u><mark>climate</mark> change, global freshwater cycle, <mark>and ocean acidification</u></mark>) do <u><mark>pose <strong>existential risks</u></strong></mark>. <u>This is <mark>because of</mark> intrinsic <strong>positive <mark>feedback loops</strong></mark>, substantial <strong><mark>lag times</u></strong></mark> <u>between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, <mark>and</mark> the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield <strong><mark>surprises</u></strong></mark>. In addition, <u>climate, freshwater, <mark>and</mark> ocean acidification are all directly <mark>connected to</mark> the provision of <strong><mark>food</strong> and <strong>water</strong></mark>, and <mark>shortages</u></mark> of food and water can <u><mark>create <strong>conflict</strong></mark> and social unrest</u>.</p><p><u>Climate change has a long history of <strong>disrupting civilizations</u></strong> <u>and sometimes precipitating the <strong>collapse of cultures</u></strong> <u>or mass emigrations</u> (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields).</p><p><u>Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to <strong>exacerbate drought</strong> and</u> <u><strong>water scarcity</strong>, as well as <strong><mark>flooding</u></strong></mark>. <u>Climate change can even impair water quality because it is associated with heavy rains that <mark>overwhelm sewage treatment</mark> facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants</u> in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. <u>Ample clean water</u> is not a luxury—it <u>is essential for human survival.</u> Consequently, <u>cities, regions and <mark>nations</mark> that lack clean freshwater <mark>are vulnerable to</mark> social disruption and <strong><mark>disease</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Finally, <u>ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of</u> the world’s <u>protein coming from oceans</u> (FAO, 2016), <u>the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious</u>. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. <u><mark>Acidification</mark> is known to <mark>interfere with</mark> oyster reef building and <strong>coral <mark>reefs</u></strong></mark>. <u>Climate change also increases <strong>storm frequency</strong> and severity. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy</u> (Spalding et al., 2014). <u>If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises</u>, <u><strong>coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge</u></strong>—<u>and may be ravaged by recurrent storms</u>.</p><p>A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). <u><mark>Society will have a <strong>hard time responding</strong> to</mark> shorter intervals between <mark>rare</mark> extreme <mark>events</mark> because in the lifespan of an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three <strong>extreme events</u></strong>. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. <u>The</u> highly <u>disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years</u> in the 18th century, <u>and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050</u> (Garner et al., 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people.</p><p>4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes.</p><p><u><mark>Humans</mark> are remarkably ingenious, and <mark>have <strong>adapted</strong></mark> to crises <mark>throughout</mark> their <mark>history</u></mark>. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). <u><strong><mark>However</strong></mark>, the many stories of human ingenuity successfully addressing existential risks</u> such as global famine or extreme air pollution <u>represent environmental challenges that are largely linear, have immediate consequences, and operate without positive feedbacks.</u> For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm.</p><p><u>In contrast, <mark>today’s</mark> great environmental <mark>crisis</mark> of climate change may cause some harm but there <mark>are</mark> generally <strong><mark>long time delays</u></strong></mark> <u>between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans</u>. <u><mark>The consequence</mark> of these delays are an <strong><mark>absence of urgency</u></strong></mark>; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, <u>unlike past environmental challenges, <strong>the Earth’s <mark>climate</mark> system <mark>is rife with positive feedback loops</u></strong></mark>. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that very warming can cause more CO2 release which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri, Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios.</p><p>Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002).</p><p>Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that forest fires will become more frequent and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). <u>This catastrophic fire embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors <mark>that could <strong>catch humanity off-guard</u></strong> <u>and produce</mark> a true <strong><mark>apocalyptic event</u></strong></mark>. Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming.</p><p>Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967).</p><p>Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, & Norris, 2009).</p><p><u>The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that</u> <u><strong><mark>runaway climate change</strong></mark>, and runaway perturbations have to be <strong><mark>take</strong></mark>n <mark>as a serious possibility</u></mark>. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, <u>this list is not exhaustive and the <mark>possibility of undiscovered</mark> positive <mark>feedbacks portends</mark> <strong>even <mark>great</mark>er <mark>existential risks</u></strong></mark>. <u>The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted</u> (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) <u>were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding.</u> <u>We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change</u><strong>.</p></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 75-78 (SPP). fulltext: While this image of the just warrior as defender of civilization at first glance seems to favor the defensive (and, would therefore not contribute to the cult of the offensive), a closer look shows that the discourse of the protection racket is actually offensive in three distinct ways. First, it leads states to value offense in order to be the best possible protectors, since offense is associated with increased chance at victory and a perception of an active approach to protection. Second, it allows militaries aspiring to the idealized or hegemonic masculinity to identify those in need of protection outside of its borders, and to start aggressive wars to protect those in need. 81 Third, insomuch as protection is a performance rather than an actual service, the appearance of boldness and bravery in actions taken on behalf of this chivalrous ideal brings attention to the protecting which is being done. In these ways, the protection racket can be associated with the increased likelihood of pursuing offensive military strategies. The chivalric codes in vogue at the turn of the century identified the vulnerable female body as the main cause for war. The enemy was cast as an inhuman, sexual predator. Propagandists described German attacks on Belgium towns in late summer, 1914 as “rape of Belgium.” The famous World War I propaganda poster illustrates this melding of race and gender: a large brown gorilla-like creature with a bloodied bat labeled “kulter” grasps a half-naked white woman who appears to have fainted. “Destroy this mad brute: Enlist,” the poster demands. Posters in Britain encouraging men to volunteer evoked women and children as defenseless targets of war and drew upon chivalric discourses of honor and protection, declaring, “Your rights of citizenship give you the privilege of joining your fellows in defence of your Honour and your Homes,” and “There are Three Types of Men: Those who hear the call and Obey, Those who Delay, and – the Others.” Discourses of chivalrous masculinity served not only to make offensive approaches to international politics in World War I possible but also to constitute a set of gendered power relations that posited white men as protectors of the nation against racialized others who threaten the purity of naïve and defenseless women. Examples of the influence of the protection racket on perceived offensive dominance and the cult of the offensive are common in present-day politics as well. This chivalric narrative has been resurrected in the post-Cold War era, and gendered identities have not only legitimated but also promoted wars. The various humanitarian wars of the 1990s are read as a narrative in which NATO, and other actors re-invent themselves as masculine, heroic, rescuers of weak and passive victims. Farmanfarmaian describes how the reports of the Iraqi Army raping women in Kuwait were used to construct Iraq as a barbaric enemy so that war was not only thinkable, but necessitated. This new American masculinity was “tough and tender,” capable of awesome military prowess but also compassion and empathy. The mission of “liberating” Afghan women was used to garner public support for the invasion of Afghanistan, and served also to silence feminine protests against the war. Two and a half years later, this same discourse of “liberation” was used to fueled support to overturn the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, represented in racialized terms as an inhuman despot when the evidence against weapons of mass destruction turned out to be fabricated or exaggerated. This narrative of rescuing the Iraqi people (as “damsels in distress”) from the clutches of an evil man may help to explain why many people in the US and its allies came to believe, with little evidence, that the invading forces would be “greeted as liberators.” These rescue narratives demonstrate that the protection racket encourages offensive military policies even when it is couched in the language of defense and protection. The protection racket is a gendered discourse that produces the gender identities of just warriors and beautiful souls. It is also the backdrop that allows for offensive military policies to be viewed as defensive, thereby gaining traction and legitimating war by enabling offensive wars to take place under the mantle of “protection.” The existence of discourse of protection can therefore help us understand the occurrence of offensive policies in the light of an ostensible defensive dominance. Conclusion One of the conclusions of the offense-defense literature is that states perceive themselves to be much more insecure than they really are. Van Evera writes, "The prime threat to the security of modern great powers is ... themselves. Their greatest menace lies in their own tendency to exaggerate the dangers they face, and to respond with counterproductive belligerence.” While states have been more or less been secure, these feelings of insecurity have led to great insecurity for people worldwide. Tens to hundreds of millions of people were killed in wars in the twentieth century alone, to say nothing of those who were injured, lost loved ones, or had their lives disrupted by war. Van Evera goes on to write, "The causes of this syndrome pose a large question for students of international relations." Feminists have much to offer in regard to this question. Focusing on how gender discourses and gender identities provide a necessary condition under which many of the factors of the offense-defense balance can thrive, feminists offer a way to think about many of the issues related to the causes of war that have been neglected by most scholars of Security Studies. For scholars interested in the offense-defense balance as a way of explaining why wars occur, feminist analysis can contribute to both defensive realists who consider wars to begin because of the perceptions of the offense-defense balance, as well as scholars who support the offensive realist position that states start wars regardless of their calculations of the offense-defense balance. Thus, despite the recent debate between Lieber and Snyder about whether or not a cult of the offensive was the key factor in Germany's offensive war plans, feminist analysis of nationalism and the protection racket provides insights into the underlying conditions that make preventative or pre-emptive wars possible in terms of anxieties over gender and racial identities and gendered discourses of military strength and the benefits of war. Feminists argue that offensive wars are based on similar concerns over gender relations and the nation, making offensive wars appear to be legitimately "defensive." As Snyder argues, "The belief in the feasibility and necessity of offensive strategy entices both fearful and greedy aggressors to attack [and] erases the distinction between security and expansion," the gendered constitution of the cult of the offensive applies to states acting out of fear or expansion. The feminist analyses of the role gender plays in constituting the perception of technology, the gendered ideologies of nationalism, and the gendered "defensive" logic of the protection racket support this view of the erasure of the distinction between security and expansion. A feminist analysis would understand gendered ideologies and identities to be at the root of both strategies, with their particular historical manifestations leading to variation in the specific forms that militarism takes. Far from being only concerned with the status of women, feminists use the concept of gender to analyze the workings of power through gendered discourses and identities. Gender matters in the ways in which technologies are perceived and used, as well as in formulating offensive military strategies. Gendered perceptions of technology, gendered discourses of nationalism, and the "protection racket" are three related ways in which offensive wars are legitimated, and thus enabled. By explaining the impact gender has on issues related to the perception of offense-defense balance, feminist analysis shows how gender discourses and the production of gender identities are not confined to individuals and the private realm, but rather are a pervasive fact of social life on an international scale. International Relations theorists concerned with determining the causes of war would do well to consider the ways in which gender can shape the conditions under which wars occur.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The AFF attempt to securitize against geopolitical vulnerabilities produces more violence than it prevents – their politics of chivalric impact avoidance constitutes a “protection racket” that justifies the intensification of militarization</h4><p><strong>Wilcox, 2010</strong> (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 75-78 (SPP).</p><p><u>While this image of the just warrior as defender of civilization at first glance seems to favor the defensive</u> (and, would therefore not contribute to the cult of the offensive), <u>a closer look shows that <mark>the discourse of the protection racket is </mark>actuall<mark>y offensive</u></mark> in three distinct ways. First<u>, <mark>it leads states to value offense in order to be the <strong>best possible protectors</strong></mark>, since offense is associated with increased chance at victory and a perception of an active approach to protection</u>. Second, <u><mark>it allows militaries</mark> aspiring to the idealized or hegemonic masculinity</u> to identify those in need of protection outside of its borders, and <u><mark>to start aggressive wars to protect those in need</u></mark>. 81 Third, insomuch as protection is a performance rather than an actual service, the appearance of boldness and bravery in actions taken on behalf of this chivalrous ideal brings attention to the protecting which is being done. In these ways, <u><mark>the protection racket </mark>can be associated with the increased likelihood of <mark>pursuing offensive military strategies</u>.</mark> The chivalric codes in vogue at the turn of the century identified the vulnerable female body as the main cause for war. The enemy was cast as an inhuman, sexual predator. Propagandists described German attacks on Belgium towns in late summer, 1914 as “rape of Belgium.” The famous World War I propaganda poster illustrates this melding of race and gender: a large brown gorilla-like creature with a bloodied bat labeled “kulter” grasps a half-naked white woman who appears to have fainted. “Destroy this mad brute: Enlist,” the poster demands. Posters in Britain encouraging men to volunteer evoked women and children as defenseless targets of war and drew upon chivalric discourses of honor and protection, declaring, “Your rights of citizenship give you the privilege of joining your fellows in defence of your Honour and your Homes,” and “There are Three Types of Men: Those who hear the call and Obey, Those who Delay, and – the Others<mark>.” <u>Discourses of </mark>chivalrous <mark>masculinity</mark> served not only to make offensive approaches to international politics</u> in World War I <u>possible but also to <mark>constitute a set of gendered power relations that posit</mark>ed <mark>white men as protectors </mark>of the nation against racialized others who threaten the purity of naïve and defenseless women</u>. </p><p>Examples of the influence of the protection racket on perceived offensive dominance and the cult of the offensive are common in present-day politics as well. <u>This chivalric narrative has been resurrected in the post-Cold War era, and gendered identities have not only legitimated but also promoted wars</u>. The various humanitarian wars of the 1990s are read as a narrative in which NATO, and other actors re-invent themselves as masculine, heroic, rescuers of weak and passive victims. Farmanfarmaian describes how the reports of the Iraqi Army raping women in Kuwait were used to construct Iraq as a barbaric enemy so that war was not only thinkable, but<u> necessitated. This new American masculinity was “tough and tender,” capable of awesome military prowess but also compassion and empathy.</p><p></u>The mission of “liberating” Afghan women was used to garner public support for the invasion of Afghanistan, and served also to silence feminine protests against the war. Two and a half years later, this same discourse of “liberation” was used to fueled support to overturn the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, represented in racialized terms as an inhuman despot when the evidence against weapons of mass destruction turned out to be fabricated or exaggerated. This narrative of rescuing the Iraqi people (as “damsels in distress”) from the clutches of an evil man may help to explain why many people in the US and its allies came to believe, with little evidence, that the invading forces would be “greeted as liberators.” These rescue narratives demonstrate that the protection racket encourages offensive military policies even when it is couched in the language of defense and protection. <u>The protection racket is a gendered discourse that produces the gender identities of just warriors and beautiful souls.<mark> </mark>It is also the backdrop that allows for offensive military policies to be viewed as defensive, thereby gaining traction and legitimating war by enabling offensive wars to take place under the mantle of “protection.” The existence of discourse of protection can therefore help us understand the occurrence of offensive policies in the light of an ostensible defensive dominance<mark>.</p><p></u></mark>Conclusion</p><p>One of the conclusions of the offense-defense literature is that states perceive themselves to be much more insecure than they really are. Van Evera writes, "<u>The prime threat to the security of modern great powers is ... themselves. Their greatest menace lies in their own tendency to exaggerate the dangers they face, and to respond with counterproductive belligerence.” While states have been more or less been secure, these <mark>feelings of insecurity have led to great insecurity for people</mark> worldwide.</u> Tens to hundreds of millions of people were killed in wars in the twentieth century alone, to say nothing of those who were injured, lost loved ones, or had their lives disrupted by war. </p><p>Van Evera goes on to write, "The causes of this syndrome pose a large question for students of international relations." Feminists have much to offer in regard to this question. Focusing on how gender discourses and gender identities provide a necessary condition under which many of the factors of the offense-defense balance can thrive, <u>feminists offer a way to think about many of the issues related to the causes of war that have been neglected by most scholars of Security Studies. </u>For scholars interested in the offense-defense balance as a way of explaining why wars occur, feminist analysis can contribute to both defensive realists who consider wars to begin because of the perceptions of the offense-defense balance, as well as scholars who support the offensive realist position that states start wars regardless of their calculations of the offense-defense balance. Thus, despite the recent debate between Lieber and Snyder about whether or not a cult of the offensive was the key factor in Germany's offensive war plans<u>, feminist analysis of nationalism and the protection racket provides insights into the underlying conditions that make preventative or pre-emptive wars possible in terms of anxieties over gender and racial identities and gendered discourses of military strength and the benefits of war. </u>Feminists argue that <u>offensive wars are based on similar concerns over gender relations and the nation, making<mark> offensive wars appear to be legitimately "defensive</mark>."</u> As Snyder argues, "<u><mark>The belief in</mark> the feasibility and <mark>necessity of offensive strategy</mark> entices</u> both fearful and greedy <u>aggressors to attack [and] <strong><mark>erases the distinction between</strong> <strong>security and expansion</strong></mark>,"</u> <u>the gendered constitution of <mark>the cult of the offensive applies to states acting out of fear or expansion.</mark> </u>The feminist analyses of the role gender plays in constituting the perception of technology, the gendered ideologies of nationalism, and the gendered "defensive" logic of the protection racket support this view of the erasure of the distinction between security and expansion. <u>A feminist analysis would understand gendered ideologies and identities to be at the root of both strategies, with their particular historical manifestations leading to variation in the specific forms that militarism takes.</u> </p><p>Far from being only concerned with the status of women, feminists use the concept of gender to analyze the workings of power through gendered discourses and identities. Gender matters in the ways in which technologies are perceived and used, as well as in formulating offensive military strategies. <u>Gendered perceptions of technology, <mark>gendered discourses of nationalism, and the "protection racket" are</mark> three related <mark>ways in which offensive wars are legitimated, and thus enabled</u></mark>. By explaining the impact gender has on issues related to the perception of offense-defense balance, feminist analysis shows how <u>gender discourses and the production of gender identities are not confined to individuals and the private realm, but rather are a pervasive fact of social life on an international scale. International Relations theorists concerned with determining the causes of war would do well to consider the ways in which gender can shape the conditions under which wars occur.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Jackel & Green ’17 (Robert Jackel – JD @ the University of Pennsylvania Law School, Attorney @ the Law Office of Robert Jackel, former Staff Attorney at the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Alex Green – MPA Candidate @ the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, research associate @ the Harvard Business School. 4 February 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/interstate-compacts-save-obamacare/515604/) fulltext: Across the country, Democrats have vowed to fight efforts from congressional Republicans and the White House to repeal the Affordable Care Act—a task that grows more complicated by the day. Yet even if the law is repealed, with or without a replacement, progressives could still have recourse at the state level. A widely used form of treaty between states could allow them to bond together and set up their own multistate health-care programs to fill the gaps created by the federal government. In an age of retreating federal programs, interstate compacts could be a tool for progressive states to enact a regional or even nationwide agenda. Large states would have little trouble replacing the ACA, often called Obamacare, with a state-run program on their own. California has the resources and population to run its state health-care exchange, Covered California, from Sacramento, and could even fund the Medicaid expansion it implemented under the ACA. To the north, less populous states like Oregon and Washington would struggle to do the same without comparably sized economies. But if they join together with California in an interstate compact, they could potentially reap the benefits of the economy of scale—saving on costs through the sheer size of the enrollment pool and bargaining power. Interstate compacts allow individual states to maintain consistency in their laws by coordinating on a multistate level. While they may not rival the power of the federal government, compacts may be a next-best option for states facing sudden cutbacks in support from Washington, D.C. States could use them to preserve ACA-initiated programs, or create new systems from scratch. There are currently over 200 active interstate compacts, many of which are regional. Twenty-two agreements are national in scope, and each one addresses a different issue facing the states. The Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, for example, oversees the transfer of parole and probation between states. And the Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission is one of roughly two dozen water-related compacts that govern everything from fish stocks to the fair use of river basins by adjoining states. Agencies that monitor compacts have authority, delegated from the states, to generate revenue and engage in rule-making—that is, they can create regulations to enforce the powers granted by a given compact. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the Delaware River Port Authority, and the Washington Metro Area Transit Authority are all interstate-compact agencies that run rapid-transit systems. There are constitutional limitations on these agreements, even though some actually predate the Constitution and were used to settle land disputes between the colonies. But states can largely work around those constraints. The Compacts Clause of the Constitution—Article I, Section 10—says, “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress … enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.” Despite that limiting language, states have regularly entered into these agreements without lawmakers’ approval at all, and the Supreme Court has supported them, curbing the scope of federal involvement in the process. In 1893, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government’s authority to approve such agreements was only applicable when an agreement “may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.” It was not completely clear what constraints this left on the states. Nearly a century later, the Court took up the issue again, building on their earlier ruling in U.S. Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission in 1978. The Court found that the commission’s policies, which were intended to reform state taxation of multistate businesses, could have been enacted individually by each state. As a result, the Court ruled that the Multistate Tax Compact did not require the consent of Congress. To date, the test for when states need approval remains murky, but in general, when states enact programs they each could have done on their own, congressional approval is not necessary. “Congressional consent is not necessarily a legal judgment, it’s a political one,” said Colmon Elridge, director of the National Center for Interstate Compacts, a division of the nonpartisan Council of State Governments that provides information and assistance on how to establish and run compacts. So the standard for lawmakers deliberating whether they should approve a compact is usually, as Elridge put it, “Is this in my political best interest?” Moreover, Congress rarely says no to states that want to enter into them. “When it gets to that level,” he said, referring to agreements that are ready for congressional review, “especially in this climate, it’s more dangerous politically to not respect the will of the states.” Congressional approval can confer advantages, too, even if it’s not necessarily required for compacts to take effect. Agreements that are backed by Congress carry the force of federal law, and once granted, Congress cannot take back its consent. But there can be drawbacks for states that decide to enter into compacts without congressional approval. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the Northeast’s auction-based cap-and-trade program for reducing greenhouse-gas emissions, has been operating for years without congressional approval. Nine states are currently members of the compact: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. As a mandatory program, the RGGI has claimed reductions in lifetime energy bills of $4.67 billion for 4.6 million residences. However, because it lacks congressional consent, the compact does not have the force of law that prevents state governments from interfering from term to term. The program relies instead on individual states for regulation, and their general willingness to continue to participate. Any dispute between states in a congressionally approved compact is brought directly to the Supreme Court of the United States, as part of the Court’s original jurisdiction. But compacts that have not sought congressional approval have no easy mechanism to resolve disagreements. This has exposed the RGGI to the whims of changing state governments. In 2011, for example, a dissatisfied New Jersey Governor Chris Christie withdrew from the compact, claiming that “it doesn’t make any sense environmentally or economically.” Even though the state legislature voted to bring New Jersey back into the program, Christie then vetoed the bills to rejoin the agreement. While at this point only New Jersey has left—and will likely return after Christie leaves office—the ability of states to leave congressionally unapproved compacts creates vulnerabilities and makes long-term planning harder. As other states, including California, continue to build regional, and even international, climate initiatives without congressional support, New Jersey’s example casts a shadow over their efforts. Given the ACA’s origins as a state-level initiative in Massachusetts, interstate health-care exchanges could be operable without lawmakers’ consent under the Supreme Court’s holding in U.S. Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission, though they would be exposed to the same vulnerabilities as the RGGI. But given Republican support for states’ rights, they might even get congressional approval. A recent Republican plan to replace Obamacare would permit states to “keep the Affordable Care Act if it is working for their residents,” as Senator Susan Collins described. While its future is unclear, the plan is a sign that there’s appetite for honoring states’ health-care decisions, which could include interstate agreements. Elridge is not even certain that multistate exchanges would be seen as controversial as interstate compacts go, despite the charged political climate. “If Kentucky and Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia said, ‘We understand the health challenges in these states, we’re going to develop some kind of interstate compact that works in terms of expanding access to care, making it quality, and making it affordable,’ they can absolutely do that,’” he said.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>Compacts solve the aff---they’re uniform and coordinated---22 national examples prove solvency</h4><p>Jackel & Green ’17</strong> (<u>Robert Jackel</u> – JD @ the University of Pennsylvania Law School, Attorney @ the Law Office of Robert Jackel, former Staff Attorney at the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. <u>Alex Green</u> – MPA Candidate @ the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, research associate @ the Harvard Business School. 4 February 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/interstate-compacts-save-obamacare/515604/)</p><p>Across the country, Democrats have vowed to fight efforts from congressional Republicans and the White House to repeal the Affordable Care Act—a task that grows more complicated by the day. Yet even if the law is repealed, with or without a replacement, progressives could still have recourse at the state level. <u>A widely used form of treaty between <mark>states</u> <u>could</mark> allow them to <strong><mark>bond together</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>and set up</mark> their own</u> <u><strong><mark>multistate health-care programs</u></strong></mark> <u>to fill the gaps created by the federal government</u>. In an age of retreating federal programs, <u>interstate compacts could be a tool for progressive states to enact a</u> regional or even <u>nationwide agenda</u>.</p><p><u><mark>Large states would have</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>little trouble</u></strong></mark> <u>replacing the ACA</u>, often called Obamacare, <u>with a state-run program on their own</u>. <u>California has the resources and population to run its state health-care exchange</u>, Covered California, from Sacramento, <u>and could even fund the Medicaid expansion</u> it implemented under the ACA. To the north, less populous states like <u>Oregon and Washington</u> would struggle to do the same without comparably sized economies. But <u>if they join together with California in an interstate compact</u>, <u><mark>they could</mark> potentially</u> <u><strong><mark>reap the benefits of the economy of scale</u></strong></mark>—<u><mark>saving on costs through</mark> the sheer size of the enrollment pool</u> <u>and</u> <u><strong><mark>bargaining power</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u><mark>Interstate compacts allow</mark> individual states to</u> <u><strong>maintain <mark>consistency</u></strong></mark> <u>in their laws by coordinating on a multistate level</u>. While they may not rival the power of the federal government, <u>compacts may be a next-best option for states facing sudden cutbacks in support from Washington, D.C</u>. States could use them to preserve ACA-initiated programs, or create new systems from scratch.</p><p><u><mark>There are</mark> currently</u> <u><strong><mark>over 200 active interstate compacts</u></strong></mark>, <u>many of which are regional.</u> <u><strong><mark>Twenty-two agreements are national</mark> in scope</u></strong>, <u>and each one addresses a different issue facing the states</u>. The Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, for example, oversees the transfer of parole and probation between states. And the Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission is one of roughly two dozen water-related compacts that govern everything from fish stocks to the fair use of river basins by adjoining states.</p><p><u>Agencies that monitor compacts have authority</u>, delegated from the states, <u>to generate revenue and engage in rule-making</u>—that is, they can create regulations to enforce the powers granted by a given compact. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the Delaware River Port Authority, and the Washington Metro Area Transit Authority are all interstate-compact agencies that run rapid-transit systems.</p><p>There are constitutional limitations on these agreements, even though some actually predate the Constitution and were used to settle land disputes between the colonies. But <u><mark>states can</mark> largely <mark>work around</u></mark> those <u><mark>constraints</u></mark>.</p><p>The Compacts Clause of the Constitution—Article I, Section 10—says, “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress … enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.” Despite that limiting language, <u><mark>states</mark> have <mark>regularly entered</mark> into <mark>these agreements</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>without lawmakers’ approval at all</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>the Supreme Court has supported them</u></strong></mark>, <u>curbing the scope of federal involvement in the process</u>. In 1893, <u>the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government’s authority to approve such agreements was only applicable when an agreement “may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.”</u> It was not completely clear what constraints this left on the states.</p><p>Nearly a century later, the Court took up the issue again, building on their earlier ruling in U.S. Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission in 1978. The Court found that the commission’s policies, which were intended to reform state taxation of multistate businesses, could have been enacted individually by each state. As a result, the Court ruled that the Multistate Tax Compact did not require the consent of Congress. To date, the test for when states need approval remains murky, but <u>in general</u>, <u>when states enact programs they each could have done on their own</u>, <u><strong><mark>congressional approval is not necessary</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>“Congressional consent is not necessarily a legal judgment, it’s a political one,” said Colmon Elridge, director of the National Center for Interstate Compacts, a division of the nonpartisan Council of State Governments that provides information and assistance on how to establish and run compacts. So the standard for lawmakers deliberating whether they should approve a compact is usually, as Elridge put it, “Is this in my political best interest?”</p><p>Moreover, <u><strong><mark>Congress rarely says no to states</u></strong></mark> <u>that want to enter into them</u>. “<u>When it gets to that level</u>,” he said, referring to agreements that are ready for congressional review, “<u>especially in this climate</u>, <u><strong><mark>it’s more dangerous politically to not respect</mark> the will of <mark>the states</u></strong></mark>.” Congressional approval can confer advantages, too, even if it’s not necessarily required for compacts to take effect. Agreements that are backed by Congress carry the force of federal law, and once granted, Congress cannot take back its consent.</p><p>But there can be drawbacks for states that decide to enter into compacts without congressional approval. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the Northeast’s auction-based cap-and-trade program for reducing greenhouse-gas emissions, has been operating for years without congressional approval. Nine states are currently members of the compact: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont.</p><p>As a mandatory program, the RGGI has claimed reductions in lifetime energy bills of $4.67 billion for 4.6 million residences. However, because it lacks congressional consent, the compact does not have the force of law that prevents state governments from interfering from term to term. The program relies instead on individual states for regulation, and their general willingness to continue to participate. Any dispute between states in a congressionally approved compact is brought directly to the Supreme Court of the United States, as part of the Court’s original jurisdiction. But compacts that have not sought congressional approval have no easy mechanism to resolve disagreements.</p><p>This has exposed the RGGI to the whims of changing state governments. In 2011, for example, a dissatisfied New Jersey Governor Chris Christie withdrew from the compact, claiming that “it doesn’t make any sense environmentally or economically.” Even though the state legislature voted to bring New Jersey back into the program, Christie then vetoed the bills to rejoin the agreement.</p><p>While at this point only New Jersey has left—and will likely return after Christie leaves office—the ability of states to leave congressionally unapproved compacts creates vulnerabilities and makes long-term planning harder. As other states, including California, continue to build regional, and even international, climate initiatives without congressional support, New Jersey’s example casts a shadow over their efforts.</p><p><u><mark>Given the</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>ACA’s origins as a state-level initiative</u></strong></mark> <u>in Massachusetts</u>, <u>interstate health-care <mark>exchanges could be</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>operable without lawmakers’ consent</u></strong></mark> <u>under the Supreme Court’s holding in U.S. Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission</u>, though they would be exposed to the same vulnerabilities as the RGGI. But <u>given Republican support for states’ rights</u>, <u><mark>they might</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>even get congressional approval</u></strong></mark>. A recent Republican plan to replace Obamacare would permit states to “keep the Affordable Care Act if it is working for their residents,” as Senator Susan Collins described. While its future is unclear, the plan is a sign that <u><mark>there’s appetite for honoring states’ health-care decisions</mark>, which could include interstate agreements</u>.</p><p><u>Elridge is not even certain that multistate exchanges would be seen as controversial as interstate compacts go,</u> despite the charged political climate. “If Kentucky and Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia said, ‘We understand the health challenges in these states, we’re going to develop some kind of interstate compact that works in terms of expanding access to care, making it quality, and making it affordable,’ they can absolutely do that,’” he said.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Meza, 15 --- Nizhone, BYU Education and Law Journal, lexis fulltext: Current Federal Indian Education Policy Although there are provisions regarding Indian education in over 150 treaties between tribes and the United States, n19 there are differing opinions, not explored in this Comment, on the extent and even on the existence of the United States' legal responsibility for Indian education. n20 And while the Supreme Court has continually upheld the unique trust responsibility to the tribes as "domestic dependent nations," n21 it is Congress and the Executive Branch that have agreed "that the federal government has a special responsibility for the education of Indian peoples." n22 In fact, not only has Congress included Indian education in bills such as the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act and specific provisions in the No Child Left Behind Act, but also "Congress has codified this responsibility more explicitly in the Native American Education Improvement Act." n23 A. Indian Education Act of 1972 The Indian Education Act addressed the special educational and cultural needs of American Indian and Alaska Native [*357] students through the Department of Education. The Act created the National Advisory Council. n24 It was also the source of funding for "research activities and various discretionary programs" and ""basic' funding to public school districts, tribes, and Bureau-funded schools based on eligible student enrollment." n25 A wide variety of programs could use the basic funding as long as the program addressed "the culturally related academic needs of Indian children, promoted high educational standards, included student performance goals and was developed with the active involvement of the Indian community and approved by a committee selected by Indian parents and students." n26 B. No Child Left Behind - Title VII: Indian Education In 2001, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act was reauthorized as the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). n27 The Statement of Policy and Purpose of Title VII of NCLB, or Indian Education, was amended to read as follows: Sec. 7101. Statement of Policy. It is the policy of the United States to fulfill the Federal Government's unique and continuing trust relationship with and responsibility to the Indian people for the education of Indian children. The Federal Government will continue to ... ensure that programs that serve Indian children are of the highest quality and provide for not only the basic elementary and secondary education needs, but also the unique educational and culturally related academic needs of these children. Sec. 7102. Purpose. (a) Purpose - It is the purpose ... to support the efforts ... to meet the unique educational and culturally related academic needs of American Indian and Alaska Native students, so that such students can meet the same challenging State student academic achievement standards as all other students are expected to meet. n28 Title VII of NCLB provides funding for research, [*358] evaluation, data collection, technical assistance as well as direct assistance for programs that meet the unique educational and culturally related academic needs of American Indian and Alaska Natives. n29 Title VII also provides for the training of Indian persons as educators, counselors, and other professionals serving Indian people. n30 In 2013, House Republicans attempted to bring a partisan bill to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act HR 5 that would have consolidated federal funds designated for special populations. n31 This was met with some resistance and Congresswoman McCollum issued the following statement: I object in the strongest terms to this abandonment of our federal trust responsibility to Native American youth. Students throughout Indian Country are already bearing the brunt of sequestrations cuts to education. Now this partisan bill would strip away the guaranteed funding and the crucial academic and cultural supports that Native students need. n32 Subsequently, the House voted to pass the Young-Gabbard-Hanabusa-McCollum Amendment to the Student Success Act which not only restored funding for students throughout Indian Country, but illustrated "the recognized need for the federal government to live up to its trust responsibility for our Native students by guaranteeing the funding needed to provide high quality culturally appropriate education." n33 C. The Native American Languages Act In stark contrast to the assimilation period, the Native American Languages Act n34 "specifically recognizes the [*359] importance of indigenous language, including Native Hawaiian and Native Pacific Islander languages, and the policy of the United States to work with native communities to ensure their survival." n35 It has been noted that native language programs may be necessarily incorporated to ensure student achievement. This realization comes after generations of children have been denied an appropriate education due to the failure of addressing the needs of native speakers. n36 The Act recognized official Native American government languages as well as the rights of tribes "to use native languages as a medium of instruction." n37 The purpose of the Act was not only to ensure equal access to education, but its purpose was also "to support indigenous language survival, cultural awareness, and student success and self-confidence." n38 The Act encouraged "teaching native languages in the same manner, and with the same status, as foreign languages." n39 [*360] Amendments to the Native American Programs Act in 2006 "authorized funding for immersion programs and other programs designed to restore native languages as living languages, by funding "Native American language nests' for children under the age of seven, "Native American language survival schools' for school age students, and restoration programs, including native language and culture camps." n40 IV. Current State of Indian Education Native American students continue to perform at a much lower rate than the general population. n41 It is estimated that 81 percent of Indian students read below grade level. n42 In 2005, it was estimated that only 50.6 percent of Native American students graduated from high school. n43 Furthermore, American Indians and Alaska Native students have significantly lower than average scores "on both the math and verbal portions of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT)" and are the least likely ethnic group to attend college. n44 American Indian Education policy can no longer be limited to the federal level. The 2010 Census revealed that about 70 percent of the American Indian and Alaska Native population now live in metropolitan areas. n45 About 90 percent of all American Indian and Alaska Native students attend regular public schools with only 7 percent attending schools administered by the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs. n46 [*361] As a result, state education policy impacts the education of Native American and Alaska Native students more than federal policy. The influence of United States Indian Education policy on the independent sovereign states is limited and dependent on each individual state and its state school board's understanding of federal funds that are intended to benefit the American Indian and Alaska Native student. As a result, there are sporadic effects on Indian education. Tribal sovereignty is indirectly being affected by the education of the future generation. There are an estimated 209 indigenous languages still spoken in America with 562 recognized sovereign tribal nations in the United States. n47 A recent survey n48 by the National Indian Education Study (NIES) showed that a higher percentage of students at Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) schools reported having more knowledge of their American Indian/Alaska Native history than in low-density public schools. n49 Children are the tribes' most vital resource to tribal sovereignty, but without student success in education and the foundational knowledge of culture and language, tribal governments may be left ill prepared. V. The Future of Indian Education The future of Indian Education remains unknown. However, the preservation of culture and language is beginning to be recognized federally and by a few states as an indirect means to improve the state of Indian Education. Proposed federal legislation includes financial support for preserving American Indian cultures and languages. State support varies between individual states as well as discrepancies of program implementation among individual school districts within the same state. When all major players influencing the education [*362] of Native American students work together, the state of Indian education has the potential to make a dramatic turn. A. Continued Support for Culture and Language Preservation 1. H.R. 5 - Student Success Act The recently proposed Student Success Act contains many provisions that indirectly preserve tribal sovereignty by restoring traditional culture and language to Indian Education. The bill would revise the current Title VII Indian Education program and consolidate federal funds designated for special populations. n50 The Student Success Act would add activities that could be supported by grants such as Native American language immersion programs and Native American language restoration programs. n51 However, the pending Student Success Act has garnered mixed reactions. While the House passed the bill with amendments, H.R. 5 only has a 20 percent chance of passing the Senate. n52 As of the date of this publication, the bill remains in Senate Committee. n53<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><u>Native education legislation can’t pass congress without PC</h4><p><strong>Meza, 15 --- </strong>Nizhone, BYU Education and Law Journal, lexis</p><p></u>Current Federal Indian Education Policy Although there are provisions regarding Indian education in over 150 treaties between tribes and the United States, n19 <u><strong><mark>there are differing opinions</u></strong></mark>, not explored in this Comment, <u><strong><mark>on</mark> the extent and even on the existence of</u></strong> the <u><strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates' legal <u><strong><mark>responsibility for Indian education</u></strong></mark>. n20 And while the Supreme Court has continually upheld the unique trust responsibility to the tribes as "domestic dependent nations," n21 it is Congress and the Executive Branch that have agreed "that the federal government has a special responsibility for the education of Indian peoples." n22 In fact, not only has Congress included Indian education in bills such as the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act and specific provisions in the No Child Left Behind Act, but also "Congress has codified this responsibility more explicitly in the Native American Education Improvement Act." n23 A. Indian Education Act of 1972 The Indian Education Act addressed the special educational and cultural needs of American Indian and Alaska Native [*357] students through the Department of Education. The Act created the National Advisory Council. n24 It was also the source of funding for "research activities and various discretionary programs" and ""basic' funding to public school districts, tribes, and Bureau-funded schools based on eligible student enrollment." n25 A wide variety of programs could use the basic funding as long as the program addressed "the culturally related academic needs of Indian children, promoted high educational standards, included student performance goals and was developed with the active involvement of the Indian community and approved by a committee selected by Indian parents and students." n26 B. No Child Left Behind - Title VII: Indian Education In 2001, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act was reauthorized as the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). n27 The Statement of Policy and Purpose of Title VII of NCLB, or Indian Education, was amended to read as follows: Sec. 7101. Statement of Policy. It is the policy of the United States to fulfill the Federal Government's unique and continuing trust relationship with and responsibility to the Indian people for the education of Indian children. The Federal Government will continue to ... ensure that programs that serve Indian children are of the highest quality and provide for not only the basic elementary and secondary education needs, but also the unique educational and culturally related academic needs of these children. Sec. 7102. Purpose. (a) Purpose - It is the purpose ... to support the efforts ... to meet the unique educational and culturally related academic needs of American Indian and Alaska Native students, so that such students can meet the same challenging State student academic achievement standards as all other students are expected to meet. n28 Title VII of NCLB provides funding for research, [*358] evaluation, data collection, technical assistance as well as direct assistance for programs that meet the unique educational and culturally related academic needs of American Indian and Alaska Natives. n29 Title VII also provides for the training of Indian persons as educators, counselors, and other professionals serving Indian people. n30 <u><strong>In 2013</u></strong>, House <u><strong><mark>Republicans attempted to bring a partisan bill</mark> </u></strong>to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act HR 5 <u><strong><mark>that</mark> would have <mark>consolidated federal funds</mark> designated for special populations</u></strong>. n31 This was met with some resistance and Congresswoman McCollum issued the following statement: I object in the strongest terms to this abandonment of our federal trust responsibility to Native American youth. Students throughout Indian Country are already bearing the brunt of sequestrations cuts to education. Now this partisan bill would strip away the guaranteed funding and the crucial academic and cultural supports that Native students need. n32 Subsequently, the House voted to pass the Young-Gabbard-Hanabusa-McCollum Amendment to the Student Success Act which not only restored funding for students throughout Indian Country, but illustrated "the recognized need for the federal government to live up to its trust responsibility for our Native students by guaranteeing the funding needed to provide high quality culturally appropriate education." n33 C. The Native American Languages Act In stark contrast to the assimilation period, the Native American Languages Act n34 "specifically recognizes the [*359] importance of indigenous language, including Native Hawaiian and Native Pacific Islander languages, and the policy of the United States to work with native communities to ensure their survival." n35 It has been noted that native language programs may be necessarily incorporated to ensure student achievement. This realization comes after generations of children have been denied an appropriate education due to the failure of addressing the needs of native speakers. n36 The Act recognized official Native American government languages as well as the rights of tribes "to use native languages as a medium of instruction." n37 The purpose of the Act was not only to ensure equal access to education, but its purpose was also "to support indigenous language survival, cultural awareness, and student success and self-confidence." n38 The Act encouraged "teaching native languages in the same manner, and with the same status, as foreign languages." n39 [*360] Amendments to the Native American Programs Act in 2006 "authorized funding for immersion programs and other programs designed to restore native languages as living languages, by funding "Native American language nests' for children under the age of seven, "Native American language survival schools' for school age students, and restoration programs, including native language and culture camps." n40 IV. Current State of Indian Education Native American students continue to perform at a much lower rate than the general population. n41 It is estimated that 81 percent of Indian students read below grade level. n42 In 2005, it was estimated that only 50.6 percent of Native American students graduated from high school. n43 Furthermore, American Indians and Alaska Native students have significantly lower than average scores "on both the math and verbal portions of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT)" and are the least likely ethnic group to attend college. n44 American Indian Education policy can no longer be limited to the federal level. The 2010 Census revealed that about 70 percent of the American Indian and Alaska Native population now live in metropolitan areas. n45 About 90 percent of all American Indian and Alaska Native students attend regular public schools with only 7 percent attending schools administered by the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs. n46 [*361] As a result, state education policy impacts the education of Native American and Alaska Native students more than federal policy. The influence of United States Indian Education policy on the independent sovereign states is limited and dependent on each individual state and its state school board's understanding of federal funds that are intended to benefit the American Indian and Alaska Native student. As a result, there are sporadic effects on Indian education. Tribal sovereignty is indirectly being affected by the education of the future generation. There are an estimated 209 indigenous languages still spoken in America with 562 recognized sovereign tribal nations in the United States. n47 A recent survey n48 by the National Indian Education Study (NIES) showed that a higher percentage of students at Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) schools reported having more knowledge of their American Indian/Alaska Native history than in low-density public schools. n49 Children are the tribes' most vital resource to tribal sovereignty, but without student success in education and the foundational knowledge of culture and language, tribal governments may be left ill prepared. V. The Future of Indian Education <u><strong><mark>The future of Indian Education remains unknown</u></strong></mark>. However, the preservation of culture and language is beginning to be recognized federally and by a few states as an indirect means to improve the state of Indian Education. Proposed federal legislation includes financial support for preserving American Indian cultures and languages. State support varies between individual states as well as discrepancies of program implementation among individual school districts within the same state. When all major players influencing the education [*362] of Native American students work together, the state of Indian education has the potential to make a dramatic turn. A. Continued Support for Culture and Language Preservation 1. H.R. 5 - Student Success Act <u><strong><mark>The recently proposed S</mark>tudent <mark>S</mark>uccess <mark>A</mark>ct contains many <mark>provisions</mark> that</u></strong> indirectly <u><strong><mark>preserve</u></strong></mark> tribal sovereignty by restoring traditional culture and language to <u><strong><mark>Indian Education</u></strong></mark>. The bill would revise the current Title VII Indian Education program and consolidate federal funds designated for special populations. n50 The Student Success Act would add activities that could be supported by grants such as Native American language immersion programs and Native American language restoration programs. n51 <u><strong><mark>However, the</mark> pending Student Success <mark>Act has garnered mixed reactions</u></strong></mark>. While the House passed the bill with amendments, <u><strong>H<mark>.R. 5 only has a 20 percent chance of passing</mark> the Senate</u></strong>. n52 As of the date of this publication, <u><strong><mark>the bill remains in</mark> Senate <mark>Committee</u></strong></mark>. n53</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Richard H. Speier et al. 17., George Nacouzi, Carrie A. Lee, and Richard M. Moore. 2017. “Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons.” RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi fulltext: Negotiations and coordination with other governments take time, so it is worth asking how much time is available for hypersonic missile nonproliferation measures before the hardware and technology are too widespread to contain. It appears that there will be a decade or less during which hypersonic missiles and their enabling technologies will remain in the hands of a few key actors and will not become fielded. Although there are predictions that hypersonic missiles will be ready for military use in the 2017-to-2020 period, the history of such complex systems suggests otherwise. Given the rate at which governments move, now is the time to raise the possibility of the control of such systems with other governments. As the history of other nonproliferation regimes demonstrates, sooner is better than later. One occasional proposal for controlling hypersonic missiles is to negotiate either a global ban or a nonproliferation treaty to stop their spread. However, the history of technology bans negotiated between the current “haves” and the “have-nots” is not promising. Typically, the have-nots demand a price for their restraint—often in the form of access to civilian forms of the items to be banned. The NPT includes a provision agreeing to share the benefits of “peaceful nuclear explosions,” and proposals for a ballistic missile NPT typically include a provision to share space launch vehicle technology.4 One proposal is to initiate a test ban on hypersonic missiles among the United States, Russia, China, and perhaps France and India.5 However, all of these proposals for bans run up against the question of whether the United States, Russia, and China—now heavily invested in hypersonic developments—would give up the weapons. Without foreclosing the possibility of bans, this report will look at other options that do not require them. Another frequent suggestion for dealing with proliferation is to promote confidence-building measures. These measures are designed to reduce tensions by such means as preannouncement of tests or mutual observation of facilities. However, because they do not necessarily hinder the spread of the hardware and technology in question, their nonproliferation value is questionable. Yet another approach is to offer incentives to nations to abjure hypersonic missiles. These might be positive incentives such as offers of nonhypersonic military aid in return for hypersonic restraint. However, such an approach raises the classic problem that to pay a price for someone not to do something is to encourage that someone to find more objectionable activities not to do. There are also negative incentives, i.e., sanctions. However, sanctions generally require widespread support, and this requires widespread agreement that the particular instance of the sanctioned activity is sufficiently objectionable—a difficult standard to meet except in the cases of such rogue nations as Iran and North Korea.6 Shared defenses against hypersonic missiles are one form of positive incentive that might be considered. The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2017 call for examination of such defenses includes provisions for working jointly with other nations. However, as noted previously, the prospects are not clear for effective defenses against hypersonic missiles. Even shared warning of an impending hypersonic attack—perhaps relying on some form of satellite observation—would, if feasible, offer no more than a few additional minutes of reaction time. Multilateral export controls are international measures that have already been well tested. These require only the actions of the nations possessing the technology in question, not the have-not nations. As is detailed in Appendix C, hypersonic missile technology is exceedingly complex. For example, igniting a scramjet engine has been compared to lighting a match in a 5,000 km/hr wind. During flight, the shape of a hypersonic missile will change; so flight controls need to be adaptive to compensate for this effect. Propulsion (for HCMs), materials, thermal management, flight control, and testing are challenges even for the United States, Russia, and China. Consequently, for other nations, such hypersonic developments could be prohibitively difficult, without experienced foreign support. Because a number of regimes for technology export controls currently exist, there is a substantial body of experience to extend them to hypersonic missiles. We examine such an approach more deeply in the remainder of this chapter. Potential Export Controls The United States, Russia, and China are key players in any discussion about the control of hypersonic technology capabilities. No export controls against the spread of such capabilities can be effective unless at least these three nations support them. If one of the three chose to freely export hypersonic weapons, the restraint of the other two would be undercut. Some would add France and India to this group—and with France, its nonproliferation experience might give it an important role.7 What would be the attitudes of the three governments toward export controls on hypersonic weapons and their technology? Of course, it is impossible to know this with confidence without approaching them through diplomatic channels to obtain an official response. And such responses can vary from time to time depending on other aspects of the relationships of these governments. The authors met with subject-matter experts on these governments or in some cases officials of the governments. Those meeting with the authors were generally optimistic on the attitudes of the governments toward a nonproliferation policy. Without giving up current programs, the three might very well be disposed to try to prevent further proliferation.8 The maps in Figures 4.1–4.3 show some reasons why Russia and China might prefer to avoid a world in which hypersonic weapons were widely marketed. Both would face challenges to defend against Japanese hypersonic weapons—Russia at least in its far east and China in its most critical cities and infrastructure. The same Chinese cities and infrastructure would be vulnerable to intermediate-range Indian missiles. To these reasons, one could add the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military threats to European Russia; a Poland able to purchase hypersonic missiles on the world market would be especially objectionable to Russia. The value of a policy shared by the three governments is highlighted when considering the technical barriers to developing hypersonic weapons.9 The barriers to developing hypersonic missiles are so great that a tripartite embargo on exports of complete hypersonic delivery systems and major subsystems could be effective for several years. And other governments might themselves honor such an embargo as part of a wider effort to ensure that hypersonic missiles are not deployed in their neighborhoods. A simple tripartite embargo, either alone or with other measures and other supporters, could therefore be the key to hindering hypersonic missile proliferation.10 What other measures might supplement such an embargo? Measure of caution toward the spread of lower-level hypersonic technology (short of the embargoed complete systems) could further reduce the proliferation problem while allowing acceptable uses of lower-level technology to be pursued. There is a 35-member international policy that currently handles the missile proliferation problem in this two-tiered manner, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Russia is a member of the MTCR, but China is not. However, China claims that it observes a version of the MTCR. A policy toward hypersonic nonproliferation could be adopted in whole or in part within the MTCR, or—perhaps because China is not a member of the MTCR—the key tripartite governments could formulate it separately. Consequently, there are possible arrangements within or outside of the MTCR. By bringing in other nations, the effectiveness of a nonproliferation policy could be substantially enhanced. Is the Missile Technology Control Regime Adaptable to Hypersonic Technology? A key feature of the MTCR that affects its application to hypersonic weapons is that the MTCR is designed to control the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering WMDs (nuclear, chemical, or biological payloads). Because the MTCR was originally intended to control nuclearcapable missiles, its strongest restraints (strong presumptions to deny exports) are against missiles capable of delivering 500-kilogram (kg) payloads. The MTCR was later broadened to place similar restraints against missiles intended to deliver WMDs. But hypersonic missiles may not fit into these categories. As noted previously, they can be effect tive with a small payload or no payload at all.11 To redesign the MTCR to direct its strongest restraints against such destabilizing missiles would be a major change in the MTCR’s focus—but not an impossible one. Consequently, it will be worth exploring whether it is feasible to place all hypersonic controls in the MTCR or whether to look at other solutions. Other possibilities would be to ensure that the lesser restraints of the MTCR (case-by-case export application reviews) cover hypersonic hardware and technology. These lesser restraints can be effective. The MTCR includes extensive information exchanges and a “no-undercut” rule (see Appendix D) that help to coordinate the restraint of 35 governments. Another option might be a hybrid approach with (1) the United States, Russia, and China declaring strong restraints against the export of complete delivery systems and their major subsystems, and (2) the MTCR requiring case-by-case export reviews of lesser components. In fact, the MTCR already requires such reviews of items like scramjets and their (currently undefined) components, so it would not be a stretch to cover other hypersonic items similarly. Whatever approach is to be taken, it is likely that the final policy would, like the MTCR, strongly hinder the export of some items and allow the export of others. The MTCR strongly hinders the export of rockets and unmanned air vehicles capable of delivering a 500-kg payload to a range of 300 km. It also strongly hinders the export of any missiles intended to deliver WMDs. However, it allows several classes of activities and, in some cases, does not affect them at all. Such allowed activities include the export of manned aircraft, the tightly controlled export of 500-kg/300-km–capable systems on a rare basis, the indigenous development of missile systems, the export of lesser components on a case-by-case basis after examining the end-use and the end-user, and the sharing of benefits without the sharing of hardware (e.g., the provision of space launch services without the export of rockets).12 At this point, it is appropriate to note the potentially important role of France in a hypersonic missile nonproliferation policy. France is the point of contact in the MTCR, the central point handling documents and hosting intercessional meetings that explore new issues. Moreover, France is perhaps the leading developer of hypersonic technology after the United States, Russia, and China. Whether or not France participates in initial policy actions by the primary three governments, it could be central in coordinating the expansion of any policy to a wider set of international participants. Recommended Items to Control This report recommends items that should be subject to new export restraints. The details are laid out in Appendix D. But how should one implement such restraints? The basic requirement is that the United States, Russia, and China agree on export restraints that they will not undercut. Without such a tripartite sponsorship, any policy will be exceedingly weak. The minimum tripartite agreement would need to embargo complete hypersonic missiles and their major subsystems. As is described in detail in Appendix C, without complete missiles, most potential proliferators would face a long and difficult process to obtain such weapons. Once a basic tripartite agreement is reached (or in parallel to it), a higher number of nations can agree on a broader set of export restraints. As noted above, we believe that France could play a central role in this process. We do not need to prejudge whether this process would take place within or outside of the MTCR, but the MTCR is well suited for much of the effort. A strong presumption of export denial should be imposed on three items: (1) complete HGVs, (2) complete HCMs, and (3) warheads for HGVs and HCMs.13<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Hypersonic weapons is a unique opportunity for arms control</h4><p>Richard H. <strong>Speier et al. 17</strong>., George Nacouzi, Carrie A. Lee, and Richard M. Moore. 2017. “Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons.” RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi</p><p><u>Negotiations and coordination with other governments take time</u>, so it is worth asking how much time is available for hypersonic missile nonproliferation measures before the hardware and technology are too widespread to contain. It appears that <u>there will be <strong>a decade or less during which hypersonic missiles and their enabling technologies will remain in the hands of a few key actors and will not become fielded. </strong>Although there are predictions that hypersonic missiles will be ready for military use in</u> the 2017-to-<u>2020</u> period, <u>the history of</u> such <u>complex systems suggests otherwise</u>. Given the rate at which governments move, <u><strong>now is the time to raise the possibility of the control of such systems with other governments</u></strong>. As the history of other nonproliferation regimes demonstrates, <u><strong>sooner is better than later. </u></strong>One occasional proposal for controlling hypersonic missiles is to negotiate either a global ban or a nonproliferation treaty to stop their spread. However, the history of technology bans negotiated between the current “haves” and the “have-nots” is not promising. Typically, the have-nots demand a price for their restraint—often in the form of access to civilian forms of the items to be banned. The NPT includes a provision agreeing to share the benefits of “peaceful nuclear explosions,” and proposals for a ballistic missile NPT typically include a provision to share space launch vehicle technology.4 One proposal is to initiate <u>a test <strong>ban</strong> on hypersonic missiles</u> among the United States, Russia, China, and perhaps France and India.5 However, all of these proposals for bans <u><strong>run up against the question of whether the United States, Russia, and China—</u></strong>now heavily invested in hypersonic developments—<u><strong>would give up the weapons</u></strong>. Without foreclosing the possibility of bans, this report will look at other options that do not require them. Another frequent suggestion for dealing with proliferation is to promote <u>confidence-building measures</u>. These measures are designed to reduce tensions by such means as preannouncement of tests or mutual observation of facilities. However, <u>because they do not necessarily hinder the spread of the hardware and technology in question, their nonproliferation value is questionable. </u>Yet another approach is to offer incentives to nations to abjure hypersonic missiles. These might be positive incentives such as offers of nonhypersonic military aid in return for hypersonic restraint. However, such an approach raises the classic problem that to pay a price for someone not to do something is to encourage that someone to find more objectionable activities not to do. There are also negative incentives, i.e., sanctions. However, sanctions generally require widespread support, and this requires widespread agreement that the particular instance of the sanctioned activity is sufficiently objectionable—a difficult standard to meet except in the cases of such rogue nations as Iran and North Korea.6 Shared defenses against hypersonic missiles are one form of positive incentive that might be considered. The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2017 call for examination of such defenses includes provisions for working jointly with other nations. However, as noted previously, the prospects are not clear for effective defenses against hypersonic missiles. Even shared warning of an impending hypersonic attack—perhaps relying on some form of satellite observation—would, if feasible, offer no more than a few additional minutes of reaction time. <u>Multilateral export controls are international measures <strong>that have already been well tested.</u></strong> These require only the actions of the nations possessing the technology in question, not the have-not nations. As is detailed in Appendix C, hypersonic missile technology is exceedingly complex. For example, igniting a scramjet engine has been compared to lighting a match in a 5,000 km/hr wind. During flight, the shape of a hypersonic missile will change; so flight controls need to be adaptive to compensate for this effect. <u>Propulsion</u> (for HCMs), <u>materials, thermal management, flight control, and testing are challenges even for the United States, Russia, and China</u>. Consequently<u>, for other nations, such hypersonic developments could be <strong>prohibitively difficult, without experienced foreign support</u></strong>. <u>Because a number of <strong>regimes</strong> for technology <strong>export controls</strong> currently exist, there is a substantial body of experience to extend them to <strong>hypersonic missiles</strong>.</u> We examine such an approach more deeply in the remainder of this chapter. Potential Export Controls <u>The United States, Russia, and China <strong>are key players in</u></strong> any discussion about the <u><strong>control of hypersonic technology capabilities</strong>. No export controls against the spread of such capabilities can be effective unless at least these three nations support them</u>. If one of the three chose to freely export hypersonic weapons, the restraint of the other two would be undercut. Some would add France and India to this group—and with France, its nonproliferation experience might give it an important role.7 What would be the attitudes of the three governments toward export controls on hypersonic weapons and their technology? Of course, it is impossible to know this with confidence without approaching them through diplomatic channels to obtain an official response. And such responses can vary from time to time depending on other aspects of the relationships of these governments. <u>The authors met with subject-matter experts on these governments or in some cases officials of the governments. Those meeting with the authors <strong>were generally optimistic on the attitudes of the governments toward a nonproliferation policy. Without giving up current programs, the three might very well be disposed to try to prevent further proliferation</u></strong>.8 The maps in Figures 4.1–4.3 show some reasons why <u>Russia and China</u> might <u>prefer to avoid a world in which hypersonic weapons were widely marketed. Both would face challenges to defend against Japanese hypersonic weapons</u>—Russia at least in its far east and China in its most critical cities and infrastructure. The same Chinese cities and infrastructure would be vulnerable to intermediate-range Indian missiles. To these reasons, one could add the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military threats to European Russia; a Poland able to purchase hypersonic missiles on the world market would be especially objectionable to Russia. The value of a policy shared by the three governments is highlighted when considering the technical barriers to developing hypersonic weapons.9 The <u>barriers to developing hypersonic missiles are so great that a </u>tripartite embargo on exports of complete hypersonic delivery systems and major subsystems could be effective<u> </u>for several years. And other governments might themselves honor such an embargo as part of a wider effort to ensure that hypersonic missiles are not deployed in their neighborhoods. <u>A simple tripartite embargo</u>, either alone or with other measures and other supporters, <u>could</u> therefore <u><strong>be the key to hindering hypersonic missile proliferation</u></strong>.10 What other measures might supplement such an embargo? Measure of caution toward the spread of lower-level hypersonic technology (short of the embargoed complete systems) could further reduce the proliferation problem while allowing acceptable uses of lower-level technology to be pursued. There is a 35-member international policy that currently handles the missile proliferation problem in this two-tiered manner, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Russia is a member of the MTCR, but China is not. However, China claims that it observes a version of the MTCR. A policy toward hypersonic nonproliferation could be adopted in whole or in part within the MTCR, or—perhaps because China is not a member of the MTCR—the key tripartite governments could formulate it separately. Consequently, there are possible arrangements within or outside of the MTCR. By bringing in other nations, the effectiveness of a nonproliferation policy could be substantially enhanced. Is the Missile Technology Control Regime Adaptable to Hypersonic Technology? A key feature of the MTCR that affects its application to hypersonic weapons is that the MTCR is designed to control the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering WMDs (nuclear, chemical, or biological payloads). Because the MTCR was originally intended to control nuclearcapable missiles, its strongest restraints (strong presumptions to deny exports) are against missiles capable of delivering 500-kilogram (kg) payloads. The MTCR was later broadened to place similar restraints against missiles intended to deliver WMDs. But hypersonic missiles may not fit into these categories. As noted previously, they can be effect tive with a small payload or no payload at all.11 To redesign the MTCR to direct its strongest restraints against such destabilizing missiles would be a major change in the MTCR’s focus—but not an impossible one. Consequently, it will be worth exploring whether it is feasible to place all hypersonic controls in the MTCR or whether to look at other solutions. Other possibilities would be to ensure that the lesser restraints of the MTCR (case-by-case export application reviews) cover hypersonic hardware and technology. These lesser restraints can be effective. The MTCR includes extensive information exchanges and a “no-undercut” rule (see Appendix D) that help to coordinate the restraint of 35 governments. Another option might be a hybrid approach with (1) the United States, Russia, and China declaring strong restraints against the export of complete delivery systems and their major subsystems, and (2) the MTCR requiring case-by-case export reviews of lesser components. In fact, the MTCR already requires such reviews of items like scramjets and their (currently undefined) components, so it would not be a stretch to cover other hypersonic items similarly. Whatever approach is to be taken, it is likely that the final policy would, like the MTCR, strongly hinder the export of some items and allow the export of others. The MTCR strongly hinders the export of rockets and unmanned air vehicles capable of delivering a 500-kg payload to a range of 300 km. It also strongly hinders the export of any missiles intended to deliver WMDs. However, it allows several classes of activities and, in some cases, does not affect them at all. Such allowed activities include the export of manned aircraft, the tightly controlled export of 500-kg/300-km–capable systems on a rare basis, the indigenous development of missile systems, the export of lesser components on a case-by-case basis after examining the end-use and the end-user, and the sharing of benefits without the sharing of hardware (e.g., the provision of space launch services without the export of rockets).12 At this point, it is appropriate to note the potentially important role of France in a hypersonic missile nonproliferation policy. France is the point of contact in the MTCR, the central point handling documents and hosting intercessional meetings that explore new issues. Moreover, France is perhaps the leading developer of hypersonic technology after the United States, Russia, and China. Whether or not France participates in initial policy actions by the primary three governments, it could be central in coordinating the expansion of any policy to a wider set of international participants. Recommended Items to Control This report recommends items that should be subject to new export restraints. The details are laid out in Appendix D. But how should one implement such restraints? <u>The basic requirement is that the United States, Russia, and China agree on export restraints that they will not undercut. Without such a tripartite sponsorship, any policy <strong>will be exceedingly weak</u></strong>. The minimum tripartite agreement would need to embargo complete hypersonic missiles and their major subsystems. As is described in detail in Appendix C, without complete missiles, most potential proliferators would face a long and difficult process to obtain such weapons. Once a basic tripartite agreement is reached (or in parallel to it), a higher number of nations can agree on a broader set of export restraints. As noted above, we believe that France could play a central role in this process. We do not need to prejudge whether this process would take place within or outside of the MTCR, but the MTCR is well suited for much of the effort. A <u>strong presumption of export denial should be imposed on three items: (1) complete HGVs, (2) complete HCMs, and (3) warheads for HGVs and HCMs</u>.13</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Metzger 17 (Gillian E. – Professor of Law at Columbia Law School & Kevin M. Stack – Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University Law School, “INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,” p. 1297-1301, Michigan Law Review, Volume 115, Issue 8, http://michiganlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/115MichLRev1239_MetzgerStack.pdf) fulltext: The limited prospects for congressional and judicial reform suggests that internal measures, coming either from the president and central executive branch entities or from agencies, will prove critical to any project of fostering internal administrative law. 1. Administering Central Executive Branch Law In line with the recommendations of the Brownlow Report and later Hoover Commission,329 presidents have increased their control over agencies in large part through executive orders and other executive actions that have imposed uniform internal law requirements on agencies. Such central executive branch internal law is the primary means by which presidents assert their policy priorities, management, and supervision over agencies. But when the operation of internal law appears in the guise of centralized executive branch policies, it takes on a more political complexion—more obviously the product of asserted political needs to control agency action than a project of agency self-organization and commitment. Internal law risks appearing as simply a vehicle for substantive politics, not a form of law, and especially so during changes in presidential administration. As a result, the president’s management of these centralized policies must be all the more attentive to the rule-of-law values including transparency, argumentation, and consistency. There is much room for improvement in how presidents have administered their internal law, in particular with respect to transparency, norms of reasoned elaboration, and precedent in centralized executive branch agencies. Transparency remains a problem for the principal offices that administer this internal law—OMB, OIRA, and the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). Despite OIRA’s investment in a much more sophisticated “Regulatory Review Dashboard”330 with information about how many agency rules are under review and their stage of development, its disclosures remain inadequate. OIRA’s public disclosures do not include a complete picture of the rules subject to review; some rules only appear on it after significant delay, some are held back from transmittal by the White House, and some items simply never appear.331 But the transparency problems at OIRA have a far greater scope. The regulatory review order requires that when the OIRA believes the agency’s action is inconsistent with the president’s policies or priorities, it must explicitly inform the agency in writing,332 provide a “written explanation” for the return of a rule,333 require the agency to identify “in plain, understandable language” changes in the rule that OIRA required,334 and make available all documents exchanged between OIRA and the agency.335 Scholars have documented that neither the Bush nor the Obama Administrations followed many of these requirements,336 and that OIRA review has often stalled rules well beyond the ninety days provided in the executive order.337 This, too, raises transparency issues. When regulations are delayed, it is often not clear, as Lisa Heinzerling argues, which office—OIRA itself, other White House offices, the head of another agency, etc.—is source of the delay.338 Similar problems of transparency arise in the OMB’s exchanges with agencies over budgeting,339 which are governed by a confidentiality norm imposed by OMB,340 as well as in OLC’s provision of legal advice through less formal processes than its traditional opinion writing.341 Transparency is particularly important to internal law’s recognition as law, so these gaps pose serious problems. Going forward, both retaining and complying with the disclosure and reason-giving requirements of the regulatory review executive order would be a good place to start.342 That level of transparency is also critical for this centralized form of internal law to promote, not obscure, political accountability between the president’s offices and the agencies. Lack of transparency is not the only feature of central executive branch internal law that requires attention. The legal demands of justification and reason giving also apply to internal forms of control.343 Reason giving serves many different functions, one critical role being to provide a source of constraint. When public authorities give reasons, they make a prima facie commitment to acting within the scope of those reasons.344 This implies that departures, changes in course, or reversals carry a burden of justification; generally, public authorities must provide reasons for the change that respond in part to the reasons originally offered. To be sure, the weight of the constraint of prior reasons varies in different aspects of the legal system. In traditional common law practice, precedent binds in the sense of providing exclusive or at least overriding reasons for action for a subsequent decisionmaker, to the extent the decisionmaker is faced with similar circumstances.345 But reason giving can also operate more permissively—as it does, for instance, under the APA’s arbitrary-and-capriciousness standard of review.346 As the Court has emphasized, that standard recognizes that agencies can and will change position, and simply requires that an agency provide a reasoned explanation for its current approach, which entails that the agency acknowledge the change and provide reasons for it.347 Within the executive branch, the norms of precedent at OLC have received greatest attention. This is not surprising; the case for common law–style adherence to precedent is easy to see with regard to OLC, at least when it engages in its traditional, formal opinion writing on particular facts.348 The formal statement of reasons in OLC’s opinions provides ready guidance to subsequent generations of lawyers, and OLC treats its prior opinions as having the weight of precedent.349 In the past few years, OLC has written fewer opinions and appears to be shifting its work more to informal, context-specific advice.350 That informal, situational advice represents a decline in the common law model. Unlike OLC, OIRA does not currently embrace any form of precedent with regard to its past decisions in the context of regulatory review—for instance in prompt or review letters. Nestor Davidson and Ethan Leib argue that it should, contending that having OIRA treat its decisions as bodies of precedent would “enable[ ] meaningful reliance on the decision made, help[ ] justify binding agencies in the future, and provide[ ] an organized way to depart from precedent when that is salutary.”351 Whether formally accorded the weight of precedent or not, a commitment to internal administrative law supports OIRA treating its decisions as at least within the obligation of reasoned elaboration. That approach would allow departures from prior practice, but also reinforce that OIRA is elaborating law, not merely making ad hoc decisions. In short, the principle of reasoned elaboration encompasses not just agencies, but also their central executive branch overseers. The recent change in presidential administration puts the need for these reforms in high relief. As is true of many presidential transitions that involve a change in political control of the White House, the new Trump Administration has made clear that it intends to significantly change substantive policy in a wide array of contexts.352 It can do so in ways that make transparent the source of the changes and provide justification for the grounds for a new approach, both as to matters of fact and policy choice. Proceeding in that way, the new administration could help to strengthen internal administrative law of the executive branch. Alternatively, however, the new presidential administration may opt to change substantive direction without paying heed to these internal constraints and legality values, leaving any enforcement of administrative-law norms of reasoned decisionmaking solely for the courts. Doing so would yield the benefit of faster policy change, but at the cost of an opportunity to embed norms of administrative legality that are important checks against abuse of executive power.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>CP solves best ― executive orders have <u>force of law</u> and are binding </h4><p><strong>Metzger 17</strong> (Gillian E. – Professor of Law at Columbia Law School & Kevin M. Stack – Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University Law School, “INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,” p. 1297-1301, Michigan Law Review, Volume 115, Issue 8, http://michiganlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/115MichLRev1239_MetzgerStack.pdf)</p><p>The <u>limited prospects for congressional and judicial reform suggests that internal measures, coming</u> either <u>from the president and central executive branch </u>entities or from agencies, <u>will prove <strong>critical</strong> to any project of fostering internal administrative law.</u> 1. Administering Central Executive Branch Law In line with the recommendations of the Brownlow Report and later Hoover Commission,329 <u>presidents have increased their control over agencies</u> in large part <u>through <strong><mark>executive orders</strong></mark> and other executive actions that <strong>have <mark>impose</mark>d <mark>uniform internal law requirements</strong></mark> on agencies.</u> Such <u>central executive branch internal law is the primary means by which presidents assert their policy priorities, management, and supervision over agencies.</u> But when the operation of internal law appears in the guise of centralized executive branch policies, it takes on a more political complexion—more obviously the product of asserted political needs to control agency action than a project of agency self-organization and commitment. Internal law risks appearing as simply a vehicle for substantive politics, not a form of law, and especially so during changes in presidential administration. As a result, the president’s management of these centralized policies must be all the more attentive to the rule-of-law values including transparency, argumentation, and consistency. There is much room for improvement in how presidents have administered their internal law, in particular with respect to transparency, norms of reasoned elaboration, and precedent in centralized executive branch agencies. Transparency remains a problem for the principal offices that administer this internal law—OMB, OIRA, and the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). Despite OIRA’s investment in a much more sophisticated “Regulatory Review Dashboard”330 with information about how many agency rules are under review and their stage of development, its disclosures remain inadequate. OIRA’s public disclosures do not include a complete picture of the rules subject to review; some rules only appear on it after significant delay, some are held back from transmittal by the White House, and some items simply never appear.331 But the transparency problems at OIRA have a far greater scope. The regulatory review order requires that when the OIRA believes the agency’s action is inconsistent with the president’s policies or priorities, it must explicitly inform the agency in writing,332 provide a “written explanation” for the return of a rule,333 require the agency to identify “in plain, understandable language” changes in the rule that OIRA required,334 and make available all documents exchanged between OIRA and the agency.335 Scholars have documented that neither the Bush nor the Obama Administrations followed many of these requirements,336 and that OIRA review has often stalled rules well beyond the ninety days provided in the executive order.337 This, too, raises transparency issues. When regulations are delayed, it is often not clear, as Lisa Heinzerling argues, which office—OIRA itself, other White House offices, the head of another agency, etc.—is source of the delay.338 Similar problems of transparency arise in the OMB’s exchanges with agencies over budgeting,339 which are governed by a confidentiality norm imposed by OMB,340 as well as in OLC’s provision of legal advice through less formal processes than its traditional opinion writing.341 <u><strong><mark>Transparency is</mark> particularly <mark>important to internal law’s recognition as law</u></strong></mark>, so these gaps pose serious problems. <u>Going forward, both retaining and complying with the disclosure and reason-giving requirements of the</u> regulatory review <u>executive order would be a good place to start.</u>342 <u>That level of <mark>transparency</mark> is also critical for this centralized form of internal law to <mark>promote</u>,</mark> not obscure, <u><strong><mark>political accountability</u></strong></mark> <u>between the president’s offices and the agencies.</u> Lack of transparency is not the only feature of central executive branch internal law that requires attention. <u><mark>The <strong>legal demands of justification and reason giving</mark> also apply to internal forms of control.</u></strong>343 <u>Reason giving serves many different functions, one critical role being to <mark>provide a <strong>source of constraint</mark>.</strong> When public authorities give reasons, they make a <strong>prima facie commitment to acting within the scope of those reasons.</u></strong>344 <u>This implies that departures, changes in course, or reversals carry a burden of justification</u>; generally, public authorities must provide reasons for the change that respond in part to the reasons originally offered. To be sure, the weight of the constraint of prior reasons varies in different aspects of the legal system. In traditional common law practice, <u>precedent binds in the sense of providing exclusive or at least overriding reasons for action for a subsequent decisionmaker, to the extent the decisionmaker is faced with similar circumstances.</u>345 But reason giving can also operate more permissively—as it does, for instance, under the APA’s arbitrary-and-capriciousness standard of review.346 As the Court has emphasized, that standard recognizes that agencies can and will change position, and simply requires that an agency provide a reasoned explanation for its current approach, which entails that the agency acknowledge the change and provide reasons for it.347 Within the executive branch, the norms of precedent at OLC have received greatest attention. This is not surprising; the case for common law–style adherence to precedent is easy to see with regard to OLC, at least when it engages in its traditional, formal opinion writing on particular facts.348 The formal statement of reasons in OLC’s opinions provides ready guidance to subsequent generations of lawyers, and OLC treats its prior opinions as having the weight of precedent.349 In the past few years, OLC has written fewer opinions and appears to be shifting its work more to informal, context-specific advice.350 That informal, situational advice represents a decline in the common law model. Unlike OLC, OIRA does not currently embrace any form of precedent with regard to its past decisions in the context of regulatory review—for instance in prompt or review letters. Nestor Davidson and Ethan Leib argue that it should, contending that having OIRA treat its decisions as bodies of precedent would “enable[ ] meaningful reliance on the decision made, help[ ] justify binding agencies in the future, and provide[ ] an organized way to depart from precedent when that is salutary.”351 Whether formally accorded the weight of precedent or not, a commitment to internal administrative law supports OIRA treating its decisions as at least within the obligation of reasoned elaboration. That approach would allow departures from prior practice, but also reinforce that OIRA is elaborating law, not merely making ad hoc decisions. In short, the principle of reasoned elaboration encompasses not just agencies, but also their central executive branch overseers. The <u>recent change in presidential administration puts the need for these reforms in high relief.</u> As is true of many presidential transitions that involve a change in political control of the White House, <u>the new <strong>Trump</strong> Administration has made clear that it intends to significantly change substantive policy in a wide array of contexts.</u>352 <u>It can do so in ways that make<strong> transparent</strong> the source of the changes and provide <strong>justification</strong> for the grounds for a new approach, both as to matters of fact and policy choice.</u> <u>Proceeding in that way,<mark> the</mark> new <mark>administration could</mark> help to <strong><mark>strengthen internal</mark> administrative <mark>law of the executive branch.</u></strong></mark> Alternatively, however, the new presidential administration may opt to change substantive direction without paying heed to these internal constraints and legality values, leaving any enforcement of administrative-law norms of reasoned decisionmaking solely for the courts. Doing so would yield the benefit of faster policy change, but at the cost of an opportunity to embed norms of administrative legality that are important checks against abuse of executive power.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: McSweeney 2016 - Citing a Nature Climate Change Study Robert, "Aerosol emissions key to the surface warming ‘slowdown’, study says," Jun 20, www.carbonbrief.org/aerosol-emissions-key-to-the-surface-warming-slowdown-study-says fulltext: In the early 2000s, the rate of warming at the Earth’s surface was slower than scientists expected, despite the continued accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere. Recent research has shown that natural fluctuations in the Pacific Ocean played an important role in this surface warming “slowdown”. But a new paper, published in Nature Climate Change, suggests these variations in the Pacific Ocean were actually triggered by changing aerosol emissions from human activity – particularly by increases in China’s burning of fossil fuels. The findings suggest that the slowdown in surface warming could have been predicted, the lead author tells Carbon Brief, and that future cuts to aerosol emissions could prompt rapid warming in the coming years. Cooling effect In its latest report, the IPCC calculated that global surface temperatures between 1998 and 2012 rose by 0.05C per decade. Accounting for uncertainty, this is 30-50% slower than the 0.12C per decade increase over the longer period of 1951-2012. This apparent slowdown in surface warming has prompted a flurry of research papers as scientists seek to identify its cause. The overall conclusion from published research suggests there is no single reason for the slowdown, but rather a series of contributing factors. One of the principal causes is thought to be fluctuations in the Pacific Ocean. These fluctuations are usually known as the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO). The PDO has two opposite phases: positive (also known as the “warm” phase) and negative (“cool”), which each affect global weather in different ways. The phases of the PDO also affect the strength of the trade winds that blow east-to-west across the tropical Pacific Ocean. These winds are driven by warm air rising along the equator and the rotation of the Earth. During a negative PDO phase, the trade winds strengthen, driving heat into the deep Pacific Ocean, which brings cooler water to the surface. This has a cooling effect on global surface temperatures, as has been seen during the recent slowdown. It’s worth noting here that the slowdown relates only to the temperature at the Earth’s surface. Looking at all the components of the climate system – including, for example, the deep ocean – scientists have no doubt that the planet as a whole has continued to warm up during the slowdown. Weaker winds during a positive PDO have the opposite effect, transferring heat from the oceans to the atmosphere and causing surface temperatures to rise more quickly. The chart below shows how the PDO has fluctuated since 1970; months where the PDO is positive are shown as red bars, while negative months are blue. You can see how the PDO has been predominantly negative since the late nineties, before turning positive again in 2014. The prevailing theory amongst scientists is that the extended negative phase of the PDO is just part of its natural cycle. But this might not be the case, says the new paper’s lead author Dr Doug Smith, who heads up the decadal climate prediction research and development at the Met Office Hadley Centre. He tells Carbon Brief: “Although the PDO can vary naturally, our results show that changes in anthropogenic aerosol emissions could be largely responsible for the negative phase.” Changing aerosol emissions Aerosols are tiny particles and droplets floating around in our atmosphere. There are natural sources of aerosols, such as volcanic eruptions and chemicals released by tiny sea creatures, but humans also churn them out via vehicle exhausts and burning fossil fuels and wood. Aerosols tend to have a cooling effect on the Earth’s climate, by scattering incoming sunlight and by stimulating clouds to form, preventing the Sun’s energy reaching Earth’s surface. But these particles have also affected the phases of the PDO, the new study says. This impact stems from recent increases in aerosol emissions from China, and decreases in the US and Europe. In the map below, you can see how the concentration of aerosols in the atmosphere changed over the period of the slowdown. The red and orange areas show the upturn in aerosols, predominantly over China. In contrast, the blue shading show the reduction over Europe and eastern US. The changing concentration of aerosols in the atmosphere caused local cooling over China and warming over Europe, North America, and, hence, the North Atlantic, Smith says. This had the knock-on effect of strengthening the Pacific trade winds, prompting an extended negative phase of the PDO, and the slowdown in surface temperature rise. Using climate models, the researchers found they could recreate the negative PDO – and the surface warming slowdown – by simulating these changes in human aerosol emissions. Natural emissions of aerosols also had a small role in the slowdown, the paper notes, as the Earth was still feeling a residual cooling effect from the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in 1991. Predictions Being able to recreate the impact of aerosol emissions on the PDO in climate models suggests that scientists could, in theory, have foreseen the warming slowdown, says Smith: “Our results suggests that the warming slowdown could have been predicted – assuming changes in aerosol emissions could have been anticipated.” The findings also suggest that changing emissions of human-caused aerosols will continue to have an impact on surface warming over the coming years, says Smith: “Future reductions in aerosol emissions from China – to improve air quality – could promote a positive phase of the PDO and a period of increased trends in global surface temperatures. There are some signs that this could be happening.” Bridging the gap The paper is a real advance in scientists’ understanding of how the climate varies from one decade to the next, says Prof Piers Forster, a professor of physical climate change at the University of Leeds, who wasn’t involved in the study. He tells Carbon Brief: “Researchers have typically split climate response into two parts – the ‘forced’ response due to greenhouse gases, aerosols or volcanic eruptions, and ‘internal variability’ – patterns of change, such as the El Niño, caused by the more or less random swilling around of the ocean and atmosphere.” “The really nice thing about the paper is that it makes the first steps in bridging the gap, examining how aerosol and volcanic forcing drive patterns of variability.” However, these are the findings of just one scientific paper, so further work will be needed to confirm the connection between aerosols and the negative PDO, says Prof Jerry Meehl, from the National Centre for Atmospheric Science (NCAR) in Colorado, who also wasn’t involved in the research. Large changes in aerosol emissions have happened in the past without affecting Pacific Ocean fluctuations, notes Meehl. So it may be that aerosol emissions strengthened a naturally-occurring negative phase of the PDO, rather than causing it, he says. In addition, recent research by Meehl suggests that different phases of the PDO could be triggered by El Niño events – such as the switch to a positive PDO that coincided with the recent strong El Niño event. Meehl’s study also suggests that global surface warming may accelerate over the next few years. Human-caused aerosols are, therefore, at least another factor to add to the list of those that have contributed to the global surface warming slowdown, Meehl tells Carbon Brief: “My takeaway from this paper is we may add another possible factor to the list of processes that have been identified as contributing to the early-2000s slowdown, and all likely played a role: internal [Pacific Ocean] variability, a succession of moderate-sized volcanic eruptions, an extended solar minimum around 2012, stratospheric water vapor, and now anthropogenic aerosols.”<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Warming is natural, but human emissions prevent runway warming from happening – cuts trigger their impact</h4><p><strong>McSweeney 2016</strong> - Citing a Nature Climate Change Study <u>Robert, "Aerosol emissions key to the surface warming ‘slowdown’, study says," Jun 20, www.carbonbrief.org/aerosol-emissions-key-to-the-surface-warming-slowdown-study-says</p><p></u>In the early 2000s, <u><mark>the rate of warming at the Earth’s surface was slower than scientists expected, despite the continued accumulation of CO2</mark> in the atmosphere. Recent research has shown that natural fluctuations in the Pacific Ocean played an important role in this surface warming “slowdown”. </u>But <u>a new paper, published in Nature Climate Change, suggests <mark>these variations in the Pacific Ocean were</mark> actually <mark>triggered by changing aerosol emissions from human activity</u></mark> – <u>particularly <mark>by increases in China’s burning of fossil fuels</mark>. </u>The findings suggest that<u> the slowdown in surface warming could have been predicted</u>, the lead author tells Carbon Brief, <u>and that future cuts to aerosol emissions could prompt rapid warming in the coming years. </u>Cooling effect In its latest report, <u><mark>the IPCC calculated that global surface temperatures</u></mark> between 1998 and 2012 <u><mark>rose</mark> </u>by 0.05C per decade. Accounting for uncertainty, this is <u>30-<mark>50% slower than the</mark> 0.12C per decade <mark>increase over the longer period of 1951-2012.</mark> </u>This apparent slowdown in surface warming has prompted a flurry of research papers as scientists seek to identify its cause. The overall conclusion from published research suggests there is no single reason for the slowdown, but rather a series of contributing factors. One of the principal causes is thought to be fluctuations in the Pacific Ocean. These fluctuations are usually known as the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO). The PDO has two opposite phases: positive (also known as the “warm” phase) and negative (“cool”), which each affect global weather in different ways. The phases of the PDO also affect the strength of the trade winds that blow east-to-west across the tropical Pacific Ocean. These winds are driven by warm air rising along the equator and the rotation of the Earth. During a negative PDO phase, the trade winds strengthen, driving heat into the deep Pacific Ocean, which brings cooler water to the surface. This has a cooling effect on global surface temperatures, as has been seen during the recent slowdown. It’s worth noting here that the slowdown relates only to the temperature at the Earth’s surface. Looking at all the components of the climate system – including, for example, the deep ocean – scientists have no doubt that the planet as a whole has continued to warm up during the slowdown. Weaker winds during a positive PDO have the opposite effect, transferring heat from the oceans to the atmosphere and causing surface temperatures to rise more quickly. The chart below shows how the PDO has fluctuated since 1970; months where the PDO is positive are shown as red bars, while negative months are blue. You can see how the PDO has been predominantly negative since the late nineties, before turning positive again in 2014. The prevailing theory amongst scientists is that the extended negative phase of the PDO is just part of its natural cycle. But this might not be the case, says the new paper’s lead author Dr Doug Smith, who heads up the decadal climate prediction research and development at the Met Office Hadley Centre. He tells Carbon Brief: “Although the PDO can vary naturally, our results show that changes in anthropogenic aerosol emissions could be largely responsible for the negative phase.” Changing aerosol emissions Aerosols are tiny particles and droplets floating around in our atmosphere. There are natural sources of aerosols, such as volcanic eruptions and chemicals released by tiny sea creatures, but humans also churn them out via vehicle exhausts and burning fossil fuels and wood. <u><mark>Aerosols</mark> tend to <mark>have a cooling effect on the Earth’s climate, by scattering incoming sunlight</mark> and by stimulating clouds to form, preventing the Sun’s energy reaching Earth’s surface. </u>But these particles have also affected the phases of the PDO, the new study says. This impact stems from recent increases in aerosol emissions from China, and decreases in the US and Europe. In the map below, you can see how the concentration of aerosols in the atmosphere changed over the period of the slowdown. The red and orange areas show the upturn in aerosols, predominantly over China. In contrast, the blue shading show the reduction over Europe and eastern US. <u><mark>The changing concentration of aerosols in the atmosphere caused local cooling over China</mark> and warming over Europe, North America, and, hence, the North Atlantic, Smith says</u>. This had the knock-on effect of strengthening the Pacific trade winds, prompting an extended negative phase of the PDO, and the slowdown in surface temperature rise. <u>Using climate models, the <mark>researchers found they could recreate the negative PDO – and the surface warming slowdown – by simulating these changes in human aerosol emissions</mark>. </u>Natural emissions of aerosols also had a small role in the slowdown, the paper notes, as the Earth was still feeling a residual cooling effect from the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in 1991. Predictions Being able to recreate the impact of aerosol emissions on the PDO in climate models suggests that scientists could, in theory, have foreseen the warming slowdown, says Smith: “Our results suggests that the warming slowdown could have been predicted – assuming changes in aerosol emissions could have been anticipated.” The findings also suggest that changing emissions of human-caused aerosols will continue to have an impact on surface warming over the coming years, says Smith: “Future reductions in aerosol emissions from China – to improve air quality – could promote a positive phase of the PDO and a period of increased trends in global surface temperatures. There are some signs that this could be happening.” Bridging the gap The paper is a real advance in scientists’ understanding of how the climate varies from one decade to the next, says Prof Piers Forster, a professor of physical climate change at the University of Leeds, who wasn’t involved in the study. He tells Carbon Brief: “Researchers have typically split climate response into two parts – the ‘forced’ response due to greenhouse gases, aerosols or volcanic eruptions, and ‘internal variability’ – patterns of change, such as the El Niño, caused by the more or less random swilling around of the ocean and atmosphere.” “The really nice thing about the paper is that it makes the first steps in bridging the gap, examining how aerosol and volcanic forcing drive patterns of variability.” However, these are the findings of just one scientific paper, so further work will be needed to confirm the connection between aerosols and the negative PDO, says Prof Jerry Meehl, from the National Centre for Atmospheric Science (NCAR) in Colorado, who also wasn’t involved in the research. Large changes in aerosol emissions have happened in the past without affecting Pacific Ocean fluctuations, notes Meehl. So it may be that aerosol emissions strengthened a naturally-occurring negative phase of the PDO, rather than causing it, he says. In addition, recent research by Meehl suggests that different phases of the PDO could be triggered by El Niño events – such as the switch to a positive PDO that coincided with the recent strong El Niño event. Meehl’s study also suggests that global surface warming may accelerate over the next few years. Human-caused aerosols are, therefore, at least another factor to add to the list of those that have contributed to the global surface warming slowdown, Meehl tells Carbon Brief: “My takeaway from this paper is we may add another possible factor to the list of processes that have been identified as contributing to the early-2000s slowdown, and all likely played a role: internal [Pacific Ocean] variability<u>, a succession of <mark>moderate-sized volcanic eruptions,</mark> an extended solar minimum around 2012, <mark>stratospheric water vapor, and </mark>now <mark>anthropogenic aerosols.”</p></u></mark><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Denetdale ‘14 fulltext: [Jennifer, an associate professor of American Studies at the University of New Mexico. She was appointed to the Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission to serve a four-year term and heads the Commission’s study on gender violence on the Navajo Nation. Indian Country Today Media Network, "Justice, Liberation and Freedom: Where Are Our Women Leaders?", 2-23-2014, <http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2014/02/23/justice-liberation-and-freedom-where-are-our-women-leaders>//wyo-hdm] I came to see that Native women experience stark oppression and violence, not just in settler nations like the United States and Canada, but within the borders of our tribal nations.¶ Thinking about the status of Navajo women in our nation, I went home with all my newfound knowledge and talked to my father, who holds a great deal of traditional knowledge. Sitting next to him, I shared my questions about the epidemic of violence against Navajo women and the question about the lack of women’s leadership in our government. After listening to me closely, with the both of us going back and forth in our language, Diné bizaad, my dad thought about the loss of respect for Navajo women and its reflection in the everyday violence of our lives. Then he said very simply, “The reason why we have lost respect for our women is because we have forgotten the name of Asdzáá Náádlehe (Changing Woman) our first mother.” I was struck by the simplicity of my father’s statement.¶ The violence against Navajo women has become pervasive, yet normalized. When Al Jeezra correspondent Massoud Hayoud came to cover the Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission’s public hearings on gender violence, he reported witnessing a Diné man assaulting a woman outside a Window Rock, Ariz. restaurant. He tried to find an emergency number to call, looked around for assistance from others nearby, and attempted to respond to the woman’s need for help; the police did not show up by the time he left.¶ When it comes to Navajo lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer that are affected by homophobic violence on our nation, we don’t even begin to know the numbers or the extent of the violence. The war on Indigenous peoples has targeted relationships among men, women, and queer, because it was necessary to break down our sense of self as a people and to move us toward a nation created on a foundation of heterosexual patriarchy.¶ Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier, serving under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, has often been praised for returning self-determination to tribal government. But self-determination on his terms meant the privileging of male power and domination. For Navajos, draconian livestock reductions under Collier redefined property ownership and work along gendered lines so that livestock and grazing leases were assigned to men as the heads of households, while retraining women as domestics, thus radically transforming our concepts of family and the meaning of women’s labor, and Navajo queer were disappeared from the extended family unit. Collier’s legacy includes making violence against women and queer people seem normal and acceptable because they defy straight, male-centered ways of being in the world.¶ Indigenous feminists recognize that gender is a tool of colonization, so we have to look at how gender works as the building block of tribal nations. In its present form, gender norms—the behaviors and social expectations that come with assuming that some people are men and some are women based on their bodies—oppresses everyone. In particular, gender norms become the excuse by which Native women and queer people experience intimate partner violence, sexual assault, discrimination, police brutality, state violence, and lack of political voice. They are rendered invisible. As a result of ongoing colonial assaults, our concepts of K’é, kin relationships extended to all beings in the natural world, have been undermined.¶ During the Commission’s working session to explore Diné traditional gender roles, the topic of Diné women’s leadership was raised. One of our medicine women, Rita Gilmore, said that women’s leadership is founded upon the leadership of our sacred mountains, two of which two are feminine. She told us that White Shell Woman is the deity from whom our leadership is drawn. Women’s leadership comes in the form of the lay of the land and is connected to ceremonial knowledge, songs, and prayers.¶ The topic of Navajo women’s leadership came about as a result of the Navajo Nation’s transformation under American democratic principles, which are founded upon heterosexual patriarchy. For example, in the last Navajo presidential election, contender Lynda Lovejoy faced challenges by traditionalists who maintained that a woman should not hold the top leadership position of the nation or we would face the wrath of nature with unseasonable weather, quakes, and tornados. I question how the profound loss of traditional knowledge and language, which should be attributed to the United States ethnic cleansing policies, instead is blamed on women and queers.¶ As we talked, surrounded by photographs of past and present male Navajo leaders hanging on the walls, people asked: “Why are we surrounded by male leadership? Where are our women leaders? If women’s leadership is based on our Holy deity, White Shell Woman, then are we expected to live up to impossibly high standards? Are the men required to lead with the same high standards?”¶ Insights by Navajo women and queers about the state of our nation today lay bare how Navajo patriarchy as the rule of law has done little to respect the women and the feminine, even though time and time again, it is declared that “traditionally, women are respected.” There are days when the effort to resist and challenge Navajo patriarchy, much less the rest of the world, seems daunting. I remain inspired by Indigenous peoples, our movements, and Indigenous scholars like Glen Coultard and Audra Simpson who illuminate how Indigenous people have refused the gift of recognition, or in our case, the gift of Western democracy.¶ To refuse the gift of liberalism, democracy, and freedom on the settler nation’s terms is to affirm traditional principles that acknowledge the power of women and queer people in ways that recognize our commitment to tribal sovereignty and expresses inclusion, acceptance, and belonging. These are age-old principles of K’é. As I endeavor to bridge the space between my nation and academia, I am profoundly affected by the persistence of my people’s wisdom, of the women and the queers, who steadfastly affirm their love of the land, the natural world, and all beings.¶ Asdzáá Náádlehe remains a beloved deity whose teachings and ethics form who we are and how we should treat the earth and each other. Our first mother, Changing Woman, formed the land and used her own skin to create us. Her teachings are the basis for our women and men allies who seek to protect the land from ongoing environmental destruction. They know that the protection of the land is also the care, love, and protection of women and their bodies. I take from my relatives – women, men, and queer – a sense of the profound forms of love that motivate them to resist and protest, to teach and inspire, and to hold allies accountable to our responsibilities to protect the values and traditions that are the foundation for the survival of the land and Indigenous peoples.¶ Asdzáá Náádlehe‘s teachings show us that we do not speak about women’s empowerment alone. Her teachings are connected to tribal national and community issues. Our ancient mother’s love and generosity move across the land and the generations to tell us that the effective tool against the persistent degradation and inhumanity of colonialism, with its tentacles of capitalism and neoliberalism, is her remembrance.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>Turns aff—native womyn experience higher rates of sexual violence than the national average--cross-x was pretty indicative of how they have deferred in the face of systems of oppression which allows indigenous women to continue to be raped with impunity. </h4><p>Denetdale ‘14</p><p></strong>[Jennifer, an associate professor of American Studies at the University of New Mexico. She was appointed to the Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission to serve a four-year term and heads the Commission’s study on gender violence on the Navajo Nation. Indian Country Today Media Network, "Justice, Liberation and Freedom: Where Are Our Women Leaders?", 2-23-2014, <http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2014/02/23/justice-liberation-and-freedom-where-are-our-women-leaders>//wyo-hdm] </p><p>I came to see that <u><strong><mark>Native women experience stark oppression and violence</u></strong></mark>, not just in settler nations like the United States and Canada, but within the borders of our tribal nations.¶ Thinking about the status of Navajo women in our nation, I went home with all my newfound knowledge and talked to my father, who holds a great deal of traditional knowledge. Sitting next to him, I shared my questions about the epidemic of violence against Navajo women and the question about the lack of women’s leadership in our government. After listening to me closely, with the both of us going back and forth in our language, Diné bizaad, my dad thought about the loss of respect for Navajo women and its reflection in the everyday violence of our lives. Then he said very simply, “The reason why we have lost respect for our women is because we have forgotten the name of Asdzáá Náádlehe (Changing Woman) our first mother.” I was struck by the simplicity of my father’s statement.¶ <u><strong>The <mark>violence against Navajo women has become</mark> pervasive, yet <mark>normalized</mark>. When Al Jeezra correspondent Massoud Hayoud came to cover the Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission’s public hearings on gender violence, he reported witnessing a Diné man assaulting a woman outside a</u></strong> Window Rock, Ariz<u><strong>. restaurant</u></strong>. <u><strong>He tried to find an emergency number to call, looked around for assistance from others nearby, and attempted to respond to the woman’s need for help; the police did not show up by the time he left</u></strong>.¶ When it comes to Navajo lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer that are affected by homophobic violence on our nation, we don’t even begin to know the numbers or the extent of the violence. The war on Indigenous peoples has targeted relationships among men, women, and queer, because it was necessary to break down our sense of self as a people and to move us toward a nation created on a foundation of heterosexual patriarchy.¶ Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier, serving under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, has often been praised for returning self-determination to tribal government. But self-determination on his terms meant the privileging of male power and domination<u><strong>. For Navajos, draconian livestock reductions under Collier redefined property ownership and work along gendered lines so that livestock and grazing leases were assigned to men as the heads of households, while retraining women as domestics, thus radically transforming our concepts of family and the meaning of women’s labor</u></strong>, and Navajo queer were disappeared from the extended family unit. <u><strong><mark>Collier’s legacy includes making violence against women</u></strong></mark> and queer people seem normal and <u><strong><mark>acceptable because they defy straight, male-centered ways of being in the world</mark>.¶ Indigenous feminists recognize that <mark>gender is a tool of colonization, so we have to look at how gender works as the building block of tribal nations</u></strong></mark>. In its present form, gender norms—the behaviors and social expectations that come with assuming that some people are men and some are women based on their bodies—oppresses everyone. In particular, <u><strong><mark>gender norms become the excuse by which Native women</mark> and queer people <mark>experience</mark> intimate <mark>partner violence, sexual assault, discrimination, police brutality, state violence, and lack of political voice</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>They are rendered invisible</mark>.</u></strong> As a result of ongoing colonial assaults, our concepts of K’é, kin relationships extended to all beings in the natural world, have been undermined.¶ During the Commission’s working session to explore Diné traditional gender roles, the topic of Diné women’s leadership was raised. One of our medicine women, Rita Gilmore, said that women’s leadership is founded upon the leadership of our sacred mountains, two of which two are feminine. She told us that White Shell Woman is the deity from whom our leadership is drawn. Women’s leadership comes in the form of the lay of the land and is connected to ceremonial knowledge, songs, and prayers.¶ <u><strong>The topic of Navajo women’s leadership came about as a result of the Navajo Nation’s transformation under <mark>American democratic principles</mark>, which <mark>are founded upon heterosexual patriarchy.</u></strong></mark> For example, in the last Navajo presidential election, contender Lynda Lovejoy faced challenges by traditionalists who maintained that a woman should not hold the top leadership position of the nation or we would face the wrath of nature with unseasonable weather, quakes, and tornados. I question how the profound loss of traditional knowledge and language, which should be attributed to the United States ethnic cleansing policies, instead is blamed on women and queers.¶ As we talked, surrounded by photographs of past and present male Navajo leaders hanging on the walls, people asked: “Why are we surrounded by male leadership? Where are our women leaders? If women’s leadership is based on our Holy deity, White Shell Woman, then are we expected to live up to impossibly high standards? Are the men required to lead with the same high standards?”¶ <u><strong>Insights by Navajo women and queers about the state of our nation today lay bare how Navajo patriarchy as the rule of law has done little to respect the women and the feminine, even though time and time again, it is declared that “traditionally, women are respected.” There are days when the effort to resist and challenge Navajo patriarchy, much less the rest of the world, seems daunting</u></strong>. I remain inspired by Indigenous peoples, our movements, and Indigenous scholars like Glen Coultard and Audra Simpson who illuminate how Indigenous people have refused the gift of recognition, or in our case, the gift of Western democracy.¶ To refuse the gift of liberalism, democracy, and freedom on the settler nation’s terms is to affirm traditional principles that acknowledge the power of women and queer people in ways that recognize our commitment to tribal sovereignty and expresses inclusion, acceptance, and belonging. These are age-old principles of K’é. As I endeavor to bridge the space between my nation and academia, I am profoundly affected by the persistence of my people’s wisdom, of the women and the queers, who steadfastly affirm their love of the land, the natural world, and all beings.¶ Asdzáá Náádlehe remains a beloved deity whose teachings and ethics form who we are and how we should treat the earth and each other. Our first mother, Changing Woman, formed the land and used her own skin to create us. Her teachings are the basis for our women and men allies who seek to protect the land from ongoing environmental destruction. They know that <u><strong>the protection of the land is also the care, love, and protection of women and their bodies</u></strong>. I take from my relatives – women, men, and queer – a sense of the profound forms of love that motivate them to resist and protest, to teach and inspire, and to hold allies accountable to our responsibilities to protect the values and traditions that are the foundation for the survival of the land and Indigenous peoples.¶ Asdzáá Náádlehe‘s teachings show us that we do not speak about women’s empowerment alone. Her teachings are connected to tribal national and community issues. <u><strong><mark>Our ancient mother’s love</mark> and generosity move across the land and the generations to <mark>tell us that the effective tool against the persistent degradation and inhumanity of colonialism</mark>, with its tentacles of capitalism and neoliberalism, <mark>is her remembrance.</p></u></strong></mark><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: John Goodman 13, Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute, 1-9-2013, "Is Private Health Insurance More Costly Than Public Health Insurance? Five Principles," National Center for Policy Analysis, http://healthblog.ncpa.org/is-private-health-insurance-more-costly-than-public-health-insurance-five-principles/#sthash.K9WPCMyp.dpbs fulltext: Principle 1: There is almost nothing the government can do that the private sector cannot do as well or better. Do you think a surgeon is likely to perform better surgery or more efficient surgery if he gets his fee from the government instead of Blue Cross? How about a nurse? Or a hospital administrator? If the answer is “no,” and it surely is, what is it about government that could possibly lower the cost of health care? The answer is: almost nothing. It is sometimes said that government can produce things at a lower cost because the government doesn’t have to earn a profit. But people who say this never learned the concept of profit in Econ 101. Every hospital, every physician’s office, every other health care business requires capital. There is a cost of capital. If there are risks involved (the risk, for example, that aggregate fees will not be high enough to cover outlays) then the cost of capital is higher. These costs have nothing whatsoever to do with whether the entity is public or private. Here is what is true: accountants do not typically record the cost of capital in the financial statements of public entities. But failure to record a cost doesn’t make it go away. To the contrary, ignoring the cost of capital in public accounting unquestionably makes public ventures prima facie less efficient — because investment decisions will tend to be made without regard to their real costs. What about the idea that whole systems (with all their complexity) might work better if they are public rather than private? For example, for years the auto companies have complained that health care costs are so much higher in the United States. than for auto workers across the border in Canada. If so, there is a straightforward remedy. There is nothing that the Canadian government is doing that the auto companies and the unions cannot do for themselves. As I have written before, the auto companies can form an HMO and tell it to ration medical care the same way the Canadians ration care. That the auto companies don’t even seriously consider this option (all the while urging government to consider it) is understandable. The reason is cultural. When a Canadian doctor has to ration care, she is likely to tell the patient, “There is nothing more we can do.” The doctor almost never says, “We could save you, but the government cares more about money than it cares about you.” An American doctor, however, might well say, “We could save you, but your employer cares more about profit that it cares about you” — thus generating a lot of employee ill will. This is a cultural issue, though, not an economic one. Principle 2: The few things government can uniquely do can be done without public insurance. The advocates of socialized medicine frequently claim that government can use its position as a monopsony (single) buyer of care to negotiate lower provider fees. This is what they envision happens in Canada, for example. In fact, governments usually don’t bargain with medical providers. They simply announce a low price they intend to pay and the suppliers of care can take it or leave it. That’s what happens in the U.S. Medicaid program, for example, and almost a third of doctors decide to leave it — refusing to accept any new Medicaid patients. However, and this is key, the government doesn’t need to pay provider fees in order to suppress them. It can simply impose price controls on all providers. In fact, if paying providers below-market fees is socially desirable, that is exactly what the government should do for all patients, not just the patients the government happens to insure. Such an act would not make health care more efficient, however, it would just shift costs from patients to the providers of care. Remember: shifting costs is not the same thing as lowering costs. Principle 3: Most public insurance in this country is actually administered by private insurance companies. I can’t begin to count the number of people I have met who believe that BlueCross is evil because it is private and that Medicare is good because it is public. I usually ask, “Who do you think runs Medicare?” Following an awkward silence I usually supply the answer: “It’s BlueCross!” And other insurers. From the beginning, Medicare and Medicaid have been mainly run by private contractors. Who else was going to do it? The government certainly had no experience doing so. Now do you think that when BlueCross is called “Medicare” it suddenly becomes more efficient than when it is called “private insurer”? If not, then can we put this nonsense aside once and for all? Principle 4: Most people with public insurance are in private sector health plans. More than one out of every four Medicare beneficiaries is in a private Medicare Advantage plan and two-thirds [see here, page 13] of all Medicaid enrollees are in private plans under contract with state governments. In the future those numbers will likely rise. In fact, almost all of Medicaid will eventually be contracted out to the private sector as state governments desperately try to cope with the impact of Medicaid on state budgets. Why turn to the private sector? Because of the next principle. Principle 5: It is only in the private sector that one finds anyone who has an incentive to lower costs without rationing care. Most providers have an incentive to increase costs rather than lower them. Their incentive is to maximize against the payment formulas of third-party insurers — whether public or private. And surprisingly, most private insurers also have no incentive to lower costs other than by negotiating lower provider fees. BlueCross, for example, has no incentive to lower Medicare’s costs when it is administering Medicare. When its clients are private employers, BlueCross (for reasons that are historical and institutional, but ultimately because of bad government policies) rarely interferes with the practice of medicine. In Dallas, for example, virtually every hospital in the Metroplex (no matter how efficient or inefficient) is in the BlueCross network. Similarly just about every doctor (no matter how good or how bad) can be in the BlueCross network if he or she chooses. However, there are providers who do have an incentive to lower costs and they appear to be responding to those incentives. Surprisingly, they are using some of the techniques the Obama administration says it likes (medical homes, coordinated care, evidence-based medicine, etc.) and that appear not to work well when the government funds pilot programs to try them out. Even more surprising, where these efforts to make medical care more cost effective are most visible is in the Medicare Advantage plans — the very plans that president Obama and many Democrats in Congress seem to be hostile to. I have previously reported on the efforts of IntegraNet, which appears to achieve good medical outcomes while holding costs down to about 70% of premium income. (Technically, that’s a 70% MLR.) Two things are important to keep in mind when comparing what I have just said to the table in Uwe Reinhardt’s post. First, the people who are holding down costs and daily searching for new ways of doing so are not the insurance companies (the Medicare Advantage HMOs) — at least as far as I can tell. They are separate companies (e.g., independent doctors associations) operating under contract with the HMOs. Second, if what I am saying is true, the real cost of delivering care under the Medicare Advantage program is much lower than anyone realizes and it’s mainly going to the profits of the HMOs and the entities they are contracting with. That implies that more competition (ah, more privatization!) has the potential to considerably reduce the taxpayer’s future burden.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Government doesn’t make things more efficient because they have no skin in the game—they only lead to cost shifting which is less efficient. </h4><p>John <strong>Goodman 13<u>, Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute, 1-9-2013, "Is Private Health Insurance More Costly Than Public Health Insurance? Five Principles," National Center for Policy Analysis, http://healthblog.ncpa.org/is-private-health-insurance-more-costly-than-public-health-insurance-five-principles/#sthash.K9WPCMyp.dpbs</p><p></strong>Principle 1: <mark>There is almost nothing the government can do that the private sector cannot do</mark> as well or <mark>better</mark>. Do you think a surgeon is likely to perform better surgery or more efficient surgery if he gets his fee from the government instead of Blue Cross? How about a nurse? Or a hospital administrator? If the answer is “no,” and it surely is, what is it about government that could possibly lower the cost of health care? The answer is: almost nothing. </u>It is sometimes said that government can produce things at a lower cost because the government doesn’t have to earn a profit. But people who say this never learned the concept of profit in Econ 101. <u>Every hospital, every physician’s office, every other health care business requires capital</u>. <u><strong><mark>There is a cost of capital</u></strong></mark>. <u>If there are risks involved (the risk, for example, that aggregate fees will not be high enough to cover outlays) then the cost of capital is higher.</u> <u><strong><mark>These costs have nothing whatsoever to do with whether the entity is public or private</u></strong></mark>. Here is what is true: <u>accountants do not typically record the cost of capital in the financial statements of public entities</u>. <u><strong>But failure to record a cost doesn’t make it go away. To the contrary, <mark>ignoring the cost of capital</mark> in public accounting unquestionably <mark>makes public ventures</mark> prima facie <mark>less efficient</mark> — <mark>because investment decisions will</mark> tend to <mark>be made without regard to their real costs</mark>. </u></strong>What about the idea that whole systems (with all their complexity) might work better if they are public rather than private? For example, for years the auto companies have complained that health care costs are so much higher in the United States. than for auto workers across the border in Canada. If so, there is a straightforward remedy. There is nothing that the Canadian government is doing that the auto companies and the unions cannot do for themselves. As I have written before, the auto companies can form an HMO and tell it to ration medical care the same way the Canadians ration care. That the auto companies don’t even seriously consider this option (all the while urging government to consider it) is understandable. The reason is cultural. When a Canadian doctor has to ration care, she is likely to tell the patient, “There is nothing more we can do.” The doctor almost never says, “We could save you, but the government cares more about money than it cares about you.” An American doctor, however, might well say, “We could save you, but your employer cares more about profit that it cares about you” — thus generating a lot of employee ill will. This is a cultural issue, though, not an economic one. <u>Principle 2: The few things government can uniquely do can be done without public insurance. The advocates of socialized medicine frequently claim that government can use its position as a monopsony (single) buyer of care to negotiate lower provider fees</u>. This is what they envision happens in Canada, for example. In fact, governments usually don’t bargain with medical providers. They simply announce a low price they intend to pay and the suppliers of care can take it or leave it. That’s what happens in the U.S. Medicaid program, for example, and almost a third of doctors decide to leave it — refusing to accept any new Medicaid patients. <u>However, and this is key, <mark>the government doesn’t need to pay provider fees</mark> in order to suppress them. <mark>It can simply impose price controls</mark> on all providers. In fact, <mark>if paying providers below-market fees</mark> <mark>is</mark> socially <mark>desirable</mark>, <mark>that is</mark> exactly <mark>what the government should</mark> <mark>do</mark> for all patients, not just the patients the government happens to insure. <mark>Such an act would not make health care more efficient</mark>, however, it would just shift costs from patients to the providers of care. <strong>Remember: <mark>shifting costs is not the same thing as lowering costs</u></strong></mark>. <u>Principle 3: Most public insurance in this country is actually administered by private insurance companies. I can’t begin to count the number of people I have met who believe that BlueCross is evil because it is private and that Medicare is good because it is public. I usually ask, “Who do you think runs Medicare?” Following an awkward silence I usually supply the answer: “It’s BlueCross!” And other insurers. </u>From the beginning, Medicare and Medicaid have been mainly run by private contractors. Who else was going to do it? The government certainly had no experience doing so. <u>Now do you think that when BlueCross is called “Medicare” it suddenly becomes more efficient than when it is called “private insurer”? If not, then can we put this nonsense aside once and for all? Principle 4: Most people with public insurance are in private sector health plans. More than one out of every four Medicare beneficiaries is in a private Medicare Advantage plan and two-thirds [see here, page 13] of all Medicaid enrollees are in private plans under contract with state governments</u>. In the future those numbers will likely rise. In <u>fact, almost all of Medicaid will eventually be contracted out to the private sector as state governments desperately try to cope with the impact of Medicaid on state budgets. Why turn to the private sector? Because of the next principle</u>. <u><strong>Principle 5: <mark>It is only in the private sector that one finds anyone who has an incentive to lower costs without rationing care.</mark> </strong>Most providers have an incentive to increase costs rather than lower them. Their incentive is to maximize against the payment formulas of third-party insurers — whether public or private. And surprisingly, most private insurers also have no incentive to lower costs other than by negotiating lower provider</u> fees. BlueCross, for example, has no incentive to lower Medicare’s costs when it is administering Medicare. When its clients are private employers, BlueCross (for reasons that are historical and institutional, but ultimately because of bad government policies) rarely interferes with the practice of medicine. In Dallas, for example, virtually every hospital in the Metroplex (no matter how efficient or inefficient) is in the BlueCross network. Similarly just about every doctor (no matter how good or how bad) can be in the BlueCross network if he or she chooses. <u>However, <mark>there are providers who do have an incentive to lower costs</mark> and <mark>they appear to be responding</mark> to those incentives. Surprisingly, they are using some of the techniques the Obama administration says it likes (medical homes, coordinated care, evidence-based medicine, etc.) and that appear not to work well when the government funds pilot programs to try</u> them out. Even more surprising, where these efforts to make medical care more cost effective are most visible is in the Medicare Advantage plans — the very plans that president Obama and many Democrats in Congress seem to be hostile to. I have previously reported on the efforts of IntegraNet, which appears to achieve good medical outcomes while holding costs down to about 70% of premium income. (Technically, that’s a 70% MLR.) Two things are important to keep in mind when comparing what I have just said to the table in Uwe Reinhardt’s post. <u><strong>First, <mark>the people who are holding down costs</mark> and daily searching for new ways of doing so <mark>are not the insurance companies</mark> (the Medicare Advantage HMOs) — at least as far as I can </strong>tell. <mark>They are separate companies</mark> (e.g., independent doctors associations) operating under contract with the HMOs. Second, if what I am saying is true, <mark>the real cost of delivering care under</mark> the <mark>Medicare Advantage</mark> program <mark>is much lower than anyone realizes and it’s mainly going to the profits of the HMOs</mark> and the entities they are contracting with. <strong><mark>That implies that more competition</mark> (ah, more privatization!) <mark>has the potential to considerably reduce</mark> the taxpayer’s future <mark>burden</mark>.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Grabel 18 Ilene Grabel, International Finance Professor at the University of Denver. This book won the 2019 International Political Economy Section Best Book Award from the International Studies Association. [When Things Don't Fall Apart: Global Financial Governance and Developmental Finance in an Age of Productive Incoherence, The MIT Press, Print] fulltext: Discontinuities, Productive Incoherence, and the Global Crisis The years leading up to the global crisis, and the crisis itself, precipitated significant and sustained change in the conditions facing EMDEs. Most important among these are an emerging attitude of intellectual uncertainty, pragmatism, and empiricism in the economics profession; a new landscape within which the BWIs operate, where they must negotiate to achieve and sustain influence that now seems precarious, and where they confront demands for governance reforms from increasingly assertive former clients, and potential and actual competition from and cooperation with EMDE institutions; the lack of recovery in Europe, and the fragility of the recovery in the United States; the serious and deepening financial fragilities and slowdowns in growth in EMDEs; and the tarnished image of the Anglo- American financial model. The discontinuities that have emerged in the financial governance landscape can only be understood in the context of these unique circumstances.13 The global crisis spurred expansion in the membership and scope of existing transnational financial governance networks. The Leaders' G-20 replaced the Leaders' G-8 in 2008, and the mandate and membership of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was broadened (and the body was renamed the Financial Stability Board, or FSB). It is true that these net¬works have proven to be unimaginative, timid, and impotent, even if they are more inclusive than their predecessors (Helleiner 2014b; Blyth 2013a; Payne 2010; Vestergaard and Wade 2012b).14 Nonetheless, these groups should not be dismissed prematurely, since their future is not fore¬ordained. Indeed, they may emerge over time as forums in which EMDE policymakers are able to promote serious dialogue, build relationships and coalitions, learn from one another, and refine their capacities to maneuver on the international stage and within multilateral institutions (Woods and Martinez-Diaz 2009). Both the continuity and discontinuity views of the G-20 and FSB (and financial governance more generally) are represented in Helleiner's work. The Status Quo Crisis (Helleiner 2014b) sustains the continuity view. Hel¬leiner argues there that the central roles of the U.S. Federal Reserve and the U.S. dollar have not just been unchallenged but have actually been strength¬ened by the crisis. In this account, formation of the G-20 and the FSB (and other initiatives) has not altered the global financial governance architec¬ture to any appreciable degree. Helleiner's book nevertheless concludes with brief speculation about the potential for transformation over the medium term. In other work, both prior to and following his 2014 book, Helleiner speculates that the pressures unleashed by the crisis could ultimately result in more decentralized and fragmented international financial governance. Not least, he and Pagliari argue that current trends in financial regulation point in the direction of "cooperative regulatory decentralization" (see Helleiner 2009; Helleiner and Pagliari 2011). More recently and less equivocally, Hel¬leiner (2016b) argues that policymakers are in fact "stumbling incremen¬tally" toward such a regime—one that involves both increased multilateral cooperation and deepening decentralization—and that the G-20 and the FSB have begun to make more meaningful commitments. The global crisis has had more immediate and significant effects on the IMF. These effects have been complex and uneven (Grabel 2011). On the one hand, the crisis has restored the IMF's relevance, coffers, and central role as first responder to financial distress, just when long-standing critics might have hoped for new institutional arrangements to manage crises that would have displaced or demoted the Fund. In important respects, IMF assistance to countries in distress has followed its well-rehearsed script: many condi- tionality programs continue to stress contractionary macroeconomic policy adjustments, privatization, and liberalization (Gabor 2010; Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016; Nelson 2014a; Weisbrot 2015). Moreover, EMDEs have secured only very modest commitments for increases in their IMF voting shares. Today the United States and Europe continue to exercise dispropor¬tionate influence at the institution (Lesage et al. 2013). The other side of the ledger is not blank, however. Today there are prom¬ising signs that the neoliberal ideas and prescriptions of important economists and departments at the Fund are being challenged by the global crisis in ways that most observers did not anticipate. In response, IMF economists are learning to live with significant departures from the old script. Most notable in this regard, Fund leadership, research staff, and staff working with countries in distress have moved further and more consistently in the direction of normalizing the use of controls over capital inflows, and even on outflows (Grabel 2011; 2015b; 2017; Chwieroth 2015; 2014; Gal¬lagher 2014; Moschella 2014). There is also evidence of change—uneven and inconsistent though it may be—concerning the IMF's approach to fis¬cal policy during the crisis (Ban 2015; Grabel 2011). Fund economists have developed conditionality programs that, while still harsh, display greater flexibility than was the norm during previous crises. While the Fund con¬tinues to advocate fiscal retrenchment, it also now routinely emphasizes the need for "pro-poor spending" to protect the most vulnerable during crises. The IMF's crisis response strategy is marked by ad hoc measures that reflect important ambiguities within the institution. Strikingly absent here is the unyielding attachment to a global strategy of neoliberalism that marked its interventions over the past several decades. The IMF's geography of influence during the global crisis has been trans¬formed substantially as well. Some of its former clients have emerged as important lenders. At the same time, the institution's client base has largely shifted to the European periphery, and in Europe the IMF appears to be the weakest leg of the European "Troika." Indeed, there is substantial evi¬dence of tension between the IMF and European authorities over important matters such as debt sustainability in Greece—which became particularly evident during the summer of 2015, when a third assistance package for the country was being negotiated—and the most severe forms of austerity in peripheral European economies.15 In a different vein, but in keeping with the idea of discontinuities at the IMF, in 2015 China achieved a long-sought goal of having the IMF include its currency in the SDR. In addition, though the formal voice of EMDEs at the IMF has increased only trivially, the crisis has opened channels for several of these countries, particularly China, to increase their informal influence. Moreover, we find increasing inconsis¬tency between the rhetoric coming from the institution, its research, and its actual practice. As we will see, the rhetoric-research-practice gap reflects something more than public relations imperatives. The gap reveals increas¬ing contestation and even confusion within the Fund. Of equal if not greater importance, productive incoherence is also evi¬denced in the emergence of a far more heterogeneous financial governance architecture. As noted, the East Asian crisis renewed interest in the creation of alternative institutions of financial governance. The drive toward institutional innovation was given far greater force during the global crisis, while the resources necessary to sustain such experiments only became avail-able to rapidly growing EMDEs following the Asian crisis. New innovations have now emerged at the transregional, regional, subregional, bilateral, and national levels. Today we encounter a range of new and expanded reserve pooling arrangements and development and infrastructure banks. Existing institutions evolved in significant ways during the global crisis and have continued to do so (as we will see in the discussion of the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation, the Arab Monetary Fund, the Development Bank of Latin America, the China Development Bank, and Brazil's National Eco¬nomic and Social Development Bank). At the same time, new arrangements have arisen to rectify perceived failings in the global financial architecture, particularly the shortage of infrastructure financing. The new arrangements are exemplified in twin BRICS initiatives, the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, and also in the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development and in the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the One Belt, One Road Initiative/Silk Road Fund. These and other innovations are emblematic of developments and aspi¬rations across EMDEs. The new willingness and ability to undertake innovation in financial governance may turn out to be one of the most important legacies associated with the global crisis, especially when compared with prior crises. The new arrangements do not coalesce around a singular, grand global architecture that might replace the BWIs. Instead, we are observing productive incoherence in the expansion of disparate and, in some cases, overlap¬ping and interconnected institutions that complement the BWIs. Taken together, they are "thickening" and diversifying the financial landscape in EMDEs and introducing the possibility of a transition to a more complex, decentralized, multitiered, pluripolar global financial and monetary system (Armijo and Roberts 2014; Chin 2010; Grabel 2013a; 2013b; Huotari and Hanemann 2014; Mittelman 2013; Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012). The expan¬sion of these initiatives is widening policy space for development. They also generate opportunities for experience-based learning and the creation of new partnerships and coalitions, and in turn enable EMDE "forum shop-ping." In sum, the initiatives are substantially complicating the terrain on which the BWIs operate. We might also understand these institutions, how¬ever small in scale, in terms of their potential to increase robustness and even what Nassim Taleb (2012) terms "anti-fragility" of the global financial governance architecture. This would involve a collection of institutions that enjoy some degree of autonomy from each other, where crises are less likely to generate contagion across countries, and where each crisis might allow for learning that induces new innovations that are better able to prevent and limit the scope of future crises. What I call the productive redun¬dancy that is a feature of the emerging financial governance landscape is central to the achievement of these goals.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>No competitiveness impact – <u>other countries</u> solve AND resilience. </h4><p><strong>Grabel 18</strong> Ilene Grabel, International Finance Professor at the University of Denver. This book won the 2019 International Political Economy Section Best Book Award from the International Studies Association. [When Things Don't Fall Apart: Global Financial Governance and Developmental Finance in an Age of Productive Incoherence, The MIT Press, Print]</p><p><u>Discontinuities, Productive Incoherence, and the Global Crisis The years leading up to the global crisis</u>, <u><strong>and <mark>the crisis</mark> itself</u></strong>, <u><mark>precipitated</u></mark> <u><strong>significant</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>sustained change</u></strong> in the conditions facing EMDEs. <u>Most</u> <u>important</u> among these <u>are an emerging attitude of</u> intellectual uncertainty, <u><strong><mark>pragmatism</u></strong>, <u>and</u> <u><strong>empiricism</u></strong> <u>in</u></mark> the <u><mark>economics</u></mark> profession; a new landscape within which the BWIs operate, where they must negotiate to achieve and sustain influence that now seems precarious, and where they confront demands for governance reforms from increasingly assertive former clients, and potential and actual competition from and cooperation with EMDE institutions; the lack of recovery in Europe, and the fragility of the recovery in the United States; the serious and deepening financial fragilities and slowdowns in growth in EMDEs; and the tarnished image of the Anglo- American financial model. The discontinuities that have emerged in the financial governance landscape can only be understood in the context of these unique circumstances.13 <u>The global crisis</u> <u><strong>spurred expansion</u></strong> <u>in the <strong>membership</strong> and <strong>scope</u></strong> <u>of</u> existing <u><strong><mark>transnational</mark> financial governance <mark>networks</strong>. The</u></mark> Leaders' <u><mark>G-20</mark> replaced the </u>Leaders' <u>G-8</u> in 2008, and the mandate and membership of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was <u>broadened</u> (and the body was renamed <u><mark>the</mark> <strong>F</strong>inancial <strong>S</strong>tability <strong><mark>B</strong>oard</u></mark>, or FSB). It is true that these net¬works have proven to be unimaginative, timid, <u><mark>and</u></mark> impotent, even if they are more inclusive than their predecessors (Helleiner 2014b; Blyth 2013a; Payne 2010; Vestergaard and Wade 2012b).14 Nonetheless, these groups should not be dismissed prematurely, since their future is not fore¬ordained. Indeed, they may emerge over time as forums in which EMDE <u><mark>policymakers</u></mark> are able to <u><mark>promote</u></mark> <u><strong>serious <mark>dialogue</strong>, <strong>build</mark> relationships</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong><mark>coalitions</strong>,</u> <u><strong>learn</u></strong></mark> <u>from one another, <mark>and <strong>refine</u></strong></mark> <u>their capacities to maneuver on the international stage and within <strong><mark>multilat</mark>eral<mark> institutions</u></strong></mark> (Woods and Martinez-Diaz 2009). Both the continuity and discontinuity views of the G-20 and FSB (and financial governance more generally) are represented in Helleiner's work. The Status Quo Crisis (Helleiner 2014b) sustains the continuity view. Hel¬leiner argues there that the central roles of the U.S. Federal Reserve and the U.S. dollar have not just been unchallenged but have actually been strength¬ened by the crisis. In this account, formation of the G-20 and the FSB (and other initiatives) has not altered the global financial governance architec¬ture to any appreciable degree. Helleiner's book nevertheless concludes with brief speculation about the potential for transformation over the medium term. In other work, both prior to and following his 2014 book, Helleiner speculates that the pressures unleashed by the crisis could ultimately result in more decentralized and fragmented international financial governance. Not least, he and Pagliari argue that current trends in financial regulation point in the direction of "cooperative regulatory decentralization" (see Helleiner 2009; Helleiner and Pagliari 2011). More recently and less equivocally, Hel¬leiner (2016b) argues that policymakers are in fact "stumbling incremen¬tally" toward such a regime—one that involves both increased multilateral cooperation and deepening decentralization—and that the G-20 and the FSB have begun to make more meaningful commitments. The global crisis has had more immediate and significant effects on the IMF. These effects have been complex and uneven (Grabel 2011). On the one hand, <u>the <mark>crisis</mark> has <mark>restored</mark> the <mark>IMF's</mark> <strong>relevance</strong>, <strong><mark>coffers</strong>, and</mark> <strong>central <mark>role</u></strong> <u>as</u> <u><strong>first responder</u></strong></mark> <u>to financial distress</u>, just when long-standing critics might have hoped for new institutional arrangements to manage crises that would have displaced or demoted the Fund. In important respects, IMF assistance to countries in distress has followed its well-rehearsed script: many condi- tionality programs continue to stress contractionary macroeconomic policy adjustments, privatization, and liberalization (Gabor 2010; Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016; Nelson 2014a; Weisbrot 2015). Moreover, EMDEs have secured only very modest commitments for increases in their IMF voting shares. Today the United States and Europe continue to exercise dispropor¬tionate influence at the institution (Lesage et al. 2013). The other side of the ledger is not blank, however. Today there are prom¬ising signs that the neoliberal ideas and prescriptions of important economists and departments at the Fund are being challenged by the global crisis in ways that most observers did not anticipate. In response, IMF economists are learning to live with significant departures from the old script. Most notable in this regard, <u>Fund leadership, research staff, and staff working with countries in distress have moved further and more consistently in the direction of normalizing the use of controls over capital inflows, and even on outflows</u> (Grabel 2011; 2015b; 2017; Chwieroth 2015; 2014; Gal¬lagher 2014; Moschella 2014). There is also evidence of change—uneven and inconsistent though it may be—concerning the IMF's approach to fis¬cal policy during the crisis (Ban 2015; Grabel 2011). <u>Fund <mark>economists</u></mark> have <u><mark>developed <strong>conditionality programs</u></strong></mark> <u>that</u>, while still harsh, <u>display</u> <u><strong><mark>greater flex</mark>ibility</u></strong> <u>than was the norm during previous crises</u>. While the Fund con¬tinues to advocate fiscal retrenchment, <u><mark>it</u></mark> also now <u><strong>routinely <mark>emphasizes</u></strong></mark> <u>the need for <strong><mark>"pro-poor spending"</strong></mark> to protect the most vulnerable</u> during crises. The IMF's crisis response strategy is marked by ad hoc measures that reflect important ambiguities within the institution. Strikingly absent here is the unyielding attachment to a global strategy of neoliberalism that marked its interventions over the past several decades. The IMF's geography of influence during the global crisis has been trans¬formed substantially as well. Some of its former clients have emerged as important lenders. At the same time, the institution's client base has largely shifted to the European periphery, and in Europe the IMF appears to be the weakest leg of the European "Troika." Indeed, there is substantial evi¬dence of tension between the IMF and European authorities over important matters such as debt sustainability in Greece—which became particularly evident during the summer of 2015, when a third assistance package for the country was being negotiated—and the most severe forms of austerity in peripheral European economies.15 In a different vein, but in keeping with the idea of discontinuities at the IMF, in 2015 China achieved a long-sought goal of having the IMF include its currency in the SDR. In addition, though the formal voice of EMDEs at the IMF has increased only trivially, the crisis has opened channels for several of these countries, particularly China, to increase their informal influence. Moreover, we find increasing inconsis¬tency between the rhetoric coming from the institution, its research, and its actual practice. As we will see, the rhetoric-research-practice gap reflects something more than public relations imperatives. The gap reveals increas¬ing contestation and even confusion within the Fund. Of equal if not greater importance, productive incoherence is also evi¬denced in the emergence of a far more heterogeneous financial governance architecture. As noted, the East Asian crisis renewed interest in the creation of alternative institutions of financial governance. <u>The drive toward <strong>institutional innovation</u></strong> <u>was given far greater force during the global crisis</u>, while the resources necessary to sustain such experiments only became avail-able to rapidly growing EMDEs following the Asian crisis. <u>New innovations</u> have now <u>emerged at the transregional, regional, subregional, bilateral, and national levels</u>. Today we encounter a range of new and expanded reserve pooling arrangements and development and infrastructure banks. Existing institutions evolved in significant ways during the global crisis and have continued to do so (as we will see in the discussion of <u>the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation, the Arab Monetary Fund, the Development Bank of Latin America, the China Development Bank, and Brazil's National Eco¬nomic and Social Development Bank</u>). At the same time, <u><mark>new arrangements</u></mark> have arisen to <u><strong><mark>rectify</u></strong></mark> <u>perceived <mark>failings in</mark> <strong>the global financial <mark>architecture</strong></mark>, particularly</u> the shortage of <u>infrastructure financing</u>. The new arrangements are exemplified in twin <u>BRICS initiatives, the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, and</u> also in <u><mark>the Eurasian Fund</mark> for Stabilization and Development</u> and in the China-led <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>sian <u><strong><mark>I</u></strong></mark>nfrastructure <u><strong><mark>I</u></strong></mark>nvestment <u><strong><mark>B</u></strong></mark>ank <u><mark>and</u></mark> the One Belt, One Road Initiative/<u><strong><mark>Silk Road</mark> </u></strong>Fund. These and other innovations <u><mark>are <strong>emblematic</u></strong> <u>of</u></mark> developments and aspi¬rations across EMDEs. <u>The <mark>new willingness</mark> and ability <mark>to <strong>undertake innovation</u></strong></mark> <u>in</u> <u><strong>financial governance</u></strong> <u>may turn out</u> to be one of <u>the most important legacie</u>s <u>associated with the global crisis</u>, especially when compared with prior crises. <u>The <mark>new arrangements <strong>do not coalesce</u></strong> <u>around a <strong>singular</mark>, grand global <mark>architecture</u></strong></mark> that might replace the BWIs. Instead, we are observing <u><strong><mark>productive incoherence</strong> in</u></mark> the expansion of disparate and, in some cases, overlap¬ping and interconnected <u><mark>institutions</u></mark> <u>that</u> complement the BWIs. Taken together, they <u><mark>are <strong>"thickening"</strong> and <strong>diversifying</u></strong> <u>the</mark> financial <mark>landscape</mark> in</u> EMDEs and introducing the possibility of a transition <u><mark>to a more <strong>complex</strong>,</u> <u><strong>decentralized</strong></mark>,</u> <u><strong>multitiered</strong>,</u> <u><strong>pluripolar global financial and monetary <mark>system</u></strong></mark> (Armijo and Roberts 2014; Chin 2010; Grabel 2013a; 2013b; Huotari and Hanemann 2014; Mittelman 2013; Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012). The expan¬sion of these initiatives is widening policy space for development. <u><mark>They</u></mark> also <u>generate</u> opportunities for experience-based learning and the creation of <u>new partnerships and coalitions</u>, and in turn enable EMDE "forum shop-ping." In sum, the initiatives are substantially complicating the terrain on which the BWIs operate. We might also understand <u>these institutions</u>, how¬ever small in scale, in terms of their potential to <u><strong><mark>increase robustness</u></strong> <u>and</u></mark> even what Nassim Taleb (2012) terms <u><strong><mark>"anti-fragility"</u></strong> <u>of the</mark> global financial governance <mark>architecture</u></mark>. This would involve a collection of <u>institutions</u> that <u>enjoy</u> some degree of <u>autonomy from each other</u>, where <u><mark>crises are <strong>less likely</strong> to generate <strong>contagion</mark> across countries</u></strong>, and where <u><mark>each crisis</mark> might allow for learning that <mark>induces</mark> <strong>new <mark>innovations</u></strong> <u></mark>that</u> are better able to <u><strong><mark>prevent</u></strong></mark> <u>and</u> <u><strong>limit</u></strong> the scope <u>of <mark>future crises</u></mark>. What I call the productive redun¬dancy that is a feature of the emerging financial governance landscape is central to the achievement of these goals.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Elina Treyger, Assistant Professor at George Mason University School of Law. She is a 2007 graduate of Harvard Law School and holds a Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University, August 25, 2015 fulltext: (“Collateral Incentives to Arrest” Kansas Law Review, Vol. 63, No. 3, pp. 557-631, 2015 George Mason Legal Studies Research Paper No. LS 15-02, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2639316, LASA-IZP) I. INTRODUCTION Alonzo King was convicted of rape as a result of a match between crime scene DNA and a DNA sample taken at his arrest for an unrelated assault.1 In Maryland v. King, the Supreme Court upheld the law that authorized the collection of King’s DNA. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy emphasized the security-enhancing potential of DNA screening at arrest for even minor crimes: [p]eople detained for minor offenses can turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals. Hours after the Oklahoma City bombing, Timothy McVeigh was stopped by a state trooper who noticed he was driving without a license plate. Police stopped serial killer Joel Rifkin for the same reason. One of the terrorists involved in the September 11 attacks was stopped and ticketed for speeding just two days before hijacking Flight 93.2 A vocal advocate of involving local law enforcement in federal immigration enforcement, Kris Kobach, similarly pointed out that several of the 9/11 terrorists had contacts with local law enforcement, after they had violated the conditions of their visas.3 Were police able to access databases that contained information about these individuals, they might have discovered that the individual they detained for a traffic violation was also a dangerous criminal or a deportable non-citizen. With these discoveries, made possible by integrating disparate data sources, disasters would be averted, crimes solved, and the rule of law vindicated. The rise of increasingly encompassing and interoperable databases presents a tantalizing opportunity to combine criminal law enforcement with other public policy goals.4 These databases raise important questions regarding privacy and expanding government surveillance, which have attracted growing scholarly attention.5 Making these new tools available to state agents upon arrest also raises questions about their influence on the exercise of the arrest power. Scholars have noted that access to such databases creates potential for police abuse of discretion, notably with regard to racial inequalities.6 This Article advances this discussion. It situates the problems posed by on-arrest screening regimes in the broader context of the proper use and misuse of the discretionary authority to arrest. It defines a category of improper influences on arrest decisions—“collateral incentives to arrest”—that are of particular concern. And it identifies what precisely is objectionable about collateral incentives as a matter of normative legal principles and as a practical matter, using two illustrative on-arrest screening regimes, Secure Communities and DNA collection laws. Under Secure Communities, fingerprints taken at arrest by any local law enforcement agency (LEA) are automatically screened against the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) database of known and potential immigration violators.7 Federal and state DNA collection laws provide for the involuntary collection of DNA samples from some arrestees, which are screened against databases containing DNA samples from arrestees and convicts as well as forensic samples from unsolved crime scenes. Programs such as Secure Communities and laws such as those authorizing DNA collection on arrest offer collateral benefits—some desirable result beyond prosecution for the crime of arrest. That is, an arrest by local LEAs anywhere in the country now carries with it the potential of promptly identifying and deporting immigration violators. And an arrest for a qualifying offense in most states now carries with it the potential to solve a cold case or deter a recidivist offender from future crimes for which DNA might be recovered. Collateral benefits provide law enforcers with collateral incentives that are relevant to the discretionary decision to arrest particular individuals. The incentives set up by these screening regimes are “collateral” because (i) they hold out benefits that are largely uncorrelated with the suspect’s probability of guilt for the crime of arrest, and (ii) the probability of reaping these benefits is largely independent of the suspect’s guilt of, or prosecution for, the crime of arrest. To the extent law enforcers value the prospect of screening, the automatic availability of such makes arrests of some suspects more attractive than others, for reasons unconnected with their guilt, culpability, or the state’s interest in pursuing charges for the crime of arrest. This Article provides a framework that defines collateral incentives, distinguishes them from less distortive influences on arrest decisions, and generates expectations about their empirical effects on arrest patterns. Scholarly attention to the police use of discretion is, of course, not new; Stephanos Bibas, for instance, recently remarked that police discretion is not in itself a problem, but “unchecked, unreviewable, and potentially idiosyncratic discretion” is. 8 In Part II, I explain in greater detail what makes incentives collateral and suggest that systematic incentives to exercise discretion in certain ways present a problem greater than idiosyncratic influences, arising from the inevitable variability in police officers’ preferences. Why are collateral incentives to arrest objectionable? One might well think that the public interest is served by a more effective enforcement of the immigration laws and the identification of criminals who perpetrated unsolved crimes. DHS officials emphasize that the program enables a more efficient detection of deportable non-citizens, but “does not in any way change local jurisdiction’s existing law enforcement or fingerprinting policies, procedures, or practices.”9 The assumption behind Secure Communities is “that LEAs continue to enforce the criminal law in exactly the same manner as they did before Secure Communities was activated.”10 The King majority similarly maintains that the benefits of DNA matching are obtained without changing law enforcement practices because “DNA collection is not subject to the judgment of officers whose perspective might be ‘colored by their primary involvement in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’”11 In short, the discourse surrounding these policy innovations tends to present arrests as useful tools that can be put to various social purposes at no additional cost.12 An obvious fact is elided in this exposition: the decision to arrest may be influenced by the officer’s awareness of the screening regimes and his assessment of the likelihood that the offender he is confronting is a dangerous recidivist or an immigration violator. Even if police were influenced by collateral incentives, what of it? The decision to arrest is, after all, discretionary. Police have no general duty to arrest and may lawfully arrest anyone for just about any reason once probable cause is present.13 This article offers two interrelated reasons to resist the proliferation of collateral incentives. The first reason, explored in Part III, is normative, based on a familiar principle that originated at common law but has survived into the modern era as the dominant standard to guide the discretionary decisions to arrest. That principle—the “prosecution principle”—holds that police decisions to arrest ought to be guided by the interest in prosecution for the crime of arrest. Collateral incentives, by definition, steer police away from that purpose. Of course, police routinely arrest for a variety of reasons, and the prosecution principle does not demand legal sanctions to root out every other motive underlying arrests. Nonetheless, systematic incentives to arrest for collateral benefits are in tension with the principled legal foundations of the arrest power—in particular, when they are created by means other than explicit state legislative expansion of that power. The second reason to resist the proliferation of collateral incentives, addressed in Part IV, is practical. Collateral incentives are liable to affect arrest patterns in ways that differ from the effects of many other dubious influences. Collateral incentives should be expected to have one or both of two effects: a redistributive effect on the pool of arrestees, including along ethno-racial lines, and an adverse effect on arrest quality. Critics of marrying immigration enforcement to local policing consistently allege that it leads to targeting of Hispanics.14 And courts and scholars express a similar concern about the impact of DNA collection.15 For a subset of arrests, as I demonstrate, collateral incentives are likely to result in both greater unwarranted inequality in arrest patterns and lower quality arrests. Moreover, although the literature tends to worry most about undue influences on discretion with regard to high-discretion petty crimes, I offer reasons why we should also expect consequences with regard to serious crimes.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>On-arrest sampling creates a <u>collateral incentive </u>for police to over-arrest to populate databases – that exacerbates police violence against already overcriminalized Black and Brown folks </h4><p>Elina <strong>Treyger</strong>, Assistant Professor at George Mason University School of Law. She is a 2007 graduate of Harvard Law School and holds a Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University, August 25, 2015</p><p>(“Collateral Incentives to Arrest” Kansas Law Review, Vol. 63, No. 3, pp. 557-631, 2015</p><p>George Mason Legal Studies Research Paper No. LS 15-02, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2639316, LASA-IZP)</p><p>I. INTRODUCTION</p><p>Alonzo King was convicted of rape as a result of a match between crime scene DNA and a DNA sample taken at his arrest for an unrelated assault.1 In Maryland v. King, the Supreme Court upheld the law that authorized the collection of King’s DNA. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy emphasized the security-enhancing potential of DNA screening at arrest for even minor crimes:</p><p>[p]eople detained for minor offenses can turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals. Hours after the Oklahoma City bombing, Timothy McVeigh was stopped by a state trooper who noticed he was driving without a license plate. Police stopped serial killer Joel Rifkin for the same reason. One of the terrorists involved in the September 11 attacks was stopped and ticketed for speeding just two days before hijacking Flight 93.2</p><p><u>A vocal advocate of involving local law enforcement in federal immigration enforcement, Kris Kobach, similarly pointed out that several of the 9/11 terrorists had contacts with local law enforcement, after they had violated the conditions of their visas.3 Were police able to access databases that contained information about these individuals, they might have discovered that the individual they detained for a traffic violation was also a dangerous criminal or a deportable non-citizen. With these discoveries, made possible by integrating disparate data sources, disasters would be averted, crimes solved, and the rule of law vindicated.</p><p><mark>The rise of </mark>increasingly encompassing and interoperable <mark>databases</mark> <mark>presents a</mark> tantalizing <mark>opportunity to combine</mark> criminal <mark>law enforcement with other</mark> public policy <mark>goals</u></mark>.4 <u>These databases raise important questions regarding privacy and expanding government surveillance,</u> which have attracted growing scholarly attention.5 <u>Making these new tools available to state agents upon arrest also raises questions about their influence on the exercise of the arrest power.</u> Scholars have noted that <u><mark>access</mark> <mark>to</mark> such <mark>databases</mark> <mark>creates potential for police abuse of discretion</mark>, notably <mark>with regard to racial inequalities</u></mark>.6 This Article advances this discussion. It situates the problems posed by on-arrest screening regimes in the broader context of the proper use and misuse of the discretionary authority to arrest. It defines a category of improper influences on arrest decisions—“collateral incentives to arrest”—that are of particular concern. And it identifies what precisely is objectionable about collateral incentives as a matter of normative legal principles and as a practical matter, using two illustrative on-arrest screening regimes, Secure Communities and DNA collection laws. Under Secure Communities, fingerprints taken at arrest by any local law enforcement agency (LEA) are automatically screened against the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) database of known and potential immigration violators.7 <u>Federal and state DNA collection laws provide for the involuntary collection of DNA samples from some arrestees, which are screened against databases containing DNA samples from arrestees and convicts as well as forensic samples from unsolved crime scenes. </p><p></u>Programs such as Secure Communities and <u><mark>laws</u></mark> such as those <u><mark>authorizing DNA collection on</mark> <mark>arrest offer collateral</mark> <mark>benefits</mark>—some desirable result <mark>beyond prosecution for </mark>the <mark>crime </mark>of arrest.</u> <u>That is, an arrest by local LEAs anywhere in the country now carries with it the potential of promptly identifying and deporting immigration violators. And <mark>an arrest</mark> for a qualifying offense in most states now <mark>carries</mark> with it <mark>the potential to solve a cold</mark> <mark>case</mark> <mark>or deter a</mark> recidivist <mark>offender</mark> from future crimes for which DNA might be recovered. Collateral benefits provide law enforcers with collateral incentives that are relevant to the discretionary decision to arrest particular individuals.</u> <u>The <mark>incentives</mark> set up by these screening regimes are “collateral” because (i) they hold out benefits that are largely uncorrelated with the suspect’s probability of guilt for the crime of arrest, and (ii) the probability of reaping these benefits is largely independent of the suspect’s guilt of, or prosecution for, the crime of arrest. To the extent law enforcers value the prospect of screening, the automatic availability of such <mark>makes</mark> <mark>arrests of some suspects more attractive than others, for reasons unconnected with</mark> their <mark>guilt</mark>, culpability, or the state’s interest in pursuing charges for the crime of arrest.</p><p>This Article provides a framework that defines collateral incentives, distinguishes them from less distortive influences on arrest decisions, and generates expectations about their empirical effects on arrest patterns. Scholarly attention to the police use of discretion is, of course, not new; Stephanos Bibas, for instance, recently remarked that police discretion is not in itself a problem, but “unchecked, unreviewable, and potentially idiosyncratic discretion” is. 8 In Part II, I explain in greater detail what makes incentives collateral and suggest that systematic incentives to exercise discretion in certain ways present a problem greater than idiosyncratic influences, arising from the inevitable variability in police officers’ preferences.</p><p></u>Why are collateral incentives to arrest objectionable? One might well think that the public interest is served by a more effective enforcement of the immigration laws and the identification of criminals who perpetrated unsolved crimes. DHS officials emphasize that the program enables a more efficient detection of deportable non-citizens, but “does not in any way change local jurisdiction’s existing law enforcement or fingerprinting policies, procedures, or practices.”9 The assumption behind Secure Communities is “that LEAs continue to enforce the criminal law in exactly the same manner as they did before Secure Communities was activated.”10 The King majority similarly maintains that the benefits of DNA matching are obtained without changing law enforcement practices because “DNA collection is not subject to the judgment of officers whose perspective might be ‘colored by their primary involvement in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’”11 In short, the discourse surrounding these policy innovations tends to present arrests as useful tools that can be put to various social purposes at no additional cost.12 An obvious fact is elided in this exposition<u>: the decision to arrest may be influenced by the officer’s awareness of the screening regimes and his assessment of the likelihood that the offender he is confronting is a dangerous recidivist or an immigration violator.</p><p></u>Even if police were influenced by collateral incentives, what of it? The decision to arrest is, after all, discretionary. Police have no general duty to arrest and may lawfully arrest anyone for just about any reason once probable cause is present.13 This article offers two interrelated reasons to resist the proliferation of collateral incentives. The first reason, explored in Part III, is normative, based on a familiar principle that originated at common law but has survived into the modern era as the dominant standard to guide the discretionary decisions to arrest. That principle—<u>the “prosecution principle”—holds that police decisions to arrest ought to be guided by the interest in prosecution for the crime of arrest. Collateral incentives, by definition, steer police away from that purpose</u>. Of course, police routinely arrest for a variety of reasons, and the prosecution principle does not demand legal sanctions to root out every other motive underlying arrests. <u>Nonetheless, systematic incentives to arrest for collateral benefits are in tension with the principled legal foundations of the arrest power—in particular, when they are created by means other than explicit state legislative expansion of that power</u>.</p><p>The second reason to resist the proliferation of collateral incentives, addressed in Part IV, is practical<u>. <mark>Collateral</mark> <mark>incentives</mark> are liable to affect arrest patterns in ways that differ from the effects of many other dubious influences.</u> <u>Collateral incentives should be expected to <mark>have</mark> one or both of two effects: <mark>a redistributive effect on the pool of arrestees</mark>, including <mark>along</mark> <mark>ethno-racial lines</mark>, and an adverse effect on arrest quality.</u> Critics of marrying immigration enforcement to local policing consistently allege that <u>it leads to targeting of Hispanics</u>.14 And courts and scholars express a similar concern about the impact of DNA collection.15 For a subset of arrests, as I demonstrate<u>, collateral incentives are likely to result in both greater unwarranted inequality in arrest patterns and lower quality arrests. Moreover, although the literature tends to worry most about undue influences on discretion with regard to high-discretion petty crimes, I offer reasons why we should also expect consequences with regard to serious crimes.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Lewis 19 (Chris Lewis, editor of Clean Energy Finance Forum and the Network, Master’s of Environmental Management from the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, 9/25/2019, Conservation Finance Network, "Building Demand in US Water Quality Trading Markets", https://www.conservationfinancenetwork.org/2019/09/25/building-demand-in-us-water-quality-trading-markets)//veronica fulltext: Water quality trading markets allow the operators of point sources of water pollution — such as sewage treatment plants or factories — to offset that pollution by purchasing credits representing reductions elsewhere. But despite the presence of functioning programs across the country, the overall volume of trading remains low. To expand trading, stakeholders need to address the lack of numeric discharge limits, transaction costs, risk aversion, and the absence of empirical data on programs. Environmental credit trading programs have gained traction for pollutants like carbon emissions, at least in concept. Is water quality trading the next frontier? The mechanism offers the possibility of more flexible and cost-effective water quality control, but in contrast to some environmental credits, markets have struggled to gain momentum. Water quality trading markets allow the operators of point sources of water pollution — such as sewage treatment plants or factories — to offset that pollution by purchasing credits representing reductions elsewhere. Just as the purchase of a carbon offset gives its buyer credit for reducing their carbon footprint, a water quality trading market allows participants to buy and sell the credit for reduction of water pollution into a given water body. Trading is a tool that may be well-suited to address the evolving nature of water pollution in the United States. “The Clean Water Act was written at a time when the major pollution in our waterways was coming from pipes,” said Kristiana Teige Witherill, clean water project manager at the Willamette Partnership, a nonprofit focused on market-based conservation in the American West. “Today, depending on what watershed you’re looking at, 80 to 90% of pollution is coming from non-point sources, not coming from the end of a pipe.” After establishing parameters for water quality trading in 2003, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reiterated its support for the tool in a statement in February. A 2017 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report tallied 19 water quality trading programs operating in 2014 in a diverse set of 11 U.S. states, from California to Idaho to Florida. But despite the presence of functioning programs across the country, the GAO noted that the overall volume of trading remains low. “According to stakeholders, two key factors have affected participation in nutrient credit trading — the presence of discharge limits for nutrients and the challenges of measuring the results of nonpoint sources’ nutrient reduction activities,” the report stated. Now, proponents of water quality trading are working to bring more participants into the fold. What can be done to scale up use of trading? Under the U.S. Clean Water Act, states are responsible for regulating the quality of water discharged into water bodies. Water quality trading markets provide an alternate way for any point source regulated by the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System to meet requirements set by states through the act. Water quality trading credits most often deal with nitrogen and phosphorus pollution, but they can be generated for other purposes as well. To protect temperature-sensitive salmon species, for example, Oregon has a functioning trading market for water temperature, according to Witherill. Less commonly, markets can also facilitate trades for credits that represent reduced stormwater quantity. Credits are frequently generated through reduced pollution from agricultural land, but can also come from point-source sites that have exceeded pollution-reduction requirements. States are responsible for approving and verifying credits. Water quality trading has the potential to provide massive increases in the cost-effectiveness of pollution reduction. According to the World Resources Institute, reducing nitrogen pollution through water treatment plant upgrades costs an average of about $15 per pound of nitrogen, but under $5 per pound through planting cover crops on farms. The GAO’s 2017 report stated that in the year they surveyed, 2014, the majority of trading occurred in Connecticut, Pennsylvania and Virginia. In those states, most point sources didn’t purchase credits, resulting in a substantial share of generated credits going unused. State officials told the GAO, however, that trading programs still provided other benefits, like flexibility in complying with water quality regulations. “I would say that there are a number of programs across the country that are working well, like here in Oregon where we have a number of facilities and municipalities that are successfully using water quality trading,” Witherill said. “But I think we haven’t yet reached a tipping point where water trading becomes a mainstream solution for meeting water quality regulations.” Often, the issue centers around the question of bringing buyers to the table. In October 2018, the National Network on Water Quality Trading — facilitated by the Willamette Partnership — published its report “Breaking Down Barriers: Priority Actions for Advancing Water Quality Trading.” The group aimed “to diagnose why, in contrast to other environmental markets, interest in water quality trading and demand for water quality credits has been slow.” Along with discharge limits, the “Breaking Down Barriers” report points to transaction costs, risk aversion, and the absence of empirical data on programs as deterrents to trading. When it comes to discharge limits, the regulatory structure of a given state plays a big role. Under the Clean Water Act some states, but not others, have set specific quantitative limits on pollution. “In places like Wisconsin that have numeric criteria for nutrients, they have a really strong driver for cities and municipalities to be looking at options like water quality trading,” Witherill said. “It’s kind of a precondition for it to have some kind of regulatory driver.” Wisconsin has a statewide trading program for the variety of pollutants regulated by the state Department of Natural Resources, but the difficulty of conducting trades has limited its use, according to Wisconsin Public Radio. Critics of the program’s current design have blamed low participation on inflexible rules and trouble connecting buyers and sellers. In the absence of a “regulatory driver” like quantitative pollution limits, water quality trading programs have limited options for attracting buyers. The Ohio River Basin Trading Program, run by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), manages a trading market in Ohio, Indiana and Kentucky. The program aims to address nutrient pollution into the Ohio River — and ultimately, the Gulf of Mexico — by generating credits from conservation practices on agricultural land. According to Program Manager Jessica Fox, the Ohio River Basin Trading Project has over 100,000 of the $12 to $14 credits — each representing a pound of verified reduced nitrogen or phosphorus discharge — “on the shelf” waiting to be sold. EPRI has sold credits to power companies, a university and individuals, Fox said, but not at the volume necessary to make the program self-sustaining. “When every transaction requires me to take a business trip,” she said, “that’s not going to work. It has to be more liquid than that.” There are other preconditions needed for water quality trading in addition to quantitative criteria, the “Breaking Down Barriers” report argues. First, unless the technology required for polluters to meet limits is expensive or nonexistent, managers of point sources are unlikely to turn to trading. Regulatory agencies must also support purchasers interested in pursuing credits. “We’ve also seen that the utilities who pursue water quality trading often have a champion supporting the program within their own organization,” the report stated. Through stakeholder interviews and other research, the “Breaking Down Barriers” authors identified seven steps that stand to increase use of trading. They advocate for simplifying trading programs; making sure state regulators have the capacity and resources they need; clarifying the policies of EPA and states; reducing buyer risk, real and perceived; addressing the legal risk that stems from a lack of case law on trading; developing more direction for stormwater trading; and building relationships. For its part, the Ohio River Basin Trading Program is looking to stimulate more demand of its own accord. In May, EPRI announced a partnership with First Climate, a firm that specializes in selling environmental credits, to sell credits on international markets and make them available to a wider range of domestic buyers. Before, the trading program wasn’t able to accommodate transactions of less than $25,000, according to Fox. Through First Climate, however, the program is taking a more retail approach to trading. “You can go on now, and you can buy one credit with a credit card or Paypal account,” Fox said. The program has a calculator online that individuals can use to determine their personal nitrogen footprint, and provides buyers a photo of the farmer who generated their credit. It even sells t-shirts. “It’s kind of like ‘adopt a sea lion,’” she said. “It’s getting it to be a more publicly accessible thing.” First Climate and EPRI are also pitching large corporate buyers on water quality credits as a way to meet voluntary sustainability commitments. But as trading programs continue to try to break into the mainstream, Willamette’s Witherill cautioned that they are just one tool in the toolbox for “expanding the number of options utilities have to invest in their watersheds,” she said. “Maybe that doesn’t necessarily look exactly like water quality trading, maybe that looks like a source water protection program or some kind of groundwater irrigation management.” On the policy front, Fox also wonders if EPA could do more to support markets. The agency’s February memo was “a huge signal that the administration is strongly behind water quality trading,” she said, but it doesn’t actually change implementation on the ground. One possibility worth exploring, Fox said, would be whether EPA could allow states to use their own share of funds from joint federal-state programs — such as Clean Water State Revolving Funds, for example — to buy credits. “Any way to incent the buyer side is a great solution,” she said.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>A quantitative limit increases trading volume, lowers transaction costs, and clarifies legal risk . </h4><p>Lewis 19</strong> (Chris Lewis, editor of Clean Energy Finance Forum and the Network, Master’s of Environmental Management from the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, 9/25/2019, Conservation Finance Network, "Building Demand in US Water Quality Trading Markets", https://www.conservationfinancenetwork.org/2019/09/25/building-demand-in-us-water-quality-trading-markets)//veronica</p><p><u>Water quality <mark>trading</mark> markets</u> <u><strong><mark>allow</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>operators</strong> of point sources of water pollution</u></mark> — such as sewage treatment plants or factories — <u><mark>to <strong>offset</strong></mark> that <strong><mark>pollution</strong> by purchasing credits</mark> representing <strong>reductions elsewhere. </p><p></u></strong>But <u>despite</u> the presence of <u>functioning programs</u> across the country, the <u>overall <strong><mark>volume</strong> of trading <strong>remains low</strong></mark>.<strong> </p><p></strong>To expand trading</u>, <u>stakeholders <mark>need to address</u></mark> the lack of <u><strong><mark>numeric</u></strong></mark> discharge <u><strong><mark>limits</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>transaction costs</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>risk aversion</mark>,</u></strong> and the absence of empirical data on programs. </p><p>Environmental credit trading programs have gained traction for pollutants like carbon emissions, at least in concept. Is <u>water quality <mark>trading</mark> the <strong>next <mark>frontier</u></strong></mark>? The <u>mechanism <mark>offers</u></mark> the possibility of <u>more <strong><mark>flexible</strong> and <strong>cost-effective</strong> water quality</mark> control</u>, but in contrast to some environmental credits, markets have <u>struggled to gain momentum</u>. </p><p>Water quality trading markets allow the operators of point sources of water pollution — such as sewage treatment plants or factories — to offset that pollution by purchasing credits representing reductions elsewhere. Just as the purchase of a carbon offset gives its buyer credit for reducing their carbon footprint, a water quality trading market allows participants to buy and sell the credit for reduction of water pollution into a given water body. </p><p><u><mark>Trading</u></mark> is a tool that may be well-<u>suited to <mark>address</mark> the <strong><mark>evolving nature</strong> of <strong></mark>water <mark>pollution</strong></mark> in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. </p><p>“The Clean Water Act was written at a time when the major pollution in our waterways was coming from pipes,” said Kristiana Teige Witherill, clean water project manager at the Willamette Partnership, a nonprofit focused on market-based conservation in the American West. “Today, depending on what watershed you’re looking at, 80 to 90% of pollution is coming from non-point sources, not coming from the end of a pipe.” </p><p>After establishing parameters for water quality trading in 2003, the Environmental Protection Agency (<u><strong>EPA</strong>) <strong>reiterated</strong> its <strong>support</strong> for the tool</u> in a statement in February. A 2017 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report tallied 19 water quality trading programs operating in 2014 in a diverse set of 11 U.S. states, from California to Idaho to Florida. </p><p>But despite the presence of functioning programs across the country, the GAO noted that the overall volume of trading remains low. “According to stakeholders, two key factors have affected participation in nutrient credit trading — the presence of discharge limits for nutrients and the challenges of measuring the results of nonpoint sources’ nutrient reduction activities,” the report stated. </p><p>Now, proponents of water quality trading are working to bring more participants into the fold. W<u>hat can be done to scale up use of trading</u>? </p><p><u>Under the U.S. Clean Water Act, states are responsible for regulating the quality of water discharged into water bodies. Water quality trading markets provide an alternate way for any point source regulated by the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System to meet requirements set by states through the act. </p><p></u>Water quality trading <u><mark>credits</mark> most often <mark>deal with nitrogen and phosphorus pollution</mark>,</u> but they <u>can be generated</u> for other purposes as well. <u>To <mark>protect</mark> temperature-sensitive <strong><mark>salmon</mark> species,</u></strong> for example, Oregon has a functioning trading market for water temperature, according to Witherill. Less commonly, <u>markets</u> can also <u><strong><mark>facilitate trades</strong> for credits</mark> that represent <mark>reduced <strong>stormwater quantity</strong></mark>. </p><p><mark>Credits</u></mark> are <u>frequently generated through <strong><mark>reduced pollution</strong> from <strong>ag</mark>ricultural <mark>land</u></strong></mark>, but <u>can</u> also <u>come from point-source sites that have <strong>exceeded</strong> pollution-reduction <strong>requirements</strong>. States are responsible for approving and verifying credits. </p><p>Water quality trading</u> <u>has</u> the <u>potential to provide <strong>massive increases</strong> in the <strong>cost-effectiveness</strong> of pollution reduction</u>. According to the World Resources Institute, <u>reducing nitrogen pollution through water treatment plant upgrades costs an average of about $15 per pound of nitrogen,</u> but <u>under $5 per pound through planting cover crops on farms. </p><p></u>The GAO’s 2017 report stated that in the year they surveyed, 2014, the majority of trading occurred in Connecticut, Pennsylvania and Virginia. In those states, most point sources didn’t purchase credits, resulting in a substantial share of generated credits going unused. State officials told the GAO, however, that trading programs still provided other benefits, like <u><strong>flexibility</strong> <strong>in complying</strong> with water quality regulations</u>. </p><p>“I would say that there are a number of programs across the country that are working well, like here in Oregon where we have a number of facilities and municipalities that are successfully using water quality trading,” Witherill said. “But I think we haven’t yet reached a tipping point where water trading becomes a mainstream solution for meeting water quality regulations.” </p><p>Often, the issue centers around the question of bringing buyers to the table. </p><p>In October 2018, the National Network on Water Quality Trading — facilitated by the Willamette Partnership — published its report “Breaking Down Barriers: Priority Actions for Advancing Water Quality Trading.” The group aimed “to diagnose why, in contrast to other environmental markets, interest in water quality trading and demand for water quality credits has been slow.” </p><p>Along with discharge limits, the “Breaking Down Barriers” report points to <u><strong><mark>transaction costs</strong></mark>, risk aversion</u>, and the absence of empirical data on programs as <u><strong><mark>deterrents to trading</u></strong></mark>. When it comes to discharge limits, the regulatory structure of a given state plays a big role. Under the Clean Water Act <u>some <mark>states</mark>, but not others, have set specific <strong>quantitative <mark>limits</strong></mark> on <mark>pollution</u></mark>. </p><p>“In places like Wisconsin that have numeric criteria for nutrients, they have a really strong driver for cities and municipalities to be looking at options like water quality trading,” Witherill said. “It’s kind of a precondition for it to have some kind of regulatory driver.” </p><p><u>Wisconsin has a statewide trading program for the variety of pollutants regulated by the state Department of Natural Resources, but the difficulty of conducting trades has limited its use, according to Wisconsin Public Radio. Critics of the program’s current design have blamed low participation on inflexible rules and trouble connecting buyers and sellers. </p><p>In the <strong>absence of</strong> a “<strong>regulatory driver</strong>” like <mark>quantitative <strong>pollution limits</mark>,</strong> water quality trading <mark>programs have <strong>limited options</strong></mark> for <mark>attracting</mark> <mark>buyers</mark>. </p><p></u>The Ohio River Basin Trading Program, run by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), manages a trading market in Ohio, Indiana and Kentucky. The program aims to address nutrient pollution into the Ohio River — and ultimately, the Gulf of Mexico — by generating credits from conservation practices on agricultural land. According to Program Manager Jessica Fox, the Ohio River Basin Trading Project has over 100,000 of the $12 to $14 credits — each representing a pound of verified reduced nitrogen or phosphorus discharge — “on the shelf” waiting to be sold. </p><p>EPRI has sold credits to power companies, a university and individuals, Fox said, but not at the volume necessary to make the program self-sustaining. “When every transaction requires me to take a business trip,” she said, “that’s not going to work. It has to be more liquid than that.” </p><p>There are other preconditions needed for water quality trading in addition to quantitative criteria, the “Breaking Down Barriers” report argues. First, unless the technology required for polluters to meet limits is expensive or nonexistent, managers of point sources are unlikely to turn to trading. Regulatory agencies must also support purchasers interested in pursuing credits. “We’ve also seen that the utilities who pursue water quality trading often have a champion supporting the program within their own organization,” the report stated. </p><p>Through stakeholder interviews and other research, the “Breaking Down Barriers” authors identified seven steps that stand to increase use of trading. They advocate for simplifying trading programs; making sure state regulators have the capacity and resources they need; <u><strong><mark>clarifying</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>policies</strong> of EPA</u></mark> and states; <u><strong><mark>reducing</mark> buyer <mark>risk</strong></mark>, real and perceived</u>; <u><strong><mark>addressing</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>legal risk</strong></mark> that stems <mark>from</mark> a <strong><mark>lack of</strong> case <strong>law</strong></mark> on trading</u>; developing more direction for stormwater trading; and building relationships. </p><p>For its part, the Ohio River Basin Trading Program is looking to stimulate more demand of its own accord. In May, EPRI announced a partnership with First Climate, a firm that specializes in selling environmental credits, to sell credits on international markets and make them available to a wider range of domestic buyers. Before, the trading program wasn’t able to accommodate transactions of less than $25,000, according to Fox. Through First Climate, however, the program is taking a more retail approach to trading. </p><p>“You can go on now, and you can buy one credit with a credit card or Paypal account,” Fox said. The program has a calculator online that individuals can use to determine their personal nitrogen footprint, and provides buyers a photo of the farmer who generated their credit. It even sells t-shirts. </p><p>“It’s kind of like ‘adopt a sea lion,’” she said. “It’s getting it to be a more publicly accessible thing.” </p><p>First Climate and EPRI are also pitching large corporate buyers on water quality credits as a way to meet voluntary sustainability commitments. </p><p><u>But as trading programs continue to try to break into the mainstream, Willamette’s Witherill cautioned that they are just one tool in the toolbox for “expanding the number of options utilities have to invest in their watersheds,” she said. “Maybe that doesn’t necessarily look exactly like water quality trading, maybe that looks like a source water protection program or some kind of groundwater irrigation management.” </p><p></u>On the policy front, Fox also wonders if <u><mark>EPA</mark> could do more to <mark>support markets</u></mark>. The agency’s February memo was “<u>a <strong><mark>huge signal</strong></mark> that the <mark>administration</mark> is strongly behind water quality trading</u>,” she said, but <u>it <strong><mark>doesn’t</strong></mark> actually <strong><mark>change implementation</strong></mark> on the ground. </p><p></u>One possibility worth exploring, Fox said, would be whether EPA could allow states to use their own share of funds from joint federal-state programs — such as Clean Water State Revolving Funds, for example — to buy credits. </p><p>“<u>Any way to <strong>incent</strong> the buyer side is a <strong>great solution</u></strong>,” she said. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Colby 16 (Elbridge - Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security who served for over five years in the U.S. government, primarily in positions focusing on nuclear weapons, arms control, and intelligence reform, “FROM SANCTUARY TO BATTLEFIELD: A Framework for a U.S. Defense and Deterrence Strategy for Space,” p. 25-26, https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Space-Report_16107.pdf?mtime=20160906081938) fulltext: What would these crucial deterrent threats look like? As previously noted, adversaries could not be expected to observe general and particularly conflict-specific norms of limitation only through goodwill and the moral pressure of third parties. Rather, U.S. opponents would need to judge that observing such rules and demands would be the more prudent course not only due to the adversary’s perception of the diplomatic and broadly reputational costs that would ensue from flouting such rules, costs that might seem worth bearing in the midst of a war with the United States, but also of their specific military consequences. Accordingly, there would need to be the credible threat of relevant military force hovering behind such laws and demands if there is to be any reasonable hope that an adversary is to abide by them. These military consequences could be of two varieties: both the frustration of failure and the fear of retaliation. Using the classic formulation, for deterrence to work a potential adversary should judge that attacks on important U.S. space assets would either trigger costs more dear than any gains, view such efforts as too likely to fail and thus be counterproductive, or both.71 Usually the United States tries to position itself so that it is able to deter by being able to deny an adversary any gains, since deterrence through the threat of inflicting costs requires the cooperation of the adversary to avoid or terminate escalation and may spark escalation itself through the nature of the retaliation. Hence, for instance, the United States seeks to deny the ability of North Korea and Iran to strike at the U.S. homeland with long-range missiles rather than rely only on its ability to retaliate.72 This focus on deterrence by denial appears to be the aspiration of U.S. space policy.73 But when vulnerability is a practically unalterable fact, as in the case of the U.S. space architecture, an exclusive concentration on deterrence by denial is ultimately a recipe for failure and possibly undue escalation. Accordingly, in such circumstances, the threat to impose costs sufficient to negate the appeal of the attack must become a vital part of an effective deterrent. Thus in the case of space the optimal deterrent approach for the United States will be a mixture of deterrence by cost imposition and deterrence by denial. It is important to emphasize that not only are these two forms of deterrence not necessarily exclusive, but that in this case they actually can and should be made to complement each other in a coherent limited war strategy. Deterrence by denial efforts should make it more difficult for an adversary to strike at and damage U.S. space assets, not merely for simple reasons of defense, but also to raise the costs and risks of doing so to an adversary and to make such an action more escalatory. If a U.S. opponent has to use a more destructive or larger weapon or set of weapons, strike at a broader array of targets, or cause more direct and peripheral damage in his attack, then the action is likely to spur and legitimate a more severe response on the part of the United States and cause more deleterious third-order effects. This prospect is more likely to deter the attack in the first place. But it will only do so if the United States has retaliatory responses to such strikes that are frightening or formidable enough to induce restraint but also tailored and modest enough in their consequences that an opponent will believe they will actually be employed. An adversary, in other words, must not only see the stipulated retaliation as fearful and damaging but also as believably implementable. Furthermore, the nature of the retaliation threatened should be appropriately correlated to the importance and gravity of the attack that the United States is trying to deter. As Forrest Morgan aptly put it, “[I]t is less a question of whether would-be aggressors can be deterred from attacking U.S. space systems than of what kind of attacks against which capabilities could be deterred under what circumstances.”74 By the same token, U.S. space defenses should be effective and cost-efficient enough to make a material difference in adversaries’ potential calculations of how worthwhile attacking U.S. satellites would be. An enemy should see that U.S. space defenses are sufficiently good to significantly raise the costs, risks, and difficulty of striking at U.S. space assets. Such an assessment on the part of the adversary should contribute to deterring his attacking such assets in the first place by weighing on his fears that the attack will fail and the consequent wastage of important weapons or capabilities, that he will tip off the United States as to intentions or hidden assets, of the potential for escalation or embarrassment, that the attack will produce space debris or otherwise cause collateral damage, and other such factors. These disincentives should weigh meaningfully towards his forgoing such attacks in the first place, or at least to narrowing or restraining them. It is important to observe that this is a different standard than the full protection of a satellite. The point is to meaningfully raise the costs and risks to the adversary of attacking, not to provide a full protection that is usually likely impossible and very likely to be an inefficient investment. One can see here the interaction between the defensibility and hardiness of U.S. satellites and the ease or difficulty of formulating retaliatory threats needed to deter attacks upon them. While a full space defense may be unobtainable in the foreseeable future, the better defended, hardier, and more resilient the U.S. space architecture is, the more drastic will be the steps an adversary needs to take to materially damage it. And the more drastic those steps are, the more escalatory they will seem to be and thus the more credible and legitimate will more serious U.S. responses to such attacks appear. And thus the more deterred an adversary will be from embarking on such attacks in the first place. But, by extension, if an adversary can seriously undermine the U.S. space architecture with relatively discriminate force and with little collateral damage, U.S. retaliatory ripostes that might themselves seem highly escalatory will be less credibile and appealing in the event, leaving the U.S. space force significantly vulnerable to degradation in conflict. The key for an effective U.S. limited war strategy for space, then, is to seek to raise the costs, the difficulties, the consequences, the violence, and ultimately the degree of escalation entailed by striking at the U.S. space constellation and its supporting infrastructure – while simultaneously developing tailored retaliatory options that, correlated to such escalation, would cause sufficient pain or damage to an adversary that he would find it more palatable to exercise restraint rather than his power. What might such retaliatory options look like? It seems clear that some counterspace capabilities would be appropriate, especially non-kinetic ones, as such capabilities would help limit the conflict by responding to an adversary’s space strike with a matching counterattack by the United States. Such capabilities will also be increasingly menacing to plausible opponents given their growing investments and presence in space. For instance, the United States could respond to attacks on its space architecture by China or Russia by striking at or employing disablement techniques against the opponent’s space assets. Such counterstrikes might focus in particular on those assets vital for the opponent’s ability to target crucial U.S. assets, such as aircraft carriers or other particularly lucrative but increasingly vulnerable targets. In the event of conflict with China, for instance, the United States could respond to attacks on U.S. satellites with strikes against the PRC’s own satellite architecture that might be used in locating and targeting U.S. surface ships with China’s DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile or other strike assets.75 Having this ability would require that the United States develop or maintain counterspace assets, primarily non-kinetic ones, that could be employed in accordance with preferred U.S. formulae for limitation but are nonetheless highly effective and whose results can be measured with a sufficient degree of reliability.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>The credible threat of force in space ensures China/Russia abide by U.S. demands </h4><p><u>Colby 16</u></strong> (Elbridge - Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security who served for over five years in the U.S. government, primarily in positions focusing on nuclear weapons, arms control, and intelligence reform, “FROM SANCTUARY TO BATTLEFIELD: A Framework for a U.S. Defense and Deterrence Strategy for Space,” p. 25-26, https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Space-Report_16107.pdf?mtime=20160906081938)</p><p>What would these crucial deterrent threats look like? As previously noted, <u><mark>adversaries could not be expected to observe</mark> general and particularly conflict-specific <mark>norms</mark> of limitation <strong><mark>only through goodwill</strong></mark> and the moral pressure of third parties.</u> Rather, <u>U.S. <mark>opponents</mark> would <mark>need to judge that <strong>observing</u></strong></mark> such rules and <u><strong><mark>demands</strong> would be</mark> the more <mark>prudent</mark> course</u> not only <u><mark>due to</u></mark> the adversary’s perception of the diplomatic and broadly reputational costs that would ensue from flouting such rules, costs that might seem worth bearing in the midst of a war with the United States, but also of <u>their specific<strong> <mark>military consequences.</u></strong></mark> Accordingly, <u><strong><mark>there would need to be the credible threat of</mark> relevant <mark>military force hovering behind</mark> such laws and <mark>demands if there is</mark> to be <mark>any</mark> reasonable <mark>hope</mark> that <mark>an adversary is to abide</mark> by them.</u></strong> These military consequences could be of two varieties: both the frustration of failure and the fear of retaliation. Using the classic formulation, for deterrence to work a potential adversary should judge that attacks on important U.S. space assets would either trigger costs more dear than any gains, view such efforts as too likely to fail and thus be counterproductive, or both.71 Usually the United States tries to position itself so that it is able to deter by being able to deny an adversary any gains, since deterrence through the threat of inflicting costs requires the cooperation of the adversary to avoid or terminate escalation and may spark escalation itself through the nature of the retaliation. Hence, for instance, the United States seeks to deny the ability of North Korea and Iran to strike at the U.S. homeland with long-range missiles rather than rely only on its ability to retaliate.72 This focus on deterrence by denial appears to be the aspiration of U.S. space policy.73 But when vulnerability is a practically unalterable fact, as in the case of the U.S. space architecture, an exclusive concentration on deterrence by denial is ultimately a recipe for failure and possibly undue escalation. Accordingly, in such circumstances, <u><strong>the threat to impose costs sufficient to negate the appeal of the attack must become a vital part of an effective deterrent.</u></strong> Thus <u>in the case of space the optimal deterrent approach for the United States will be a mixture of deterrence by cost imposition and deterrence by denial.</u> It is important to emphasize that not only are these two forms of deterrence not necessarily exclusive, but that in this case they actually can and should be made to complement each other in a coherent limited war strategy. Deterrence by denial efforts should make it more difficult for an adversary to strike at and damage U.S. space assets, not merely for simple reasons of defense, but also to raise the costs and risks of doing so to an adversary and to make such an action more escalatory. If a U.S. opponent has to use a more destructive or larger weapon or set of weapons, strike at a broader array of targets, or cause more direct and peripheral damage in his attack, then the action is likely to spur and legitimate a more severe response on the part of the United States and cause more deleterious third-order effects. <u>This prospect is more likely to <strong>deter the attack in the first place. </strong>But <mark>it will only do so if the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>has <strong>retaliatory responses</mark> to such strikes <mark>that are</mark> frightening or <mark>formidable enough to induce restraint but</mark> also tailored and <mark>modest enough</mark> in their consequences <mark>that an opponent will believe they will</mark> actually <mark>be employed.</u></strong></mark> <u>An adversary, in other words, must not only see the stipulated retaliation as fearful and damaging but also as believably implementable.</u> Furthermore, the nature of the retaliation threatened should be appropriately correlated to the importance and gravity of the attack that the United States is trying to deter. As Forrest Morgan aptly put it, “[I]t is less a question of whether would-be aggressors can be deterred from attacking U.S. space systems than of what kind of attacks against which capabilities could be deterred under what circumstances.”74 By the same token, U.S. space defenses should be effective and cost-efficient enough to make a material difference in adversaries’ potential calculations of how worthwhile attacking U.S. satellites would be. An enemy should see that U.S. space defenses are sufficiently good to significantly raise the costs, risks, and difficulty of striking at U.S. space assets. Such an assessment on the part of the adversary should contribute to deterring his attacking such assets in the first place by weighing on his fears that the attack will fail and the consequent wastage of important weapons or capabilities, that he will tip off the United States as to intentions or hidden assets, of the potential for escalation or embarrassment, that the attack will produce space debris or otherwise cause collateral damage, and other such factors. These disincentives should weigh meaningfully towards his forgoing such attacks in the first place, or at least to narrowing or restraining them. It is important to observe that this is a different standard than the full protection of a satellite. The point is to meaningfully raise the costs and risks to the adversary of attacking, not to provide a full protection that is usually likely impossible and very likely to be an inefficient investment. One can see here the interaction between the defensibility and hardiness of U.S. satellites and the ease or difficulty of formulating retaliatory threats needed to deter attacks upon them. While a full space defense may be unobtainable in the foreseeable future, the better defended, hardier, and more resilient the U.S. space architecture is, the more drastic will be the steps an adversary needs to take to materially damage it. And the more drastic those steps are, the more escalatory they will seem to be and thus the more credible and legitimate will more serious U.S. responses to such attacks appear. And thus the more deterred an adversary will be from embarking on such attacks in the first place. But, by extension, if an adversary can seriously undermine the U.S. space architecture with relatively discriminate force and with little collateral damage, U.S. retaliatory ripostes that might themselves seem highly escalatory will be less credibile and appealing in the event, leaving the U.S. space force significantly vulnerable to degradation in conflict. The key for an effective U.S. limited war strategy for space, then, is to seek to raise the costs, the difficulties, the consequences, the violence, and ultimately the degree of escalation entailed by striking at the U.S. space constellation and its supporting infrastructure – while simultaneously developing tailored retaliatory options that, correlated to such escalation, would cause sufficient pain or damage to an adversary that he would find it more palatable to exercise restraint rather than his power. What might such retaliatory options look like? It seems clear that some <u><mark>counterspace</mark> capabilities</u> would be appropriate, <u>especially <strong><mark>non-kinetic</strong></mark> ones, as such <mark>capabilities</mark> would help <mark>limit</mark> the <mark>conflict</mark> by responding to an adversary’s space strike with a matching counterattack by the United States. <mark>Such capabilities will </mark>also <mark>be</mark> <strong>increasingly <mark>menacing to plausible opponents</mark> given their growing investments and presence in space.</u></strong> <u>For instance, the United States could respond to attacks on its space architecture by <strong>China or Russia</strong> by striking at or employing disablement techniques against the opponent’s space assets.</u><strong> Such counterstrikes might focus in particular on those assets vital for the opponent’s ability to target crucial U.S. assets, such as aircraft carriers or other particularly lucrative but increasingly vulnerable targets. In the event of conflict with China, for instance, the United States could respond to attacks on U.S. satellites with strikes against the PRC’s own satellite architecture that might be used in locating and targeting U.S. surface ships with China’s DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile or other strike assets.75 Having this ability would require that the United States develop or maintain counterspace assets, primarily non-kinetic ones, that could be employed in accordance with preferred U.S. formulae for limitation but are nonetheless highly effective and whose results can be measured with a sufficient degree of reliability. </p></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Ayten Gündoğdu 18, Tow Associate Professor for Distinguished Scholars in the Department of Political Science at Barnard College, “On the Ambivalent Politics of Human Rights,” Journal of International Political Theory, vol. 14, no. 3, 10/2018, pp. 367–380 fulltext: Human rights and the heterogeneous practices of emancipation Human rights turn democratic politics into “a theater of contestation,” Claude Lefort argues, because they “go beyond any particular formulation which has been given of them” and contain within them “the demand for their reformulation” (Lefort, 1986: 258). The books under review share Lefort’s crucial insight that the political function of human rights cannot be limited to their legitimation of sovereign power. To the extent that the human rights discourse renders the concept of “humanity” indeterminable and opens it to political contestation, it contains within it possibilities of challenging existing power relations and established understandings of rights. But how can human rights be mobilized so that they contest and transform dominant political and normative orders instead of reinforcing them? And how does the critical theorist differentiate between the “emancipatory” and “hegemonic” articulations of human rights? What kinds of criteria, if any, could one use in making such judgments? Among the works under review, Hoover’s Reconstructing Human Rights is the one that is most emphatic about the need to understand human rights in terms of “a democratizing ethos of disruption and change” (2016: 77). It is also the only book that discusses in detail how a collective political struggle can invoke human rights for the purposes of contesting “the coordinates of sovereign authority and political membership” (2016: 148). Focusing particularly on ONE DC, a grassroots organization advocating for fair and affordable housing and the preservation of historically black neighborhoods in Washington, D.C., Hoover challenges some of the conclusions in criticisms of human rights, particularly Wendy Brown’s argument that the hegemonic language of human rights has displaced “dissonant political projects” that “may offer a more appropriate and far-reaching remedy for injustice defined as suffering and as systematic disenfranchisement from collaborative self-governance” (Brown, 2004: 461–462). In response to such criticisms, Hoover points out that the struggles that demand housing as a human right in Brazil, South Africa, and the United States, among other places, do not simply appeal to the state to remedy a rights violation or plead for inclusion in the existing order. They articulate much more radical demands that reframe “housing as a right rather than a commodity” (Hoover, 2016: 190), criticize “larger economic and legal structures” of property ownership (2016: 201), “[reclaim] collective democratic agency” (2016: 199), and support “a more substantive vision of justice” and “an alternative political subjectivity” (2016: 205). Similar radical possibilities can be found in Golder’s discussion of Foucault’s efforts to articulate a right to suicide. When liberal theorists defend such a right, they approach it primarily as a matter of striking a balance between the state’s interest in the preservation of life and the individual autonomy to choose one’s manner of dying (Golder, 2015: 130). As a result, they fall short of challenging the biopolitical power that the governmental and medical authorities exercise in regulating life and death (Golder, 2015: 130, 131). Golder shows how Foucault diverges from such a liberal approach and appropriates the rights discourse subversively for the purposes of envisioning new forms of subjectivity that could resist biopolitical governance. Refusing to proceed with the highly medicalized framework of assisted suicide, Foucault instead invites rethinking suicide as “an aesthetic and creative act” (Golder, 2015: 133), perhaps even a “heterotopic experience” (Golder, 2015: 134), that could open up “a space for a kind of ethical conduct, or self-transformation” (Golder, 2015: 133). Foucault’s proposals to stage different imagined encounters with death, including suicide festivals, point to “a highly individualized” form of resistance, as Golder recognizes (Golder, 2015: 137). Arguably, such proposals could validate the critics who highlight the depoliticizing risks of privileging “the care of the self” as the primary site for resisting existing forms of power (e.g. Myers, 2013: 21–52). In response, Golder represents Foucault’s defense of a right to die as a performative political act that “prompt[s] us to rethink how we are led to live [our lives] under biopolitical care” (Golder, 2015: 137). Foucault’s critics may still have objections, but more importantly for the purposes of this essay, given the tendency to see rights in individualistic terms, it would have been perhaps a more persuasive move to illustrate the potentially subversive effects of rights with a collective political struggle that contests the biopolitical regulation of life and death. Similar to Hoover and Golder, Perugini and Gordon also challenge overwhelmingly negative critics of human rights and argue for the need to recognize the possibilities of mobilizing human rights as “a counterhegemonic and counterdominant discourse” (Perugini and Gordon, 2015: 129). They only briefly allude to such possibilities, however, as they mention the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement at the very end of the book, without detailing how it “deploys human rights alongside discourses of antiracist, anticolonial, and antiapartheid popular inclusion” (Perugini and Gordon, 2015: 138). But they emphasize that human rights can be reconnected to their “emancipatory legacies” only by adopting “a nonlegal perspective” that breaks away from the reformist strategies of remedying “the institutionalized excesses of oppressive legal regimes” (Perugini and Gordon, 2015: 136, 137). Human rights litigation ends up “oiling an unrecoverable apparatus of injustice,” Perugini and Gordon seem to suggest, whereas a non-legal emancipatory struggle would instead strive to “create new political communities based on justice” (Perugini and Gordon, 2015: 138). This last point, read alongside the arguments of Golder and Hoover, raises the question of how the critic differentiates between the “emancipatory” and “hegemonic” uses of human rights. All the authors would probably agree with Golder that the critic “is located immanently within the social field and so is necessarily invested and implicated in the object under critique” (Golder, 2015: 36). But at times the critic seems to be elevated above that social field, adjudicating on rights claims and struggles on the basis of certain assumptions about what counts as “democratizing,” “emancipatory,” or “counterhegemonic.” To give some examples, Hoover’s analysis often pits “universal,” “general,” and “abstract” principles against “particular,” “situated,” and “lived” experiences of political subjects (e.g. Hoover, 2016: 46–47, 60–61, 86–87). Such oppositions frame his critique of universalistic theories as “forcible imposition[s]” that distort the “lived experience” of marginalized communities (Hoover, 2016: 87, 86). But if certain strands of universalism fail to attend to how rights struggles may involve community-based claims that exclude the oppressors from their scope for the purposes of countering historically rooted forms of oppression (e.g. Hoover, 2016: 47, 54), Hoover’s account risks underemphasizing that such struggles also involve universalizing, generalizing, and abstracting moves, as can be seen in ONE DC’s demand for “universal housing.”1 Perugini and Gordon are right to highlight that human rights cannot, and should not, be reduced to their legal codifications, but their insistence on “a nonlegal perspective” (2015: 136) risks disregarding legal efforts that could involve “strategies of rupture,” to use a term proposed by Emilios Christodoulidis (2009) and discussed by Golder (2015: 124–125). Such strategies could mobilize an immanent critique of law for the purposes of making it more responsive to forms of violence that would otherwise be invisible or unintelligible within its “economy of representation” (Christodoulidis, 2009: 5). Finally, in discussing Foucault’s refusal to use the language of rights to oppose the death penalty, Golder argues that a “tactical” invocation of rights in that context would have called for prison reforms but fallen short of the “strategic” goal of prison abolition. But this conclusion risks “subsum[ing] local, tactical interventions under a totalizing theory of the social whole,” to recall Foucault’s own critique of Leninism (Golder, 2015: 124). Following Foucault’s argument that strategy can only be built from local, tactical interventions (Golder, 2015: 124), we could note, for example, how the language of human rights has been mobilized by organizations such as the Human Rights Coalition and the Abolitionist Law Center in the United States to reframe the pervasive rights violations within prisons as systemic problems inherent to the American penal system.2<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Incremental assertions of rights are <u>necessary</u> for broader systemic critique. <u>Oppositional</u> framings and zero sum thinking are worse. </h4><p>Ayten <strong>Gündoğdu 18</strong>, Tow Associate Professor for Distinguished Scholars in the Department of Political Science at Barnard College, “On the Ambivalent Politics of Human Rights,” Journal of International Political Theory, vol. 14, no. 3, 10/2018, pp. 367–380 </p><p>Human rights and the heterogeneous practices of emancipation</p><p><u><mark>Human rights</u></mark> turn democratic politics into “a theater of contestation,” Claude Lefort argues, because they “<u><mark>go</u> <u><strong>beyond</u></strong> <u>any</u> <u><strong>particular formulation</u></strong></mark> which has been given of them” <u><mark>and <strong>contain</mark> within them</u></strong> “<u><mark>the demand for</mark> their <strong><mark>reformulation</u></strong></mark>” (Lefort, 1986: 258). The books under review share Lefort’s crucial insight that the political function of human rights cannot be limited to their legitimation of sovereign power. <u><mark>To the extent</mark> that the human <mark>rights</mark> discourse <mark>renders</mark> the concept of “<mark>humanity” <strong>indeterminable</u></strong></mark> <u>and opens it to political contestation, <mark>it contains</mark> within it <mark>possibilities of <strong>challenging</strong></mark> existing <mark>power relations</mark> and established understandings of rights. But how can human rights be <strong>mobilized</u></strong> <u>so that they <strong>contest</u></strong> and transform <u>dominant political and normative orders instead of <strong>reinforcing</strong> them?</u> And how does the critical theorist differentiate between the “emancipatory” and “hegemonic” articulations of human rights? What kinds of criteria, if any, could one use in making such judgments?</p><p>Among the works under review, Hoover’s Reconstructing Human Rights is the one that is most emphatic about the need to understand human rights in terms of “a democratizing ethos of disruption and change” (2016: 77). It is also the only book that discusses in detail how a collective political struggle can invoke human rights for the purposes of contesting “the coordinates of sovereign authority and political membership” (2016: 148). Focusing particularly on ONE DC, a grassroots organization advocating for fair and affordable housing and the preservation of historically black neighborhoods in Washington, D.C., Hoover challenges some of the conclusions in criticisms of human rights, particularly Wendy Brown’s argument that the hegemonic language of human rights has displaced “dissonant political projects” that “may offer a more appropriate and far-reaching remedy for injustice defined as suffering and as systematic disenfranchisement from collaborative self-governance” (Brown, 2004: 461–462). In response to such criticisms, Hoover points out that the struggles that demand housing as a human right in Brazil, South Africa, and the United States, among other places, do not simply appeal to the state to remedy a rights violation or plead for inclusion in the existing order. They articulate much more radical demands that reframe “housing as a right rather than a commodity” (Hoover, 2016: 190), criticize “larger economic and legal structures” of property ownership (2016: 201), “[reclaim] collective democratic agency” (2016: 199), and support “a more substantive vision of justice” and “an alternative political subjectivity” (2016: 205).</p><p>Similar <u><strong><mark>radical possibilities</u></strong> <u>can be found in</u></mark> Golder’s discussion of Foucault’s efforts to articulate a right to suicide. When liberal theorists defend such <u><mark>a right</u></mark>, they approach it primarily as a matter of striking a balance between the state’s interest in the preservation of life and the individual autonomy to choose one’s manner of dying (Golder, 2015: 130). As a result, they fall short of challenging the biopolitical power that the governmental and medical authorities exercise in regulating life and death (Golder, 2015: 130, 131). Golder shows how Foucault diverges from such a liberal approach and appropriates the rights discourse subversively for the purposes of envisioning new forms of subjectivity that could resist biopolitical governance. Refusing to proceed with the highly medicalized framework of assisted suicide, Foucault instead invites rethinking suicide as “an aesthetic and creative act” (Golder, 2015: 133), perhaps even a “heterotopic experience” (Golder, 2015: 134), that could open up “a space for a kind of ethical conduct, or self-transformation” (Golder, 2015: 133). Foucault’s proposals to stage different imagined encounters with death, including suicide festivals, point to “a highly individualized” form of resistance, as Golder recognizes (Golder, 2015: 137). Arguably, such proposals could validate the critics who highlight the depoliticizing risks of privileging “the care of the self” as the primary site for resisting existing forms of power (e.g. Myers, 2013: 21–52). In response, Golder represents Foucault’s defense of a right to die as a performative political act that “prompt[s] us to rethink how we are led to live [our lives] under biopolitical care” (Golder, 2015: 137). Foucault’s critics may still have objections, but more importantly for the purposes of this essay, given the tendency to see rights in individualistic terms, it would have been perhaps a more persuasive move to illustrate the potentially subversive effects of rights with a collective political struggle that contests the biopolitical regulation of life and death.</p><p>Similar to Hoover and Golder, Perugini and Gordon also challenge overwhelmingly negative critics of human rights and argue for the need to recognize the possibilities of mobilizing human rights as “a counterhegemonic and counterdominant discourse” (Perugini and Gordon, 2015: 129). They only briefly allude to such possibilities, however, as they mention the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement at the very end of the book, without detailing how it “deploys human rights alongside discourses of antiracist, anticolonial, and antiapartheid popular inclusion” (Perugini and Gordon, 2015: 138). But they emphasize that human rights can be reconnected to their “emancipatory legacies” only by adopting “a nonlegal perspective” that breaks away from the reformist strategies of remedying “the institutionalized excesses of oppressive legal regimes” (Perugini and Gordon, 2015: 136, 137). Human rights litigation ends up “oiling an unrecoverable apparatus of injustice,” Perugini and Gordon seem to suggest, whereas a non-legal emancipatory struggle would instead strive to “create new political communities based on justice” (Perugini<u> and Gordon, 2015: 138).</p><p></u>This last point, read alongside the arguments of Golder and Hoover, raises the question of how the critic differentiates between the “emancipatory” and “hegemonic” uses of human rights. All the authors would probably agree with Golder that the critic “is located immanently within the social field and so is necessarily invested and implicated in the object under critique” (Golder, 2015: 36). But <u><mark>at times the critic <strong>seems</strong></mark> to be <strong><mark>elevated</mark> above that social field</u></strong>, <u><mark>adjudicating</mark> on rights claims and struggles <mark>on the basis of certain <strong>assumptions</strong></mark> about what <strong>counts</strong> as “democratizing,” “emancipatory,” or “counterhegemonic.”</p><p></u>To give some examples, Hoover’s analysis often pits “universal,” “general,” and “abstract” principles against “particular,” “situated,” and “lived” experiences of political subjects (e.g. Hoover, 2016: 46–47, 60–61, 86–87). Such oppositions frame his critique of universalistic theories as “forcible imposition[s]” that distort the “lived experience” of marginalized communities (Hoover, 2016: 87, 86). But <u>if certain strands of <strong>universalism</u></strong> <u>fail to attend to how rights struggles may involve community-based claims</u> that exclude the oppressors from their scope for the purposes of countering historically <u><strong>rooted</u></strong> <u>forms</u> of oppression (e.g. Hoover, 2016: 47, 54), Hoover’s account <u><strong>risk</u></strong>s <u><strong>underemphasizing</u></strong> <u>that</u> such <u><mark>struggles</u> <u><strong>also</u></strong> <u>involve</u> <u><strong>universalizing</u></strong></mark>, generalizing, and abstracting <u><strong><mark>moves</u></strong>, <u>as can be seen in</u></mark> ONE DC’s <u><mark>demand for “universal <strong>housing</strong></mark>.”</u>1 Perugini and Gordon are right to highlight that human <u><mark>rights </mark>cannot, and <mark>should not, be <strong>reduced</strong> to</mark> their <mark>legal codifications, but</u></mark> their <u><mark>insistence on “a <strong>nonlegal</strong> perspective</u></mark>” (2015: 136) <u><mark>risks <strong>disregarding</mark> legal <mark>efforts</u></strong> <u>that could involve</mark> “strategies of <strong><mark>rupture</u></strong></mark>,” to use a term proposed by Emilios Christodoulidis (2009) and discussed by Golder (2015: 124–125). <u>Such strategies could <strong>mobilize</strong> an <strong>immanent critique of law</u></strong> <u>for the purposes of making it <strong>more responsive</u></strong> <u>to forms of violence that would otherwise be <strong>invisible</strong> or <strong>unintelligible</strong> within its “economy of representation”</u> (Christodoulidis, 2009: 5). Finally, <u>in discussing</u> Foucault’s <u>refusal to use the language of <strong>rights</u></strong> to oppose the death penalty, <u><strong><mark>Golder</u></strong> <u>argues</u></mark> that <u><mark>a “<strong>tactical</strong>” invocation of rights</u></mark> in that context <u><mark>would have</mark> called for</u> prison <u><strong>reforms</u></strong> <u>but</u> <u><strong><mark>fallen short</u></strong></mark> <u>of the “<strong>strategic</strong>” goal of prison <strong>abolition</u></strong>. <u>But <strong><mark>this conclusion risks “subsum[ing]</mark> local, tactical <mark>interventions under a totalizing theory</mark> of the social whole</u></strong>,” to recall Foucault’s own critique of Leninism (Golder, 2015: 124). <u>Following</u> Foucault’s <u>argument that</u> <u><strong>strategy</u></strong> <u>can <strong>only</u></strong> <u>be built from local, tactical interventions</u> (Golder, 2015: 124), <u>we could note</u>, for example, <u>how the language of human <mark>rights has been mobilized by</mark> organizations such as the</u> <u><strong><mark>H</u></strong></mark>uman <u><strong><mark>R</u></strong></mark>ights <u><strong><mark>C</u></strong></mark>oalition <u>and the</u> <u><strong>Abolitionist Law Center</u></strong> in the United States <u><mark>to</u> <u><strong>reframe</u></strong></mark> the <u>pervasive <mark>rights violations</mark> within prisons <mark>as</u> <u><strong>systemic problems</u></strong> <u><strong>inherent</u></strong> <u>to the</mark> American <mark>penal system</u>.2</p></mark><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Simms 17 [(Andrew Simms, Andrew Simms is an author, analyst and campaigner. His books include The New Economics, Tescopoly, Ecological Debt, and Cancel the Apocalypse: The New Path to prosperity. his new book We Want More Than This will be published in 2017 by Little Brown. He co-founded the New Weather Institute, is a research associate at the Centre for Global Political Economy, University of Sussex, and a fellow of the New Economics Foundation.) "‘A cat in hell’s chance’ – why we’re losing the battle to keep global warming below 2C", 19 Jan 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jan/19/cat-in-hells-chance-why-losing-battle-keep-global-warming-2c-climate-change] SJDI fulltext: It all seemed so simple in 2008. All we had was financial collapse, a cripplingly high oil price and global crop failures due to extreme weather events. In addition, my climate scientist colleague Dr Viki Johnson and I worked out that we had about 100 months before it would no longer be “likely” that global average surface temperatures could be held below a 2C rise, compared with pre-industrial times. What’s so special about 2C? The simple answer is that it is a target that could be politically agreed on the international stage. It was first suggested in 1975 by the environmental economist William Nordhaus as an upper threshold beyond which we would arrive at a climate unrecognisable to humans. In 1990, the Stockholm Environment Institute recommended 2C as the maximum that should be tolerated, but noted: “Temperature increases beyond 1C may elicit rapid, unpredictable and non-linear responses that could lead to extensive ecosystem damage.” To date, temperatures have risen by almost 1C since 1880. The effects of this warming are already being observed in melting ice, ocean levels rising, worse heat waves and other extreme weather events. There are negative impacts on farming, the disruption of plant and animal species on land and in the sea, extinctions, the disturbance of water supplies and food production and increased vulnerability, especially among people in poverty in low-income countries. But effects are global. So 2C was never seen as necessarily safe, just a guardrail between dangerous and very dangerous change. To get a sense of what a 2C shift can do, just look in Earth’s rear-view mirror. When the planet was 2C colder than during the industrial revolution, we were in the grip of an ice age and a mile-thick North American ice sheet reached as far south as New York. The same warming again will intensify and accelerate human-driven changes already under way and has been described by James Hansen, one of the first scientists to call global attention to climate change, as a “prescription for long-term disaster”, including an ice-free Arctic. Nevertheless, in 1996, a European Council of environment ministers, that included a young Angela Merkel, adopted 2C as a target for the EU. International negotiators agreed the same in 2010 in Cancun. It was a commitment repeated in the Paris Climate Accord of 2015 where, pushed by a new group of countries called the Climate Vulnerable Forum, ambitions went one step further, agreeing to hold temperature rises to “well below 2C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5C”. Is it still likely that we will stay below even 2C? In the 100 months since August 2008, I have been writing a climate-change diary for the Guardian to raise questions and monitor progress, or the lack of it, on climate action. To see how well we have fared, I asked a number of leading climate scientists and analysts for their views. The responses were as bracing as a bath in a pool of glacial meltwater. Nasa’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies has an important place in the history of climate-change research. Hansen was its director from 1981 until 2013. Donald Trump is set to strip the institute of funding for climate research. Its current director, Dr Gavin Schmidt, is categoric that we are no longer likely to stay below 2C. “The inertia in the system (oceans, economies, technologies, people) is substantial and … so far the efforts are not commensurate with the goal,” he says. Sabine Fuss, of Germany’s Mercator Research Institute, on Global Commons and Climate Change says emissions are currently “not aligned” with the 2C target and will need to “come down more quickly”. Joanna Haigh, co-director of the Grantham Institute for Climate Change and Environment, thinks there is “no chance whatsoever at current levels of carbon emissions”, and her Grantham Institute colleague, Prof Sir Brian Hoskins, is not “confident” that temperature rises can be held below 2C. Prof Andrew Watkinson of the School of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia thinks it “unlikely” and Prof John Shepherd, a physicist at the National Oceanography Centre in Southampton, calls it “not very likely at all”. Stuart Haszeldine of the School of GeoSciences at the University of Edinburgh says we have “very little chance”, and Prof Piers Forster, director of the Priestly International Centre for Climate at the University of Leeds calls it, “on the fanciful edge of plausible”. Glen Peters, senior researcher at Norway’s leading climate change centre, Cicero, is unambiguous, saying: “We have emitted too much already.” And these sentiments are echoed by Prof Alice Larkin, of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research at Manchester University, and Dr Chris Vernon, a glaciologist and former scientist at the Met Office’s Hadley Centre for Climate Science. Only one influential scientist preferred their comments to remain anonymous, but they too said we were off-target, because the “international negotiating process is disconnected from national policymaking”. In short, not a single one of the scientists polled thought the 2C target likely to be met. Bill McGuire, professor emeritus of geophysical and climate hazards at University College London, is most emphatic. “My personal view,” he says, “is that there is not a cat in hell’s chance.” The most positive response came in the guarded words of Chris Jones, head of the Earth system and mitigation science team at the Met Office’s Hadley Centre, who says that current levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere “don’t preclude” successfully achieving the target. Prof Joachim Schellnhuber, director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, would “only confirm that it is still possible to keep global warming below 2C”. The last point, however, is contentious, for precisely the reason the target exists. Namely, to prevent global warming from feeding off itself by triggering long-term, potentially irreversible environmental domino effects, such as ice loss and forest die-back, and the weakening ability of things such as our oceans to absorb carbon. “The open question for me is not whether we will breach the 2C target,” says Prof Barry McMullin of Dublin City University, “but how soon.” In addition, the temperature target is a global average, and local variations matter. In November 2016, the Arctic was already experiencing extraordinary anomalies. Temperatures were 20C above normal. A global average rise of 2C implies higher temperatures still for the Arctic, sufficient to push long-term ice loss and trigger other potentially uncontrollable climate changes. At the other end of the world, a development more bizarre than extraordinary is touching the Antarctic. Gambling with our future used to be largely a metaphor, but it is now possible to place bets on when the next giant iceberg will detach itself from the Larsen C ice shelf. At the time of writing, betting company PaddyPower is offering odds of 7/2 in February 2017 or 12/1 in August. Hoskins says: “We have no evidence that a 1.9C rise is something we can easily cope with, and 2.1 is a disaster.” But Saleemul Huq, director of the International Centre for Climate Change and Development in Bangladesh, one of the countries most vulnerable to warming, warns in stark terms of the failure to stick to a much lower target: “The consequences of failing to keep the temperature below 1.5C will be to wilfully condemn hundreds of millions of the poorest citizens of Earth to certain deaths from the severe impacts of climate change.” “I think we actively chose to forgo the carbon budgets for a likely chance of 2C many years ago,” says Kevin Anderson, currently professor of climate change at Uppsala University in Sweden. “Judging that rate at which our emissions would need to be reduced was too politically challenging to contemplate.” The one thing agreed by all the climate scientists was the need for immediate and dramatic transition to a low-carbon economy, at a scale and speed we have not yet remotely approached. And the truly striking thing is that a huge number of the actions we need to take are things that bring enormous economic, social and environmental benefits. Rationally, we would be choosing to do them anyway. Where there are challenging shifts in behaviour required, they mostly affect only a small, wealthy proportion of society. Take flying, for example: 70% of all flights by UK residents are accounted for by just 15% of the population. So, what scale of change are we looking at to stay below 2C? Being optimistic about what might be achieved in terms of saving forests from being cut down and cleaning up industry, especially the production of steel and cement, Anderson estimates globally we can afford to emit around 650bn tonnes of carbon dioxide in total from energy systems. Currently, the world pumps out about 36bn tonnes every year alone. Starting from today, and assuming that poorer and industrialising nations see a peak in the emissions from energy use by 2025 and go zero carbon by 2050, Anderson calculates that this leaves a rich country such as the UK with the challenge of cutting its emissions by around 13% per year. Chris Goodall charts the remarkable rise of renewable energy and its equally dramatic falling costs. But renewables have to substitute for fossil fuels, not merely add to overall energy supply. In the meantime, it matters as much that we reduce our total energy use. You will hear a lot of talk about technologies to capture carbon from the burning of fuel and prevent it entering the atmosphere. Most of the climate models used to project what will happen to our atmosphere rely heavily on the assumption that they will be used at large scale. While most climate scientists see these so-called “negative emissions technologies” for carbon capture and storage (CCS) as essential parts of the toolkit to tackle climate change, many are sceptical of hope being placed in them. It is easier not to burn the carbon in the first place. “There is no guarantee that CCS will work at a sufficiently global scale,” says Dr Hugh Hunt, a Cambridge specialist on climate engineering. “These technologies will take decades to reach any meaningful scale.” Tellingly, as an engineer, he argues that our top priorities are to stop burning fossil fuels and for the biggest consumers to live less extravagantly. And, it seems, moderate shifts by the most profligate could yield huge climate dividends. Currently about half of all global emissions are the responsibility of just of just one in 10 of the global population. If just this group reduced their carbon footprints to that of the average, barely impoverished European, argues Anderson, global emissions would be cut by around one-third. There are many ways to reach a 2C world, according to Prof Diana Ürge-Vorsatz, of the Central European University. “Their common characteristic is that they all require rapid and transformational action,” she says. Small, incremental changes won’t do it. Retrofitting existing buildings in rich countries can save 70-90% of the energy used to heat and cool them, she adds. And such a move also tackles fuel poverty, creates local jobs and reduces deaths from cold. Switching transport from fossil fuels to electricity power by renewables cuts emissions but also removes the air pollution that is responsible for an epidemic of lethal respiratory disease. In Europe alone, about half a million people suffer premature deaths each year due to air pollution. In November 2016, many, mostly low-income countries, from Bangladesh to Tanzania and Guatemala, committed to switching entirely to renewable energy by 2030-50 at the latest. Costa Rica, aided by favourable geography, has already managed to power itself for extended periods, relying just on renewables. Portugal has managed the same for shorter periods. But great leaps forward are happening elsewhere, too. China is installing more new wind energy capacity in a single year than the UK has in total. So, adding to the prevailing global strangeness, the edifice of international climate policy rests on a target that no one believes it is likely can be met. And some think even that insufficiently ambitious. Yet, among climate scientists, there is a consensus that swift action is vital, and with it the target remains, at least, possible. With the amount of carbon burned by humans, we have now created a climate not experienced on Earth since the Pliocene era, 2m-5m years ago. We are daily rolling the climate dice with the odds stacked against us. But we are also clever, quick and innovative when we want to be. Now that we understand the game better, the question we face is whether we will choose to change it, fast and enough, so that we can all have better lives.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>We have a limited window to address warming – action must be taken now to prevent extinction and massive global suffering</h4><p>Simms 17 </strong>[(Andrew Simms, Andrew Simms is an author, analyst and campaigner. His books include The New Economics, Tescopoly, Ecological Debt, and Cancel the Apocalypse: The New Path to prosperity. his new book We Want More Than This will be published in 2017 by Little Brown. He co-founded the New Weather Institute, is a research associate at the Centre for Global Political Economy, University of Sussex, and a fellow of the New Economics Foundation.) "‘A cat in hell’s chance’ – why we’re losing the battle to keep global warming below 2C", 19 Jan 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jan/19/cat-in-hells-chance-why-losing-battle-keep-global-warming-2c-climate-change] SJDI</p><p>It all seemed so simple in 2008. All we had was financial collapse, a cripplingly high oil price and global crop failures due to extreme weather events. In addition, my climate scientist colleague Dr Viki Johnson and I worked out that we had about 100 months before it would no longer be “likely” that global average surface temperatures could be held below a 2C rise, compared with pre-industrial times. What’s so special about 2C? The simple answer is that it is a target that could be politically agreed on the international stage. It was first suggested in 1975 by the environmental economist William Nordhaus as an upper threshold beyond which we would arrive at a climate unrecognisable to humans. In 1990, the Stockholm Environment Institute recommended 2C as the maximum that should be tolerated, but noted: “Temperature increases beyond 1C may elicit rapid, unpredictable and non-linear responses that could lead to extensive ecosystem damage.” To date, <u><mark>temperatures have risen by almost 1C</mark> since 1880<mark>. The effects of this warming are already being observed </mark>in melting ice, ocean levels rising, worse heat waves and other extreme weather events. There are negative impacts on farming, the disruption of plant and animal species on land and in the sea, extinctions, the disturbance of water supplies and food production and increased vulnerability, especially among people in poverty in low-income countries. But effects are global. So <mark>2C was</mark> </u>never seen as necessarily safe,<u> <mark>just a guardrail between dangerous and very dangerous change</mark>. </u>To get a sense of what a 2C shift can do, just look in Earth’s rear-view mirror. When the planet was 2C colder than during the industrial revolution, we were in the grip of an ice age and a mile-thick North American ice sheet reached as far south as New York.<u> <mark>The same warming again will intensify and accelerate human-driven change</mark>s already under way and has been described by James Hansen, one of the first scientists to call global attention to climate change, as a “prescription for long-term disaster”, including an ice-free Arctic. </u>Nevertheless, in 1996, a European Council of environment ministers, that included a young Angela Merkel, adopted 2C as a target for the EU. International negotiators agreed the same in 2010 in Cancun. It was a commitment repeated in the Paris Climate Accord of 2015 where, pushed by a new group of countries called the Climate Vulnerable Forum, ambitions went one step further, agreeing to hold temperature rises to “well below 2C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5C”. <u>Is it still likely that we will stay below even 2C?</u> <u>In the 100 months since August 2008, I have been writing a climate-change diary for the Guardian to raise questions and monitor progress,</u> or the lack of it, on climate action. To see how well we have fared, I asked a number of leading climate scientists and analysts for their views. The responses were as bracing as a bath in a pool of glacial meltwater. Nasa’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies has an important place in the history of climate-change research. Hansen was its director from 1981 until 2013. Donald Trump is set to strip the institute of funding for climate research. Its current director, Dr Gavin Schmidt, is categoric that we are no longer likely to stay below 2C. “The inertia in the system (oceans, economies, technologies, people) is substantial and … so far the efforts are not commensurate with the goal,” he says. Sabine Fuss, of Germany’s Mercator Research Institute, on Global Commons and Climate Change <mark>says <u>emissions are currently “not aligned” with the 2C target and will need to “come down more quickly</mark>”. </u>Joanna Haigh, co-director of the Grantham Institute for Climate Change and Environment, thinks there is “no chance whatsoever at current levels of carbon emissions”, and her<u> Grantham Institute colleague, Prof Sir Brian Hoskins, is not “confident” that temperature rises can be held below 2C. </u>Prof Andrew Watkinson of the School of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia thinks it “unlikely” and Prof John Shepherd, a physicist at the National Oceanography Centre in Southampton, calls it “not very likely at all”. Stuart Haszeldine of the School of GeoSciences at the University of Edinburgh says we have “very little chance”, and Prof Piers Forster, director of the Priestly International Centre for Climate at the University of Leeds calls it, “on the fanciful edge of plausible”. Glen Peters, senior researcher at Norway’s leading climate change centre, Cicero, is unambiguous, saying: “We have emitted too much already.” And these sentiments are echoed by Prof Alice Larkin, of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research at Manchester University, and Dr Chris Vernon, a glaciologist and former scientist at the Met Office’s Hadley Centre for Climate Science. Only one influential scientist preferred their comments to remain anonymous, but they too said we were off-target, because the “international negotiating process is disconnected from national policymaking”. In short, <u>not a single one of the scientists polled thought the 2C target likely to be met.</u> Bill McGuire, professor emeritus of geophysical and climate hazards at University College London, is most emphatic. “My personal view,” he says, “is that there is not a cat in hell’s chance.” The most positive response came in the guarded words of Chris Jones, head of the Earth system and mitigation science team at the Met Office’s Hadley Centre, who says that <u>current levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere “don’t preclude” successfully achieving the target.</u> Prof Joachim Schellnhuber, director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, would “only confirm that <u>it is still possible to keep global warming below 2C</u>”. The last point, however, is contentious, for precisely the reason the target exists. Namely, <u>to prevent global warming from feeding off itself by triggering long-term, potentially irreversible environmental domino effects, such as ice loss and forest die-back, and the weakening ability of things such as our oceans to absorb carbon.</u> “The open question for me is not whether we will breach the 2C target,” says Prof Barry McMullin of Dublin City University, “but how soon.” In addition, the temperature target is a global average, and local variations matter. In November 2016, the Arctic was already experiencing extraordinary anomalies. Temperatures were 20C above normal<mark>. <u></mark>A global average rise of 2C implies higher temperatures still for the Arctic, sufficient to push long-term ice loss and trigger other potentially uncontrollable climate changes.</u> At the other end of the world, a development more bizarre than extraordinary is touching the Antarctic. Gambling with our future used to be largely a metaphor, but it is now possible to place bets on when the next giant iceberg will detach itself from the Larsen C ice shelf. At the time of writing, betting company PaddyPower is offering odds of 7/2 in February 2017 or 12/1 in August. Hoskins says: “We have no evidence that a 1.9C rise is something we can easily cope with, and 2.1 is a disaster.” But Saleemul Huq, director of the International Centre for Climate Change and Development in Bangladesh, one of the countries most vulnerable to warming, warns in stark terms of the failure to stick to a much lower target: “<u><mark>The consequences of failing to keep the temperature below 1.5C will be to wilfully condemn hundreds of millions of the poorest citizens of Earth</mark> to certain deaths from the severe impacts of climate change.” </u>“I think we actively chose to forgo the carbon budgets for a likely chance of 2C many years ago,” says Kevin Anderson, currently professor of climate change at Uppsala University in Sweden. “Judging that rate at which our emissions would need to be reduced was too politically challenging to contemplate.” <u><mark>The one thing agreed by all the climate scientists was the need for immediate and dramatic transition to a low-carbon economy,</mark> <mark>at a scale and speed we have not yet remotely approached</mark>. </u>And<u> the truly striking thing is that a huge number of the actions we need to take are things that bring enormous economic, social and environmental benefits. </u>Rationally, we would be choosing to do them anyway. Where there are challenging shifts in behaviour required, they mostly affect only a small, wealthy proportion of society. Take flying, for example: 70% of all flights by UK residents are accounted for by just 15% of the population. So, what scale of change are we looking at to stay below 2C? Being optimistic about what might be achieved in terms of saving forests from being cut down and cleaning up industry, especially the production of steel and cement, Anderson estimates <u>globally we can afford to emit around 650bn tonnes of carbon dioxide in total from energy systems.</u> Currently, the world pumps out about 36bn tonnes every year alone. Starting from today, and assuming that poorer and industrialising nations see a peak in the emissions from energy use by 2025 and go zero carbon by 2050, Anderson calculates that this leaves a rich country such as the UK with the challenge of cutting its emissions by around 13% per year. Chris Goodall charts the remarkable rise of renewable energy and its equally dramatic falling costs. But<u> renewables have to substitute for fossil fuels, not merely add to overall energy supply. In the meantime, it matters as much that we reduce our total energy use. </u>You will hear a lot of talk about technologies to capture carbon from the burning of fuel and prevent it entering the atmosphere. Most of the climate models used to project what will happen to our atmosphere rely heavily on the assumption that they will be used at large scale. <u>While most climate scientists see these so-called “negative emissions technologies” for carbon capture and storage (CCS) as essential parts of the toolkit to tackle climate change, many are sceptical of hope being placed in them. <strong>It is easier not to burn the carbon in the first place. </strong>“There is no guarantee that CCS will work at a sufficiently global scale</u>,” says Dr Hugh Hunt, a Cambridge specialist on climate engineering. “These technologies will take decades to reach any meaningful scale.” Tellingly, as an engineer, he argues that our top priorities are to stop burning fossil fuels and for the biggest consumers to live less extravagantly. And, it seems, <u><strong>moderate shifts by the most profligate could yield huge climate dividends.</u></strong> <u>Currently about half of all global emissions are the responsibility of just of just one in 10 of the global population. </u>If just this group reduced their carbon footprints to that of the average, barely impoverished European, argues Anderson, global emissions would be cut by around one-third. <u><strong>There are many ways to reach a 2C world</u></strong>, according to Prof Diana Ürge-Vorsatz, of the Central European University. “<u>Their common characteristic is that they all require rapid and transformational action,” she says. Small, incremental changes won’t do it. </u>Retrofitting existing buildings in rich countries can save 70-90% of the energy used to heat and cool them, she adds. And such a move also tackles fuel poverty, creates local jobs and reduces deaths from cold. <u>Switching transport from fossil fuels to electricity power by renewables cuts emissions but also removes the air pollution that is responsible for an epidemic of lethal respiratory disease. In Europe alone, about half a million people suffer premature deaths each year due to air pollution. </u>In November 2016, many, mostly low-income countries, from Bangladesh to Tanzania and Guatemala, committed to switching entirely to renewable energy by 2030-50 at the latest. Costa Rica, aided by favourable geography, has already managed to power itself for extended periods, relying just on renewables. Portugal has managed the same for shorter periods. But great leaps forward are happening elsewhere, too. China is installing more new wind energy capacity in a single year than the UK has in total. So, adding to the prevailing global strangeness, the edifice of international climate policy rests on a target that no one believes it is likely can be met. And some think even that insufficiently ambitious. Yet<mark>,<u> among climate scientists, there is a consensus that <strong>swift action is vital</strong></mark>, and with it the target remains, at least, possible. With the amount of carbon burned by humans, we have now created a climate not experienced on Earth since </u>the Pliocene era,<u> 2m-5m years ago. We are daily rolling the climate dice with the odds stacked against us. </u>But we are also clever, quick and innovative when we want to be. Now that we understand the game better, the question we face is whether we will choose to change it, fast and enough, so that we can all have better lives.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Gimenez 1(Prof. Sociology at UC Boulder,Martha, “Marxism and Class; Gender and Race”, Race, Gender and Class, Vol. 8, p. online: http://www.colorado.edu/Sociology/gimenez/work/cgr.html) fulltext: There are many competing theories of race, gender, class, American society, political economy, power, etc. but no specific theory is invoked to define how the terms race, gender and class are used, or to identify how they are related to the rest of the social system. To some extent, race, gender and class and their intersections and interlockings have become a mantra to be invoked in any and all theoretical contexts, for a tacit agreement about their ubiquitousness and meaning seems to have developed among RGC studies advocates, so that all that remains to be dome is empirically to document their intersections everywhere, for everything that happens is, by definition, raced, classed, and gendered. This pragmatic acceptance of race, gender and class, as givens, results in the downplaying of theory, and the resort to experience as the source of knowledge. The emphasis on experience in the construction of knowledge is intended as a corrective to theories that, presumably, reflect only the experience of the powerful. RGC seems to offer a subjectivist understanding of theory as simply a reflection of the experience and consciousness of the individual theorist, rather than as a body of propositions which is collectively and systematically produced under historically specific conditions of possibility which grant them historical validity for as long as those conditions prevail. Instead, knowledge and theory are pragmatically conceived as the products or reflection of experience and, as such, unavoidably partial, so that greater accuracy and relative completeness can be approximated only through gathering the experiential accounts of all groups. Such is the importance given to the role of experience in the production of knowledge that in the eight page introduction to the first section of an RGC anthology, the word experience is repeated thirty six times (Andersen and Collins, 1995: 1-9). I agree with the importance of learning from the experience of all groups, especially those who have been silenced by oppression and exclusion and by the effects of ideologies that mystify their actual conditions of existence. To learn how people describe their understanding of their lives is very illuminating, for "ideas are the conscious expression -- real or illusory -- of (our) actual relations and activities" (Marx, 1994: 111), because "social existence determines consciousness" (Marx, 1994: 211). Given that our existence is shaped by the capitalist mode of production, experience, to be fully understood in its broader social and political implications, has to be situated in the context of the capitalist forces and relations that produce it. Experience in itself, however, is suspect because, dialectically, it is a unity of opposites; it is, at the same time, unique, personal, insightful and revealing and, at the same time, thoroughly social, partial, mystifying, itself the product of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing about (for a critical assessment of experience as a source of knowledge see Sherry Gorelick, "Contradictions of feminist methodology," in Chow, Wilkinson, and Baca Zinn, 1996; applicable to the role of experience in contemporary RGC and feminist research is Jacoby's critique of the 1960s politics of subjectivity: Jacoby, 1973: 37- 49). Given the emancipatory goals of the RGC perspective, it is through the analytical tools of Marxist theory that it can move forward, beyond the impasse revealed by the constant reiteration of variations on the "interlocking" metaphor. This would require, however, a) a rethinking and modification of the postulated relationships between race, class and gender, and b) a reconsideration of the notion that, because everyone is located at the intersection of these structures, all social relations and interactions are "raced," "classed," and "gendered." In the RGC perspective, race, gender and class are presented as equivalent systems of oppression with extremely negative consequences for the oppressed. It is also asserted that the theorization of the connections between these systems require "a working hypothesis of equivalency" (Collins, 1997:74). Whether or not it is possible to view class as just another system of oppression depends on the theoretical framework within class is defined. If defined within the traditional sociology of stratification perspective, in terms of a gradation perspective, class refers simply to strata or population aggregates ranked on the basis of standard SES indicators (income, occupation, and education) (for an excellent discussion of the difference between gradational and relational concepts of class, see Ossowski, 1963). Class in this non-relational, descriptive sense has no claims to being more fundamental than gender or racial oppression; it simply refers to the set of individual attributes that place individuals within an aggregate or strata arbitrarily defined by the researcher (i.e., depending on their data and research purposes, anywhere from three or four to twelve "classes" can be identified). From the standpoint of Marxist theory, however, class is qualitatively different from gender and race and cannot be considered just another system of oppression. As Eagleton points out, whereas racism and sexism are unremittingly bad, class is not entirely a "bad thing" even though socialists would like to abolish it. The bourgeoisie in its revolutionary stage was instrumental in ushering a new era in historical development, one which liberated the average person from the oppressions of feudalism and put forth the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. Today, however, it has an unquestionably negative role to play as it expands and deepens the rule of capital over the entire globe. The working class, on the other hand, is pivotally located to wage the final struggle against capital and, consequently, it is "an excellent thing" (Eagleton, 1996: 57). While racism and sexism have no redeeming feature, class relations are, dialectically, a unity of opposites; both a site of exploitation and, objectively, a site where the potential agents of social change are forged. To argue that the working class is the fundamental agent of change does not entail the notion that it is the only agent of change. The working class is of course composed of women and men who belong to different races, ethnicities, national origins, cultures, and so forth, so that gender and racial/ethnic struggles have the potential of fueling class struggles because, given the patterns of wealth ownership and income distribution in this and all capitalist countries, those who raise the banners of gender and racial struggles are overwhelmingly propertyless workers, technically members of the working class, people who need to work for economic survival whether it is for a wage or a salary, for whom racism, sexism and class exploitation matter. But this vision of a mobilized working class where gender and racial struggles are not subsumed but are nevertheless related requires a class conscious effort to link RGC studies to the Marxist analysis of historical change. In so far as the "class" in RGC remains a neutral concept, open to any and all theoretical meanings, just one oppression among others, intersectionality will not realize its revolutionary potential. Nevertheless, I want to argue against the notion that class should be considered equivalent to gender and race. I find the grounds for my argument not only on the crucial role class struggles play in processes of epochal change but also in the very assumptions of RGC studies and the ethnomethodological insights put forth by West and Fenstermaker (1994). The assumption of the simultaneity of experience (i.e., all interactions are raced, classed, gendered) together with the ambiguity inherent in the interactions themselves, so that while one person might think he or she is "doing gender," another might interpret those "doings" in terms of "doing class," highlight the basic issue that Collins accurately identifies when she argues that ethnomethodology ignores power relations. Power relations underlie all processes of social interaction and this is why social facts are constraining upon people. But the pervasiveness of power ought not to obfuscate the fact that some power relations are more important and consequential than others. For example, the power that physical attractiveness might confer a woman in her interactions with her less attractive female supervisor or employer does not match the economic power of the latter over the former. In my view, the flattening or erasure of the qualitative difference between class, race and gender in the RGC perspective is the foundation for the recognition that it is important to deal with "basic relations of domination and subordination" which now appear disembodied, outside class relations. In the effort to reject "class reductionism," by postulating the equivalence between class and other forms of oppression, the RGC perspective both negates the fundamental importance of class but it is forced to acknowledge its importance by postulating some other "basic" structures of domination. Class relations -- whether we are referring to the relations between capitalist and wage workers, or to the relations between workers (salaried and waged) and their managers and supervisors, those who are placed in "contradictory class locations," (Wright, 1978) -- are of paramount importance, for most people's economic survival is determined by them. Those in dominant class positions do exert power over their employees and subordinates and a crucial way in which that power is used is through their choosing the identity they impute their workers. Whatever identity workers might claim or "do," employers can, in turn, disregard their claims and "read" their "doings" differently as "raced" or "gendered" or both, rather than as "classed," thus downplaying their class location and the class nature of their grievances. To argue, then, that class is fundamental is not to "reduce" gender or racial oppression to class, but to acknowledge that the underlying basic and "nameless" power at the root of what happens in social interactions grounded in "intersectionality" is class power<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>People do experience oppression every day and it is real – failing to recognize this allows the system to satisfy demands on grounds of formal equality, destroying attempts to overcome it</h4><p><strong>Gimenez 1</strong>(Prof. Sociology at UC Boulder,Martha, “Marxism and Class; Gender and Race”, Race, Gender and Class, Vol. 8, p. online: http://www.colorado.edu/Sociology/gimenez/work/cgr.html)</p><p>There are many competing theories of race, gender, class, American society, political economy, power, etc. but no specific theory is invoked to define how the terms race, gender and class are used, or to identify how they are related to the rest of the social system. To some extent, <u><mark>race, gender and class and their intersections</u></mark> and interlockings <u><mark>have become a mantra to be invoked in any and all theoretical contexts</u></mark>, for a tacit agreement about their ubiquitousness and meaning seems to have developed among RGC studies advocates<mark>, <u>so that all that remains to be dome is empirically to document their intersections everywhere</u>, <u>for everything that happens is, by definition, raced, classed, and gendered.</u> <u>This pragmatic acceptance</u></mark> of race, gender and class, as givens, <u><mark>results in the downplaying of theory, and the resort to experience as the source of knowledge</mark>.</u> The emphasis on experience in the construction of knowledge is intended as a corrective to theories that, presumably, reflect only the experience of the powerful. <u>RGC seems to offer a subjectivist understanding of theory as simply a reflection of the experience and consciousness of the individual theorist, rather than as a body of propositions which is collectively and systematically produced under historically specific conditions of possibility which grant them historical validity</u> for as long as those conditions prevail. Instead, <u>knowledge and theory are pragmatically conceived as the products</u> or reflection of experience and, as such, unavoidably partial, <u>so that greater accuracy and relative completeness can be approximated only through gathering the experiential accounts of all groups</u>. Such is the importance given to the role of experience in the production of knowledge that in the eight page introduction to the first section of an RGC anthology, the word experience is repeated thirty six times (Andersen and Collins, 1995: 1-9). I agree with the importance of learning from the experience of all groups, especially those who have been silenced by oppression and exclusion and by the effects of ideologies that mystify their actual conditions of existence. <u>To learn how people describe their understanding of their lives is very illuminating,</u> for "ideas are the conscious expression -- real or illusory -- <u>of (our) actual relations and activities</u>" (Marx, 1994: 111), <u>because "social existence determines consciousness</u>" (Marx, 1994: 211<mark>). <u>Given that our existence is shaped by the capitalist mode of production</u></mark>, experience, <u><mark>to be fully understood</u></mark> in its broader social and political implications, <u><mark>has to be situated in the context of the capitalist forces and relations that produce it</u>. <u>Experience</u></mark> in itself, <u><mark>however</u>, <u>is</u></mark> suspect because, <u><mark>dialectically</u>, it is <u>a unity of opposites</u></mark>; it is, at the same time, <u><mark>unique, personal, insightful and revealing and, at the same time, thoroughly social, partial, mystifying,</u> i</mark>tself the product of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing about (for a critical assessment of experience as a source of knowledge see Sherry Gorelick, "Contradictions of feminist methodology," in Chow, Wilkinson, and Baca Zinn, 1996; applicable to the role of experience in contemporary RGC and feminist research is Jacoby's critique of the 1960s politics of subjectivity: Jacoby, 1973: 37- 49). Given the emancipatory goals of the RGC perspective, it is <u>through the analytical tools of Marxist theory</u> that <u>it can move forward, beyond the</u> impasse revealed by the constant reiteration of variations on the "<u>interlocking" metaphor</u>. <u>This would require</u>, however, a) <u>a rethinking and modification of the postulated relationships between race, class and gender, and b) a reconsideration of the notion that, because everyone is located at the intersection of these structures, all social relations and interactions are "raced," "classed," and "gendered</u>." In the RGC perspective, race, gender and class are presented as equivalent systems of oppression with extremely negative consequences for the oppressed. It is also asserted that the theorization of the connections between these systems require "a working hypothesis of equivalency" (Collins, 1997:74). Whether or not it is possible to view class as just another system of oppression depends on the theoretical framework within class is defined. If defined within the traditional sociology of stratification perspective, in terms of a gradation perspective, class refers simply to strata or population aggregates ranked on the basis of standard SES indicators (income, occupation, and education) (for an excellent discussion of the difference between gradational and relational concepts of class, see Ossowski, 1963). <u>Class</u> in this non-relational, descriptive sense has no claims to being more fundamental than gender or racial oppression; it simply refers to the set of individual attributes that place individuals within an aggregate or strata arbitrarily defined by the researcher (i.e., depending on their data and research purposes, anywhere from three or four to twelve "classes" can be identified). From the standpoint of Marxist theory, however, <u>class is qualitatively different from gender and race and cannot be considered just another system of oppression</u>. As Eagleton points out, whereas racism and sexism are unremittingly bad, class is not entirely a "bad thing" even though socialists would like to abolish it. The bourgeoisie in its revolutionary stage was instrumental in ushering a new era in historical development, one which liberated the average person from the oppressions of feudalism and put forth the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. Today, however, <u>it has an unquestionably negative role to play as it expands and deepens the rule of capital over the entire globe</u>. The working class, on the other hand, is pivotally located to wage the final struggle against capital and, consequently, it is "an excellent thing" (Eagleton, 1996: 57). <u>While racism and sexism have no redeeming feature, class relations are, dialectically, a unity of opposites; both a site of exploitation and, objectively, a site where the potential agents of social change are forged</u>. To argue that the working class is the fundamental agent of change does not entail the notion that it is the only agent of change. <u><mark>The working class is of course composed of women and men who belong to different races, ethnicities, national origins, cultures,</u> <u>and</u></mark> so forth, so that gender and racial/ethnic struggles <u><mark>have the potential of fueling class struggles</u></mark> because, given the patterns of wealth ownership and income distribution in this and all capitalist countries, <u><mark>those who raise the banners of gender and racial struggles are overwhelmingly propertyless worke</mark>rs</u>, technically members of the working class, people who need to work for economic survival whether it is for a wage or a <mark>salary, <u>for whom racism, sexism and class exploitation matter</mark>.</u> But this vision of a mobilized working class where gender and racial struggles are not subsumed but are nevertheless related requires a class conscious effort to link RGC studies to the Marxist analysis of historical change. <u><mark>In so far as the "class</u></mark>" in RGC <u><mark>remains a neutral concept</u></mark>, open to any and all theoretical meanings, just one oppression among others, <u><mark>intersectionality will not realize its revolutionary potential</u></mark>. Nevertheless, I want to argue against the notion that class should be considered equivalent to gender and race. I find the grounds for my argument not only on the crucial role class struggles play in processes of epochal change but also in the very assumptions of RGC studies and the ethnomethodological insights put forth by West and Fenstermaker (1994). The assumption of the simultaneity of experience (i.e., all interactions are raced, classed, gendered) together with the ambiguity inherent in the interactions themselves, so that while one person might think he or she is "doing gender," another might interpret those "doings" in terms of "doing class," highlight the basic issue that Collins accurately identifies when she argues that ethnomethodology ignores power relations. <u>Power relations underlie all processes of social interaction and this is why social facts are constraining upon people</u>. <u>But the pervasiveness of power ought not to obfuscate the fact that some power relations are more important and consequential than others</u>. For example, the power that physical attractiveness might confer a woman in her interactions with her less attractive female supervisor or employer does not match the economic power of the latter over the former. In my view, <u>the</u> flattening or <u>erasure of the qualitative difference between class, race and gender</u> in the RGC perspective <u>is the foundation for the recognition that it is important to deal with "basic relations of domination and subordination</u>" which now appear disembodied, outside class relations. In the effort to reject "class reductionism," by postulating the equivalence between class and other forms of oppression, the RGC perspective both negates the fundamental importance of class but it is forced to acknowledge its importance by postulating some other "basic" structures of domination. Class relations -- whether we are referring to the relations between capitalist and wage workers, or to the relations between workers (salaried and waged) and their managers and supervisors, those who are placed in "contradictory class locations," (Wright, 1978) -- are of paramount importance, for most people's economic survival is determined by them. <u>Those in dominant class positions do exert power over their employees and subordinates and a crucial way in which that power is used is through their choosing the identity they impute their workers. Whatever identity workers might claim or "do," employers can, in turn, disregard their claims and "read" their "doings" differently as "raced" or "gendered" or both, rather than as "classed</u>," thus downplaying their class location and the class nature of their grievances. To argue, then, that class is fundamental is not to "reduce" gender or racial oppression to class, but to acknowledge that the underlying basic and "nameless" power at the root of what happens in social interactions grounded in "intersectionality" is class power</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Walt 20, Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “How to Ruin a Superpower,” 7/23/20, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/23/how-to-ruin-a-superpower/ fulltext: Over the past 35 years or so, warnings of imminent American decline have fared poorly. Paul Kennedy’s bestselling The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers suggested that “imperial overstretch” might cause the United States to follow Great Britain’s downward path, a gloomy forecast that proved to be at best premature. Other prominent scholars suggested that America was becoming an “ordinary country,” heading for a world “after hegemony,” only to be surprised when it was the Soviet Union that collapsed and the United States emerged as the sole remaining superpower. Ideal conditions, it turned out, for a dangerous combination of hubris and complacency. By the mid-1990s, the United States found itself in a position of primacy unmatched in modern history. Its combination of economic, military, and soft power dwarfed all others, and scholars such as William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks offered sophisticated and well-reasoned arguments for why the unipolar era might last as long or longer than the bipolar era that preceded it. What these optimists did not anticipate, alas, was the series of self-inflicted wounds that the United States would suffer in the years that followed, a train wreck of recurring blunders that has accelerated and worsened under Donald Trump. In particular, Trump’s egregious mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic is producing debilitating[harmful] long-term effects that will further accelerate America’s decline. Even if he is defeated in November and a Joe Biden administration does nearly everything right, the consequences of Trump’s reign of error will be with us for many years to come. Before Trump, the mistakes of the unipolar era fell under three main headings. The first error was adopting a grand strategy of liberal hegemony, which sought to spread democracy, markets, and other liberal values far and wide and to bring the whole world into a liberal order that was designed and led by the United States. This vastly ambitious strategy provoked a strong backlash from a variety of quarters, led to unnecessary and costly wars that squandered trillions of dollars, and undermined key sectors of the U.S. economy. The second mistake was to allow public institutions to deteriorate, by starving them of resources and then blaming them for all our problems. Republican leaders pushed tax cuts with scant regard for the fiscal consequences, while the IRS was defunded to the point that it could no longer deter or detect widespread evasion and fraud. Like the Prussian Junkers or the pre-revolutionary French aristocrats, wealthy Americans—including Trump—found countless new ways to avoid contributing enough to public coffers and with less and less fear that they might get caught. Instead of creating and funding robust, competent, and respected public institutions—the sort of administrative and managerial capacity that would be invaluable in a pandemic and that some other countries have—Americans decided they didn’t need them. The third misstep was the weaponization of partisan politics that began with the Newt Gingrich revolution in the U.S. Congress. As Julian Zelizer documents in a fascinating but disturbing new book, Gingrich’s decision to take down House Leader Jim Wright began a process that turned American politics into a blood sport where gaining and retaining power mattered more than advancing the public interest. Aided by talk radio hate-mongers like Rush Limbaugh and the factually challenged propagandists at the Weekly Standard and Fox News, conspiracy theories, slander, and the steady erosion of the “soft guardrails” of democracy replaced respectful debate, discussion, and compromise. Unfortunately, these three trends were also sharply at odds with each other. Remaking the world in America’s image is an enormous undertaking; if you were serious about it, you’d need a large, well-funded, and highly competent state to do it. Not only would running the world require a strong military, but it would also take a large, highly professional diplomatic corps to manage the political fallout abroad, a vast army of well-trained development experts, and lots of safety-net programs back home to deal with the destabilizing consequences of economic globalization. In this way, the grand strategy of liberal hegemony was fundamentally at odds with the endless demand for tax cuts and the concomitant desire to shrink the state. Liberal hegemony’s defenders got around this problem by assuming that the tides of history were running their way and that creating a global liberal order would be relatively easy. As Fareed Zakaria noted back in 1998, the result was a “hollow hegemony,” as the United States tried in vain to manage the world on the cheap. Moreover, if a single country hopes to mold local politics in lots of very different places, it damn well better be politically united at home. Running the world entails substantial sacrifices, and doing it effectively requires a powerful bipartisan consensus and robust public support. Needless to say, a poisonous atmosphere of relentless partisanship, where politicians on the make repeatedly grandstand over made-up scandals (remember those endless congressional hearings about Benghazi?), is antithetical to the forging of national unity. Endless gridlock also made American democracy a less appealing model for other societies. To be clear: I don’t think liberal hegemony would have worked even if the United States decided to pursue it in a more serious and sophisticated fashion. But doing it in the half-assed way America did made failure inevitable and at no small cost. The consequences of these three errors provided the toxic brew that allowed an incompetent and narcissistic charlatan like Trump to reach the White House. Since then, he has managed to drive America’s image around the world to record lows, bungled the trade war with China, pushed Iran closer to a nuclear bomb, and lavished praise on a number of murderous dictators (some of whom are openly hostile to the United States). His only significant foreign-policy achievement to date is getting Britain to decide not to use Huawei technology for its new 5G digital network, but that’s not much to show for nearly four years in office. Apart from appointing a lot of conservative judges, Trump’s major achievement as 2020 dawned was not screwing up the economic recovery that Barack Obama had bequeathed to him. Then came COVID-19. The administration’s disastrous mishandling of the pandemic has been well documented elsewhere, and there’s no need to rehearse that depressing story once more. Instead, I want to highlight what the long-term consequences for America’s global position are likely to be. Spoiler alert: It’s not a pretty picture. First, as I’ve argued before, Trump’s attempt to wish away the problem (along with the rest of his administration’s incompetent response) has tarnished America’s dwindling reputation as a society that knows how to get things done effectively. When countries all over the world are barring Americans from their territory due to legitimate fears that they will spread the disease, while looking on with a combination of shock and pity, you know something has gone badly wrong. Consider this: Rwandans, Uruguayans, and Algerians are all welcome to visit Europe this summer. Americans aren’t. Second, the economic depression caused by the pandemic will leave deep scars on the U.S. economy, and the damage increases the longer the crisis occurs. Jobs won’t suddenly reemerge once a lot of businesses have gone under, and bankruptcies and layoffs will continue until we get the virus under control. The U.S. Federal Reserve and Congress have provided emergency funds to cushion the blow temporarily, but these measures have ballooned the federal deficit to historically high levels. The longer the crisis continues, the bigger the pile of debt will be. Here’s the key takeaway: Although the pandemic has harmed every economy in the world, other countries have got it under control, can begin to reopen safely, and will suffer less long-term damage as a result. That’s why Trump’s failure is so disastrous: By prolonging the period where the United States has to maintain lockdowns and other restrictive measures, he has guaranteed that a subsequent recovery—whenever it finally occurs—will be slower and less vigorous. Third, the lockdown has exacerbated both intimate partner abuse and child abuse while making it harder to detect both. Schoolteachers often spot and report signs of child abuse, for example, but that is less likely to happen when kids aren’t physically in class. Chronic abuse has serious emotional consequences for its victims, and the longer the pandemic continues, the worse such problems will be. The result: The United States will have a higher-than-expected incidence of mental health problems in the future, which is both a tragedy for the victims and a further drain on U.S. power. Fourth, although keeping public schools closed is necessary to get the virus under control, it will inevitably have a negative effect on learning and put American kids even further behind their foreign counterparts in terms of educational achievement. Once again, education everywhere has suffered as a result of COVID-19, but the damage will be greatest in countries that didn’t deal with it successfully and are still facing an escalating spiral of new cases. Sad to say, the United States is one of those countries. Fifth, higher education will take a big hit, too. America’s colleges and universities have been the world’s best for decades and a huge driver of innovation for the U.S. economy. They are suffering from the shutdown and especially from the loss of foreign students, who have been both a source of revenue and in the past a further engine of technological advancement. Although the Trump administration has reversed its ill-advised attempt to ban foreign students receiving only online education this fall, the poor U.S. response to the pandemic will lead some of the foreign students who used to come to the United States to pursue educational opportunities in countries where their health is not at risk and universities are open for normal operations. America has long benefited from so-called “brain gain” (i.e., talented foreigners who arrived in the country for college or graduate school and chose to remain, lending their talents to innovative U.S. companies); that benefit is likely to be smaller in the future. The longer America trails the world in dealing with COVID-19, the more damage it will suffer on this front as well. Last but not least, the pandemic has not stopped women from bearing children, but many are now doing so in an atmosphere of enormous economic uncertainty and coronavirus-related stress. A growing body of research shows that maternal stress of all kinds has deleterious effects on fetal and early childhood development, with long-term consequences for a child’s physical well-being, cognitive abilities, emotional maturity, and overall life chances. Once again: These harmful effects are undoubtedly present in every country where the coronavirus has spread, but the damage will be greatest in countries where the virus has yet to be brought under control. That’s America. The United States still has a number of important advantages compared with other major powers, including abundant natural resources, a still innovative economy, temperate climate (at least so far), and an extremely favorable geopolitical location. Those qualities make long-term success more likely but do not guarantee it. The country also faces a number of serious rivals—most notably a still rising China—but recent decades suggest that Americans remain their own worst enemy. Trump didn’t deliberately and consciously set out to ruin the United States—and torpedo his own chances for reelection—he just couldn’t help himself. It is the rest of us—and especially our children and grandchildren—who will suffer the consequences.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Decline is <u>inevitable</u> and <u>accelerated</u> due to <u>Trump</u> – even a <u>Biden win</u> <u>can’t stop the spiral</h4><p></u><strong>Walt 20</strong>, Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “How to Ruin a Superpower,” 7/23/20, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/23/how-to-ruin-a-superpower/</p><p>Over the past 35 years or so, warnings of imminent American decline have fared poorly. Paul Kennedy’s bestselling The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers suggested that “imperial overstretch” might cause the United States to follow Great Britain’s downward path, a gloomy forecast that proved to be at best premature. Other prominent scholars suggested that America was becoming an “ordinary country,” heading for a world “after hegemony,” only to be surprised when it was the Soviet Union that collapsed and the United States emerged as the sole remaining superpower. Ideal conditions, it turned out, for a dangerous combination of hubris and complacency. <u>By the mid-1990s</u>, <u>the United States found itself in a position of primacy unmatched in modern history.</u> <u>Its combination of economic</u>, <u>military</u>, <u>and soft power dwarfed all others, and scholars such as William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks offered sophisticated and well-reasoned arguments for why the unipolar era might last as long or longer than the bipolar era that preceded it</u>. What <u>these <mark>optimists did</mark> <mark>not anticipate</u></mark>, alas, <u>was the series of <mark>self-inflicted wounds</mark> that the United States would suffer in the years that followed</u>, <u><mark>a train wreck of</mark> recurring <mark>blunders</mark> that has accelerated and <mark>worsened under</mark> Donald <mark>Trump</mark>.</u> <u>In particular, <strong>Trump’s egregious <mark>mishandling of</mark> the <mark>COVID</mark>-19 pandemic is <mark>producing</strong></mark> </u>debilitating<u><strong>[<mark>harmful] long-term effects that</mark> will further <mark>accelerate America’s decline</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Even if he is</mark> <mark>defeated</mark> in November <mark>and</mark> a Joe <mark>Biden</mark> administration <mark>does</mark> nearly <mark>everything right</u></mark>, <u>the <mark>consequences</mark> <mark>of Trump</mark>’s reign of error <mark>will be with us for</mark> many <mark>years to come</mark>. </u>Before Trump, the mistakes of the unipolar era fell under three main headings. The <u><mark>first error was</mark> adopting a <mark>grand strategy of liberal hegemony</u></mark>, <u>which <mark>sought to spread</mark> democracy</u>, <u>markets</u>, <u>and other <mark>liberal values far and wide</mark> and to bring the whole world into a liberal order that was designed and led by the United States</u>. <u>This <mark>vastly ambitious</mark> strategy <mark>provoked a strong backlash</mark> from a variety of quarters</u>, <u>led to unnecessary and <strong><mark>costly wars</strong></mark> that <strong><mark>squandered trillions</strong></mark> of dollars</u>, <u><strong><mark>and undermined</strong></mark> key sectors of <strong><mark>the U.S. economy</u></strong></mark>. <u>The <mark>second mistake</mark> was <mark>to allow public institutions to deteriorate</u></mark>, <u>by starving them of resources and then blaming them for all our problems</u>. <u><mark>Republican</mark> leaders pushed <mark>tax cuts</mark> with scant regard for the fiscal consequences</u>, <u>while the <mark>IRS</mark> was <mark>defunded</mark> to the point that it <mark>could no longer deter</mark> or detect widespread <mark>evasion</mark> and fraud</u>. Like the Prussian Junkers or the pre-revolutionary French aristocrats, wealthy Americans—including Trump—found countless new ways to avoid contributing enough to public coffers and with less and less fear that they might get caught. <u><mark>Instead of</mark> creating and <mark>funding</mark> <mark>robust</mark>, competent, and respected <mark>public institutions</u></mark>—<u>the sort of administrative and managerial capacity that would be <strong><mark>invaluable in a pandemic</strong></mark> and that some other countries have</u>—<u>Americans decided they didn’t need them. The <mark>third misstep was</mark> the <mark>weaponization of partisan politics</mark> that began with the Newt Gingrich revolution in the U.S. Congress</u>. As Julian Zelizer documents in a fascinating but disturbing new book, Gingrich’s decision to take down House Leader Jim Wright began a process that turned American politics into a blood sport where gaining and retaining power mattered more than advancing the public interest. <u><mark>Aided by</mark> talk radio hate-mongers like Rush Limbaugh and the factually challenged propagandists at the Weekly Standard and <mark>Fox News</mark>, conspiracy theories, slander, and <mark>the steady</mark> <mark>erosion of <strong>the “soft guardrails” of democracy</strong></mark> <mark>replaced respectful debate</mark>, discussion, and compromise</u>. Unfortunately, <u>these three trends were also sharply at odds with each other</u>. <u>Remaking the world in America’s image is an enormous undertaking</u>; <u>if you were serious about it,</u> <u>you’d need a large</u>, <u>well-funded</u>, and highly competent state to do it. Not only would running the world require a strong military, but it would also take a large, highly professional diplomatic corps to manage the political fallout abroad, a vast army of well-trained development experts, and lots of safety-net programs back home to deal with the destabilizing consequences of economic globalization. In this way, <u>the <mark>grand strategy</mark> of liberal hegemony <mark>was</mark> fundamentally <mark>at odds with</mark> the endless demand for <mark>tax cuts</mark> and the concomitant desire to shrink the state</u>. Liberal hegemony’s defenders got around this problem by assuming that the tides of history were running their way and that creating a global liberal order would be relatively easy. As Fareed Zakaria noted back in 1998, <u><strong><mark>the result was a “hollow hegemony,”</u></strong></mark> as the United States tried in vain to manage the world on the cheap. Moreover, <u>if a single country hopes to mold local politics in lots of very different places, it damn well better be politically united at home</u>. <u><mark>Running the world</mark> entails substantial sacrifices</u>, <u>and doing it effectively <mark>requires</mark> a powerful <mark>bipartisan consensus</mark> and robust public support</u>. Needless to say, <u>a poisonous atmosphere of relentless partisanship</u>, <u>where politicians on the make repeatedly grandstand over made-up scandals</u> (remember those endless congressional hearings about Benghazi?), <u>is antithetical to the forging of national unity</u>. <u><mark>Endless gridlock</mark> also <mark>made</mark> American <mark>democracy</mark> a <mark>less appealing</mark> model for other societies. </u>To be clear: I don’t think liberal hegemony would have worked even if the United States decided to pursue it in a more serious and sophisticated fashion. But doing it in the half-assed way America did made failure inevitable and at no small cost. The consequences of these three errors provided the toxic brew that allowed an incompetent and narcissistic charlatan like <u><mark>Trump</u></mark> to reach the White House. Since then, <u>he <mark>has managed to drive</mark> <mark>America’s image</mark> around the world <mark>to record lows</mark>, <mark>bungled</mark> the <mark>trade war</mark> with China, <mark>pushed Iran</mark> <mark>closer to a</mark> nuclear <mark>bomb</mark>, <mark>and</mark> <mark>lavished praise on</mark> a number of murderous <mark>dictators</u></mark> (some of whom are openly hostile to the United States). His only significant foreign-policy achievement to date is getting Britain to decide not to use Huawei technology for its new 5G digital network, but that’s not much to show for nearly four years in office. Apart from appointing a lot of conservative judges, Trump’s major achievement as 2020 dawned was not screwing up the economic recovery that Barack Obama had bequeathed to him. <u><strong><mark>Then came COVID</u></strong></mark>-19. The administration’s disastrous mishandling of the pandemic has been well documented elsewhere, and there’s no need to rehearse that depressing story once more. Instead, I want to highlight what the <u><mark>long-term consequences for America’s global position</mark> are likely to be.</u> Spoiler alert: It’s not a pretty picture. First, as I’ve argued before, <u><mark>Trump</mark>’s attempt to wish away the problem (along with the rest of his administration’s incompetent response) has <mark>tarnished America’s</mark> dwindling <mark>reputation</mark> <mark>as a society that</mark> <mark>knows how to get things done</mark> effectively</u>. When countries all over the world are barring Americans from their territory due to legitimate fears that they will spread the disease, while looking on with a combination of shock and pity, you know something has gone badly wrong. Consider this: Rwandans, Uruguayans, and Algerians are all welcome to visit Europe this summer. Americans aren’t. Second, <u>the <mark>economic depression</mark> <mark>caused by</mark> the <mark>pandemic will leave deep scars on the U.S. economy,</mark> and the damage increases the longer the crisis occurs. Jobs won’t suddenly reemerge once a lot of businesses have gone under, and bankruptcies and layoffs will continue until we get the virus under contro</u>l. <u>The U.S. Federal Reserve and Congress have provided <mark>emergency funds</mark> to cushion the blow temporarily, but these measures <mark>have ballooned the federal deficit</mark> to historically high levels. The longer the crisis continues, the bigger the pile of debt will be.</u> Here’s the key takeaway: Although the pandemic has harmed every economy in the world, <u><mark>other countries have</mark> got <mark>it under control</u></mark>, can begin to reopen safely, and will suffer less long-term damage as a result. That’s why Trump’s failure is so disastrous: <u><mark>By prolonging the</mark> period where the United States has to maintain <mark>lockdowns</mark> and other restrictive measures, <mark>he has guaranteed</mark> that a subsequent <mark>recovery</mark>—whenever it finally occurs—<mark>will be slower</mark> and less vigorous. </u>Third, the lockdown has exacerbated both intimate partner abuse and child abuse while making it harder to detect both. Schoolteachers often spot and report signs of child abuse, for example, but that is less likely to happen when kids aren’t physically in class. Chronic abuse has serious emotional consequences for its victims, and the longer the pandemic continues, the worse such problems will be. The result: The United States will have a higher-than-expected incidence of mental health problems in the future, which is both a tragedy for the victims and a further drain on U.S. power. Fourth, <u>although <mark>keeping</mark> public <mark>schools closed</mark> is necessary to get the virus under control, it <mark>will</mark> inevitably <mark>have a negative effect on learning</mark> and <mark>put American kids even further behind</mark> their foreign counterparts in terms of educational achievement.</u> Once again, education everywhere has suffered as a result of COVID-19, but the damage will be greatest in countries that didn’t deal with it successfully and are still facing an escalating spiral of new cases. Sad to say, the United States is one of those countries. Fifth, higher education will take a big hit, too. America’s colleges and universities have been the world’s best for decades and a huge driver of innovation for the U.S. economy. They are suffering from the shutdown and especially from the loss of foreign students, who have been both a source of revenue and in the past a further engine of technological advancement. Although the Trump administration has reversed its ill-advised attempt to ban foreign students receiving only online education this fall, the poor U.S. response to the pandemic will lead some of the foreign students who used to come to the United States to pursue educational opportunities in countries where their health is not at risk and universities are open for normal operations. America has long benefited from so-called “brain gain” (i.e., talented foreigners who arrived in the country for college or graduate school and chose to remain, lending their talents to innovative U.S. companies); that benefit is likely to be smaller in the future. The longer America trails the world in dealing with COVID-19, the more damage it will suffer on this front as well. Last but not least, the pandemic has not stopped women from bearing children, but many are now doing so in an atmosphere of enormous economic uncertainty and coronavirus-related stress. A growing body of research shows that maternal stress of all kinds has deleterious effects on fetal and early childhood development, with long-term consequences for a child’s physical well-being, cognitive abilities, emotional maturity, and overall life chances. Once again: These harmful effects are undoubtedly present in every country where the coronavirus has spread, but the damage will be greatest in countries where the virus has yet to be brought under control. That’s America. The United States still has a number of important advantages compared with other major powers, including abundant natural resources, a still innovative economy, temperate climate (at least so far), and an extremely favorable geopolitical location. Those qualities make long-term success more likely but do not guarantee it. The country also faces a number of serious rivals—most notably a still rising China—but recent decades suggest that Americans remain their own worst enemy. Trump didn’t deliberately and consciously set out to ruin the United States—and torpedo his own chances for reelection—he just couldn’t help himself. It is the rest of us—and especially our children and grandchildren—who will suffer the consequences.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Knox 14, university of Louisville (“Against the grain: The Challenge of Black discourse within inter-collegiate policy debate” https://ir.library.louisville.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3166&context=etd)Mberhe fulltext: There are three generally agreed upon goals in Academic Debate across the ideological divisions. Those goals are the education that the debaters receive, an agreement to debate the important issues of the topic, and fairness within the game of debate. However, the problems arise when participants do not agree upon what each of those goals mean and how best to achieve them. Upon reflection, Warner concludes that the missing goal is the incorporation of the cultural and social values of the participants. This goal deserves attention as the Intercollegiate Policy Debate community attempts to increase diversity14 and retention of underrepresented student populations. During the 2003-2004 season the University of Louisville debaters had become very skilled at utilizing and defending the three-tier process—academic intellectuals, organic intellectuals, and personal experiences—as a method for incorporating different social and cultural values into Academic Debate practices. However, engaging in debates about the topic and defending the stylistic choices became an overwhelming task. Recognizing the importance of the topical education as well as the mission to increase meaningful Black participation in Intercollegiate Policy Debate, the team decided to add another component to its strategic arsenal. The team decided to engage in a metaphorical discussion of the topic that allowed them to articulate both a topic advocacy and advocate procedural changes to the way Debate functioned. The topic that year was, Resolved: The United States federal government should enact one or more of the following: Withdrawal of its World Trade Organization complaint against the European Union’s restrictions on genetically modified foods; A substantial increase in its government-to-government economic and/or conflict prevention assistance to Turkey and/or Greece; Full withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Removal of its barriers to and encouragement of substantial European Union and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation in 14 Diversity, as used in the CEDA Constitution, is not defined in an 47 peacekeeping in Iraq and reconstruction in Iraq; Removal of its tactical nuclear weapons from Europe; Harmonization of its intellectual property law with the European Union in the area of human DNA sequences; Rescission of all or nearly all agriculture subsidy increases in the 2002 Farm Bill (Cross Examination Debate Association Wikipedia, 2014, para. 13). The affirmative advocacy for the Louisville team was that the ―United States Federal Government should enact a full withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization just like the University of Louisville debate team should enact a full withdrawal from the harmful norms of Traditional debate practices.‖ This advocacy statement allowed the team to make direct comparisons between the actions of the United States within NATO and the exclusionary norms used by traditional debaters within the Intercollegiate Policy Debate community. The use of metaphor allowed the team to take an abstract discussion about the topic and use it to inform the ways in which debaters conceptualize reality by applying it to the debate structure. It is important to note that this chapter is not exhaustive of the various strategies used by Warner and his debaters to challenge the inherent assumptions that guide practices. Nevertheless, these are the practices that have survived over the years and are currently being used as the primary method for engagement. The three-tier process has been a productive method and has had a major impact on the larger Debate community. There have been several schools, such as Towson University, Oklahoma University, and the University of California State-Long Beach, as well as individual debaters that have adopted the three tier methodology (with and without the use of the metaphor) and applied it to various goals over the last thirteen years. Nevertheless, there is still a power struggle between these participants and those who would consider themselves to be a part of the traditionalists within Debate. Most of the debate literature surrounding alternative 48 debate has examined its personal and performative implications but little, if any, has incorporated a linguistic lens as a means of understanding how language is used to determine inclusion and exclusion from Debate. 49 CHAPTER V COMMUNITY OF DIFFERENCE Debate as a Speech Community The Intercollegiate Policy Debate community can be conceived of as a speech community. The highly technical procedures and jargon laden aspects of Debate have a language that can be specific to Debate itself and can be exclusionary to underrepresented populations. By using the speech community model of analysis, this can help one understand the challenges of working with demographically diverse populations. Therefore, this project will use the Debate community as a site for examining how speech communities (un)intentionally suppress and exclude minority members, particularly Blacks. Membership in a particular identity group occurs when two or more individuals have a shared linguistic system that would include some or all of their language, practices, norms, beliefs, and values. Speech community as defined by Patrick (2002) as being a socially-based unit of linguistic analysis is the term that some linguists have used to refer to these groups. A speech community could be bound geographically (Labov, 1989; Feagin, 1996), nationally (Dittmar, 1976), and socio-culturally (Morgan, 2002). Verbal communication is not the only tool used to make up a system of communication. According to Rosina Lippi-Green (1997), ―language is more than a tool 50 for communication of the facts between two or more persons. It is the most salient way we have of establishing and advertising our social identities (p. 5).‖ This is done in a variety of ways; for instance, through verbal communication, ways of dressing, gestures, signs, facial expressions, written text and symbols. All of these things combine to make up communication between people possible. Particular language patterns and meanings are understood according to the meaning prescribed by factors such as culture (Boas, 1911; Sapir, 1921; Whorf, 1956); the economy (Bourdieu, 1977; Irvine, 1989); cognition (Lakoff, 1988; Croft & Cruse, 2004); and social constructions (Gumperz, 1982; Hymes 1967). Michael Silverstein (1985) argues that ―language is an unstable mutual interaction of meaningful sign forms contextualized to situations of interested human use mediated by the fact of cultural ideology (p. 220).‖ The dialogue between speakers of different backgrounds is constantly reiterating and constituting language codes and patterns meaningful to each particular speaker. This is particularly true for Debate. Debate is inherently an oral exchange of ideas and world views from people of diverse backgrounds. Naturally debaters will come across various ideas and world views over the course of their careers. During this time period debaters take from these exchanges aspects that they find productive and useful, thus altering their original language patterns. However, the process for determining what is productive and useful is guided by their particular ideologies. These ideologies are shaped by each individual‘s relationship to society at large. Therefore, as Silverstein contends, ―we must look at their ideas about the meaning, function, and value of language in order to understand the degree of socially shared systematicity in empirically occurring linguistic forms‖ (p.220). This meaning, 51 function, and value can be analyzed in the context of what Norman Fairclough (1989) calls discourse, ―a social practice determined by social structures (p. 17).‖ Fairclough argues that discourse is determined by socially constituted orders of discourse, or sets of conventions associated with social institutions. Historically, traditional norms and procedures within Debate have determined the orders of discourse for the Debate community. These norms and procedures of debate developed out of a culture of a relatively homogenous group of wealthy, white males. However, the increase in diversity—defined as race, class, gender, sexuality, and those with disabilities—in recent years has shifted Debate into a more heterogeneous community. With the influx of each group has come the potential of different ways of communicating, thus creating a need to shift the norms and procedures of debate to account for these differences. Unfortunately, there is no mechanism in place to guide this shift. As a result, there have been tense conflicts over what constitutes ―appropriate‖ or ―productive‖ language use within Debate. Recognizing that each of these groups has its own relationship to Debate, each group would warrant independent research. This project however, will focus on the conflicts associated with the membership of Blacks in the Debate community. It is important to note that some Black debaters have chosen to participate in the normative practices of debate; therefore, the emphasis here will be on those Black debaters who have elected to engage in alternative debate methods. These methods vary in performance and presentation and thus should not be reduced to an essentialized notion of ―Black Debate.‖ Nevertheless, there are cultural discourse patterns that can be found in most of the variations of alternative styles. 52 The Debate literature suggests that some of the methods utilized by alternative debaters victimize Debate (Zompetti, 2004), are less productive for the goals of debate competition (Atchison and Panetta, 2009), and do not maximize the benefits that Debate can provide (Harrigan, 2008). Therefore, this research seeks to enter that dialogue and offer an alternative view of the clash of civilizations that is occurring in Debate by arguing that some of the traditional norms and procedures of debate can have the unintended effect of excluding Blacks.15<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Our interpretation is necessary with increasing diversity in the community</h4><p><strong>Knox 14</strong>, university of Louisville (“Against the grain: The Challenge of Black discourse within inter-collegiate policy debate” https://ir.library.louisville.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3166&context=etd)Mberhe</p><p>There are three generally agreed upon goals in Academic Debate across the ideological divisions. Those goals are the education that the debaters receive, an agreement to debate the important issues of the topic, and fairness within the game of debate. However, the problems arise when participants do not agree upon what each of those goals mean and how best to achieve them. Upon reflection, Warner concludes that the <u><mark>missing goal</mark> is the <mark>incorporation of</mark> the <mark>cultural and social values</mark> <mark>of</mark> the <mark>participants</u></mark>. This <u>goal <mark>deserves</mark> <mark>attention a</mark>s the Intercollegiate <mark>Policy Debate community attempts to increase diversity</u></mark>14 and retention of underrepresented student populations. <u>During the 2003-2004 season the University of <mark>Louisville debaters</mark> had become <mark>very skilled at utilizin</mark>g and defending the <mark>three-tier process—academic intellectuals, organic</mark> <mark>intellectuals, and personal experiences</mark>—as a <mark>method for incorporating different social</mark> and <mark>cultural</mark> <mark>values into Academic Debate practices</u></mark>. However, engaging in debates about the topic and defending the stylistic choices became an overwhelming task. Recognizing the importance of the topical education as well as the mission to increase meaningful Black participation in Intercollegiate Policy Debate, the team decided to add another component to its strategic arsenal. The team decided to engage in a metaphorical discussion of the topic that allowed them to articulate both a topic advocacy and advocate procedural changes to the way Debate functioned. The topic that year was, Resolved: The United States federal government should enact one or more of the following: Withdrawal of its World Trade Organization complaint against the European Union’s restrictions on genetically modified foods; A substantial increase in its government-to-government economic and/or conflict prevention assistance to Turkey and/or Greece; Full withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Removal of its barriers to and encouragement of substantial European Union and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation in 14 Diversity, as used in the CEDA Constitution, is not defined in an 47 peacekeeping in Iraq and reconstruction in Iraq; Removal of its tactical nuclear weapons from Europe; Harmonization of its intellectual property law with the European Union in the area of human DNA sequences; Rescission of all or nearly all agriculture subsidy increases in the 2002 Farm Bill (Cross Examination Debate Association Wikipedia, 2014, para. 13). The affirmative advocacy for the Louisville team was that the ―United States Federal Government should enact a full withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization just like the University of Louisville debate team should enact a full withdrawal from the harmful norms of Traditional debate practices.‖ This advocacy statement allowed the team to make direct comparisons between the actions of the United States within NATO and the exclusionary norms used by traditional debaters within the Intercollegiate Policy Debate community. The use of metaphor allowed the team to take an abstract discussion about the topic and use it to inform the ways in which debaters conceptualize reality by applying it to the debate structure. It is important to note that this chapter is not exhaustive of the various strategies used by Warner and his debaters to challenge the inherent assumptions that guide practices. Nevertheless, these are the practices that have survived over the years and are currently being used as the primary method for engagement. <u>The <mark>three-tier process</mark> has <mark>been</mark> a <mark>productive method</mark> and has had a <mark>major impact on the larger Debate community</mark>. There have been <mark>several schools</mark>, such as <mark>Towson University, Oklahoma University</mark>, and the <mark>University of California State-Long Beach</mark>, as well as <mark>individual debaters</mark> that have <mark>adopted</mark> the <mark>three tier methodology</mark> (with and without the use of the metaphor) and applied it to various goals over the last thirteen years.</u> Nevertheless, there is still a power struggle between these participants and those who would consider themselves to be a part of the traditionalists within Debate. Most of the debate literature surrounding alternative 48 debate has examined its personal and performative implications but little, if any, has incorporated a linguistic lens as a means of understanding how language is used to determine inclusion and exclusion from Debate. 49 CHAPTER V COMMUNITY OF DIFFERENCE Debate as a Speech Community The Intercollegiate Policy Debate community can be conceived of as a speech community. The highly technical procedures and jargon laden aspects of Debate have a language that can be specific to Debate itself and can be exclusionary to underrepresented populations. By using the speech community model of analysis, this can help one understand the challenges of working with demographically diverse populations. Therefore, this project will use the Debate community as a site for examining how speech communities (un)intentionally suppress and exclude minority members, particularly Blacks. Membership in a particular identity group occurs when two or more individuals have a shared linguistic system that would include some or all of their language, practices, norms, beliefs, and values. Speech community as defined by Patrick (2002) as being a socially-based unit of linguistic analysis is the term that some linguists have used to refer to these groups. A speech community could be bound geographically (Labov, 1989; Feagin, 1996), nationally (Dittmar, 1976), and socio-culturally (Morgan, 2002). Verbal communication is not the only tool used to make up a system of communication. According to Rosina Lippi-Green (1997), ―language is more than a tool 50 for communication of the facts between two or more persons. It is the most salient way we have of establishing and advertising our social identities (p. 5).‖ This is done in a variety of ways; for instance, through verbal communication, ways of dressing, gestures, signs, facial expressions, written text and symbols. All of these things combine to make up communication between people possible. Particular language patterns and meanings are understood according to the meaning prescribed by factors such as culture (Boas, 1911; Sapir, 1921; Whorf, 1956); the economy (Bourdieu, 1977; Irvine, 1989); cognition (Lakoff, 1988; Croft & Cruse, 2004); and social constructions (Gumperz, 1982; Hymes 1967). Michael Silverstein (1985) argues that ―language is an unstable mutual interaction of meaningful sign forms contextualized to situations of interested human use mediated by the fact of cultural ideology (p. 220).‖ The dialogue between speakers of different backgrounds is constantly reiterating and constituting language codes and patterns meaningful to each particular speaker. This is particularly true for Debate. Debate is inherently an oral exchange of ideas and world views from people of diverse backgrounds. Naturally debaters will come across various ideas and world views over the course of their careers. During this time period debaters take from these exchanges aspects that they find productive and useful, thus altering their original language patterns. However, the process for determining what is productive and useful is guided by their particular ideologies. These ideologies are shaped by each individual‘s relationship to society at large. Therefore, as Silverstein contends, ―we must look at their ideas about the meaning, function, and value of language in order to understand the degree of socially shared systematicity in empirically occurring linguistic forms‖ (p.220). This meaning, 51 function, and value can be analyzed in the context of what Norman Fairclough (1989) calls discourse, ―a social practice determined by social structures (p. 17).‖ Fairclough argues that discourse is determined by socially constituted orders of discourse, or sets of conventions associated with social institutions. Historically, <u><mark>traditional norms</mark> and <mark>procedures within Debate</mark> have <mark>determined</mark> the <mark>orders of discourse for the Debate community</u></mark>. <u><mark>These</mark> <mark>norms</mark> and procedures of debate <mark>developed</mark> out of <mark>a culture of a relatively homogenous group</mark> of wealthy, white males. However, the <mark>increase in diversity</mark>—<mark>defined as race, class, gender, sexuality</mark>, <mark>and those with disabilities</mark>—in recent years <mark>has shifted Debate into a more heterogeneous</mark> <mark>community</mark>. With the <mark>influx of each group</mark> has <mark>come the potential of different ways of communicating,</mark> thus <mark>creating</mark> <mark>a need to shift the norms</mark> and procedures of debate <mark>to account for these differences</mark>.</u> Unfortunately, there is no mechanism in place to guide this shift. As a result, there have been tense conflicts over what constitutes ―appropriate‖ or ―productive‖ language use within Debate. <u>Recognizing that <mark>each of these groups has its own relationship to</mark> <mark>Debate</mark>, each group would warrant independent research. </u>This project however, will focus on the conflicts associated with the membership of Blacks in the Debate community. It is important to note that some Black debaters have chosen to participate in the normative practices of debate; therefore, the emphasis here will be on those<u> <mark>Black debaters who have elected to engage in alternative debate</mark> methods. These <mark>methods vary in performance and presentation</mark> and thus <mark>should not be reduced to</mark> an <mark>essentialized notion of</mark> ―<mark>Black Debate.‖</mark> </u>Nevertheless, there are cultural discourse patterns that can be found in most of the variations of alternative styles. 52 The Debate literature suggests that some of the methods utilized by alternative debaters victimize Debate (Zompetti, 2004), are less productive for the goals of debate competition (Atchison and Panetta, 2009), and do not maximize the benefits that Debate can provide (Harrigan, 2008). Therefore, this research seeks to enter that dialogue and offer an alternative view of the clash of civilizations that is occurring in Debate by arguing that some of the traditional norms and procedures of debate can have the unintended effect of excluding Blacks.15</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: MacNeil 11 MacNeil, W.P. (2011). Novel Judgements: Legal Theory as Fiction (1st ed.). Routledge-Cavendish. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203930861 Chapter A Jurisprudential Postscript: Century's Close and the End of the Meta- arrative of Law? ByWilliam P. MacNeil Book Novel Judgements Edition1st Edition First Published2011 ImprintRoutledge-Cavendish Pages4 William P. MacNeil is the Dean of the Griffith Law School, Queensland, Australia. Trained in both law and literature, MacNeil has published widely in the field of cultural legal studies //avery fulltext: Nor am I concerned, for that matter, with a certain kind of historicist literary criticism (Old or New) clustering around ‘the rise of the novel’ be it, for example, the growth of realism, the development of free indirect discourse or the triumph of ‘character as fate’. This is not to dismiss the signifi cance of that kind of ‘critico-historical’ inquiry; but my purpose in Novel Judgements is otherwise, and seeks to align ‘the literary’ with ‘the legal’ in order to ask how the one reads the other differently – and vice versa. For my interest in these hitherto discrete discourses is how they link up with, hook onto, and illuminate an(O)ther intertextual history, one that goes, I hasten to add, well beyond ‘law-and-literature’ as it has been traditionally understood; for example, parsing the literary trope in the jurisprudential essay, or explicating the novelistic representation of court processes. Rather, the historical intertext this book engages is organised around, and by a ‘concept of law’ in its broadest philosophical sense, one that takes onboard and knits together nomological topoi as diverse as desire, transgression, sovereignty, rights, utility, trusteeship, retribution, distribution, governmentality, and so forth. I refer, of course, to that most anchoring – but also elastic and elusive – of legal notions, the Rule of Law. This explains why this study is, largely, a nineteenth-century one – whether defi ned as long, short or somewhere in between. For that period was the chrysalis of modern (and postmodern) jurisprudence, giving forth, and form to the Rule of Law as the degree zero of legal philosophy, past and present. It is this nomological ‘quilting point’ that will become, throughout the century, the juridical imaginary’s equivalent of that era’s most touted and questionable meta-narrative: namely, that of ‘progress’ be it liberal or socialist, heralding the era of markets or Marx. As a result of this hegemony, a range of ancillary jurisprudential theories proliferated during that century, theorising – and legitimating – the Rule of Law: legal positivism, utilitarianism, rights theory, formalism, legal liberalism and so forth. Each in their own way are a support of the status quo, ensuring not only the persistence of the Rule of Law, but trumpeting its inevitability . With the dawn of the twentieth century, however, an ideological shift occurs, one that bears witness to the emergence of new, more sceptical forms of legal theory challenging not only the Rule of Law’s claims to access to justice, impartiality of hearing and consistency of judgment, but its raison d’être . These movements of legal critique – sociological jurisprudence, legal realism, public policy analysis, the ‘legal process’ school, law in context, critical legal studies, critical legal feminism, critical race theory, cultural legal studies, postmodern jurisprudence – will occur and recur throughout the century. This ebb and fl ow of legal critique, however, is prefigured in, and overdetermined by the Rule of Law itself. For what might be called the Rule of Law’s thesis – of full and fair procedures available to all – gives rise to its antithesis – critique – in much the same way, during this period, Capital organises its dialectical opposite, Labour. So there is an undercurrent, critical of the Rule of Law, running throughout the nineteenth century’s various discourses of power/knowledge, replete with jurisprudential possibilities, charged with curial alternatives. This undercurrent, I have argued, finds its most vivid expression, neither in the period’s established ‘trad’ jurisprudence (and legal history), nor its emerging ‘rad’ socio-legal disciplines (criminology, penology, etc.), but, rather, in a hugely popular (and still somewhat dubious) aesthetic medium, the novel – the prototype of what I have called elsewhere, lex populi . 1 Indeed, the wager of this book has been to release these novels’ respective subtexts of legal critique, often heavily coded in terms of the domestic, the interior, the private, through a new interpretive method: that is, ‘reading jurisprudentially’. When ‘read jurisprudentially’, the private sphere these texts depict – country houses, family dynamics, friendship, unrequited love, courtship, marriage – are publicised , so to speak, as profoundly legal in their concerns. And not only legal; but critical of that legality. For these texts disclose how, under the nineteenth-century’s new industrial mode of production, all relationships – personal and political, private and public – are mediated by not just law’s heavy-handed coerciveness, and its prescriptive and/or proscriptive content (‘Thou shalt not . . .’), but its near invisible forms : the language of the bargain, the discourse of ownership, the idiom of Recht , each a superstructural prop of the infrastructure of Capital. In rendering visible what has become so naturalised as to be unseen, these texts put the Rule of Law on trial and render a novel judgement, passing a sentence of critique. Some of these sentences turn on plot devices (an entail bypassing – and disinheriting – the female line; a missing will, and the trusts it sets up gone seriously awry; a deed to vast holdings, long hidden) or settings (revolutionary tribunals, Chancery, a colonial witch trial) that are recognisably legal. But, more often than not, legal critique comes in the form of characters seemingly remote from the law: characters such as Elizabeth Bennet, Rebecca of York, Frankenstein’s monster, Holgrave, Esther Summerson and Joe Gargery (as well as the more legalistic, Carton and Bucket) – each of whom rebuke the Rule of Law in its various permutations, be it defi ned as the ‘command of the sovereign’, the ‘nonsense upon stilts’ of natural rights, utility’s felicifi c calculus, the ‘clean hands’ of equity, the call of a higher justice, the sanctity of property, or the letter of the law. As neutralised and nullifi ed as they so often are here – married or killed off, exiled or executed – these figures of legal critique point the reader to another space, another scene of nomos ; that is, a legality re-envisaged by their narratives’ very images and metaphors, their plot twists and textual tropes. What sort of law might that be? What would it look like? What shape would it take? These texts, and the novel judgements they propound, provide something like a jurisprudential cornucopia, their responses instantiated variously as follows: sometimes, a dwelling (Pemberley, Bleak House); sometimes, a message, spoken (Jo to Pip) or unspoken (Mary Shelley to Mary Wollstonecraft); sometimes a positive act, be it a departure (Rebecca), a disclosure (Holgrave) or a sacrifi ce (Sydney Carton). When read together and taken as a whole, what these spaces and signs, movements and modes gesture towards is a place of law open to all and free of possessive imperatives, in which the legal letter is married to the spirit, in which rights disseminate equally, in which a duty of care extends to, and embraces all, in which no one is the chattel of another and each a legal subject of their own world. That is, they point to a site of justice , the novelistic rendering of which might be called, following British jurisprude Herbert Hart, law’s ‘noble dream’. It is this reverie of the law that our era – often in the wake of anti-legalist ‘nightmares’, 2 be they totalitarian, authoritarian, even liberal–democratic – seeks to realise, especially in the rethinking of rights (of the group as much as the individual), of equality (of outcomes as much as opportunities), of the Rule of Law (of equitable results in addition to just procedures). Within this context of a reconceived ‘juridical (un)conscious’, the ‘imagination of critique’ plays a valuable role, and sets the stage for law’s re-visioning, nowhere more so than in the novels under consideration in this book, and their highly imaginative judgements. For these novel judgements, when read jurisprudentially, do more than just judge the law and find it wanting; they construct something at the very moment they combust it, positing, impliedly, a judgement of the law that is truly novel : that is, by making it new again. A new law re-theorised, fictively, for a new era.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Jurisprudential reading produces new alternatives to legal studies that reimagines the juridical imaginary </h4><p><strong>MacNeil 11</strong> MacNeil, W.P. (2011). Novel Judgements: Legal Theory as Fiction (1st ed.). Routledge-Cavendish. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203930861 Chapter A Jurisprudential Postscript: Century's Close and the End of the Meta- arrative of Law? ByWilliam P. MacNeil Book Novel Judgements Edition1st Edition First Published2011 ImprintRoutledge-Cavendish Pages4 William P. MacNeil is the Dean of the Griffith Law School, Queensland, Australia. Trained in both law and literature, MacNeil has published widely in the field of cultural legal studies //avery</p><p>Nor am I concerned, for that matter, with a certain kind of historicist literary criticism (Old or New) clustering around ‘the rise of the novel’ be it, for example, the growth of realism, the development of free indirect discourse or the triumph of ‘character as fate’. This is not to dismiss the signifi cance of that kind of ‘critico-historical’ inquiry; but <u>my purpose in Novel Judgements is otherwise, and seeks to align ‘the literary’ with ‘the legal’</u> in order to ask how the one reads the other differently – and vice versa<u>. </u>For my interest in these hitherto discrete discourses is how they link up with, hook onto, and illuminate an(O)ther intertextual history, <u>one that goes</u>, I hasten to add, <u>well beyond ‘law-and-literature’ </u>as it has been traditionally understood; for example, parsing the literary trope in the jurisprudential essay, or explicating the novelistic representation of court processes. Rather, the historical intertext this book engages is organised around, and by a ‘concept of law’ in its broadest philosophical sense, <u>one that takes onboard and knits together nomological topoi as diverse as desire, transgression, sovereignty, rights, utility, trusteeship, retribution, </u>distribution, governmentality, and so forth. I refer, of course, to that most anchoring – but also elastic and elusive – of legal notions, the Rule of Law. This explains why this study is, largely, a nineteenth-century one – whether defi ned as long, short or somewhere in between. For that period was the chrysalis of modern (and postmodern) jurisprudence, giving forth, and form to the Rule of Law as the degree zero of legal philosophy, past and present. <u>It is this nomological ‘quilting point’ that will become, throughout the century, the juridical imaginary’s </u>equivalent of that era’s most touted and questionable<u> meta-narrative: namely, that of ‘progress’ be it liberal or socialist</u>, <u>heralding the era of markets or Marx. </u>As a result of this hegemony, a <u>range of ancillary jurisprudential theories proliferated during that century, theorising – and legitimating – the Rule of Law</u>: <u>legal positivism</u>, utilitarianism, <u>rights theory, formalism, </u>legal liberalism and so forth. <u>Each in their own way are a support of the status quo, ensuring not only the persistence of the Rule of Law, but trumpeting its inevitability . With the dawn of the twentieth century, </u>however, an ideological shift occurs, one that<u> bears </u>witness to the emergence of new<u>, more sceptical forms of legal theory</u> challenging not only the Rule of Law’s claims to access to justice, impartiality of hearing and consistency of judgment, but its raison d’être . <u>These movements </u>of legal critique – sociological jurisprudence, legal realism, public policy analysis, the ‘legal process’ school, law in context, critical legal studies, critical legal feminism, critical race theory, cultural legal studies, postmodern jurisprudence<u> – will occur and recur throughout the century.</u> This ebb and fl ow of legal critique, however, is prefigured in, and overdetermined by the Rule of Law itself. For what might be called the Rule of Law’s thesis – of full and fair procedures available to all – gives rise to its antithesis – critique – in much the same way, during this period, Capital organises its dialectical opposite, Labour. <u>So there is an undercurrent, critical of the Rule of Law, running throughout the nineteenth century’s various discourses of power/knowledge, replete with jurisprudential possibilities, charged with curial alternatives</u>. This undercurrent<u>, I have argued, finds its most vivid expression</u>, neither in the period’s established ‘trad’ jurisprudence (and legal history), nor its emerging ‘rad’ socio-legal disciplines (criminology, penology, etc.), but, rather, <u>in a hugely popular</u> (and still somewhat dubious) <u>aesthetic medium, the novel</u> – the prototype of what I have called elsewhere, lex populi . 1 Indeed, the wager of this book has been to release these novels’ respective subtexts of legal critique, often heavily coded in terms of the domestic, the interior, the private, through a new interpretive method: that is, ‘reading jurisprudentially’. When ‘read jurisprudentially’, the private sphere these texts depict – country houses, family dynamics, friendship, unrequited love, courtship, marriage – are publicised , so to speak, as profoundly legal in their concerns. <u>And not only legal; but critical of that legality. For these texts disclose how, under the nineteenth-century’s new industrial mode of production, all relationships</u> – personal and political, private and public – <u>are mediated by not just law’s heavy-handed coerciveness, and its prescriptive and/or proscriptive content</u> (‘Thou shalt not . . .’), <u>but its near invisible forms</u> : <u>the language of the bargain, the discourse of ownership, the idiom of Recht</u> , each a superstructural prop of the infrastructure of Capital. <u>In rendering visible what has become so naturalised as to be unseen, these texts put the Rule of Law on trial and render a novel judgement, passing a sentence of critique</u>. Some of these sentences turn on plot devices (an entail bypassing – and disinheriting – the female line; a missing will, and the trusts it sets up gone seriously awry; a deed to vast holdings, long hidden) or settings (revolutionary tribunals, Chancery, a colonial witch trial) that are recognisably legal. But, more often than not, <u>legal critique comes in the form of characters seemingly remote from the law</u>: <u>characters such as</u> Elizabeth Bennet, Rebecca of York, <u>Frankenstein’s monster</u>, Holgrave, Esther Summerson and Joe Gargery (as well as the more legalistic, Carton and Bucket) – each of whom rebuke the Rule of Law in its various permutations, be it defi ned as the ‘command of the sovereign’, the ‘nonsense upon stilts’ of natural rights, utility’s felicifi c calculus, the ‘clean hands’ of equity, the call of a higher justice, the sanctity of property, or the letter of the law. As neutralised and nullifi ed as they so often are here – married or killed off, exiled or executed – <u>these figures of legal critique point the reader to another space, another scene of nomos ; that is, a legality re-envisaged by their narratives’ very images and metaphors, their plot twists and textual tropes</u>. What sort of law might that be? What would it look like? What shape would it take? These texts, and the novel judgements they propound, provide something like a jurisprudential cornucopia, their responses instantiated variously as follows: sometimes, a dwelling (Pemberley, Bleak House); sometimes, a message, spoken (Jo to Pip) or unspoken (Mary Shelley to Mary Wollstonecraft); sometimes a positive act, be it a departure (Rebecca), a disclosure (Holgrave) or a sacrifi ce (Sydney Carton). <u>When read together and taken as a whole, what these spaces and signs, movements and modes gesture towards is a place of law open to all and free of possessive imperatives</u>, in which the legal letter is married to the spirit, in which rights disseminate equally, in which a duty of care extends to, and embraces all, in which no one is the chattel of another and each a legal subject of their own world. That is, they point to a site of justice , the novelistic rendering of which might be called, following British jurisprude Herbert Hart, law’s ‘noble dream’. It <u>is this reverie of the law that our era – often in the wake of anti-legalist ‘nightmares’, </u>2 <u>be they totalitarian, authoritarian, even liberal–democratic – seeks to realise, especially in the rethinking of rights</u> (of the group as much as the individual), of equality (of outcomes as much as opportunities), of the Rule of Law (of equitable results in addition to just procedures). <u>Within this context of a reconceived ‘juridical (un)conscious’, the ‘imagination of critique’ plays a valuable role,</u> <u>and sets the stage for law’s re-visioning</u>, nowhere more so than in the novels under consideration in this book, and their highly imaginative judgements. <u>For these novel judgements, when read jurisprudentially, do more than just judge the law and find it wanting; they construct something at the very moment they combust it, positing, impliedly, a judgement of the law that is truly novel : that is, by making it new again. A new law re-theorised, fictively, for a new era.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Tertrais 11 (Bruno, ; 2011; The Relevance, Morality and Cost-effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons; http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp39tertrais.pdf)//jac fulltext: It is by definition impossible to prove that deterrence has worked, and correlation is not causality. But History gives us solid arguments in support of the positive role played by nuclear weapons, especially since our "database" now covers nearly 70 years. No major power conflict has taken place In nearly 70 years - The role of nuclear deterrence to explain this historical anomaly has been highlighted by leading historians and authors such as John Lewis Gaddis, Kenneth Waltz, and Michael Quinlan.3 No comparable period of time has ever existed in the history of States. There were two dozen conflicts among major powers in the equivalent amount of time following the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), and several after the Vienna Congress (1815).4 There has never been a direct military conflict between two nuclear States* - Beyond this mere observation, two recent quantitative studies have shown that the possession of nuclear weapons by two countries significantly reduced - all things equal - the likelihood of war between them.6 Events in Asia since 1949 provide an interesting test case. China and India fought a war in 1962, but have refrained from resorting to arms against each other ever since. There were three India-Pakistan wars (1962, 1965 and 1971) before both countries became nuclear; but since the late 1980s (when the two countries acquired a minimum nuclear capability), none of the two has launched any significant air or land operations against the other. No nuclear-armed country has ever been invaded - This proposition too can be tested by the evolution of regional crises. Israel had been invaded in 1948, on the day of its independence. But in 1973, Arab States deliberately limited their operations to disputed territories (the Sinai and the Golan Heights).7 It is thus incorrect to take the example of the Yom Kippur war as a "proof of the failure of nuclear deterrence. Likewise, India refrained from penetrating Pakistani territory at the occasion of the crises of 1990, 1999, 2002 and 2008, whereas it had done so in 1965 and 1971. Another example is sometimes mistakenly counted as a failure of nuclear deterrence: the Falklands War (1982). But this was a British Dependent Territory for which nothing indicated that it was covered by nuclear deterrence. Furthermore, it would be erroneous to take these two events as evidence that extended deterrence does not make sense, as some authors have done ("if nuclear weapons cannot protect part of the national territory, how could they protect a foreign country?"8). Extended deterrence is meant to cover interests that are much more important to the protector than non¬essential territories; for instance, during the Cold war Germany was much more "vital" to the United States than, say, Puerto Rico. No country covered by a nuclear guarantee has ever been the target of a major State attack - Here again evidence is hard to give, but can be found a contrario. The United States refrained from invading Cuba in 1962, for instance, but did not hesitate in invading Grenada, Panama or Iraq. The Soviet Union invaded Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, but not a single US ally. China has refrained from invading Taiwan, which benefits from a US defense commitment. North Korea invaded its southern neighbor in 1950 after Washington had excluded it from its "defensive perimeter", but has refrained from doing so since Seoul has been covered with a nuclear guarantee. Neither South Vietnam nor Kuwait were under the US nuclear umbrella. Russia could afford to invade Georgia because its country was not a NATO member. A partial exception is the shelling of Yeongpyeong island (2011); but the limited character of the attack and its location (in a maritime area not recognized by Pyongyang as being part of South Korean territory) make it hard to count it as a major failure of extended deterrence. Alternative Explanations Are Not Satisfying Some have suggested alternative explanations which all rest, to some extent, on the idea that international society has undergone major transformations since 1945: the development of international institutions, the progress of democracy, the rise of global trade, etc., to which is often added the memories of the Second World War. Thus for authors such as John Mueller, nuclear weapons played a marginal - non-necessary - role in the preservation of peace.9 The Soviet Union, it is also argued, was a status quo power in Europe which would not have taken the risk of a major war on the continent. But such explanations are not satisfying. The rise of international trade from 1870 onwards did not prevent the First World War: Norman Angell's "Great Illusion" was a fallacy. The construction of a new global order based on the League of Nations did not prevent the Second.10 Kenneth Waltz reminds us that "in a conventional world even forceful and tragic lessons have proved to be exceedingly difficult for states to learn"." In the same vein, Elbridge Colby holds that such cultural argumentation "markedly overestimates the durability of historically contingent value systems while seriously downplaying the enduring centrality of competition, fear, uncertainty and power".12 Major powers have continued to use military force in deadly conflicts, especially in the two decades after 1945: "war fatigue" is a limited and rather recent phenomenon. As for democratization, it is obviously a red herring: during the Cold war, the risk of major war was between pro-Western (not all of them democratic until at least the late 1970s) and totalitarian regimes. No one knows how a "non-nuclear cold war" would have unfolded in Europe. However, without nuclear weapons, Washington might have hesitated to guarantee the security in Europe ("no nukes, no troops"), and might have returned to isolationism; and without US protection, the temptation for Moscow to grab territory in Western Europe would have been stronger.'3 And as Michael Quinlan puts it, in order to claim that nuclear deterrence was key in the preservation of peace, one does not need to postulate a Soviet desire for expansionist aggression: it is enough to argue that "had armed conflict not been so manifestly intolerable the ebb and flow of friction might have managed with less caution, and a slide sooner or later into major war, on the pattern of 1914 or 1939, might have been less unlikely"." Alternative explanations might not even suffice to explain the absence of conflict among European countries: the integration process which began in 1957 and culminated with the creation of the European Union in 1991 might have been much more difficult without the US umbrella.'5 Neither are they satisfying regarding regional powers. It is hard to believe that the political, economic and cultural factors mentioned above are enough to explain the absence of a major conventional war involving Israel, India or Pakistan since these countries have become nuclear powers.16 Deterrence has limited the scope and intensity of conflict among the major States. If crises in Europe, as well as wars in Asia and the Middle East, did not turn into global conflicts, it is probably due largely to nuclear weapons. The fear of nuclear war and the precautions taken by decision¬makers during the Cold war to reduce the risks of direct conflict have been made clear by a collective study that contradicts Mueller's thesis.17 A former Russian official even writes: I dare claim and am ready to prove that nuclear weapons were the greatest 'civilizing tool' for these elites. They cleansed their ranks of all radicals and ideologues, and they strengthened the pragmatists who saw their main goal in averting a nuclear war or the clashes that had the potential to escalate to a nuclear conflict.18_ It is not an intellectual stretch to claim that the international stability obtained thanks to nuclear deterrence (in its national and extended forms) has been a form of global common good. For all non-nuclear weapons States benefitted from it during the past 65-plus years - even though some of them suffered from the indirect conflicts made possible by the stability-instability paradox. Without it, for instance, it is dubious that Asia would have known the peace and stability that allowed for its massive transformation and development, leading to hundreds of millions of human beings being lifted out of poverty. Patrick Morgan adds that nuclear weapons may even have hastened the end of the Cold war, by giving confidence to Soviet leaders that the country's survival would be assured even after the loss of the Eastern European glacis.19 As a result, one can only subscribe to the wise advice given by Michael O'Hanlon regarding the current drive for the "abolition" of nuclear weapons: Perhaps nuclear deterrence has been only a minor factor in preserving peace in the past: the issue is arguable. But policymakers need to be careful, and gradual, about how they run the experiment to test that proposition.20<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Deterrence prevents conflict – empirics <strong> </h4><p>Tertrais 11</p><p></strong>(Bruno, ; 2011; The Relevance, Morality and Cost-effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons; http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp39tertrais.pdf)//jac</p><p>It is by definition impossible to prove that deterrence has worked, and correlation is not causality. But History gives us solid arguments in support of the positive role played by nuclear weapons, especially since our "database" now covers nearly 70 years. <u><mark>No major power conflict has taken place In</mark> nearly <mark>70 years</mark> - The role of <mark>nuclear deterrence</mark> to <mark>explain this historical</mark> <mark>anomaly</mark> has been highlighted by leading historians and authors</u> such as John Lewis Gaddis, Kenneth Waltz, and Michael Quinlan.3 <u><mark>No comparable </mark>period of <mark>time has ever existed</mark> in the history of States.</u> There were two dozen conflicts among major powers in the equivalent amount of time following the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), and several after the Vienna Co<u>ngress (1815).4 There has never been a direct military conflict between two nuclear States</u>* - Beyond this mere observation, <u>two recent quantitative studies have shown that the <mark>possession of nuclear weapons</mark> by two countries significantly <mark>reduced</mark> </u>- all things equal - <u>the <mark>likelihood of war between them</u></mark>.6 Events in Asia since 1949 provide an interesting test case. China and India fought a war in 1962, but have refrained from resorting to arms against each other ever since. There were three India-Pakistan wars (1962, 1965 and 1971) before both countries became nuclear; but since the late 1980s (when the two countries acquired a minimum nuclear capability), none of the two has launched any significant air or land operations against the other. <u><mark>No nuclear-armed country has ever been invaded</mark> - This proposition too can be tested by the evolution of regional crises. </u>Israel had been invaded in 1948, on the day of its independence. But in 1973, Arab States deliberately limited their operations to disputed territories (the Sinai and the Golan Heights).7 It is thus incorrect to take the example of the Yom Kippur war as a "proof of the failure of nuclear deterrence. Likewise, India refrained from penetrating Pakistani territory at the occasion of the crises of 1990, 1999, 2002 and 2008, whereas it had done so in 1965 and 1971. Another example is sometimes mistakenly counted as a failure of nuclear deterrence: the Falklands War (1982). But this was a British Dependent Territory for which nothing indicated that it was covered by nuclear deterrence. Furthermore, it would be erroneous to take these two events as evidence that extended deterrence does not make sense, as some authors have done ("if nuclear weapons cannot protect part of the national territory, how could they protect a foreign country?"8). <u>Extended deterrence is meant to cover interests that are much more important to the protector than non¬essential territories; for instance, during the Cold war Germany was much more "vital" to the United States than, say, Puerto Rico. <mark>No country covered by a nuclear guarantee has ever been the target </mark>of a major State attack</u> - Here again evidence is hard to give, but can be found a contrario. The United States refrained from invading Cuba in 1962, for instance, but did not hesitate in invading Grenada, Panama or Iraq. The Soviet Union invaded Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, but not a single US ally. China has refrained from invading Taiwan, which benefits from a US defense commitment. North Korea invaded its southern neighbor in 1950 after Washington had excluded it from its "defensive perimeter", but has refrained from doing so since Seoul has been covered with a nuclear guarantee. Neither South Vietnam nor Kuwait were under the US nuclear umbrella. Russia could afford to invade Georgia because its country was not a NATO member. A partial exception is the shelling of Yeongpyeong island (2011); but the limited character of the attack and its location (in a maritime area not recognized by Pyongyang as being part of South Korean territory) make it hard to count it as a major failure of extended deterrence. <u>Alternative Explanations Are Not Satisfying </u>Some have suggested alternative explanations which all rest, to some extent, on the idea that international society has undergone major transformations since 1945: the development of international institutions, the progress of democracy, the rise of global trade, etc., to which is often added the memories of the Second World War. Thus for authors such as John Mueller, nuclear weapons played a marginal - non-necessary - role in the preservation of peace.9 The Soviet Union, it is also argued, was a status quo power in Europe which would not have taken the risk of a major war on the continent. But <u>such explanations are not satisfying. The rise of international <mark>trade</mark> from 1870 onwards <mark>did not prevent the First World War</mark>: Norman Angell's "Great Illusion" was a fallacy. The construction of a new global order based on the <mark>League of Nations did not prevent the Second</mark>.10 </u>Kenneth <u>Waltz reminds us that "in a conventional world even forceful and tragic lessons have proved to be exceedingly difficult for states to learn".</u>" In the same vein, Elbridge Colby holds that such cultural argumentation "markedly overestimates the durability of historically contingent value systems while seriously downplaying the enduring centrality of competition, fear, uncertainty and power".12 Major powers have continued to use military force in deadly conflicts, especially in the two decades after 1945: "war fatigue" is a limited and rather recent phenomenon. As for democratization, it is obviously a red herring: during the Cold war, the risk of major war was between pro-Western (not all of them democratic until at least the late 1970s) and totalitarian regimes. No one knows how a "non-nuclear cold war" would have unfolded in Europe. However, <u><mark>without nuclear weapons, Washington might have hesitated to guarantee the security in Europe</mark> ("no nukes, no troops"), and might have returned to isolationism; and without US protection, the temptation for Moscow to grab territory in Western Europe would have been stronger</u>.'3 And as Michael Quinlan puts it, in order to claim that nuclear deterrence was key in the preservation of peace, one does not need to postulate a Soviet desire for expansionist aggression: it is enough to argue that "had armed conflict not been so manifestly intolerable the ebb and flow of friction might have managed with less caution, and a slide sooner or later into major war, on the pattern of 1914 or 1939, might have been less unlikely"." <u>Alternative explanations might not even suffice to explain the absence of conflict among European countries: the integration process which began in 1957 and culminated with the creation of the European Union in 1991 might have been much more difficult without the US umbrella.'</u>5 Neither are they satisfying regarding regional powers. It is hard to believe that the political, economic and cultural factors mentioned above are enough to explain the absence of a major conventional war involving Israel, India or Pakistan since these countries have become nuclear powers.16 Deterrence has limited the scope and intensity of conflict among the major States. If crises in Europe, as well as wars in Asia and the Middle East, did not turn into global conflicts, it is probably due largely to nuclear weapons. The fear of nuclear war and the precautions taken by decision¬makers during the Cold war to reduce the risks of direct conflict have been made clear by a collective study that contradicts Mueller's thesis.17 A former Russian official even writes: I dare claim and am ready to prove that nuclear weapons were the greatest 'civilizing tool' for these elites. They cleansed their ranks of all radicals and ideologues, and they strengthened the pragmatists who saw their main goal in averting a nuclear war or the clashes that had the potential to escalate to a nuclear conflict.18_ It is not an intellectual stretch to claim that <u><mark>the international stability obtained thanks to nuclear deterrenc</mark>e</u> (in its national and extended forms) <u><mark>has been</mark> a form of global <mark>common good</mark>.</u> For all non-nuclear weapons States benefitted from it during the past 65-plus years - even though some of them suffered from the indirect conflicts made possible by the stability-instability paradox. Without it, for instance, it is dubious that Asia would have known the peace and stability that allowed for its massive transformation and development, leading to hundreds of millions of human beings being lifted out of poverty. Patrick Morgan adds that nuclear weapons may even have hastened the end of the Cold war, by giving confidence to Soviet leaders that the country's survival would be assured even after the loss of the Eastern European glacis.19 As a result, one can only subscribe to the wise advice given by Michael O'Hanlon regarding the current drive for the "abolition" of nuclear weapons: Perhaps nuclear deterrence has been only a minor factor in preserving peace in the past: the issue is arguable. But policymakers need to be careful, and gradual, about how they run the experiment to test that proposition.20</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: McGranahan 19 (McGranahan, Carole. "Chinese settler colonialism: empire and life in the Tibetan borderlands." Frontier Tibet 517 (2019), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337951834_Chinese_Settler_Colonialism_Empire_and_Life_in_the_Tibetan_Borderlands) fulltext: Empires take many forms. Settler colonialism is one form, elastic rather than rigid across cultural and historic contexts (Veracini 2013). It consists of the settling of others’ land by the colonizer with the intention of displacing, replacing, or otherwise eliminating the natives of the colonized territory (Wolfe 1999). Classic examples of settler colonialism are Australia, Canada, and the United States of America. In each instance, there exist drastic policies of both assimilation and destruction, including of native peoples as well as of their historical beliefs, practices, and claims to land. Settler colonialism may be one of several strategies or forms an empire takes. While it is often linked to European colonialism and also white supremacy, it – like empire in general – is not solely a European or white phenomenon. Settler colonialism is a possible feature of all imperial formations, including that of China. Is China an empire? If many China Studies scholars have been hesitant to call the P.R.C. an empire, Tibetan Studies scholars have not hesitated to do so. From political science and international relations (e.g., Anand 2019; D. Norbu 1985; Smith 1996, 2008) to anthropology, geography, and history (e.g., Carrico 2018, Hansen 2003, Lokyitsang 2017; McGranahan 1995, 2007; Yeh 2013), many Tibetan Studies scholars portray Tibet’s relationship with the P.R.C. as imperial. However, not all scholars do. Some prefer the term ‘occupied’, a term that calls attention to the problematic and violent nature of Tibet’s relationship with the P.R.C. but that falls short of the term ‘colonized’. This dilemma of naming the socialist state an empire is not limited to China, but also exists within Soviet Studies. Given the development of colonial and later postcolonial studies from within Marxist frameworks, non-capitalist empires such as the P.R.C. and U.S.S.R. did not fit scholarly imperial models (Annus 2012; Chari and Verdery 2008; McGranahan 2007; Stoler and McGranahan 2007; Verdery 2002). While there are similarities in the two cases, the scholarly literatures on these two socialist empires has unfolded differently. In much of China Studies empire is past-tense, with important studies focused on the Qing or further back (e.g., Crossley 1999; Hostetler 2005; Leibold 2007; Perdue 2007, 2009). Why is this? Avoiding labelling China as imperial draws on a range of possible reasons, including the following: 1) scholarly fears of criticizing the government, and thus potential persecution or loss of research access (Makley 2009; Milward 2011); 2) Marxist ‘radical reductionism’ or ideological affiliation with or apology for the Chinese communist government (Yeh 2009); 3) a myopic focus on European empire 522 Carole McGranahan (Stoler, McGranahan, and Purdue 2007); and, 4) pervasive ‘discourse[s] of Chinese victimhood at the hands of Western empires’ (Shih 2011, 709). Within China Studies, one important recalibration of the study of empire is through Sinophone Studies (Shih 2011, 2012; Shih, Tsai, and Bernards 2013) or the domination of the Chinese language. Sinophone communities are one way to recognize Chinese empire. Literary scholar Shu-mei Shih identifies three historical processes of imperial consolidation: ‘the continental colonialism of Manchu and Han Chinese empires that produced internal colonies in today’s China; Han settler colonialism in select places such as Taiwan, Singapore and colonial Malaya; and (im)migration out of China that produced minoritized Sinophone communities in different parts of the world such as Australia, Europe, and the Americas’ (2012, 5; on Taiwan, see also Chen 2010; Hirano, Veracini and Roy 2018; Sugimoto 2018). In this formulation, language is central. This holds true in some but not all ways for Tibetan colonial experiences in the P.R.C. A focus on language misses important historical and theoretical conversations about sovereignty that necessarily ground discussions and experiences of empire in Tibet. In the Tibetan language, the conceptual and imperial Other is China (gyanak) and the Chinese (gyemi), not the Chinese language nor the ‘Han’ Chinese. Thus, in addition to a genealogical connection to an imperial formation grounded around language, i.e. the Sinophone, in the case of Tibet, we also need a Tibetan-centred historical and political perspective. Following World War II, China and the U.S.A. both used anti-imperial Cold War rhetoric to reframe empire as something else; for example, to posit imperialism as development or as the liberating spread of either socialism or democracy (McGranahan 2007, 2018). In the case of China, the consolidation of the People’s Republic of China as socialist empire used and also retuned longstanding Chinese tropes of barbarians outside the gates of civilized society as well as new political strategies for and justifications of empire. When the People’s Liberation Army invaded Tibet, the initial justification was the need for socialist liberation from feudalism and religion. Later the Chinese Communist Party added a historical justification to the earlier ideological one: the claim that Tibet was always a part of China. Ironically, this historical argument is itself only several decades old. For Xinjiang in addition to Tibet, anthropologist Kevin Carrico argues that such rhetorical shifts over time maintain the colonial project: ‘the ideological application of the euphemism of development is particularly pressing in the current western areas of China, where from the Maoist rhetoric of “liberation” to the post-Maoist rhetoric of “development” a process of unrelenting Han Chinese Afterword 523 colonization has been insistently represented as anything but colonization’ (2018, 640; see also Fischer 2013; Yeh and Wharton 2016). Whom does a denial of colonialism serve? Mostly, but not only, those in power. Under socialism, the Chinese civilizing project has been one of forging national unity and ethnic harmony (Harrell 1995). In Tibet, one example of this is the ongoing Education Aid for Tibet project where Chinese citizens travel to Tibetan areas to work as teachers. This labour is seen as moral and part of a civilizing saviour complex familiar to colonial situations elsewhere (Yang 2019). Moral justifications for the programme rest on stereotypical narratives such as ‘the Han [i.e., Chinese] are superior, central, civilized, and safe and the ethnic minorities [i.e., the Tibetans] are inferior, peripheral, barbaric, and unsafe’ (Yang 2019, 5; see also Carrico 2017). In her ethnographic research with teachers in the programme, scholar Miaoyan Yang (2019) found they understood their participation to be not so much about education for its own sake, as education in the service of ethnic unity, national stability, and national integration. Underlying this discourse is the argument that Tibetans are not integrated into the Chinese state, and that this is a problem to be fixed. Instead of unity and harmony, Tibetans thus potentially present problems of ‘separatism’ and ‘splittism’ to a benevolent imperial state. Tibet is not an internal colony of China. To call it an ‘internal colony’ would support the fiction that Tibet was historically part of China. An internal colony is a territory inside a state which is administered in a colonial fashion, or for which there exists massive economic inequality between it and the state centre (Hechter 1975). In the P.R.C., there are places and peoples whose relation to the state is that of an internal colony (Gladney 1998; Oakes 1995). These are mostly non-Han ethnic areas and groups, but not necessarily ones that had a sovereign state as did Tibet. All non-Han peoples are nonetheless grouped into one ethno-political category, that of ‘minority nationalities’ or minzu, in a way that defines this grouping as natural or inevitable, that is such that ‘these peoples are officially described as always already a part of China, as if they somehow naturally belonged on this map and did not end up as part of China by being conquered’ (Fiskesjö 2017, 7). Anthropologist of China Magnus Fiskesjö argues that this historical revisionism has stark political repercussions: ‘One formidable effect of this formulation is that it equalizes all the minorities and thereby erases the differences between those who built their own states and empires in the past, such as Tibet, which could easily, like Mongolia, fulfill the criteria for being recognized by the modern world as independent states with their own seat in the United Nations and on the other hand, those minority peoples who never engaged in any such state-building in the past’ (Fiskesjö 2017, 7). 524 Carole McGranahan Tibet’s eighteenth-nineteenth-century imperial relations were with the Qing (Manchu) empire, which was a non-Han empire of China. Buddhism bound the Qing emperor and Tibetan Dalai Lama together in a ‘patronpriest’ relationship that Tibetans understood as a relation of equals, not one of subordination (Jagou 2009; Schwieger 2015). Being in an imperial relationship was not the same as being in a colonial one. During the same period, for example, British India also considered Tibet to be in its imperial interest; however, these Great Game politics were not an indicator of loss of sovereignty. In 1913, following the fall of the Qing empire and efforts of the new Republican government in China to assert claims to Tibet, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama proclaimed Tibet’s independence. Tibet never came under the imperial or colonial administration of the Republican government of China. What then does current Chinese settler colonialism look like? Instructions on how to be civilized. Exclusions from certain programmes and possibilities. Inclusions in other programmes and possibilities. Requirements to perform gratitude, to embrace aspects of socialism, to reject local beliefs and practices, including religious ones – Buddhism in Tibet and Islam in Xinjiang. A visible security presence, and invisible but known surveillance methods. State policies based on misunderstandings of native peoples, such as nomadic pastoralists (Tan, this volume). Alongside these, however, is everyday life. People find ways to live in empire, to live alongside colonizers, to survive and even thrive within limits. Strategies for doing so are multiple. Within the P.R.C., at times Tibetans creatively push back on their state ethnic (minzu) categorization, and other times they operate within proscribed limits (Germano 1998; Grant 2017, 2018; Hillman and Henfry 2006; Jinba 2013; Keogh 2015; Makley 2007; Smyer Yü 2103; Yeh 2007). Poetry, literature, art, and song are all important genres for Tibetan cultural and political expression, often with risks of imprisonment and abuse for artists, intellectuals, and even community members (Buffetrille, this volume; Gayley 2016; Jabb 2013, 2019; Morcom 2015; Thurston 2017; Warner 2013). Changes in government policies for nomads, farmers, and urban residents have created new forms of inequality and struggle between Tibetans (Bum 2018; Gyal 2019; Sulek 2019; Yeh and Makley 2019; Zhaxi 2019). Tibetan experiences of nationalist modernity within China are shared across regions. For example, short stories written in Amdo are read by people in Kham. Songs performed by Khampas are beloved by people in Amdo. Poems composed in honour of historical events in Lhasa circulate among Tibetans in all provinces via social media (Jabb 2019). In the digital era, people have new ways to connect and communicate, including to ‘undermine political authoritarianism’ (Jabb 2019, 51). Afterword 525 Tibetan experiences with Chinese neighbours long precede contemporary empire. Traders, intellectuals, monks, and others regularly travelled to China and other neighbouring countries such as India and Nepal, and resided there sometimes by choice and other times as forced exile (Jagou 2013; McGranahan 2017; Stoddard 1985; Yongdan 2019). The city of Chengdu in Sichuan, for example, has long had Tibetan residents, and is currently being reimagined anew as a Tibetan place within China (Xu, Kou, and Wall 2018). While Kham and other Tibetan regions each have historical and administrative specificities, shared cultural sensibilities and forms have new uses under colonial rule. Understanding Kham thus requires understanding Tibet and vice versa.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The PRC is a settler colonial empire built on the extraction of land and elimination of the other - its settler colonial tendencies are erased through the idea that land conquered in the past are now China’s property, enabling an erasure of ethnic minorities and justifies extracting from those lands</h4><p><strong>McGranahan 19</strong> (McGranahan, Carole. "Chinese settler colonialism: empire and life in the Tibetan borderlands." Frontier Tibet<u> 517 (2019), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337951834_Chinese_Settler_Colonialism_Empire_and_Life_in_the_Tibetan_Borderlands)</p><p><strong>Empires take many forms. <mark>Settler colonialism</mark> is one form, elastic rather than rigid across cultural and historic contexts (Veracini 2013). It <mark>consists of the settling of others’ land by the colonizer with the intention of</mark> <mark>displacing, replacing, or otherwise</mark> <mark>eliminating the natives of the colonized territory</u></strong></mark> (Wolfe 1999). Classic examples of settler colonialism are Australia, Canada, and the United States of America. In each instance, there exist drastic policies of both assimilation and destruction, including of native peoples as well as of their historical beliefs, practices, and claims to land. Settler colonialism may be one of several strategies or forms an empire takes. While it is often linked to European colonialism and also white supremacy, it – like empire in general – is not solely a European or white phenomenon. <u><strong>Settler colonialism is a possible feature of all imperial formations, including that of China. Is China an empire? If many China Studies scholars have been hesitant to call the P.R.C. an empire, Tibetan Studies scholars have not hesitated to do so.</u></strong> From political science and international relations (e.g., Anand 2019; D. Norbu 1985; Smith 1996, 2008) to anthropology, geography, and history (e.g., Carrico 2018, Hansen 2003, Lokyitsang 2017; McGranahan 1995, 2007; Yeh 2013), <u><strong>many Tibetan Studies scholars portray Tibet’s relationship with the P.R.C. as imperial</u></strong>. However, not all scholars do. Some prefer the term ‘occupied’, a term that calls attention to the problematic and violent nature of Tibet’s relationship with the P.R.C. but that falls short of the term ‘colonized’. This dilemma of naming the socialist state an empire is not limited to China, but also exists within Soviet Studies. Given the development of colonial and later postcolonial studies from within Marxist frameworks, non-capitalist empires such as the P.R.C. and U.S.S.R. did not fit scholarly imperial models (Annus 2012; Chari and Verdery 2008; McGranahan 2007; Stoler and McGranahan 2007; Verdery 2002). While there are similarities in the two cases, the scholarly literatures on these two socialist empires has unfolded differently. In much of China Studies empire is past-tense, with important studies focused on the Qing or further back (e.g., Crossley 1999; Hostetler 2005; Leibold 2007; Perdue 2007, 2009). Why is this? <u>Avoiding labelling China as imperial draws on a range of possible reasons, including the following: 1) scholarly fears of criticizing the government, and thus potential persecution or loss of research access (Makley 2009; Milward 2011); 2) Marxist ‘radical reductionism’ or ideological affiliation with or apology for the Chinese communist government (Yeh 2009); 3) a myopic focus on European empire 522 Carole McGranahan (Stoler, McGranahan, and Purdue 2007); and, 4) pervasive ‘discourse[s] of Chinese victimhood at the hands of Western empires’ (Shih 2011, 709). Within China Studies, one important recalibration of the study of empire is through Sinophone Studies (Shih 2011, 2012; Shih, Tsai, and Bernards 2013) or the domination of the Chinese language.</u><strong> Sinophone communities are one way to recognize Chinese empire. Literary scholar Shu-mei Shih identifies three historical processes of imperial consolidation: ‘the continental colonialism of Manchu and Han Chinese empires that produced internal colonies in today’s China; Han settler colonialism in select places such as Taiwan, Singapore and colonial Malaya; and (im)migration out of China that produced minoritized Sinophone communities in different parts of the world such as Australia, Europe, and the Americas’ (2012, 5; on Taiwan, see also Chen 2010; Hirano, Veracini and Roy 2018; Sugimoto 2018). In this formulation, language is central. This holds true in some but not all ways for Tibetan</strong> colonial experiences in the P.R.C. A focus on language misses important historical and theoretical conversations about sovereignty that necessarily ground discussions and experiences of empire in Tibet. <u><strong><mark>In</mark> the <mark>Tibet</mark>an language, <mark>the</mark> conceptual and <mark>imperial Other is China</mark> (gyanak) and the Chinese (gyemi), </strong>not the Chinese language nor the ‘Han’ Chinese<strong>. </u></strong>Thus, in addition to a genealogical connection to an imperial formation grounded around language, i.e. the Sinophone, in the case of Tibet, we also need a Tibetan-centred historical and political perspective. Following World War II, China and the U.S.A. both used anti-imperial Cold War rhetoric to reframe empire as something else; for example, to posit imperialism as development or as the liberating spread of either socialism or democracy (McGranahan 2007, 2018). In the case of China, the consolidation of the People’s Republic of China as socialist empire used and also retuned longstanding Chinese tropes of barbarians outside the gates of civilized society as well as new political strategies for and justifications of empire. <u><strong>When the People’s Liberation Army invaded Tibet, the initial justification was the need for socialist liberation from feudalism and religion. Later <mark>the C</mark>hinese<mark> C</mark>ommunist <mark>P</mark>arty <mark>added a historical justification</mark> to the earlier ideological one: the claim <mark>that Tibet was always a part of China</mark>.</u></strong> <u>Ironically, this historical argument is itself only several decades old. For Xinjiang in addition to Tibet, anthropologist Kevin Carrico argues that such rhetorical shifts over time maintain the colonial project: ‘the ideological application of the euphemism of development is particularly pressing in the current western areas of China, where from the Maoist rhetoric of “liberation” to the post-Maoist rhetoric of “development” a process of unrelenting Han Chinese Afterword 523 colonization has been insistently represented as anything but colonization’ </u>(2018, 640; see also Fischer 2013; Yeh and Wharton 2016<strong>). <u></strong>Whom does <mark>a denial of colonialism serve</u></mark>? Mostly, but not only,<u> <mark>those in power</mark>.<strong> </u></strong>Under socialism, the Chinese civilizing project has been one of forging national unity and ethnic harmony (Harrell 1995). <u><strong>In Tibet, one example of this is the ongoing Education Aid for Tibet project where Chinese citizens travel to Tibetan areas to work as teachers. This labour is seen as moral and part of a civilizing saviour complex familiar to colonial situations elsewhere</u></strong> (Yang 2019). <u><strong>Moral justifications for the programme rest on stereotypical narratives such as ‘the Han [i.e., Chinese] are superior, central, civilized, and safe and the ethnic minorities [i.e., the Tibetans] are inferior, peripheral, barbaric, and unsafe’</u></strong> (Yang 2019, 5; see also Carrico 2017). In her ethnographic research with teachers in the programme, scholar Miaoyan Yang (2019) found they understood their participation to be not so much about education for its own sake, as education in the service of ethnic unity, national stability, and national integration. Underlying this discourse is the argument that Tibetans are not integrated into the Chinese state, and that this is a problem to be fixed. <u><strong>Instead of unity and harmony, Tibetans thus potentially present problems of ‘separatism’ and ‘splittism’ to a benevolent imperial state. <mark>T</mark>ibet is not an internal colony of China. <mark>To call it an ‘internal colony’ would support the fiction that Tibet was historically part of China</strong></mark>. An internal colony is a territory inside a state which is administered in a colonial fashion, or for which there exists massive economic inequality between it and the state centre</u><strong> (Hechter 1975). <u></strong>In the P.R.C., there are places and peoples whose relation to the state is that of an internal colony</u> (Gladney 1998; Oakes 1995). <u><strong>These are mostly non-Han ethnic areas and groups, but not necessarily ones that had a sovereign state as did Tibet. <mark>All non-Han peoples are nonetheless grouped into one ethno-political category</mark>, that of ‘minority nationalities’ or minzu, <mark>in a way that defines this grouping as natural or inevitable</mark>, that is such that ‘these peoples are officially described as always already a part of China, as if they somehow naturally belonged on this map and did not end up as part of China by being conquered’</u></strong> (Fiskesjö 2017, 7). Anthropologist of China Magnus Fiskesjö argues that this historical revisionism has stark political repercussions: ‘<u><strong>One formidable effect of <mark>this</mark> formulation is that it equalizes all the minorities and thereby <mark>erases</mark> the <mark>differences</mark> </strong>between those who built their own states and empires in the past, such as Tibet, which could easily, like Mongolia, fulfill the criteria for being recognized by the modern world as independent states with their own seat in the United Nations and on the other hand, those minority peoples who never engaged in any such state-building in the past’</u> (Fiskesjö 2017, 7). 524 Carole McGranahan Tibet’s eighteenth-nineteenth-century imperial relations were with the Qing (Manchu) empire, which was a non-Han empire of China. Buddhism bound the Qing emperor and Tibetan Dalai Lama together in a ‘patronpriest’ relationship that Tibetans understood as a relation of equals, not one of subordination (Jagou 2009; Schwieger 2015). <u>Being in an imperial relationship was not the same as being in a colonial one.</u><strong> During the same period, for example, British India also considered Tibet to be in its imperial interest; however, these Great Game politics were not an indicator of loss of sovereignty. In 1913, following the fall of the Qing empire and efforts of the new Republican government in China to assert claims to Tibet, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama proclaimed Tibet’s independence. Tibet never came under the imperial or colonial administration of the Republican government of China. <u></strong>What then does current Chinese settler colonialism look like? Instructions on how to be civilized. Exclusions from certain programmes and possibilities. Inclusions in other programmes and possibilities. Requirements to perform gratitude, to embrace aspects of socialism, to reject local beliefs and practices, including religious ones – Buddhism in Tibet and Islam in Xinjiang. </u><strong>A visible security presence, and invisible but known surveillance methods. State policies based on misunderstandings of native peoples, such as nomadic pastoralists (Tan, this volume). Alongside these, however, is everyday life. People find ways to live in empire, to live alongside colonizers, to survive and even thrive within limits. Strategies for doing so are multiple. Within the P.R.C., at times Tibetans creatively push back on their state ethnic (minzu) categorization, and other times they operate within proscribed limits (Germano 1998; Grant 2017, 2018; Hillman and Henfry 2006; Jinba 2013; Keogh 2015; Makley 2007; Smyer Yü 2103; Yeh 2007). Poetry, literature, art, and song are all important genres for Tibetan cultural and political expression, often with risks of imprisonment and abuse for artists, intellectuals, and even community members (Buffetrille, this volume; Gayley 2016; Jabb 2013, 2019; Morcom 2015; Thurston 2017; Warner 2013). <u></strong>Changes in government policies for nomads, farmers, and urban residents have created new forms of inequality and struggle between Tibetans </u><strong>(Bum 2018; Gyal 2019; Sulek 2019; Yeh and Makley 2019; Zhaxi 2019). <u></strong>Tibetan experiences of nationalist modernity within China are shared across regions. </u><strong>For example, short stories written in Amdo are read by people in Kham. Songs performed by Khampas are beloved by people in Amdo. Poems composed in honour of historical events in Lhasa circulate among Tibetans in all provinces via social media (Jabb 2019). In the digital era, people have new ways to connect and communicate, including to ‘undermine political authoritarianism’ (Jabb 2019, 51). Afterword 525 Tibetan experiences with Chinese neighbours long precede contemporary empire. Traders, intellectuals, monks, and others regularly travelled to China and other neighbouring countries such as India and Nepal, and resided there sometimes by choice and other times as forced exile (Jagou 2013; McGranahan 2017; Stoddard 1985; Yongdan 2019). The city of Chengdu in Sichuan, for example, has long had Tibetan residents, and is currently being reimagined anew as a Tibetan place within China (Xu, Kou, and Wall 2018). <u></strong>While Kham and other Tibetan regions each have historical and administrative specificities, shared cultural sensibilities and forms have new uses under colonial rule. Understanding Kham thus requires understanding Tibet and vice versa.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Allo 18 (Awol Allo, Lecturer in Law at Keele University, UK, “The ICC's problem is not overt racism, it is Eurocentricism”, Al-Jazeera, 07/28/2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/icc-problem-simple-racism-eurocentricism-180725111213623.html, VO) fulltext: This month marks the 20th anniversary of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The inauguration of the first permanent international criminal tribunal of its kind tasked with the solemn duty to prosecute, judge, and punish those responsible of perpetrating the most egregious atrocities was widely hailed as a landmark achievement that would help preserve the global public order. During the signing ceremony of the Statute of the Court (the Rome Statute), the then-secretary-general of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, described the court as a "gift of hope to future generations, and a giant step forward in the march towards universal human rights and the rule of law". Cherif Bassiouni, the Egyptian American jurist widely regarded as a leading expert in modern international criminal law and the architect of the ICC, described the foundation of the tribunal as "the end of a historical process," but also "the beginning of a new phase in the history of international criminal justice". The 20th anniversary of the court offers an important opportunity to take stock of the court's journey so far, and to reflect on the challenges facing the institution, particularly its alleged Africa bias, calls for withdrawal and non-cooperation, and lack of support from the major players in the international order. Writing for Al Jazeera Opinion on the 20th anniversary of the court, Liechtenstein's Foreign Minister Aurelia Frick offered a passionate defence of the ICC, emphasising its positive legacy as a global watchdog against impunity and its innovative role in expanding the canon of international criminal law to bring about cultural shifts that would strengthen and sustain the rules-based international order. Frick valorised the ICC as the "embodiment of the world in which [she] wants to live and serve" and called upon states to support and defend it. While Frick is right to point out the legacy of the court and the need to defend it from "populists, nationalists and those who want to roll back the achievements of multilateralism", she appears to dismiss its alleged Africa bias as insignificant and presents the ICC as the achievement of multilateralism. In doing so, she repeats the rosy teleological narrative of the great uninterrupted and irreversible progress of a global system of justice told by the defenders of a "multilateral order" that is not multilateral at all. The problem with this line of thought is not that it is necessarily wrong but that it obfuscates the complex colonial legacies of the international legal order, and its alienation and erasure of the Global South from the history and story of the global public order. The ICC's Africa bias Of the 11 situations being investigated by the ICC, 10 involve African countries. Of those 10, five are self-referrals - the state refers itself to the ICC to investigate a situation within its territory because it is unable to prosecute perpetrators of crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC - genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. All arrest warrants and indictments so far issued by the ICC are for Africans, including two sitting heads of states - Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan and Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya. This curious and disproportionate focus of the court on Africa, particularly the cases against al-Bashir and Kenyatta, angered African leaders, leading to accusations of racist bias. In October 2013, the African Union called upon African states not to cooperate with the ICC, after the Security Council refused to defer the proceedings against the two leaders. The former Ethiopian PM Hailemariam Desalegn accused the tribunal of being a racist institution "hunting" Africans while Burundi, who became the first country to withdraw from the court, criticised it for being "a political tool used by [foreign] powers to remove whoever they want from power on the African continent". The accusations of simple and overt racism are somewhat exaggerated. They are clearly part of a self-serving ploy by the continent's abusive leaders who oversaw atrocities of unimaginable magnitude and are seeking a get-out-of-jail-free card. As the African Union and several African leaders have shown, it is easier to dismiss the court's fight against impunity as a neo-colonial attempt by the West to pursue Africans in the name of justice than to explain their own horrendous and intolerable human rights records. In fact, there is something rotten about the very people responsible for overseeing some of the most shocking atrocities against their own people invoking colonialism and racism to avoid responsibility and accountability. However, the disproportionate number of investigations against Africans cannot simply be explained away by the sheer scale and magnitude of atrocities in Africa. The point is not that the court is racist, nor is it that it lacks objectivity in the sense that it is biased against Africa. The point is that the ICC, just like the larger international legal order within which it operates, is Eurocentric and the world views, perspectives and stand points it reflects and embeds are uncompromisingly European. International institutions, and the norms, categories, priorities and theories dominant in international law come from a particular place and reflect the stand points of that place. International law, the postcolonial theorist Antony Anghie argues, is part and parcel of the imperial knowledge system, encapsulating European imperial values, experiences and perspectives. As an integral part of this knowledge system, the ICC represents the European stand point because its theories, principles and norms were formed in the heartland of Europe, crafted in European intellectual and cultural milieus. While there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the ICC's Africa focus is driven by racist bias, it is nevertheless critical to recognise that even seemingly innocent theories of accountability and justice bear the imprint of this imperial standpoint and are closely tied to the world views and interests of the place and culture from which they come. ICC as a multilateral institution The ICC, like all other "multilateral" international institutions, is not genuinely multilateral. International law and international organisations first emerged not as an intellectual project, but instead as a colonial knowledge project in the service of the empire. Distinctively Euro-American ideals and narratives determine the perspectives and standpoints of international organisations, including the ICC. As Finnish international lawyer Martti Koskenniemi points out, "Europe is [the] geographical, political, and conceptual epicentre" of international legal thought and it "served as the origin, engine and telos" of international legal knowledge. When the ICC and its defenders delineate its functions as "the fight against impunity", "responsibility to protect", and "advancing accountability and justice", they deploy the analytic frameworks, normative languages, and vocabularies that are intrinsically European, whose experts and advisers hail from European and American universities, think-tanks and NGOs. In so doing, the ICC sadly reinforces Western perspectives and standpoints as universal maxims valid for all people and all nations, and re-enacts racialised metaphors of savages, victims and saviours in the name of truth and justice. These metaphors further reaffirm the sharp divisions between the West and non-West, whereby the atrocities perpetrated by savages against victims should be prosecuted, judged and punished by the civilised West according to Western standards. This is best exemplified by two points: one, the fact that some of the most powerful states responsible for the establishment and maintenance of the global public order, namely the US, Russia, and China, are not parties to the ICC, creating a two-tiered standard of accountability for the powerful and the powerless; and two, the principle of complementarity, which provides that the ICC intervenes only when national jurisdictions are either unable or unwilling to prosecute. As the US and German representatives to the Rome Conference bragged repeatedly, the judicial systems in the West will never be found to be unable or unwilling to prosecute whereas the ICC can make out such a case easily against non-Western states. Beyond the immediate concerns of accountability and fighting impunity, painting a rosy picture of international institutions, including the ICC, carries the complex and horrific risk of reinforcing the unequal global knowledge order by establishing some standpoints and perspectives as inferior while valorising others as superior.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The ICC was created under Eurocentric ideals that have caused for the court to act in an inherently racist manner. A disproportionate number of cases target African Countries and avoiding European ones.</h4><p><strong>Allo 18</strong> (Awol Allo, Lecturer in Law at Keele University, UK, “The ICC's problem is not overt racism, it is Eurocentricism”, Al-Jazeera, 07/28/2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/icc-problem-simple-racism-eurocentricism-180725111213623.html, VO)</p><p>This month marks the 20th anniversary of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The inauguration of the first permanent international criminal tribunal of its kind tasked with the solemn duty to prosecute, judge, and punish those responsible of perpetrating the most egregious atrocities was widely hailed as a landmark achievement that would help preserve the global public order. <u>During the signing ceremony of the Statute of the Court</u> (the Rome Statute), <u>the then-secretary-general of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, described the court as a "gift of hope to future generations, and a giant step forward in the march towards universal human rights and the rule of law</u>". Cherif Bassiouni, the Egyptian American jurist widely regarded as a leading expert in modern international criminal law and the architect of the ICC, described the foundation of the tribunal as "the end of a historical process," but also "the beginning of a new phase in the history of international criminal justice". The 20th anniversary of the court offers an important opportunity to take stock of the court's journey so far, and to reflect on the challenges facing the institution, particularly <u>its alleged Africa bias, calls for withdrawal and non-cooperation, and lack of support from the major players in the international order</u>. Writing for Al Jazeera Opinion on the 20th anniversary of the court, <u>Liechtenstein's Foreign Minister Aurelia Frick</u> offered a passionate defence of the ICC, emphasising its positive legacy as a global watchdog against impunity and its innovative role in expanding the canon of international criminal law to bring about cultural shifts that would strengthen and sustain the rules-based international order. Frick valorised the ICC as the "embodiment of the world in which [she] wants to live and serve" and called upon states to support and defend it. While Frick is right to point out the legacy of the court and the need to defend it from "populists, nationalists and those who want to roll back the achievements of multilateralism", she <u>appears to dismiss its alleged Africa bias as insignificant and presents the ICC as the achievement of multilateralism. In doing so, she repeats the rosy teleological narrative of the great uninterrupted and irreversible progress of a global system of justice told by the defenders of a "multilateral order" that is not multilateral at all</u>. The problem with this line of thought is not that it is necessarily wrong but that it obfuscates the complex colonial legacies of the international legal order, and its alienation and erasure of the Global South from the history and story of the global public order. <u>The ICC's Africa bias Of the 11 situations being investigated by the ICC, 10 involve African countries. Of those 10, five are self-referrals</u> - the state refers itself to the ICC to investigate a situation within its territory because it is unable to prosecute perpetrators of crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC - genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. <u>All arrest warrants and indictments so far issued by the ICC are for Africans, including two sitting heads of states</u> - Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan and Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya<u>. This curious and disproportionate focus of the court on Africa</u>, particularly the cases against al-Bashir and Kenyatta<u>, angered African leaders, leading to accusations of racist bias</u>. In October 2013, the African Union called upon African states not to cooperate with the ICC, after the Security Council refused to defer the proceedings against the two leaders. The former Ethiopian PM Hailemariam Desalegn accused the tribunal of being a racist institution "hunting" Africans while Burundi, who became the first country to withdraw from the court, criticised it for being "a political tool used by [foreign] powers to remove whoever they want from power on the African continent". The accusations of simple and overt racism are somewhat exaggerated. They are clearly part of a self-serving ploy by the continent's abusive leaders who oversaw atrocities of unimaginable magnitude and are seeking a get-out-of-jail-free card. As the African Union and several African leaders have shown, it is easier to dismiss the court's fight against impunity as a neo-colonial attempt by the West to pursue Africans in the name of justice than to explain their own horrendous and intolerable human rights records. In fact, there is something rotten about the very people responsible for overseeing some of the most shocking atrocities against their own people invoking colonialism and racism to avoid responsibility and accountability. However, <u>the disproportionate number of investigations against Africans cannot simply be explained away by the sheer scale and magnitude of atrocities in Africa.</u> The point is not that the court is racist, nor is it that it lacks objectivity in the sense that it is biased against Africa. <u>The point is that the ICC, just like the larger international legal order within which it operates, is Eurocentric and the world views, perspectives and stand points it reflects and embeds are uncompromisingly European.</u> International institutions, and the norms, categories, priorities and theories dominant in international law come from a particular place and reflect the stand points of that place. International law, the postcolonial theorist Antony Anghie argues, is part and parcel of the imperial knowledge system, <u>encapsulating European imperial values, experiences and perspectives. As an integral part of this knowledge system, the ICC represents the European stand point because its theories, principles and norms were formed in the heartland of Europe, crafted in European intellectual and cultural milieus. </u>While there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the ICC's Africa focus is driven by racist bias, it is nevertheless critical to recognise that even seemingly innocent theories of accountability and justice bear the imprint of this imperial standpoint and are closely tied to the world views and interests of the place and culture from which they come. ICC as a multilateral institution The ICC, like all other "multilateral" international institutions, is not genuinely multilateral. International law and international organisations first emerged not as an intellectual project, but instead as a colonial knowledge project in the service of the empire. Distinctively Euro-American ideals and narratives determine the perspectives and standpoints of international organisations, including the ICC. As Finnish international lawyer Martti Koskenniemi points out, "Europe is [the] geographical, political, and conceptual epicentre" of international legal thought and it "served as the origin, engine and telos" of international legal knowledge. When the ICC and its defenders delineate its functions as "the fight against impunity", "responsibility to protect", and "advancing accountability and justice", they deploy the analytic frameworks, normative languages, and vocabularies that are intrinsically European, whose experts and advisers hail from European and American universities, think-tanks and NGOs. In so doing, the <u>ICC sadly reinforces Western perspectives and standpoints as universal maxims valid for all people and all nations, and re-enacts racialised metaphors of savages, victims and saviours in the name of truth and justice.</u> These metaphors further reaffirm the sharp divisions between the West and non-West, whereby the atrocities perpetrated by savages against victims should be prosecuted, judged and punished by the civilised West according to Western standards. This is best exemplified by two points: one, the fact that some of the most powerful states responsible for the establishment and maintenance of the global public order, namely the US, Russia, and China, are not parties to the ICC, creating a two-tiered standard of accountability for the powerful and the powerless; and two, the principle of complementarity, which provides that the ICC intervenes only when national jurisdictions are either unable or unwilling to prosecute. As the US and German representatives to the Rome Conference bragged repeatedly, the judicial systems in the West will never be found to be unable or unwilling to prosecute whereas the ICC can make out such a case easily against non-Western states. Beyond the immediate concerns of accountability and fighting impunity, painting a rosy picture of international institutions, including the ICC, carries the complex and horrific risk of reinforcing the unequal global knowledge order by establishing some standpoints and perspectives as inferior while valorising others as superior. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Vidaurri 10/24- (Monica, Astrobiologist, policy and ethics specialist, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, 10/24/19, “Humans will ruin outer space just like they’ve ruined everything else”, https://qz.com/1734103/will-people-go-to-space-and-then-colonize-it/, date accessed-10/24/19) fulltext: Space exploration, as I see it, is the last true peaceful international collaboration on Earth. I understand this claim is bound to invoke some scoffs from readers—the Cold War space race, for one, was characterized by serious military tensions between the US and the Soviet Union. But for those of us who work in the field, space exploration requires an understanding that no one person, space agency, or nation alone can authoritatively define our place in the universe. Because no entity can claim any part of the cosmos for themselves, outer space is the perfect place to demonstrate that we can respect universal (literally) human rights for all of Earth’s people. Given that thought, the level of international cooperation is remarkable if we take into account just how precarious the field of space law and policy truly is. Especially if we consider the nearly non-existent and fragile landscape of international space law. But my optimism comes with a caveat. When it comes to an industry as young as space exploration, is important to recognize colonization, imperialism, and exploitation as not just a series of major historical events that humanity is still recovering from, but as things that can conceivably inspire the future laws that will determine our fate in space. Colonization and exploitation define our major institutions, and are engrained in western society. They persists in science. And unless we make changes, they will persist in outer space as well. Spacing out In 1998, several nations signed a treaty into effect called the Intergovernmental Agreement on Space Station Cooperation. But since then, nothing substantial has been done to implement an international infrastructure to ensure accountability and planetary protection, safety, and ethics standards. Space exploration—like most other major events in human history—will only become even more susceptible to imperialism, colonialism, and general selfishness of our past should it continue to remain unchecked by any kind of system of accountability, collaboration, or transparency. Because of this, we see events play out in space that would almost surely be ruled violations if they were carried out in the terrestrial realm. A destroyed Chinese satellite emitted tons of space debris into the atmosphere, followed by India destroying its own satellite and sending more trash to float around in our low Earth orbit. Agencies and public figures voiced disapproval of these reckless acts, but nothing was done on the international accountability level. This is especially shocking when we account for the fact that space debris the size of one single speck of paint has the power to bore a hole through the International Space Station. When SpaceX launched the Starlink satellite array, it was met with outrage from the astronomy community when astronomers found their work impeded by increased light pollution. But with no written standards in place to ensure the private space sector cooperates with science (except acts of good faith), nothing was done to protect the work of researchers. Then there was the case of the Beresheet, a private Israeli lunar lander, which crashed on the moon and spilled its cargo of a few thousand tardigrades in the process. The private mission was funded by the non-profit Arch Mission Foundation, an organization dedicated to creating “a backup of planet Earth.” The Beresheet lander was able to jump through all sorts of planetary protection hoops, because there were no laws in place to stop it. There were also no transparency rules in place, and some suggested that the private company that owned the spacecraft was unaware of the animals on board the craft. When the micro-animals, also known as water bears or moss piglets, were dumped into the atmosphere, there was no formal recourse to recover them, nor regulations in place to ensured the spacecraft was properly decontaminated. Again, the international community reacted with concern, and contemplated the state of international space affairs. But without recourse, no one had a good response. What we do on Earth, we take to space In Mauna Kea, Hawai’i, tensions flared between international science and cultural rights. Representatives of a telescope management company were granted permission by local native authorities to use the island for cutting-edge stellar research on the condition that they would pay rent to them, employ a certain number of people from their community to work in telescope operations, and ensure that native students were granted learning and intern opportunities. Unfortunately, the company parlayed this into a free pass to build an additional telescope, this time on a sacred site that was deemed off-limits by native law, and vital to the island’s ecosystem. When locals protested, they were met with resistance from police and military officials. The message: Scientific advances are more important and protected than human rights, especially when those humans are part of a marginalized community. The incident has sparked important discourse within the scientific community. But as of yet, there’s no sign of policy reform. New space colonies As space exploration advances, these ethical dilemmas are only going to become more complex and important. And yet, as I first stated, space remains peaceful. The United States still launches astronauts off Russian soil, utilizes Chinese and Iranian technologies, partners with Japan, Australia, Canada, many European countries, shares scientific endeavors with Latin America, and more. Perhaps this is because no one actually wants space to fall to one ideology, one method of governance, and one leadership. But can it last? Outer space as we know it exists at a precarious point in time. In today’s landscape of non-binding rules, technical advances, and outdated customs, silence has become an anxiety-inducing catalyst for even more of these precarious independent actions playing in outer space. Take the dismissive response to contamination on the Moon and Mars. Utilizing the “barren” nature of the Moon, and dismissing its seemingly uninteresting environment (yes, it does have an environment) as a justification to further contaminate the atmosphere simply because we can is evidence that the harmful and painfully human ideals of colonialism are alive and well. It is also important to remember that even though the Moon is deemed “low-risk” for contamination by NASA’s Planetary Protection office, it is in fact being contaminated, according to our very limited range of understanding and technology. No matter how large a public pool is, there are rules against glass and liquids in the pool that can harm others that use it. Even amidst its barren-ness, ensuring that the Moon remains in a state that can be researched by all means ensuring it is not totally contaminated. Simply put, we don’t know what we don’t know. But we can put procedures in place to ensure we don’t get caught off guard by any major curveballs, and so that what we do explore is fair game. Explore on This is in no way to say that space exploration should come to a halt. I’ve come to appreciate the capabilities for speed and precision in innovation that the private sector brings to the table, and they are often my favorite people and projects to follow. In addition, space exploration and innovation in space is nothing if not risky, and it’s the risk that excites so many and keeps the industry alive. It’s certainly what excited me as a kid. I knew there would be a high chance of dying if I ever became an astronaut and became the first to set foot on Mars (which, for the record, I still want to do). And I it made me all the more determined to follow my dreams. But we need rules, regulations, and recourse for justice. And how can we achieve that if we have never succeeded in solving those issues on our own planet? The minute we launch into space, our human tendencies and ideologies are not magically left on Earth. Continuing space exploration without first dismantling institutionally oppressive systems on Earth, and without the understanding that any endeavor in space must be properly accounted for and insured by updated safety and protection procedures, is morally wrong. It disregards the rights of many communities to access space—communities that are not wealthy, or communities that do not share a similar economic system. If we don’t make changes, we will only continue to facilitate these harmful institutions that have thrived on earth for all of human history. To the richest, and the quickest, go the spoils. We have the capabilities and resources to update safety protocols that will avoid preventable mistakes. Recklessly and hastily moving forward into space without a framework in place for an international cooperative to prepare for these big unknowns is deeply irresponsible. Refusing to have the necessary conversation of why certain people feel colonization at any cost is a right, or why talks of colonization are inherently not diverse, is unjust. These things are no longer science fiction. We are well within our means to accomplish them. For the first time in history perhaps, we have the opportunity to begin to undo our ugly past and ensure space is accessible for everyone. If we want to create a truly sustainable and responsible space environment, we must ensure that our efforts are transparent, ethical, and inclusive, and that we fully understand our historical tendencies as wealthy nations with an affinity for capitalism. Refusing to make changes today will only guarantee that we continue to facilitate the ills of humanity in a field that fully has the potential to bring out the very best in us.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Transparent coop in space key refusal of colonialism and ethical norms—turns the k</h4><p><u><strong>Vidaurri 10/24- </u></strong>(Monica, Astrobiologist, policy and ethics specialist, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, 10/24/19, “Humans will ruin outer space just like they’ve ruined everything else”, https://qz.com/1734103/will-people-go-to-space-and-then-colonize-it/<u><strong>, date accessed-10/24/19)</p><p>Space exploration</u></strong>, as I see it, <u><strong>is the last true peaceful international collaboration on Earth</u></strong>. I understand this claim is bound to invoke some scoffs from readers—the Cold War space race, for one, was characterized by serious military tensions between the US and the Soviet Union. But for those of us who work in the field, <u><strong>space <mark>exploration requires</mark> an understanding that <mark>no </mark>one </u></strong>person, space agency, or <u><strong><mark>nation alone can</mark> authoritatively <mark>define our place</mark> in the universe</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Because no entity can claim any part of the cosmos</mark> for themselves,</u></strong> outer <u><strong><mark>space is the perfect place to demonstrate</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>we can respect</mark> universal </u></strong>(literally) <u><strong><mark>human rights</mark> </u></strong>for all of Earth’s people. Given that thought, the <u><strong>level of international coop</u></strong>eration <u><strong>is remarkable if we take into account just how precarious</u></strong> the field of <u><strong>space law </u></strong>and policy truly <u><strong>is</u></strong>. Especially if we consider the nearly non-existent and fragile landscape of international space law. But <u><strong>my optimism comes with a caveat. When it comes to</u></strong> an industry as young as <u><strong><mark>space</u></strong></mark> exploration, is <u><strong>important to recognize <mark>colonization</mark>, imperialism, and exploitation </u></strong>as not just a series of major historical events that humanity is still recovering from, <u><strong>but as things that <mark>can</mark> conceivably <mark>inspire</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong>future <mark>laws</mark> that <mark>will determine our fate in space</mark>. Colonization</u></strong> and exploitation <u><strong>define</u></strong> our <u><strong>major institutions</u></strong>, and are engrained <u><strong>in western society.</u></strong> They persists in science. <u><strong>And <mark>unless we make changes, they will persist in</u></strong></mark> outer <u><strong><mark>space</mark> as well</u></strong>. Spacing out <u><strong>In</u></strong> 19<u><strong>98</u></strong>, <u><strong>several nations signed a treaty into effect called the I</u></strong>ntergovernmental <u><strong>A</u></strong>greement on <u><strong>S</u></strong>pace <u><strong>S</u></strong>tation <u><strong>C</u></strong>ooperation. <u><strong>But since then, nothing substantial has been done to implement an international infrastructure to ensure accountability and</u></strong> planetary protection, safety, and <u><strong>ethics</u></strong> <u><strong>standards</u></strong>. <u><strong>Space <mark>exploration</u></strong></mark>—like most other major events in human history—<u><strong><mark>will only become</mark> even <mark>more susceptible to</mark> </u></strong>imperialism<u><strong>, <mark>colonialism</u></strong></mark>, and general selfishness of our past <u><strong><mark>should it continue</u></strong></mark> to remain <u><strong><mark>unchecked by</mark> any kind of <mark>system of accountability, collaboration, or transparency.</mark> </u></strong>Because of this, <u><strong>we see events play out in space that would almost surely be ruled violations if they were carried out in the terrestrial realm. </u></strong>A <u><strong>destroyed Chinese satellite emitted tons of</u></strong> space <u><strong>debris</u></strong> into the atmosphere, <u><strong>followed by India destroying its own satellite and sending more trash</u></strong> to float around in our low Earth orbit. Agencies and <u><strong>public</u></strong> figures voiced <u><strong>disapproval of these</u></strong> reckless <u><strong>acts, but nothing was done on the international accountability level.</u></strong> This is especially shocking when we account for the fact that space debris the size of one single speck of paint has the power to bore a hole through the International Space Station. When SpaceX launched the Starlink satellite array, it was met with outrage from the astronomy community when astronomers found their work impeded by increased light pollution. But with no written standards in place to ensure the private space sector cooperates with science (except acts of good faith), nothing was done to protect the work of researchers. Then there was the case of the Beresheet, a private Israeli lunar lander, which crashed on the moon and spilled its cargo of a few thousand tardigrades in the process. The private mission was funded by the non-profit Arch Mission Foundation, an organization dedicated to creating “a backup of planet Earth.” The Beresheet lander was able to jump through all sorts of planetary protection hoops, because there were no laws in place to stop it. There were also no transparency rules in place, and some suggested that the private company that owned the spacecraft was unaware of the animals on board the craft. When the micro-animals, also known as water bears or moss piglets, were dumped into the atmosphere, there was no formal recourse to recover them, nor regulations in place to ensured the spacecraft was properly decontaminated. Again, the international community reacted with concern, and contemplated the state of international space affairs. But without recourse, no one had a good response. What we do on Earth, we take to space <u><strong>In</u></strong> Mauna Kea, <u><strong>Hawai’i, tensions flared between international science and cultural rights</u></strong>. <u><strong>Representatives of a telescope management company were granted permission by local native authorities to use the island for</u></strong> cutting-edge <u><strong>stellar research</u></strong> on the condition that they would pay rent to them, employ a certain number of people from their community to work in telescope operations, and ensure that native students were granted learning and intern opportunities. <u><strong>Unfortunately, the company parlayed this into a free pass to build an additional telescope</u></strong>, this time <u><strong>on a sacred site</u></strong> that was <u><strong>deemed off-limits by native law</u></strong>, and vital to the island’s ecosystem. When locals protested, they were met with resistance from police and military officials. The message: Scientific advances are more important and protected than human rights, especially when those humans are part of a marginalized community. The <u><strong>incident has sparked important discourse within the scientific community. But</u></strong> as of yet, there’s <u><strong>no sign of policy reform. </u></strong>New space colonies As space exploration advances, these ethical dilemmas are only going to become more complex and important. And yet, as I first stated, space remains peaceful. The United States still launches astronauts off Russian soil, utilizes Chinese and Iranian technologies, partners with Japan, Australia, Canada, many European countries, shares scientific endeavors with Latin America, and more. Perhaps this is because no one actually wants space to fall to one ideology, one method of governance, and one leadership. But can it last? <u><strong>Outer <mark>space</mark> as we know it <mark>exists at a precarious </mark>point in <mark>time</mark>. In <mark>today’s landscape of</mark> <mark>non-binding rules, tech</mark>nical <mark>advances, and outdated customs, silence</mark> has <mark>become</mark> an anxiety-inducing <mark>catalyst for even more</mark> of these <mark>precarious independent actions</mark> playing in outer space. Take</u></strong> the <u><strong>dismissive response to contamination on the Moon</u></strong> and Mars. Utilizing the “barren” nature of the Moon, and dismissing its seemingly uninteresting environment (yes, it does have an environment) as a justification to further contaminate the atmosphere simply because we can is <u><strong>evidence</u></strong> that the harmful and painfully <u><strong>human ideals of colonialism are alive and well. </u></strong>It is also important to remember that even though the Moon is deemed “low-risk” for contamination by NASA’s Planetary Protection office, it is in fact being contaminated, according to our very limited range of understanding and technology. No matter how large a public pool is, there are rules against glass and liquids in the pool that can harm others that use it. Even amidst its barren-ness, ensuring that the Moon remains in a state that can be researched by all means ensuring it is not totally contaminated. Simply put, we don’t know what we don’t know. But we can put procedures in place to ensure we don’t get caught off guard by any major curveballs, and so that what we do explore is fair game. Explore on This is in no way to say that space exploration should come to a halt. I’ve come to appreciate the capabilities for speed and precision in innovation that the private sector brings to the table, and they are often my favorite people and projects to follow. In addition, space exploration and innovation in space is nothing if not risky, and it’s the risk that excites so many and keeps the industry alive. It’s certainly what excited me as a kid. I knew there would be a high chance of dying if I ever became an astronaut and became the first to set foot on Mars (which, for the record, I still want to do). And I it made me all the more determined to follow my dreams. But <u><strong>we need rules, regulations, and recourse for justice</u></strong>. And how can we achieve that if we have never succeeded in solving those issues on our own planet? The minute we launch into space, our human tendencies and ideologies are not magically left on Earth. <u><strong><mark>Continuing</u></strong></mark> space <u><strong><mark>exploration</u></strong></mark> without first dismantling institutionally oppressive systems on Earth, and <u><strong><mark>without</u></strong></mark> the understanding that any endeavor in space must be properly accounted for and insured by <u><strong>updated <mark>safety and protection procedures, is </mark>morally <mark>wrong.</mark> </u></strong>It disregards the rights of many communities to access space—communities that are not wealthy, or communities that do not share a similar economic system. <u><strong><mark>If we don’t make changes, we will</mark> only <mark>continue</mark> to facilitate</u></strong> these <u><strong><mark>harmful institutions</mark> that have thrived on earth for all of human history</u></strong>. To the richest, and the quickest, go the spoils. <u><strong>We have</u></strong> the capabilities and <u><strong>resources to update safety protocols that will avoid</u></strong> preventable <u><strong>mistakes</u></strong>. Recklessly and <u><strong>hastily <mark>moving</u></strong></mark> forward <u><strong>into space <mark>without a framework</u></strong></mark> in place <u><strong><mark>for</mark> an <mark>international coop</u></strong></mark>erative to prepare for these big unknowns <u><strong><mark>is</mark> deeply <mark>irresponsible</mark>. </u></strong>Refusing to have the necessary conversation of why certain people feel colonization at any cost is a right, or why talks of colonization are inherently not diverse, is unjust. These things are no longer science fiction. We are well within our means to accomplish them. <u><strong>For the first time in history</u></strong> perhaps, <u><strong><mark>we have </mark>the <mark>opportunity to </mark>begin to <mark>undo </mark>our <mark>ugly past</mark> <mark>and ensure space </mark>is <mark>access</mark>ible<mark> for everyone</mark>.</u></strong> If we want to create a truly sustainable and responsible space environment, <u><strong>we must <mark>ensure</u></strong></mark> that our <u><strong><mark>efforts are transparent, ethical, and inclusive</u></strong></mark>, and that we fully understand our historical tendencies as wealthy nations with an affinity for capitalism. <u><strong><mark>Refusing</mark> to make <mark>changes</u></strong></mark> today <u><strong><mark>will</mark> only <mark>guarantee</mark> that <mark>we continue to facilitate</mark> the <mark>ills of humanity</mark> in a field that fully has the potential to bring out the very best in us.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: 1AC Author Afkhami 13 Rehighlighted (Amir, Assistant Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, and of Global Health, at George Washington University, "How Iran won the war on drugs," http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139095/amir-a-afkhami/how-iran-won-the-war-on-drugs) fulltext: He was right. The failure of international forces in Afghanistan to curb the narcotics trade presents one of the gravest threats to the country’s long-term stability and security. Even though the U.S.-led coalition has spent more than $6 billion on stopping drug shipments, creating incentives for farmers to exchange poppies for other crops, and disrupting illicit financial networks over the past decade, Afghanistan remains the world’s largest supplier of heroin and other illegal opiates. In NATO countries alone, Afghan narcotics cause more than 10,000 heroin-overdose deaths per year — making them far deadlier than the munitions that have claimed the lives of approximately 3,200 coalition personnel since the start of the war. Meanwhile, needle-sharing among intravenous drug users has led to an explosion of HIV infections from the Russian heartland to communities in the Baltics and Eastern Europe. The Afghan drug trade presents a unique threat to international security, since it has created unlikely bedfellows out of ideologically divergent terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah, which has its hands in narcotics transport and financing from Lebanon to South America, and the Taliban, which controls production. Within Afghanistan, the drug trade provides the funding for the ongoing insurgency and perpetuates a culture of impunity and corruption — major impediments to the establishment of good governance and a healthy civil society. Furthermore, from a public health standpoint, the skyrocketing rate of drug addiction there has created a potentially insurmountable challenge for the central government. A 2010 study by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported that roughly one million Afghans between the ages of 15 and 64 are addicted to narcotics, up from 860,000 in 2005. Afghanistan’s eight percent addiction rate among adults is twice as high as the global average. Most troubling, Afghans are turning to intravenous drug use in large numbers — heroin use increased by 140 percent between 2005 and 2010 alone. This raises the risk of lethal blood-borne diseases, including HIV/AIDS and hepatitis, which can be transmitted through shared needles. Left unchecked, Afghanistan’s growing HIV outbreak has the potential to upend the gains made since the Taliban era in limiting the death caused by infectious diseases. Since the U.S.-led antinarcotics efforts have made scant progress, it is time for Afghanistan to look to other models. As it turns out, neighboring Iran’s failures and successes in reducing both the demand for drugs and the harm they cause offer a good example. HOW TO STOP A PLAGUE For much of the twentieth century, Iran’s strategy for curbing drug addiction looked a lot like Afghanistan’s current one: stopping the flow of narcotics and destroying crops. When, in the early 1970s, it became clear that this method wasn’t working, Iranian authorities adopted policies that focused more on prevention and treatment, with promising results. But the 1979 revolution changed all that, and the Islamic government it brought to power implemented strict zero-tolerance narcotics laws. The regime, which saw drug use not as a medical or public health issue but as a moral shortcoming, believed that addiction and abuse could be beaten out of the public through punitive measures. Penalties for addicts included fining, imprisonment, and physical punishment; drug dealers and smugglers were often considered to be “at war with God” and executed. By the late 1980s, the government was sending thousands of addicts to prison camps, where they were supposed to detoxify and atone for their sins through forced labor. These draconian social measures against drug users and dealers were matched with similarly aggressive operations to prevent the flow of opiates across the border from Afghanistan. By the late 1980s, an estimated 50 percent of Afghan opiate production was passing through Iranian territory, and the Iranian markets were flooded with Afghan opium, heroin, and morphine. Starting in the early 1990s, Tehran constructed more than 260 kilometers of static defenses — including concrete dams that blocked mountain passes, anti-vehicle berms, trenches, minefields, forts, and mountain towers — at a cost of over $80 million. By the late 1990s, more than 100,000 police officers, army troops, and Revolutionary Guardsmen were committed to antinarcotic operations. Yet both the social policies and the border fortifications were fruitless. Although the Iranian authorities seized nearly eight times the amount of narcotics in 1999 than they had in 1990, they could not keep up with the expansion of Afghan opium production, which rose in those years from approximately 1,500 metric tons to roughly 4,500. Iran also found that the number of intravenous drug users was growing. Ironically, the prisons and camps where addicts were expected to kick their habits became epicenters of drug use, in which people learned how to inject heroin and shared primitive infection-prone needles. The rise in malignant drug use brought with it more deaths, more cases of addiction, and, most embarrassingly for Iran’s leaders, a full-blown HIV/AIDS epidemic. After years of blaming the West’s moral turpitude and decadence for the virus, Iran’s leadership had to face an outbreak at home, fueled by its own failed antinarcotic policy. By the late 1990s, in some provinces, double-digit percentages of heroin users were falling prey to the disease. In 2005, biological surveillance data from the Kermanshah province showed a 13.5 percent HIV prevalence rate among the adult prison population. These setbacks prompted a complete turnaround in Iran’s approach to fighting narcotics. Instead of focusing on punishing addicts and trying to stop the drug supply, Iran decided to try to reduce the harm of narcotics and the demand for them. By 2002, over 50 percent of the country’s drug-control budget was dedicated to preventive public health campaigns, such as advertisement and education. Iran’s conservative and previously intransigent leadership opened narcotics outpatient treatment centers and abstinence-based residential centers in Tehran and the provinces. The Islamic Republic also began to allow nongovernmental organizations to launch their own prevention and treatment efforts. The government began to implicitly support needle-exchange programs, going so far as to encourage the distribution of clean needles in the Iranian prison system. Gradually, the road was paved for methadone maintenance treatment centers and clinics that dispensed locally produced opium pills, in a bid to turn injection drug users into medicated patients. In making this shift, Iran sought not only to halt the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic but also to reduce the demand for illicit narcotics and to reintegrate drug users back into the economy. These new measures began to show results: the number of new HIV cases among intravenous drug users dropped from a high of 3,111 in 2004 to 1,585 in 2010. This trend was particularly notable among Iran’s prison population, which witnessed a drop in HIV prevalence from a high of 7.92 percent in 1998 to a low of 1.51 percent in 2007. Additionally, in areas where the country set up harm-reduction programs, improvements were observed in addicts’ life expectancies and psychological well-being, coupled with an overall reduction in the illicit consumption of opiates. INTERVENING IN AFGHANISTAN Iran’s experience is particularly instructive for Afghanistan; both are Islamic republics that are inclined to see drug addiction through a religious prism. Yet the Iranians demonstrated that it is possible to overcome this inclination and to view drug use primarily as a public health issue. Going forward, the United States and other donor countries need to encourage Kabul to take a page out of the Iranian playbook and adopt a broader, medically oriented approach to its drug problem. In the past several years, several European organizations have begun to train Afghans in harm reduction strategies. Médecins du Monde, a French nongovernmental organization, has established a handful of methadone treatment centers to treat HIV-positive patients with antiretrovirals in addition to caring for intravenous drug users. These efforts, however, have run up against inadequate funding and significant ideological barriers within Afghanistan’s strictly conservative government. Moreover, powerful members of President Hamid Karzai’s ruling clique still have financial stakes in the poppy trade, and are therefore unenthusiastic about such efforts. But as Iran’s experience shows, the only way to actually drive down drug use and contain its negative effects is to focus on prevention and treatment. To make this shift, Afghanistan should start by creating a drug-oriented policymaking body that could operate outside the corrupting confines of the Afghan government. For this measure to succeed, the international forces in the country would need to move beyond their counterproductive focus on crop exchanges and interdiction. Western investments in Afghan counternarcotic efforts should emphasize education, treatment, and reducing the overall demand for the drugs. If these efforts fail, much of the international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan will have been for naught: the country will remain a dangerous narco-state, home to a devastating public health epidemic, and an exporter of addiction and death to the rest of the world.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>No internal link to Afghan stability- 1AC Afkhami evidence cites a laundry list of additional measures that need to be taken for Afghanistan to reform its approach in the 8pt font- this piece of evidence makes zero modeling claim </h4><p><strong>1AC Author Afkhami 13 Rehighlighted</strong> (Amir, Assistant Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, and of Global Health, at George Washington University, "How Iran won the war on drugs," http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139095/amir-a-afkhami/how-iran-won-the-war-on-drugs)</p><p>He was right. <u>The failure of</u> international <u>forces in Afghanistan to curb the narcotics trade presents <strong>one of the gravest threats to the country’s long-term stability and security</u></strong>. Even though the U.S.-led coalition has spent more than $6 billion on stopping drug shipments, creating incentives for farmers to exchange poppies for other crops, and disrupting illicit financial networks over the past decade, Afghanistan remains the world’s largest supplier of heroin and other illegal opiates. In NATO countries alone, Afghan narcotics cause more than 10,000 heroin-overdose deaths per year — making them far deadlier than the munitions that have claimed the lives of approximately 3,200 coalition personnel since the start of the war. Meanwhile, needle-sharing among intravenous drug users has led to an explosion of HIV infections from the Russian heartland to communities in the Baltics and Eastern Europe. <u>The Afghan drug trade presents a unique threat to international security</u>, since <u>it has created unlikely bedfellows out of ideologically divergent terrorist organizations</u>, such as Hezbollah, which has its hands in narcotics transport and financing from Lebanon to South America, and the Taliban, which controls production. <u>Within Afghanistan, the drug trade provides the funding for the ongoing insurgency and perpetuates a culture of impunity and corruption</u> — <u>major impediments to</u> the establishment of <u>good governance and</u> a healthy <u>civil society</u>. Furthermore, from a public health standpoint, <u>the skyrocketing rate of drug addiction</u> there <u>has created a potentially insurmountable challenge for the central government</u>. A 2010 study by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported that roughly one million Afghans between the ages of 15 and 64 are addicted to narcotics, up from 860,000 in 2005. Afghanistan’s eight percent addiction rate among adults is twice as high as the global average. Most troubling, Afghans are turning to intravenous drug use in large numbers — heroin use increased by 140 percent between 2005 and 2010 alone. <u>This raises the risk of lethal blood-borne diseases, including HIV/AIDS and hepatitis</u>, which can be transmitted through shared needles. Left unchecked, Afghanistan’s growing HIV outbreak has the potential to upend the gains made since the Taliban era in limiting the death caused by infectious diseases. Since the U.S.-led antinarcotics efforts have made scant progress, <u><strong>it is time for Afghanistan to look to other models</u></strong>. As it turns out, neighboring Iran’s failures and successes in reducing both the demand for drugs and the harm they cause offer a good example. HOW TO STOP A PLAGUE <u>For much of the twentieth century, Iran’s strategy for curbing drug addiction looked a lot like Afghanistan’s </u>current one: stopping the flow of narcotics and destroying crops. When, in the early 1970s, it became clear that this method wasn’t working, Iranian authorities adopted policies that focused more on prevention and treatment, with promising results. But the 1979 revolution changed all that, and the Islamic government it brought to power implemented strict zero-tolerance narcotics laws. The regime, which saw drug use not as a medical or public health issue but as a moral shortcoming, believed that addiction and abuse could be beaten out of the public through punitive measures. Penalties for addicts included fining, imprisonment, and physical punishment; drug dealers and smugglers were often considered to be “at war with God” and executed. By the late 1980s, the government was sending thousands of addicts to prison camps, where they were supposed to detoxify and atone for their sins through forced labor. These draconian social measures against drug users and dealers were matched with similarly aggressive operations to prevent the flow of opiates across the border from Afghanistan. By the late 1980s, an estimated 50 percent of Afghan opiate production was passing through Iranian territory, and the Iranian markets were flooded with Afghan opium, heroin, and morphine. Starting in the early 1990s, Tehran constructed more than 260 kilometers of static defenses — including concrete dams that blocked mountain passes, anti-vehicle berms, trenches, minefields, forts, and mountain towers — at a cost of over $80 million. By the late 1990s, more than 100,000 police officers, army troops, and Revolutionary Guardsmen were committed to antinarcotic operations. Yet both the social policies and the border fortifications were fruitless. Although the Iranian authorities seized nearly eight times the amount of narcotics in 1999 than they had in 1990, they could not keep up with the expansion of Afghan opium production, which rose in those years from approximately 1,500 metric tons to roughly 4,500. Iran also found that the number of intravenous drug users was growing. Ironically, the prisons and camps where addicts were expected to kick their habits became epicenters of drug use, in which people learned how to inject heroin and shared primitive infection-prone needles. The rise in malignant drug use brought with it more deaths, more cases of addiction, and, most embarrassingly for Iran’s leaders, a full-blown HIV/AIDS epidemic. After years of blaming the West’s moral turpitude and decadence for the virus, <u>Iran’s leadership had to face an outbreak at home, fueled by its own failed antinarcotic policy</u>. By the late 1990s, in some provinces, double-digit percentages of heroin users were falling prey to the disease. In 2005, biological surveillance data from the Kermanshah province showed a 13.5 percent HIV prevalence rate among the adult prison population. These <u>setbacks prompted a complete turnaround in Iran’s approach to fighting narcotics. Instead of focusing on punishing addicts and trying to stop the drug supply, Iran decided to try to reduce the harm of narcotics and the demand for them</u>. By 2002, <u>over 50 percent of the country’s drug-control budget was <strong>dedicated to preventive public health campaigns</u></strong>, such as advertisement and education. <mark>Iran’s conservative and previously intransigent leadership opened narcotics outpatient treatment centers and abstinence-based residential centers in Tehran and the provinces. The Islamic Republic also began to allow nongovernmental organizations to launch their own prevention and treatment efforts</mark>. <u>The government began to implicitly support <mark>needle-exchange programs</u></mark>, going so far as <mark>to encourage the distribution of clean needles in the Iranian prison system.</mark> Gradually, the road was paved for <mark>methadone maintenance treatment centers and clinics that dispensed</mark> locally produced <mark>opium pills</mark>, in a bid to turn injection drug users into medicated patients. In making this shift, <u>Iran sought not only to halt the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic but also to reduce the demand for illicit narcotics and to reintegrate drug users back into the economy</u>. <u>These new measures began to show results</u>: the number of new HIV cases among intravenous drug users dropped from a high of 3,111 in 2004 to 1,585 in 2010. This trend was particularly notable among Iran’s prison population, which witnessed a drop in HIV prevalence from a high of 7.92 percent in 1998 to a low of 1.51 percent in 2007. Additionally, <u><strong>in areas where the country set up harm-reduction programs</u></strong>, <u>improvements were observed in addicts’ life expectancies</u> and psychological well-being, <u>coupled with an overall reduction in</u> the <u>illicit consumption</u> of opiates. INTERVENING IN AFGHANISTAN <u>Iran’s experience is particularly instructive for Afghanistan</u>; both are Islamic republics that are inclined to see drug addiction through a religious prism. Yet the <u>Iranians demonstrated that it is possible to</u> overcome this inclination and to <u><strong>view drug use primarily as a public health issue</u></strong>. Going forward, <u><mark>the United States</u> and other donor countries <u>need to encourage Kabul</u> <u>to </u>take a page out of the Iranian playbook and <u><strong>adopt a broader, medically oriented approach to its drug problem</u></strong>.</mark> </p><p>In the past several years, several European organizations have begun to train Afghans in harm reduction strategies. Médecins du Monde, a French nongovernmental organization, has established a handful of methadone treatment centers to treat HIV-positive patients with antiretrovirals in addition to caring for intravenous drug users. These efforts, however, have run up against inadequate funding and significant ideological barriers within Afghanistan’s strictly conservative government. Moreover, powerful members of President Hamid Karzai’s ruling clique still have financial stakes in the poppy trade, and are therefore unenthusiastic about such efforts. But as Iran’s experience shows, the only way to actually drive down drug use and contain its negative effects is to focus on prevention and treatment. <mark>To make this shift, Afghanistan should start by creating a drug-oriented policymaking body that could operate outside the corrupting confines of the Afghan government. For this measure to succeed, the international forces in the country would need to move beyond their counterproductive focus on crop exchanges and interdiction. Western investments in Afghan counternarcotic efforts should emphasize education, treatment, and reducing the overall demand for the drugs.</mark> <u>If these efforts fail</u>, much of the international efforts to stabilize <u>Afghanistan</u> will have been for naught: the country <u><strong>will remain a dangerous narco-state</u></strong>, home to a devastating public health epidemic, <u><strong>and an exporter of addiction and death to the rest of the world</u></strong>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: James Andrew Lewis 18, senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, January 2018, “Rethinking Cybersecurity: Strategy, Mass Effect, and States,” https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/180108_Lewis_ReconsideringCybersecurity_Web.pdf, p. 7-11 fulltext: The most dangerous and damaging attacks required resources and engineering knowledge that are beyond the capabilities of nonstate actors, and those who possess such capabilities consider their use in the context of some larger strategy to achieve national goals. Precision and predictability—always desirable in offensive operations in order to provide assured effect and economy of force—suggest that the risk of collateral damage is smaller than we assume, and with this, so is the risk of indiscriminate or mass effect. State Use of Cyber Attack Is Consistent with Larger Strategic Aims Based on a review of state actions to date, cyber operations give countries a new way to implement existing policies rather than leading them to adopt new policy or strategies. State opponents use cyber techniques in ways consistent with their national strategies and objectives. But for now, cyber may be best explained as an addition to the existing portfolio of tools available to nations. Cyber operations are ideal for achieving the strategic effect our opponents seek in this new environment. How nations use cyber techniques will be determined by their larger needs and interests, by their strategies, experience, and institutions, and by their tolerance for risk. Cyber operations provide unparalleled access to targets, and the only constraint on attackers is the risk of retaliation—a risk they manage by avoiding actions that would provoke a damaging response. This is done by staying below an implicit threshold on what can be considered the use of force in cyberspace. The reality of cyber attack differs greatly from our fears. Analysts place a range of hypothetical threats, often accompanied by extreme consequences, before the public without considering the probability of occurrence or the likelihood that opponents will choose a course of action that does not advance their strategic aims and creates grave risk of damaging escalation. Our opponents' goals are not to carry out a cyber 9/11. While there have been many opponent probes of critical infrastructure facilities in numerous countries, the number of malicious cyber actions that caused physical damage can be counted on one hand. While opponents have probed critical infrastructure networks, there is no indication that they are for the purposes of the kind of crippling strategic attacks against critical infrastructure that dominated planning in the Second World War or the Cold War. Similarly, the popular idea that opponents use cyber techniques to inflict cumulative economic harm is not supported by evidence. Economic warfare has always been part of conflict, but there are no examples of a country seeking to imperceptibly harm the economy of an opponent. The United States engaged in economic warfare during the Cold War, and still uses sanctions as a tool of foreign power, but few if any other nations do the same. The intent of cyber espionage is to gain market or technological advantage. Coercive actions against government agencies or companies are intended to intimidate. Terrorists do not seek to inflict economic damage. The difficulty of wreaking real harm on large, interconnected economies is usually ignored. Economic warfare in cyberspace is ascribed to China, but China's cyber doctrine has three elements: control of cyberspace to preserve party rule and political stability, espionage (both commercial and military), and preparation for disruptive acts to damage an opponent's weapons, military information systems, and command and control. "Strategic" uses, such as striking civilian infrastructure in the opponent's homeland, appear to be a lower priority and are an adjunct to nuclear strikes as part of China's strategic deterrence. Chinese officials seem more concerned about accelerating China's growth rather than some long-term effort to undermine the American economy.6 The 2015 agreement with the United States served Chinese interests by centralizing tasking authority in Beijing and ending People's Liberation Army (PLA) "freelancing" against commercial targets. The Russians specialize in coercion, financial crime, and creating harmful cognitive effect—the ability to manipulate emotions and decisionmaking. Under their 2010 military doctrine on disruptive information operations (part of what they call "New Generation Warfare"). Russians want confusion, not physical damage. Iran and North Korea use cyber actions against American banks or entertainment companies like Sony or the Sands Casino, but their goal is political coercion, not destruction. None of these countries talk about death by 1000 cuts or attacking critical infrastructure to produce a cyber Pearl Harbor or any of the other scenarios that dominate the media. The few disruptive attacks on critical infrastructure have focused almost exclusively on the energy sector. Major financial institutions face a high degree of risk but in most cases, the attackers' intent is to extract money. There have been cases of service disruption and data erasure, but these have been limited in scope. Denial-of-service attacks against banks impede services and may be costly to the targeted bank, but do not have a major effect on the national economy. In all of these actions, there is a line that countries have been unwilling to cross. When our opponents decided to challenge American "hegemony," they developed strategies to circumvent the risks of retaliation or escalation by ensuring that their actions stayed below the use-of-force threshold—an imprecise threshold, roughly defined by international law, but usually considered to involve actions that produce destruction or casualties. Almost all cyber attacks fall below this threshold, including, crime, espionage, and politically coercive acts. This explains why the decades-long quest to rebuild Cold War deterrence in cyberspace has been fruitless. It also explains why we have not seen the dreaded cyber Pearl Harbor or other predicted catastrophes. Opponents are keenly aware that launching catastrophe brings with it immense risk of receiving catastrophe in return. States are the only actors who can carry out catastrophic cyber attacks and they are very unlikely to do so in a strategic environment that seeks to gain advantage without engaging in armed conflict. Decisions on targets and attack make sense only when embedded in their larger strategic calculations regarding how best to fight with the United States. There have been thousands of incidents of cybercrime and cyber espionage, but only a handful of true attacks, where the intent was not to extract information or money, but to disrupt and, in a few cases, destroy. From these incidents, we can extract a more accurate picture of risk. The salient incidents are the cyber operations against Iran's nuclear weapons facility (Stuxnet), Iran's actions against Aramco and leading American banks, North Korean interference with Sony and with South Korean banks and television stations, and Russian actions against Estonia, Ukrainian power facilities, Canal 5 (television network in France), and the 2016 U S. presidential elections. Cyber attacks are not random. All of these incidents have been part of larger geopolitical conflicts involving Iran, Korea, and the Ukraine, or Russia's contest with the United States and NATO. There are commonalities in each attack. All were undertaken by state actors or proxy forces to achieve the attacking state's policy objectives. Only two caused tangible damage; the rest created coercive effect, intended to create confusion and psychological pressure through fear, uncertainty, and embarrassment. In no instance were there deaths or casualties. In two decades of cyber attacks, there has never been a single casualty. This alone should give pause to the doomsayers. Nor has there been widespread collateral damage.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>1. No cyber impact---every scenario is empirically denied </h4><p>James Andrew <strong>Lewis 18</strong>, senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, January 2018, “Rethinking Cybersecurity: Strategy, Mass Effect, and States,” https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/180108_Lewis_ReconsideringCybersecurity_Web.pdf<u>, p. 7-11</p><p>The most dangerous and damaging attacks required resources and engineering knowledge that are <strong>beyond the capabilities of nonstate actors</u></strong>, <u>and those who possess such capabilities consider their use in the context of some larger strategy to achieve national goals</u>. <u>Precision and predictability</u>—always desirable in offensive operations in order to provide assured effect and economy of force—<u>suggest that the risk of collateral damage is smaller than we assume,</u> and with this, <u>so is the risk of indiscriminate or mass effect. </p><p>State Use of Cyber Attack Is Consistent with Larger Strategic Aims </p><p></u>Based on a review of state actions to date, <u>cyber operations give countries a new way to implement existing policies rather than leading them to adopt new policy or strategies.</u> State opponents use cyber techniques in ways consistent with their national strategies and objectives. But for now, <u>cyber may be best explained as an addition to the existing portfolio of tools available to nations. </p><p></u>Cyber operations are ideal for achieving the strategic effect our opponents seek in this new environment. How nations use cyber techniques will be determined by their larger needs and interests, by their strategies, experience, and institutions, and by their tolerance for risk. <u>Cyber operations provide unparalleled access to targets, and the only constraint on attackers is the <strong>risk of retaliation</u></strong>—<u>a risk they manage by <strong>avoiding actions that would provoke</strong> a damaging response</u>. <u>This is done by staying below an implicit threshold on what can be considered the use of force in cyberspace. </p><p><strong>The reality of cyber attack differs greatly from our fears</u></strong>. Analysts place a range of hypothetical threats, often accompanied by extreme consequences, before the public without considering the probability of occurrence or the likelihood that opponents will choose a course of action that does not advance their strategic aims and creates grave risk of damaging escalation. <u>Our opponents' goals are not to carry out a cyber 9/11</u>. While there have been many opponent probes of critical infrastructure facilities in numerous countries, <u>the number of malicious cyber actions that caused physical damage can be <strong>counted on one hand</u></strong>. <u>While opponents have probed critical infrastructure networks, there is no indication that they are for the purposes of the kind of crippling strategic attacks against critical infrastructure</u> that dominated planning in the Second World War or the Cold War. </p><p>Similarly, <u>the popular idea that opponents use cyber techniques to inflict cumulative economic harm is not supported by evidence. Economic warfare has always been part of conflict, but there are no examples of a country seeking to imperceptibly harm the economy of an opponent</u>. The United States engaged in economic warfare during the Cold War, and still uses sanctions as a tool of foreign power, but few if any other nations do the same. The intent of cyber espionage is to gain market or technological advantage. Coercive actions against government agencies or companies are intended to intimidate. <u><strong>Terrorists do not seek to inflict economic damage</u></strong>. <u>The difficulty of wreaking real harm on large, interconnected economies is usually ignored</u>.</p><p><u>Economic warfare in cyberspace is ascribed to China, but</u> China's cyber doctrine has three elements: control of cyberspace to preserve party rule and political stability, espionage (both commercial and military), and preparation for disruptive acts to damage an opponent's weapons, military information systems, and command and control. <u>"Strategic" uses, such as striking civilian infrastructure in the opponent's homeland, appear to be a lower priority and are an adjunct to nuclear strikes as part of China's strategic deterrence.</u> <u>Chinese officials seem more concerned about accelerating China's growth rather than some long-term effort to undermine the American economy</u>.6 The 2015 agreement with the United States served Chinese interests by centralizing tasking authority in Beijing and ending People's Liberation Army (PLA) "freelancing" against commercial targets. </p><p><u>The Russians specialize in coercion, financial crime, and creating harmful cognitive effect</u>—the ability to manipulate emotions and decisionmaking. Under their 2010 military doctrine on disruptive information operations (part of what they call "New Generation Warfare"). <u><strong>Russians want confusion, not physical damage</strong>. Iran and <strong>No</strong>rth <strong>Ko</strong>rea use cyber actions against American banks or entertainment companies like Sony or the Sands Casino, but their goal is political coercion, not destruction.<strong> </p><p></strong>None of these countries talk about death by 1000 cuts or attacking critical infrastructure</u> to produce a cyber Pearl Harbor or any of the other scenarios that dominate the media. The few disruptive attacks on critical infrastructure have focused almost exclusively on the energy sector. <u>Major financial institutions face a high degree of risk but in most cases, the attackers' intent is to extract money</u>. <u>There have been cases of service disruption and data erasure, but these have been <strong>limited</strong> in scope. Denial-of-service attacks against banks impede services and may be costly to the targeted bank, but <strong>do not have a major effect on the national economy</u></strong>. In all of these actions, <u>there is a line that countries have been unwilling to cross. </p><p>When our opponents decided to challenge American "hegemony," they developed strategies to circumvent the risks of retaliation or escalation by ensuring that their actions stayed below the use-of-force threshold</u>—an imprecise threshold, roughly defined by international law, but usually considered to involve actions that produce destruction or casualties. <u><strong>Almost all cyber attacks fall below this threshold, including, crime, espionage, and politically coercive acts</strong>. This explains why the decades-long quest to rebuild Cold War deterrence in cyberspace has been fruitless. </p><p>It also explains why we have not seen the dreaded cyber Pearl Harbor or other predicted catastrophes.</u> <u>Opponents are keenly aware that launching catastrophe brings with it immense risk of receiving catastrophe in return</u>. <u>States are the only actors who can carry out catastrophic cyber attacks and they are <strong>very unlikely</strong> to do so in a strategic environment that seeks to gain advantage without engaging in armed conflict</u>. Decisions on targets and attack make sense only when embedded in their larger strategic calculations regarding how best to fight with the United States. </p><p><u>There have been thousands of incidents of cybercrime and cyber espionage, but only a <strong>handful</strong> of true attacks, where the intent was not to extract information or money, but to disrupt and, in a few cases, destroy.</u> From these incidents, we can extract a more accurate picture of risk. The salient incidents are the cyber operations against Iran's nuclear weapons facility (Stuxnet), Iran's actions against Aramco and leading American banks, North Korean interference with Sony and with South Korean banks and television stations, and Russian actions against Estonia, Ukrainian power facilities, Canal 5 (television network in France), and the 2016 U S. presidential elections. <u><strong>Cyber attacks are not random</u></strong>. <u>All of these incidents have been part of larger geopolitical conflicts</u> involving Iran, Korea, and the Ukraine, or Russia's contest with the United States and NATO. </p><p><u>There are commonalities in each attack. All were undertaken by state actors or proxy forces to achieve the attacking state's policy objectives</u>. <u><strong>Only two caused tangible damage</u></strong>; the rest created coercive effect, intended to create confusion and psychological pressure through fear, uncertainty, and embarrassment. <u><strong>In no instance were there deaths or casualties</u></strong>. <u><strong>In two decades of cyber attacks, there has never been a single casualty</strong>. This alone should give pause to the doomsayers</u>. <u><strong>Nor has there been widespread collateral damage</u></strong>. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Ferrier 20 (Kyle Ferrier is a Fellow and Director of Academic Affairs at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI). He holds an MSc in international political economy from the London School of Economics and a BA in economics and government and international politics from George Mason University. Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs – Fall edition of the journal. Specific Date of August 21st, 2020 - #E&F - https://media.defense.gov/2020/Aug/21/2002482244/-1/-1/1/DO_FERRIER.PDF) fulltext: To be certain, both the pandemic and climate change have been on the US government’s radar—including the Department of Defense.27 But, given the impact of the current coronavirus outbreak and what it portends about the potential scope of future shocks to the system from nontraditional security issues, now is the time to critically rethink US foreign policy and defense priorities. This particularly holds true for the Indo-Pacific region, which will clearly play a major part in shaping the twenty-first century. In increasing attention to nontraditional security areas like health and climate as well as dialing back a blanket zero-sum approach toward Beijing, Washington would, in effect, be opening the door for more regional cooperation with Seoul. This would not be cooperation for its own sake; rather it would tangibly buttress US interests in the region, due to South Korea’s proven expertise and capability in these areas as well as its ability to facilitate and even lead discussion among regional partners. South Korea on Global Health How South Korea went from being the global epicenter of the COVID-19 outbreak in mid-February to zero locally transmitted cases by the beginning of May is one of the most significant bright spots of the global pandemic. The gov-ernment’s fast and broad efforts to contain the virus through testing and contact tracing helped to curb the spread of the virus after an explosion of new cases linked to a religious community in Daegu. Although there are concerns of a second outbreak after initial measures to reopen the country saw a jump in new cases, containment efforts do not seem to be losing steam. The ROK’s success, however, has far reaching implications beyond the peninsula. Seoul’s handling of COVID-19 has become one of the key models for countries around the world to follow, made all the more significant by how it is most often contrasted with Beijing’s efforts. Both countries have been able to dramatically limit new infections but have pursued very different paths. After initial measures to cover up the virus, the CCP’s enforced quarantines and quick buildup of health infrastructure has been touted as a triumph of the authoritarian system.28 Though there are clear holes in this narrative, it nonetheless raised questions about the efficacy of democratic political systems over authoritarian ones against the backdrop of retrenching democracy and pluralism around the world.29 The Moon administration’s response to the virus—emphasizing openness, transparency, and civic engagement—has been credited with limiting the impact of COVID-19 and held up as a model for effectively combating pandemics.30 As New York Times columnists Max Fisher and Choe Sang Hun summarized, there are four key takeaways from South Korea’s pandemic response: intervene fast, before it is a crisis; test early, often and safely; contract tracing isolation and surveillance; and enlist the public’s help.31 Additionally, South Korea’s accountable, competent bureaucracy, and transparent daily disclosure of COVID-19 cases further highlight how key democratic institutions can help successfully contain the virus. While it may already be too late for many countries to apply this model to the ongoing crisis, South Korea is taking an active leadership role to help others with COVID-19, both within the region and around the world. As South Korea’s experience has proven the importance of testing for the disease in ultimately containing it, Seoul is actively working to send its diagnostic tests abroad. Faced with mounting demand from foreign governments, the Moon administration has actively engaged with private local producers of COVID-19 testing kits to help support exports.32 These efforts have largely been fruitful. In March, South Korea sent around 24 million USD worth of test kits overseas, expanding to just over 200 million USD in exports in April.33 Tests have so far been exported to 117 countries, including those in the Indo-Pacific region, such as Vietnam, China, Australia, and Thailand.34 More than just through commercial sales, Seoul is also striving to donate tests to important partner countries with less domestic capacity to handle the virus. Within the region, this has notably in-cluded the donation of 50,000 kits to Jakarta through the South Korean conglomerate LG and its manufacturing operations in Indonesia.35 Beyond bilateral cooperation, South Korea has also played an active role in helping to coordinate multilateral responses to the virus in light of limited leadership elsewhere. Whereas the G-20 served as the main focus of multilateral cooperation during the global financial crisis, the institution has been slow to muster a strong, collective response in the face of COVID-19—at least in part due to the China–US rivalry.36 For its part, South Korea has been actively working with other international institutions to stem the growth of the disease. In early May, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Park Han-ki spoke with NATO leadership to discuss cooperation on the pandemic.37 Around the same time, Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-hwa spoke with the South Korean envoys to major international organizations, such as the UN and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, emphasizing the importance of multilateralism and asking them to utilize the country’s success in managing the virus to help build on this cooperation.38 Seoul’s leadership has also been clear at the regional level through ASEAN+3— consisting of ASEAN members, China, Japan, and South Korea. In a special ASEAN+3 summit on 14 April, Moon expressed South Korea’s full support for ASEAN and that his government would be looking to utilize the ASEAN-ROK Cooperation Fund—totaling over 110 million USD—to help combat COVID-19.39 Moon also stressed the importance of keeping the flow of economic and people-to-people exchanges open.40 Perhaps the most noteworthy acclaim for the South Korean government’s response has come from UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres. During a press conference in late April, Guterres praised South Korea for not only its handling of COVID-19 but also its continued emphasis on climate change—stating the country is a “remarkable example” of how “the two things can be put together.”41 Indeed, South Korea’s approach to climate change—both prior to the pandemic and its plans for after—suggests that it will have an important role to play on the regional and global stages in the near future. South Korea on Climate Change South Korean leaders from both ends of the political spectrum have pursued policies to limit the country’s carbon footprint in recent decades. Former president Lee Myung-bak was one of the first world leaders to embrace “green growth” as a development strategy, when he was elected in 2008. During the 2008 global financial crisis, 80 percent of the government’s fiscal stimulus plan went to green growth projects. The Lee administration also initiated a Five-Year Plan in 2009, committing 2 percent of annual GDP to strengthening the use of sustainable technologies, such as goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 30 percent through 2020.42 These climate-conscious efforts were not just limited to the peninsula. Lee’s Global Green Growth Institute was launched in 2010 and, only two years later, was transformed into an international treaty-based organization.43 The current Moon administration has taken a similar path on climate. The cornerstone of Moon’s efforts is his Renewable Energy 3020 Plan, intended to increase the renewable energy portion of the country’s energy consumption from where it currently stands—nearly 8 percent—to 20 percent by 2030.44 Of course, this is not without its challenges, as South Korea faces an uphill battle in moving away from coal.45 But, there is some early evidence to suggest that the general public is willing to accept the trade-off of higher prices in exchange for the benefits of renewables.46 The outcome of the National Assembly election in April stands to make the country’s turn toward fighting climate change all the sharper. The big victory for Moon’s Democratic Party, winning a majority of seats, has provided them with the political space to pursue their platform of enacting a “Green New Deal.”47 Released in the leadup to the election, the plan aspires to make South Korea carbon neutral by 2050, the first pledge of its kind in East Asia. To meet its ambitious goals, the plan includes large investments in renewable energy, the creation of a carbon tax, and the establishment of center to help workers transition to green jobs.48 Though there is still much work ahead in terms of implementation, that South Korea could be the first country in Asia to enact sweeping climate-oriented policies amid the pandemic is certainly noteworthy. Much as Lee proved over a decade ago, South Korea would be showing other leaders in the region that it is possible to still incorporate climate into efforts designed to fight the current crisis. More than just a model, however, the current inflection point provides an opportunity to build on South Korea’s existing cooperation within the Indo-Pacific on climate change.49 It is not just the ROK’s values, expertise, and emphasis on diplomacy that make it an attractive partner for countries in the region and, therefore, an indispensable actor for Washington. South Korea’s position in the Indo-Pacific allows it to be seen as a more impartial player, which comes with its own set of advantages. South Korea as a More Neutral Regional Middle Power and Facilitator The structural limitations South Korea faces can also be seen to provide key structural benefits. While the regional balance of power places clear boundaries on Seoul’s ability to more openly engage in efforts to counter Beijing, these same dynamics endow South Korea with less political baggage for partners in the Indo-Pacific. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the enduring Sino–Japanese rivalry in the region tint cooperation with Beijing and Tokyo in a way that does not affect Seoul. Additionally, South Korea’s efforts to shape itself as a middle power, both on the global and regional stages, has cemented its position as an effective diplomatic convenor. Over the past two decades, each South Korean president has undertaken their own respective approaches to building the country’s middle-power image. Starting in the early 2000s, Roh Moo-hyun conceptualized South Korea as a regional balancer between China and Japan, also serving as a hub for security and economic cooperation. President Lee’s agenda looked beyond the region under the “Global Korea” slogan and operationalized South Korea’s middle-power role through international institutions, most notably the G20.50 Though the country’s middle-power branding faltered under Park Geun-hye’s agenda of “Trustpolitik,” Moon’s NSP can be seen as an extension of previous middle-power pursuits in the Indo-Pacific region.51 One of the clearest examples of the efficacy of South Korea’s middle-power diplomacy is enshrined in the regional financial governance. When ASEAN+3 countries were in talks to create a new multilateral currency swap arrangement after the 2008 financial crisis proved the existing Chiang Mai Initiative ineffectual, the rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo proved a considerable obstacle. With both sides vying for greater voting power than the other in the new organization, Seoul broke the deadlock by proposing a quota system that now forms the structure of the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization.52 China and Japan are on equal footing with the largest voting shares as the biggest would-be donors, South Korea’s quota amounts to half of what is allotted to each of its larger neighbors, and ASEAN members have various smaller quotas. South Korea’s commitment to mutually beneficial cooperation and serving as an honest broker in the region shows no signs of letting up in the face of the pandemic. If anything, the country’s successes in managing the virus appears to be redoubling these commitments as previously highlighted. In the face of a worsening US–China rivalry, South Korea’s continued ability to fulfill this role is all the more important in light of diminishing goodwill and the need for coordination on key transborder issues like health and climate.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Seoul’s COVID coop is <u>succeeding</u>. That’ll reverse when they lose impartiality – Seoul’s appeal is key to avert <u>COVID spread</u> and <u>global democratic retrenchment</u><strong>. </h4><p>Ferrier 20 </strong>(Kyle Ferrier is a Fellow and Director of Academic Affairs at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI). He holds an MSc in international political economy from the London School of Economics and a BA in economics and government and international politics from George Mason University. Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs – Fall edition of the journal. Specific Date of August 21st, 2020 - #E&F - https://media.defense.gov/2020/Aug/21/2002482244/-1/-1/1/DO_FERRIER.PDF)</p><p>To be certain, both the pandemic and climate change have been on the US government’s radar—including the Department of Defense.27 But, <u><mark>given</mark> the impact of</u> the current <u><mark>corona</mark>virus </u>outbreak <u><strong><mark>and what it portends</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>about</mark> </u>the potential scope of <u><strong><mark>future shocks</mark> to the system</u></strong> from nontraditional security issues, <u><strong><mark>now is the time</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>to</mark> critically <mark>rethink US</u></mark> <u>foreign policy and</u> <u><mark>defense priorities</mark>.</u> <u><mark>This</mark> particularly <mark>holds</u></mark> true <u><strong><mark>for the Indo-Pacific</mark> region, </u></strong>which will clearly play a major part in shaping the twenty-first century. <u><mark>In </u></mark>increasing attention to nontraditional security areas like health and climate as well as <u><strong><mark>dialing back</mark> a blanket <mark>zero-sum approach toward Beijing</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>Washington would</u></mark>, <u><strong>in effect</strong>,</u> be <u><strong><mark>open</u></strong></mark>ing <u><strong><mark>the door</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>for</mark> more <strong><mark>regional </strong>coop</u></mark>eration <u><strong><mark>with Seoul</mark>.</u></strong> This would not be cooperation for its own sake; rather it would tangibly buttress US interests in the region, due to South Korea’s proven expertise and capability in these areas as well as its ability to facilitate and even lead discussion among regional partners. <u><strong>South Korea on Global Health </strong><mark>How So</mark>uth<mark> Ko</mark>rea <mark>went from</u></mark> being <u><mark>the</mark> global <mark>epicenter of</u></mark> the <u><mark>COVID</u></mark>-19 outbreak in mid-February <u><strong><mark>to zero</mark> locally transmitted <mark>cases</mark> by</u></strong> the beginning of <u><strong>May</u></strong> <u><mark>is</u></mark> one of <u><mark>the</mark> most significant <mark>bright spot</u></mark>s <u><mark>of the</u></mark> <u>global <mark>pandemic</u></mark>. <u>The gov-ernment’s</u> <u>fast</u> and broad <u><mark>efforts to contain the virus</u></mark> through testing and contact tracing <u><mark>helped</u></mark> to <u><mark>curb</u></mark> the <u><mark>spread</u></mark> of the virus <u><strong>after an explosion of new cases</u></strong> linked to a religious community in Daegu. Although there are concerns of a second outbreak after initial measures to reopen the country saw a jump in new cases, containment efforts do not seem to be losing steam. <u><strong><mark>The ROK’s success</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>has</mark> far reaching <mark>implications beyond the peninsula</mark>.</strong> <mark>Seoul’s handling</mark> of COVID</u>-19 <u><mark>has become</mark> one of <mark>the <strong>key model</mark>s</u></strong> <u>for countries around the world <mark>to follow</u></mark>, <u>made</u> all the <u>more significant by how it is</u> most often <u><strong><mark>contrasted with Beijing’s</u></strong></mark> efforts. <u><mark>Both</mark> countries <mark>have</u></mark> <u><mark>been able to</u></mark> <u>dramatically</u> <u><mark>limit</u></mark> new <u><mark>infections</u></mark> <u><mark>but</mark> </u>have <u><mark>pursued</u></mark> <u>very <mark>different paths</u></mark>. After initial measures to cover up the virus, <u><mark>the CCP</u></mark>’s enforced quarantines and quick buildup of health infrastructure <u><mark>has been</mark> touted as <mark>a triumph of the authoritarian system</mark>.</u>28 <u>Though there are</u> clear <u>holes in this narrative</u>, <u><mark>it</mark> nonetheless <mark>raised questions about the efficacy of democratic</u></mark> political <u><mark>systems</mark> over authoritarian ones</u> <u>against the backdrop of</u> <u>retrenching democracy</u> and pluralism <u>around the world</u>.29 The <u><mark>Moon</u></mark> administration<u><mark>’s</mark> <mark>response</mark> to the virus</u>—<u><mark>emphasizing</u></mark> openness, <u><strong><mark>transparency</u></strong></mark>, and civic engagement—<u><mark>has been</u></mark> <u>credited with limiting the impact of COVID</u>-19 <u>and <strong><mark>held up as a model</u></strong></mark> <u>for effectively combating pandemics</u>.30 As New York Times columnists Max Fisher and Choe Sang Hun summarized, <u>there are four key takeaways from South Korea’s pandemic response: <strong>intervene fast</u></strong>, before it is a crisis; <u><strong>test early</u></strong>, often and safely; <u><strong>contract tracing</u></strong> isolation and surveillance; <u><strong>and enlist the public’s help</u></strong>.31 Additionally, South Korea’s accountable, competent bureaucracy, and transparent daily disclosure of COVID-19 cases further highlight how key democratic institutions can help successfully contain the virus. <u>While it may</u> already <u>be too late for many countries to apply this model</u> to the ongoing crisis, <u><mark>So</mark>uth <mark>Ko</mark>rea <mark>is taking a</u></mark>n active leadership <u><mark>role to help others with COVID</u></mark>-19, <u>both <strong>within the region</u></strong> <u>and <strong><mark>around the world.</u></strong></mark> As South Korea’s experience has proven the importance of testing for the disease in ultimately containing it, Seoul is actively working to send its diagnostic tests abroad. Faced with mounting demand from foreign governments, the Moon administration has actively engaged with private local producers of COVID-19 testing kits to help support exports.32 These efforts have largely been fruitful. In March, South Korea sent around 24 million USD worth of test kits overseas, expanding to just over 200 million USD in exports in April.33 Tests have so far been exported to 117 countries, including those in the Indo-Pacific region, such as Vietnam, China, Australia, and Thailand.34 More than just through commercial sales, Seoul is also striving to donate tests to important partner countries with less domestic capacity to handle the virus. Within the region, this has notably in-cluded the donation of 50,000 kits to Jakarta through the South Korean conglomerate LG and its manufacturing operations in Indonesia.35 Beyond bilateral cooperation, South Korea has also played an active role in helping to coordinate multilateral responses to the virus in light of limited leadership elsewhere. Whereas the G-20 served as the main focus of multilateral cooperation during the global financial crisis, the institution has been slow to muster a strong, collective response in the face of COVID-19—at least in part due to the China–US rivalry.36 For its part, South Korea has been actively working with other international institutions to stem the growth of the disease. In early May, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Park Han-ki spoke with NATO leadership to discuss cooperation on the pandemic.37 Around the same time, Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-hwa spoke with the South Korean envoys to major international organizations, such as the UN and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, emphasizing the importance of multilateralism and asking them to utilize the country’s success in managing the virus to help build on this cooperation.38 Seoul’s leadership has also been clear at the regional level through ASEAN+3— consisting of ASEAN members, China, Japan, and South Korea. In a special ASEAN+3 summit on 14 April, Moon expressed South Korea’s full support for ASEAN and that his government would be looking to utilize the ASEAN-ROK Cooperation Fund—totaling over 110 million USD—to help combat COVID-19.39 Moon also stressed the importance of keeping the flow of economic and people-to-people exchanges open.40 Perhaps the most noteworthy acclaim for the South Korean government’s response has come from UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres. During a press conference in late April, Guterres praised South Korea for not only its handling of COVID-19 but also its continued emphasis on climate change—stating the country is a “remarkable example” of how “the two things can be put together.”41 Indeed, South Korea’s approach to climate change—both prior to the pandemic and its plans for after—suggests that it will have an important role to play on the regional and global stages in the near future. South Korea on Climate Change South Korean leaders from both ends of the political spectrum have pursued policies to limit the country’s carbon footprint in recent decades. Former president Lee Myung-bak was one of the first world leaders to embrace “green growth” as a development strategy, when he was elected in 2008. During the 2008 global financial crisis, 80 percent of the government’s fiscal stimulus plan went to green growth projects. The Lee administration also initiated a Five-Year Plan in 2009, committing 2 percent of annual GDP to strengthening the use of sustainable technologies, such as goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 30 percent through 2020.42 These climate-conscious efforts were not just limited to the peninsula. Lee’s Global Green Growth Institute was launched in 2010 and, only two years later, was transformed into an international treaty-based organization.43 The current Moon administration has taken a similar path on climate. The cornerstone of Moon’s efforts is his Renewable Energy 3020 Plan, intended to increase the renewable energy portion of the country’s energy consumption from where it currently stands—nearly 8 percent—to 20 percent by 2030.44 Of course, this is not without its challenges, as South Korea faces an uphill battle in moving away from coal.45 But, there is some early evidence to suggest that the general public is willing to accept the trade-off of higher prices in exchange for the benefits of renewables.46 The outcome of the National Assembly election in April stands to make the country’s turn toward fighting climate change all the sharper. The big victory for Moon’s Democratic Party, winning a majority of seats, has provided them with the political space to pursue their platform of enacting a “Green New Deal.”47 Released in the leadup to the election, the plan aspires to make South Korea carbon neutral by 2050, the first pledge of its kind in East Asia. To meet its ambitious goals, the plan includes large investments in renewable energy, the creation of a carbon tax, and the establishment of center to help workers transition to green jobs.48 Though there is still much work ahead in terms of implementation, that South Korea could be the first country in Asia to enact sweeping climate-oriented policies amid the pandemic is certainly noteworthy. Much as Lee proved over a decade ago, South Korea would be showing other leaders in the region that it is possible to still incorporate climate into efforts designed to fight the current crisis. More than just a model, however, the current inflection point provides an opportunity to build on South Korea’s existing cooperation within the Indo-Pacific on climate change.49 <u><strong>It is not just the ROK’s</u></strong> values, <u><strong>expertise</u></strong>, and emphasis on diplomacy <u><strong>that make it an attractive partner for countries in the region</u></strong> and, therefore, an indispensable actor for Washington. <u><strong><mark>So</mark>uth <mark>Ko</mark>rea<mark>’s</strong></mark> position in the Indo-Pacific <strong>allows it to be <mark>seen as</u></strong></mark> a <u><strong>more <mark>impartial</u></strong></mark> player, <u><mark>which comes with</u></mark> its own set of <u><mark>advantages</mark>.</u> <u><strong>South Korea as a More Neutral Regional Middle Power and Facilitator </u></strong>The structural limitations South Korea faces can also be seen to provide key structural benefits. <u><mark>While the</mark> regional <mark>b</mark>alance <mark>o</mark>f <mark>p</mark>ower <mark>places</u></mark> clear <u><mark>boundaries on Seoul’s ability to</u></mark> more <u><mark>openly</mark> </u>engage in efforts to <u><mark>counter Beijing</u></mark>, <u><mark>these</mark> same <mark>dynamics endow</u> <u>So</mark>uth <mark>Ko</mark>rea <mark>with less</mark> political <mark>baggage</mark> for partners <strong>in the Indo-Pacific.</u></strong> China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the enduring Sino–Japanese rivalry in the region tint cooperation with Beijing and Tokyo in a way that does not affect Seoul. Additionally, South Korea’s efforts to shape itself as a middle power, both on the global and regional stages, has cemented its position as an effective diplomatic convenor. Over the past two decades, each South Korean president has undertaken their own respective approaches to building the country’s middle-power image. Starting in the early 2000s, Roh Moo-hyun conceptualized South Korea as a regional balancer between China and Japan, also serving as a hub for security and economic cooperation. President Lee’s agenda looked beyond the region under the “Global Korea” slogan and operationalized South Korea’s middle-power role through international institutions, most notably the G20.50 Though the country’s middle-power branding faltered under Park Geun-hye’s agenda of “Trustpolitik,” <u>Moon’s <strong>NSP</strong> can be seen as a</u>n extension of previous <u>middle-power pursuit</u>s <u>in the Indo-Pacific region</u>.51 <u>One</u> of the <u>clear</u>est <u>example</u>s <u>of the efficacy of South Korea’s middle-power</u> <u>diplomacy is</u> enshrined <u>in </u>the <u><strong>regional </u></strong>financial <u><strong>governance</u></strong>. <u>When ASEAN+3 countries were in talks</u> to create a new multilateral currency swap arrangement after the 2008 financial crisis proved the existing Chiang Mai Initiative ineffectual, the <u>rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo proved a considerable obstacle</u>. With both sides vying for greater voting power than the other in the new organization, <u>Seoul broke the deadlock</u> by proposing a quota system that now forms the structure of the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization.52 China and Japan are on equal footing with the largest voting shares as the biggest would-be donors, South Korea’s quota amounts to half of what is allotted to each of its larger neighbors, and ASEAN members have various smaller quotas. <u><mark>So</mark>uth <mark>Ko</mark>rea<mark>’s</mark> </u>commitment to mutually beneficial cooperation and serving as<u> <strong><mark>an honest broker</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>in the region</u></mark> shows no signs of letting up in the face of the pandemic. If anything, the country’s successes in managing the virus appears to be redoubling these commitments as previously highlighted. <u><strong><mark>In the face of a</mark> worsening US–<mark>China rivalry</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>So</mark>uth <mark>Ko</mark>rea<mark>’s</mark> continued <strong><mark>ability</mark> <mark>to fulfill this role</strong> is</u></mark> <u><strong>all the more</u></strong> <u><mark>important</mark> <mark>in light of</u></mark> diminishing goodwill and the <u><strong><mark>need for coordination on</u></strong></mark> key <u><mark>transborder</mark> issues like</u> <u><mark>health</mark> </u>and climate.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Sullivan 11 (Thomas Sullivan, founder of Rockpointe Inc., former political consultant, “Study Shows Importance of Biopharmaceutical Jobs For US Economy,” Policy and Medicine, July 12, 2011, http://www.policymed.com/2011/07/study-shows-importance-of-biopharmaceutical-jobs-for-us-economy-for-every-20-billion-loss-in-revenue.html) fulltext: Biopharmaceutical research companies produce the highest-value jobs, the types of jobs Americans want in the 21st century economy, the kinds of jobs that can drive future economic growth. No other sector has the ability to drive innovation, create high-quality jobs and provide new life-saving medicines for patients. According to a recent report from the Battelle Technology Partnership Practice (TPP), “nationwide, the biopharmaceutical sector supported a total of 4 million jobs in 2009, including nearly 675,000 direct jobs. Battelle is the world’s largest non‐profit independent research and development organization, providing innovative solutions to the world’s most pressing needs through its four global businesses. TPP has an established reputation in state‐by‐state assessment of the biopharmaceutical sector, and has recently undertaken major impact assessment projects for the Human Genome Project, the nation’s biotechnology sector, and major bioscience organizations such as Mayo Clinic. TPP has also been active in provision of analysis to industry organizations, including the Council for American Medical Innovation, PhRMA and BIO‐the Biotechnology Industry Organization. Each job in a biopharmaceutical research company supported almost 6 additional jobs in other sectors, ranging from manufacturing jobs to construction and other building service jobs to contract researchers and child care providers. Together, this biopharmaceutical sector‐related workforce received $258 billion in wages and benefits in 2009. “Battelle also found that across all occupations involved in the biopharmaceutical sector, the average wage is higher than across all other private sector industries, due to the sector’s role as a ‘high value-added sector.” Specifically, the annual average personal income of a biopharmaceutical worker was $118,690 in 2009 as compared to $64,278 in the overall economy. Additionally, the biopharmaceutical sector’s total economic output (including direct, indirect and induced impacts) was $918 billion in 2009. The sector generated an estimated $85 billion tax revenues in 2009—$33 billion in state and local and more than $52 billion in federal. This impact comprises $382 billion in direct impact of biopharmaceutical businesses and $535 billion in indirect and induced impacts (an output multiplier of 2.4—meaning that every $1 dollar in output generated by the biopharmaceutical sector generates another $1.4 in output in other sectors of the economy). To put this export volume into perspective, 2010’s total biopharmaceutical exports of $46.7 billion compares favorably to other major U.S. exports including: automobiles ($38.4 billion in 2010 exports); plastics and rubber products ($25.9 billion); communications equipment ($27 billion) and computers ($12.5 billion). In addition, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office noted that, “the pharmaceutical industry is one of the most research‐intensive industries in the United States and that pharmaceutical firms invest as much as five times more in research and development, relative to their sales, than the average U.S. manufacturing firm.” At over $105,000 in biopharmaceutical R&D per employee, the sector is way ahead of the average across all U.S. manufacturing which stands at about $10,000 per employee—and is far ahead of the second and third ranked sectors of “communications equipment” and “semiconductors, which respectively spend $63,000 and $40,000 per employee in R&D annually. PhRMA Statement on Battelle Report Consequently, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) President and CEO John J. Castellani issued a statement discussing the results from this report and the biopharmaceutical research sector’s impact on jobs and the American economy. Castellani asserted that, “at a time when the U.S. is facing a jobs crisis, evidenced by the terrible employment numbers from last Friday, it is critical that our policymakers embrace dynamic and innovative business sectors such as the biopharmaceutical research sector and refrain from stifling job growth through shortsighted proposals such as government-mandated price controls in Medicare Part D.” Specifically, the PhRMA CEO pointed to a new paper from the Battelle Technology Partnership Practice, which underscored the pharmaceutical sector’s tremendous contribution to America’s economy. Castellani recognized that, “startling potential job losses would result from undermining the business foundations of biopharmaceutical companies.” He noted that the Battelle report estimated “that a $20 billion per year reduction in biopharmaceutical sector revenue would result in 260,000 job losses across the U.S. economy” and a $59 billion reduction in U.S. economic activity. As a result, Castellani recognized that, “as the President and Congressional leaders negotiate an important agreement on the debt ceiling and the future of the nation’s economy, it is critical that the jobs crisis is not exacerbated.” For example, Castellani noted how “the President and some in Congress have proposed including government-mandated rebates in Medicare Part D as part of a debt ceiling agreement.” However, he recognized that “such a provision would have a dramatic negative effect on the economy and patients, and could undermine the success of the Part D program, which has very high beneficiary satisfaction and has cost far less than original government projections.” He pointed to the “Battelle numbers, which clearly demonstrated that reducing the biopharmaceutical sector’s annual revenue by $20 billion would be a serious blow to employment.” Castellani added that, “while the research is not specific to any one policy or event, proposals being considered, such as government-mandated Part D rebates, would be expected to have revenue impact of this magnitude.” Moreover, he noted that, “Part D is an unparalleled success, providing unprecedented access to life-saving medicines for seniors.” Accordingly, Castellani asserted that PhRMA does not “believe policies that discourage R&D and cutting-edge science and that will inevitably slow the development of needed new medicines are fair for seniors waiting for new treatments against our most challenging and costly diseases.” Battelle Report The Battelle Report quantifies the economic impact of the biopharmaceutical sector on the U.S. economy and jobs using input/output analysis, measures the direct and indirect impacts of the biopharmaceutical sector, and quantifies the economic impacts that would occur if biopharmaceutical revenues increase or decrease from significant changes in the business operating environment. The report also highlights some of the functional impacts of the sector—the wide‐ranging benefits provided through the biopharmaceutical sector’s contributions to enhancing human health, improving life spans and sustaining the high quality‐of‐life that Americans enjoy—and assesses the contributions of the biopharmaceutical sector to key areas of importance to our economy— innovation, product exports and quality of jobs produced. The Battelle Report starts by recognizing that the biopharmaceutical sector has all of the characteristics for an ideal industry for economic growth and sustainability in the U.S. Specifically, the biopharmaceutical sector: Grows in output and employment even in tough economic times Provides high wage, good quality jobs Is innovative and deploys high‐technology to generate comparative advantage for U.S. companies Generates significant exports that boost the U.S. economy Has a strong supply chain that drives further economic growth across the economy through “multiplier effects” Builds on America’s long‐standing strengths and investment in fundamental and applied research Encourages capital flows to sustain growth, and is profitable to provide funds for reinvestment into the research and development (R&D) cycle; Generates federal, state and local taxes and other economic contributions that support public services Is sustainable and not a major drain on global resources Is geographically dispersed, providing opportunities for job creation and economic growth across many areas of the nation, not just a few selected places Produces a product of value to society, something that improves the quality of life for humankind, including Improved life spans (personal longevity) Improved productivity resulting from prevention and effective management of disease and chronic conditions; and Reductions in unnecessary hospitalizations resulting in potential cost‐offsets elsewhere in the health care system. Fundamental to major progress in human longevity, reducing the marginalization of individuals from disease and disability, and generally improving our quality‐of‐life, biopharmaceuticals are a unique contributor to societal and individual well‐being. Moreover, the output of the biopharmaceutical sector is highly valued by society because the sector develops and manufactures a broad‐range of unique products to treat disorders and diseases that, were they to go untreated, can ruin individual quality of life, personal abilities and productivity. In many instances, biopharmaceuticals are central to helping to prevent and treat a range of public health issues, address pandemic risk and thereby support national economic security. For example, innovation in the biopharmaceutical sector, combined with the diagnostic and treatment skills of U.S. healthcare professionals, has contributed to a lengthening of the average life span of Americans. In 1900, the expected life span of an American at birth was just 47.3 years. With the advent of more modern medicines and advanced medical knowledge, life expectancy at birth has seen a steady increase rising to 69.7 years in 1960, and 77.9 years in 2007. In fact, the National Bureau of Economic Research reports that “there is a highly statistically significant relationship between the number of new molecular entities [drugs] approved by the FDA and increased longevity.” Furthermore, Lichtenberg found in a study of FDA data that "approval of priority‐review drugs—those considered by the FDA to offer significant improvements in the treatment, diagnosis, or prevention of a disease—has a significant positive impact on longevity.” Additionally, the American Hospital Association (AHA) notes that “advances in medicine contribute to national economic growth by helping Americans recover more quickly from injury and illness, avoid lost or ineffective work time due to flare‐ups of chronic conditions, and live longer with higher quality of life.” Without effective medicines and treatments for illnesses, injuries, pain and chronic conditions, the productivity of the U.S. economy would clearly be greatly impaired. Biopharmaceuticals are a key contributor to a more productive and healthy America and U.S. economy. Beyond direct employment in biopharmaceutical companies, the biopharmaceutical sector is the foundation upon which one of the United States’ most dynamic innovation and business ecosystems is built. A large part of the modern biomedical economy is built upon a robust foundation of biopharmaceutical companies that perform and support advanced biomedical and technological R&D, and act as the funnel and distribution engine for getting life‐saving and quality‐of‐life‐sustaining therapeutics to the marketplace. Providing R&D impetus and funding, capital resources, technology licensing opportunities, and a sophisticated market access and distribution system, the biopharmaceutical sector is of central importance to the much broader biomedical and life sciences economy. Fueled by private investment capital, venture capital investments, and public/private collaborations, and enabled by the U.S. open market system, the nation has been able to advance biomedical innovation, which in turn has led to new start‐up companies, business growth and exports across the world. Conclusion Despite the tremendous success in the biopharmaceutical industry, emerging infectious diseases continue to present new challenges and a substantial volume of long‐standing diseases such as cancer, diabetes, neurodegenerative diseases, psychiatric diseases, immunological diseases, etc. continue to demand novel treatments and improved therapeutics. There are millions of people suffering from diseases and disorders for which a therapy has yet to be found. The need for ongoing biopharmaceutical research and development is simply enormous. The only way the U.S. economy can stay ahead of international competition is by using advanced R&D and innovation to drive the growth of high value‐added industries. By leveraging investment in federal lab, university and industry R&D, our nation is able to produce high‐value, typically technologically advanced products that the rest of the world values highly. In recent decades, life sciences have come to the fore as a leading driver of U.S. technological innovation and competitive advantage, and the biopharmaceutical sector is a key foundation of the life sciences innovation ecosystem. The Unites States’ biopharmaceutical industry produces products that save, sustain and improve lives, and the sector has a large and significant economic impact, affecting many other key areas of the U.S. economy. Gains or losses in biopharmaceutical sector revenues will be reflected in gains and losses across a broad range of additionally important U.S. economic sectors that have robust supply chain relationships with the biopharmaceutical sector.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The impact is <u>economic collapse</u> – pharma supports <u>resilience</u> </h4><p><strong>Sullivan 11</strong> (Thomas Sullivan, founder of Rockpointe Inc., former political consultant, “Study Shows Importance of Biopharmaceutical Jobs For US Economy,” Policy and Medicine, July 12, 2011, http://www.policymed.com/2011/07/study-shows-importance-of-biopharmaceutical-jobs-for-us-economy-for-every-20-billion-loss-in-revenue.html<u>)</p><p>Bio<mark>pharma</mark>ceutical research <mark>companies</u></mark> produce the highest-value jobs, the types of jobs Americans want in the 21st century economy, the kinds of jobs that <u>can <strong><mark>drive future economic growth.</strong> No other sector has the ability to drive <strong>innovation</strong></mark>, create high-quality jobs and provide new life-saving medicines for patients. According to a recent report from the Battelle Technology Partnership Practice (TPP),</u> “nationwide, <u>the biopharmaceutical sector supported</u> a total of <u>4 million jobs</u> in 2009, including nearly 675,000 direct jobs. <u><mark>Battelle is the <strong>world’s largest</strong> non</mark>‐profit independent <mark>research</mark> and development <strong><mark>organization</strong></mark>,</u> providing innovative solutions to the world’s most pressing needs through its four global businesses. <u>TPP has an established reputation in</u> state‐by‐state <u>assessment</u> of the biopharmaceutical sector, and has recently undertaken major impact assessment projects for the Human Genome Project, the nation’s biotechnology sector, and major bioscience organizations such as Mayo Clinic. TPP has also been active in provision of analysis to industry organizations, including the Council for American Medical Innovation, PhRMA and BIO‐the Biotechnology Industry Organization. <u><mark>Each job</mark> in a biopharmaceutical</u> research <u>company <mark>supported</u></mark> almost <u><mark>6 </mark>additional jobs <mark>in other sectors,</u></mark> ranging from manufacturing jobs to construction and other building service jobs to contract researchers and child care providers. <u>Together, this biopharmaceutical sector‐related workforce received $258 billion in wages and benefits in 2009.</u> “Battelle also found that across all occupations involved in the biopharmaceutical sector, the average wage is higher than across all other private sector industries, due to the sector’s role as a ‘high value-added sector.” Specifically, the annual average personal income of a biopharmaceutical worker was $118,690 in 2009 as compared to $64,278 in the overall economy. Additionally, <u><mark>the</mark> biopharmaceutical <mark>sector’s </mark>total economic <mark>output</u></mark> (including direct, indirect and induced impacts) <u><mark>was <strong>$918 billion</u></strong></mark> in 2009. The sector generated an estimated $85 billion tax revenues in 2009—$33 billion in state and local and more than $52 billion in federal. This impact comprises $382 billion in direct impact of biopharmaceutical businesses and $535 billion in indirect and induced impacts <u>(an output multiplier of 2.4</u>—meaning that every $1 dollar in output generated by the biopharmaceutical sector generates another $1.4 in output in other sectors of the economy). <u>To put this export volume into perspective,</u> 2010’s total <u>biopharmaceutical exports of $46.7 billion compares favorably to other major U.S. exports</u> including: automobiles ($38.4 billion in 2010 exports); plastics and rubber products ($25.9 billion); communications equipment ($27 billion) and computers ($12.5 billion). In addition, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office noted that, <u>“the pharmaceutical industry is one of the most research‐intensive industries in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and</u> that <u>pharmaceutical firms invest as much as five times more in research and development,</u> relative to their sales, than the average U.S. manufacturing firm.” At over $105,000 in biopharmaceutical R&D per employee, the sector is way ahead of the average across all U.S. manufacturing which stands at about $10,000 per employee—and is far ahead of the second and third ranked sectors of “communications equipment” and “semiconductors, which respectively spend $63,000 and $40,000 per employee in R&D annually. PhRMA Statement on Battelle Report Consequently, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) President and CEO John J. Castellani issued a statement discussing the results from this report and the biopharmaceutical research sector’s impact on jobs and the American economy. Castellani asserted that, “at a time when the U.S. is facing a jobs crisis, evidenced by the terrible employment numbers from last Friday, it is critical that our policymakers embrace dynamic and innovative business sectors such as the biopharmaceutical research sector and refrain from stifling job growth through shortsighted proposals such as government-mandated price controls in Medicare Part D.” Specifically, the PhRMA CEO pointed to a new paper from the Battelle Technology Partnership Practice, which underscored the pharmaceutical sector’s tremendous contribution to America’s economy. Castellani recognized that, “startling potential job losses would result from undermining the business foundations of biopharmaceutical companies.” He noted that the Battelle report estimated “that a $20 billion per year reduction in biopharmaceutical sector revenue would result in 260,000 job losses across the U.S. economy” and a $59 billion reduction in U.S. economic activity. As a result, Castellani recognized that, “as the President and Congressional leaders negotiate an important agreement on the debt ceiling and the future of the nation’s economy, it is critical that the jobs crisis is not exacerbated.” For example, Castellani noted how “the President and some in Congress have proposed including government-mandated rebates in Medicare Part D as part of a debt ceiling agreement.” However, he recognized that “such a provision would have a dramatic negative effect on the economy and patients, and could undermine the success of the Part D program, which has very high beneficiary satisfaction and has cost far less than original government projections.” He pointed to the “Battelle numbers, which clearly demonstrated that reducing the biopharmaceutical sector’s annual revenue by $20 billion would be a serious blow to employment.” Castellani added that, “while the research is not specific to any one policy or event, proposals being considered, such as government-mandated Part D rebates, would be expected to have revenue impact of this magnitude.” Moreover, he noted that, “Part D is an unparalleled success, providing unprecedented access to life-saving medicines for seniors.” Accordingly, Castellani asserted that PhRMA does not “believe policies that discourage R&D and cutting-edge science and that will inevitably slow the development of needed new medicines are fair for seniors waiting for new treatments against our most challenging and costly diseases.” Battelle Report <u>The <mark>Battelle</mark> Report quantifies the economic impact of the biopharmaceutical sector on the U.S. economy and jobs using input/output analysis,</u> measures the direct and indirect impacts of the biopharmaceutical sector, <u>and quantifies the economic impacts that would occur if biopharmaceutical revenues increase or decrease</u> from significant changes in the business operating environment. <u>The report</u> also <u><mark>highlights</u></mark> some of the functional impacts of the sector—the wide‐ranging benefits provided through the biopharmaceutical sector’s contributions to enhancing human health, improving life spans and sustaining the high quality‐of‐life that Americans enjoy—and assesses the <u><mark>contributions </mark>of the biopharmaceutical sector <mark>to <strong>key areas of importance to our economy</strong>— <strong>innovation, </mark>product <mark>exports and quality of jobs </mark>produced. </u></strong>The Battelle Report starts by recognizing that <u>the biopharmaceutical sector has</u> all of <u>the characteristics for an ideal industry for economic growth and sustainability in the U.S.</u> Specifically, <u><mark>the</mark> biopharmaceutical <mark>sector:</u> <u>Grows </mark>in output</u> and employment <u><mark>even in tough </mark>economic <mark>times</u></mark> Provides high wage, good quality jobs <u>Is innovative and <mark>deploys</mark> high‐<mark>tech</mark>nology <mark>to generate comparative advantage</u></mark> for U.S. companies <u><mark>Generates </mark>significant <mark>exports that <strong>boost the</strong></mark> U.S. <strong><mark>economy</strong></mark> <mark>Has a strong supply chain that <strong>drives </mark>further economic <mark>growth</strong></mark> across the economy <mark>through <strong>“multiplier effects”</u></mark> </strong>Builds on America’s long‐standing strengths and investment in fundamental and applied research <u><mark>Encourages capital flows to <strong>sustain growth,</strong></mark> and is profitable to provide funds for reinvestment into the research and development</u> (R&D) <u>cycle;</u> Generates federal, state and local taxes and other economic contributions that support public services Is sustainable and not a major drain on global resources <u><mark>Is</mark> geographically <mark>dispersed, providing</mark> opportunities for <mark>job creation</mark> and economic growth <mark>across</mark> many areas of <mark>the nation,</u></mark> not just a few selected places <u>Produces a product</u> of value to society, something <u>that <mark>improves</u></mark> the quality of life for humankind, including Improved life spans (personal longevity) Improved <u><mark>productivity </mark>resulting <mark>from</mark> prevention and effective <mark>management of disease</mark> and chronic conditions; <mark>and Reductions in </mark>unnecessary <mark>hospitalizations resulting in</u></mark> potential <u><mark>cost‐offsets </mark>elsewhere <mark>in the health care system.</u></mark> Fundamental to major progress in human longevity, reducing the marginalization of individuals from disease and disability, and generally improving our quality‐of‐life, biopharmaceuticals are a unique contributor to societal and individual well‐being. Moreover, the output of the biopharmaceutical sector is highly valued by society because the sector develops and manufactures a broad‐range of unique products to treat disorders and diseases that, were they to go untreated, can ruin individual quality of life, personal abilities and productivity. In many instances, <u>biopharmaceuticals are central to helping to prevent and treat a range of public health issues,</u> address pandemic risk and thereby support national economic security. For example, <u>innovation in the biopharmaceutical sector,</u> combined with the diagnostic and treatment skills of U.S. healthcare professionals, <u>has contributed to a lengthening of the average life span</u> of Americans. In 1900, the expected life span of an American at birth was just 47.3 years. With the advent of more modern medicines and advanced medical knowledge, life expectancy at birth has seen a steady increase rising to 69.7 years in 1960, and 77.9 years in 2007. In fact, the National Bureau of Economic Research reports that <u>“there is a highly statistically significant relationship between the number of new molecular entities [drugs] approved by the FDA and increased longevity.”</u> Furthermore, Lichtenberg found in a study of FDA data that "approval of priority‐review drugs—those considered by the FDA to offer significant improvements in the treatment, diagnosis, or prevention of a disease—has a significant positive impact on longevity.” Additionally, the American Hospital Association (AHA) notes that <u>“advances in medicine contribute to national economic growth by helping Americans recover more quickly from</u> injury and <u>illness, avoid lost or ineffective work time due to</u> flare‐ups of <u>chronic conditions,</u> and live longer with higher quality of life.” <u>Without effective medicines and treatments</u> for illnesses, injuries, pain and chronic conditions, <u><mark>the productivity of the</u></mark> U.S. <u><mark>economy would </mark>clearly <mark>be greatly impaired. Biopharmaceuticals are a <strong>key contributor</strong> </mark>to a more <strong>productive and healthy</u></strong> America and U.S. <u><strong>economy.</u></strong> Beyond direct employment in biopharmaceutical companies, <u>the biopharmaceutical sector is the foundation upon which one of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates’ <u>most dynamic innovation and business ecosystems is built.</u> A large part of the modern biomedical economy is built upon a robust foundation of <u>biopharmaceutical companies</u> that <u>perform and support advanced biomedical and technological R&D, and act as the funnel and distribution engine for</u> getting life‐saving and quality‐of‐life‐sustaining <u>therapeutics</u> to the marketplace. <u><mark>Providing R&D</mark> impetus and funding,</u> capital resources, <u>technology</u> licensing <u><mark>opportunities, and a</mark> sophisticated <mark>market </mark>access and <mark>distribution system, the</mark> biopharmaceutical <mark>sector is of <strong>central importance to the </mark>much broader</u></strong> biomedical and <u><strong><mark>life sciences economy.</u></strong></mark> Fueled by private investment capital, venture capital investments, and public/private collaborations, and enabled by the U.S. open market system, <u>the nation has been able to advance biomedical innovation, which in turn has led to new start‐up companies, business growth and exports across the world.</u> Conclusion Despite the tremendous success in the biopharmaceutical industry, emerging infectious diseases continue to present new challenges and a substantial volume of long‐standing diseases such as cancer, diabetes, neurodegenerative diseases, psychiatric diseases, immunological diseases, etc. continue to demand novel treatments and improved therapeutics. There are millions of people suffering from diseases and disorders for which a therapy has yet to be found. The need for ongoing biopharmaceutical research and development is simply enormous. The only way the U.S. economy can stay ahead of international competition is by using advanced R&D and innovation to drive the growth of high value‐added industries. By leveraging investment in federal lab, university and industry R&D, our nation is able to produce high‐value, typically technologically advanced products that the rest of the world values highly. In recent decades, <u>life sciences have come to the fore as a leading driver of U.S. technological innovation</u> and competitive advantage, <u>and the biopharmaceutical sector is a key foundation of the life sciences innovation ecosystem. The</u> Unites States’ <u>biopharmaceutical industry</u> produces products that save, sustain and improve lives, and the sector <u>has a <strong>large and significant economic impact,</strong> affecting <strong>many other key areas</strong> of the U.S. economy. Gains or <mark>losses in </mark>biopharmaceutical sector <mark>revenues will be reflected in</mark> gains and losses across <mark>a <strong>broad range of </mark>additionally <mark>important </mark>U.S. economic <mark>sectors</strong></mark> that have robust supply chain relationships with the biopharmaceutical sector. </p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Colin Drury 17, Journalist for VICE, citing Ian Shield, Associate Lecturer in International Relations at Anglia Ruskin University, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Russian Lawmaker, and Keri Giles, Associate Fellow with the UK Foreign-policy Think Tank Chatham House, “What Would Happen if Russia and Europe Went to War?”, Vice, 3/30/2017, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4xe5a3/what-would-happen-if-russia-and-europe-went-to-war fulltext: : An emboldened Vladimir Putin decides to help himself to the Baltic states—Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia—he has long believed should be part of Russia. Three: Given these states have been NATO members since 2004, the rest of the alliance—the UK, Germany, France, and others—go to their aid. The result? "Hiroshimas and Nagasakis everywhere," reckoned the Russian lawmaker Vladimir Zhirinovsky when discussing the possibility last year. So that's not ideal. But could Russia and Europe really go to war? And if they did, how would that work out? Be warned: As Keir Giles, associate fellow with the UK foreign-policy think tank Chatham House, that is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization based in London tells me, "There's not much good news." 1. Tensions Rise Tensions between Russia and Europe are always high. Even so, the present unease is ominous. On one hand, Russia has been holding major nuclear drills for 40 million citizens, sending submarines into the territorial waters of other nations and running mock bombing missions on the edge of British airspace. Forcibly annexing part of another country, This behavior isn't generally viewed as good neighborliness, either. Yet NATO isn't entirely averse to mucking things up. The alliance has almost 10,000 troops in countries that border Russia, while a two-week war game featuring thousands of personnel and 50 aircrafts is being held in Scotland right now. The enemy state in such rehearsals is often given a somewhat unambiguous name: the Reds. 2. The Flash Point It's not wildly anti-Russian to say the current administration favors the countries that border the Baltic Sea—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Putin believes these former Soviet states should never have become independent: Each has a large Russian population and strategically excellent sea ports. He's certainly not keen on them being NATO members and sees the alliance—not without rationale—as encircling Russia. "If you compress a spring," he warned in 2014, "eventually it will snap back." With America gone, that snap back could happen instantly. "They would move on the Baltic states more or less immediately," says Giles, who is also director of the Conflict Studies Research Center in Oxfordshire. "Putin believes Russian security requires the Baltic states under its domain. But you need to look further. It's hard to put a definitive border on how far ambitious Russians think the frontier should expand. But certainly you're looking at Poland and Finland too." 3. Internet Down! Shots Fired! In 2015, a study by research institute the RAND Corporation concluded it would take just 60 hours for Russia to overrun Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Giles, however, believes the signs would be there sometime in advance. "There would be a noticeable rise in Russian diplomacy and media focusing on issues that could give rationale for an armed intervention," he says. On some pretense, such as a peacekeeping mission, thousands of troops would gather on the border. In the days before any invasion or attack, the target's internet would be shut down or disrupted by specialist telecommunications soldiers. Power supplies would fail, and ATMs would stop functioning. Cellphones and TV signals would be jammed. Perhaps most ominously, personalized texts would be sent direct to opposition officials, soldiers, and citizens, creating confusion and panic. In some cases, these texts would appear to come from someone already in the recipient's phone book. "In the right circumstances, this could be enough," says Giles. "Russia doesn't need to roll tanks across a border. They can stage an attack without a military presence. Misinformation and civil disorder could lead to regime change with a client government of Moscow taking charge. That would meet Russia's security and economic objectives." And if no such regime change happened? Think hybrid warfare: all the above combined with the sudden movement of troops into the country. "We don't know how exactly an occupation would look, but Russia does practice this scenario," says Giles. "What we do know is it would be over pretty swiftly." 4. NATO: Fight or Fall Once diplomacy fails, the hard fact is that a US-less NATO almost certainly doesn't have the firepower to win a war with Russia. We'll ignore nuclear weapons for now and keep things conventional. Russia has more men (the reserves alone are 2.5 million strong) and hardware. As a single country, its chain of command is better streamlined. Soldiers are battle-hardened from Ukraine and Syria. After a decade of $40 billion-a-year military upgrades, its weaponry—such as the Pantsir-S1, a tank that can literally destroy cruise missiles—is superior too. It's also possible some NATO members would withdraw—in particular Turkey, given the warm relationship between President Putin and President Recep Erdoğan. That's 600,000 men—the second-biggest contingent after the US—gone. The result would be the last of NATO facing an existential decision: Fight and probably lose, or, in this scenario, cut the Baltic states loose. Or, as Ian Shield, associate lecturer in international relations at Anglia Ruskin University, puts it: "The choice would be between reneging on the treaty—which would certainly lead to the disintegration of NATO and probably, by extension, the whole European order—or participating in a cataclysmic war extending up to nuclear weapons." Rock and a hard place, basically. 5. War on the Ground Let's carry on gaming, though, and say NATO engages Russia. How does that go? Not well for either side, says Shields: "On any battlefield, there would be annihilation—although these wouldn't be battlefields like we have previously known. Missiles and artillery have far greater range and precision, meaning enemy posts, infrastructure, armories, and even entire towns could be destroyed from within home territory. What you have is fewer individual battles but far greater destruction. If neither side backed down, entire swathes of Europe—it's impossible to know where—would be reduced to rubble. The death tolls would be unimaginable." Britain wouldn't be safe; the English Channel has become a hopelessly outdated moat. "Russian aircrafts wouldn't need to even enter British airspace," says Shields. "They could land precision strikes from well outside." Both sides would wrestle for control of the seas around Scandinavia. Cyber attacks, meanwhile, could shut down transport infrastructure, hospitals, media, and utilities. Russia's main advantage amid the carnage would be two-fold. First, because it has more weaponry and men, it can, essentially, keep blasting away longer. Second, its sheer landmass means it could better absorb the devastation: NATO could wipe out every single structure hundreds of miles into its adversary's territory, and Moscow wouldn't even be scratched. 6. Going Nuclear As any history student knows, it doesn't matter if you have 7,000 nuclear weapons (Russia) or 200 (Britain and France); their cataclysmic qualities level things up. The thought goes that the pressing of the red button means MAD: mutually assured destruction. If one side starts throwing warheads about, the other responds in kind. Both adversaries are wiped out. Right? Wrong. "What Russia has in its arsenal that the West doesn't is tactical nuclear weapons," explains Giles. "These are not big city-leveling nukes, but ones that can destroy battlefields or neighborhoods. The West had these weapons but got rid of them. So its only response to a tactical nuclear strike would be a full nuclear attack. Which is self-defeating because it would also ensure their own destruction. The West is missing several rungs on the escalation ladder that Russia has built into its strategy." Nonetheless, once things go nuclear, it all becomes unpredictable: cities wiped out, millions dead. At this point, even the most advanced strategists tend to stop plotting possible paths. 7. But Cheer Up If the US leaving NATO is a gateway to Armageddon, the good news is it seems increasingly unlikely. Trump probably won't ditch the alliance. That's because it doesn't only keep the US secure; it's also politically and economically advantageous. It gives Washington influence in Europe and protects a vast and prosperous continent that—and this is important—spends much of its wealth with American companies. That said, maybe it's still worth remembering peace here really does hang by threads. Maybe go out and play more.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Baltic invasion is quick and causes extinction.</h4><p>Colin <strong>Drury 17</strong>, Journalist for VICE, citing Ian Shield, Associate Lecturer in International Relations at Anglia Ruskin University, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Russian Lawmaker, and Keri Giles, Associate Fellow with the UK Foreign-policy Think Tank Chatham House, “What Would Happen if Russia and Europe Went to War?”, Vice, 3/30/2017, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4xe5a3/what-would-happen-if-russia-and-europe-went-to-war</p><p>: <u>An <strong>emboldened</u></strong> Vladimir <u>Putin decides to help himself to the <strong>Baltic states</strong>—Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia—he has long believed should be part of Russia.</u> Three: Given these states have been NATO members since 2004, <u>the <strong>rest</strong> of the alliance—the UK, Germany, France, and others—go to their aid</u>.</p><p><u>The result? <strong>"Hiroshimas and Nagasakis everywhere,"</u></strong> reckoned the Russian lawmaker Vladimir Zhirinovsky when discussing the possibility last year.</p><p>So that's not ideal.</p><p>But could Russia and Europe really go to war? And if they did, how would that work out? Be warned: As Keir Giles, associate fellow with the UK foreign-policy think tank Chatham House, that is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization based in London tells me, "There's not much good news."</p><p>1. Tensions Rise</p><p>Tensions between Russia and Europe are always high. Even so, the present unease is ominous.</p><p>On one hand, Russia has been holding major nuclear drills for 40 million citizens, sending submarines into the territorial waters of other nations and running mock bombing missions on the edge of British airspace. Forcibly annexing part of another country, This behavior isn't generally viewed as good neighborliness, either.</p><p>Yet NATO isn't entirely averse to mucking things up. The alliance has almost 10,000 troops in countries that border Russia, while a two-week war game featuring thousands of personnel and 50 aircrafts is being held in Scotland right now. The enemy state in such rehearsals is often given a somewhat unambiguous name: the Reds.</p><p>2. The Flash Point</p><p>It's not wildly anti-Russian to say the current administration favors the countries that border the Baltic Sea—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.</p><p><u>Putin believes these former Soviet states should never have become independent: Each has a large Russian population and strategically excellent sea ports. He's certainly not keen on them being NATO members and sees the alliance—not without rationale—as encircling Russia.</p><p>"If you compress a spring," he warned</u> in 2014, <u>"eventually it will snap back."</p><p>With <strong>America gone</strong>, that <strong>snap back</strong> could happen <strong>instantly</u></strong>.</p><p><u>"They would move on the Baltic states more or less <strong>immediately</strong>,"</u> says Giles, who is also director of the Conflict Studies Research Center in Oxfordshire. "Putin believes Russian security requires the Baltic states under its domain. But you need to look further. It's hard to put a definitive border on how far ambitious Russians think the frontier should expand. But certainly you're looking at Poland and Finland too."</p><p>3. Internet Down! Shots Fired!</p><p>In 2015, a study by research institute the RAND Corporation concluded <u>it would take <strong>just 60 hours</strong> for Russia to overrun Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia</u>.</p><p>Giles, however, believes the signs would be there sometime in advance. "There would be a noticeable rise in Russian diplomacy and media focusing on issues that could give rationale for an armed intervention," he says.</p><p>On some pretense, such as a peacekeeping mission, thousands of troops would gather on the border. In the days before any invasion or attack, the target's <u><strong>internet</strong> would be <strong>shut down</u></strong> or disrupted by specialist telecommunications soldiers. Power supplies would fail, and ATMs would stop functioning. Cellphones and TV signals would be jammed. Perhaps most ominously, personalized texts would be sent direct to opposition officials, soldiers, and citizens, creating confusion and panic. In some cases, these texts would appear to come from someone already in the recipient's phone book.</p><p>"In the right circumstances, this could be enough," says Giles. "Russia doesn't need to roll tanks across a border. They can stage an attack without a military presence. Misinformation and civil disorder could lead to regime change with a client government of Moscow taking charge. That would meet Russia's security and economic objectives."</p><p>And if no such regime change happened?</p><p>Think hybrid warfare: all the above combined with the sudden movement of troops into the country. "We don't know how exactly an occupation would look, but Russia does practice this scenario," says Giles. "What we do know is it would be over pretty swiftly."</p><p>4. NATO: Fight or Fall</p><p>Once diplomacy fails, the hard fact is that a US-less NATO almost certainly doesn't have the firepower to win a war with Russia.</p><p>We'll ignore nuclear weapons for now and keep things conventional. Russia has more men (the reserves alone are 2.5 million strong) and hardware. As a single country, its chain of command is better streamlined. Soldiers are battle-hardened from Ukraine and Syria. After a decade of $40 billion-a-year military upgrades, its weaponry—such as the Pantsir-S1, a tank that can literally destroy cruise missiles—is superior too.</p><p>It's also possible some NATO members would withdraw—in particular Turkey, given the warm relationship between President Putin and President Recep Erdoğan. That's 600,000 men—the second-biggest contingent after the US—gone.</p><p>The result would be the last of NATO facing an existential decision: Fight and probably lose, or, in this scenario, cut the Baltic states loose.</p><p>Or, as Ian Shield, associate lecturer in international relations at Anglia Ruskin University, puts it: "The choice would be between reneging on the treaty—which would certainly lead to the disintegration of NATO and probably, by extension, the whole European order—or participating in <u>a <strong>cataclysmic war</strong> <strong>extend</strong>ing up to <strong>nuclear weapons</u></strong>."</p><p>Rock and a hard place, basically.</p><p>5. War on the Ground</p><p>Let's carry on gaming, though, and say NATO engages Russia. How does that go?</p><p>Not well for either side, says Shields: "On any battlefield, there would be annihilation—although these wouldn't be battlefields like we have previously known. Missiles and artillery have far greater range and precision, meaning enemy posts, infrastructure, armories, and even entire towns could be destroyed from within home territory. What you have is fewer individual battles but far greater destruction. If neither side backed down, <u><strong>entire swathes</strong> of Europe</u>—it's impossible to know where—<u>would be reduced to <strong>rubble</strong>. The <strong>death tolls</strong> would be <strong>unimaginable</u></strong>."</p><p>Britain wouldn't be safe; the English Channel has become a hopelessly outdated moat. "Russian aircrafts wouldn't need to even enter British airspace," says Shields. "They could land precision strikes from well outside."</p><p>Both sides would wrestle for control of the seas around Scandinavia. Cyber attacks, meanwhile, could shut down transport infrastructure, hospitals, media, and utilities.</p><p>Russia's main advantage amid the carnage would be two-fold. First, because it has more weaponry and men, it can, essentially, keep blasting away longer. Second, its sheer landmass means it could better absorb the devastation: NATO could wipe out every single structure hundreds of miles into its adversary's territory, and Moscow wouldn't even be scratched.</p><p>6. Going Nuclear</p><p>As any history student knows, it doesn't matter if you have 7,000 nuclear weapons (Russia) or 200 (Britain and France); their cataclysmic qualities level things up. The thought goes that the pressing of the red button means MAD: mutually assured destruction. If one side starts throwing warheads about, the other responds in kind. Both adversaries are wiped out. Right? Wrong.</p><p>"What Russia has in its arsenal that the West doesn't is tactical nuclear weapons," explains Giles. "These are not big city-leveling nukes, but ones that can destroy battlefields or neighborhoods. The West had these weapons but got rid of them. So its only response to a tactical nuclear strike would be a full nuclear attack. Which is self-defeating because it would also ensure their own destruction. The West is missing several rungs on the escalation ladder that Russia has built into its strategy."</p><p>Nonetheless, once things go nuclear, it all becomes unpredictable: cities wiped out, millions dead. At this point, even the most advanced strategists tend to stop plotting possible paths.</p><p>7. But Cheer Up</p><p><u>If the US <strong>leaving NATO</strong> is a <strong>gateway to Armageddon</strong>, the good news is it seems <strong>increasingly unlikely</strong>. Trump probably won't ditch the alliance</u>.</p><p><u>That's because it doesn't only keep the US secure; it's also politically and economically advantageous.</u> It gives Washington influence in Europe and protects a vast and prosperous continent that—and this is important—spends much of its wealth with American companies.</p><p>That said, maybe it's still worth remembering <u><strong>peace</strong> here really does <strong>hang by threads</u></strong>. Maybe go out and play more.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Rovner 17 – Professor of Political Science, SMU (Joshua, “Two kinds of catastrophe: nuclear escalation and protracted war in Asia,” Journal of Strategic Studies, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2017.1293532?journalCode=fjss20) fulltext: This clash of great power interests has led to concerns that a US–China war may be over the horizon. Such a war is not inevitable, of course, and both sides have obvious reasons to avoid any military conflict. But neither has shown much willingness to back down from the political issues at stake, some of which are infused with nationalism. As long as these issues remain unresolved, and as long as the United States remains committed to the allies who are at loggerheads with Beijing, then conflict will remain a possibility. The fact that both sides possess nuclear weapons raises the danger of a nuclear exchange, even over crises that begin over what to be relatively minor disputes.1 In the event of a war, both China and the United States would seek a quick decisive victory. Any war is likely to exact high costs in blood and treasure. Their high level of trade and financial interdependence, and the centrality of the United States and China to the global economy, means that a prolonged war would be an economic calamity. Chinese military doctrine increasingly stresses the importance of winning quickly, and it puts a premium on seizing the initiative and controlling the pace of combat under what it calls “informatized conditions.” The examples of the US wars in Iraq, Kosovo, and Afghanistan convinced Chinese thinkers that high-intensity conventional combat is no longer a question of relative industrial power. Instead, it is a competition for control of communications. In future conflicts, long-range attacks coupled with aggressive information operations will sew confusion and allow China to dictate the crucial opening stages. The 2001 edition of the Science of Military Strategy (SMS) states that China envisions precision strikes in order to “paralyze the enemy in one stroke.” 2 Organizational changes in the years that followed gave the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) more autonomy and responsibility for long-range strike. In addition, the 2013 edition of SMS called for the PLAAF to develop information operations capable of “effective suppression and destruction” of enemy’s information systems alongside an “information protection capability.” 3 Chinese leaders have committed to the PLA’s military space and counter-space capabilities, investing in more missions, more launches, and more satellites. Finally, the PLA has deliberately merged electronic warfare with psychological operations, based on the idea that confusing the enemy by undermining its communications will force it into operational sclerosis and have a profound psychological effect. The goal is to win fast. The PLA must “seize and control the battlefield initiative, paralyze and destroy the enemy’s operational system of systems, and shock the enemy’s will for war.” 4 This approach closely resembles the US model, which relies on prompt attacks on communications and intelligence networks, which will make it safe for follow-on forces to surge into theater and dictate the scope and pace of combat. American officers have become accustomed to short conventional clashes since the first Gulf War, and their basic operational concept remains largely unchanged. Doctrine continues to emphasize the importance of seizing the initiative, confusing the enemy, and establishing control. The standing joint publication on operations provides a neat summary of the US approach: As operations commence, the (joint force commander) needs to exploit friendly advantages and capabilities to shock, demoralize, and disrupt the enemy immediately. The JFC seeks decisive advantage through the use of all available elements of combat power to seize and maintain the initiative, deny the enemy the opportunity to achieve its objectives, and generate in the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat.5 Rapid attacks cause physical destruction and psychological damage, turning dangerous adversaries into helpless, disorganized, and vulnerable targets. Under these conditions, enemies have neither the ability nor the desire to fight on, and the United States can consolidate its initial gains with additional forces who face little or no resistance. In sum, China and the United States are preparing for a kind of highintensity warfare that requires executing rapid and complex operations while simultaneously disrupting the enemy’s command and control. Both sides believe this operational concept can lead to victory at a reasonably low cost, and are tailoring military doctrine to achieve specific political objectives without risking national disaster. What if both sides are wrong? Great powers often exaggerate their capabilities and minimize the importance of contingency and chance in war. Sometimes they launch campaigns with the false belief that war will be brief and painless, only to learn the opposite. Combat against a thinking adversary reveals the limits of existing capabilities in ways that are impossible to know before the fact. Strategic interaction during war plays havoc with prewar expectations, because the combatants do their utmost to undermine the other. Ambiguous information may not allow either side to judge whether it is succeeding, or, indeed, whether its forces are actually carrying out operations as intended. Great power wars rarely go according to plan. Good strategies thus contain a reasonable margin of error, and good strategists learn to think about what might go wrong. Contingency planning is especially important in cases where nuclear weapons may come into play This article discusses the relationship between conventional and nuclear weapons in a hypothetical war between the United States and China. Both countries have spent lavishly on new conventional military capabilities. Beijing is developing “anti-access” systems to make operations dangerous for US forces in the region, and Washington has responded by refining its operational approach. In the nuclear realm, China is undergoing a modernization of its arsenal and has revised its posture, while the United States has invested in increasingly accurate missiles, lethal warheads, and remote sensing technologies that enable rapid precision strikes. These trends may have important and troubling effects on the dynamics of a potential conventional military confrontation. While optimists imagine a quick and decisive victory, the presence of nuclear weapons opens the possibility of unexpected scenarios that neither side can fully control. The following discussion describes two such scenarios. The first section discusses the prospects for nuclear use. The second section discusses the opposite scenario by looking at the prospects for a protracted conventional war. While escalation concerns have attracted a great deal of scrutiny, scholars have paid much less attention to the possibility of a drawn-out fight. The third section evaluates which scenario is more likely in a US–China conflict. The conclusion discusses the political and military trade-offs leaders will face in a future crisis. Efforts to win quickly will increase the risk of nuclear use. Efforts to reduce the risk of escalation, on the other hand, will increase the risk of a prolonged war. Escalation What would cause leaders to cross the nuclear threshold? In some cases, the choice may be a conscious decision to marry conventional and nuclear doctrine and incorporate escalatory moves in prewar plans. This would be the case if they believe they can execute a preemptive first strike and disable or destroy the adversary’s arsenal. Preemptive attacks are particularly appealing against states with incautious or irrational leaders, especially if they possess small and vulnerable forces. Deliberate escalation is also possible if leaders believe that they must signal resolve by indicating their control at all levels of violence. Preparations for conventional war would transparently include plans for nuclear use in the case of certain contingencies. According to this logic, a clear signal of “escalation dominance” is necessary to convince the enemy that the risks are overwhelming and the prospects of victory are slim. If demonstrations of dominance fail, however, then the stronger state can simply execute its plan in order to defeat the enemy. US leaders in the Cold War invested in capabilities to enable attacks on enemy nuclear weapons and associated systems.6 If this was the case in the Cold War, when the United States faced a superpower adversary with a sprawling nuclear weapons complex, then leaders today probably remain interested in counterforce. Open-source analyses of US technology, along with some telling statements from US leaders, reveal an ongoing program for building and deploying weapons to preempt enemy escalation during a conventional conflict.7 They are also concerned with adversary innovations that complicate counterforce strikes.8 But suppose that leaders have no intention of using nuclear weapons. It is one thing to develop impressive technologies, but quite another to use them, and policymakers may blanch at the real prospect of authorizing first use. Even in these cases, there are several theoretical pathways to escalation. The first is psychological. Cognitive biases may cause leaders to misperceive rival intentions, mistaking signals of restraint for signs of danger. Prewar expectations strongly influence how individuals interpret new information, and they will ignore or reframe dissonant information so it fits into their existing beliefs. Misperceptions intensify after the shooting starts, when information is ambiguous and incomplete. Carl von Clausewitz dwelt on the problem in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, noting that intelligence reports were often contradictory and unreliable “in the thick of fighting.” Despite advances in intelligence and communications, the fog of war remains an enduring problem. Organized violence is an iterative process, and each side has incentives to hide its actions and deceive its adversary. Violence also unleashes intense emotions that obscure the material effects of battle. Commanders may not understand whether they are winning or losing, and in lieu of reliable intelligence they are likely to let passion overtake good judgment. “In short,” Clausewitz concluded, “most intelligence is false, and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and inaccuracies.” 9 Wartime leaders are prone to attribution bias, or the belief that their counterparts are inherently evil. Leaders in conflict are likely to assume the worst about their rivals or else they would not have picked a fight in the first place. Attribution bias causes them disregard the notion that their enemies have limited goals and are willing to accept partial victories. They are also prone to reject peace overtures as meaningless gestures at best, or as efforts to lull them into passivity before escalating the conflict.10 Finally, prospect theory tells us that individuals will fight harder to avoid losing a possession than they will to gain something new. If leaders equate settling with losing, then they will be tempted to risk escalation. All of these psychological pressures are exacerbated under stress and tight time constraints.11 Domestic pressures might lead to escalation if one or both governments fear that regime change will be the political penalty for battlefield failure. Escalation is also possible if the issues at stake are wrapped up in nationalism or ideologies that inflate the value of the object. Leaders will be hard pressed to accept defeat in such cases, especially if military outcome is particularly lopsided and humiliating. Leaders who depend on particularly hawkish constituencies to remain in power are especially likely to take new risks even against long odds. Rather than negotiating an end to the war, they might gamble for resurrection by escalating to the nuclear level.12 Such a move would not necessarily be irrational. Instead, resurrection succeeds by shifting the war towards the balance of interests rather than the balance of capabilities. A retreating combatant, battered in the early stages of a conflict, may still affect the enemy’s calculation by taking extraordinary risks. Escalation signals a willingness to fight to the finish and a reminder that it has powerful interests at stake. Such a strategy is admittedly risky, but it may be effective, especially if the escalating state is fighting to defend its own territory against a distant rival. Transforming a conflict into a test of resolve makes sense when a state is failing the test of arms.13 Finally, inadvertent escalation may occur when conventional attacks put the adversary’s nuclear force at risk. Under these conditions, the target state might reasonably worry that the attack is only the first phase of a larger war. There may be no way to offer credible reassurances that it is not. Fearing the destruction or incapacitation of its nuclear deterrent, the target state might face a “use it or lose it” dilemma. Inadvertent escalation is especially likely if key command and control nodes are vulnerable or if conventional and nuclear target sets are indistinguishable. The danger also increases if military organizations indulge organizational preferences for offensive action. This encourages planners to err on the side of attacking all available targets. While it might sense to allow the adversary to retain some capabilities in order to reduce the incentives for escalation, planners may bridle at the thought of consciously allowing the enemy to retain the capacity for attack.14 In recent years, China has invested heavily in capabilities that will complicate US maritime operations and threaten US bases in Japan and Guam. Equipped with a range of anti-access capabilities, China may be able to deter the United States from intervening in the case of a regional war. If it does intervene, China may attempt to damage or destroy US assets or force carrier groups to operate at prohibitively long distances from the mainland.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Goes nuclear --- it’s <u>most likely</u> if signaling is murky</h4><p><strong>Rovner 17</strong> – Professor of Political Science, SMU (Joshua, “Two kinds of catastrophe: nuclear escalation and protracted war in Asia,” Journal of Strategic Studies, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2017.1293532?journalCode=fjss20)</p><p>This clash of great power interests has led to concerns that a US–China war may be over the horizon. Such a war is not inevitable, of course, and both sides have obvious reasons to avoid any military conflict. But neither has shown much willingness to back down from the political issues at stake, some of which are infused with nationalism. As long as these issues remain unresolved, and as long as the United States remains committed to the allies who are at loggerheads with Beijing, then conflict will remain a possibility. <u><strong>The fact that <mark>both sides possess nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s raises the danger of a nuclear exchange, even over </mark>crises that begin over </u></strong>what to be relatively <u><strong><mark>minor disputes</u></strong></mark>.1 In the event of a war, <u><strong><mark>both China and the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>would seek a quick</mark> <mark>decisive victory</u></strong></mark>. Any war is likely to exact high costs in blood and treasure. Their high level of trade and financial interdependence, and the centrality of the United States and China to the global economy, means that a prolonged war would be an economic calamity. Chinese military doctrine increasingly stresses the importance of winning quickly, and it puts a premium on seizing the initiative and controlling the pace of combat under what it calls “informatized conditions.” The examples of the US wars in Iraq, Kosovo, and Afghanistan convinced Chinese thinkers that high-intensity conventional combat is no longer a question of relative industrial power. Instead, it is a competition for control of communications. In future conflicts, long-range attacks coupled with aggressive information operations will sew confusion and allow China to dictate the crucial opening stages. The 2001 edition of the Science of Military Strategy (SMS) states that China envisions precision strikes in order to “paralyze the enemy in one stroke.” 2 Organizational changes in the years that followed gave the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) more autonomy and responsibility for long-range strike. In addition, the 2013 edition of SMS called for the PLAAF to develop information operations capable of “effective suppression and destruction” of enemy’s information systems alongside an “information protection capability.” 3 Chinese leaders have committed to the PLA’s military space and counter-space capabilities, investing in more missions, more launches, and more satellites. Finally, the PLA has deliberately merged electronic warfare with psychological operations, based on the idea that confusing the enemy by undermining its communications will force it into operational sclerosis and have a profound psychological effect. The goal is to win fast. The PLA must “seize and control the battlefield initiative, paralyze and destroy the enemy’s operational system of systems, and shock the enemy’s will for war.” 4 This approach closely resembles the US model, which relies on prompt attacks on communications and intelligence networks, which will make it safe for follow-on forces to surge into theater and dictate the scope and pace of combat. American officers have become accustomed to short conventional clashes since the first Gulf War, and their basic operational concept remains largely unchanged. Doctrine continues to emphasize the importance of seizing the initiative, confusing the enemy, and establishing control. The standing joint publication on operations provides a neat summary of the US approach: As operations commence, the (joint force commander) needs to exploit friendly advantages and capabilities to shock, demoralize, and disrupt the enemy immediately. The JFC seeks decisive advantage through the use of all available elements of combat power to seize and maintain the initiative, deny the enemy the opportunity to achieve its objectives, and generate in the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat.5 Rapid attacks cause physical destruction and psychological damage, turning dangerous adversaries into helpless, disorganized, and vulnerable targets. Under these conditions, enemies have neither the ability nor the desire to fight on, and the United States can consolidate its initial gains with additional forces who face little or no resistance. In sum, China and the United States are preparing for a kind of highintensity warfare that requires executing rapid and complex operations while simultaneously disrupting the enemy’s command and control. Both sides believe this operational concept can lead to victory at a reasonably low cost, and are tailoring military doctrine to achieve specific political objectives without risking national disaster. What if both sides are wrong? <u><strong>Great powers often exaggerate their capabilities and minimize the importance of contingency and chance in war</u></strong>. Sometimes they launch campaigns with the false belief that war will be brief and painless, only to learn the opposite. Combat against a thinking adversary reveals the limits of existing capabilities in ways that are impossible to know before the fact. <u><strong>Strategic interaction during war plays havoc with prewar expectations</u></strong>, because the combatants do their utmost to undermine the other. Ambiguous information may not allow either side to judge whether it is succeeding, or, indeed, whether its forces are actually carrying out operations as intended. Great power wars rarely go according to plan. Good strategies thus contain a reasonable margin of error, and good strategists learn to think about what might go wrong. Contingency planning is especially important in cases where nuclear weapons may come into play This article discusses the relationship between conventional and nuclear weapons in a hypothetical war between the United States and China. Both countries have spent lavishly on new conventional military capabilities. Beijing is developing “anti-access” systems to make operations dangerous for US forces in the region, and Washington has responded by refining its operational approach. In the nuclear realm, <u><strong>China is undergoing a modernization of its arsenal and has revised its posture, while the United States has invested in increasingly accurate missile</u></strong>s, lethal warheads, and remote sensing technologies that enable <u><strong>rapid precision strikes</u></strong>. <u><strong>These trends may have</u></strong> important and <u><strong>troubling effects on the dynamics of a potential conventional military confrontation</u></strong>. While optimists imagine a quick and decisive victory, <u><strong>the presence of nuclear weapons opens the possibility of unexpected scenarios that neither side can fully control</u></strong>. The following discussion describes two such scenarios. The first section discusses the prospects for nuclear use. The second section discusses the opposite scenario by looking at the prospects for a protracted conventional war. While escalation concerns have attracted a great deal of scrutiny, scholars have paid much less attention to the possibility of a drawn-out fight. The third section evaluates which scenario is more likely in a US–China conflict. The conclusion discusses the political and military trade-offs leaders will face in a future crisis. <u><strong><mark>Efforts to win quickly </mark>will <mark>increase the risk of nuclear use</u></strong></mark>. Efforts to reduce the risk of escalation, on the other hand, will increase the risk of a prolonged war. Escalation What would cause leaders to cross the nuclear threshold? In some cases, the choice may be a conscious decision to marry conventional and nuclear doctrine and incorporate escalatory moves in prewar plans. This would be the case if they believe they can execute a preemptive first strike and disable or destroy the adversary’s arsenal. Preemptive attacks are particularly appealing against states with incautious or irrational leaders, especially if they possess small and vulnerable forces. Deliberate escalation is also possible if leaders believe that they must signal resolve by indicating their control at all levels of violence. Preparations for conventional war would transparently include plans for nuclear use in the case of certain contingencies. According to this logic, a clear signal of “escalation dominance” is necessary to convince the enemy that the risks are overwhelming and the prospects of victory are slim. If demonstrations of dominance fail, however, then the stronger state can simply execute its plan in order to defeat the enemy. US leaders in the Cold War invested in capabilities to enable attacks on enemy nuclear weapons and associated systems.6 If this was the case in the Cold War, when the United States faced a superpower adversary with a sprawling nuclear weapons complex, then leaders today probably remain interested in counterforce. Open-source analyses of US technology, along with some telling statements from US leaders, reveal an ongoing program for building and deploying weapons to preempt enemy escalation during a conventional conflict.7 They are also concerned with adversary innovations that complicate counterforce strikes.8 But <u><strong>suppose that leaders have no intention of using nuclear weapons</u></strong>. It is one thing to develop impressive technologies, but quite another to use them, and policymakers may blanch at the real prospect of authorizing first use. <u><strong>Even in these cases, there are several</u></strong> theoretical <u><strong>pathways to escalation. The first is psychological. <mark>Cognitive biases </mark>may <mark>cause leaders to misperceive rival intentions, mistaking signals of restraint for signs of danger</u></strong></mark>. Prewar expectations strongly influence how individuals interpret new information, and they will ignore or reframe dissonant information so it fits into their existing beliefs. <u><strong>Misperceptions intensify after the shooting starts</u></strong>, when information is ambiguous and incomplete. Carl von Clausewitz dwelt on the problem in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, noting that intelligence reports were often contradictory and unreliable “in the thick of fighting.” <u><strong><mark>Despite</mark> advances in <mark>intel</mark>ligence</u></strong> and communications, <u><strong><mark>the fog of war remains an enduring problem</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Organized violence is an iterative process, and each side has incentives to hide its actions and deceive its adversary. Violence also unleashes intense emotions that obscure the material effects of battle</u></strong>. Commanders may not understand whether they are winning or losing, and in lieu of reliable intelligence they are likely to let passion overtake good judgment. “In short,” Clausewitz concluded, “most intelligence is false, and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and inaccuracies.” 9 <u><strong>Wartime leaders are prone to attribution bias, or the belief that their counterparts are inherently evil. </u></strong>Leaders in conflict are likely to assume the worst about their rivals or else they would not have picked a fight in the first place. <u><strong><mark>Attribution bias causes them disregard </mark>the notion that their enemies have <mark>limited goals</u></strong></mark> and are willing to accept partial victories. <u><strong>They are also prone to reject peace overtures</u></strong> as meaningless gestures at best, or as efforts to lull them into passivity before escalating the conflict.10 Finally, prospect theory tells us that individuals will fight harder to avoid losing a possession than they will to gain something new. <u><strong>If leaders equate settling with losing, then they will be tempted to risk escalation</u></strong>. All of these psychological pressures are exacerbated under stress and tight time constraints.11 <u><strong>Domestic pressures might lead to escalation if one or both governments fear that regime change will be the political penalty</u></strong> for battlefield failure. <u><strong>Escalation is also possible if the issues at stake are wrapped up in nationalism</u></strong> or ideologies that inflate the value of the object. Leaders will be hard pressed to accept defeat in such cases, especially if military outcome is particularly lopsided and humiliating. Leaders who depend on particularly hawkish constituencies to remain in power are especially likely to take new risks even against long odds. Rather than negotiating an end to the war, they might gamble for resurrection by escalating to the nuclear level.12 Such a move would not necessarily be irrational. Instead, resurrection succeeds by shifting the war towards the balance of interests rather than the balance of capabilities. A retreating combatant, battered in the early stages of a conflict, may still affect the enemy’s calculation by taking extraordinary risks. <u><strong>Escalation signals a willingness to fight to the finish and a reminder that it has powerful interests at stake.</u></strong> Such a strategy is admittedly risky, but it may be effective, especially if the escalating state is fighting to defend its own territory against a distant rival. Transforming a conflict into a test of resolve makes sense when a state is failing the test of arms.13 Finally, <u><strong><mark>inadvertent escalation may occur when conventional attacks put the adversary’s nuclear force at risk</u></strong></mark>. Under these conditions, the target state might reasonably worry that the attack is only the first phase of a larger war. There may be no way to offer credible reassurances that it is not. <u><strong>Fearing the destruction</u></strong> or incapacitation <u><strong>of its nuclear deterrent, <mark>the target state might face a “use it or lose it” dilemma</u></strong></mark>. Inadvertent escalation is especially likely if key command and control nodes are vulnerable or if conventional and nuclear target sets are indistinguishable. The danger also increases if military organizations indulge organizational preferences for offensive action. This encourages planners to err on the side of attacking all available targets. While it might sense to allow the adversary to retain some capabilities in order to reduce the incentives for escalation, planners may bridle at the thought of consciously allowing the enemy to retain the capacity for attack.14 In recent years, China has invested heavily in capabilities that will complicate US maritime operations and threaten US bases in Japan and Guam. Equipped with a range of anti-access capabilities, China may be able to deter the United States from intervening in the case of a regional war. If it does intervene, China may attempt to damage or destroy US assets or force carrier groups to operate at prohibitively long distances from the mainland.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Malkopoulou 20 [Anthoula Malkopoulou is Docent and Lecturer at the Department of Government, Uppsala University. She has been a Marie Curie Fellow at the same department and a visiting fellow at the Faculty of Arts Program. “Compulsory voting and right-wing populism: mobilisation, representation and socioeconomic inequalities.” June 8, 2020. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10361146.2020.1774507] fulltext: Socioeconomic inequalities The problem: populist promises of greater equality So far, I have shown how populism and mandatory voting constitute two qualitatively different strategies for addressing the ills of demobilisation and underrepresentation. Yet, for many scholars, these two so-called political grievances are not the only type of grievances explaining the populist phenomenon. Economic and cultural grievances are cited as equally relevant, if not more so. How important for populist mobilisation are cultural grievances? Cultural grievances include ‘the rise of immigration and the failure to culturally and socially integrate new minorities, especially of Muslim origin’ (Ivarsflaten 2008; see also Oesch 2008), as well as ‘a retro reaction’ to progressive values (Norris and Inglehart 2018). It has been claimed, however, that ‘what may look like a racist or xenophobic backlash may have its roots in economic anxieties and dislocations’ (Rodrik 2018, 25). Likewise, Guiso et al. argue that ‘populism does not have a cultural cause, but rather an economic insecurity cause, with an important and traceable cultural channel’ (Guiso, Herrera, and Morelli 2017, 41, emphasis in the original). In other words, cultural grievances may only be the political manifestation of reactions to economic shocks, a strategic way to channel economic anxiety into opposition for immigrants and refugees with different cultural and religious identities. These observations create increasing support for the idea that the populist backlash originates in economic grievances. A growing number of scholars indeed point at the link between populism and macroeconomic changes, for example, welfare state retrenchment or wage repression (Guiso, Herrera, and Morelli 2017; Dal Bó et al. 2018). In fact, the rise of economic inequalities in Europe and the United States since the 1970s has been exacerbated by post-industrial developments and global trade practices, such as the outsourcing of manufacturing industries. As a result, local communities, especially semi-urban and rural ones, have seen a decrease in social mobility and an increase of economic insecurity (Bonikowski 2017). Moreover, the 2008 financial crisis created an unusual sense of combined inability for both governments and markets to provide economic security (Guiso, Herrera, and Morelli 2017). According to the economic-grievance model, then, voters are attracted to right-wing populist parties either as a protest against mainstream parties’ economic policies or indeed as a preference for populist economic policies (Rydgren 2005; Mudde 2007; Betz and Meret 2013). In response to this, many right-wing populist parties have adopted pro-welfare positions, although their overall economic agendas may remain pro-market, ambiguous, or even irrelevant for their political appeal (Ivarsflaten 2008; De Koster, Achterberg, and Van der Waal 2013). Regardless of right-wing populist parties’ actual economic policies, it remains a given that the rhetorical promise of greater socioeconomic equality is key for populist mobilisation. The winning formula of populists is that they shake the established political order by bringing in radical ideas, new faces with little-to-no over-exposure to political office, a willingness to violate basic norms and to upend the status quo (Bonikowski 2017, 204). Their program is appealing because it highlights and unequivocally condemns inequalities and offers an – often unreasonable – vision for how to overcome them. In the words of Benjamin Arditi (2007, 97): ‘Their individual gesture of unveiling present inequality and depicting it as unjust and unnecessary educates us in the promise of a seemingly impossible equality to come. It opens the way for emancipation’. However, unlike traditional left-wing calls for economic egalitarianism, populists base their claims not on class, but on popular sovereignty (Da Silva and Vieira 2018, 12). Because ‘the people’ is a fluid category with unclear borders, it is up to the populist leader to define these borders in economic but also in political, social and cultural terms. As a result, the populist promise of socioeconomic equality expends the universalist criterion of equality for all in favour of a particularistic claim of equality for (only those who constitute) ‘the people’; in combination with radical right ethno-nationalism, this particularistic claim for socioeconomic equality then easily transforms into support for welfare chauvinism. The solution: egalitarian outcomes of universal turnout In view of the questionable egalitarian promise of populism, my third and last argument is that compulsory voting is a more reliable tool for reducing socioeconomic inequalities compared to populist mobilisation. In what sense do high turnouts lead to more egalitarian policies? Firstly, we know that voters who turn out have a higher impact on policymaking than voters who abstain – this is because politicians pay closer attention to habitual voting groups (for a full overview of the relevant literature see Hill 2014, 137–141). When turnout is low, habitual voters are more likely to be ‘white, well-off, home-owning, educated, older and middle-class’, in other words, voters who are already better off (Chong and Mauricio 2008; Mahler 2008; Birch 2009; Fowler 2013). Conversely, when turnout is high, the active electorate is more socially diverse. Indeed, high turnout closes voting gaps associated with socioeconomic status, 5 but also with other sources of inequality like ethnic origin and gender (Córdova and Rangel 2017). This makes governments and political parties more responsive to all citizens, not just the well-off. What follows is that high turnouts lead to policy outputs that better serve the interests of typical non-voters. Many empirical case studies confirm the solid relationship between, on one hand, the demographic profile of voters who show up at the polls and, on the other, public policies that favour the wellbeing of these groups (e.g. Martin 2003, 111; Griffin and Newman 2005; Chong and Mauricio 2008; Mahler 2008; Gallego 2010; Peters and Ensink 2015). For example, in some US constituencies where the disadvantaged vote in higher numbers, there is more redistribution and higher amounts of welfare state assistance (Martin 2003). A few historical examples also point to the same conclusions. In Australia, a hike in turnouts following the introduction of compulsory voting in 1924 brought more poor citizens to the polls and led to a ‘dramatic increase in pension spending’ (Fowler 2013). 6 Similarly, in Switzerland, sanctions for non-voting in pre-WWII referenda increased support for leftist, redistributive policies, such as a guaranteed minimum wage, higher unemployment benefits and increased public sector spending (Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid 2016); the evidence is robust enough to suggest that compulsory voting may have single-handedly contributed to building the Swiss modern welfare state (Ibid., 765). In general, as Sarah Birch (2009) has shown, high turnouts in compulsory voting settings are associated with lower wealth inequality (Birch 2009, 131). The overall picture here is that compulsory voting effectively causes more egalitarian socioeconomic outcomes. As a result, a system where everyone votes produces less sudden demand for egalitarian socioeconomic policies. This is because such policies are supported systematically and consistently as a result of the way the political system is structured: with more electoral participation leading to more even responsiveness and policy outcomes. Because voters who habitually abstain tend to favour egalitarian policies, in mandatory systems political parties across the political spectrum are incentivised to campaign and vouch for these policies. In other words, compulsory voting systems are less likely to allow conditions where socioeconomic inequalities are so profound to fuel the success of right-wing populist parties. success of right-wing populist parties.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><u>Second</u>, CV <u>decreases demand</u> for populism by addressing the underlying <u>socioeconomic inequality</u> which <u>breeds populism</u> – <u>only </u>CV creates a <u>structure</u> where politicians have an incentive to <u>systematically</u> and <u>consistently</u> address inequality which is key to reduce <u>populist currents<strong>.</h4><p></u>Malkopoulou 20</strong> [Anthoula Malkopoulou is Docent and Lecturer at the Department of Government, Uppsala University. She has been a Marie Curie Fellow at the same department and a visiting fellow at the Faculty of Arts Program. “Compulsory voting and right-wing populism: mobilisation, representation and socioeconomic inequalities.” June 8, 2020. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10361146.2020.1774507<u><mark>]</p><p></u></mark>Socioeconomic inequalities The problem<u>: <mark>populist promises</mark> of <mark>greater equality</mark> So far, I have shown how populism and mandatory voting constitute two qualitatively different strategies for addressing the ills of demobilisation and underrepresentation. Yet, for many scholars, these two so-called political grievances are not the only type of grievances explaining the populist phenomenon. <strong>Economic</strong> and cultural <strong>grievances</strong> are cited as equally relevant, if not more so. How important for populist mobilisation are cultural grievances? Cultural grievances include ‘the rise of immigration and the failure to culturally and socially integrate new minorities, especially of Muslim origin’ (Ivarsflaten 2008; see also Oesch 2008), as well as ‘a retro reaction’ to progressive values (Norris and Inglehart 2018). It has been claimed, however, that ‘what may look like a racist or xenophobic backlash may have its roots in economic anxieties and dislocations’ (Rodrik 2018, 25). Likewise, Guiso et al. argue that ‘populism does not have a cultural cause, but rather an economic insecurity cause, with an important and traceable cultural channel’ (Guiso, Herrera, and Morelli 2017, 41, emphasis in the original). In other words, cultural grievances may only be the political manifestation of reactions to economic shocks, a strategic way to channel economic anxiety into opposition for immigrants and refugees with different cultural and religious identities. </u>These observations create increasing<u> support for the idea that the <strong><mark>populist backlash</strong> originates in <strong>economic grievances</strong></mark>. A growing number of <mark>scholars</mark> indeed point at the <mark>link</mark> between <strong><mark>populism</strong> and <strong>macroeconomic changes</strong></mark>, for example, <strong><mark>welfare</strong></mark> state <mark>retrenchment or <strong>wage repression</strong></mark> (Guiso, Herrera, and Morelli 2017; Dal Bó et al. 2018). In fact, the rise of economic inequalities in Europe and the United States since the 1970s has been exacerbated by post-industrial developments and global trade practices, such as the outsourcing of manufacturing industries. As a result, local communities, especially semi-urban and rural ones, have seen a decrease in social mobility and an increase of economic insecurity (Bonikowski 2017). Moreover, the 2008 financial crisis created an unusual sense of combined inability for both governments and markets to provide economic security (Guiso, Herrera, and Morelli 2017). According to the economic-grievance model, then, <mark>voters are <strong>attracted</strong> to</mark> right-wing <strong><mark>populist parties</strong></mark> either <mark>as a protest against mainstream</mark> parties’ <strong><mark>economic policies</strong></mark> or indeed as a preference for populist economic policies (Rydgren 2005; Mudde 2007; Betz and Meret 2013). In response to this, many right-wing </u>populist parties have adopted<u> pro-welfare positions, although their overall <mark>economic agendas</mark> may remain pro-market, ambiguous, or even irrelevant <strong><mark>for their political appeal</strong></mark> (Ivarsflaten 2008; De Koster, Achterberg, and Van der Waal 2013). Regardless of <mark>right-wing populist parties’</mark> actual economic policies, it remains a given that the <strong>rhetorical <mark>promise</strong></mark> of greater <strong><mark>socioeconomic equality</strong></mark> is <mark>key for</mark> populist <strong><mark>mobilisation</strong></mark>. The winning formula of populists is that they shake the established political order by bringing in radical ideas, new faces with little-to-no over-exposure to political office, a willingness to violate basic norms and to upend the status quo (Bonikowski 2017, 204). <mark>Their program is <strong>appealing</strong> because it <strong>highlights</strong></mark> and unequivocally <strong>condemns <mark>inequalities</strong></mark> and offers an – often unreasonable – vision for how to overcome them. In the words of Benjamin Arditi (2007, 97): ‘Their individual gesture of unveiling present inequality and depicting it as unjust and unnecessary educates us in the promise of a seemingly impossible equality to come. It opens the way for emancipation’. However, unlike traditional left-wing calls for economic egalitarianism, populists base their claims not on class, but on popular sovereignty (Da Silva and Vieira 2018, 12). Because ‘the people’ is a fluid category with unclear borders, it is up to the populist leader to define these borders in economic but also in political, social and cultural terms. As a result, the populist promise of socioeconomic equality expends the universalist criterion of equality for all in favour of a particularistic claim of equality for (only those who constitute) ‘the people’; in combination with radical right ethno-nationalism, this particularistic claim for socioeconomic equality then easily transforms into support for welfare chauvinism. The solution: egalitarian outcomes of universal turnout In view of the questionable egalitarian promise of populism, my third and last argument is that <mark>c</mark>ompulsory <mark>v</mark>oting is a more <strong>reliable tool</strong> for <mark>reduc</mark>ing socioeconomic <mark>inequalities</mark> compared to populist mobilisation. In what sense do <strong><mark>high turnouts</strong> lead to</mark> more <strong><mark>egalitarian policies</strong></mark>? Firstly, we know that <mark>voters who turn out have a <strong>higher impact</strong> on <strong>policymaking</strong></mark> than voters who <strong>abstain</strong> – this is because <mark>politicians pay <strong>closer attention</strong> to <strong>habitual voting groups</strong></mark> (for a full overview of the relevant literature see Hill 2014, 137–141). <mark>When turnout is low</mark>, <mark>habitual voters are</mark> more likely to be ‘<strong>white</strong>, <strong>well-off</strong>, home-owning, educated, older and <strong>middle-class’</strong>, in other words, voters who are <strong><mark>already better off</strong></mark> (Chong and Mauricio 2008; Mahler 2008; Birch 2009; Fowler 2013). Conversely, <mark>when turnout is high</mark>, <mark>the</mark> <strong>active <mark>electorate</strong> is more</mark> <strong>socially <mark>diverse</strong></mark>. Indeed, high turnout closes <strong>voting gaps</strong> associated <mark>with <strong>socioeconomic status</strong></mark>, 5 but also with other sources of inequality like ethnic origin and gender (Córdova and Rangel 2017). <mark>This makes governments</mark> and political parties more <mark>responsive to <strong>all citizens</strong></mark>, not just the well-off. What follows is that high turnouts lead to <strong>policy outputs</strong> that better <strong>serve the interests of typical non-voters</strong>. Many <strong>empirical <mark>case studies</strong> confirm the <strong>solid relationship</strong></mark> between, on one hand, the <strong>demographic profile</strong> of voters who show up at the polls and, on the other, public policies that favour the <strong>wellbeing of these groups</strong> (e.g. Martin 2003, 111; Griffin and Newman 2005; Chong and Mauricio 2008; Mahler 2008; Gallego 2010; Peters and Ensink 2015). For example, <mark>in</mark> some <mark>US constituencies where</mark> the <strong><mark>disadvantaged</strong> vote in <strong>higher numbers</mark>,</strong> <mark>there is more <strong>redistribution</strong> and higher</mark> amounts of <strong><mark>welfare</strong></mark> state assistance (Martin 2003). A few <strong>historical examples</strong> also point to the <strong>same conclusions</strong>. <mark>In Australia</mark>, a hike in turnouts <mark>following the introduction of <strong>compulsory voting</strong></mark> in 1924 <mark>brought more <strong>poor citizens</strong> to the polls and led to a ‘<strong>dramatic increase in pension spending’</strong> (Fowler 2013). 6 Similarly, in Switzerland, sanctions for non-voting in pre-WWII referenda <strong>increased support</strong> for leftist, <strong>redistributive policies</strong>, such as a <strong>guaranteed minimum wage</strong>, higher <strong>unemployment benefits</strong> and increased <strong>public sector spending</strong> (Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid 2016); the evidence is robust enough to suggest that <strong>compulsory voting</strong> may have <strong>single-handedly contributed</strong> to building the Swiss <strong>modern welfare state</strong> (Ibid., 765). In general, as Sarah Birch (2009) has shown, high turnouts in compulsory voting settings are associated with <strong>lower wealth inequality</strong> (Birch 2009, 131). The overall picture here is that compulsory voting effectively causes more egalitarian socioeconomic outcomes. As a result, a system where <strong>everyone votes</strong> produces <strong>less</strong> sudden <strong>demand</strong> for egalitarian socioeconomic policies. This is because such policies are supported <strong>systematically</strong> and <strong>consistently</strong> as a result of the way the <strong>political system is structured</strong>: with more electoral participation leading to more <strong>even responsiveness</strong> and <strong>policy outcomes</strong>. Because voters who habitually abstain tend to favour egalitarian policies, in mandatory systems political parties across the political spectrum are incentivised to campaign and vouch for these policies. In other words, compulsory voting systems are less likely to allow <strong>conditions</strong> where <strong>socioeconomic inequalities</strong> are so profound to fuel the success of <strong>right-wing populist parties</strong>.</p><p>success of <strong>right-wing populist parties</strong>.</p></u></mark><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: David Marriott Durmukhi. Professor, UC Santa Cruz. “Cultural Studies in Emerging Knowledge.” Rhizomes 29: 1-5. http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/pdf/marriott.pdf. fulltext: [5] We know that the case of blackness (and its juridical rhetoric) includes at least two questions: what is this thing called blackness and how is it to be represented? The junction at which these two questions meet in Peau noire, masques blancs is that of a flaw: this flaw is born very specifically from an experience of ruination 'that interdicts any ontological explanation'.[12] In the colony, the phenomenological form of social power is never immediate, that is to say, a relation of representation, but a confrontation that designifies, and, at the same time, resignifies social relations once they are racially determined, a confrontation in which both being and law acquire new significations born out of disavowal (what Fanon defines as the lactifying desire for substitution or separation of the black from the négre, and of the white from its other) and of amplification (the recoding of the social and symbolic order by racial signifiers of precarity and threat, fear and impoverishment). Saying that there is a question whether blackness is disavowed in Fanon, a disavowal whose meaning is in dispute, does not, however, explain why Moten continues to use the language of ontology and of law to explain Fanon's writing on blackness as a phenomenology. The etymology of the word 'case' also includes that of contingency and of fall (lapsus); that is to say, the meaning of blackness is not prescribed, and has no prior signification before it is raced. This contingency or fall (the lapsus or trauma of racialization) denotes not a prescribed imperfection but refers to the time, paradoxically enough, in which the black comes face to face with its own contaminating filiation with the négre, a confrontation that is never simply in the order of an object, but is that of an exposure that is also the work of a certain concealment; it is a moment in which any simple history (of escape or confinement, mimicry or identification) is necessarily the impure avowal of an imaginary longing for a colorless presence, meaning, or proximity. If one accepts, along with Moten, that blackness always escapes its positioning in either law or representation, and if it were to be shown that neither that law (or its history) nor that representation (or its history) can capture 'the case blackness makes for itself in spite of and by way of every interdiction', according to which this case names both a specific pathology and object, then why hold onto this juridical rhetoric (with respect to the case) to present that which apparently always escapes law and representation?[13] [6] By writing blackness as ceaseless fugitivity, Moten has moved towards a position in which blackness is only black when it exceeds its racist disavowal. Or, the blackness of blackness can only be recognized as black in so far as it escapes the racism of its history: but what allows us to see this escape is not blackness, but its racist disavowal. Or, in order to reconcile blackness with that which blackness supposedly is, Moten has to rely on the narrative of its constraint or pathology, which he cannot do without: this pathology enables Moten to avoid the disavowing naiveties of Fanon but only in so far as he too reads naively, or optimistically. A third possibility would make this disavowing claim, that Moten wants to make deliver up its secrets, a sign of how Moten himself disavows how racist disavowal complicates his reading of what he describes as Fanon's phenomenology, in which impurity inevitably generates a pathological meaning. Or again: if Fanon hears what Moten does not hear (in terms of his reading of the case), this is because Moten can only affirm blackness as affirmation, not because it escapes pathology, but because blackness is experienced only as the activity of escape, but one which never escapes the ontology of such production. It follows that blackness cannot escape its own fugitivity; its constitutive moment is traversal (or, what constitutes it is its force of subversion with regard to the pathological classifications of blackness). If Fanon fails 'to investigate more adequately the change from object to thing', one could also suggest this failure fails to address, or forecloses, that other scene in Fanon; in short, how the very distinction between object and thing refuses to engage with the Fanonian unconscious (in which the object is neither simply represented nor simply fugitive to the languages of law, ontology, or difference).[14] The form of this problem seems to be linked to what can appear to be a persistent equivocation in Moten's reading of Fanon between apparently ontological claims and the use of the aesthetic-political to somehow escape ontology. This situation, which would demand new formulations of the relationship between ontology and the aesthetic-political, is perhaps programmed by the logic of a presentation which needs to see a radical break between them, a necessity whose prescription is also thus disavowed. [7] This scenario is not an easy one to follow, and might therefore be described as itself Fanonian. Moten defines as black a situation in which the obligation to steal away goes along with a 'movement of escape' that is not criminal and cannot be 'enframed' as such. Moten states this movement as follows: blackness is 'an ensemble always operating in excess of that ancient juridical formulation of the thing', it is 'a stolen, transplanted organ always eliciting rejection', and, 'the lived experience of blackness is, among other things, a constant demand for an ontology of disorder, an ontology of dehiscence' and so on.[15] Aside from noting the logical instability of this 'always': namely, if x is always escaping then it cannot be said to ever entirely escape, it is clear that, according to Moten's own logic, these descriptions leave it completely undecidable whether blackness is fugitive because it never quite escapes (its enslavement, its impurity), or whether it always thereby escapes how it is rendered black, or not, precisely because it is not an object. Moten refers to this situation as the 'special ontic-ontological fugitivity of/in the slave' which he says is 'necessarily unaccounted for in Fanon'.[16] I am not going to provide any detailed commentary on this word 'necessarily', although it would not be difficult to construct an argument showing that Fanon, in so far as he insists on the necessary mis-recognition of blackness as black, is in fact in some senses the most radical discourse of why blackness remains unaccounted for. Nor would it be difficult to argue that Fanon escapes the hold of the pathological/normative opposition. I shall also try to resist the temptation of denouncing a very general tendency to present the operation of disavowal as a 'critique' of what Fanon himself says about racist disavowal, of assuming that when Fanon says that black lived experience names both a specific discourse of misrecognition and the symptom of that misrecognition, that attempts to name misrecognition, such as Moten's, which attempt to position Fanonism as a misrecognition of what blackness is, would themselves not generate further cases of misrecogniton, or escape the naivety of such optimism. Instead, I shall narrow down the scenario still further and consider something like the logic of escape in Moten's engagement with phenomenology, especially with respect to his own representations of the aesthetic-political. This restriction will seem only the more excessive in that I shall appeal to only a very small part of Moten's case history, ignoring notably all of what he says about art here, and concentrating on what he says about theft, in the sense of stolen from or dispossession.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The aff can never move beyond fugitivity.</h4><p>David <strong>Marriott </strong>Durmukhi. Professor, UC Santa Cruz. “Cultural Studies in Emerging Knowledge.” Rhizomes 29: 1-5. http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/pdf/marriott.pdf.</p><p>[5] We know that the case of blackness (and its juridical rhetoric) includes at least two questions: what is this thing called blackness and how is it to be represented? The junction at which these two questions meet in Peau noire, masques blancs is that of a flaw: this flaw is born very specifically from an experience of ruination 'that interdicts any ontological explanation'.[12] In the colony, the phenomenological form of social power is never immediate, that is to say, a relation of representation, but a confrontation that designifies, and, at the same time, resignifies social relations once they are racially determined, a confrontation in which both being and law acquire new significations born out of disavowal (what Fanon defines as the lactifying desire for substitution or separation of the black from the négre, and of the white from its other) and of amplification (the recoding of the social and symbolic order by racial signifiers of precarity and threat, fear and impoverishment). <u>Saying that there is a question whether blackness is disavowed in Fanon, a disavowal whose meaning is in dispute, <strong>does not</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>explain</strong> why Moten continues to use the language of ontology and of law to explain Fanon's writing on blackness as a phenomenology</u>. <u>The etymology of the word 'case'</u> also <u>includes that of <strong>contingency</u></strong> and of fall (lapsus); <u>that is to say, the meaning of blackness is <strong>not prescribed</strong>, and has no prior signification before it is raced</u>. This contingency or fall (the lapsus or trauma of racialization) denotes not a prescribed imperfection but refers to the time, paradoxically enough, in which the black comes face to face with its own contaminating filiation with the négre, a confrontation that is never simply in the order of an object, but is that of an exposure that is also the work of a certain concealment; it is a moment in which any simple history (of escape or confinement, mimicry or identification) is necessarily the impure avowal of an imaginary longing for a colorless presence, meaning, or proximity. <u>If one accepts, along with Moten, that blackness always escapes its positioning in either law or representation, and if it were to be shown that neither that law (or its history) nor that representation (or its history) can capture 'the case blackness makes for itself in spite of and by way of every interdiction', according to which this case names both a specific pathology and object, then <strong>why</strong> hold onto this juridical rhetoric (with respect to the case) to present that which <strong>apparently</strong> always escapes law and representation?</u>[13]</p><p>[6] <u>By writing blackness as ceaseless fugitivity, Moten</u> has <u>moved towards a position in which blackness is only black when it exceeds its racist disavowal</u>. <u>Or, the blackness of blackness can only be recognized as black in so far as it escapes the racism of its history: but what allows us to see this escape is not blackness, but its racist disavowal</u>. Or, <u>in order to reconcile blackness with that which blackness supposedly is, Moten has to rely on the narrative of its constraint or pathology, <strong>which he cannot do without</u></strong>: this pathology enables Moten to avoid the disavowing naiveties of Fanon but only in so far as he too reads naively, or optimistically. A third possibility would make this disavowing claim, that Moten wants to make deliver up its secrets, a sign of how Moten himself disavows how racist disavowal complicates his reading of what he describes as Fanon's phenomenology, in which impurity inevitably generates a pathological meaning. Or again: if Fanon hears what Moten does not hear (in terms of his reading of the case), this is because <u>Moten can only affirm blackness as affirmation, not because it escapes pathology, but because blackness is experienced <strong>only</strong> as the activity of escape, but one which <strong>never escapes the ontology of such production</u></strong>. <u>It follows that blackness <strong>cannot escape</strong> its own fugitivity; its constitutive moment is traversal (or, what constitutes it is its force of subversion with regard to the pathological classifications of blackness)</u>. If Fanon fails 'to investigate more adequately the change from object to thing', one could also suggest <u>this failure</u> fails to address, or <u><strong>forecloses</u></strong>, that other scene in Fanon; in short, <u>how the very distinction between <strong>object and thing</strong> refuses to engage with the Fanonian unconscious (in which the object is <strong>neither</strong> simply represented nor simply fugitive to the languages of <strong>law</strong>, <strong>ontology</strong>, or <strong>difference</strong>)</u>.[14] <u>The form of this problem seems to be linked to what can appear to be a persistent equivocation in Moten's reading of Fanon between apparently ontological claims and the use of the aesthetic-political to somehow escape ontology</u>. <u>This situation, which would demand new formulations of the relationship between ontology and the aesthetic-political, is perhaps programmed by the logic of a presentation which needs to see a radical break between them, a necessity whose prescription is also thus <strong>disavowed</u></strong>.</p><p>[7] <u>This scenario is not an easy one to follow</u>, and might therefore be described as itself Fanonian. Moten defines as black a situation in which the obligation to steal away goes along with a 'movement of escape' that is not criminal and cannot be 'enframed' as such. Moten states this movement as follows: blackness is 'an ensemble always operating in excess of that ancient juridical formulation of the thing', it is 'a stolen, transplanted organ always eliciting rejection', and, 'the lived experience of blackness is, among other things, a constant demand for an ontology of disorder, an ontology of dehiscence' and so on.[15] <u>Aside from noting the logical instability of this 'always': namely, if x is always escaping then it cannot be said to ever entirely escape, it is clear that, according to <strong>Moten's own logic</strong>, these descriptions leave it completely undecidable whether blackness is fugitive because it <strong>never</strong> quite escapes (its enslavement, its impurity), or whether it always thereby escapes how it is rendered black, or not, precisely because it is not an object</u>. Moten refers to this situation as the 'special ontic-ontological fugitivity of/in the slave' which he says is 'necessarily unaccounted for in Fanon'.[16] I am not going to provide any detailed commentary on this word 'necessarily', although it would not be difficult to construct an argument showing that <u>Fanon</u>, in so far as he <u>insists on the necessary mis-recognition of blackness as black, is</u> in fact in some senses <u>the most radical discourse of why blackness remains unaccounted for</u>. Nor would it be difficult to argue that <u>Fanon escapes the hold of the pathological/normative opposition</u>. I shall also try to resist the temptation of denouncing <u>a very general tendency to present the operation of disavowal as a 'critique' of</u> what Fanon himself says about <u>racist disavowal</u>, of assuming that when Fanon says that <u>black lived experience names both a specific discourse of misrecognition and the symptom of that misrecognition, that attempts to name misrecognition, such as Moten's, which attempt to position Fanonism as a misrecognition of what blackness is, would themselves</u> not <u><strong>generate further cases of misrecogniton</u></strong>, or escape <u>the naivety of such optimism</u>. Instead, I shall narrow down the scenario still further and consider something like the logic of escape in Moten's engagement with phenomenology, especially with respect to his own representations of the aesthetic-political. This restriction will seem only the more excessive in that I shall appeal to only a very small part of Moten's case history, ignoring notably all of what he says about art here, and concentrating on what he says about theft, in the sense of stolen from or dispossession.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Bilgin ‘5 (Assistant Prof of International Relations at Bilkent University, REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE, pp. 50-54) fulltext: It is not only the conception of practice adopted by Gray and Garnett but also that of theory that is restricted in that both conceive theory as ‘problem-solving theory", in Robert Cox’s (1981) terms; it is there to assist policy-makers in solving problems (Gray 1992: 626-31). Security Studies, in this sense, is supposed to deal with issues that are deemed problematic by policy-makers,2' leaving untouched other issues that do not make it to govemmental agendas. This, in turn, creates a vicious circle where issues to be put on the security agenda are decided by policy-makers and analysed by those who they consider as ‘experts’. Those who propound alternative views are dismissed as mere propagandists and the issues they identified, such as ‘structural violence’, are not allowed on security agendas. This position is still prevalent in certain strands of security thinking in the post-Cold War era (see, for example, Walt 1991). Moreover, Garnett argues that strategists, even if they adopted a critical stance (and were allowed to get their voices heard) would not make much difference. He maintains that: if a conflict-oriented view of international politics has caught the public imagination . . . this is not because it is propagated by strategists but because it offers the man in the street a more plausible interpretation of international reality than any of the alternatives to which he has been exposed. (Gamett 1987: 22) This statement is yet another manifestation of Garnett's restricted notion of theory (which, in turn, is representative of Cold War thinking on security). After all, what the ‘man in the street’ views as ‘a more plausible interpretation of intemational reality’ (Garnett 1987: 22) is shaped by theories and discourses that were /are dominant at the time.” Garnett’s statement also hints at an underestimation of the power of theories in informing not only governmental policies, but also individuals’ conceptions of the world. These conceptions that individuals absorb, accept and live uncritically constitute what Gramsci calls ‘common sense’ which helps sustain the status quo by ‘making situations of inequality and oppression appear to them as natural and unchangeable’ (Forgacs 1988). To go back to Kaldor’s argument regarding the Cold War, it was the ‘imaginary war’ discourse of realist Security Studies that informed men and women in North America and Western Europe of the relevance, legitimacy and inescapability of power politics, tough responses and brinkmanship. In sum, it was these objectivist conceptions of theory and the theory/practice relationship, a restricted notion of theory as ‘problem solving theory’ and practice as governmental policy-making that have, for long, sustained an underestimation of the role theories play in helping constitute ‘reality’ and narrowed the ethical and political horizons of security thinking and practice. Contra Garnett, the role of theories is not to take these conceptions as given but to try and enter into people’s ‘common sense’ and to present them a critical understanding of their own situation. Accordingly, theory is viewed as constitutive of the ‘reality’ it seeks to explain. As Steve Smith has argued: Theories do not simply explain or predict. They tell us what possibilities exist for human action and intervention; they define not merely our explanatory possibilities but also our ethical and political horizons. (Smith 1996: 13) The argument here is not that theories ‘create’ the world in a philosophical idealist sense of the term, but that theories help organise knowledge, which, in turn, informs, enables, privileges or legitimises certain practices whilst inhibiting or marginalising others (as with the relationship between Middle Eastern security discourse and the ‘invention’ of the ‘Middle East’). Given this self-constitutive potential of security thinking, critical self-reflection becomes crucial for students of critical approaches to security. The role of the students of security, in this sense, is to try and be self-conscious about the normative and mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice in their thinking and writing rather than feeding ‘common sense’ back into the system hiding behind a notion of ‘objectivity’. It should be noted that one advantage of feeding ‘common sense’ into the system is that it is readily accepted by those who are in a position of power. Indeed, as Steve Smith maintains, once established as common sense, theories become incredibly powerful since they delineate not simply what can be known but also what it is sensible to talk about or suggest. Those who swim outside these safe waters risk more than simply the judgement that their theories are wrong; their entire ethical or moral stance may be ridiculed or seen as dangerous just because their theoretical assumptions are deemed unrealistic. Defining common sense is therefore the ultimate act of political power. (Smith 1996: 13; see also Smith I997) In other words, although theory/practice relationship is one of mutual constitution, not all theories get to shape practices. Then, the answer to the question why theorising may become self-constitutive in some cases (such as the Cold War security discourse) but not in others (as with Peace Research) is rooted in the power/knowledge relationship. More often than not, it is theories that are picked up by those in positions of power that get to shape what men and women in the street view as ‘a more plausible interpretation of international reality’ - as john Gamett (1987: 22) wrote when explaining the way realism has prevailed over the years. Furthermore, ‘dominant discourses, especially those of the state, become and remain dominant because of the power relations sustaining them’ (Weldes et al. 1999: 18). In this sense, it is difficult to underestimate the power of theories in informing not only governmental policies, but also individuals’ conceptions of the world. Here, Kaldor’s (1990) argument regarding the Cold War is again instructive in accounting for the ways in which Cold War security discourse informed men and women in North America and Western Europe of the relevance, legitimacy and inescapability of power politics, tough responses and brinkmanship. The competition between theories over shaping practices and therefore the future never takes place on a level playing field. To understand theory as constitutive of ‘reality’ is not to suggest that once we get our theories right the rest would follow. What shape the future might take would depend on whose theories get to shape practices. For example (as Chapter 2 will argue), the reason why the lands to the southwest of Asia and north of Africa were lumped together in the mind’s eye and labelled the ‘Middle East’, but not something else, has had its roots in the dominance of British and US security discourses. The sources of their dominance could, in turn, be found in the material (military and economic) as well as representational power of these actors. Here I distinguish between the representational and material dimensions of power for analytical reasons in an attempt to stress that the workings of the power/ knowledge relationship cannot be accounted for by adopting a narrow or purely material conception of power. Rather, one’s conception of power should account for its representational dimension as well; that is, the power to shape ideas. One potential problem involved in trying to account for the representational dimension of power is that it cannot be observed in the same way as the material dimension can be; the latter is often utilised to keep issues outside security agendas, thereby averting conflict. In the absence of overt (or latent) conflict, no observable behaviour change takes place. However, the absence of an observable power relationship does not necessarily mean there is not one. To be able to account for such instances of power relationships, I adopt, following Steven Lukes (1974: 24), a ‘three-dimensional view of power’ that ‘allows for consideration of the many ways in which potential issues are kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social forces and institutional practices or through individuals’ decisions’. Adopting a conception of power that stresses both its material and representational dimensions enables me to account for the ways in which some discourses come to dominate others, shaping ‘reality’ by informing certain practices whilst marginalising others. ‘Our liberation will come through a rereading of our past’, wrote Fatima Mernissi (1993: 160) when discussing the future of women in the Arab world and the need for writing alternative accounts of the Islamic and pre-Islamic past to point to instances of women's struggle and triumph. Indeed, one task of students of critical security is to present alternative readings of the past and to account for choices that were made — or were obscured due to the way security agendas were set up by keeping certain issues out (as was the case with female illiteracy as argued above) (also see Booth 1998a: 29-55). It should also be stressed that neither material nor representational dimensions of power could be monopolised by one actor only. This is more so in the case of the latter. For, although it is true that it is a combination of ideas and material resources that has enabled some discourses to dominate others, history is replete with examples of the ideas of the weak coming to power (by being taken up by those who are in power, or directly through revolutions). One example of this phenomenon is the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe and the role played by Polish Pope jean Paul II and the Catholic Church.” It is perhaps ironic that the current Pope, whose predecessor Stalin famously ridiculed for not having enough material power when he quipped, ‘how many divisions has the Pope?’, played a major role in the 1989 revolutions that eventually culminated in the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Garrison and Phipps with Shiypuri 1989: 76-84). Another example of the ideas of the weak coming to power was observed when Gorbachev reinterpreted the Soviet domestic situation and external relations and decided to change the course of Soviet foreign policy in the 1980s and adopted the ideas of Peace Researchers, Alternative Security thinkers and peace movements who have been propounding ideas about common security and non-offensive defence since the 1960s (Risse-Kappen 1995b). As Ken Booth (1998b: 353) has noted, the Berlin Wall did not fall: it was pushed. It was thought up, unthought and pulled down. This most symbolic material structure of the Cold War was demolished by people changing their minds. Without such ideas being floated by some (in the Soviet Union and elsewhere) Gorbachev would not have had the intellectual resources to tap into when he decided to change course. Those who floated such ideas, on the other hand, needed Gorbachev for their ideas to be put into practice. The end of the Cold War, in this sense, evolved as a symbiosis of top-down and bottom-up approaches to security, neither of which would have been successful without the other (Galtung 1995; Kaldor 1997). ln sum, critical approaches to security suggest putting into use the constitutive role played by theories by presenting a fundamentally different approach to security in theory and practice in the attempt to open up space for political action to take place and to help shape alternative futures. The roles students of security could play as agents of security will be further developed in the following section. Suffice it to say that there should be some self-reflection on their part as to the fact that their theories do not leave the world untouched. In other words, students of security should reflect upon the constitutive implications of their own thinking and writing - to the extent that they can be aware of them. The state, as noted above, has traditionally been viewed as both the primary referent of and agent for security in Cold War Security Studies. Students of critical approaches, by posing the question ‘whose security are we concerned with?’, have challenged the primacy accorded to the state as the primary referent for security. However, although the privileged status of the state as the primary referent has been challenged, Security Studies continues to accord the state a central position largely due to its status as the dominant agent for security. This is partly because states have had the licence to legitimate use of violence and are therefore better endowed than any other agent to provide for certain dimensions of security (such as military defence)?‘ But perhaps more significant is the fact that students of International Relations in general and Security Studies in particular have not been oriented to look at the agency of actors other than the state concerning security issues (Turner 1998). The prominence of the state’s agency in the economic and financial sectors has for long been challenged, but it is yet to be de-throned in (certain types of) security matters.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The alternative is to reject the aff—that’s critical to open up political space for new ways of thinking— our academic space must be used to interrogate knowledge production</h4><p><strong>Bilgin ‘5</strong> (Assistant Prof of International Relations at Bilkent University, REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE, pp. 50-54) </p><p>It is not only the conception of practice adopted by Gray and Garnett but also that of theory that is restricted in that both conceive theory as ‘problem-solving theory", in Robert Cox’s (1981) terms; it is there to assist policy-makers in solving problems (Gray 1992: 626-31). Security Studies, in this sense, is supposed to deal with issues that are deemed problematic by policy-makers,2' leaving untouched other issues that do not make it to govemmental agendas. This, in turn, creates a vicious circle where issues to be put on the security agenda are decided by policy-makers and analysed by those who they consider as ‘experts’. Those who propound alternative views are dismissed as mere propagandists and the issues they identified, such as ‘structural violence’, are not allowed on security agendas. This position is still prevalent in certain strands of security thinking in the post-Cold War era (see, for example, Walt 1991). Moreover<u>, Garnett argues that <mark>strategists</mark>, even if they adopted a critical stance</u> (<u>and were allowed to get their voices heard) would not make much difference. </u>He maintains that: if a conflict-oriented view of international politics has caught the public imagination . . . this is not because it is propagated by strategists but because it offers the man in the street a more plausible interpretation of international reality than any of the alternatives to which he has been exposed. (Gamett 1987: 22) This statement is yet another manifestation of Garnett's restricted notion of theory (which, in turn, is representative of Cold War thinking on security). After all, what the ‘man in the street’ views as ‘a more plausible interpretation of intemational reality’ (Garnett 1987: 22) is shaped by theories and discourses that were /are dominant at the time.”<u> Garnett’s statement also <mark>hint</mark>s <mark>at an <strong>underestimation of the power of theories in informing not only governmental policies, but also </mark>individuals’ <mark>conceptions of the world</strong>.</mark> These conceptions that individuals absorb, accept and live uncritically constitute what Gramsci calls ‘common sense’ which helps sustain the status quo by ‘making situations of inequality and oppression appear to them as natural and unchangeable’</u> (Forgacs 1988). <u>To go back to Kaldor’s argument regarding the Cold War, it was the ‘imaginary war’ discourse of realist Security Studies that informed men and women in North America and Western Europe of the relevance, legitimacy and inescapability of power politics, tough responses and brinkmanship</u>. <u>In sum, it was these objectivist conceptions of theory and the theory/practice relationship, <mark>a restricted notion of</mark> theory as ‘problem solving theory’ and practice as <mark>governmental policy-making</mark> that <mark>have</mark>, for long, <strong><mark>sustained an underestimation of the role theories play in helping constitute ‘reality’ and narrowed the </mark>ethical and political <mark>horizons of security thinking and practice</u></strong></mark>. Contra Garnett, the role of theories is not to take these conceptions as given but to try and enter into people’s ‘common sense’ and to present them a critical understanding of their own situation. Accordingly, theory is viewed as constitutive of the ‘reality’ it seeks to explain. As Steve Smith has argued: Theories do not simply explain or predict. They tell us what possibilities exist for human action and intervention; they define not merely our explanatory possibilities but also our ethical and political horizons. (Smith 1996: 13) The argument here is not that theories ‘create’ the world in a philosophical idealist sense of the term, but that theories help organise knowledge, which, in turn, informs, enables, privileges or legitimises certain practices whilst inhibiting or marginalising others (as with the relationship between Middle Eastern security discourse and the ‘invention’ of the ‘Middle East’). <u>Given this self-constitutive potential of security thinking, <strong><mark>critical self-reflection becomes crucial </u></strong></mark>for students of critical approaches to security.<u><strong> <mark>The role of the students </strong></mark>of security, in this sense, <strong><mark>is to</strong></mark> try and <strong><mark>be self-conscious about the </strong></mark>normative and<strong> <mark>mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice</strong></mark> in their thinking and writing <strong><mark>rather than feeding ‘common sense’ back into the system hiding behind a notion of ‘objectivity’</u></strong></mark>. It should be noted that one advantage of feeding ‘common sense’ into the system is that it is readily accepted by those who are in a position of power. Indeed, as Steve Smith maintains, once established as common sense, theories become incredibly powerful since they delineate not simply what can be known but also what it is sensible to talk about or suggest. Those who swim outside these safe waters risk more than simply the judgement that their theories are wrong; their entire ethical or moral stance may be ridiculed or seen as dangerous just because their theoretical assumptions are deemed unrealistic. Defining common sense is therefore the ultimate act of political power. (Smith 1996: 13; see also Smith I997) In other words, although theory/practice relationship is one of mutual constitution, not all theories get to shape practices. Then, the answer to the question why theorising may become self-constitutive in some cases (such as the Cold War security discourse) but not in others (as with Peace Research) is rooted in the power/knowledge relationship. More often than not, it is theories that are picked up by those in positions of power that get to shape what men and women in the street view as ‘a more plausible interpretation of international reality’ - as john Gamett (1987: 22) wrote when explaining the way realism has prevailed over the years. Furthermore, ‘dominant discourses, especially those of the state, become and remain dominant because of the power relations sustaining them’ (Weldes et al. 1999: 18). In this sense, it is difficult to underestimate the power of theories in informing not only governmental policies, but also individuals’ conceptions of the world. Here, Kaldor’s (1990) argument regarding the Cold War is again instructive in accounting for the ways in which Cold War security discourse informed men and women in North America and Western Europe of the relevance, legitimacy and inescapability of power politics, tough responses and brinkmanship. The competition between theories over shaping practices and therefore the future never takes place on a level playing field. To understand theory as constitutive of ‘reality’ is not to suggest that once we get our theories right the rest would follow. What shape the future might take would depend on whose theories get to shape practices. For example (as Chapter 2 will argue), the reason why the lands to the southwest of Asia and north of Africa were lumped together in the mind’s eye and labelled the ‘Middle East’, but not something else, has had its roots in the dominance of British and US security discourses. The sources of their dominance could, in turn, be found in the material (military and economic) as well as representational power of these actors. Here I distinguish between the representational and material dimensions of power for analytical reasons in an attempt to stress that the workings of the power/ knowledge relationship cannot be accounted for by adopting a narrow or purely material conception of power. Rather, one’s conception of power should account for its representational dimension as well; that is, the power to shape ideas. One potential problem involved in trying to account for the representational dimension of power is that it cannot be observed in the same way as the material dimension can be; the latter is often utilised to keep issues outside security agendas, thereby averting conflict. In the absence of overt (or latent) conflict, no observable behaviour change takes place. However, the absence of an observable power relationship does not necessarily mean there is not one. To be able to account for such instances of power relationships, I adopt, following Steven Lukes (1974: 24), a ‘three-dimensional view of power’ that ‘allows for consideration of the many ways in which potential issues are kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social forces and institutional practices or through individuals’ decisions’. Adopting a conception of power that stresses both its material and representational dimensions enables me to account for the ways in which some <u><mark>discourses <strong>come to dominate others, shaping ‘reality’ by informing certain practices whilst marginalising others</strong>. ‘</u></mark>Our liberation will come through a rereading of our past’, wrote Fatima Mernissi (1993: 160) when discussing the future of women in the Arab world and the need for writing alternative accounts of the Islamic and pre-Islamic past to point to instances of women's struggle and triumph. Indeed, one task of students of critical security is to present alternative readings of the past and to account for choices that were made — or were obscured due to the way security agendas were set up by keeping certain issues out (as was the case with female illiteracy as argued above) (also see Booth 1998a: 29-55). It should also be stressed that neither material nor representational dimensions of power could be monopolised by one actor only. This is more so in the case of the latter. For, although it is true that it is a combination of ideas and material resources that has enabled some discourses to dominate others, history is replete with examples of the ideas of the weak coming to power (by being taken up by those who are in power, or directly through revolutions). One example of this phenomenon is the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe and the role played by Polish Pope jean Paul II and the Catholic Church.” It is perhaps ironic that the current Pope, whose predecessor Stalin famously ridiculed for not having enough material power when he quipped, ‘how many divisions has the Pope?’, played a major role in the 1989 revolutions that eventually culminated in the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Garrison and Phipps with Shiypuri 1989: 76-84). <u>Another example of the ideas of the weak coming to power was observed when Gorbachev reinterpreted the Soviet domestic situation and external relations and decided to change the course of Soviet foreign policy in the 1980s and adopted the ideas of Peace Researchers, Alternative Security thinkers and peace movements who have been propounding ideas about common security and non-offensive defence since the 1960s</u> (Risse-Kappen 1995b<u>). As Ken Booth (1998b: 353) has noted, the Berlin Wall did not fall: it was pushed. It was thought up, unthought and pulled down</u>. This most symbolic material structure of the Cold War was demolished by people changing their minds.<u><strong> Without such ideas being floated </strong>by some</u> (<u>in the Soviet Union and elsewhere) <strong>Gorbachev would not have had the intellectual resources to tap into when he decided to change course</u></strong>. Those who floated such ideas, on the other hand, needed Gorbachev for their ideas to be put into practice. The end of the Cold War, in this sense, evolved as a symbiosis of top-down and bottom-up approaches to security, neither of which would have been successful without the other (Galtung 1995; Kaldor 1997). ln sum, <u><mark>critical approaches</mark> to security <strong>suggest putting into use the constitutive role played by theories by presenting a fundamentally different approach </strong>to security in theory and practice<strong> </u></strong>in the attempt<u><strong> to <mark>open up space for political action to take place and </u></strong></mark>to help<u><strong> <mark>shape alternative futures</strong>.</u></mark> The roles students of security could play as agents of security will be further developed in the following section. Suffice it to say that there should be some self-reflection on their part as to the fact that their theories do not leave the world untouched. In other words, students of security should reflect upon the constitutive implications of their own thinking and writing - to the extent that they can be aware of them. The state, as noted above, has traditionally been viewed as both the primary referent of and agent for security in Cold War Security Studies. Students of critical approaches, by posing the question ‘whose security are we concerned with?’, have challenged the primacy accorded to the state as the primary referent for security. However, although the privileged status of the state as the primary referent has been challenged, Security Studies continues to accord the state a central position largely due to its status as the dominant agent for security. This is partly because states have had the licence to legitimate use of violence and are therefore better endowed than any other agent to provide for certain dimensions of security (such as military defence)?‘ But perhaps more significant is the fact that students of International Relations in general and Security Studies in particular have not been oriented to look at the agency of actors other than the state concerning security issues (Turner 1998). The prominence of the state’s agency in the economic and financial sectors has for long been challenged, but it is yet to be de-throned in (certain types of) security matters.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Jason Hickel 18, anthropologist and fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, 9-12-2018, “Why Growth Can’t Be Green,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/why-growth-cant-be-green/ fulltext: Warnings about ecological breakdown have become ubiquitous. Over the past few years, major newspapers, including the Guardian and the New York Times, have carried alarming stories on soil depletion, deforestation, and the collapse of fish stocks and insect populations. These crises are being driven by global economic growth, and its accompanying consumption, which is destroying the Earth’s biosphere and blowing past key planetary boundaries that scientists say must be respected to avoid triggering collapse. Many policymakers have responded by pushing for what has come to be called “green growth.” All we need to do, they argue, is invest in more efficient technology and introduce the right incentives, and we’ll be able to keep growing while simultaneously reducing our impact on the natural world, which is already at an unsustainable level. In technical terms, the goal is to achieve “absolute decoupling” of GDP from the total use of natural resources, according to the U.N. definition. It sounds like an elegant solution to an otherwise catastrophic problem. There’s just one hitch: New evidence suggests that green growth isn’t the panacea everyone has been hoping for. In fact, it isn’t even possible. Green growth first became a buzz phrase in 2012 at the United Nations Cosnference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro. In the run-up to the conference, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the U.N. Environment Program all produced reports promoting green growth. Today, it is a core plank of the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals. But the promise of green growth turns out to have been based more on wishful thinking than on evidence. In the years since the Rio conference, three major empirical studies have arrived at the same rather troubling conclusion: Even under the best conditions, absolute decoupling of GDP from resource use is not possible on a global scale. A team of scientists led by the German researcher Monika Dittrich first raised doubts in 2012. The group ran a sophisticated computer model that predicted what would happen to global resource use if economic growth continued on its current trajectory, increasing at about 2 to 3 percent per year. It found that human consumption of natural resources (including fish, livestock, forests, metals, minerals, and fossil fuels) would rise from 70 billion metric tons per year in 2012 to 180 billion metric tons per year by 2050. For reference, a sustainable level of resource use is about 50 billion metric tons per year—a boundary we breached back in 2000. The team then reran the model to see what would happen if every nation on Earth immediately adopted best practice in efficient resource use (an extremely optimistic assumption). The results improved; resource consumption would hit only 93 billion metric tons by 2050. But that is still a lot more than we’re consuming today. Burning through all those resources could hardly be described as absolute decoupling or green growth. In 2016, a second team of scientists tested a different premise: one in which the world’s nations all agreed to go above and beyond existing best practice. In their best-case scenario, the researchers assumed a tax that would raise the global price of carbon from $50 to $236 per metric ton and imagined technological innovations that would double the efficiency with which we use resources. The results were almost exactly the same as in Dittrich’s study. Under these conditions, if the global economy kept growing by 3 percent each year, we’d still hit about 95 billion metric tons of resource use by 2050. Bottom line: no absolute decoupling. Finally, last year the U.N. Environment Program—once one of the main cheerleaders of green growth theory—weighed in on the debate. It tested a scenario with carbon priced at a whopping $573 per metric ton, slapped on a resource extraction tax, and assumed rapid technological innovation spurred by strong government support. The result? We hit 132 billion metric tons by 2050. This finding is worse than those of the two previous studies because the researchers accounted for the “rebound effect,” whereby improvements in resource efficiency drive down prices and cause demand to rise—thus canceling out some of the gains. Study after study shows the same thing. Scientists are beginning to realize that there are physical limits to how efficiently we can use resources. Sure, we might be able to produce cars and iPhones and skyscrapers more efficiently, but we can’t produce them out of thin air. We might shift the economy to services such as education and yoga, but even universities and workout studios require material inputs. Once we reach the limits of efficiency, pursuing any degree of economic growth drives resource use back up. These problems throw the entire concept of green growth into doubt and necessitate some radical rethinking. Remember that each of the three studies used highly optimistic assumptions. We are nowhere near imposing a global carbon tax today, much less one of nearly $600 per metric ton, and resource efficiency is currently getting worse, not better. Yet the studies suggest that even if we do everything right, decoupling economic growth with resource use will remain elusive and our environmental problems will continue to worsen. Preventing that outcome will require a whole new paradigm. High taxes and technological innovation will help, but they’re not going to be enough. The only realistic shot humanity has at averting ecological collapse is to impose hard caps on resource use, as the economist Daniel O’Neill recently proposed. Such caps, enforced by national governments or by international treaties, could ensure that we do not extract more from the land and the seas than the Earth can safely regenerate. We could also ditch GDP as an indicator of economic success and adopt a more balanced measure like the genuine progress indicator (GPI), which accounts for pollution and natural asset depletion. Using GPI would help us maximize socially good outcomes while minimizing ecologically bad ones. But there’s no escaping the obvious conclusion. Ultimately, bringing our civilization back within planetary boundaries is going to require that we liberate ourselves from our dependence on economic growth—starting with rich nations. This might sound scarier than it really is. Ending growth doesn’t mean shutting down economic activity—it simply means that next year we can’t produce and consume more than we are doing this year. It might also mean shrinking certain sectors that are particularly damaging to our ecology and that are unnecessary for human flourishing, such as advertising, commuting, and single-use products. But ending growth doesn’t mean that living standards need to take a hit. Our planet provides more than enough for all of us; the problem is that its resources are not equally distributed. We can improve people’s lives right now simply by sharing what we already have more fairly, rather than plundering the Earth for more. Maybe this means better public services. Maybe it means basic income. Maybe it means a shorter working week that allows us to scale down production while still delivering full employment. Policies such as these—and countless others—will be crucial to not only surviving the 21st century but also flourishing in it.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>(b) Neoliberal expansion causes extinction---decoupling is impossible even under perfect conditions </h4><p>Jason <strong>Hickel 18</strong>, anthropologist and fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, 9-12-2018, “Why Growth Can’t Be Green,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/why-growth-cant-be-green/</p><p><u>Warnings about <strong>ecological breakdown</strong> have become ubiquitous</u>. Over the past few years, major newspapers, including the Guardian and the New York Times, have carried alarming stories on <u><strong>soil depletion</strong>, <strong>defo</strong>restation, and the collapse of <strong>fish stocks</strong> and <strong>insect populations</u></strong>. These <u>crises are being <strong>driven by</strong> global economic <strong>growth</strong>, and its accompanying <mark>consumption</mark>, which is <strong><mark>destroy</mark>ing <mark>the</strong></mark> Earth’s <strong><mark>biosphere</strong> and <strong>blow</mark>ing <mark>past</strong></mark> key <strong><mark>planetary boundaries</strong></mark> that scientists say must be respected to avoid <strong>triggering collapse</u></strong>. Many <u>policymakers have responded by pushing for</u> what has come to be called “<u><strong>green growth</u></strong>.” <u>All we need to do, they argue, is invest in more efficient technology and introduce the right incentives</u>, and we’ll be able to keep growing while simultaneously reducing our impact on the natural world, which is already at an unsustainable level. In technical terms, the goal is <u>to achieve “<strong>absolute decoupling</strong>”</u> of GDP from the total use of natural resources, according to the U.N. definition. It sounds like an elegant solution to an otherwise catastrophic problem. There’s just one hitch: <u><strong>New evidence</strong> suggests</u> that <u><mark>green growth</u></mark> isn’t the panacea everyone has been hoping for. In fact, <u>it <strong><mark>isn’t</u></strong></mark> even <u><strong><mark>possible</u></strong></mark>. Green growth first became a buzz phrase in 2012 at the United Nations Cosnference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro. In the run-up to the conference, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the U.N. Environment Program all produced reports promoting green growth. Today, it is a core plank of the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals. But the promise of green growth turns out to have been based more on wishful thinking than on evidence. In the years since the Rio conference, three <u><strong>major <mark>empirical studies</strong></mark> have <mark>arrived at</mark> the <strong>same</strong> rather troubling <strong>conclusion</strong>: <strong>Even <mark>under</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>best conditions</strong></mark>, absolute <mark>decoupling</mark> of <mark>GDP from resource</mark> use <mark>is not possible on a global scale</u></mark>. <u>A team of scientists</u> led by the German researcher Monika Dittrich first raised doubts in 2012. The group <u>ran a sophisticated computer model that predicted what would happen to global resource use if economic growth continued on its current trajectory</u>, increasing at about 2 to 3 percent per year. It found that <u>human consumption of natural resources</u> (including fish, livestock, forests, metals, minerals, and fossil fuels) <u>would rise from 70 billion metric tons per year in 2012 to <strong>180</strong> billion metric tons per year by 2050</u>. For reference, <u>a sustainable level</u> of resource use <u>is</u> about <u>50</u> billion metric tons per year—a boundary we breached back in 2000. <u>The team</u> then <u>reran the model to see what would happen if </u>every nation<u> on Earth <strong>immediately adopted best practice</strong> in efficient resource use</u> (an extremely optimistic assumption). The results improved; <u>resource consumption would hit only <strong>93</strong> billion metric tons</u> by 2050. But that is still a lot more than we’re consuming today. Burning through all those resources could hardly be described as absolute decoupling or green growth. In 2016, <u>a second team of scientists tested a different premise</u>: one in which the world’s nations all agreed to go above and beyond existing best practice. In their best-case scenario, <u>the researchers assumed a tax that would raise the global price of carbon</u> from $50 to $236 per metric ton and imagined technological innovations that would double the efficiency with which we use resources. The results were almost exactly the same as in Dittrich’s study. Under these conditions, if <u>the global economy kept growing by 3 percent each year, we’d still hit about <strong>95</u></strong> billion metric tons of resource use by 2050. Bottom line: no absolute decoupling. Finally, <u>last year the U.N. Environment Program</u>—once one of the main cheerleaders of green growth theory—weighed in on the debate. It <u>tested a scenario </u>with carbon priced at a whopping $573 per metric ton, slapped on a resource extraction tax, and assumed rapid technological innovation spurred by strong government support. The result? We hit 132 billion metric tons by 2050. This finding is worse than those of the two previous studies because the researchers accounted for the “rebound effect,” whereby improvements in resource efficiency drive down prices and cause demand to rise—thus canceling out some of the gains. Study after<u> study shows the same thing</u>. Scientists are beginning to realize that there are physical limits to how efficiently we can use resources. Sure, we might be able to produce cars and iPhones and skyscrapers more efficiently, but we can’t produce them out of thin air. We might shift the economy to services such as education and yoga, but even universities and workout studios require material inputs. Once we reach the limits of efficiency, pursuing any degree of economic growth drives resource use back up. These problems throw the entire concept of green growth into doubt and necessitate some radical rethinking. Remember that each of the three studies used highly optimistic assumptions. We are nowhere near imposing a global carbon tax today, much less one of nearly $600 per metric ton, and resource efficiency is currently getting worse, not better. Yet the studies suggest that even if we do everything right, decoupling economic growth with resource use will remain elusive and our environmental problems will continue to worsen. Preventing that outcome will require a whole new paradigm. High taxes and technological innovation will help, but they’re not going to be enough. The only realistic shot humanity has at averting ecological collapse is to impose hard caps on resource use, as the economist Daniel O’Neill recently proposed. Such caps, enforced by national governments or by international treaties, could ensure that we do not extract more from the land and the seas than the Earth can safely regenerate. We could also ditch GDP as an indicator of economic success and adopt a more balanced measure like the genuine progress indicator (GPI), which accounts for pollution and natural asset depletion. Using GPI would help us maximize socially good outcomes while minimizing ecologically bad ones. But <u>there’s no escaping the obvious conclusion</u>. Ultimately, <u><mark>bringing</mark> our <mark>civilization</mark> back <mark>within</mark> planetary <mark>boundaries</mark> is going to <mark>require that we <strong>liberate ourselves</strong> from</mark> our <strong>dependence on economic <mark>growth</strong></mark>—starting with <strong>rich nations</u></strong>. <u>This might <strong>sound scarier than it really is</u></strong>. <u>Ending growth doesn’t mean shutting down economic activity—it simply means that next year we can’t produce and consume more than we are doing this year</u>. It might also mean shrinking certain sectors that are particularly damaging to our ecology and that are unnecessary for human flourishing, such as advertising, commuting, and single-use products. But ending growth doesn’t mean that living standards need to take a hit. Our planet provides more than enough for all of us; the problem is that its resources are not equally distributed. We can improve people’s lives right now simply by <u><mark>sharing</mark> what we already have more <mark>fairly</mark>, rather than plundering the Earth for more</u>. Maybe this means better public services. Maybe it means basic income. Maybe it means a shorter working week that allows us to scale down production while still delivering full employment. Policies such as these—and countless others—<u><mark>will be <strong>crucial</strong> to</mark> not only <strong><mark>surviving</mark> the 21st century</strong> but also flourishing in it</u>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Kallenborn 19 [Zachary Kallenborn, researcher specializing in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, terrorism, and drone swarms, 9-3-2019, "What if the U.S. Military Neglects AI? AI Futures and U.S. Incapacity," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/what-if-the-u-s-military-neglects-ai-ai-futures-and-u-s-incapacity/]/Kankee fulltext: Advances in computing power, data collection, and machine learning suggest a new era of AI prominence. Advanced unmanned systems, enhanced by sophisticated AI, allow militaries to replace expensive, multi-mission platforms with low-cost, single mission systems. Managing masses of autonomous systems will be a challenge, but improvements in AI will make that easier too. Some AI experts also believe hardware advances will keep AI progress steady in the near term. If AI dominates the battlefield, a United States without robust AI capabilities would lose its conventional superiority. Although the United States would retain considerable capabilities in its existing ships, tanks, and aircraft, in a full-scale conflict, adversaries could overwhelm U.S. forces with masses of drones. Conventional weaknesses would exacerbate threats to U.S. alliance networks, as U.S. security guarantees would be weaker. Allied states already seek increased strategic autonomy. Nonetheless, the United States remains largely secure from existential harm due to its nuclear deterrent and asymmetric information warfare. Threats of nuclear annihilation could still shield the United States against existential threats. The United States would retain nuclear parity with Russia and nuclear superiority to China. If even limited North Korean nuclear weapons can plausibly hold back the United States, American nuclear threats could plausibly hold back a new robotic superpower. Unfortunately, reliance on nuclear deterrence in this scenario would encourage broader proliferation. The United States likely would be forced to abandon commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to work towards denuclearization. Some states may develop nuclear weapons as the nonproliferation regime collapses. Asymmetric information warfare would allow the United States to resist some adversary conventional threats. The United States could create and disseminate fake images or videos designed to manipulate adversary AI software. The United States could use cyber means to put such images in data collections used to train adversary AI algorithms, or subtly alter robotic control systems to induce mistakes or slow algorithms. Such sabotage would create weaknesses in any robotic system using them. Anti-space weapons may also disable or damage orbital or ad hoc satellite networks used to control adversary robots. Electronic warfare capabilities might be able to defeat some older robotic systems or send false signals to confuse or control adversary drones. But in the world of AI Explosion, advances in autonomy will limit the harm from information-based attacks. New autonomous systems are less dependent on information — more autonomous platforms and weapons mean less need for external commands via satellite or electronic signal. Nonetheless, U.S. information capabilities might inflict sufficient harm to prevent adversaries from achieving some objectives. The United States would also be likely to face new homeland security risks from non-state actors. Already, open-source information allows non-state actors to build crude robotic weapons. State sponsors and open-source resources may be sufficient to cause considerable harm. Novel forms of attack against chemical facilities, airports, and stadiums could cause mass casualties with simple drones. AI Trinity The year is 2040: AI and robotics threaten nuclear deterrence and dominate the battlefield. Swarms of drones guard national borders with a mixture of advanced air and missile defenses, while massive undersea swarms rove the sea in search of nuclear submarines. Cheap drone-mounted sensors virtually eliminated costly advantages in stealth, made the ocean vastly more transparent, and created significant uncertainty in submarines as reliable second-strike platforms. Other AI capabilities help manage the system, optimize processes to keep costs low, and reduce false positives and negatives. A series of short but bloody conflicts between the United States, China and Russia in the late 2030s raised specters of new great power conflict unconstrained by nuclear weapons. AI could threaten the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Although constant, real-time tracking of all nuclear submarines is difficult to imagine due to the massive size of the oceans, technology improvements and some luck could allow an adversary to know the locations of second-strike platforms for long enough to eliminate them in a first strike. Swarms of undersea drones and big data analysis offer great potential for new and improved anti-submarine platforms, weapons, and sensor networks. Already, some missile defenses use simple automation that could be improved with AI. Drones can also help track missiles, serve as platforms to defeat them, or simply collide with incoming missiles and aircraft. AI improvements generally enable more advanced robotic weapons, more sophisticated swarms, and better insights into data. Of course, the long history of failed attempts and huge costs of missile defense suggest elimination of nuclear deterrence is highly unlikely, but all of these developments could add up to serious risks to the reliability of nuclear deterrence. In such a world, a United States without robust military AI capabilities is extremely insecure. The United States has neither conventional superiority nor a reliable nuclear deterrent, and must drastically rethink American grand strategy. U.S. extended deterrence guarantees would be far less effective and some states under the umbrella would likely seek their own nuclear weapons instead. South Korea and Saudi Arabia would likely become nuclear weapons states due to their established civilian nuclear programs, high relative wealth, and proximity to hostile powers in possession or recent pursuit of nuclear weapons. The United States could expand its nuclear arsenal to mitigate the harms of a less reliable deterrent, but that would require abandoning the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and other arms control treaties. Ensuring national security would mean avoiding conflict or focusing on homeland defense — rather than a forward defense posture with forces stationed on the Eurasian landmass — to increase adversary costs. Diplomacy, soft power, and international institutions remain key to national security. However, a soft-power strategy would be extremely challenging. The factors that could inhibit development of AI — domestic dysfunction, high debt, and international isolation — would cause considerable harm to U.S. soft power. American soft power is arguably already in decline and funding for the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development have been cut considerably. Likewise, any abandonment of arms control treaties to support the nuclear arsenal would cause further damage. In short, in AI Trinity, a United States without AI is no longer a serious global power. AI Fizzle<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Lack of US AI weapon leadership is bad – it causes rapidfire nuclear prolif, loss of US hegemony, and the breakup of alliances</h4><p><strong>Kallenborn 19</strong> [Zachary Kallenborn, researcher specializing in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, terrorism, and drone swarms, 9-3-2019, "What if the U.S. Military Neglects AI? AI Futures and U.S. Incapacity," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/what-if-the-u-s-military-neglects-ai-ai-futures-and-u-s-incapacity/]/Kankee</p><p>Advances in computing power, data collection, and machine learning suggest a new era of AI prominence. Advanced unmanned systems, enhanced by sophisticated AI, allow militaries to replace expensive, multi-mission platforms with low-cost, single mission systems. Managing masses of autonomous systems will be a challenge, but improvements in AI will make that easier too. Some AI experts also believe hardware advances will keep AI progress steady in the near term. <u><strong><mark>If AI dominates</mark> the battlefield</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>a</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>without robust AI</mark> capabilities <mark>would lose</mark> its <mark>conventional superiority</u></strong></mark>. Although the United States would retain considerable capabilities in its existing ships, tanks, and aircraft, in a full-scale conflict, <u><strong><mark>adversaries could overwhelm</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>.<u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>forces</u></strong> <u><strong>with</mark> masses of <mark>drones</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Conventional weaknesses would exacerbate</mark> <mark>threats</u></strong> <u><strong>to</u></strong></mark> U.S. <u><strong><mark>alliance</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>network<mark>s</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>as</u></strong> U.S. <u><strong><mark>security</u></strong> <u><strong>guarantees would be weaker</u></strong></mark>. Allied states already seek increased strategic autonomy. Nonetheless, the United States remains largely secure from existential harm due to its nuclear deterrent and asymmetric information warfare. Threats of nuclear annihilation could still shield the United States against existential threats. The United States would retain nuclear parity with Russia and nuclear superiority to China. If even limited North Korean nuclear weapons can plausibly hold back the United States, American nuclear threats could plausibly hold back a new robotic superpower. Unfortunately, <u><strong><mark>reliance on nuclear deterrence</u></strong></mark> in this scenario <u><strong><mark>would encourage</mark> broader <mark>prolif</mark>eration</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates likely <mark>would</mark> be forced to <mark>abandon</u></strong></mark> commitments under <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> Nuclear <u><strong><mark>N</mark>on<mark>p</mark>roliferation <mark>T</mark>reaty</u></strong> to work towards denuclearization. Some <u><strong>states may develop nuclear weapons as <mark>the nonprolif</mark>eration <mark>regime collapses</u></strong></mark>. Asymmetric information warfare would allow the United States to resist some adversary conventional threats. The United States could create and disseminate fake images or videos designed to manipulate adversary AI software. The United States could use cyber means to put such images in data collections used to train adversary AI algorithms, or subtly alter robotic control systems to induce mistakes or slow algorithms. Such sabotage would create weaknesses in any robotic system using them. Anti-space weapons may also disable or damage orbital or ad hoc satellite networks used to control adversary robots. Electronic warfare capabilities might be able to defeat some older robotic systems or send false signals to confuse or control adversary drones. But in the world of AI Explosion, <u><strong>advances in autonomy will limit the harm from information-based attacks</u></strong>. New <u><strong>autonomous systems are less dependent on information</u></strong> — <u><strong>more autonomous platforms and weapons mean less need for external commands via satellite or electronic signal</u></strong>. Nonetheless, U.S. information capabilities might inflict sufficient harm to prevent adversaries from achieving some objectives. The United States would also be likely to face new homeland security risks from non-state actors. Already, open-source information allows non-state actors to build crude robotic weapons. State sponsors and open-source resources may be sufficient to cause considerable harm. Novel forms of attack against chemical facilities, airports, and stadiums could cause mass casualties with simple drones. AI Trinity The year is 2040: AI and robotics threaten nuclear deterrence and dominate the battlefield. Swarms of drones guard national borders with a mixture of advanced air and missile defenses, while massive undersea swarms rove the sea in search of nuclear submarines. Cheap drone-mounted sensors virtually eliminated costly advantages in stealth, made the ocean vastly more transparent, and created significant uncertainty in submarines as reliable second-strike platforms. Other AI capabilities help manage the system, optimize processes to keep costs low, and reduce false positives and negatives. A series of short but bloody conflicts between the United States, China and Russia in the late 2030s raised specters of new great power conflict unconstrained by nuclear weapons. <u><strong><mark>AI could threaten the cred</mark>ibility <mark>of the</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>U</u></strong>.<u><strong>S</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>nuclear deterrent</u></strong></mark>. Although constant, real-time tracking of all nuclear submarines is difficult to imagine due to the massive size of the oceans, <u><strong><mark>tech</u></strong></mark>nology <u><strong><mark>improvements</u></strong></mark> and some luck <u><strong><mark>could allow an adversary to know the locations of second-strike platforms</u></strong></mark> for <u><strong>long enough <mark>to eliminate them in a first strike</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Swarms of undersea drones</u></strong></mark> and big data analysis <u><strong><mark>offer</u></strong></mark> great <u><strong>potential for new and <mark>improved anti-sub</mark>marine <mark>platforms</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>weapons</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>and sensor networks</u></strong></mark>. Already, some <u><strong>missile defenses</u></strong> use simple automation that <u><strong>could</u></strong> <u><strong>be improved with AI</u></strong>. <u><strong>Drones</u></strong> <u><strong>can</u></strong> also <u><strong>help track missiles</u></strong>, <u><strong>serve as platforms to defeat them</u></strong>, <u><strong>or</u></strong> simply <u><strong>collide with incoming missiles and aircraft</u></strong>. AI improvements generally enable more advanced robotic weapons, more sophisticated swarms, and better insights into data. Of course, the long history of failed attempts and huge costs of missile defense suggest elimination of nuclear deterrence is highly unlikely, but <u><strong>all of these developments could add up to serious risks to the reliability of nuclear deterrence</u></strong>. In such a world, <u><strong>a United States without robust military AI capabilities is extremely insecure</u></strong>. The <u><strong>United States has neither conventional superiority nor a reliable nuclear deterrent</u></strong>, <u><strong>and must drastically rethink American grand strategy</u></strong>. <u><strong>U</u></strong>.<u><strong>S</u></strong>. <u><strong>extended deterrence guarantees would be far less effective and</u></strong> some <u><strong>states under the umbrella would likely seek their own nuclear weapons instead</u></strong>. <u><strong>South Korea and Saudi Arabia would likely become nuclear weapons states due to their established civilian nuclear programs</u></strong>, <u><strong>high relative wealth</u></strong>, and <u><strong>proximity to hostile powers in possession or recent pursuit of nuclear weapons</u></strong>. <u><strong>The United States could expand its nuclear arsenal to mitigate the harms of a less reliable deterrent</u></strong>, <u><strong>but that would require abandoning the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and other arms control treaties</u></strong>. <u><strong>Ensuring national security</u></strong> <u><strong>would mean</u></strong> avoiding conflict or <u><strong>focusing on homeland defense</u></strong> — rather than a forward defense posture with forces stationed on the Eurasian landmass — to increase adversary costs. Diplomacy, soft power, and international institutions remain key to national security. However, a soft-power strategy would be extremely challenging. The <u><strong>factors that</u></strong> could <u><strong>inhibit development of AI</u></strong> — <u><strong>domestic dysfunction</u></strong>, <u><strong>high debt</u></strong>, <u><strong>and international isolation</u></strong> — would cause considerable harm to U.S. soft power. American soft power is arguably already in decline and funding for the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development have been cut considerably. Likewise, any abandonment of arms control treaties to support the nuclear arsenal would cause further damage. In short, in AI Trinity<u><strong>, a United States without AI is no longer a serious global</u></strong> <u><strong>power</u></strong>. AI Fizzle</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt 21. Director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; formerly a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress; former member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs at the U.S. Department of State. Senior policy analyst in the National Security and International Policy department at American Progress, master’s in public policy from the Harvard Kennedy School, bachelor’s degree in political science from Grinnell College in Iowa, Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance.” Center for American Progress. Mar 9 2021. https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/ - recut Introduction and summary fulltext: U.S. security assistance is broken and in need of an overhaul. Over the past two decades, the bureaucratic system developed to deliver billions of dollars of military aid to partner nations has evolved and expanded not by design but as the result of a series of ad hoc legislative and policy changes. Though the U.S. Department of State was initially in charge of security assistance policy and accounts, since 9/11, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has established a separate, well-funded security assistance bureaucracy at the Pentagon. This has inhibited effective congressional oversight, harmed coordination between diplomacy and defense, and contributed to the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy. It has created a dysfunctional and bifurcated security assistance system. Under the current security assistance system, the returns on America’s security investments are limited, inconsistent, and not strategic. The consequences of today’s broken system include increased reliance on the military to solve foreign policy challenges; a perpetuated status quo whereby nondemocratic partners receive U.S. assistance and where human rights abuses are ignored; and an ineffective and unwieldy bureaucracy. This matters because the United States depends on capable allies and partners as a core component of its national security strategy, but the current system is not suited to the task. A new administration can change this by embracing wholesale reform of the security assistance system. To do so, however, a Biden-Harris administration must move quickly to work with Congress and include such reforms in any effort to rebuild and revive U.S. diplomacy. This will require talking not only about security assistance authorities, but fundamentally about money and resources as well. Any reform efforts intending to bolster the role of the State Department must start by examining how funding is oriented and balanced between the departments. This necessitates close cooperation with the Hill. There must be a dramatic realignment of U.S. security assistance. This report provides an overview and a systemic critique of the current bureaucratic structure of U.S. security assistance and outlines how transferring resources and responsibilities for security assistance back to the State Department will better advance U.S. interests and address the current geopolitical challenges America confronts. It calls for reviving the centrality of diplomacy by restoring the State Department’s role, as originally intended under U.S. law, as the overseer of all U.S. foreign assistance. It also offers recommendations for expanding and training the security assistance workforce, improving interagency coordination, elevating human rights concerns in security assistance policy, and adapting best practices from the DOD. Specifically, this report calls for transferring the following programs and funding from the DOD to the State Department: The relatively newly created Section 333 train and equip authority, which replicates the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority The DOD’s security assistance authorities that focus on long-term security force reform to the State Department, including the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative fund This would result in a roughly $7 billion transfer, significantly augmenting the State Department’s budget and capacity to guide security assistance policy. Putting the State Department back in charge of security assistance will be a major reform and will require significant operational changes within the department, as well as a dramatic expansion of its administrative capacity. This will take time to implement and require significant reform within the agency. The DOD has done an admirable job in setting up a new institutional structure, in implementing assistance, and in coordinating with the State Department. However, officials across the U.S. foreign policy world acknowledge that the system is not working. Tommy Ross, a former DOD official in charge of overseeing the Pentagon’s security assistance, recently argued that U.S. security assistance is “not fit for purpose” and is “out of sync with U.S. priorities when it comes to where resources are needed most and the types of capabilities required by America’s allied and partners.”1 Indeed, throughout much of the last decade, it has been DOD officials who publicly argued for increased funding for the State Department.2 Ultimately, the current bifurcated security assistance system is suboptimal and results in the bureaucratic diminishment of the State Department relative to the military considerations of the DOD. Transferring resources and responsibility to the State Department would centralize responsibility for foreign aid under diplomatic control, while improving interagency cooperation, as DOD would remain the primary implementer of U.S. assistance. Some of these ideas will likely be met with innate skepticism from a generation of security professionals whose experience in Washington has been characterized by an ever-withering State Department and an ever-strengthening Pentagon. This report anticipates and rebuts likely arguments against reform, including the capacity of the State Department to take on this responsibility, the benefits of the Pentagon’s current management, or the unnecessary disruption that would result from significant bureaucratic change laid out in this proposal. Failing to reform security assistance not only leaves the United States with a wasteful and inefficient status quo, it also perpetuates the marginalization of diplomacy and locks in the military’s newly found dominance in driving U.S. foreign policy. The current security assistance system evolved to address the threats posed by the post-9/11 era and is now outdated and ill-suited for a new geopolitical environment characterized by competition. If the next administration is to revive U.S. diplomacy and rebuild the State Department, it must empower the agency to oversee and direct foreign assistance. The Biden-Harris administration should seize the opportunity to work with a new Congress to reform the system from its first days in office and restore an effective tool in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal. A new security assistance system, centralized and coordinated within the State Department, would allow the United States to wield its security assistance more effectively and responsibly in today’s competitive geopolitical environment. Arms transfers, training, and support could also better support U.S. foreign policy goals, in particular bolstering democratic partners and emerging democracies, making them stronger U.S. partners to counter threats from authoritarian actors. Empowering the State Department to oversee and manage security assistance would also ensure that aid is used to advance a values-based foreign policy that respects and supports human rights.3 It would also give U.S. diplomats greater clout and leverage and potentially create greater coherence to the provision of foreign assistance overall. The result would be to strengthen a key tool in the U.S. foreign policy toolbox and increase the clout and authority of America’s diplomats, which is badly needed in this new era of geopolitical competition.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Empowering the DOS creates an effective security assistance process – but <u>DOD</u> control <u>militarizes</u> foreign policy.</h4><p>Max <strong>Bergmann</strong> <strong>and</strong> Alexandra <strong>Schmitt</strong> <strong>21</strong>. Director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; formerly a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress; former member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs at the U.S. Department of State. Senior policy analyst in the National Security and International Policy department at American Progress, master’s in public policy from the Harvard Kennedy School, bachelor’s degree in political science from Grinnell College in Iowa, Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance.” Center for American Progress. Mar 9 2021. https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/ - recut</p><p><u>Introduction and summary</p><p><strong><mark>U.S. security assistance</strong></mark> <mark>is</mark> <strong>broken</strong> and <mark>in need of an <strong>overhaul</u></strong></mark>. <u>Over the past two decades</u>, <u>the bureaucratic system </u>developed to deliver billions of dollars of military aid to partner nations <u>has evolved and expanded</u> not by design but <u>as the result of a series of ad hoc</u> legislative and <u>policy changes</u>. Though the U.S. Department of State was initially in charge of security assistance policy and accounts, <u>since 9/11</u>, <u>the U.S. Department of Defense (<mark>DOD</mark>) has established a separate</u>, <u>well-funded security assistance bureaucracy</u> at the Pentagon. <u>This</u> has <u><strong><mark>inhibited</strong></mark> <mark>effective</mark> congressional <strong><mark>oversight</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>harmed</strong></mark> <strong><mark>coordination</strong></mark> between diplomacy and defense</u>, <u><mark>and</mark> <strong><mark>contributed</strong></mark> <mark>to</mark> the growing <strong><mark>militarization</strong></mark> of U.S. foreign policy</u>. <u><mark>It has created a <strong>dysfunctional</strong></mark> and bifurcated security assistance <mark>system</mark>.</p><p>Under the current security assistance system</u>, <u>the returns</u> on America’s security investments <u>are limited, <strong>inconsistent</strong>, and not strategic</u>. <u>The <strong>consequences</u></strong> <u>of today’s <strong>broken system</u></strong> <u>include</u> <u>increased reliance on the military to solve</u> <u>foreign policy</u> <u>challenges</u>;<u> a</u> perpetuated <u>status quo</u> whereby<u> </u>nondemocratic partners receive U.S. assistance and where <u>human rights</u> <u>abuses are ignored</u>; <u>and an ineffective and <strong>unwieldy bureaucracy</u></strong>. This matters because the United States depends on capable allies and partners as a core component of its national security strategy, but <u>the current system is not suited to the task.</u> <u>A new administration can change this <mark>by embracing <strong>wholesale reform</strong></mark> of the security assistance system. To do so, however, a Biden-Harris administration must move quickly to work with Congress and include such reforms in any effort to rebuild and revive U.S. diplomacy. This will require talking not only about security assistance authorities, but fundamentally about money and resources as well. Any reform efforts intending to bolster the role of the State Department must start by examining how funding is oriented and balanced between the departments. This necessitates close cooperation with the Hill.</p><p>There must be a <strong>dramatic</strong> <strong>realignment</strong> of U.S. security assistance</u>. This report provides an overview and a systemic critique of the current bureaucratic structure of U.S. security assistance and outlines how <u><strong>transferring</strong> resources and responsibilities for security assistance back to the State Department will better advance</u> U.S. interests <u>and <strong>address</strong> the <strong>current geopolitical challenges</strong> America confronts. It calls for</u> <u><strong>reviving</u></strong> the centrality of <u>diplomacy by restoring the State Department’s role</u>, as originally intended under U.S. law, <u>as the overseer of all U.S. foreign assistance</u>. It also <u>offers recommendations</u> <u>for</u> <u>expanding and training the security assistance workforce</u>, <u>improving <strong>interagency coordination</u></strong>, elevating human rights concerns in security assistance policy<u>, <mark>and <strong>adapting</strong> best practices</mark> from the DOD.</p><p></u>Specifically, <u>this report <mark>calls for <strong>transferring</strong></mark> the following programs and <strong>funding</strong> from the DOD to the State Department:</p><p></u>The relatively newly created Section 333 train and equip authority, which replicates the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority</p><p>The DOD’s security assistance authorities that focus on long-term security force reform to the State Department, including the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative fund</p><p>This would result in a roughly $7 billion transfer, significantly augmenting the State Department’s budget and capacity to guide security assistance policy.</p><p><u>Putting <mark>the State Department back in charge</mark> of security assistance </u>will be a major reform and <u>will require significant operational changes within the department, as well as a dramatic expansion of its administrative capacity</u>. This will take time to implement and require significant reform within the agency.</p><p>The DOD has done an admirable job in setting up a new institutional structure, in implementing assistance, and in coordinating with the State Department. However, <u>officials across the U.S. foreign policy world acknowledge that the <strong>system is not working</u></strong>. Tommy Ross, a former DOD official in charge of overseeing the Pentagon’s security assistance, recently argued that <u>U.S. security assistance is “not fit for purpose” and is “<strong>out of sync</strong> with U.S. priorities when it comes to</u> where <u>resources</u> are needed most <u>and</u> the types of <u>capabilities</u> <u>required by America’s </u>allied and <u>partners</u>.”1 Indeed, <u>throughout</u> much of <u>the last decade</u>, it has been <u>DOD officials</u> who <u>publicly argued for increased funding for the State Department</u>.2 Ultimately, <u>the current bifurcated security assistance system is suboptimal</u> <u>and results in the bureaucratic diminishment of the State Department</u> relative to the military considerations of the DOD. <u>Transferring resources and responsibility to the State Department <mark>would <strong>centralize responsibility</strong></mark> </u>for foreign aid <u>under diplomatic control</u>, <u>while <mark>improving interagency cooperation</u></mark>, <u><mark>as <strong>DOD</strong> would <strong>remain</strong> the <strong>primary implementer</strong></mark> <mark>of</mark> U.S. <mark>assistance</u></mark>.</p><p><u>Some of these ideas will likely be met with</u> innate <u>skepticism</u> from a generation of security professionals whose experience in Washington has been characterized by an ever-withering State Department and an ever-strengthening Pentagon. <u>This report anticipates and rebuts likely arguments</u> <u>against reform</u>, <u>including the capacity of the State Department</u> to take on this responsibility, the <u>benefits</u> <u>of</u> the Pentagon’s <u>current management</u>, <u>or</u> <u>the unnecessary disruption</u> <u>that would result</u> <u>from</u> <u>significant</u> bureaucratic <u>change</u> laid out in this proposal.</p><p><u><mark>Failing to reform</mark> security assistance not only leaves the United States with a <strong>wasteful</strong> and <strong>inefficient</strong> status quo</u>, <u>it also <mark>perpetuates the <strong>marginalization</strong></mark> <mark>of</mark> diplomacy and locks in the <mark>military</mark>’s newly found <mark>dominance</mark> <mark>in</mark> driving U.S. foreign policy</u>. <u>The current security assistance system</u> evolved to address the threats posed by the post-9/11 era and <u>is now outdated and <strong>ill-suited</strong> for a new geopolitical environment</u> characterized by competition. If the next administration is <u><mark>to <strong></mark>revive U.S. diplomacy</strong> and <strong><mark>rebuild</strong> the State Department</mark>, <mark>it must <strong>empower</strong> the agency</mark> <mark>to oversee</mark> and <strong>direct</strong> <mark>foreign <strong>assistance</strong></mark>.</u> The Biden-Harris administration should seize the opportunity to work with a new Congress to reform the system from its first days in office and restore an effective tool in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal.</p><p><u>A new security assistance system</u>, <u><strong>centralized</u></strong> and coordinated <u>within the State Department,</u> <u><mark>would allow the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>to wield</mark> its <mark>s</mark>ecurity <mark>a</mark>ssistance more <strong><mark>effectively</u></strong></mark> and responsibly <u>in today’s </u>competitive <u><strong>geopolitical environment</u></strong>. Arms transfers, training, and <u>support could also better support U.S. foreign policy goals</u>, in particular <u><strong>bolstering</strong> democratic</u> <u>partners</u> and emerging democracies, <u>making them <strong>stronger</u></strong> U.S. partners <u><mark>to <strong>counter threats</strong></mark> from authoritarian actors</u>. <u>Empowering the State Department to oversee</u> <u>and manage security assistance</u> <u>would</u> also <u><mark>ensure</u></mark> that aid is used to advance a values-based foreign policy that respects and supports human rights.3 It would also give <u>U.S. diplomats <mark>greater <strong>clout</u></strong> <u>and <strong>leverage</u></strong></mark> and <u>potentially create greater coherence</u> <u>to</u> the provision of <u>foreign assistance</u> overall. <u>The result</u> <u>would</u> be to <u><strong><mark>strengthen</u></strong></mark> a key tool in the <u><strong><mark>U.S. fo</mark>reign <mark>po</mark>licy</u></strong> toolbox <u>and increase the clout and authority</u> <u>of</u> America’s <u>diplomats</u>, which is <u>badly needed</u> <u>in</u> <u>this</u> <u>new era of geopolitical competition.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Harris 16 [Benjamin Avi Harris, Executive Editor for the UCLA Journal of Environmental Law & Policy. "What the Supreme Court’s Stay of the Clean Power Plan Means for the EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Regulation Moving Forward", UCLA Environmental Law Review Syndicate, 2-12-2016, https://jelpblog.wordpress.com/2016/02/12/what-the-supreme-courts-stay-of-the-clean-power-plan-means-for-the-epas-greenhouse-gas-regulation-moving-forward/ // wyo-cjh] fulltext: Predictions about the Future of the Clean Power Plan Nevertheless, now that the CPP is halted pending litigation, the looming question is what the future holds for the CPP. With the stay in place, states are no longer obliged to continue with regulatory efforts to implement the CPP and develop state plans. Most states will likely abandon their previous efforts to comply with the CPP, but some may continue to develop certain facets of their state plans in the event that the CPP will be upheld to some degree. The future of the litigation will play out over an extended period of time, and the results are challenging to predict with certainty. Currently, oral arguments in front of the D.C. Circuit are scheduled for June 2-3, 2016.[44] Per this schedule, the D.C. Circuit’s decision may not arrive until late 2016, possibly after the September deadline for the submission of state plans under the CPP.[45] Given the D.C. Circuit’s unwillingness to issue a stay, it is fair to predict that the Circuit Court will similarly rule in favor of the EPA. In fact, the announcement of the panel of judges hearing the case is favorable to the EPA, with two appointments from Democrat presidents and a conservative judge who has sided with the EPA on several occasions.[46] Even if the EPA is successful at the Circuit level, the Supreme Court’s stay will remain in place until the Supreme Court either denies a writ of certiorari (extremely unlikely) or enters its own judgmen.[4t7] Given the drawn-out process of Supreme Court jurisprudence, a final decision on the litigation may not arise until the second quarter of 2017. Therefore, even if the CPP is upheld, the EPA’s implementation timeline would be set back by almost a full year, triggering a cascade of delays and likely requiring significant revisions of the rules. Despite the logistical complications this outcome may cause, it would be more than manageable for the EPA. The agency would likely still be able to preserve the ultimate mission to achieve particular emissions reduction goals in each state by 2030.[48] Unfortunately, following the Supreme Court’s granting of a stay against the CPP, the EPA should not be over-confident heading into the Supreme Court chambers. In the (near-certain) event that the Supreme Court decides to hear the case after the D.C. Circuit, the fate of the EPA’s regulatory darling will seemingly turn on the most moderate of the conservative Supreme Court justices. Justice Anthony Kennedy, voting in favor of the stay on the CPP, was the deciding vote in Massachusetts v. EPA. A proponent of federalism and states’ sovereign rights, Justice Kennedy may have been persuaded by the states’ interests in getting greenhouse gases regulated under the CAA.[49] However, he may not look as favorably toward the CPP’s effects on states. While states have significant flexibility under the CPP to meet the emission reduction targets in any manner they see fit, the imposition of an emissions reduction requirement in the first place can potentially interfere with a state’s desired energy profile and could have significant repercussions on the local economy. This is why more than half of states in the country have joined in on some kind of challenge to the CPP. It therefore seems likely that Justice Kennedy, given his jurisprudence on federalism, will side with these states as they strive to maintain state sovereignty in the energy sector. This position, however, would be hard to rectify with Justice Kennedy’s voting record in Massachusetts v. EPA, especially considering that stationary source regulation for greenhouse gases is an inevitable corollary of an endangerment finding under Section 202. The EPA clearly intended for the CPP to provide states sufficient leeway to feel comfortable achieving the requisite reductions in a manner tailored to their individualized needs. It would be an odd result for Justice Kennedy to find this an overstep into traditional state regulation when such a holding would undermine the federal objectives of the CAA, which he personally expanded to encompass greenhouse gases. And the CPP affords states ample discretion in crafting a state plan that satisfies the emission reduction targets, perhaps more than what the states are entitled to receive under legal precedent. Regardless, if the five conservative justices find the state sovereignty argument compelling, that will be sufficient grounds to invalidate the entire CPP. One other avenue for striking down the CPP is the statutory interpretation question regarding the legislative history of Section 111(d). If the Court finds the provision to be clear and unambiguous in prohibiting the EPA from regulating existing sources already subject to Section 112 permitting requirements, then the reach of the CPP would at best be highly limited to only those power plants that do not have the potential to emit 250 tons per year of hazardous air pollutants (of which there are few, if any), and at worst struck down altogether. On the other hand, if the Court buys into the muddied legislative history and considers the EPA’s interpretation of a vague provision to be permissible, then the entirety of the CPP would not be statutorily suspect on these grounds. Another option is available to the Court, where it could partially uphold the CPP for its regulation of existing sources but strike down the portions of the plan that may involve regulation “outside the fence.” This mainly concerns the second and third building blocks of the BSER, which are to encourage natural gas generation and renewable energy generation, respectively, as substitutes for high-carbon fossil fuel generation. The availability of these “generation-shifting” measures are incorporated into the BSER calculations for each state, and therefore if the Court finds these provisions an overreach of the EPA’s statutory authority, it will unwind a significant portion of the EPA’s emissions reduction targets. Again, this is a matter of statutory interpretation based on whether Section 111(d) unambiguously intends to limit regulation under that provision to only the design or operations of “existing” sources of the targeted pollutant.[50] The practical effects of a partial invalidation of the CPP are difficult to ascertain, given the significant weight placed on the BSER in the final rule. Even in this scenario, the EPA would be sent back to the drawing board to come up with a whole new way to achieve its desired emissions targets. Given the multitude of legal challenges from which the justices have to choose, it seems likely that Justice Kennedy will join with his conservative colleagues on at least one of the legal bases to invalidate the CPP. Can a NAAQS for Carbon Dioxide Save the Day? It is clear that in light of the Supreme Court’s stay on the Clean Power Plan, things are not looking great for the EPA. In preparation for an adverse Supreme Court ruling, the EPA should already be identifying ways to re-implement the goals of the CPP. The CPP was a key program in place to help the United States achieve its intended nationally determined contribution (INDC), of at least a 26% reduction from 2005 levels by 2025, under the Paris Agreement from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.[51] If the CPP is no longer viable, the EPA will need to have an alternative plan in place to satisfy the nation’s reduction obligations. To this end, there is still one significant mechanism to regulate greenhouse gases under the CAA that the EPA has yet to utilize: the setting of a National Ambient Air Quality Standard for carbon dioxide. Indeed, the EPA is legally obligated to declare greenhouse gases as criteria pollutants under Section 108(a) after making an endangerment finding regarding mobile sources under Section 202(a).[52] The requirements for listing a criteria pollutant under Section 108(a)(1) are findings that the pollutant (A) may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare, (B) is emitted from numerous or diverse sources, and (c) is one for which the EPA plans to issue air quality criteria.[53] In the case of Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, the Second Circuit held that “[o]nce the conditions of [Section] 108(a) (1)(A) and (B) have been met, the listing of lead and the issuance of air quality standards for lead become mandatory.”[54] Because the EPA already made an endangerment finding for greenhouse gases from mobile sources, and because greenhouse gases are clearly emitted from a plethora of stationary sources throughout the country, the EPA is similarly legally required to list greenhouse gases as criteria pollutants. And once a criteria pollutant is listed, the EPA is obligated to develop a NAAQS for that pollutant under Section 109, at a level requisite to protect the public health and welfare.[55] The Center for Biological Diversity filed a petition with the EPA to list greenhouse gases as criteria pollutants on December 2, 2009.[56] The petition asks for the EPA to set a NAAQS for carbon dioxide at 350 ppm, far lower than current levels throughout the world.[57] At this point in time, it is unclear what the extent of the EPA’s response to this petition has been, or if the EPA has even acknowledged it at all. To be sure, listing greenhouse gases as criteria pollutants would be a drastic and radical option for the EPA. It would bring the entire country’s GHG emissions under the jurisdiction of the EPA, which would be uniquely situated to effectuate emissions reductions in numerous ways.[58] The promulgation of a NAAQS for greenhouse gases would still give states considerable flexibility to determine how to reduce emissions through state implementation plans, in a manner similar to the CPP but with far more stringent targets.[59] There are also drawbacks to such a scheme, a primary concern being that the entire country would perpetually be in non-attainment for exceeding the concentrations of greenhouse gases set in the standard.[60] But in the event that the EPA finds itself picking up the pieces that were once the Clean Power Plan, perhaps it would be time to take a more dramatic approach to ensure that our country can meet its INDC that it pledged to the international community back in December 2015. It will be interesting to see whether this extreme route of greenhouse gas regulation becomes elevated to the forefront of the national climate change discussion if the Supreme Court carries out the execution of the CPP as it has threatened to do by issuing a stay. Without the CPP, the EPA clearly would need to take drastic action to meet the emission reduction contributions pledged under the INDC. Conclusion The public perception regarding climate change is clearly progressing toward a strong drive for action. Individual states have not been proactive enough in regulating greenhouse gases, revealing a need for national action. The EPA is certainly making every effort to incorporate greenhouse gases within the purview of the Clean Air Act. Given the poor knowledge about climate change when the CAA was enacted, the EPA has been creative in identifying regulatory solutions amidst ill-adapted statutory language. The Supreme Court’s stay of the Clean Power Plan is just the latest development in a perpetual struggle over how to adapt a decades-old, excessively-complex statute to arguably the most significant environmental disaster our planet will ever face. National greenhouse gas regulation under the CAA is inevitable, and the EPA will continue to search for the judicially-approved answers. Whether those answers take the form of the Clean Power Plan, or whether the EPA must resort to a more drastic measure such as National Ambient Air Quality Standards for greenhouse gases, is yet to be seen.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>National emissions restrictions are inevitable—CPP failure in the courts forces EPA to turn to more drastic, high-cost measures.</h4><p>Harris 16 </strong>[Benjamin Avi Harris, Executive Editor for the UCLA Journal of Environmental Law & Policy. "What the Supreme Court’s Stay of the Clean Power Plan Means for the EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Regulation Moving Forward", UCLA Environmental Law Review Syndicate, 2-12-2016, https://jelpblog.wordpress.com/2016/02/12/what-the-supreme-courts-stay-of-the-clean-power-plan-means-for-the-epas-greenhouse-gas-regulation-moving-forward/ // wyo-cjh<u><strong>]</p><p></u></strong>Predictions about the Future of the Clean Power Plan Nevertheless, now that the CPP is halted pending litigation, the looming question is what the future holds for the CPP. With the stay in place, states are no longer obliged to continue with regulatory efforts to implement the CPP and develop state plans. Most <u>states</u> will likely abandon their previous efforts to comply with the CPP, but some <u>may continue to develop certain facets of their state plans in the event that the<mark> CPP</mark> will be upheld to some degree.</u> <u><strong>The <mark>future</mark> of the litigation will play out over an extended period of time, and the results are <mark>challeng</mark>ing<mark> to predict </mark>with certainty. </u></strong>Currently, oral arguments in front of the D.C. Circuit are scheduled for June 2-3, 2016.[44] Per this schedule, the D.C. Circuit’s decision may not arrive until late 2016, possibly after the September deadline for the submission of state plans under the CPP.[45] Given the D.C. Circuit’s unwillingness to issue a stay, it is fair to predict that the Circuit Court will similarly rule in favor of the EPA. In fact, the announcement of the panel of judges hearing the case is favorable to the EPA, with two appointments from Democrat presidents and a conservative judge who has sided with the EPA on several occasions.[46] <u>Even if the EPA is successful at the Circuit level, the Supreme Court’s stay will remain in place until the Supreme Court either denies</u> a writ of <u>cert</u>iorari (extremely unlikely) <u>or enters its own judgmen</u>.[4<u>t</u>7] Given the drawn-out process of Supreme Court jurisprudence, <u>a final decision on the litigation may not arise until the second quarter of 2017.</u> Therefore, <u><strong><mark>even if</mark> <mark>the CPP is upheld</mark>, the EPA’s <mark>implementation</mark> timeline <mark>would be set back</mark> by almost <mark>a full year</mark>, triggering a cascade of delays <mark>and</mark> likely <mark>requir</mark>ing significant <mark>revisions</mark> of the rules.</u></strong> Despite the logistical complications this outcome may cause, it would be more than manageable for the EPA. The agency would likely still be able to preserve the ultimate mission to achieve particular emissions reduction goals in each state by 2030.[48] Unfortunately, <u>following the Supreme Court’s granting of a stay against the CPP, the EPA should not be over-confident heading into the Supreme Court chambers.</u> <u>In the (near-certain) event that <mark>the S</mark>upreme<mark> C</mark>ourt decides to hear the <mark>case</mark> after the D.C. Circuit,</u> <u><strong>the <mark>fate</mark> of the EPA’s regulatory darling <mark>will</u></strong> </mark>seemingly <u><strong><mark>turn on the most moderate of the conservative</u></strong> </mark>Supreme Court <u><strong><mark>justices</mark>. </strong>Justice</u> Anthony <u><mark>Kennedy</mark>, voting in favor of the stay </u>on the CPP, was the deciding vote in Massachusetts v. EPA. <u>A proponent of federalism and states’ sovereign rights,</u> Justice Kennedy may have been persuaded by the states’ interests in getting greenhouse gases regulated under the CAA.[49] However, <u><strong>he <mark>may not </mark>look</u></strong> as <u><strong><mark>favor</mark>ably toward the <mark>CPP’s effects on states.</u></strong></mark> <u>While states have significant flexibility</u> under the CPP to meet the emission reduction targets in any manner they see fit, <u>the imposition of an emissions reduction requirement</u> in the first place <u>can potentially interfere with a state’s desired energy profile and</u> could <u>have</u> significant <u>repercussions on the local economy.</u> <u>This is why more than half of states</u> in the country <u>have joined in on some kind of challenge</u> to the CPP. <u><strong>It</u></strong> therefore <u><strong>seems likely that</u></strong> Justice <u><strong>Kennedy</u></strong>, given his jurisprudence on federalism, <u><strong>will side with these states</u></strong> as they strive to maintain state sovereignty in the energy sector. This position, however, would be hard to rectify with Justice Kennedy’s voting record in Massachusetts v. EPA, especially considering that stationary source regulation for greenhouse gases is an inevitable corollary of an endangerment finding under Section 202. The EPA clearly intended for the CPP to provide states sufficient leeway to feel comfortable achieving the requisite reductions in a manner tailored to their individualized needs. It would be an odd result for Justice Kennedy to find this an overstep into traditional state regulation when such a holding would undermine the federal objectives of the CAA, which he personally expanded to encompass greenhouse gases. And the CPP affords states ample discretion in crafting a state plan that satisfies the emission reduction targets, perhaps more than what the states are entitled to receive under legal precedent.<u> <strong>Regardless, <mark>if the five conservative justices find the state sovereignty argument compelling, that will </mark>be sufficient grounds to <mark>invalidate </mark>the entire <mark>CPP</mark>.</u></strong> <u>One other avenue for striking down the CPP is the statutory interpretation question regarding the legislative history of Section <mark>111(d).</u> <u>If the Court finds the provision</mark> to be</u> clear and <u>unambiguous in <mark>prohibiting</mark> the EPA from <mark>regulating existing sources</mark> already subject to Section 112</u> permitting requirements<mark>, <u>then</mark> the reach of the CPP would at best be highly limited </u>to only those power plants that do not have the potential to emit 250 tons per year of hazardous air pollutants (of which there are few, if any), <u>and at worst struck down altogether. </u>On the other hand, if the Court buys into the muddied legislative history and considers the EPA’s interpretation of a vague provision to be permissible, then the entirety of the CPP would not be statutorily suspect on these grounds. Another option is available to <u><mark>the Court</u></mark>, where it <u><mark>could partially uphold</mark> the <mark>CPP</mark> for its regulation of existing sources <mark>but strike down</mark> the portions of the plan that may involve<mark> regulation “outside</mark> the fence.”</u> <u>This mainly concerns the second <mark>and</mark> third building blocks of the BSER</u>, which are to encourage natural gas generation and renewable energy generation, respectively, as substitutes for high-carbon fossil fuel generation. The availability of these <u>“generation-shifting” measures are incorporated into the BSER calculations for each state, and therefore if the Court finds these provisions an overreach</u> of the EPA’s statutory authority, <u><strong>it <mark>will unwind</mark> a <mark>significant portion of the</mark> EPA’s emissions reduction <mark>targets</mark>.</u></strong> <u>Again, this is a matter of statutory interpretation based on</u> whether Section <u>111(d)</u> unambiguously intends to limit regulation under that provision to only the design or operations of “existing” sources of the targeted pollutant.[50] <u>The practical effects of a partial invalidation of the CPP are difficult to ascertain,</u> given the significant weight placed on the BSER in the final rule. <u><strong>Even in this scenario, the EPA would be sent back to the drawing board to come up with a whole new way to achieve its desired emissions targets. <mark>Given the </mark>multitude of<mark> legal challenges </mark>from which the justices have to choose, it seems likely that</u></strong> Justice <u><strong><mark>Kennedy will join</mark> with his<mark> conservative </mark>colleagues on at least one of the legal bases to invalidate the CPP. </u></strong>Can a NAAQS for Carbon Dioxide Save the Day? It is clear that <u>in light of the Supreme Court’s stay </u>on the Clean Power Plan, <u>things are not looking great for the EPA. In preparation for an adverse</u> Supreme Court <u>ruling, the EPA should already be identifying ways to re-implement the goals of the CPP.</u> The CPP was a key program in place to help the United States achieve its intended nationally determined contribution (INDC), of at least a 26% reduction from 2005 levels by 2025, under the Paris Agreement from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.[51] <u><strong>If the CPP is no longer viable, the EPA will need to have an alternative plan in place </u></strong>to satisfy the nation’s reduction obligations. To this end, there is still one significant mechanism to regulate greenhouse gases under the CAA that the EPA has yet to utilize: the setting of a National Ambient Air Quality Standard for carbon dioxide. Indeed, the EPA is legally obligated to declare greenhouse gases as criteria pollutants under Section 108(a) after making an endangerment finding regarding mobile sources under Section 202(a).[52] The requirements for listing a criteria pollutant under Section 108(a)(1) are findings that the pollutant (A) may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare, (B) is emitted from numerous or diverse sources, and (c) is one for which the EPA plans to issue air quality criteria.[53] In the case of Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, the Second Circuit held that “[o]nce the conditions of [Section] 108(a) (1)(A) and (B) have been met, the listing of lead and the issuance of air quality standards for lead become mandatory.”[54] <u>Because the EPA already made an endangerment finding for greenhouse gases from mobile sources, and because greenhouse gases are clearly emitted from a plethora of stationary sources</u> throughout the country, <u><strong>the EPA is</u></strong> similarly <u><strong>legally required to list greenhouse gases as criteria pollutants.</u></strong> <u>And once a criteria pollutant is listed, the EPA is obligated to develop a NAAQS </u>for that pollutant under Section 109, at a level requisite to protect the public health and welfare.[55] The Center for Biological Diversity filed a petition with the EPA to list greenhouse gases as criteria pollutants on December 2, 2009.[56] The petition asks for the EPA to set a NAAQS for carbon dioxide at 350 ppm, far lower than current levels throughout the world.[57] At this point in time, it is unclear what the extent of the EPA’s response to this petition has been, or if the EPA has even acknowledged it at all. <u>To be sure, listing greenhouse gases as criteria pollutants would be a drastic and radical option for the EPA. </u>It would bring the entire country’s GHG emissions under the jurisdiction of the EPA, which would be uniquely situated to effectuate emissions reductions in numerous ways.[58] <u>The promulgation of a NAAQS for greenhouse gases would still give states considerable flexibility</u> to determine how to reduce emissions through state implementation plans, in a manner similar to the CPP <u><strong>but with far more stringent targets.</u></strong>[59] <u>There are also drawbacks to such a scheme, a primary concern being that the entire country would perpetually be in non-attainment for exceeding the</u> concentrations of greenhouse gases set in the <u>standard.[</u>60] But <u><strong>in the event that the EPA finds itself picking up the pieces that were once the</u></strong> <u><strong>C</u></strong>lean <u><strong>P</u></strong>ower <u><strong>P</u></strong>lan, perhaps <u><strong>it would</u></strong> be time to <u><strong>take a more dramatic approach</u></strong> to ensure that our country can meet its INDC that it pledged to the international community back in December 2015. It will be interesting to see whether this extreme route of greenhouse gas regulation becomes elevated to the forefront of the national climate change discussion if the Supreme Court carries out the execution of the CPP as it has threatened to do by issuing a stay. <u><mark>Without the CPP, the EPA </mark>clearly <mark>would need to take drastic action to meet the</mark> emission reduction contributions pledged under the <mark>INDC</mark>. </u>Conclusion The <u><strong><mark>public perception</mark> regarding climate change <mark>is </mark>clearly <mark>progressing toward </mark>a strong drive for <mark>action.</u></strong></mark> Individual states have not been proactive enough in regulating greenhouse gases, revealing a need for national action. <u>The EPA is certainly making every effort to incorporate greenhouse gases within the purview of the Clean Air Act. </u>Given the poor knowledge about climate change when the CAA was enacted, <u>the EPA has been creative in identifying regulatory solutions amidst ill-adapted statutory language.</u> The Supreme Court’s stay of the Clean Power Plan is just the latest development in a perpetual struggle over how to adapt a decades-old, excessively-complex statute to arguably the most significant environmental disaster our planet will ever face. <u><strong><mark>National g</mark>reen<mark>h</mark>ouse <mark>g</mark>as<mark> regulation under </mark>the<mark> CAA is inevitable, and </mark>the<mark> EPA will continue to search for</mark> the <mark>judicially-approved answers.</u></strong> <u><strong>Whether those</u></strong></mark> answers <u><strong><mark>take the form of the</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>C</u></strong></mark>lean <u><strong><mark>P</u></strong></mark>ower <u><strong><mark>P</u></strong></mark>lan, <u><strong><mark>or</u></strong></mark> whether <u><strong>the EPA must resort to <mark>a more drastic measure</u></strong></mark> such as National Ambient Air Quality Standards for greenhouse gases, <u><strong>is yet to be seen.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: The Dark Mountain 9 (Uncivilization, The Dark Mountain Manifesto, http://dark-mountain.net/about/manifesto/, 2009) fulltext: Against the civilising project, which has becomfe the progenitor of ecocide, Uncivilised writing offers not a non-human perspective—we remain human and, even now, are not quite ashamed — but a perspective which sees us as one strand of a web rather than as the first palanquin in a glorious procession. It offers an unblinking look at the forces among which we find ourselves. It sets out to paint a picture of homo sapiens which a being from another world or, better, a being from our own — a blue whale, an albatross, a mountain hare — might recognise as something approaching a truth. It sets out to tug our attention away from ourselves and turn it outwards; to uncentre our minds. It is writing, in short, which puts civilisation — and us — into perspective. Writing that comes not, as most writing still does, from the self-absorbed and self-congratulatory metropolitan centres of civilisation but from somewhere on its wilder fringes. Somewhere woody and weedy and largely avoided, from where insistent, uncomfortable truths about ourselves drift in; truths which we’re not keen on hearing. Writing which unflinchingly stares us down, however uncomfortable this may prove. It might perhaps be just as useful to explain what Uncivilised writing is not. It is not environmental writing, for there is much of that about already, and most of it fails to jump the barrier which marks the limit of our collective human ego; much of it, indeed, ends up shoring-up that ego, and helping us to persist in our civilisational delusions. It is not nature writing, for there is no such thing as nature as distinct from people, and to suggest otherwise is to perpetuate the attitude which has brought us here. And it is not political writing, with which the world is already flooded, for politics is a human confection, complicit in ecocide and decaying from within. Uncivilised writing is more rooted than any of these. Above all, it is determined to shift our worldview, not to feed into it. It is writing for outsiders. If you want to be loved, it might be best not to get involved, for the world, at least for a time, will resolutely refuse to listen. A salutary example of this last point can be found in the fate of one of the twentieth century’s most significant yet most neglected poets. Robinson Jeffers was writing Uncivilised verse seventy years before this manifesto was thought of, though he did not call it that. In his early poetic career, Jeffers was a star: he appeared on the cover of Time magazine, read his poems in the US Library of Congress and was respected for the alternative he offered to the Modernist juggernaut. Today his work is left out of anthologies, his name is barely known and his politics are regarded with suspicion. Read Jeffers’ later work and you will see why. His crime was to deliberately puncture humanity’s sense of self-importance. His punishment was to be sent into a lonely literary exile from which, forty years after his death, he has still not been allowed to return. But Jeffers knew what he was in for. He knew that nobody, in an age of ‘consumer choice’, wanted to be told by this stone-faced prophet of the California cliffs that ‘it is good for man … To know that his needs and nature are no more changed in fact in ten thousand years than the beaks of eagles.’ He knew that no comfortable liberal wanted to hear his angry warning, issued at the height of the Second World War: ‘Keep clear of the dupes that talk democracy / And the dogs that talk revolution / Drunk with talk, liars and believers … / Long live freedom, and damn the ideologies.’ His vision of a world in which humanity was doomed to destroy its surroundings and eventually itself (‘I would burn my right hand in a [14] slow fire / To change the future … I should do foolishly’) was furiously rejected in the rising age of consumer democracy which he also predicted (‘Be happy, adjust your economics to the new abundance…’) Jeffers, as his poetry developed, developed a philosophy too. He called it ‘inhumanism.’ It was, he wrote: a shifting of emphasis and significance from man to notman; the rejection of human solipsism and recognition of the transhuman magnificence…This manner of thought and feeling is neither misanthropic nor pessimist … It offers a reasonable detachment as rule of conduct, instead of love, hate and envy… it provides magnificence for the religious instinct, and satisfies our need to admire greatness and rejoice in beauty. The shifting of emphasis from man to notman: this is the aim of Uncivilised writing. To ‘unhumanise our views a little, and become confident / As the rock and ocean that we were made from.’ This is not a rejection of our humanity — it is an affirmation of the wonder of what it means to be truly human. It is to accept the world for what it is and to make our home here, rather than dreaming of relocating to the stars, or existing in a Man-forged bubble and pretending to ourselves that there is nothing outside it to which we have any connection at all. This, then, is the literary challenge of our age. So far, few have taken it up. The signs of the times flash out in urgent neon, but our literary lions have better things to read. Their art remains stuck in its own civilised bubble. The idea of civilisation is entangled, right down to its semantic roots, with city-dwelling, and this provokes a thought: if our writers seem unable to find new stories which might lead us through the times ahead, is this not a function of their metropolitan mentality? The big names of contemporary literature are equally at home in the fashionable quarters of London or New York, and their writing reflects the prejudices of the placeless, transnational elite to which they belong. The converse also applies. Those voices which tell other stories tend to be rooted in a sense of place. Think of John Berger’s novels and essays from the Haute Savoie, or the depths explored by Alan Garner within a day’s walk of his birthplace in Cheshire. Think of Wendell Berry or WS Merwin, Mary Oliver or Cormac McCarthy. Those whose writings [15] approach the shores of the Uncivilised are those who know their place, in the physical sense, and who remain wary of the siren cries of metrovincial fashion and civilised excitement. If we name particular writers whose work embodies what we are arguing for, the aim is not to place them more prominently on the existing map of literary reputations. Rather, as Geoff Dyer has said of Berger, to take their work seriously is to redraw the maps altogether — not only the map of literary reputations, but those by which we navigate all areas of life. Even here, we go carefully, for cartography itself is not a neutral activity. The drawing of maps is full of colonial echoes. The civilised eye seeks to view the world from above, as something we can stand over and survey. The Uncivilised writer knows the world is, rather, something we are enmeshed in — a patchwork and a framework of places, experiences, sights, smells, sounds. Maps can lead, but can also mislead. Our maps must be the kind sketched in the dust with a stick, washed away by the next rain. They can be read only by those who ask to see them, and they cannot be bought. This, then, is Uncivilised writing. Human, inhuman, stoic and entirely natural. Humble, questioning, suspicious of the big idea and the easy answer. Walking the boundaries and reopening old conversations. Apart but engaged, its practitioners always willing to get their hands dirty; aware, in fact, that dirt is essential; that keyboards should be tapped by those with soil under their fingernails and wilderness in their heads. We tried ruling the world; we tried acting as God’s steward, then we tried ushering in the human revolution, the age of reason and isolation. We failed in all of it, and our failure destroyed more than we were even aware of. The time for civilisation is past. Uncivilisation, which knows its flaws because it has participated in them; which sees unflinchingly and bites down hard as it records — this is the project we must embark on now. This is the challenge for writing — for art — to meet. This is what we are here for.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Our alternative is uncivilized writing and speaking – only by viewing ourselves as objects in a larger web and shattering subjectivity can we be at peace with the Universe.</h4><p><strong>The Dark Mountain 9 (Uncivilization, The Dark Mountain Manifesto, </strong>http://dark-mountain.net/about/manifesto/<strong>, 2009)</p><p></strong>Against the civilising project, which has becomfe the progenitor of ecocide, <u>Uncivilised writing offers not a non-human perspective</u>—<u>we remain human and</u>, even now<u>, are not</u> quite <u>ashamed</u> — <u>but a perspective which sees us as one strand of a web rather than as the first palanquin</u> in a glorious procession<u>. It offers an unblinking look at the forces among which we find ourselves</u>. It sets out to paint a picture of homo sapiens which a being from another world or, better, a being from our own — a blue whale, an albatross, a mountain hare — might recognise as something approaching a truth. <u>It sets out to tug our attention away from ourselves and turn it outwards; to uncentre our minds. </u>It is writing, in short, <u>which puts civilisation — and us — into perspective</u>. <u>Writing that comes not</u>, as most writing still does, <u>from the self-absorbed</u> and self-congratulatory metropolitan centres of civilisation <u>but from somewhere on its wilder fringes</u>. <u>Somewhere woody and weedy and largely avoided,</u> from where insistent, <u>uncomfortable truths about ourselves drift in; truths which we’re not keen on hearing. Writing which unflinchingly stares us down</u>, however uncomfortable this may prove. It might perhaps be just as useful to explain what Uncivilised writing is not. <u>It is not environmental writing</u>, for there is much of that about already, and most of it fails to jump the barrier <u>which marks the limit of our collective human ego</u>; much of it, indeed, ends up <u>shoring-up that ego,</u> and helping us to persist in our civilisational delusions. <u>It is not nature writing, for there is no such thing as nature</u> as distinct from people, <u>and to suggest otherwise is to perpetuate the attitude which has brought us here</u>. And <u>it is not political writing</u>, with which the world is already flooded, for politics is a human confection, complicit in ecocide and decaying from within. Uncivilised writing is more rooted than any of these. Above all, <u>it is determined to shift our worldview, not to feed into it. It is writing for outsiders. If you want to be loved, it might be best not to get involved</u>, for the world, at least for a time, will resolutely refuse to listen. A salutary example of this last point can be found in the fate of one of the twentieth century’s most significant yet most neglected poets. Robinson Jeffers was writing Uncivilised verse seventy years before this manifesto was thought of, though he did not call it that. In his early poetic career, Jeffers was a star: he appeared on the cover of Time magazine, read his poems in the US Library of Congress and was respected for the alternative he offered to the Modernist juggernaut. Today his work is left out of anthologies, his name is barely known and his politics are regarded with suspicion. Read Jeffers’ later work and you will see why. His crime was to deliberately puncture humanity’s sense of self-importance. His punishment was to be sent into a lonely literary exile from which, forty years after his death, he has still not been allowed to return. But Jeffers knew what he was in for. He knew that nobody, in an age of ‘consumer choice’, wanted to be told by this stone-faced prophet of the California cliffs that ‘it is good for man … To know that his needs and nature are no more changed in fact in ten thousand years than the beaks of eagles.’ He knew that no comfortable liberal wanted to hear his angry warning, issued at the height of the Second World War: ‘Keep clear of the dupes that talk democracy / And the dogs that talk revolution / Drunk with talk, liars and believers … / Long live freedom, and damn the ideologies.’ His vision of a world in which humanity was doomed to destroy its surroundings and eventually itself (‘I would burn my right hand in a [14] slow fire / To change the future … I should do foolishly’) was furiously rejected in the rising age of consumer democracy which he also predicted (‘Be happy, adjust your economics to the new abundance…’) Jeffers, as his poetry developed, developed a philosophy too. He called it ‘inhumanism.’ It was, he wrote: a shifting of emphasis and significance from man to notman; the rejection of human solipsism and recognition of the transhuman magnificence…This manner of thought and feeling is neither misanthropic nor pessimist … It offers a reasonable detachment as rule of conduct, instead of love, hate and envy… it provides magnificence for the religious instinct, and satisfies our need to admire greatness and rejoice in beauty. The shifting of emphasis from man to notman: this is the aim of Uncivilised writing. <u>To ‘unhumanise our views</u> a little, and become confident / As the rock and ocean that we were made from.<u>’ This is not a rejection of our humanity — it is an affirmation of the wonder of what it means to be truly human. It is to accept the world for what it is</u> and to make our home here, <u>rather than dreaming of relocating to the stars, or existing in a Man-forged bubble</u> <u>and pretending to ourselves that there is nothing outside it to which we have any connection at all. </u>This, then, is the literary challenge of our age. So far, few have taken it up. The signs of the times flash out in urgent neon, but our literary lions have better things to read. Their art remains stuck in its own civilised bubble. The idea of civilisation is entangled, right down to its semantic roots, with city-dwelling, and this provokes a thought: if our writers seem unable to find new stories which might lead us through the times ahead, is this not a function of their metropolitan mentality? The big names of contemporary literature are equally at home in the fashionable quarters of London or New York, and their writing reflects the prejudices of the placeless, transnational elite to which they belong. The converse also applies. Those voices which tell other stories tend to be rooted in a sense of place. Think of John Berger’s novels and essays from the Haute Savoie, or the depths explored by Alan Garner within a day’s walk of his birthplace in Cheshire. Think of Wendell Berry or WS Merwin, Mary Oliver or Cormac McCarthy. Those whose writings [15] approach the shores of the Uncivilised are those who know their place, in the physical sense, and who remain wary of the siren cries of metrovincial fashion and civilised excitement. If we name particular writers whose work embodies what we are arguing for, the aim is not to place them more prominently on the existing map of literary reputations. Rather, as Geoff Dyer has said of Berger, to take their work seriously is to redraw the maps altogether — not only the map of literary reputations, but those by which we navigate all areas of life. Even here, we go carefully, for cartography itself is not a neutral activity. The drawing of maps is full of colonial echoes. <u>The civilised eye seeks to view the world from above, as something we can stand over and survey. The Uncivilised writer knows the world is,</u> rather, <u>something we are enmeshed in — a patchwork and a framework of places</u>, experiences, sights, smells, sounds<u>. Maps can lead, but can also mislead. Our maps must be the kind sketched in the dust with a stick, washed away by the next rain. They can be read only by those who ask to see them, and they cannot be bought</u>. This, then, is Uncivilised writing. Human, inhuman, stoic and entirely natural. Humble, questioning, suspicious of the big idea and the easy answer. Walking the boundaries and reopening old conversations. Apart but engaged, its practitioners always willing to get their hands dirty; aware, in fact, that dirt is essential; that keyboards should be tapped by those with soil under their fingernails and wilderness in their heads. <u>We tried ruling the world</u>; we tried acting as God’s steward, then we tried ushering in the human revolution, the age of reason and isolation. <u>We failed</u> in all of it, <u>and our failure destroyed more than we were even aware of. The time for civilisation is past. Uncivilisation, </u>which knows its flaws because it has participated in them; which sees unflinchingly and bites down hard as it records — this <u>is the project we must embark on now</u><strong>. This is the challenge for writing — for art — to meet. This is what we are here for.</p></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Cahill 14—(Damien Cahill, Senior Lecturer in Political Economy, University of Sydney, Australia, 2014, “The End of Laissez-Faire?: On the Durability of Embedded Neoliberalism” p119-121)//don fulltext: Writing of the constraints imposed upon the ability of member states to conduct autonomous fiscal and monetary policies by the European Union (EU), van Appledorn (2009: 26) observes that ‘policy making is structurally biased towards policies of neoliberal restructuring’. This prompts recognition that the roll-out of neoliberalism has entailed more than just the construction of new institutions to regulate markets in which corporations have been granted greater freedoms or in which newly privatised entities now operate. Rather, it has also entailed the enactment of new regulations that commit states to neoliberal forms of governance. These are ‘structurally biased’ towards neoliberalism because they provide a framework of rules and obligations that privilege and commit states to neoliberal forms of regulation and response. While the fiscal and monetary policy constraints of the European Union provide a clear example of this, the structural bias extends beyond the sphere of European macroeconomic management. It is embodied in various forms of competition policy, in the EU and beyond, and in the articles of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as well as numerous free trade agreements, all of which commit states to neoliberal forms of governance. Not only does this highlight that actually existing neoliberalism is underpinned by much more than fundamentalist neoliberal ideas, it also suggests that a shift in the ideological adherence of policy makers away from neoliberal norms is far from a sufficient condition to bring about a shift away from neoliberal forms of state regulation. Indeed, as several authors have observed, the structural bias towards neoliberal policies gives them a constitutional element (Gill 2001; Nicol 2010). The neoliberal bias is institutionally embedded in such a way as to make neoliberal policy norms part of the rules, principles and precedents by which nation-states are governed, thus effectively constitutionalising neoliberalism. Nicol (2010: 46) therefore calls such measures a ‘constitutional law protection of neoliberal capitalism’, which draws attention to the ways in which such regulations limit the policy freedom of states to move in non-neoliberal directions, irrespective of the ideology or policy preferences of state elites. The following section will detail key examples of institutionally embedded neoliberalism which underpin the structural bias towards, and constitutional nature of, neoliberal policy norms, before turning to a consideration of the de-democratising tendencies inherent within such structures and the ways in which they reinforce the class embedded nature of neoliberalism, privileging not just neoliberal forms of policy, but the interests of the owners and controllers of capital as well. The constitutionalisation of neoliberalism occurs at both the national and supranational levels. At the supranational level neoliberalism has been institutionally embedded and constitutionalised via states joining or making legally binding commitments to supranational economic institutions including the IMF, World Bank, WTO, European Union, EU and various multilateral trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The mechanism by which neoliberalism becomes embedded through these institutions varies, with the former two institutions – the IMF and World Bank – providing a less durable form of institutionally embedded neoliberalism than the latter agreements, treaties and supranational governance bodies. The contrast between the IMF and the WTO provides a good example of this differential durability. Both have their origins in the post-World War Two era, as key institutions for regulating the international political economy during this period. Moreover, both were later transformed into institutions which facilitated the expanded reproduction of neoliberalism. However, differences in the membership, applicability and enforcement of the rules of each organisation are at the heart of differences in the ways in which each contributes to the expanded reproduction of neoliberalism. The IMF facilitates the institutional embedding of neoliberalism through the conditions attached to the loans it brokers for nation-states. That this supranational organisation requires states to implement a range of neoliberal institutional transformations as a condition of access to finance means that, in such states, neoliberalism becomes state policy irrespective of the ideological disposition of state elites. Thus, neoliberal policy norms are institutionally embedded within the conditional lending rules of the IMF. Alt fails- Capitalism is psychologically inevitable due to evolutionary change Wilkinson 5 (Will, policy analyst @CATO, “Capitalism and Human Nature”, CATO Policy Report, XXVII(1), January/February, http://www.cato.org/research/articles/wilkinson-050201.html) Perhaps the most depressing lesson of evolutionary psychology for politics is found in its account of the deep-seated human capacity for envy and, related, of our difficulty in understanding the idea of gains from trade and increases in productivity—the idea of an ever-expanding "pie" of wealth.  There is evidence that greater skill and initiative could lead to higher status and bigger shares of resources for an individual in the EEA. But because of the social nature of hunting and gathering, the fact that food spoiled quickly, and the utter absence of privacy, the benefits of individual success in hunting or foraging could not be easily internalized by the individual, and were expected to be shared. The EEA was for the most part a zero-sum world, where increases in total wealth through invention, investment, and extended economic exchange were totally unknown. More for you was less for me. Therefore, if anyone managed to acquire a great deal more than anyone else, that was pretty good evidence that theirs was a stash of ill-gotten gains, acquired by cheating, stealing, raw force, or, at best, sheer luck. Envy of the disproportionately wealthy may have helped to reinforce generally adaptive norms of sharing and to help those of lower status on the dominance hierarchy guard against further predation by those able to amass power.  Our zero-sum mentality makes it hard for us to understand how trade and investment can increase the amount of total wealth. We are thus ill-equipped to easily understand our own economic system.  These features of human nature—that we are coalitional, hierarchical, and envious zero-sum thinkers—would seem to make liberal capitalism extremely unlikely. And it is. However, the benefits of a liberal market order can be seen in a few further features of the human mind and social organization in the EEA.  Property Rights are Natural  The problem of distributing scarce resources can be handled in part by implicitly coercive allocative hierarchies. An alternative solution to the problem of distribution is the recognition and enforcement of property rights. Property rights are prefigured in nature by the way animals mark out territories for their exclusive use in foraging, hunting, and mating. Recognition of such rudimentary claims to control and exclude minimizes costly conflict, which by itself provides a strong evolutionary reason to look for innate tendencies to recognize and respect norms of property.  New scientific research provides even stronger evidence for the existence of such property "instincts." For example, recent experimental work by Oliver Goodenough, a legal theorist, and Christine Prehn, a neuroscientist, suggests that the human mind evolved specialized modules for making judgments about moral transgressions, and transgressions against property in particular.  Evolutionary psychology can help us to understand that property rights are not created simply by strokes of the legislator's pen.  Mutually Beneficial Exchange is Natural  Trade and mutually beneficial exchange are human universals, as is the division of labor. In their groundbreaking paper, "Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange," Cosmides and Tooby point out that, contrary to widespread belief, hunter-gatherer life is not "a kind of retro-utopia" of "indiscriminate, egalitarian cooperation and sharing." The archeological and ethnographic evidence shows that hunter-gatherers were involved in numerous forms of trade and exchange. Some forms of hunter-gatherer trading can involve quite complex specialization and the interaction of supply and demand.  Most impressive, Cosmides and Tooby have shown through a series of experiments that human beings are able easily to solve complex logical puzzles involving reciprocity, the accounting of costs and benefits, and the detection of people who have cheated on agreements. However, we are unable to solve formally identical puzzles that do not deal with questions of social exchange. That, they argue, points to the existence of "functionally specialized, content-dependent cognitive adaptations for social exchange."<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>It’s inevitable</h4><p><strong>Cahill 14</strong>—(Damien Cahill, Senior Lecturer in Political Economy, University of Sydney, Australia, 2014, “The End of Laissez-Faire?: On the Durability of Embedded Neoliberalism” p119-121)//don</p><p>Writing of the constraints imposed upon the ability of member states to conduct autonomous fiscal and monetary policies by the European Union (EU), van Appledorn (2009: 26) observes that ‘<u><strong><mark>policy making</mark> is structurally <mark>biased towards</mark> policies of <mark>neoliberal restructuring’</u></strong></mark>. This prompts recognition that <u>the roll-out of neoliberalism</u> has <u>entailed more than</u> just <u>the construction of new institutions to regulate markets</u> in which corporations have been granted greater freedoms or in which newly privatised entities now operate. Rather, <u>it</u> has also <u>entailed the <mark>enactment of<strong> new regulations that commit states to neoliberal forms of governance</mark>.</u></strong> These are ‘<u><strong>structurally <mark>biased’ towards neoliberalism</u></strong></mark> <u>because they provide a framework of rules</u> and obligations <u>that privilege</u> and commit <u>states to neoliberal forms of regulation</u> and response. While the fiscal and monetary policy constraints of the European Union provide a clear example of this, the <u>structural bias extends</u> beyond the sphere of European macroeconomic management. It is embodied in various forms of competition policy, in the EU and beyond, and <u>in the <mark>articles of</mark> the</u> World Trade Organisation (<u><mark>WTO</u></mark>) <u><mark>as well as </mark>numerous <mark>free trade agreements</u></mark>, <u><strong>all of which <mark>commit states to neoliberal </mark>forms of <mark>governance</u></strong></mark>. Not only does this highlight that <u>actually existing neoliberalism is underpinned by</u> much <u>more than fundamentalist neoliberal ideas</u>, <u><strong>it</u></strong> also <u><strong>suggests that a <mark>shift</mark> <mark>in</mark> the <mark>ideological adherence of</mark> <mark>policy makers away from neoliberal norms is far from a sufficient</mark> condition <mark>to</mark> <mark>bring</mark> about a <mark>shift away from neoliberal forms of state regulation</mark>. </u></strong>Indeed, as several authors have observed, the structural bias towards neoliberal policies gives them a constitutional element (Gill 2001; Nicol 2010). <u>The</u> neoliberal <u>bias is institutionally embedded</u> in such a way as <u>to make <mark>neoliberal policy norms part of the rules</u></mark>, principles and precedents <u>by which nation-states are governed</u>, <u>thus</u> effectively <u><strong>constitutionalising neoliberalism</u></strong>. Nicol (2010: 46) therefore calls such measures a ‘constitutional law protection of neoliberal capitalism’, which draws attention to the ways in which such regulations limit the policy freedom of states to move in non-neoliberal directions, irrespective of the ideology or policy preferences of state elites. The following section will detail key examples of institutionally embedded neoliberalism which underpin the structural bias towards, and constitutional nature of, neoliberal policy norms, before turning to a consideration of the de-democratising tendencies inherent within such structures and the ways in which they reinforce the class embedded nature of neoliberalism, privileging not just neoliberal forms of policy, but the interests of the owners and controllers of capital as well. <u>The constitutionalisation of neoliberalism</u> <u>occurs at both the national and supranational levels</u>. At the supranational level <u>neoliberalism has been</u> <u>institutionally <mark>embedded and constitutionalised via states joining</u></mark> or making <u>legally binding <mark>commitments</u></mark> to supranational economic institutions <u><mark>including</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>IMF, World Bank, WTO, European Union, EU</u></strong></mark> <u>and various multilateral trade agreements such</u> as the North American Free Trade Agreement (<u><strong>NAFTA</u></strong>). The mechanism by which neoliberalism becomes embedded through these institutions varies, with the former two institutions – the IMF and World Bank – providing a less durable form of institutionally embedded neoliberalism than the latter agreements, treaties and supranational governance bodies. The contrast between the IMF and the WTO provides a good example of this differential durability. Both have their origins in the post-World War Two era, as key institutions for regulating the international political economy during this period. Moreover, both were later transformed into institutions which facilitated the expanded reproduction of neoliberalism. However, differences in the membership, applicability and enforcement of the rules of each organisation are at the heart of differences in the ways in which each contributes to the expanded reproduction of neoliberalism. <u>The IMF facilitates the institutional embedding of neoliberalism through the conditions attached to the loans it brokers for nation-states</u>. That this <u><strong>supranational organisation</u></strong> <u><strong>requires states to implement a range of neoliberal institutional transformations</u></strong> as a condition of access to finance means that, in such states, <u>neoliberalism becomes state policy irrespective of the ideological disposition of state elites</u><strong>. Thus, neoliberal policy norms are institutionally embedded within the conditional lending rules of the IMF.</p><p>Alt fails- Capitalism is psychologically inevitable due to evolutionary change</p><p>Wilkinson 5 </strong>(Will, policy analyst @CATO, “Capitalism and Human Nature”, CATO Policy Report, XXVII(1), January/February, http://www.cato.org/research/articles/wilkinson-050201.html)</p><p>Perhaps <u><strong><mark>the most depressing lesson</mark> <mark>of</mark> evolutionary <mark>psychology</mark> </u></strong>for politics <u><strong><mark>is</u></strong></mark> found in its account of <u><strong><mark>the deep-seated human capacity for envy</u></strong></mark> and, related, of our difficulty in understanding the idea of gains from trade and increases in productivity—the idea of an ever-expanding "pie" of wealth.  There is evidence that greater skill and initiative could lead to higher status and bigger shares of resources for an individual in the EEA. But because of the social nature of hunting and gathering, the fact that food spoiled quickly, and the utter absence of privacy, the benefits of individual success in hunting or foraging could not be easily internalized by the individual, and were expected to be shared. The EEA was for the most part a zero-sum world, where increases in total wealth through invention, investment, and extended economic exchange were totally unknown. <u><strong>More for you was less for me.</u></strong> Therefore, if anyone managed to acquire a great deal more than anyone else, that was pretty good evidence that theirs was a stash of ill-gotten gains, acquired by cheating, stealing, raw force, or, at best, sheer luck. Envy of the disproportionately wealthy may have helped to reinforce generally adaptive norms of sharing and to help those of lower status on the dominance hierarchy guard against further predation by those able to amass power.  Our zero-sum mentality makes it hard for us to understand how trade and investment can increase the amount of total wealth. We are thus ill-equipped to easily understand our own economic system.  These features of human nature—that we are coalitional, hierarchical, and envious zero-sum thinkers—would seem to make liberal capitalism extremely unlikely. And it is. However, <u><strong><mark>the benefits of a liberal market order can be seen in</u></strong></mark> a few further <u><strong><mark>features of the human mind</mark> and social organization</u></strong> in the EEA.  <u><strong>Property Rights are Natural</u></strong>  The problem of distributing scarce resources can be handled in part by implicitly coercive allocative hierarchies. An alternative solution to the problem of distribution is the recognition and enforcement of property rights. <u><strong><mark>Property rights are prefigured in nature</mark> by the way animals mark out territories</u></strong> for their exclusive use in foraging, hunting, and mating. Recognition of such rudimentary claims to control and exclude minimizes costly conflict, which by itself provides a strong evolutionary reason to look for innate tendencies to recognize and respect norms of property.  New scientific research provides even stronger evidence for the existence of such property "instincts." For example, recent experimental work by Oliver Goodenough, a legal theorist, and Christine Prehn, a neuroscientist, suggests that <u><strong><mark>the</mark> human <mark>mind evolved specialized modules for making judgments</mark> about moral transgressions, and transgressions against property in particular.</u></strong>  Evolutionary psychology can help us to understand that <u><strong>property rights are not created simply by strokes of the legislator's pen.</u></strong>  <u><strong><mark>Mutually Beneficial Exchange is Natural</u></strong>  T</mark>rade and mutually beneficial exchange are human universals, as is the division of labor. In their groundbreaking paper, "Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange," Cosmides and Tooby point out that, contrary to widespread belief, <u><strong>hunter-gatherer life is not "a kind of retro-utopia" of "indiscriminate</u></strong>, egalitarian <u><strong>cooperation and sharing</u></strong>." The archeological and ethnographic evidence shows that <u><strong>hunter-gatherers were involved in numerous forms of trade and exchange</u></strong>. Some forms of hunter-gatherer trading can involve quite complex specialization and the interaction of supply and demand.  Most impressive, Cosmides and Tooby have shown through a series of experiments that <u><strong><mark>human</mark> being<mark>s are able</mark> easily <mark>to solve</mark> complex logical <mark>puzzles</mark> involving reciprocity, the accounting of costs and benefits</u></strong>, and the detection of people who have cheated on agreements. However, <u><strong><mark>we are unable to solve</mark> formally <mark>identical puzzles that do not deal with questions of social exchange</u></strong></mark>. That, they argue, points to the existence of "functionally specialized, content-dependent cognitive adaptations for social exchange." </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Bergmann and Schmitt 21, *senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, **senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/)//BB fulltext: U.S. security assistance is broken and in need of an overhaul. Over the past two decades, the bureaucratic system developed to deliver billions of dollars of military aid to partner nations has evolved and expanded not by design but as the result of a series of ad hoc legislative and policy changes. Though the U.S. Department of State was initially in charge of security assistance policy and accounts, since 9/11, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has established a separate, well-funded security assistance bureaucracy at the Pentagon. This has inhibited effective congressional oversight, harmed coordination between diplomacy and defense, and contributed to the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy. It has created a dysfunctional and bifurcated security assistance system. Under the current security assistance system, the returns on America’s security investments are limited, inconsistent, and not strategic. The consequences of today’s broken system include increased reliance on the military to solve foreign policy challenges; a perpetuated status quo whereby nondemocratic partners receive U.S. assistance and where human rights abuses are ignored; and an ineffective and unwieldy bureaucracy. This matters because the United States depends on capable allies and partners as a core component of its national security strategy, but the current system is not suited to the task. A new administration can change this by embracing wholesale reform of the security assistance system. To do so, however, a Biden-Harris administration must move quickly to work with Congress and include such reforms in any effort to rebuild and revive U.S. diplomacy. This will require talking not only about security assistance authorities, but fundamentally about money and resources as well. Any reform efforts intending to bolster the role of the State Department must start by examining how funding is oriented and balanced between the departments. This necessitates close cooperation with the Hill. There must be a dramatic realignment of U.S. security assistance. This report provides an overview and a systemic critique of the current bureaucratic structure of U.S. security assistance and outlines how transferring resources and responsibilities for security assistance back to the State Department will better advance U.S. interests and address the current geopolitical challenges America confronts. It calls for reviving the centrality of diplomacy by restoring the State Department’s role, as originally intended under U.S. law, as the overseer of all U.S. foreign assistance. It also offers recommendations for expanding and training the security assistance workforce, improving interagency coordination, elevating human rights concerns in security assistance policy, and adapting best practices from the DOD. Specifically, this report calls for transferring the following programs and funding from the DOD to the State Department: The relatively newly created Section 333 train and equip authority, which replicates the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority The DOD’s security assistance authorities that focus on long-term security force reform to the State Department, including the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative fund This would result in a roughly $7 billion transfer, significantly augmenting the State Department’s budget and capacity to guide security assistance policy. Putting the State Department back in charge of security assistance will be a major reform and will require significant operational changes within the department, as well as a dramatic expansion of its administrative capacity. This will take time to implement and require significant reform within the agency. The DOD has done an admirable job in setting up a new institutional structure, in implementing assistance, and in coordinating with the State Department. However, officials across the U.S. foreign policy world acknowledge that the system is not working. Tommy Ross, a former DOD official in charge of overseeing the Pentagon’s security assistance, recently argued that U.S. security assistance is “not fit for purpose” and is “out of sync with U.S. priorities when it comes to where resources are needed most and the types of capabilities required by America’s allied and partners.”1 Indeed, throughout much of the last decade, it has been DOD officials who publicly argued for increased funding for the State Department.2 Ultimately, the current bifurcated security assistance system is suboptimal and results in the bureaucratic diminishment of the State Department relative to the military considerations of the DOD. Transferring resources and responsibility to the State Department would centralize responsibility for foreign aid under diplomatic control, while improving interagency cooperation, as DOD would remain the primary implementer of U.S. assistance. Some of these ideas will likely be met with innate skepticism from a generation of security professionals whose experience in Washington has been characterized by an ever-withering State Department and an ever-strengthening Pentagon. This report anticipates and rebuts likely arguments against reform, including the capacity of the State Department to take on this responsibility, the benefits of the Pentagon’s current management, or the unnecessary disruption that would result from significant bureaucratic change laid out in this proposal. Failing to reform security assistance not only leaves the United States with a wasteful and inefficient status quo, it also perpetuates the marginalization of diplomacy and locks in the military’s newly found dominance in driving U.S. foreign policy. The current security assistance system evolved to address the threats posed by the post-9/11 era and is now outdated and ill-suited for a new geopolitical environment characterized by competition. If the next administration is to revive U.S. diplomacy and rebuild the State Department, it must empower the agency to oversee and direct foreign assistance. The Biden-Harris administration should seize the opportunity to work with a new Congress to reform the system from its first days in office and restore an effective tool in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal. A new security assistance system, centralized and coordinated within the State Department, would allow the United States to wield its security assistance more effectively and responsibly in today’s competitive geopolitical environment. Arms transfers, training, and support could also better support U.S. foreign policy goals, in particular bolstering democratic partners and emerging democracies, making them stronger U.S. partners to counter threats from authoritarian actors. Empowering the State Department to oversee and manage security assistance would also ensure that aid is used to advance a values-based foreign policy that respects and supports human rights.3 It would also give U.S. diplomats greater clout and leverage and potentially create greater coherence to the provision of foreign assistance overall. The result would be to strengthen a key tool in the U.S. foreign policy toolbox and increase the clout and authority of America’s diplomats, which is badly needed in this new era of geopolitical competition.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Department of State assistance solves best</h4><p><strong>Bergmann</strong> and Schmitt <strong>21</strong>, *senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, **senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/)//BB</p><p><u>U.S. security assistance is broken and in need of an overhaul</u>. Over the past two decades, the bureaucratic system developed to deliver billions of dollars of military aid to partner nations has evolved and expanded not by design but as the result of a series of ad hoc legislative and policy changes. <u>Though the U.S. <mark>D</mark>epartment <mark>o</mark>f <mark>St</mark>ate <mark>was initially in charge</u></mark> of security assistance policy and accounts, <u><mark>since 9/11</mark>, the</u> U.S. Department of Defense (<u><strong><mark>DOD</u></strong>)</mark> <u>has <mark>establishe</mark>d a separate</u>, well-funded <mark>security <u>assistance bureaucracy at the Pentagon</mark>. This has inhibited effective congressional oversight, harmed coordination between diplomacy and defense, and contributed to the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy. <mark>It has created a <strong>dysfunctional</u></strong></mark> and bifurcated <u><mark>security assistance system</u></mark>. <u><mark>Under the current</mark> security assistance <mark>system,</mark> the <mark>returns on</mark> America’s security <mark>investments are <strong>limited</strong>,</mark> <strong><mark>inconsistent</strong>, and <strong>not</strong> <strong>strategic</strong></mark>. The consequences of today’s broken system include increased reliance on the military to solve foreign policy challenges; a perpetuated status quo</u> whereby nondemocratic partners receive U.S. assistance and where human rights abuses are ignored; <u>and an <strong>ineffective and unwieldy</strong> bureaucracy</u>. This matters because the United States depends on capable allies and partners as a core component of its national security strategy, but the current system is not suited to the task. <u>A <mark>new administration can</mark> change this <mark>by embracing</mark> </u>wholesale <u><mark>reform</u></mark> of the security assistance system. To do so, however, a <u><mark>Biden</u></mark>-Harris administration <u><mark>must</u></mark> move quickly to work with Congress and include such reforms in any effort to <u><strong><mark>rebuild and revive</strong> U.S. diplomacy</u></mark>. <u><mark>This</mark> will <mark>require</u></mark> talking not only about <u><strong><mark>security assistance</u></strong> <u><strong>authorities</u></strong></mark>, but fundamentally about <u><strong><mark>money and resources</u></strong></mark> as well. <u>Any <mark>reform efforts</mark> intending to bolster the role of the State <mark>Department must start by examining how funding</mark> is</u> oriented and <u><mark>balanced between</u></mark> the <u><mark>department</mark>s</u>. This necessitates close cooperation with the Hill. There must be a dramatic realignment of U.S. security assistance. This report provides an overview and a systemic critique of the current bureaucratic structure of U.S. security assistance and outlines how transferring resources and responsibilities for security assistance back to the State Department will better advance U.S. interests and address the current geopolitical challenges America confronts. It calls for reviving the centrality of diplomacy by restoring the State Department’s role, as originally intended under U.S. law, as the overseer of all U.S. foreign assistance. It also offers recommendations for expanding and training the security assistance workforce, improving interagency coordination, elevating human rights concerns in security assistance policy, and adapting best practices from the DOD. Specifically, this report calls for transferring the following programs and funding from the DOD to the State Department: The relatively newly created Section 333 train and equip authority, which replicates the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority The DOD’s security assistance authorities that focus on long-term security force reform to the State Department, including the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative fund This would result in a roughly $7 billion transfer, significantly augmenting the State Department’s budget and capacity to guide security assistance policy. <u><mark>Putting the State Department back in charge</u></mark> of security assistance <u><mark>will</u></mark> be a major reform and will <u>r<mark>equire</u></mark> significant operational changes within the department, as well as<mark> <u>a dramatic expansion of its administrative capacity</u>.</mark> This will take time to implement and require significant reform within the agency. <u>The<mark> DOD</mark> has done an admirable job</u> in setting up a new institutional structure, in implementing assistance, and in coordinating with the State Department. <u>However, officials across the U.S. foreign policy world acknowledge that the <mark>system is <strong>not working</u></strong></mark>. Tommy Ross, a former <u>DOD</u> official in charge of overseeing the Pentagon’s security assistance, recently argued that U.S. <u>security assistance is “<strong>not</strong> fit for purpose” and is “<strong>out of sync</strong> with U.S. priorities</u> when it comes to where resources are needed most <u>and</u> the types of <u>capabilities required by America’s allied and partners.”</u>1 Indeed, throughout much of the last decade, <u>it has been <mark>DOD officials</mark> who <mark>public</mark>ly <mark>argued for increased funding for the State Department</u></mark>.2 Ultimately, <u>the current</u> bifurcated security assistance <u>system is suboptimal and results in the bureaucratic diminishment of the State Department relative to the</u> military considerations of the <u>DOD</u><mark>. <u>Transferring</u></mark> resources and <u><mark>responsibility to the <strong>State</strong> Department</mark> would <mark>centralize responsibility for foreign aid under diplomatic control</u>,</mark> while improving interagency cooperation, as DOD would remain the primary implementer of U.S. assistance. Some of these ideas will likely be met with innate skepticism from a generation of security professionals whose experience in Washington has been characterized by an ever-withering State Department and an ever-strengthening Pentagon. This report anticipates and rebuts likely arguments against reform, including the capacity of the State Department to take on this responsibility, the benefits of the Pentagon’s current management, or the unnecessary disruption that would result from significant bureaucratic change laid out in this proposal. <u><mark>Failing to reform security assistanc</mark>e not only <mark>leaves the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>with a <strong>wasteful and inefficient</strong> status quo,</mark> it also <mark>perpetuates the <strong>marginalization of diplomacy</strong></mark> and <mark>locks in the <strong>military’s newly found dominance</strong> i</mark>n driving U.S. foreign policy</u>. <u><mark>The current</mark> security assistance<mark> system</mark> </u>evolved to address the threats posed by the post-9/11 era and <u><mark>is</mark> now <mark>outdated and ill-suited</mark> <mark>for</mark> <mark>a new geopolitical environment</u></mark> characterized by competition. <u>If the next administration is to revive U.S. diplomacy and rebuild the State Department, it must empower the agency to oversee</u> and direct <u>foreign assistance</u>. The <u>Biden</u>-Harris administration <u>should</u> seize the opportunity to work with a new Congress to <u>reform the system</u> from its first days in office <u>and <strong>restore an effective tool</strong> in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal.</u> A new <u><mark>security assistance</u></mark> system, <u>centralized and coordinated within the State Department, <mark>would allow the United States to wield its security assistance <strong>more effectively and responsibly</strong> in today’s competitive geopolitical environment</mark>.</u> Arms transfers, training, and <u><mark>support could</mark> </u>also<u> better support U.S. foreign policy goals</u>, in particular <u><mark>bolster</mark>ing <mark>democratic partners and emerging democracies,</mark> making them stronger U.S. partners to <mark>counter threats from authoritarian actors</u></mark>. <u>Empowering the State Department to </u>oversee and<u> manage security assistance would also <mark>ensure that aid is used to advance a values-based foreign policy that <strong>respects and supports human right</mark>s</u></strong>.3 <u>It would also give U.S. <strong>diplomats greater clout and leverage</strong> and </u>potentially<u> create greater coherence to </u>the provision of<u> foreign assistance overall</u>. <u>The result would be to strengthen <strong>a key tool in the U.S. foreign policy toolbox </strong>and increase the <strong>clout and authority of America’s diplomats</strong>, which is badly needed in this new era of geopolitical competition</u>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: *Green highlight is Saudi Arabia specific fulltext: Kliman and Grace 18 [Daniel Kliman, Abigail Grace, Daniel Kliman is the senior fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, and until July 2017 served at the U.S. Department of Defense. Abigail Grace is a research associate with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS., 6-14-2018, "China Smells Opportunity in the Middle East's Crisis," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/14/china-smells-opportunity-in-the-middle-easts-crisis/, accessed 2-1-2019] BC As the Middle East becomes ever more unstable, a surprising victor may be emerging: China. Under President Xi Jinping, China has accelerated its engagement with the Middle East — a region Beijing once treated as peripheral to its interests. Increased trade and investment, invigorated diplomatic exchanges, and expanded military ties are gradually transforming China’s position in the Middle East. Unless Washington can free its focus from the crises of the moment, Beijing may realize its ambitions: a Middle East more squarely within its own economic and diplomatic orbit, where the United States remains responsible for addressing the region’s most intractable challenges. Oil has traditionally served as the glue holding together America’s relationships with key Arab states. Yet while the United States has revitalized its domestic petroleum production through the fracking revolution and reduced its dependence on foreign oil, China’s energy imports from the region have surged as the Middle East’s demand for energy at home has grown. Today, even as Beijing seeks to diversify its sources of foreign oil away from the region, it remains the among the top three importers from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran. China’s appetite for Middle Eastern energy is creating the conditions for economic interdependence that mirrors the ties that have bound the United States to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. This co-dependency runs the risk of curbing U.S. influence and rendering key Arab states more susceptible to Chinese demands. Indeed, Beijing has not shied away from using its leverage as a leading energy importer — in a recent example, it threatened to scale back oil imports from Saudi Arabia over a pricing dispute. Beyond energy trade, China’s economic influence across the Middle East has expanded through its investment. Arab countries, eager to reduce their dependency on oil exports and diversify their economies through creating new industries, are welcoming Chinese investment. Saudi Arabia and Jordan are both in discussions with Beijing to harmonize their development plans with the Belt and Road Initiative — Xi’s signature piece of economic statecraft. In the case of Saudi Arabia, this alignment of strategic visions has translated into a strong commercial signing package during King Salman’s March 2017 state visit to Beijing, totaling $65 billion of bilateral agreements in the oil, space, and renewable energy sectors. Additionally, Egyptian collaboration with China on a new Suez Canal cooperation zone is underway. In Duqm, Oman, Chinese capital inflows transformed a backwater fishing village into a $10.7 billion “Sino-Oman Industrial City” featuring an oil refinery capable of processing 235,000 barrels per day. In positioning its engagement with the Middle East as purely commercial in nature, China has enhanced its economic relations with the Arab states without endangering its similarly growing ties with Israel and Iran. In Israel, China has invested in ports and railways, and it has become a growing player in the Israeli high-tech sector. At a time when the United States and its allies in Europe, Australia, and Japan increasingly regard Chinese investment as a threat to their long-term innovation edge, Israel, without taking appropriate precautions, could become a backdoor for China to obtain the technology it needs to realize its ambitions to dominate the critical industries of the 21st century. China’s economic relationship with Iran, for which it is the No. 1 trading partner, has continued to deepen. As European firms fretted last year about a return of U.S. sanctions under President Donald Trump, Chinese state-owned investment arm CITIC Group established a $10 billion credit line for Iran. In 2017, China-Iran trade exceeded $37 billion, with year-on-year growth of 19 percent. U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the threat of new sanctions puts all foreign companies under growing pressure to scale down their presence in Iran. Yet the specter of sanctions does not appear to have dissuaded Beijing from continuing to enhance its trade and investment relationship with Tehran, which will — as it did prior to the nuclear deal — have few alternatives to China going forward. China’s burgeoning ties with the Middle East — though still primarily economic — are not limited to commercial and financial activity. Xi is augmenting the country’s economic gains with diplomatic exchanges, notably his January 2016 tour of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran. Xi subsequently welcomed Saudi Arabia’s King Salman and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Beijing for official visits. China has also demonstrated a new, if cautious, willingness to make forays into some of the region’s disputes. For example, Beijing has given the Bashar al-Assad regime and its patron in Moscow diplomatic backing as well as consistent support in the Chinese media. Beijing has also hosted Israelis and Palestinians for a Peace Symposium. Although it is unlikely that China will ever play a prominent role as a mediator in either of these crises, its increasing willingness to wade into divisive regional issues demonstrates Beijing’s changing perception of its role in the region. Beyond these diplomatic overtures, China has ramped up its military engagement across the Middle East. The Chinese navy has made efforts to demonstrate its presence in the vicinity of strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb strait, and the Suez Canal. Since 2010, the navy has conducted port calls in every nation in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Egypt, Israel, and Iran. In June 2017, China and Iran conducted a joint naval exercise on the fringe of the Strait of Hormuz. Building on port visits and exercises, and leveraging dual-use infrastructure created by its regional investments, China could ultimately seek to obtain military access in the region — much as it did in nearby Djibouti. China has also emerged as a boutique source of armaments for the Middle East, given its willingness to supply military-grade unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that until very recently were subject to U.S. export controls. Preliminary open-source satellite imagery indicates that China recently sold such UAVsto the United Arab Emirates. Reporting from Yemen indicates that these drones are being actively employed in the ongoing campaign to eliminate prominent Houthi leaders. Moreover, China has reportedly inked an agreement to open a new facility in Saudi Arabia to manufacture military drones. Although China has little hope of displacing the United States as the region’s preeminent arms supplier, military sales to the Middle East generate new markets for China’s low-cost, high-tech weapons systems, which further incentivize Chinese indigenous research, development, and production. And China’s willingness to sell weapons to nearly any actor, regardless of its intentions, could exacerbate regional conflicts by providing countries with the means to wage war at attractive prices. Now is the time for the United States to engage key regional allies and partners on China’s growing involvement in the Middle East. This can start by debunking Beijing’s narrative that it is a purely commercial actor without a geopolitical agenda. The Trump administration should, in particular, publicly and privately highlight to the GCC members and Israel the nature of China’s relationship with Iran, which has too often remained overlooked. The United States should also have a quiet — and candid — dialogue with Israel on the challenges posed by China’s investment in its high-tech sector, and it should work to align their screening processes. In the economic domain, the United States need not match the level of Chinese trade and investment. But it must advance a positive vision for the Middle East. This could take the form of a new infrastructure initiative in partnership with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, U.S. allies that are keen to play the role of hubs linking the region both internally and to Africa and the Indian Ocean. With many countries in the Middle East eager to diversify their sources of domestic energy production away from fossil fuels, the United States should consider a regional energy agenda premised on efficiency and the use of renewables. On both infrastructure and energy, Japan, which ranks among the top five export destinations for all GCC countries, could play a pivotal — and reinforcing — role in counterbalancing China’s regional economic influence. Finally, the United States should continue pressing China to expand the Belt and Road Initiative to countries in need of reconstruction assistance, such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Washington should be unafraid of comparing the hypocrisy of Xi’s “community with shared future for mankind” with Beijing’s tepid interest in post-conflict reconstruction efforts. With tensions roiling the Middle East, it would be easy for the United States to simply ignore China’s quiet power play. But that would be a mistake — one that will enable Beijing to continue to capitalize on economic opportunities across the region and solidify its diplomatic influence while leaving Washington to carry the burden of crisis management.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>China’s hegemony in the Middle East is rising. Only continual US intervention stops their push.</h4><p>*Green highlight is Saudi Arabia specific</p><p><strong>Kliman and Grace 18<u></strong> [Daniel Kliman, Abigail Grace, Daniel Kliman is the senior fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, and until July 2017 served at the U.S. Department of Defense. Abigail Grace is a research associate with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS., 6-14-2018, "China Smells Opportunity in the Middle East's Crisis," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/14/china-smells-opportunity-in-the-middle-easts-crisis/, accessed 2-1-2019] BC</p><p>As the Middle East becomes ever more unstable, a surprising victor may be emerging: China.</u> Under President Xi Jinping, <u>China has accelerated its engagement with the Middle East </u>— a region Beijing once treated as peripheral to its interests. <u>Increased trade and investment, invigorated diplomatic exchanges, and expanded military ties are gradually transforming China’s position in the Middle East.</u> <u><mark>Unless Washington can free its focus from the crises of the moment,</u> <u>Beijing may realize</mark> its ambitions: <mark>a Middle East</mark> more squarely <mark>within its</mark> own economic and diplomatic <mark>orbit</mark>, where the United States remains responsible for addressing the region’s most intractable challenges. </u>Oil has traditionally served as the glue holding together America’s relationships with key Arab states. Yet while the United States has revitalized its domestic petroleum production through the fracking revolution and reduced its dependence on foreign oil, <u><mark>China’s energy imports</mark> from the region <mark>have surged</mark> as the Middle East’s demand for energy at home has grown.</u> Today, even as <u>Beijing</u> seeks to diversify its sources of foreign oil away from the region, it <u>remains the <mark>among</mark> the top three importers from <mark>Saudi Arabia,</mark> Iraq, and Iran. <mark>China’s appetite for </mark>Middle Eastern <mark>energy is creating</mark> the conditions for economic <mark>interdependence that mirrors</mark> the <mark>ties that</mark> have <mark>bound the United States to Saudi Arabia</mark> and other Gulf countries. This <mark>co-dependency </mark>runs the risk of <mark>curb</mark>ing <mark>U.S. influence</mark> <mark>and render</mark>ing key <mark>Arab states</mark> more <mark>susceptible to Chinese </mark>demands<mark>.</u></mark> Indeed, <u>Beijing has not shied away from using its leverage as a leading energy importer </u>— in a recent example, <u>it threatened to scale back oil imports from Saudi Arabia over a pricing dispute. </u>Beyond energy trade, <u>China’s economic influence across the Middle East has expanded through its investment. Arab countries, eager to reduce their dependency on oil exports and diversify their economies through creating new industries, are welcoming Chinese investment. Saudi Arabia and Jordan are both in discussions with Beijing to harmonize their development plans with the Belt and Road Initiative</u> — Xi’s signature piece of economic statecraft. <u><mark>In</mark> the case of <mark>Saudi Arabia,</mark> this alignment of strategic <mark>visions has translated into a</mark> strong commercial signing <mark>package </mark>during King Salman’s March 2017 state visit to Beijing, <mark>totaling $65 billion of </mark>bilateral <mark>agreements in </mark>the oil, space, and renewable <mark>energy sectors</mark>.</u> Additionally, <u>Egyptian collaboration with China on a new Suez Canal cooperation zone is underway.</u> In Duqm, Oman, Chinese capital inflows transformed a backwater fishing village into a $10.7 billion “Sino-Oman Industrial City” featuring an oil refinery capable of processing 235,000 barrels per day. In positioning its engagement with the Middle East as purely commercial in nature, <u>China has enhanced its economic relations with the Arab states without endangering its similarly growing ties with Israel and Iran<mark>.</mark> In Israel, China has invested in ports and railways, and it has become a growing player in the Israeli high-tech sector. </u>At a time when the United States and its allies in Europe, Australia, and Japan increasingly regard Chinese investment as a threat to their long-term innovation edge, <u>Israel, without taking appropriate precautions, could become a backdoor for China to obtain the technology it needs to realize its ambitions to dominate the critical industries of the 21st century. China’s economic relationship with Iran, </u>for which it is the No. 1 trading partner, <u>has continued to deepen. </u>As European firms fretted last year about a return of U.S. sanctions under President Donald Trump, <u>Chinese state-owned investment arm CITIC Group established a $10 billion credit line for Iran.</u> In 2017, <u>China-Iran trade exceeded $37 billion, with year-on-year growth of 19 percent. U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the threat of new sanctions puts all foreign companies under growing pressure to scale down their presence in Iran. </u>Yet <u>the specter of sanctions does not appear to have dissuaded Beijing</u> from continuing to enhance its trade and investment relationship with Tehran, which will — as it did prior to the nuclear deal — have few alternatives to China going forward. <u>China’s burgeoning ties with the Middle East </u>— though still primarily economic — <u>are not limited to commercial and financial activity. <mark>Xi is augmenting</mark> the country’s economic <mark>gains with diplomatic exchanges</mark>,</u> notably his January 2016 tour of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran. Xi subsequently welcomed Saudi Arabia’s King Salman and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Beijing for official visits. <u>China has also demonstrated a new,</u> if cautious, <u>willingness to make forays into some of the region’s disputes.</u> For example, <u>Beijing has given the Bashar al-Assad regime and its patron in Moscow diplomatic backing as well as consistent support in the Chinese media. Beijing has also hosted Israelis and Palestinians for a Peace Symposium.</u> Although it is unlikely that China will ever play a prominent role as a mediator in either of these crises, <u>its <mark>increasing willingness to wade into </mark>divisive <mark>regional issues demonstrates</mark> <mark>Beijing’s changing perception</mark> of its role in the region. </u>Beyond these diplomatic overtures, <u><mark>China has ramped up</mark> its <mark>military engagement</mark> across the Middle East.</u> <u>The <mark>Chinese navy has </mark>made efforts to demonstrate its <mark>presence in </mark>the vicinity of strategic <mark>chokepoints</mark> such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb strait, and the Suez Canal</u>. Since 2010, <u>the navy has conducted port calls in every nation in the </u>Gulf Cooperation Council <u>(GCC),</u> Egypt, Israel, and Iran. In June 2017, <u>China and Iran conducted a joint naval exercise on the fringe of the Strait of Hormuz. </u>Building on port visits and exercises, and leveraging dual-use infrastructure created by its regional investments, China could ultimately seek to obtain military access in the region — much as it did in nearby Djibouti. <u><mark>China has</mark> also <mark>emerged as a boutique</mark> source <mark>of armaments</mark> for the Middle East, <mark>given its willingness to supply military</mark>-grade unmanned aerial vehicles (</u>UAVs) <u>that until very recently were subject to U.S. export controls.</u> Preliminary open-source satellite imagery indicates that China recently sold such UAVsto the United Arab Emirates. Reporting from Yemen indicates that these drones are being actively employed in the ongoing campaign to eliminate prominent Houthi leaders. Moreover, <u><mark>China has</mark> reportedly <mark>inked an agreement to open a</mark> new fa<mark>cility in Saudi Arabia to manufacture military drones.</u></mark> Although China has little hope of displacing the United States as the region’s preeminent arms supplier, <u>military sales to the Middle East generate new markets for China’s low-cost, high-tech weapons systems, which further incentivize Chinese indigenous research, development, and production. </u>And <u><mark>China’s </mark>willingness to sell <mark>weapons </mark>to nearly any <mark>actor,</u></mark> regardless of its intentions, <u>could <mark>exacerbate</mark> regional <mark>conflicts</mark> by providing countries with the means to wage war at attractive prices. Now is the time for the United States to engage key regional allies and partners on China’s growing involvement in the Middle East.</u> This can start by debunking Beijing’s narrative that it is a purely commercial actor without a geopolitical agenda. <u><mark>The Trump administration should</mark>, in particular,</u> publicly and privately <u><mark>highlight</mark> to the GCC members and Israel <mark>the nature of China’s relationship</mark> with Iran,</u> which has too often remained overlooked. <u><mark>The United States</mark> should also have a quiet — and candid — dialogue with Israel on the challenges posed by China’s investment in its high-tech sector, and it should work to align their screening processes. </u>In the economic domain, the United States need not match the level of Chinese trade and investment. But <u>it <mark>must advance a positive vision for the Middle East.</mark> <mark>This could take</mark> the <mark>form</mark> of a new infrastructure initiative <mark>in partnership with Saudi Arabia and the UAE,</u></mark> <u>U.S. allies that are keen to play the role of hubs linking the region both internally and to Africa and the Indian Ocean. </u>With many countries in the Middle East eager to diversify their sources of domestic energy production away from fossil fuels, the United States should consider a regional energy agenda premised on efficiency and the use of renewables. On both infrastructure and energy, Japan, which ranks among the top five export destinations for all GCC countries, could play a pivotal — and reinforcing — role in counterbalancing China’s regional economic influence. Finally, the United States should continue pressing China to expand the Belt and Road Initiative to countries in need of reconstruction assistance, such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Washington should be unafraid of comparing the hypocrisy of Xi’s “community with shared future for mankind” with Beijing’s tepid interest in post-conflict reconstruction efforts. With tensions roiling the Middle East<u>, it would be easy for the United States to simply ignore China’s quiet power play. But that would be a mistake </u>— <u>one that will enable Beijing to continue to capitalize on economic opportunities across the region and solidify its diplomatic influence while leaving Washington to carry the burden of crisis management.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Bill Powell 11-15. Senior writer for Newsweek and Time. "Could the Senate convict Donald Trump? Here's what Mitch McConnell worries about". Newsweek. 11-15-2019. https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-impeachment-mitch-mcconnell-senate-1471897 fulltext: Mitch McConnell has reason to worry—and that means Donald Trump does, too. To convict President Trump of an impeachable offense, the Democrats have to muster a two-thirds vote in the Senate: at least 20 Republican senators (and probably more like 22 because of expected Democratic defections) would have to break ranks. That math sounds unforgiving, and it's true that the road to 67 votes is a narrow and bumpy one. But the Senate majority leader and the White House fear that if more than a couple of GOP senators say they intend to vote against Trump, there will be something of a traffic jam as Republican senators turn against the president. For starters, it's no secret that some senators can't stand Trump. Former Arizona Senator Jeff Flake, famously a "never Trumper," said in September that if it were a private vote, 35 senators would vote to oust the president. Utah Senator Mitt Romney stands out among this group—and for Trump the feeling of disdain is distinctly mutual, never mind that during his transition the then-president-elect actually interviewed the former GOP standard bearer for Secretary of State. Romney recently called Trump's interactions with Ukraine's president "appalling." Trump called Romney "a pompous ass" on Twitter. Though Romney has said he has an open mind and will see where the facts take him, Trump vote-counters already assume his vote is lost. The White House—and McConnell—have their eyes on two senators in particular: Susan Collins of Maine and Lisa Murkowski of Alaska. They are no fans of the president. Murkowski famously voted against the bill repealing Obamacare in 2017, thus helping save it and dealing Trump a bitter defeat. Collins, who is up for reelection in what is expected to be a close race next year, has repeatedly criticized Trump. She said he "made a big mistake" asking Beijing to investigate Hunter Biden's business dealings there and called for the president to retract a tweet in which he compared the House impeachment investigation to a "lynching." McConnell is worried their votes are not safe. In fact, in his role as Trump's sherpa—the calm hand who knows better than anyone how to count his caucus' votes—McConnell counseled the president to call Murkowski and pledge to work with her on an ambitious energy bill that the Alaska senator has been pushing for three years. He also told Trump to knock off the juvenile name-calling of Mitt Romney, which other senators found distasteful. "[McConnell] has stressed to the president that he thinks he can keep the caucus together, but Trump needs to help," says a Senate source familiar with McConnell's thinking. "He can't just demand loyalty and expect to give nothing back. That's not how this is going to work." The passionate partisanship that has kept Republicans aligned with Trump until now might work against the president and McConnell. University of Virginia political scientist Larry Sabato notes that "the nationalization of politics—how people feel about the president—is bleeding down the ballot to an extreme degree." In 2016, every state with a Senate race voted for the same party for senator and president—the first time that's happened since 1912, when the era of popular voting for the Senate began. And as Sabato says, "impeachment may be the ultimate nationalizing event" for Senate members. To understand the implications, consider the GOP senators up for reelection in purple swing states: first-term Senators Cory Gardner of Colorado, Martha McSally of Arizona and Joni Ernst of Iowa. The first two are in races viewed as toss-ups; in Colorado Trump is deeply underwater and in Arizona only slightly less so. If the nationalization thesis holds, it could be risky for Gardner and McSally to vote to acquit an increasingly unpopular president. Impeachment road to 67 cover Cover illustration by Alex Fine for Newsweek. COVER ILLUSTRATION BY ALEX FINE FOR NEWSWEEK. Senator Ernst at this point is a slight favorite to be re-elected in Iowa, but the race will be tricky. Trump's trade war with China has hurt the state's agricultural sector. Ernst also, associates say, has complained about Trump's boorishness: the hush money payments to a porn star, the Billy Bush "locker room talk" video. She publicly has been supportive of Trump but privately isn't much of a fan. If she defects, it could prompt some others—who are currently saying all the right things to the White House—to consider it, too. Tom Tillis of North Carolina is in a race considered a toss up. Trump won North Carolina in 2016, but is no lock next year. This is the scenario the Trump White House dreads, and for good reason. The risk is not, at this point, that enough GOP senators will defect to oust him—at least not, again, based on what's currently known about the Ukraine affair. The risk is that even if he's acquitted, he begins to look politically weak in his own party, becoming a drag on down-ballot candidates. RELATED STORIES Trump Impeachment Has More Evidence Than Nixon Faced: Watergate Witness A Senate trial will be open and reasonably fair. It will not look like the president is being railroaded. It will be presided over by John Roberts, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the president's defense team will be allowed to cross examine hostile witnesses and call their own to testify. If, given that, several GOP senators still end up voting for removal, Trump potentially is a dead man walking. "He won't just look weaker going into the general election, he will be weaker," says a source close to McConnell. "If you get Joni Ernst and Martha McSalley, military veterans both, voting against you, you've got trouble." Other GOP lawmakers are making their own calculations, driven by the ambivalence—usually expressed only privately—that many Republicans in both the House and Senate feel about Trump. Unlike the president, most are used to operating in traditional ways. The president's crassness, his chaotic White House, the recent sellout of the Kurdish fighters in Syria, the "lunatic" effort to strong arm the Ukrainian president to investigate Biden, as one senior Senate staffer describes it: all serve to make Republicans distinctly uncomfortable. There's an ideological factor at play as well. The vast majority of GOP-ers in both House and Senate believe in longtime Republican policies like free trade and fiscal sobriety. The Tea Party elected 138 House members in 2010 largely as a protest against what was then viewed as out-of-control spending in Washington. In the Trump era, free trade is dead and no one ever talks about spending. Republicans on the Hill feel as if they're "trapped" into supporting Trump, says Justin Amash, the Michigan Republican who announced his intention to leave the GOP this summer. Another GOP congressman, unwilling to speak on the record, says a big chunk of the party has been "lobotomized." "There are any number of people up here who feel the same way, they're just not willing to say so publicly," he says. The reason for that is simple: as politicians, they know how to read polls. And while in several recent polls a slim majority of Americans now believe Trump should be removed from office, his support among Republican voters remains rock solid. In a recent Fox News poll in which 51 percent favored his removal, only 16 percent of Republicans did. Trump's overall approval rating was 86 percent among Republicans. Apostates within Trump's GOP are not treated kindly. Ask Francis Rooney, a representative from Naples, Fla. Last month he gave a television interview in which he equated Trump's Ukraine scandal with Watergate. "I'm very mindful of the fact that back during Watergate everybody said, 'Oh, it's a witch hunt to get Nixon.' Turns out it wasn't a witch hunt. It was absolutely correct." The backlash from his district was swift, intense and stoked by a furious White House. Several constituents called his office and said if he wasn't prepared to support the president he should stand down. The reaction stunned Rooney; so much so that the next day, he took the advice and announced that he would not run for re-election next year. The episode, more than anything, showed "that this is not the Republican Party anymore," says political scientist Sabato. "It's the Party of Trump." RELATED STORIES Donald Trump Impeachment Inquiry Latest Updates McConnell has already spoken directly with the president on "multiple occasions" about the impeachment trial, according to four Capitol Hill and White House sources. At this point, sources familiar with McConnell's thinking say, the majority leader does not disagree with the conventional view of the forthcoming impeachment drama: the country's founders made it difficult to remove a president. Based on his understanding of the facts surrounding the Ukraine affair, in which the president allegedly tried to leverage military aid in return for a Ukrainian investigation into political rival Joe Biden and his son, McConnell believes there is little chance Trump would be convicted in the Senate—particularly if a vote to impeach in the House proceeds strictly along partisan lines, which is expected. McConnell, White House sources say, has told Trump that privately. He is said to be dismissive, too, of the charges Democrats are likely to bring in the House that the Trump White House obstructed their investigation into the Ukraine matter. Asked if Trump could be convicted, GOP Senate staffers answer with a standard caveat: "If all we know [about Ukraine-gate] is out there now, and nothing new emerges or happens, then no, he would be acquitted," says one staff member of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The bottom line, for them, is that the military aid money ultimately flowed to Ukraine, and the government in Kiev never investigated the Bidens. Trump's alleged intervention in the affair ended up being of no consequence, and the idea "that this amounts to an impeachable offense is a joke," as South Carolina Senator Lindsey Graham puts it. But with Trump, this source acknowledges, "you never know." After all, it was just one day after Robert Mueller's Congressional testimony about so-called Russian collusion—which buried Democratic dreams of impeaching Trump on that issue—that the phone call between the president and his Ukrainian counterpart took place. An impeachment is fluid. Things may not proceed precisely as the political pros believe they will. If Trump loses key votes of support in swing states he needs to win the election, how nervous will the party get? Is it possible enough senators get so nervous they go to the White House and ask that Trump resign, rather than have to put lawmakers on record voting for or against him? Might a weak president put the GOP's hold on the Senate at risk next November? As of now, the president's rock-solid GOP polls make that seem unlikely, and the Trump base would be enraged and very unlikely to vote for Mike Pence, Nikki Haley or anyone else who might gain the nomination in Trump's wake. Trump may survive and even flourish, much as Bill Clinton did after the GOP's misguided impeachment effort in 1998. But it isn't a lock. Trump's election upended all political norms and expectations; his impeachment trial is likely to do the same.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>2. Threshold is low---a <u>few defections</u> set off Trump’s <u>worst</u> fears</h4><p>Bill <strong>Powell 11-15</strong>. Senior writer for Newsweek and Time. "Could the Senate convict Donald Trump? Here's what Mitch McConnell worries about". Newsweek. 11-15-2019. <u>https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-impeachment-mitch-mcconnell-senate-1471897</p><p></u>Mitch <u>McConnell has reason to worry</u>—<u>and that means</u> Donald <u><strong>Trump does, too. </u></strong>To convict President Trump of an impeachable offense, the Democrats have to muster a two-thirds vote in the Senate: <u>at least 20 Republican senators</u> (and probably more like 22 because of expected Democratic defections) <u>would have to break ranks</u>. <u>That math <strong>sounds unforgiving</u></strong>, and it's true that the road to 67 votes is a narrow and bumpy one. <u><strong>But</u></strong> the Senate majority leader and <u>the White House fear</u> <u>that <mark>if <strong>more than a couple of GOP senators</strong></mark> say they <strong><mark>intend to</strong></mark> vote against Trump, <mark>there will be</u></mark> something of <u><mark>a <strong>traffic jam as Republican senators turn against the president</u></strong></mark>. For starters, it's no secret that <u>some senators can't stand Trump</u>. Former Arizona Senator Jeff <u><mark>Flake</u></mark>, famously a "never Trumper," <u><mark>said</mark> in September that if it were a private vote, <mark>35 senators</mark> <strong><mark>would vote to oust the president</u></strong></mark>. Utah Senator Mitt Romney stands out among this group—and for Trump the feeling of disdain is distinctly mutual, never mind that during his transition the then-president-elect actually interviewed the former GOP standard bearer for Secretary of State. Romney recently called Trump's interactions with Ukraine's president "appalling." Trump called Romney "a pompous ass" on Twitter. Though Romney has said he has an open mind and will see where the facts take him, Trump vote-counters already assume his vote is lost. <u>The White House</u>—<u>and McConnell</u>—<u>have their eyes on two senators in particular</u>: Susan <u><mark>Collins</u></mark> of Maine <u><mark>and</u></mark> Lisa <u><mark>Murkowski</u></mark> of Alaska. They are no fans of the president. Murkowski famously voted against the bill repealing Obamacare in 2017, thus helping save it and dealing Trump a bitter defeat. Collins, who is up for reelection in what is expected to be a close race next year, has repeatedly criticized Trump. She said he "made a big mistake" asking Beijing to investigate Hunter Biden's business dealings there and called for the president to retract a tweet in which he compared the House impeachment investigation to a "lynching." <u>McConnell is worried their <mark>votes are not safe</u></mark>. In fact, in his role as Trump's sherpa—the calm hand who knows better than anyone how to count his caucus' votes—McConnell counseled the president to call Murkowski and pledge to work with her on an ambitious energy bill that the Alaska senator has been pushing for three years. He also told Trump to knock off the juvenile name-calling of Mitt Romney, which other senators found distasteful. "[McConnell] has stressed to the president that he thinks he can keep the caucus together, but Trump needs to help," says a Senate source familiar with McConnell's thinking. "He can't just demand loyalty and expect to give nothing back. That's not how this is going to work." The passionate partisanship that has kept Republicans aligned with Trump until now might work against the president and McConnell. University of Virginia political scientist Larry Sabato notes that "the nationalization of politics—how people feel about the president—is bleeding down the ballot to an extreme degree." In 2016, every state with a Senate race voted for the same party for senator and president—the first time that's happened since 1912, when the era of popular voting for the Senate began. And as Sabato says, "impeachment may be the ultimate nationalizing event" for Senate members. To understand the implications, consider the <u>GOP senators up for reelection in purple swing states:</u> first-term Senators Cory Gardner of Colorado, Martha McSally of Arizona and Joni Ernst of Iowa. The first two are in races viewed as toss-ups; in Colorado Trump is deeply underwater and in Arizona only slightly less so. If the nationalization thesis holds, <u>it could be risky for Gardner and McSally</u> <u>to vote to acquit an increasingly unpopular president. </u>Impeachment road to 67 cover Cover illustration by Alex Fine for Newsweek. COVER ILLUSTRATION BY ALEX FINE FOR NEWSWEEK. Senator Ernst at this point is a slight favorite to be re-elected in Iowa, but the race will be tricky. Trump's trade war with China has hurt the state's agricultural sector. <u><mark>Ernst</u></mark> also, associates say, has complained about Trump's boorishness: the hush money payments to a porn star, the Billy Bush "locker room talk" video. She <u>publicly has been supportive of Trump but privately isn't much of a fan. <strong>If she <mark>defects</u></strong>, <u></mark>it</u> <u><strong><mark>could prompt</strong></mark> </u>some <u><strong><mark>others</u></strong></mark>—who are currently saying all the right things to the White House—<u><strong><mark>to consider it</mark>, too</u></strong>. Tom Tillis of North Carolina is in a race considered a toss up. Trump won North Carolina in 2016, but is no lock next year. <u><mark>This is the scenario </mark>the <strong><mark>Trump</strong></mark> White House <strong><mark>dreads</strong></mark>, <strong>and for good reason</u></strong>. The risk is not, at this point, that enough GOP senators will defect to oust him—at least not, again, based on what's currently known about the Ukraine affair. The risk is that even if he's acquitted, he begins to look politically weak in his own party, becoming a drag on down-ballot candidates. RELATED STORIES Trump Impeachment Has More Evidence Than Nixon Faced: Watergate Witness A Senate trial will be open and reasonably fair. It will not look like the president is being railroaded. It will be presided over by John Roberts, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the president's defense team will be allowed to cross examine hostile witnesses and call their own to testify. If, given that, several GOP senators still end up voting for removal, Trump potentially is a dead man walking. "He won't just look weaker going into the general election, he will be weaker," says a source close to McConnell. "If you get Joni Ernst and Martha McSalley, military veterans both, voting against you, you've got trouble." Other GOP lawmakers are making their own calculations, driven by the ambivalence—usually expressed only privately—that many Republicans in both the House and Senate feel about Trump. Unlike the president, most are used to operating in traditional ways. The president's crassness, his chaotic White House, the recent sellout of the Kurdish fighters in Syria, the "lunatic" effort to strong arm the Ukrainian president to investigate Biden, as one senior Senate staffer describes it: all serve to make Republicans distinctly uncomfortable. There's an ideological factor at play as well. The vast majority of GOP-ers in both House and Senate believe in longtime Republican policies like free trade and fiscal sobriety. The Tea Party elected 138 House members in 2010 largely as a protest against what was then viewed as out-of-control spending in Washington. In the Trump era, free trade is dead and no one ever talks about spending. Republicans on the Hill feel as if they're "trapped" into supporting Trump, says Justin Amash, the Michigan Republican who announced his intention to leave the GOP this summer. Another GOP congressman, unwilling to speak on the record, says a big chunk of the party has been "lobotomized." "There are any number of people up here who feel the same way, they're just not willing to say so publicly," he says. The reason for that is simple: as politicians, they know how to read polls. And <u>while in several recent polls a slim majority of Americans now believe Trump</u> <u>should be removed from office</u>, <u>his</u> <u><strong>support among Republican voters</strong> <strong>remains rock solid</u></strong>. In a recent Fox News poll in which 51 percent favored his removal, only 16 percent of Republicans did. <u>Trump's overall approval rating was <strong>86 percent among Republicans</strong>. </u>Apostates within Trump's GOP are not treated kindly. Ask Francis Rooney, a representative from Naples, Fla. Last month he gave a television interview in which he equated Trump's Ukraine scandal with Watergate. "I'm very mindful of the fact that back during Watergate everybody said, 'Oh, it's a witch hunt to get Nixon.' Turns out it wasn't a witch hunt. It was absolutely correct." The backlash from his district was swift, intense and stoked by a furious White House. Several constituents called his office and said if he wasn't prepared to support the president he should stand down. The reaction stunned Rooney; so much so that the next day, he took the advice and announced that he would not run for re-election next year. The episode, more than anything, showed "that this is not the Republican Party anymore," says political scientist Sabato. "It's the Party of Trump." RELATED STORIES Donald Trump Impeachment Inquiry Latest Updates McConnell has already spoken directly with the president on "multiple occasions" about the impeachment trial, according to four Capitol Hill and White House sources. At this point, sources familiar with McConnell's thinking say, the majority leader does not disagree with the conventional view of the forthcoming impeachment drama: the country's founders made it difficult to remove a president. Based on his understanding of the facts surrounding the Ukraine affair, in which the president allegedly tried to leverage military aid in return for a Ukrainian investigation into political rival Joe Biden and his son, McConnell believes there is little chance Trump would be convicted in the Senate—particularly if a vote to impeach in the House proceeds strictly along partisan lines, which is expected. McConnell, White House sources say, has told Trump that privately. He is said to be dismissive, too, of the charges Democrats are likely to bring in the House that the Trump White House obstructed their investigation into the Ukraine matter. Asked if Trump could be convicted, GOP Senate staffers answer with a standard caveat: "If all we know [about Ukraine-gate] is out there now, and nothing new emerges or happens, then no, he would be acquitted," says one staff member of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The bottom line, for them, is that the military aid money ultimately flowed to Ukraine, and the government in Kiev never investigated the Bidens. Trump's alleged intervention in the affair ended up being of no consequence, and the idea "that this amounts to an impeachable offense is a joke," as South Carolina Senator Lindsey Graham puts it. <u>But with Trump</u>, this source acknowledges, "<u>you never know</u>." <u>After all, it was just one day after</u> Robert <u>Mueller's</u> Congressional <u>testimony</u> about so-called Russian collusion—which buried Democratic dreams of impeaching Trump on that issue—<u>that the phone call between the president and his Ukrainian counterpart took place. </u>An impeachment is fluid. Things may not proceed precisely as the political pros believe they will. <u><mark>If Trump loses <strong>key votes of</mark> <mark>support</strong> in <strong>swing states</strong></mark> he needs to win the election</u>, <u><strong><mark>how nervous will the party get</u></strong></mark>? Is it possible enough senators get so nervous they go to the White House and ask that Trump resign, rather than have to put lawmakers on record voting for or against him? Might a weak president put the GOP's hold on the Senate at risk next November? As of now, <u><mark>the president's</mark> <strong><mark>rock-solid GOP polls</strong> make that seem unlikely</u></mark>, <u>and</u> <u>the Trump</u> <u>base would be enraged</u> <u>and very unlikely to vote</u> <u>for</u> Mike Pence, Nikki Haley or <u>anyone else who might gain the nomination in Trump's wake</u>. Trump may survive and even flourish, much as Bill Clinton did after the GOP's misguided impeachment effort in 1998. <u><strong><mark>But it isn't a lock</u></strong></mark>. <u>Trump's</u> <u>election upended all political</u> norms and <u>expectations</u>; <u>his impeachment trial is likely to do the same.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: ICTSD 6/28 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Founded in 1996, the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) is an independent non-profit organisation based in Geneva, Switzerland. The goal of the organisation is to advance sustainable development through trade-related policymaking. “WTO Members Intensify Debate Over Resolving Appellate Body Impasse.” ICTSD. June 28, 2018. https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/wto-members-intensify-debate-over-resolving-appellate-body-impasse fulltext: Trade delegates in Geneva had an intensive agenda last Friday during a meeting of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) at the organisation’s headquarters. Notably, members debated how to resolve an impasse over filling vacancies at the top global trade court, particularly given that a fourth slot on the seven-member body may become vacant this autumn unless the situation is fixed. According to a Geneva trade official, much of the debate last week centred on a US suggestion to treat Appellate Body reports issued after the established 90-day deadline as non-binding unless all members endorse them, which drew pushback from many other delegations. The discussions on 22 June mark the latest episode in an evolving debate over how to lessen the strains on the highest global trade court, particularly in a time of growing geopolitical tensions on trade. Going back to the GATT era? The Appellate Body is a seven-member group that functions as the WTO’s highest adjudicative body. Each member serves a four-year term, with the possibility of a one-time renewal. The group has not been able to work with its full capacity for over a year now, given that three seats are currently vacant. The number may increase to four in this coming September if Shree Baboo Chekitan Servansing, currently an Appellate Body member and previously Mauritius’ WTO Ambassador, is not endorsed for a second term. Experts warn that without a prompt selection process, the court will not have enough judges needed to sign off on any Appellate Body rulings after December 2019. Under WTO rules, a minimum of three judges must sign off on any ruling. The organisation’s rules on dispute settlement say that the appointment of Appellate Body members requires consensus among the WTO membership. Essentially, this means that WTO members need to formally object to block an appointment, otherwise consent is implied. Conversely, for other steps such as the establishment of dispute panels, the adoption of dispute reports, and the authorisation of retaliation, decisions are made by “negative” consensus. WTO rules provide that “the DSB must automatically decide to take the action ahead, unless there is a consensus not to do so,” according to a summary of these provisions published by the global trade club. Since last August, the US has objected to the launch of multiple processes to begin selecting new judges to fill the current vacancies. Washington has argued that it cannot approve new judges given that various other “systemic” issues in the Appellate Body’s functioning remain unresolved. Among its complaints are the continued participation of some former Appellate Body members in cases that those judges were already working on when their term expired, which has long been established practice, though not WTO law, under the Appellate Body’s Working Procedures. (Bridges Weekly, 14 September 2017) The US move has drawn pushback from across the membership, with well over 60 members endorsing proposals to launch the selection processes and fill the vacant slots. Some delegations have publicly said that they need more clarity from Washington on how to address its concerns. Similar concerns have been raised at past WTO meetings, including at the General Council, which is the organisation’s highest-level gathering outside of its biennial ministerial conferences. At the last General Council meeting in early May, sources say that several ambassadors publicly warned about wider ramifications of the Appellate Body impasse for the whole multilateral trading system. (Bridges Weekly, 9 May 2018) Also last month, Appellate Body Chair Ujal Singh Bhatia commented about the “profound implications” of a paralysed Appellate Body, given that “any losing party could prevent the adoption of the panel report by appealing it to a paralysed Appellate Body.” Such a result, he said, would “warp us back to the GATT era,” referring to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which governed the pre-WTO trading system. Under the GATT system, the “contracting parties” operated under a very different approach to dispute adjudication, including through the use of “positive consensus,” where parties had the option of vetoing report adoptions, dispute panel establishments, or certain other steps in these legal proceedings. US raises 90-day deadline, other concerns Last week, the US complained that since 2011, the Appellate Body has “frequently and increasingly” issued its rulings beyond the 90-day deadline as mandated by the WTO rules, specifically under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Furthermore, the US delegate noted, this practice has occurred without the Appellate Body first consulting with dispute parties to see whether they agree. “For too long, the Appellate Body has ignored the clear text of the DSU. We want Members to read that rule together and to decide: do the words in the WTO Agreement matter? Or is the Appellate Body free to disregard and effectively re-write those words whenever it thinks that is necessary or appropriate?” the US said, according to a copy of their statement published by the country’s mission to the WTO. According to a Geneva trade official, several other WTO members spoke last week, recognising the importance of having the Appellate Body meet the 90-day deadline for issuing reports. Many noted, for example, that this would speed up the process for resolving trade cases, and referred to the need to improve transparency in communications between the Appellate Body and dispute parties, while saying that they did not want this 90-day deadline to lead to lesser quality as a result of time pressure. Some also referred to some growing challenges that the Appellate Body faces in reviewing cases, such as increasingly complex disputes and limited resources for conducting their work. However, various members noted that the impasse over Appellate Body judge vacancies is exacerbating the problem, rather than ameliorating it, and adhering to the 90-day deadline is not currently a realistic goal. The US also faulted the Appellate Body for allegedly failing to limit its appeal review only to those issues “necessary to resolve” the dispute at hand, thus causing the delays. The US cited a series of disputes where this was purportedly the case, and argued that this issue is grounds for making late reports non-binding. Many other WTO members intervened on this point, however, and disagreed with this line of argument. This is not the first time that US officials have criticised or questioned procedural and substantive aspects of the Appellate Body’s practices. Earlier this year, the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) issues its 2018 President’s Trade Policy Agenda, in which the agency alleged that the Appellate Body frequently goes beyond its mandate, to the point where the panel of judges has “added to or diminished rights or obligations” of WTO members. (See Bridges Weekly, 8 March 2018) AB Chair’s speech During a separate event on the same day, the Appellate Body Chair provided his observations on challenges faced by highest global trade court, calling for “swift and robust action” from the WTO membership to resolve the impasse situation. Singh Bhatia reiterated previously expressed concerns, such as the burgeoning caseload of the Appellate Body, made even more difficult given the complexity of today’s disputes. He also highlighted the resource limitations involved, arguing that those elements as a whole lead to “very significant delays” and that the Appellate Body “cannot be realistically expected to deliver high-quality reports within the timeframes prescribed in the DSU.” He also noted the debate among members over how the Appellate Body should approach “ambiguity” in existing treaties. When a matter falls out of the scope of the WTO rules, the Appellate Body had left the freedom of members untouched, he said. Singh Bhatia commented that a decision not to fully address an issue properly established in a dispute, “could, in effect, be a decision in favour of one of the participants, possibly altering the rights and obligations of WTO members.” The speech had also touched on the value of past case law and the necessary evolution of the legal interpretations conducted by the Appellate Body in order to ensure the “security and predictability” of the multilateral trading system. Singh Bhatia concluded his remarks by calling for WTO members to act to preserve the legitimacy of the dispute settlement system and to address broader challenges to multilateralism. “WTO members must embrace this responsibility and engage in constructive dialogue to ensure the continued good health of a system that is uniquely effective, but which cannot be taken for granted,” he said. Geopolitical landscape on trade Those debates occur during a critical moment for the global trading system, with one key player, the US, opting in recent months to adopt unilateral actions to address its trade concerns with partners. Those actions have in turn triggered vocal responses from other players, both in light of the commercial consequences and the systemic implications. Much of the spotlight has been on the responsive measures announced by the EU, China, Canada, and Mexico following US tariffs on steel and aluminium, which are also facing domestic legal challenges from industry players. Other economies whose interests have also been affected have publicly expressed their own concerns, and in some cases notified planned actions in response. These include, for example, a WTO dispute from Norway on the US’ steel and aluminium tariffs, or notifications of “suspension of concessions” in response to these tariffs from the likes of India, Turkey, Russia, and others, who have argued that the US tariffs are safeguard measures, rather than national security-related policies. That distinction has legal implications at the global trade club, given that safeguard measures and national security-related trade measures are subject to different requirements, including over whether compensation is required for affected exporting members. Even some countries that have reached deals with the US to avert the duties, such as Brazil, have publicly criticised Washington’s negotiating approach in this area, and have noted that alternative quota arrangements were imposed over Brasilia’s objections. (A more detailed report on the Section 232 situation will be featured in next week’s edition of Bridges) US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer issued a statement on Tuesday 26 June criticising the responsive measures adopted by other WTO members in light of the US’ steel and aluminium tariffs. He argued that while the US tariffs were “wholly legitimate and fully justified” under both domestic law and at the WTO, steps like the EU’s “re-balancing” measures are based on a “groundless legal theory.” “These retaliatory tariffs underscore the complete hypocrisy that governs so much of the global trading system.  For months, the EU, China, and others have criticised the trade policy of the United States, while claiming to champion the WTO. But their recent tariffs prove that they simply ignore WTO rules whenever doing so is convenient,” he said.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>But, the DSB is <u>irrelevant</u> --- judge vacancies and lack of <u>enforcement</u> mechanisms for disputes </h4><p><strong>ICTSD 6/28</strong> International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Founded in 1996, the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) is an independent non-profit organisation based in Geneva, Switzerland. The goal of the organisation is to advance sustainable development through trade-related policymaking. “WTO Members Intensify Debate Over Resolving Appellate Body Impasse.” ICTSD. June 28, 2018. https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/wto-members-intensify-debate-over-resolving-appellate-body-impasse</p><p><u>Trade delegates in Geneva had an intensive agenda last Friday <mark>during a meeting of the</mark> WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (<mark>DSB</u></mark>) at the organisation’s headquarters. Notably, <u><mark>members debated how to <strong>resolve an impasse over filling vacancies</strong></mark> at the top global trade court, particularly given that a fourth slot on the seven-member body may become vacant this autumn unless the situation is fixed. </p><p></u>According to a Geneva trade official, <u>much of the debate last week centred on a US suggestion to treat Appellate Body reports issued after the established 90-day deadline as non-binding unless all members endorse them, which drew pushback from many other delegations. </p><p>The discussions on 22 June mark the latest episode in an evolving debate <mark>over <strong>how to lessen the strains on the highest global trade court</strong></mark>, particularly in a time of growing geopolitical tensions on trade. </p><p></u>Going back to the GATT era? </p><p>The Appellate Body is a seven-member group that functions as the WTO’s highest adjudicative body. Each member serves a four-year term, with the possibility of a one-time renewal.  </p><p><u><strong><mark>The group has not been able to work with</mark> its <mark>full capacity for over a year</mark> now</strong>, given that three seats are currently vacant. The number may increase to four in this coming September</u> if Shree Baboo Chekitan Servansing, currently an Appellate Body member and previously Mauritius’ WTO Ambassador, is not endorsed for a second term. </p><p>Experts warn that without a prompt selection process, <u><strong>the <mark>court will not have enough judges needed to sign off on any Appellate Body rulings</mark> after December 2019</u></strong>. Under WTO rules, a minimum of three judges must sign off on any ruling. </p><p><u>The organisation’s rules on dispute settlement say that the appointment of Appellate Body members requires consensus among the WTO membership. Essentially, this means that WTO members need to formally object to block an appointment</u>, otherwise consent is implied. </p><p>Conversely, for other steps such as the establishment of dispute panels, the adoption of dispute reports, and the authorisation of retaliation, <u>decisions are made by “negative” consensus. WTO rules provide that “the DSB must automatically decide to take the action ahead, unless there is a consensus not to do so</u>,” according to a summary of these provisions published by the global trade club. </p><p>Since last August, <u>the US has objected to the launch of multiple processes to begin selecting new judges to fill the current vacancies.</u> Washington has argued that it cannot approve new judges given that various other “systemic” issues in the Appellate Body’s functioning remain unresolved. Among its complaints are the continued participation of some former Appellate Body members in cases that those judges were already working on when their term expired, which has long been established practice, though not WTO law, under the Appellate Body’s Working Procedures. (Bridges Weekly, 14 September 2017) </p><p>The US move has drawn pushback from across the membership, with well over 60 members endorsing proposals to launch the selection processes and fill the vacant slots. Some delegations have publicly said that they need more clarity from Washington on how to address its concerns. </p><p>Similar concerns have been raised at past WTO meetings, including at the General Council, which is the organisation’s highest-level gathering outside of its biennial ministerial conferences. At the last General Council meeting in early May, sources say that several ambassadors publicly warned about wider ramifications of the Appellate Body impasse for the whole multilateral trading system. (Bridges Weekly, 9 May 2018) </p><p>Also last month, <u>Appellate Body Chair Ujal Singh Bhatia commented about the “profound implications” of a paralysed Appellate Body, given that “<strong><mark>any losing party could prevent the adoption of the panel report</strong></mark> by appealing it to a paralysed Appellate Body</u>.” <u><mark>Such a result</mark>, he said, <mark>would “<strong>warp us back to the GATT era</strong></mark>,” referring to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which governed the pre-WTO trading system. </p><p></u>Under the GATT system, the “contracting parties” operated under a very different approach to dispute adjudication, including through the use of “positive consensus,” <u>where parties had the option of vetoing report adoptions, dispute panel establishments, or certain other steps in these legal proceedings. </p><p></u>US raises 90-day deadline, other concerns </p><p>Last week, <u>the US complained that since 2011, the Appellate Body has “frequently and increasingly” issued its rulings beyond the 90-day deadline as mandated by the WTO rules</u>, specifically under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Furthermore, the US delegate noted, this practice has occurred without the Appellate Body first consulting with dispute parties to see whether they agree. </p><p>“For too long, the Appellate Body has ignored the clear text of the DSU. We want Members to read that rule together and to decide: do the words in the WTO Agreement matter? Or is the Appellate Body free to disregard and effectively re-write those words whenever it thinks that is necessary or appropriate?” the US said, according to a copy of their statement published by the country’s mission to the WTO. </p><p>According to a Geneva trade official, several other WTO members spoke last week, recognising the importance of having the Appellate Body meet the 90-day deadline for issuing reports. Many noted, for example, that this would speed up the process for resolving trade cases, and referred to the need to improve transparency in communications between the Appellate Body and dispute parties, while saying that they did not want this 90-day deadline to lead to lesser quality as a result of time pressure. </p><p><u>Some also referred to some growing challenges that the Appellate Body faces in reviewing cases, such as increasingly complex disputes and limited resources for conducting their work</u>. However, various members noted that <u><strong><mark>the impasse over Appellate Body judge vacancies is exacerbating the problem</mark>, rather than ameliorating it,</u></strong> and adhering to the 90-day deadline is not currently a realistic goal. </p><p>The US also faulted the Appellate Body for allegedly failing to limit its appeal review only to those issues “necessary to resolve” the dispute at hand, thus causing the delays. <u>The US cited a series of disputes where this was purportedly the case, and argued that this issue is grounds for making late reports non-binding</u>. Many other WTO members intervened on this point, however, and disagreed with this line of argument. </p><p><u>This is not the first time that US officials have criticised or questioned procedural and substantive aspects of the Appellate Body’s practices</u>. Earlier this year, the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) issues its 2018 President’s Trade Policy Agenda, in which the agency alleged that the Appellate Body frequently goes beyond its mandate, to the point where the panel of judges has “added to or diminished rights or obligations” of WTO members. (See Bridges Weekly, 8 March 2018) </p><p>AB Chair’s speech</p><p>During a separate event on the same day, the Appellate Body Chair provided his observations on challenges faced by highest global trade court, calling for “swift and robust action” from the WTO membership to resolve the impasse situation. </p><p>Singh Bhatia reiterated previously expressed concerns, such as the burgeoning caseload of the Appellate Body, made even more difficult given the complexity of today’s disputes. He also highlighted the resource limitations involved, arguing that those elements as a whole lead to “very significant delays” and that the Appellate Body “cannot be realistically expected to deliver high-quality reports within the timeframes prescribed in the DSU.” </p><p>He also noted the debate among members over how the Appellate Body should approach “ambiguity” in existing treaties. When a matter falls out of the scope of the WTO rules, the Appellate Body had left the freedom of members untouched, he said. </p><p>Singh Bhatia commented that a decision not to fully address an issue properly established in a dispute, “could, in effect, be a decision in favour of one of the participants, possibly altering the rights and obligations of WTO members.” </p><p>The speech had also touched on the value of past case law and the necessary evolution of the legal interpretations conducted by the Appellate Body in order to ensure the “security and predictability” of the multilateral trading system. </p><p>Singh Bhatia concluded his remarks by calling for WTO members to act to preserve the legitimacy of the dispute settlement system and to address broader challenges to multilateralism. </p><p>“WTO members must embrace this responsibility and engage in constructive dialogue to ensure the continued good health of a system that is uniquely effective, but which cannot be taken for granted,” he said. </p><p>Geopolitical landscape on trade</p><p>Those debates occur during a critical moment for the global trading system, with one key player, the US, opting in recent months to adopt unilateral actions to address its trade concerns with partners. Those actions have in turn triggered vocal responses from other players, both in light of the commercial consequences and the systemic implications. </p><p><u>Much of the spotlight has been on the responsive measures announced by the EU, China, Canada, and Mexico following US tariffs on steel and aluminium</u>, which are also facing domestic legal challenges from industry players. Other economies whose interests have also been affected have publicly expressed their own concerns, and in some cases notified planned actions in response. </p><p><u>These include, for example, a WTO dispute from Norway on the US’ steel and aluminium tariffs, </u>or notifications of “suspension of concessions”<u> in response to these tariffs from the likes of India, Turkey, Russia, and others, who have argued that the US tariffs are safeguard measures, rather than national security-related policies</u>. That distinction has legal implications at the global trade club, given that safeguard measures and national security-related trade measures are subject to different requirements, including over whether compensation is required for affected exporting members. </p><p>Even some countries that have reached deals with the US to avert the duties, such as Brazil, have publicly criticised Washington’s negotiating approach in this area, and have noted that alternative quota arrangements were imposed over Brasilia’s objections. (A more detailed report on the Section 232 situation will be featured in next week’s edition of Bridges) </p><p>US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer issued a statement on Tuesday 26 June criticising the responsive measures adopted by other WTO members in light of the US’ steel and aluminium tariffs. He argued that while the US tariffs were “wholly legitimate and fully justified” under both domestic law and at the WTO, steps like the EU’s “re-balancing” measures are based on a “groundless legal theory.” </p><p>“These retaliatory tariffs underscore the complete hypocrisy that governs so much of the global trading system.  For <u>months, the EU, China, and others have criticised the trade policy of <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates, while claiming to champion the WTO. But their recent tariffs prove tha</u>t <u><strong>they <mark>simply ignore WTO rules whenever doing so is convenient</u></strong>,” </mark>he said. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Tai Ming Cheung 22, professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at the University of California San Diego and director of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 10-24-2022, accessed on 11-14-2022, Foreign Policy, “Russia’s Ukraine Disaster Exposes China’s Military Weakness”, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/24/russias-ukraine-disaster-exposes-chinas-military-weakness/, HBisevac fulltext: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has stirred fears that China could similarly move on Taiwan. By this logic, shared among foreign and security policy thinkers across the American mainstream, Putin’s floundering conquest of the eastern European nation on NATO’s doorstep shattered international norms and expanded the policy menu for the world’s other leading irredentist strongman, Xi Jinping. But this line of argument has a fundamental flaw. In Beijing, the conflict in Europe serves not as a green-light for China’s military campaign against Taiwan, but as an invaluable opportunity for Chinese war planners to learn about their own battlefield vulnerabilities at someone else’s expense. Beijing is not in a state of reckless escalation or suicidal. To the contrary, Chinese military planners view their own military capabilities with marked caution, and eight months into the war in Ukraine Russia’s serial failures have amounted to a drawn-out approximation of what a rash or poorly prepared Chinese campaign in Taiwan might look like. From a strictly military perspective, the Ukraine crisis has very likely pushed the timeline for Chinese attack against Taiwan backwards, not forwards. China’s decades-long military relationship with Russia helps to explain why Chinese leaders see the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait with so much circumspection. Russia and China have an extensive if volatile history of close military cooperation—the Chinese Communist Party based the organization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on the Soviet model and has imported a significant amount of high-end weaponry from Moscow. When Chinese leaders see Russia’s tens of thousands of dead or wounded troops over the course of its sputtering campaign in Ukraine, its loss of several thousand fighting vehicles, its inability to achieve battlefield objectives that once seemed easily attainable, and the end of its military’s ability to inspire any real fear, they are glimpsing a potential catastrophe that has alarming implications for their own security. Chinese leaders fear that if they were to go to war against Taiwan and fail to take the island, this would lead to the downfall of the Communist Party. Economically, China has long leaned westward, towards the rich countries of the democratic world whose demand for Chinese goods and resources fueled decades of high-paced economic growth and brought hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. But militarily, China has been under an arms embargo from those exact trading partners ever since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown—there is simply too much moral, political, and legal hazard for top weapons exporters like the United States, France, or the U.K. to enter into business with Beijing. Russia is the only global defense industrial power that is willing to work with Beijing. In 1989, after the Tiananmen Square crackdown turned China into one of the world’s more isolated regimes, the Chinese government appealed to the collapsing Soviet Union for help with its defense sector, reestablishing a relationship that had ruptured with the Sino-Soviet split in 1960. In the first five years of the resumption of the Chinese-Russian arms trade, China mostly wanted completed weapons systems—full aircraft, ships, artillery pieces, and other materiel that could be put to immediate use because of rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Starting in the mid 1990s, the focus changed, as China realized it had a greater need for specific components and subsystems that could be slotted into the increasing number of platforms that the Chinese now built and designed themselves. China also sought to produce Russian systems within its own defense factories. The rising superpower was an attractive destination for Russian weapons experts who wanted to escape their post-Soviet homeland’s myriad crises, and hundreds of the country’s defense scientists and engineers were recruited into China in the 1990s. In 1995, Moscow and Beijing signed a license agreement for the assembly and eventual manufacturing of Russia’s advanced Su-27 fighter aircraft by the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation. Later, Russia accused China of using the agreement as an opportunity to swipe the design of the Su-27, which the Chinese relabelled as the J-11. Credible evidence of widespread Chinese theft of Russian military technology was not enough though to scuttle the dependent defense relationship between the two countries—a sign of how durable the ties between their military-industrial complexes have turned out to be, as well as evidence of how few other options for high-level arms cooperation both believe they have. The relationship thrived into the new millennium. China was the world’s leading arms importer between 2003 and 2007 with a global share of 12 percent of total global purchases, second-largest between 2009 and 2013 with a 4.8 percent share, and sixth-largest from 2014 to 2018 with a 4.2 percent share, according to estimates from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The overwhelming majority of these imports came from Russia. The PLA even had a specific front company, the China Poly Group Corporation, responsible for Russian arms procurement. The SIPRI-reported decline of China’s share of the world arms import market over the first two decades of the 21st Century reflects the new-found ability of the Chinese defense industry to meet the PLA’s requirements. This revival of the military industrial complex has accelerated under Xi Jinping’s rule, who has prioritized indigenous defense innovation and self-sufficiency. Still, the PLA generals in charge of the country’s armaments system see no contradiction between foreign defense cooperation and home-grown weapons development. In 2012, Lieutenant General Li Andong, the director of the PLA General Armament Department, wrote an article in Chinese Military Industry News urging a ramp-up in Chinese defense research while also instructing the country to “grasp opportunities and actively carry out international cooperation.” Russia was the prime focus of this foreign “cooperation,” as it continues to be. The ties only seemed to deepen: There would be “no forbidden areas” of collaboration between Russia and China according to Xi and Putin’s fateful declaration at the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, a euphemism for, among other things, an expansion of existing and new joint development of military technology. Over the past decade, the ties between the two countries have taken on a broader strategic character, as Chinese thinkers began to view superpower competition with the US as both an inevitability and the primary existential national security challenge. In 2011, analysts affiliated with the PLA Academy of Military Sciences argued that “the United States does not want to see big powers like China and Russia to grow stronger,” showing how Chinese official thinking linked the strategic horizons of both countries. Moscow’s military failures in Ukraine raise many awkward issues from a Chinese perspective, especially if the two neighbors really are destined to be erstwhile allies in a long-term struggle with the United States. Russia’s air force has been conspicuously absent over Ukraine, and its high-end ground weaponry has been either unimpressive or completely irrelevant on the battlefield—the Russian military has gained what little ground it could only by obliterating entire cities using long-range firepower, a low-tech and high-brutality means of breaking an opponent who has gained a potentially decisive battlefield edge from the American weaponry it has received. The Ukrainians have been able to reverse much of Russia’s meager territorial gains during an ongoing series of counter-offenses that began in early September, with even experienced Russian combat units proving unable to hold out against a smaller western-equipped force. The command-and-control structure of the PLA, with an over-dependence on inexperienced junior and mid-ranking officers because of a structural deficit of non-commissioned officers, is modeled on that of a Russian military whose leadership has proven stunningly poor in recent months. Perhaps most worryingly from a Chinese perspective, the army that is currently bogged down in Ukraine is far more battle-tested than China’s, with recent experience in Chechnya, Syria, Georgia, and a range of other contexts. In contrast, out of the top 100 officers in the Chinese military, only one of them was at junior officer level during the country’s disastrous 1979 invasion into Vietnam, which is the last major land war China has fought. A Russian military that’s been fighting somewhere on earth for most of the past 30 years has shown a notable inability to carry out complex joint operations in Ukraine—the invasion began with Ukrainian National Guard units holding off a botched Russian special forces landing in Hostomel, an air installation outside of Kiev. China has been ramping up military drills in recent years, in part to create the impression that the PLA actually can coordinate an unified air, land, and sea command for an invasion of Taiwan. But most exercises would not qualify as joint (requiring interoperability among services) and would more likely be combined maneuvers (services operating next to each other with occasional coordination). In Beijing, military planners are likely wondering if the PLA could perform any better than its Russian counterpart against what is in some respects an even harder target than Ukraine—a mountainous and heavily protected island wielding a larger and more advanced arsenal of American and European aircraft and air-defense systems, naval systems, and ground forces. China will have to project its troops over considerable distance into Taiwan by sea and by air, a formidable and complex undertaking the Russians have not faced in Ukraine. With Taiwan, the U.S., and much of the world are carefully watching China’s every military move in and around the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait, so the critical element of strategic surprise essential for a successful invasion will be hard to attain. Russia’s Ukraine adventure should be inspiring caution among the PLA’s professional war-fighting cadre. They have seen their closest military ally gamble everything on an elective war of territorial conquest only to end up weaker, less feared, and more isolated than they were before the invasion. Still, it would be a mistake to think that the Ukraine war will convince China never to attempt a takeover of Taiwan, or that it will prevent China from using force to pursue its territorial claims in the South China Sea, India, or anywhere else. Indeed, a year before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Chinese authorities issued a new accelerated timeline to the PLA to accomplish key modernization goals at a far more urgent pace. This was reiterated by Xi in his keynote speech at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 when he called for a “quicker elevation of the PLA to world-class standards” and the need to achieve key unspecified military development goals by 2027 instead of an earlier timeline of 2035. This suggests that PLA leaders are facing a worrying conundrum over the next few years. The lessons of the Russian war against Ukraine shows that China militarily needs much more time to strengthen and revamp its war-fighting establishment to address the glaring weaknesses and gaps highlighted on the Ukrainian battlefield. Politically though, Beijing is becoming increasingly anxious that its goal of reunification with Taiwan is at growing risk because deepening ties between Taiwan and the U.S. and its allies. The PLA may find itself being called into action well before it is combat-ready.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>8---No Taiwan invasion.</h4><p>Tai Ming <strong>Cheung 22</strong>, professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at the University of California San Diego and director of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 10-24-2022, accessed on 11-14-2022, Foreign Policy, “Russia’s Ukraine Disaster Exposes China’s Military Weakness”, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/24/russias-ukraine-disaster-exposes-chinas-military-weakness/, HBisevac</p><p>Russia’s invasion of <mark>Ukraine</mark> has <mark>stirred fears</mark> that <mark>China</mark> <mark>could</mark> similarly <mark>move on</mark> <mark>Taiwan</mark>. By this logic, shared among foreign and security policy thinkers across the American mainstream, Putin’s floundering conquest of the eastern European nation on NATO’s doorstep shattered international norms and expanded the policy menu for the world’s other leading irredentist strongman, Xi Jinping.</p><p>But this line of <mark>argument</mark> has a <mark>fundamental flaw</mark>. <mark>In Beijing</mark>, the <mark>conflict</mark> in Europe <mark>serves</mark> not as a green-light for China’s military campaign against Taiwan, but <mark>as</mark> an invaluable <mark>opportunity</mark> for Chinese war planners <mark>to learn about</mark> their own <mark>battlefield vulnerabilities</mark> at someone else’s expense. Beijing is not in a state of reckless escalation or suicidal. To the contrary, <mark>Chinese military</mark> planners <mark>view</mark> their own military <mark>capabilities with marked caution</mark>, and eight months into the war in Ukraine Russia’s serial failures have amounted to a drawn-out approximation of what a rash or poorly prepared Chinese campaign in Taiwan might look like. From a strictly military perspective, the <mark>Ukraine</mark> crisis has very likely <mark>pushed</mark> the <mark>timeline</mark> <mark>for</mark> Chinese <mark>attack against</mark> <mark>Taiwan</mark> <mark>backwards</mark>, not forwards.</p><p>China’s decades-long military relationship with Russia helps to explain why Chinese leaders see the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait with so much circumspection. Russia and China have an extensive if volatile history of close military cooperation—the Chinese Communist Party based the organization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on the Soviet model and has imported a significant amount of high-end weaponry from Moscow. When Chinese leaders see Russia’s tens of thousands of dead or wounded troops over the course of its sputtering campaign in Ukraine, its loss of several thousand fighting vehicles, its inability to achieve battlefield objectives that once seemed easily attainable, and the end of its military’s ability to inspire any real fear, they are glimpsing a potential catastrophe that has alarming implications for their own security. Chinese leaders fear that if they were to go to war against Taiwan and fail to take the island, this would lead to the downfall of the Communist Party.</p><p>Economically, China has long leaned westward, towards the rich countries of the democratic world whose demand for Chinese goods and resources fueled decades of high-paced economic growth and brought hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. But militarily, <mark>China</mark> has been <mark>under</mark> an <mark>arms embargo</mark> from those exact trading partners ever since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown—there is simply too much moral, political, and legal hazard for top weapons exporters like the United States, France, or the U.K. to enter into business with Beijing. Russia is the only global defense industrial power that is willing to work with Beijing.</p><p>In 1989, after the Tiananmen Square crackdown turned China into one of the world’s more isolated regimes, the Chinese government appealed to the collapsing Soviet Union for help with its defense sector, reestablishing a relationship that had ruptured with the Sino-Soviet split in 1960. In the first five years of the resumption of the Chinese-Russian arms trade, China mostly wanted completed weapons systems—full aircraft, ships, artillery pieces, and other materiel that could be put to immediate use because of rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Starting in the mid 1990s, the focus changed, as China realized it had a greater need for specific components and subsystems that could be slotted into the increasing number of platforms that the Chinese now built and designed themselves.</p><p>China also sought to produce Russian systems within its own defense factories. The rising superpower was an attractive destination for Russian weapons experts who wanted to escape their post-Soviet homeland’s myriad crises, and hundreds of the country’s defense scientists and engineers were recruited into China in the 1990s.</p><p>In 1995, Moscow and Beijing signed a license agreement for the assembly and eventual manufacturing of Russia’s advanced Su-27 fighter aircraft by the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation. Later, Russia accused China of using the agreement as an opportunity to swipe the design of the Su-27, which the Chinese relabelled as the J-11.</p><p>Credible evidence of widespread Chinese theft of Russian military technology was not enough though to scuttle the dependent defense relationship between the two countries—a sign of how durable the ties between their military-industrial complexes have turned out to be, as well as evidence of how few other options for high-level arms cooperation both believe they have.</p><p>The relationship thrived into the new millennium. China was the world’s leading arms importer between 2003 and 2007 with a global share of 12 percent of total global purchases, second-largest between 2009 and 2013 with a 4.8 percent share, and sixth-largest from 2014 to 2018 with a 4.2 percent share, according to estimates from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The overwhelming majority of these imports came from Russia. The PLA even had a specific front company, the China Poly Group Corporation, responsible for Russian arms procurement.</p><p>The SIPRI-reported decline of China’s share of the world arms import market over the first two decades of the 21st Century reflects the new-found ability of the Chinese defense industry to meet the PLA’s requirements. This revival of the military industrial complex has accelerated under Xi Jinping’s rule, who has prioritized indigenous defense innovation and self-sufficiency.</p><p>Still, the PLA generals in charge of the country’s armaments system see no contradiction between foreign defense cooperation and home-grown weapons development. In 2012, Lieutenant General Li Andong, the director of the PLA General Armament Department, wrote an article in Chinese Military Industry News urging a ramp-up in Chinese defense research while also instructing the country to “grasp opportunities and actively carry out international cooperation.” Russia was the prime focus of this foreign “cooperation,” as it continues to be. The ties only seemed to deepen: There would be “no forbidden areas” of collaboration between Russia and China according to Xi and Putin’s fateful declaration at the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, a euphemism for, among other things, an expansion of existing and new joint development of military technology.</p><p>Over the past decade, the ties between the two countries have taken on a broader strategic character, as Chinese thinkers began to view superpower competition with the US as both an inevitability and the primary existential national security challenge. In 2011, analysts affiliated with the PLA Academy of Military Sciences argued that “the United States does not want to see big powers like China and Russia to grow stronger,” showing how Chinese official thinking linked the strategic horizons of both countries.</p><p>Moscow’s military failures in Ukraine raise many awkward issues from a Chinese perspective, especially if the two neighbors really are destined to be erstwhile allies in a long-term struggle with the United States. Russia’s air force has been conspicuously absent over Ukraine, and its high-end ground weaponry has been either unimpressive or completely irrelevant on the battlefield—the Russian military has gained what little ground it could only by obliterating entire cities using long-range firepower, a low-tech and high-brutality means of breaking an opponent who has gained a potentially decisive battlefield edge from the American weaponry it has received. The Ukrainians have been able to reverse much of Russia’s meager territorial gains during an ongoing series of counter-offenses that began in early September, with even experienced Russian combat units proving unable to hold out against a smaller western-equipped force.</p><p>The <mark>c</mark>ommand-<mark>and</mark>-<mark>c</mark>ontrol <mark>structure of</mark> the <mark>PLA</mark>, with an <mark>over-dependence</mark> <mark>on</mark> <mark>inexperienced</mark> junior and mid-ranking <mark>officers</mark> <mark>because</mark> of a <mark>structural deficit</mark> <mark>of</mark> non-commissioned <mark>officers</mark>, is <mark>modeled on</mark> that of a <mark>Russian</mark> <mark>military</mark> whose <mark>leadership</mark> has <mark>proven stunningly poor</mark> in recent months. Perhaps most worryingly from a Chinese perspective, the army that is currently bogged down in Ukraine is far more battle-tested than China’s, with recent experience in Chechnya, Syria, Georgia, and a range of other contexts. In contrast, out of the top 100 officers in the Chinese military, only one of them was at junior officer level during the country’s disastrous 1979 invasion into Vietnam, which is the last major land war China has fought.</p><p>A Russian military that’s been fighting somewhere on earth for most of the past 30 years has shown a notable inability to carry out complex joint operations in Ukraine—the invasion began with Ukrainian National Guard units holding off a botched Russian special forces landing in Hostomel, an air installation outside of Kiev. China has been ramping up military drills in recent years, in part to create the impression that the PLA actually can coordinate an unified air, land, and sea command for an invasion of Taiwan. But most exercises would not qualify as joint (requiring interoperability among services) and would more likely be combined maneuvers (services operating next to each other with occasional coordination).</p><p>In Beijing, military planners are likely wondering if the PLA could perform any better than its Russian counterpart against what is in some respects an even harder target than Ukraine—a mountainous and heavily protected island wielding a larger and more advanced arsenal of American and European aircraft and air-defense systems, naval systems, and ground forces. China will have to project its troops over considerable distance into Taiwan by sea and by air, a formidable and complex undertaking the Russians have not faced in Ukraine. With Taiwan, the U.S., and much of the world are carefully watching China’s every military move in and around the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait, so the critical element of strategic surprise essential for a successful invasion will be hard to attain.</p><p>Russia’s Ukraine adventure should be inspiring caution among the PLA’s professional war-fighting cadre. They have seen their closest military ally gamble everything on an elective war of territorial conquest only to end up weaker, less feared, and more isolated than they were before the invasion.</p><p>Still, it would be a mistake to think that the Ukraine war will convince China never to attempt a takeover of Taiwan, or that it will prevent China from using force to pursue its territorial claims in the South China Sea, India, or anywhere else. Indeed, a year before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Chinese authorities issued a new accelerated timeline to the PLA to accomplish key modernization goals at a far more urgent pace. This was reiterated by Xi in his keynote speech at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 when he called for a “quicker elevation of the PLA to world-class standards” and the need to achieve key unspecified military development goals by 2027 instead of an earlier timeline of 2035.</p><p>This suggests that <mark>PLA leaders</mark> are <mark>facing</mark> a <mark>worrying conundrum</mark> over the next few years. The <mark>lessons of</mark> the Russian war against <mark>Ukraine</mark> <mark>shows</mark> that <mark>China</mark> <mark>militarily needs much more time to strengthen</mark> and revamp its <mark>war-fighting establishment</mark> <mark>to address</mark> the <mark>glaring weaknesses</mark> <mark>and</mark> <mark>gaps</mark> highlighted on the Ukrainian battlefield. Politically though, Beijing is becoming increasingly anxious that its goal of reunification with Taiwan is at growing risk because deepening ties between Taiwan and the U.S. and its allies. The PLA may find itself being called into action well before it is combat-ready.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Dahlstrom 14 [Michael F. Dahlstrom, Greenlee School of Journalism and Communication Iowa State University, 9-15-2014, “Using narratives and storytelling to communicate science with nonexpert audiences” PNAS, accessed 9-7-2022, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4183170/ ww fulltext: Storytelling often has a bad reputation within science (1). Viewed as baseless or even manipulative, stories are often denigrated with statements such as, “the plural of anecdote is not data.” Such a perspective is valuable within the context of scientific data collection to underscore the important difference between making informed generalizations from systematically sampled populations versus overgeneralizations from small and often biased samples.∂ However, when the context moves from data collection to the communication of science to nonexpert audiences, stories, anecdotes, and narratives become not only more appropriate but potentially more important. Research suggests that narratives are easier to comprehend and audiences find them more engaging than traditional logical-scientific communication (3, 4). More pragmatically, the sources from which nonexperts receive most of their science information are already biased toward narrative formats of communication. Once out of formal schooling, nonexpert audiences get the majority of their scientific information from mass media content (5). Because media practitioners have to compete for the attention of their audiences, they routinely rely on stories, anecdotes, and other narrative formats to cut although the information clutter and resonate with their audiences. Although the plural of anecdote may not be data, the anecdote has a greater chance of reaching and engaging with a nonexpert audience. The challenge for science communicators, then, is to decide when and how narratives can effectively and appropriately help them communicate to nonexperts about science.∂ The purpose of this article is to synthesize literature on narrative communication and place it within a science communication context. The article begins with a review of narrative literature, as well as the mass media context through which most nonexpert audiences get their information about science. The article then reviews the potential persuasive impacts of narrative communication and the ethical considerations of using narrative to communicate science. Finally, future intersections of narrative with ongoing questions in science communication are introduced.∂ NARRATIVES∂ Most individuals have an inherent understanding of what it means to tell a story. Communication scholars supplement this colloquial understanding of narrative through the articulation of certain factors that distinguish narrative as a communication format. Narratives follow a particular structure that describes the cause-and-effect relationships between events that take place over a particular time period that impact particular characters. Although there exist more nuanced factors that scholars can use to further determine the narrativity of a message (6–8), this triumvirate of causality, temporality, and character represents a fairly standard definition of narrative communication. Such a definition is independent of content and so narratives can be present within almost any communication activity or media platform. Obvious examples include interpersonal conversation, entertainment television programs, and news profiles, but narratives can also present themselves within larger messages as testimonials, exemplars, case studies, or eyewitness accounts.∂ Narratives are often contrasted with other formats of communication, such as expository or argumentative communication (7), or with other types of explanations, such as descriptive, deductive, or statistical (6). However, more generally, narratives are often contrasted with the logical-scientific communication underlying most of the sciences (3, 9). Three areas in particular where logical-scientific and narrative formats differ are in their direction of generalizability, their reliance on context, and their standards for legitimacy.∂ Logical-scientific communication aims to provide abstract truths that remain valid across a specified range of situations. An individual may then use these abstract truths to generalize down to a specific case and ideally provide some level of predictive power regarding that specific. Narrative communication instead provides a specific case from which an individual can generalize up to infer what the general truths must be to permit such a specific to occur (3, 10). In essence, the utilization of logical-scientific information follows deductive reasoning, whereas the utilization of narrative information follows inductive reasoning.∂ Logical-scientific communication is context-free in that it deals with the understanding of facts that retain their meaning independently from their surrounding units of information. As such, these facts represent the meaningful unit of content and can be excised from a larger message and inserted into other messages, or even presented alone, with little loss of understanding. In contrast, narrative communication is context-dependent because it derives it meaning from the ongoing cause-and-effect structure of the temporal events of which it is comprised (11–13). As such, it is much harder to break a narrative into smaller units of meaningful content without either greatly altering the understanding of the smaller unit or rendering the original narrative incoherent (3).∂ Finally, because logical-scientific communication aims to provide general truths as an outcome, the legitimacy of its message is judged on the accuracy of its claims. In contrast, because narrative communication instead aims to provide a reasonable depiction of individual experiences, the legitimacy of its message is judged on the verisimilitude of its situations. This difference confusingly allows logical-scientific communication and narrative communication with opposing outcomes to be judged with equal levels of “truth” (3), and partially explains why narratives can rarely be effectively countered with facts (14).∂ Such differences have in part led to a framework claiming that logical-scientific and narrative communication are not just contrasting formats of communication, but represent two distinct cognitive pathways of comprehension (3, 15, 16). The paradigmatic pathway controls the encoding of science-based evidence, whereas the narrative pathway controls the encoding of situation-based exemplars, leading to distinct differences in comprehension and understanding based on the pathway used to process the content.∂ Empirical studies support such a categorical difference between paradigmatic and narrative processing, and suggest that narrative processing is generally more efficient. Narratives are often associated with increased recall, ease of comprehension, and shorter reading times (17, 18). In a direct comparison with expository text, narrative text was read twice as fast and recalled twice as well, regardless of topic familiarity or interest in the content itself (19, 20). Graesser and Ottati (20) describe these and similar results as suggesting that narratives have a “privileged status” in human cognition. These benefits should not be assumed to come from simplicity, as coherent narratives demand a high level of complexity in both internal complexity and alignment to cultural and social expectancies (15, 21). Instead, narratives seem to offer intrinsic benefits in each of the four main steps of processing information: motivation and interest, allocating cognitive resources, elaboration, and transfer into long-term memory (22).∂ As such, narrative cognition is thought to represent the default mode of human thought, proving structure to reality and serving as the underlying foundation for memory (18). This reliance on narratives is suggested to be the result of an evolutionary benefit because narratives provide their users with a format of comprehension to simulate possible realities (23), which would serve to better predict cause-and-effect relationships and model the thoughts of other humans in the complex social interactions that define our species (24).∂ Such intrinsic benefits in comprehension could benefit the communication of science. Indeed, such a movement is underway within the science education literature (7, 25). Responding to various calls for reform in science education curriculum, some of which specifically note the potential of narrative formats for learning (26), scholars are exploring how narratives may improve upon the traditional ways science is taught. For example, Glaser et al. (22) describe four factors that narratives offer, which could improve knowledge acquisition about science compared with the traditional expository curriculum, namely dramatization, emotionalization, personalization, and fictionalization. Similarly, the capacity model describes how both the narrative and educational components are processed when narratives are used in service of science education. Specifically, educational content that is more integral to the plotline of the narrative requires less cognitive resources for comprehension and leads to enhanced learning (27), a prediction that has found empirical support elsewhere in narrative research (12, 13).∂ Similarly, health communication is another area exploring the potential benefits of using narrative, often to better educate or persuade individuals toward healthy behavior choices. Some studies empirically examine the effects of narratives on perceptions of specific health issues, such as anticoagulant medication (28), breast cancer (29), or vaccinations (20–32), whereas others take a broader view to justify the theoretical inclusion of narrative within health (33) or to provide a guide to its use (8). A meta-analysis of many of these health-related narrative studies found mixed results with regard to a net narrative effect (34), although a lack of a consistent conceptualization of narrative (35) likely complicates any generalization. Regardless of the complexities involved, calls for more narrative within health contexts continue to surface (36).∂ Although the benefits of including narrative into science education and health contexts remain under investigation, there is another context where narratives have long been the norm in the communication of science: the mass media.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>Sci-Fi builds realities that improve communication to those outside the debate space – my mom can understand the general thesis of Elysium but not people blitzing through cap cards that are purely theoretical</h4><p>Dahlstrom 14 </strong>[Michael F. Dahlstrom, Greenlee School of Journalism and Communication Iowa State University, 9-15-2014, “Using narratives and storytelling to communicate science with nonexpert audiences” PNAS, accessed 9-7-2022, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4183170/ ww </p><p><u><strong><mark>Storytelling</mark> often has a bad reputation within science</u></strong> (1). <u><mark>Viewed as baseless</mark> or even manipulative</u>, <u>stories are often denigrated with statements such as, “the plural of anecdote is not data.”</u> Such a perspective is valuable within the context of scientific data collection to underscore the important difference between making informed generalizations from systematically sampled populations versus overgeneralizations from small and often biased samples.∂ However, when the context moves from data collection to the <u><mark>communication of science to nonexpert</mark> audiences,</u> <u><strong><mark>stories</u></strong></mark>, anecdotes, and narratives <u><strong><mark>become</u></strong></mark> not only more appropriate but potentially <u><strong><mark>more important</u></strong></mark>. <u>Research suggests that <mark>narratives are easier to comprehend</mark> and audiences find them more engaging than traditional logical-scientific communication</u> (3, 4). More pragmatically, <u>the sources from which <mark>nonexperts</mark> receive most of their science information are already <mark>biased toward narrative formats of communication</u></mark>. Once out of formal schooling, <u><strong>nonexpert audiences get the majority of their scientific information from mass media content</u></strong> (5). Because <u><strong>media practitioners</u></strong> have to compete for the attention of their audiences, they rout<u>inely rely on stories, anecdotes, and other narrative formats to cut although the information clutter and resonate with their audiences. </u>Although the plural of anecdote may not be data, the anecdote has a greater chance of reaching and engaging with a nonexpert audience. <u>The challenge for science communicators, then, is to decide when and how narratives can effectively and appropriately help them communicate to nonexperts about science.</u>∂ The purpose of this article is to synthesize literature on narrative communication and place it within a science communication context. The article begins with a review of narrative literature, as well as the mass media context through which most nonexpert audiences get their information about science. The article then reviews the potential persuasive impacts of narrative communication and the ethical considerations of using narrative to communicate science. Finally, future intersections of narrative with ongoing questions in science communication are introduced.∂ NARRATIVES∂ Most individuals have an inherent understanding of what it means to tell a story. Communication scholars supplement this colloquial understanding of narrative through the articulation of certain factors that distinguish narrative as a communication format. Narratives follow a particular structure that describes the cause-and-effect relationships between events that take place over a particular time period that impact particular characters. Although there exist more nuanced factors that scholars can use to further determine the narrativity of a message (6–8), this triumvirate of causality, temporality, and character represents a fairly standard definition of narrative communication. Such a definition is independent of content and so narratives can be present within almost any communication activity or media platform. Obvious examples include interpersonal conversation, entertainment television programs, and news profiles, but narratives can also present themselves within larger messages as testimonials, exemplars, case studies, or eyewitness accounts.∂ Narratives are often contrasted with other formats of communication, such as expository or argumentative communication (7), or with other types of explanations, such as descriptive, deductive, or statistical (6). However, more generally, <u>narratives are often contrasted with the logical-scientific communication underlying most of the sciences</u> (3, 9). Three areas in particular where logical-scientific and narrative formats differ are in their direction of generalizability, their reliance on context, and their standards for legitimacy.∂ <u>Logical-<mark>scientific communication</mark> <mark>aims to provide abstract truths </mark>that remain valid across a specified range of situations. An individual may then <mark>use these</mark> abstract <mark>truths to generalize down</mark> to a specific case <mark>and</mark> ideally <mark>provide</mark> some level of <mark>predictive power</mark> regarding that specific. <mark>Narrative</mark> <mark>communication</mark> instead <mark>provides a specific case from which an individual can generalize up</mark> to infer what the general truths must be to permit such a specific to occur</u> (3, 10). In essence<u>, the utilization of logical-scientific information follows deductive reasoning, whereas the utilization of narrative information follows inductive reasoning.</u>∂ <u>Logical-<mark>scientific communication is context-free</mark> in that it deals with the understanding of <mark>facts</mark> that <mark>retain</mark> their <mark>meaning independently from their surrounding</mark> units of information. As such, these facts represent the meaningful unit of content and can be excised from a larger message and inserted into other messages, or even presented alone, with little loss of understanding. In contrast, <mark>narrative communication is context-dependent</mark> because it derives it <mark>meaning from the ongoing cause-and-effect</mark> <mark>structure of the temporal events</mark> of which it is comprised </u>(11–13). <u>As such, it is much harder to break a narrative into smaller units of meaningful content without either greatly altering the understanding of the smaller unit or rendering the original narrative incoherent </u>(3).∂ Finally, because logical-scientific communication aims to provide general truths as an outcome, the legitimacy of its message is judged on the accuracy of its claims. In contrast, because <u><mark>narrative communication</mark> instead aims to <mark>provide</mark> a <mark>reasonable depiction</mark> <mark>of individual experiences</mark>, the legitimacy of its message is judged on the verisimilitude of its situations</u>. This difference confusingly allows logical-scientific communication and narrative communication with opposing outcomes to be judged with equal levels of “truth” (3), and partially explains why narratives can rarely be effectively countered with facts (14).∂ Such differences have in part led to a framework claiming that logical-scientific and narrative communication are not just contrasting formats of communication, but represent two distinct cognitive pathways of comprehension (3, 15, 16). <u>The <mark>paradigmatic pathway controls</mark> the encoding of <mark>science-based evidence</mark>, <mark>whereas</mark> the <mark>narrative pathway controls the encoding of situation-based exemplars</mark>, leading to <mark>distinct differences in comprehension</mark> and understanding based on the pathway used to process the content.</u>∂ <u><strong><mark>Empirical studies</u></strong></mark> <u>support such a categorical difference between paradigmatic and narrative processing, and <strong><mark>suggest</mark> that <mark>narrative processing is</mark> generally <mark>more efficient</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Narratives</mark> are often <mark>associated with increased recall,</mark> ease of <mark>comprehension</mark>, and shorter reading times</u></strong> (17, 18). <u><strong><mark>In a direct comparison</strong> with expository text,</mark> <mark>narrative text was read twice as fast</mark> and <mark>recalled twice as well</mark>, regardless of topic familiarity or interest in the content itself</u> (19, 20). Graesser and Ottati (20) describe these and similar results as suggesting that <u><strong><mark>narratives have a</mark> <mark>“privileged status” in</mark> </u></strong>human<u><strong> <mark>cognition</u></strong></mark>. <u>These benefits should not be assumed to come from simplicity, as coherent narratives demand a high level of complexity in both internal complexity and alignment to cultural and social expectancies</u> (15, 21). Instead, narratives seem to offer intrinsic benefits in each of the four main steps of processing information: motivation and interest, allocating cognitive resources, elaboration, and transfer into long-term memory (22).∂ As such, <u><mark>narrative cognition is thought to represent the default mode of</mark> </u>human <u><mark>thought</mark>, proving structure to reality and serving as the underlying foundation for memory</u> (18). This reliance on narratives is suggested to be the result of an evolutionary benefit because narratives provide their users with a format of comprehension to simulate possible realities (23), which would serve to better predict cause-and-effect relationships and model the thoughts of other humans in the complex social interactions that define our species (24).∂ Such <u><strong><mark>intrinsic benefits in</mark> <mark>comprehension</mark> could <mark>benefit the communication of science</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, <u>such a movement is underway within the science education literature </u>(7, 25). Responding to various calls for reform in science education curriculum, some of which specifically note the potential of narrative formats for learning (26), scholars are exploring how <u><strong><mark>narratives</mark> may <mark>improve</mark> upon <mark>the traditional ways</mark> <mark>science is taught</u></strong></mark>. For example, Glaser et al. (22) describe four factors that <u><strong><mark>narratives</u></strong></mark> offer, which could <u><mark>improve knowledge acquisition</mark> about science compared with the traditional expository curriculum</u>, namely dramatization, emotionalization, personalization, and fictionalization. Similarly, the capacity model describes how both the narrative and educational components are processed when narratives are used in service of science education. Specifically, educational content that is more integral to the plotline of the narrative requires less cognitive resources for comprehension and leads to enhanced learning (27), a prediction that has found empirical support elsewhere in narrative research (12, 13).∂ Similarly, health communication is another area exploring the potential benefits of using narrative, often to better educate or persuade individuals toward healthy behavior choices. Some studies empirically examine the effects of narratives on perceptions of specific health issues, such as anticoagulant medication (28), breast cancer (29), or vaccinations (20–32), whereas others take a broader view to justify the theoretical inclusion of narrative within health (33) or to provide a guide to its use (8). A meta-analysis of many of these health-related narrative studies found mixed results with regard to a net narrative effect (34), although a lack of a consistent conceptualization of narrative (35) likely complicates any generalization. Regardless of the complexities involved, calls for more narrative within health contexts continue to surface (36).∂ Although the benefits of including narrative into science education and health contexts remain under investigation, there is another context where narratives have long been the norm in the communication of science: the mass media.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Arango 12/22 [(Steve, a deputy staff judge advocate at Training and Education Command and currently working toward his LL.M. in national security and cybersecurity from the George Washington University School of Law. He was selected as a Regional Affairs Officer for Latin America. Prior to his time on active duty, Steven worked for the U.S. House of Representatives, the Department of Defense in the Office of General Counsel, International Affairs, and served as a federal law clerk for U.S. District Judge Fernando Rodriguez, who presides on the southern border.) “China Next Door: The CCP's Growing Influence in Latin America,” CIMSEC, 12/22/22. https://cimsec.org/china-next-door-how-the-ccp-is-reshaping-latin-america/] RR Americans hear about countries such as China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran on a frequent basis, and for good reason. All have been intertwined in global affairs, politics at home, or both for most of this century so far. But in stark contrast, the United States has treated Latin America with “benign neglect.” fulltext: Although Russia and Iran have exploited Latin America for their purposes and to the United States’ detriment—China’s inroads into the region are among the most significant threats to U.S. national security. China’s actions in the region reveal short and long-term plans to become the predominant superpower in the region. To do so, China’s influence has sowed its roots in two main areas: military and economic. But most importantly, this influence is not superficial—China’s actions seep through all levels of Latin American governments, even down to city halls. China is not simply a regional challenge; it is a global challenge as demonstrated in Latin America. To ignore Latin America is to ignore the critical inroads being developed by the United States’ chief competitor in its own backyard. Military Influence China’s military influence in Latin America is mainly through soft power, not physical presence. China has fostered significant military relationships through arms sales, exchange programs, and training engagements. China has found a fruitful market for arm’s sales in Latin America; in roughly the last eight years China has sold more than $615 million in weapons to Venezuela. Military sales may have started as simply small arms, but China’s expansion in this market now includes “aircraft, armored vehicles, and radars.” But these sales are not simply about the equipment; the sale is just the beginning of a relationship. Opportunities for training and maintenance follow each transaction—leading to greater interaction between these countries, their militaries, and China. As these deals continue to grow, Chinese personnel and military bases in the region could follow. China has also made major inroads with Latin American militaries through professional military education (PME) programs and exchange officer programs of significant scale. These programs steep Latin American servicemembers in Chinese military and political doctrine and anti-U.S. sentiment, while creating stronger relationships between the respective country and China. To attract military talent to these programs, China has also offered perks to Latin American military personnel. China will pay for business-class travel for exchange students, provide five-star hotels, and pay for other expenses while they live in China. Since 2015, China has “trained more Latin American military officers than the United States, and the difference has grown every year since.” Recent SOUTHCOM commander Adm. Craig Faller noted in Congressional testimony that China was sending five times as many Latin American military officers to its war colleges compared to the United States. According to John Kreul, who was acting deputy secretary of defense for the Western Hemisphere, the feedback on these professional military exchange programs suggested they were “straight up recruitment and propaganda 24/7.” Once these personnel are educated in China and establish professional connections with China’s military, the United States may have to be weary of working with these personnel because of the potential operational security risks. Chinese Influence—Economic Economic influence in Latin America is China’s main focus in the region. In 2000, China’s total trade value with Latin America was $12 billion. Today it is roughly $450 billion, and economists predict it could exceed $700 billion within the next 15 years. China is South America’s top trading partner and second only to the United States for all of Latin America. Underlying this trade is the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s ambitious $1 trillion trade and infrastructure program spanning across the globe. One portion of this program is a proposed transcontinental railway that can link South America’s Atlantic and Pacific coasts from Brazil to Chile. As it does elsewhere, trade naturally builds relationships and influence in the countries China builds in. China can then use its powerful economic leverage in pursuit of political goals, such as persuading regional countries to withhold recognition of Taiwan—which it has. China also engages in debt-trap diplomacy. Through deceptive trade and loan practices, China can manipulate and coerce countries that are unable to repay their loans. For example, China uses contractual language that allows it to cancel and demand repayment on one loan when a country defaults on a separate loan from a “different lender,” which is unusual for government loans. These contracts also allow China to cancel the loan if the “debtor country undertakes policy changes adverse” to China’s preferences. Loans from China have penetrated significant sectors of Latin America, including energy and mineral sectors, port infrastructure, and telecommunications. China is also willing to offer cheaper credit even to countries with poor track records of paying off debt, raising the likelihood that Latin American countries choose Chinese loans over competing loans from other countries. And with the acute economic and domestic pressures in the region, many developing countries may not effectively consider the long-term consequences that may stem from these loans. China has used these practices around the globe. Similar contracts forced Sri Lanka to hand over a major port to Beijing in 2017 when it could not pay off its debts. There is also concern that countries with Chinese debt could be pressured into denying support to U.S. forces, including logistical infrastructure, staging areas, and ports. In fact, China has loans attached to “three [of the] largest projects of port construction by cost” in Latin America. China’s focus and investment in telecommunication technologies in Latin America poses a major issue, too. Chinese companies, such as Huawei and ZTE, have created networks for governments and private sector telecommunications companies, while integrating local government staffs with Chinese personnel who have ties to the Chinese government. These companies are willing to accept lower profits for greater access in Latin America because of the access it provides the Chinese government and vice versa. To be sure, these countries do receive the benefit of modern technology and creating networks that can reach underserved rural citizens. However, China may use this new infrastructure to surveil and undermine Latin American citizens and apply its authoritarian philosophies on personal privacy against populations outside of China. Indeed, one nation has asked the United States “for assistance in disassembling and disinvesting in the Huawei Smart City program because of excessive Chinese monitoring.” But the more Latin American governments adopt this technology, the more difficult it will be for the United States to engage with them on national security issues. Conclusion Latin America is critical to U.S. national security and great power competition. Not only is it the geographic neighbor of the U.S., but the U.S. also has strong economic, political, and cultural ties to the region. According to the White House’s recently released National Security Strategy, the “Western Hemisphere directly impacts the United States more than any other region,” which is predominately Latin America. But China is in Latin America to pursue long-term interests, and to ignore this reality threatens the stability of the region and the United States.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Chinese presence in South America causes great power conflict</h4><p><strong>Arango 12/22<u> [(Steve, a deputy staff judge advocate at Training and Education Command and currently working toward his LL.M. in national security and cybersecurity from the George Washington University School of Law. He was selected as a Regional Affairs Officer for Latin America. Prior to his time on active duty, Steven worked for the U.S. House of Representatives, the Department of Defense in the Office of General Counsel, International Affairs, and served as a federal law clerk for U.S. District Judge Fernando Rodriguez, who presides on the southern border.) “China Next Door: The CCP's Growing Influence in Latin America,” CIMSEC, 12/22/22. https://cimsec.org/china-next-door-how-the-ccp-is-reshaping-latin-america/] RR</p><p></u></strong>Americans hear about countries such as China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran on a frequent basis, and for good reason. All have been intertwined in global affairs, politics at home, or both for most of this century so far. But in stark contrast, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>has</mark> <mark>treated Latin America with</mark> “benign <mark>neglect</mark>.”</p><p></u></strong>Although Russia and Iran have exploited Latin America for their purposes and to the United States’ detriment—<u><strong><mark>China’s inroads into</mark> <mark>the region are</mark> among the most significant <mark>threats to U.S. national security</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>China’s actions</mark> in the region <mark>reveal</mark> short and long-term <mark>plans to become the predominant superpower </mark>in the region</u></strong>. To do so, <u><strong>China’s influence has sowed its roots in two main areas: military and economic.</u></strong> But most importantly, this influence is not superficial—China’s actions seep through all levels of Latin American governments, even down to city halls. <u><strong>China is</u></strong> not simply a regional challenge; it is <u><strong>a global challenge as demonstrated in Latin America. To ignore Latin America is to ignore the critical inroads being developed by the United States’ chief competitor in its own backyard.</p><p>Military Influence</p><p><mark>China’s military influence in Latin America is</mark> mainly <mark>through soft power</mark>, not physical presence</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>China</mark> <mark>has fostered</mark> significant military relationships through <mark>arms sales, exchange programs</mark>, <mark>and training</mark> engagements.</u></strong> <u><strong>China has found a fruitful market for arm’s sales in Latin America;</u></strong> in roughly the last eight years <u><strong>China has sold more than $615 million in weapons to Venezuela</u></strong>. Military sales may have started as simply small arms, but China’s expansion in this market now includes “aircraft, armored vehicles, and radars.” But these sales are not simply about the equipment; the sale is just the beginning of a relationship. <u><strong>Opportunities for training and maintenance follow each transaction—leading to greater interaction between these countries, their militaries, and China. As these deals continue to grow, <mark>Chinese </mark>personnel and military <mark>bases </mark>in the region could <mark>follow</mark>.</p><p>China has</u></strong> also <u><strong>made </u></strong>major <u><strong>inroads with Latin American militaries through</u></strong> professional military education (<u><strong>PME) programs and exchange officer programs of significant scale. These programs</u></strong> steep Latin American servicemembers in Chinese military and political doctrine and anti-U.S. sentiment, while <u><strong>creating</u></strong> <u><strong>stronger relationships between the respective country and China.</u></strong> To attract military talent to these programs<u><strong>, China has also offered perks to Latin American military personnel. China will pay for business-class travel for exchange students, provide five-star hotels, and pay for other expenses while they live in China. Since 2015, China has “trained more Latin American military officers than the United States, and the difference has grown every year since.”</p><p></u></strong>Recent SOUTHCOM commander Adm. Craig Faller noted in Congressional testimony that China was sending five times as many Latin American military officers to its war colleges compared to the United States. According to John Kreul, who was acting deputy secretary of defense for the Western Hemisphere, the feedback on these professional military exchange programs suggested they were “straight up recruitment and propaganda 24/7.” Once these personnel are educated in China and establish professional connections with China’s military, <u><strong><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>may</mark> <mark>have to be weary of working with </mark>these <mark>personnel because of the</mark> <mark>potential</mark> operational <mark>security risks</mark>.</p><p>Chinese Influence—Economic</p><p>Economic influence in Latin America is China’s main focus in the region. </u></strong>In 2000,<u><strong> <mark>China’s total trade</mark> value with Latin America was $12 billion. Today it is roughly $450 billion, and economists predict it <mark>could</mark> <mark>exceed $700 billion</mark> within the next 15 years. <mark>China is South America’s top trading partner</mark> and second only to the United States for all of Latin America</u></strong>. <u><strong>Underlying this trade is the Belt and Road Initiative</u></strong>, <u><strong>China’s ambitious $1 trillion trade and infrastructure program spanning across the globe</u></strong>. <u><strong>One portion</u></strong> of this program is a proposed transcontinental railway <u><strong>that can link South America’s Atlantic and Pacific coasts from Brazil to Chile.</p><p></u></strong>As it does elsewhere, trade naturally builds relationships and influence in the countries China builds in. China can then use its powerful economic leverage in pursuit of political goals, such as persuading regional countries to withhold recognition of Taiwan—which it has.</p><p><u><strong><mark>China </mark>also <mark>engages in debt-trap diplomacy</mark>.</u></strong> Through deceptive trade and loan practices, <u><strong>China can manipulate and coerce countries that are unable to repay their loans.</u></strong> For example, China uses contractual language that allows it to cancel and demand repayment on one loan when a country defaults on a separate loan from a “different lender,” which is unusual for government loans. These contracts also allow China to cancel the loan if the “debtor country undertakes policy changes adverse” to China’s preferences.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Loans from China have penetrated</mark> significant sectors of <mark>Latin America</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>including</mark> <mark>energy and mineral</mark> <mark>sectors, </mark>port infrastructure, and telecommunications.</u></strong> <u><strong>China is also willing to offer cheaper credit even to countries with poor track records of paying off debt, raising the likelihood that Latin American countries choose Chinese loans over competing loans from other countries.</u></strong> And with the acute economic and domestic pressures in the region, many developing countries may not effectively consider the long-term consequences that may stem from these loans.</p><p>China has used these practices around the globe. Similar contracts forced Sri Lanka to hand over a major port to Beijing in 2017 when it could not pay off its debts. There is also concern that countries with Chinese debt could be pressured into denying support to U.S. forces, including logistical infrastructure, staging areas, and ports. In fact, China has loans attached to “three [of the] largest projects of port construction by cost” in Latin America.</p><p>China’s focus and investment in telecommunication technologies in Latin America poses a major issue, too. <u><strong>Chinese companies</u></strong>, such as Huawei and ZTE, <u><strong>have created networks for governments and private sector telecommunications companies, while integrating local government staffs with Chinese personnel who have ties to the Chinese government</u></strong>. These <u><strong>companies are willing to accept lower profits for greater access in Latin America</u></strong> <u><strong>because of the access it provides the Chinese government and vice versa.</p><p></u></strong>To be sure, these countries do receive the benefit of modern technology and creating networks that can reach underserved rural citizens. However, China may use this new infrastructure to surveil and undermine Latin American citizens and apply its authoritarian philosophies on personal privacy against populations outside of China. Indeed, one nation has asked the United States “for assistance in disassembling and disinvesting in the Huawei Smart City program because of excessive Chinese monitoring.” But <u><strong><mark>the more Latin American</mark> <mark>governments</mark> <mark>adopt this</mark> <mark>tech</mark>nology, <mark>the more difficult it will be for the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>to engage with</mark> <mark>them</mark> <mark>on national security</mark> issues.</p><p>Conclusion</p><p><mark>Latin America is critical to U.S.</mark> national security and <mark>great power competition</u></strong></mark>. Not only is it the geographic neighbor of the U.S., but <u><strong>the U.S. also has strong economic, political, and cultural ties to the region</u></strong>. According to the White House’s recently released National Security Strategy, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> “<mark>Western Hemisphere</mark> directly <mark>impacts</mark> <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates more than any other region,”</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>which is predominately Latin America</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>But China</mark> is <mark>in Latin</mark> <mark>America</mark> to pursue long-term interests, and to ignore this reality <mark>threatens the stability of the region</mark> <mark>and the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: David E. Thaler 16, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND, MIA International Security Policy/Middle East, Columbia University; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Beth Grill, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND, MA Middle Eastern Studies and Economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Amanda Kadlec, RAND; “From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation,” RR1438, RAND Corporation, 2016, p.26-31, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1438/RAND_RR1438.pdf fulltext: Three other limitations or gaps have been raised in numerous discussions with SC personnel in DoD. We indicated above that DoD has been limited in some authorities to working only with foreign forces associated with national defense agencies. Emerging transnational threats and mission areas require the ability to work with interior agency forces or other gendarme or civil authorities when their security forces retain primary responsibility for those mission areas or operate in close collaboration with MoDs. For example, in many cases, the ministry or department of interior is responsible for securing national infrastructure and cyber assets; of six countries CENTCOM officials are engaging on infrastructure security, only in Jordan is the military responsible for protecting the country’s infrastructure.66 A second gap in Title 10 authorities is in the flexibility for DoD to work with regional organizations rather than just bilaterally with national governments. Under Title 10, even regional programs (such as the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund [CTPF]) are implemented bilaterally with national governments. There are no mechanisms for training and equipping regional organizations.67 When this limitation is combined with the limitation on U.S. military engagement with non-MoD security forces, it inhibits the U.S. ability to facilitate coordination among agencies with similar responsibilities within and across partners to have regional effects and to address local security threats.68 Finally, while Section 1206 and the subsequent Section 2282 were designed to be a more rapid means of building partner capacity than traditional Title 22 authorities like FMF and FMS, even these programs take some 12-18 months to deliver equipment to partners. A number of SC stakeholders in DoD still perceive a need for more “timely assistance” to partners who require small amounts of support to recover or enhance existing capability of their “forces in the fight.”69 Currently, these stakeholders point out, a “pseudo-FMS” case for $10,000 in truck springs takes the same amount of time to process as a major item of equipment.70 Summary of DoD Perceptions of Title 10 SC Authorities In sum, DoD has been able to achieve many of its SC objectives with the patchwork of Title 10 authorities, but the proliferation of authorities and the complexities they engender have rendered them exceedingly difficult to apply. As we have noted here and in previous research, authorities are not the only reason for the frustration expressed by SC personnel; internal processes, organizational relationships, programmatic requirements, and inadequate levels of funding have also created obstacles. But the existing catalog of Title 10 authorities in some ways drives or complicates these other factors when they present the challenges in planning and execution detailed above. What many in the DoD SC community perceive as a flawed legislative foundation has had a compounding impact on the administration and management of SC programs, systems, and processes. However, multiple discussants agreed that Title 10 authorities have enabled broader engagement with partners during a period of a rapidly evolving security environment. While recognizing the challenges these authorities present, they also cautioned that any revisions in existing authorities or in how they are structured “do no harm.” For example, many pointed to CN authorities as providing unparalleled flexibility to engage, train, and equip partner-nation MoD and non-MoD security forces in this mission area.71 Authorities for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are seen as powerful tools that enable training of U.S. and partner civil and military forces while assisting local populations in need.72 The Section 2249c Regional Defense CTFP has been touted as highly successful in educating future leaders from partner nations on common principles for countering extremist groups.73 Section 2011 JCETs are seen as a “great tool” for training U.S. SOF and assessing and improving interoperability with partner SOF.74 Thus, in considering consolidation or revision of Title 10 authorities, what is left alone is equally as important as what is changed. Congressional Concerns Accompany Acknowledgment of Challenges What are congressional perspectives on the challenges DoD stakeholders say they face, and what might be the way forward? We sought to bring these perspectives to light through a workshop and a series of individual and small-group discussions with congressional staffers to inform both our suggestions for change in Title 10 authorities and OSD’s own efforts to pursue reforms. The two-hour workshop included House and Senate staff members from armed services, foreign relations, and appropriations committees and offices of members of Congress, as well as representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff, and DoS. Congressional staff members we engaged who work with Title 10 SC authorities acknowledge the complexities and challenges the statutes pose to effective SC. They agree with DoD that the manner in which authorities are cobbled together in a patchwork, and the affiliated congressional notifications processes, create problems both for DoD and Congress. They point out that both DoD and Congress are responsible for the “hackneyed genesis” of the existing Title 10 authorities structure—DoD because it asks frequently for new authorities in an ad hoc manner and Congress for allowing this “tactical” approach and adding its own requirements (such as multiple reports to many committees) without demanding a strategic rationalization of the authorities.75 While the staffers recognize the cumbersome nature of the patchwork, however, there is some reluctance to make major changes to Title 10. As one staffer noted in relation to yearly OSD and CCMD requests for new authorities, “everyone hates the patchwork until they don’t have the patchwork, but it works the way it is.”76 But they do see room for improvement and simplification. Some congressional staffers with whom we spoke indicated that Congress may be willing to consider modifications to Title 10 SC authorities through consolidation and revision that broaden and or clarify activities the DoD can pursue to build partnerships and partner capacity. But embedded in this willingness is caution as to the amount of flexibility Congress can offer to DoD and the oversight that modified authorities would provide. According to these staffers, Congress is not willing to cede discretionary spending to DoD in a way that encroaches on the foreign policy role of DoS or on its own oversight responsibilities. For example, staffers suggested that there are limits to which Congress will allow comprehensive “umbrella” authorities that DoD might seek for simplification and reduction in numbers of statutes. At its inception, Section 1207 Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) was a pilot program to be used for unforeseen contingencies that could not be addressed in normal systems and processes. It was to be used by exception rather than as a primary tool. But it came to be seen as a “be-all end-all” umbrella authority that would provide multiyear funds to train-and-equip partner MoD and non-MoD security forces in a range of mission areas, and thereby help address preferences of the CCMDs.77 The concept was to provide flexibility to use DoD funds while giving DoS a lead role in the decisionmaking about where to spend them. It took three years and a great deal of congressional work and “horsetrading” to pass the legislation. But GSCF is perceived to have failed because of unwieldy justification and reporting requirements to eight separate congressional committees, the aforementioned internal DoD (and DoS) bureaucratic processes, and obstacles to DoD-DoS interagency coordination derived from competition over SC roles. On the last issue, staffers noted that Congress “cannot legislate that DoD and DoS get along.” There is a perception among some congressional staff members that large umbrella authorities have a high potential for misuse, do not achieve stated goals of interagency SC alignment, and simply create added bureaucratic work in DoD and in congressional staffs. Authorities that become too “generic” suffer negative connotations on Capitol Hill. They point out that this is why one of the broadest SC authorities, Title 22 FMF, is frequently “tied up in knots” in committee for many recipient countries.78 Staffers expressed some preference for smaller targeted “niche” authorities because committee oversight and management are much easier—and in some cases, legislators have equities invested in authorities they originated for issues they believe are of high priority—but understand that in many cases something in between broad “umbrella” and narrow “niche” would be a reasonable way to rationalize the patchwork. We also heard that an important part of congressional reluctance to make wholesale changes to the structure and content of Title 10 SC authorities is broad agreement over DoD’s need to revamp its own internal SC processes. One staffer noted that “the patchwork problem is one of the leading complaints being thrown at Congress, but DoD has never looked at itself…. It created the problem by being mired in its own red tape.”79 The staff members contend that DoD’s structures and processes for planning, justifying, and approving SC initiatives have created much of the “churn” that SC personnel in the field face and the “gaming” in which they feel they must engage. Some staffers suggested that Congress would insist that internal reforms to remove bureaucratic obstacles and rationalize processes must take place before—or at least concurrently with—any DoD requests to revise Title 10 SC authorities.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Plan requires Congressional horse-trading that enables broader interference in internal DoD process</h4><p>David E. <strong>Thaler 16</strong>, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND, MIA International Security Policy/Middle East, Columbia University; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Beth Grill, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND, MA Middle Eastern Studies and Economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Amanda Kadlec, RAND; “From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation,” RR1438, RAND Corporation, 2016, p.26-31, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1438/RAND_RR1438.pdf</p><p>Three other <u><strong>limitations</strong> or <strong>gaps</strong> have been raised in <strong>numerous</strong> discussions with <strong>SC personnel in DoD</u></strong>. We indicated above that <u><strong>DoD</strong> has been <strong>limited</u></strong> in some authorities <u>to working <strong>only with</strong> foreign forces associated with <strong>national defense agencies</u></strong>. <u><strong>Emerging</strong> transnational <strong>threats</strong> and <strong>mission areas</strong> <strong>require</strong> the ability to work with <strong>interior agency forces</strong> or other gendarme or <strong>civil authorities</strong> when their security forces retain primary responsibility for those mission areas or operate in close collaboration with MoDs. For example</u>, in many cases, the ministry or department of interior is responsible for securing national <u><strong>infrastructure</strong> and <strong>cyber</strong> assets</u>; of six countries CENTCOM officials are engaging on infrastructure security, only in Jordan is the military responsible for protecting the country’s infrastructure.66</p><p><u>A <strong>second gap</strong> in <strong>Title 10 authorities</strong> is</u> in the flexibility <u>for <strong>DoD</strong> to work with <strong>regional organizations</strong> rather than just <strong>bilaterally</strong> with national governments. Under Title 10, <strong>even regional programs</u></strong> (such as the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund [CTPF]) <u>are <strong>implemented bilaterally</strong> with national governments. There are <strong>no mechanisms</strong> for training and equipping <strong>regional organizations</u></strong>.67 When this limitation is combined with the limitation on U.S. military engagement with non-MoD security forces, it inhibits the U.S. ability to facilitate coordination among agencies with similar responsibilities within and across partners to have regional effects and to address local security threats.68</p><p>Finally, while Section 1206 and the subsequent Section 2282 were designed to be a more rapid means of building partner capacity than traditional Title 22 authorities like FMF and FMS, even these programs take some 12-18 months to deliver equipment to partners. A number of SC stakeholders in DoD still perceive a need for more “timely assistance” to partners who require small amounts of support to recover or enhance existing capability of their “forces in the fight.”69 Currently, these stakeholders point out, a “pseudo-FMS” case for $10,000 in truck springs takes the same amount of time to process as a major item of equipment.70</p><p>Summary of DoD Perceptions of Title 10 SC Authorities</p><p>In sum, DoD has been able to achieve many of its SC objectives with the patchwork of Title 10 authorities, but the proliferation of authorities and the complexities they engender have rendered them exceedingly difficult to apply. As we have noted here and in previous research, authorities are not the only reason for the frustration expressed by SC personnel; internal processes, organizational relationships, programmatic requirements, and inadequate levels of funding have also created obstacles. But the existing catalog of Title 10 authorities in some ways drives or complicates these other factors when they present the challenges in planning and execution detailed above. What many in the DoD SC community perceive as a flawed legislative foundation has had a compounding impact on the administration and management of SC programs, systems, and processes.</p><p><u>However, <strong>multiple</strong> discussants <strong>agreed</strong> that Title 10 authorities have enabled broader engagement with partners during a period of a rapidly evolving security environment. While recognizing the challenges these authorities present, they also <strong>cautioned</strong> that <strong>any revisions in existing authorities</strong> or in how they are structured “<strong>do no harm</strong>.”</u> For example, many pointed to CN authorities as providing unparalleled flexibility to engage, train, and equip partner-nation MoD and non-MoD security forces in this mission area.71 Authorities for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are seen as powerful tools that enable training of U.S. and partner civil and military forces while assisting local populations in need.72 The Section 2249c Regional Defense CTFP has been touted as highly successful in educating future leaders from partner nations on common principles for countering extremist groups.73 Section 2011 JCETs are seen as a “great tool” for training U.S. SOF and assessing and improving interoperability with partner SOF.74 Thus, <u>in considering</u> consolidation or <u><strong>revision</strong> of Title 10 authorities, what is <strong>left alone</strong> is <strong>equally as important</strong> as <strong>what is changed</u></strong>.</p><p>Congressional Concerns Accompany Acknowledgment of Challenges</p><p>What are congressional perspectives on the challenges DoD stakeholders say they face, and what might be the way forward? We sought to bring these perspectives to light through a workshop and a series of individual and small-group discussions with congressional staffers to inform both our suggestions for change in Title 10 authorities and OSD’s own efforts to pursue reforms. The two-hour workshop included House and Senate staff members from armed services, foreign relations, and appropriations committees and offices of members of Congress, as well as representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff, and DoS.</p><p>Congressional staff members we engaged who work with Title 10 SC authorities acknowledge the complexities and challenges the statutes pose to effective SC. They agree with DoD that the manner in which authorities are cobbled together in a patchwork, and the affiliated congressional notifications processes, create problems both for DoD and Congress. They point out that both DoD and Congress are responsible for the “hackneyed genesis” of the existing Title 10 authorities structure—DoD because it asks frequently for new authorities in an ad hoc manner and Congress for allowing this “tactical” approach and adding its own requirements (such as multiple reports to many committees) without demanding a strategic rationalization of the authorities.75 While the staffers recognize the cumbersome nature of the patchwork, however, there is some reluctance to make major changes to Title 10. As one staffer noted in relation to yearly OSD and CCMD requests for new authorities, “everyone hates the patchwork until they don’t have the patchwork, but it works the way it is.”76 But they do see room for improvement and simplification.</p><p>Some <u>congressional staffers</u> with whom we spoke <u>indicated that <strong>Congress</strong> may be <strong>willing to consider modifications to Title 10 SC authorities</strong> through</u> consolidation and <u>revision that <strong>broaden</strong> and or clarify <strong>activities</strong> the <strong>DoD</strong> can pursue to build partnerships and partner capacity. <strong>But</strong> <strong>embedded in this willingness is caution</strong> as to the amount of <strong>flexibility</strong> Congress can offer to <strong>DoD</u></strong> and the oversight that modified authorities would provide. According to these staffers, Congress is not willing to cede discretionary spending to DoD in a way that encroaches on the foreign policy role of DoS or on its own oversight responsibilities.</p><p>For example, staffers suggested that there are limits to which Congress will allow comprehensive “umbrella” authorities that DoD might seek for simplification and reduction in numbers of statutes. At its inception, Section 1207 Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) was a pilot program to be used for unforeseen contingencies that could not be addressed in normal systems and processes. It was to be used by exception rather than as a primary tool. But it came to be seen as a “be-all end-all” umbrella authority that would provide multiyear funds to train-and-equip partner MoD and non-MoD security forces in a range of mission areas, and thereby help address preferences of the CCMDs.77 The concept was to provide flexibility to use DoD funds while giving DoS a lead role in the decisionmaking about where to spend them. <u>It <strong>took</u></strong> three years and <u>a <strong>great deal</strong> of congressional work and <strong>“horsetrading”</strong> to <strong>pass</u></strong> the <u><strong>legislation</u></strong>. But GSCF is perceived to have failed because of unwieldy justification and reporting requirements to eight separate congressional committees, the aforementioned internal DoD (and DoS) bureaucratic processes, and obstacles to DoD-DoS interagency coordination derived from competition over SC roles. On the last issue, staffers noted that Congress “cannot legislate that DoD and DoS get along.”</p><p>There is a perception among some congressional staff members that large umbrella authorities have a high potential for misuse, do not achieve stated goals of interagency SC alignment, and simply create added bureaucratic work in DoD and in congressional staffs. Authorities that become too “generic” suffer negative connotations on Capitol Hill. They point out that this is why one of the broadest SC authorities, Title 22 FMF, is frequently “tied up in knots” in committee for many recipient countries.78 Staffers expressed some preference for smaller targeted “niche” authorities because committee oversight and management are much easier—and in some cases, legislators have equities invested in authorities they originated for issues they believe are of high priority—but understand that in many cases something in between broad “umbrella” and narrow “niche” would be a reasonable way to rationalize the patchwork.</p><p>We also heard that <u><strong>an important part of congressional reluctance</strong> to make wholesale changes to the structure and content of Title 10 SC authorities is <strong>broad agreement over DoD’s need to revamp its own internal SC processes</u></strong>. One staffer noted that “the patchwork problem is one of the leading complaints being thrown at Congress, but DoD has never looked at itself…. It created the problem by being mired in its own red tape.”79 The staff members contend that DoD’s structures and processes for planning, justifying, and approving SC initiatives have created much of the “churn” that SC personnel in the field face and the “gaming” in which they feel they must engage. Some <u>staffers suggested that <strong>Congress would insist</strong> that <strong>internal reforms</strong> to remove bureaucratic obstacles and rationalize processes <strong>must take place</strong> before—or at least <strong>concurrently</strong> with—<strong>any</strong> DoD requests to <strong>revise Title 10 SC authorities</u></strong>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: David M. Kotz 22, Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst and Distinguished Professor in the School of Economics at the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, “The Ukraine War: Dilemma for the U.S. Left,” DSA, 04/08/2022, https://www.dsausa.org/democratic-left/the-ukraine-war-dilemma-for-the-u-s-left/ fulltext: Why the Conflict with the United States? Post-Soviet Russia’s first president, Boris Yeltsin, had a drive for power, and a talent for  gaining it, but he had no clear ideas about economic policy. He realized that the developing pro- capitalist coalition was the base that could propel his ascent to state power. Once he gained state  power, he deferred to his U.S.-approved neoliberal top officials and administrators to make  economic policies. But a clear theme was Yeltsin’s desire for Russia to serve as chief assistant to  U.S. imperialism, a policy direction that found approval among many of Yeltsin’s top cabinet  officials. U.S. advisers had assisted Yeltsin in his rise, and he admired the United States. One of his first  acts as president of an independent Russia was to cut off ties with Cuba, aiming to please the United States.  However, the United States was not interested in a strong Russia and  instead launched a NATO expansion policy to hem Russia in. Perhaps U.S. strategists were  worried about the future direction of Russia, where public support for socialism and nostalgia for  the USSR remained strong. As the new capitalist class emerged and was consolidated in the 1990s, the most  profitable sectors of the economy fell into the hands of Russian capitalists, in energy, metals, and chemicals. U.S. capitalists mainly got fast food and soft drinks. Even a foray into co-ownership of  a major Moscow hotel by a U.S. capitalist ended abruptly when he was assassinated by one of his  Russian business partners in 1996. Over the course of the 1990s, Russia emerged as a newly  capitalist state, with a wealthy domestic capitalist class close to the state and a large military and  nuclear weapons. We know that such a system will have a strong imperialist drive, yet any effort to  extend domination even in its neighborhood would run into the United States  and NATO. U.S. imperialism can tolerate other large, wealthy, and strong capitalist states only if they  acknowledge U.S. “leadership.” Thus, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy are “allies” as long as they acknowledge U.S. leadership. When  French president Charles DeGaulle briefly challenged the United States and NATO in the  1950s, France became an adversary, although that challenge ended  in 1968, when the French ruling class was threatened by a student-worker uprising and sought  NATO protection. Japan, which never allowed foreign capital to penetrate its domestic economy,  faced a strong U.S. reaction in the 1980s, when Japanese products began to threaten the profits of  core U.S. companies in U.S. markets. However, Japan never challenged the United States politically and  depended on the U.S. military for its security, and that conflict was in the end settled peacefully. Russia had become a powerful capitalist state that was on a trajectory of independence  from U.S. “leadership.” In his first year as president, Putin reportedly floated Russian membership  in NATO to President Bill Clinton, but there was no response. Thereafter, Putin adopted a posture of an independent foreign policy aiming to  protect the interests of his base in the oligarchic capitalist class of Russia. A Left Position on Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine The U.S. Left should condemn the unjustified Russian invasion of Ukraine, which is  wreaking death and destruction on the population. However, at the same time the Left should not  align itself with the distorted portrayal of the conflict that fills the mass media. . First, this war is not between democracy and autocracy. Right-wing nationalist authoritarianism is indeed challenging the state form of liberal democracy today, but that battle is taking place within countries, not between countries. Fundamentally, the conflict underlying this war is an inter-imperial rivalry between two large capitalist states, the global U.S. hegemon and the weaker Russian capitalist state. Second, Russia is not a uniquely evil state. It is autocratic, but so are a number of U.S.  allies such as Saudi Arabia. Although  Russia indeed suffers under a dictatorship, U.S. power and policy played a significant role in pushing the initially democratic post-Soviet Russia  in that direction by its influential support for policies that fostered the development of an  oligarchic form of capitalism with extreme inequality and mass impoverishment. The First World War  pitted an autocratic Germany against a somewhat democratic Britain, but Eugene Debs and the American Socialist Party rightly condemned that war as one of inter-imperialist rivalry. In that  war, the autocratic pre-revolutionary Russian regime had been allied with Britain and the United States. Third, Russia’s military tactics are indeed deadly but not uniquely so. The U.S. invasion of Iraq killed more civilians than Russia’s intervention in Syria. Newsweek reported that Pentagon experts, speaking off the record, claim that Russia is targeting military sites, not civilians. The truth about Russian military tactics is difficult to determine, but the limited accuracy of most bombs and artillery shells means that some of them will inevitably hit civilian infrastructure. Modern war tactics since the Second World War have always caused large numbers of civilian casualties. Russia’s leaders may be guilty of war crimes, but no more so than U.S. leaders in past invasions of other countries. The Left has condemned the indiscriminate killing of civilians in U.S. interventions and should have no hesitation in condemning similar Russian atrocities. The U.S. media coverage tends to promote war fever. The war hype, including pressure for a “no fly zone,”  is increasing the risk of a military confrontation between the US/NATO and Russia that could turn into a nuclear war. While avoiding any alignment with the war propaganda coming from U.S. sources, the Left must also clearly and loudly condemn Russia’s invasion. We should support an immediate cease fire, large-scale humanitarian aid, global support for rebuilding Ukraine, and negotiations to  achieve a compromise settlement of what is an underlying conflict between the United States and Russian  imperialist interests. In a future socialist world there should be no role for spheres of interest for large  countries. However, in the capitalist world we live in,  a viable settlement of this conflict  would have to accept Russia’s right to have security guarantees in its neighborhood. A Ukraine  settlement that includes neutrality for Ukraine along with U.S. and Russian guarantees of  Ukraine’s independence and security could avert further bloodshed and bring some stability to  the region. The Left should continue to point out the role of U.S. imperialism in pushing a NATO  expansion policy that was bound to lead to a costly and dangerous conflict, while also  noting the responsibility of U.S. imperialism for its role in creating the retrograde oligarchic Putin  regime that severely oppresses its own working class while also imposing a deadly war on  working people in neighboring Ukraine.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Capitalism <u>drives</u> the NATO-Russia <u>imperialist rivalry</u>---the plan buys into the US <u>war hype</u> that drives the risk of <u>nuclear war</u>. </h4><p>David M. <strong>Kotz 22</strong>, Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst and Distinguished Professor in the School of Economics at the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, “The Ukraine War: Dilemma for the U.S. Left,” DSA, 04/08/2022, https://www.dsausa.org/democratic-left/the-ukraine-war-dilemma-for-the-u-s-left/</p><p>Why the Conflict with the United States?</p><p>Post-Soviet Russia’s first president, Boris Yeltsin, had a drive for power, and a talent for  gaining it, but he had no clear ideas about economic policy. He realized that the developing pro- capitalist coalition was the base that could propel his ascent to state power. Once he gained state  power, he deferred to his U.S.-approved neoliberal top officials and administrators to make  economic policies. But a clear theme was Yeltsin’s desire for Russia to serve as chief assistant to  U.S. imperialism, a policy direction that found approval among many of Yeltsin’s top cabinet  officials. U.S. advisers had assisted Yeltsin in his rise, and he admired the United States. One of his first  acts as president of an independent Russia was to cut off ties with Cuba, aiming to please the United States.  However, <u>the United States was <strong>not interested</strong> in a <strong>strong Russia</u></strong> <u>and</u>  instead <u>launched a <strong>NATO expansion policy</u></strong> <u>to</u> <u><strong>hem Russia in</u></strong>. Perhaps <u>U.S. strategists were  <strong>worried</strong> about the <strong>future direction of Russia</u></strong>, where public support for socialism and nostalgia for  the USSR remained strong. </p><p><u>As the new capitalist class <strong>emerged</u></strong> <u>and was <strong>consolidated</u></strong> in the 1990s, <u>the most  profitable sectors of the economy</u> <u><strong>fell into the hands</u></strong> <u>of</u> <u><strong>Russian capitalists</u></strong>, <u>in</u> <u><strong>energy</u></strong>, <u><strong>metals</u></strong>, <u>and</u> <u><strong>chemicals</u></strong>. U.S. capitalists mainly got fast food and soft drinks. Even a foray into co-ownership of  a major Moscow hotel by a U.S. capitalist ended abruptly when he was assassinated by one of his  Russian business partners in 1996. Over the course of the 1990s, <u>Russia emerged as a <strong>newly  capitalist state</u></strong>, <u>with a wealthy</u> <u><strong>domestic capitalist class</u></strong> <u>close to the state and a <strong>large military</strong> and</u>  <u><strong>nuclear weapons</u></strong>. <u>We know that such a system will have a <strong>strong imperialist drive</u></strong>, <u>yet any effort to  <strong>extend domination</u></strong> <u>even in its neighborhood would <strong>run into the U</strong>nited <strong>S</strong>tates  <strong>and NATO</u></strong>. </p><p><u>U.S. <strong>imperialism</strong> can <strong>tolerate</strong> other large, wealthy, and strong capitalist states <strong>only if they  acknowledge U.S. “leadership</u></strong>.” <u>Thus</u>, <u>Britain, France, Germany, and Italy are “<strong>allies</u></strong>” <u>as long as they <strong>acknowledge U.S. leadership</u></strong>. When  French president Charles DeGaulle briefly challenged the United States and NATO in the  1950s, France became an adversary, although that challenge ended  in 1968, when the French ruling class was threatened by a student-worker uprising and sought  NATO protection. Japan, which never allowed foreign capital to penetrate its domestic economy,  faced a strong U.S. reaction in the 1980s, when Japanese products began to threaten the profits of  core U.S. companies in U.S. markets. However, Japan never challenged the United States politically and  depended on the U.S. military for its security, and that conflict was in the end settled peacefully. </p><p><u>Russia had become a <strong>powerful capitalist state</u></strong> <u>that was on a <strong>trajectory of independence</u></strong>  <u>from <strong>U.S. “leadership</u></strong>.” In his first year as president, <u>Putin</u> reportedly <u>floated <strong>Russian membership</u></strong>  <u>in</u> <u><strong>NATO</u></strong> to President Bill Clinton, <u>but there was <strong>no response</u></strong>. <u>Thereafter, Putin adopted a posture of an <strong>independent foreign policy</u></strong> aiming <u>to  protect the <strong>interests of his base</u></strong> <u>in the <strong>oligarchic capitalist class</strong> of Russia</u>. </p><p>A Left Position on Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine </p><p><u>The U.S. Left should <strong>condemn</strong> the <strong>unjustified</u></strong> <u>Russian invasion of Ukraine, which is  <strong>wreaking death</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>destruction</u></strong> on the population. <u>However, at the same time the Left <strong>should not  align itself</strong> with the <strong>distorted portrayal</strong> of the conflict </u>that fills the mass media. . </p><p>First, <u>this war is <strong>not</u></strong> <u>between</u> <u><strong>democracy and autocracy</u></strong>. <u>Right-wing nationalist authoritarianism is indeed challenging the state form of liberal democracy</u> today, <u>but</u> <u>that battle is taking place <strong>within countries</u></strong>, not between countries. Fundamentally, <u>the conflict <strong>underlying this war</strong> is an <strong>inter-imperial rivalry</u></strong> <u>between two large capitalist states, the <strong>global U.S. hegemon</strong> and the <strong>weaker</strong> <strong>Russian</strong> capitalist <strong>state</u></strong>. </p><p>Second, <u>Russia is <strong>not</u></strong> a <u><strong>uniquely evil</u></strong> state. <u>It is autocratic, but so are a number of U.S.  allies such as Saudi Arabia</u>. <u>Although  Russia indeed suffers under a dictatorship, U.S. <strong>power and policy</u></strong> <u>played a <strong>significant role</strong> in <strong>pushing</strong> the</u> initially <u>democratic post-Soviet Russia</u>  <u>in that direction by its influential support</u> for policies that fostered the development of an  oligarchic form of capitalism with extreme inequality and mass impoverishment. The First World War  pitted an autocratic Germany against a somewhat democratic Britain, but Eugene Debs and the American Socialist Party rightly condemned that war as one of inter-imperialist rivalry. In that  war, the autocratic pre-revolutionary Russian regime had been allied with Britain and the United States.</p><p>Third, Russia’s military tactics are indeed deadly but not uniquely so. The U.S. invasion of Iraq killed more civilians than Russia’s intervention in Syria. Newsweek reported that Pentagon experts, speaking off the record, claim that Russia is targeting military sites, not civilians. The truth about Russian military tactics is difficult to determine, but the limited accuracy of most bombs and artillery shells means that some of them will inevitably hit civilian infrastructure. Modern war tactics since the Second World War have always caused large numbers of civilian casualties. <u>Russia’s leaders <strong>may be guilty</strong> of <strong>war crimes</u></strong>, <u>but <strong>no more so</u></strong> <u>than U.S. leaders in <strong>past invasions</strong> of other countries</u>. <u>The Left has <strong>condemned</u></strong> the <u><strong>indiscriminate killing</u></strong> <u>of civilians in U.S. interventions and should have no hesitation in condemning similar Russian atrocities.</p><p></u>The U.S. media coverage tends to promote war fever. <u>The</u> <u><strong>war hype</u></strong>, including pressure for a “no fly zone,”  <u>is <strong>increasing</strong> the <strong>risk of a military confrontation</strong> between the <strong>US/NATO</strong> and <strong>Russia</u></strong> <u>that <strong>could turn into a nuclear war</u></strong>.  </p><p><u>While avoiding any alignment with the <strong>war propaganda</u></strong> <u>coming from U.S. sources</u>, <u>the Left must</u> also <u><strong>clearly and loudly</u></strong> <u>condemn Russia’s invasion</u>. <u>We should</u> <u>support a</u>n immediate <u><strong>cease fire</u></strong>, large-scale humanitarian <u><strong>aid</u></strong>, global <u>support for <strong>rebuilding Ukraine</u></strong>, <u>and</u> <u><strong>negotiations</u></strong> <u>to  achieve a compromise settlement of what is an underlying conflict between the United States and Russian  <strong>imperialist interests</u></strong>.</p><p><u>In a <strong>future socialist world</u></strong> <u>there should be <strong>no role</strong> for <strong>spheres of interest</strong> for large  countries</u>. However, in the capitalist world we live in,  a viable settlement of this conflict  would have to accept Russia’s right to have security guarantees in its neighborhood. A Ukraine  settlement that includes neutrality for Ukraine along with U.S. and Russian guarantees of  Ukraine’s independence and security could avert further bloodshed and bring some stability to  the region. </p><p><u>The Left should continue to point out <strong>the role of U.S. imperialism</u></strong> <u>in pushing a <strong>NATO  expansion policy</u></strong> <u>that was bound to lead to a <strong>costly</strong> and <strong>dangerous conflict</u></strong>, <u>while</u> also  <u>noting the responsibility of U.S. <strong>imperialism</u></strong> <u>for its role in creating the <strong>retrograde</strong> oligarchic</u> <u><strong>Putin  regime</u></strong> that severely oppresses its own working class while also imposing a deadly war on  working people in neighboring Ukraine. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Berlant 2006 (Lauren, Professor of Literature at the University of Chicago, “Cruel Optimism” in differences 17.3) fulltext: It is striking that these moments of optimism, which mark a possibility that the habits of a history might not be reproduced, release an overwhelmingly negative force: one predicts such effects in traumatic scenes, but it is not usual to think about an optimistic event as having the same potential consequences. The conventional fantasy that a revolu- tionary lifting of being might happen in proximity to a new object/scene would predict otherwise than that a person or a group might prefer, after all, to surf from episode to episode while leaning toward a cluster of vaguely phrased prospects. And yet: at a certain degree of abstraction both from trauma and optimism, the experience of self-dissolution, radi- cally reshaped consciousness, new sensoria, and narrative rupture can look similar; the emotional flooding in proximity to a new object can also produce a similar grasping toward stabilizing form, a reanchoring in the symptom’s predictability.¶ I have suggested that the particular ways in which identity and desire are articulated and lived sensually within capitalist culture produce such counterintuitive overlaps. But it would be reductive to read the preceding as a claim that anyone’s subjective transaction with the optimistic structure of value in capital produces the knotty entailments of cruel optimism as such. This essay focuses on artworks that explicitly remediate singularities into cases of nonuniversal but general abstraction, providing narrative scenarios of how people learn to identify, manage, and maintain the hazy luminosity of their attachment to being x and having x, given that their attachments were promises and not possessions after all. Geoff Ryman’s historical novel Was provides a different kind of limit case of cruel optimism. Linking agrarian labor, the culture industries, and therapy culture through four encounters with The Wizard of Oz, its pursuit of the affective continuity of trauma and optimism in self-unfold- ing excitement is neither comic, tragic, nor melodramatic, but metaformal: it absorbs all of these into a literary mode that validates fantasy (from absorption in pretty things to crazy delusion) as a life-affirming defense against the attritions of ordinary history.¶ Was constructs a post-traumatic drama that is held together by the governing consciousness of Bill Davison, a mental health worker, a white heterosexual Midwesterner whose only intimate personal brush with trauma has been ambivalence toward his fiancée but whose profes- sional capacity to enter into the impasse with his patients, and to let their impasses into him, makes him the novel’s optimistic remainder, a rich witness. The first traumatic story told is about the real Dorothy Gale, spelled Gael, partly, I imagine, to link up the girl who’s transported to Oz on a strong breeze to someone in prison, and also to link her to the Gaelic part of Scotland, home of the historical novel, the genre whose affective and political conventions shape explicitly Ryman’s quasi-documentary inclusion of experiences and memories whose traces are in archives, land- scapes, and bodies scattered throughout Kansas, Canada, and the United States. Like Cooter, this Dorothy Gael uses whatever fantasy she can scrap together to survive her scene of hopeless historical embeddedness. But her process is not to drift vaguely, but intensely, by way of multigeneric inven- tion: dreams, fantasies, private plays, psychotic projection, aggressive quiet, lying, being a loud bully and a frank truth teller. Dorothy’s creativity makes a wall of post-traumatic noise, as she has been abandoned by her parents, raped and shamed by her Uncle Henry Gulch, and shunned by other children for being big, fat, and ineloquent.¶ Part 2 of Was tells the story of Judy Garland as the child Frances Gumm. On the Wizard of Oz set she plays Dorothy Gale as desexualized sweetheart, her breasts tightly bound so that she can remain a child and therefore have her childhood stolen from her. It is not stolen through rape, but by parents bound up in their own fantasies of living through children in terms of money and fame (Gumm’s mother) or sex (Gumm’s father, whose object choice was young boys). The third story in Was is about a fictional gay man, a minor Hollywood actor named Jonathan, whose fame comes from being the monster in serial killer movies titled The Child Minder and who, as the book begins, is offered a part in a touring Wizard of Oz company while he is entering aids dementia. All of these stories are about the cruelty of optimism for people without control over the material condi- tions of their lives and whose relation to fantasy is all that protects them from being destroyed by other people and the nation. I cannot do justice here to the singularities of what optimism makes possible and impossible in this entire book but want to focus on a scene that makes the whole book possible. In this scene, Dorothy Gael encounters a substitute teacher, Frank Baum, in her rural Kansas elementary school.¶ “The children,” writes Ryman, “knew the Substitute was not a real teacher because he was so soft” (168). “Substitute” derives from the word “succeed,” and the sense of possibility around the changeover is deeply embedded in the word. A substitute brings optimism if he hasn’t yet been defeated—by life or by the students. He enters their lives as a new site for attachment, a dedramatized possibility. He is by definition a placeholder, a space of abeyance, an aleatory event. His coming is not personal—he is not there for anyone in particular. The amount of affect released around him says something about the intensity of the children’s available drive to be less dead, numb, neutralized, or crazy with habit; but it says nothing about what it would feel like to be in transit between the stale life and all its others, or whether that feeling would lead to something good.¶ Of course, often students are cruel to substitutes, out of excite- ment at the unpredictable and out of not having fear or transference to make them docile or even desiring of a recognition that has no time to be built. But this substitute is special to Dorothy: he is an actor, like her parents; he teaches them Turkish, and tells them about alternative histo- ries lived right now and in the past (171). Dorothy fantasizes about Frank Baum not in a narrative way, but with a mixture of sheer pleasure and defense: “Frank, Frank, as her uncle put his hands on her” (169); then she berates herself for her “own unworthiness” (169) because she knows “how beautiful you are and I know how ugly I am and how you could never have anything to do with me” (174). She says his name, Frank, over and over: it “seemed to sum up everything that was missing from her life” (169). Yet, face to face she cannot bear the feeling of relief from her life that the substitute’s being near provides for her. She alternately bristles and melts at his deference, his undemanding kindness. She mocks him and disrupts class to drown out her tenderness, but obeys him when he asks her to leave the room to just write something, anything.¶ What she comes back with is a lie, a wish. Her dog, Toto, had been murdered by her aunt and uncle, who hated him and who had no food to spare for him. But the story she hands in to the substitute is a substitute: it is about how happy she and Toto are. It includes sentences about how they play together and how exuberant he is, running around yelping “like he is saying hello to everything” (174). Imaginary Toto sits on her lap, licks her hand, has a cold nose, sleeps on her lap, and eats food that Auntie Em gives her to give him. The essay suggests a successful life, a life where love circulates and extends its sympathies, rather than the life she actually lives, where “[i]t was as if they had all stood back-to-back, shouting ‘love’ at the tops of their lungs, but in the wrong direction, away from each other” (221). It carries traces of all of the good experience Dorothy has ever had. The essay closes this way: “I did not call him Toto. That is the name my mother gave him when she was alive. It is the same as mine” (175).¶ Toto, Dodo, Dorothy: the teacher sees that the child has opened up something in herself, let down a defense, and he is moved by the brav- ery of her admission of identification and attachment. But he makes the mistake of being mimetic in response, acting soft toward her in a way he might imagine that she seeks to be: “I’m very glad,” he murmured, “that you have something to love as much as that little animal.” Dorothy goes ballistic at this response and insults Baum, but goes on to blurt out all of the truths of her life, in public, in front of the other students. She talks nonstop about being raped and hungry all the time, about the murder of her dog, and about her ineloquence: “I can’t say anything,” she closes (176). That phrase means she can’t do anything to change anything. From here she regresses to yelping and tries to dig a hole in the ground, to become the size she feels, and also to become, in a sense, an embodiment of the last thing she loved. After that, Dorothy goes crazy, lives in a fantasy world of her own, wandering homeless and free, especially, of the capacity to reflect on loss in the modalities of realism, tragedy, or melodrama. To protect her last iota of optimism, she goes crazy.¶ In Was, Baum goes on to write The Wizard of Oz as a gift of alternativity to the person who can’t say or do anything to change her life materially and who has taken in so much that one moment of relief from herself produces a permanent crack in the available genres of her survival. In “What Is a Minor Literature?” Deleuze and Guattari exhort people to become minor in exactly that way, to deterritorialize from the normal by digging a hole in sense, like a dog or a mole. Creating an impasse, a space of internal displacement, in this view, shatters the normal hierar- chies, clarities, tyrannies, and confusions of compliance with autonomous individuality. This strategy looks promising in the Ashbery poem. But in “Exchange Value,” a moment of relief produces a psychotic defense against the risk of loss in optimism. For Dorothy Gael, in Was, the optimism of attachment to another living being is itself the cruelest slap of all.¶ From this cluster we can understand a bit more of the magnetic attraction to cruel optimism, with its suppression of the risks of attach- ment. A change of heart, a sensorial shift, intersubjectivity, or transference with a promising object cannot generate on its own the better good life: nor can the collaboration of a couple, brothers, or pedagogy. The vague futurities of normative optimism produce small self-interruptions as the utopias of structural inequality. The texts we have looked at here stage moments when it could become otherwise, but shifts in affective atmo- sphere are not equal to changing the world. They are, here, only pieces of an argument about the centrality of optimistic fantasy to reproducing and surviving in zones of compromised ordinariness. And that is one way to take the measure of the impasse of living in the overwhelmingly present moment.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>This turns the case and takes out solvency—your frame produces the revolutionary hope that debate and society might change but ultimately reinstitutes the same in a way that solidifies and naturalizes the brutal logic of the economy centered on the exchange value.</h4><p>Berlant 2006</strong> (Lauren, Professor of Literature at the University of Chicago, “Cruel Optimism” in differences 17.3)</p><p>It is striking that these <u><strong><mark>moments of optimism, which mark a possibility that the habits of a history might not be reproduced, release </mark>an overwhelmingly negative <mark>force: one predicts such effects in traumatic scenes, but it is not usual to think about an optimistic event as having the same potential consequences</mark>. The <mark>conventional fantasy that a revolu- tionary lifting of being might happen in proximity to a new object/scene would predict otherwise</mark> than that a person or a group might prefer, after all, to surf from episode to episode while leaning toward a cluster of vaguely phrased prospects. And yet: <mark>at a certain degree of abstraction </mark>both from trauma and optimism, <mark>the experience of self-dissolution, radi- cally reshaped consciousness, new sensoria, and narrative rupture can look similar; the emotional flooding in proximity to a new object can also produce a similar grasping toward stabilizing form, a reanchoring in the symptom’s predictability</u></strong></mark>.¶ I have suggested that the particular ways in which <u><strong><mark>identity and desire are articulated and lived sensually within capitalist culture produce such counterintuitive overlaps</u></strong></mark>. But it would be reductive to read the preceding as a claim that anyone’s subjective transaction with the optimistic structure of value in capital produces the knotty entailments of cruel optimism as such. This essay focuses on artworks that explicitly remediate singularities into cases of nonuniversal but general abstraction, providing narrative scenarios of how people learn to identify, manage, and maintain the hazy luminosity of their attachment to being x and having x, given that their attachments were promises and not possessions after all. Geoff Ryman’s historical novel Was provides a different kind of limit case of cruel optimism. Linking agrarian labor, the culture industries, and therapy culture through four encounters with The Wizard of Oz, its pursuit of the affective continuity of trauma and optimism in self-unfold- ing excitement is neither comic, tragic, nor melodramatic, but metaformal: it absorbs all of these into a literary mode that validates fantasy (from absorption in pretty things to crazy delusion) as a life-affirming defense against the attritions of ordinary history.¶ Was constructs a post-traumatic drama that is held together by the governing consciousness of Bill Davison, a mental health worker, a white heterosexual Midwesterner whose only intimate personal brush with trauma has been ambivalence toward his fiancée but whose profes- sional capacity to enter into the impasse with his patients, and to let their impasses into him, makes him the novel’s optimistic remainder, a rich witness. The first traumatic story told is about the real Dorothy Gale, spelled Gael, partly, I imagine, to link up the girl who’s transported to Oz on a strong breeze to someone in prison, and also to link her to the Gaelic part of Scotland, home of the historical novel, the genre whose affective and political conventions shape explicitly Ryman’s quasi-documentary inclusion of experiences and memories whose traces are in archives, land- scapes, and bodies scattered throughout Kansas, Canada, and the United States. Like Cooter, this Dorothy Gael uses whatever fantasy she can scrap together to survive her scene of hopeless historical embeddedness. But her process is not to drift vaguely, but intensely, by way of multigeneric inven- tion: dreams, fantasies, private plays, psychotic projection, aggressive quiet, lying, being a loud bully and a frank truth teller. Dorothy’s creativity makes a wall of post-traumatic noise, as she has been abandoned by her parents, raped and shamed by her Uncle Henry Gulch, and shunned by other children for being big, fat, and ineloquent.¶ Part 2 of Was tells the story of Judy Garland as the child Frances Gumm. On the Wizard of Oz set she plays Dorothy Gale as desexualized sweetheart, her breasts tightly bound so that she can remain a child and therefore have her childhood stolen from her. It is not stolen through rape, but by parents bound up in their own fantasies of living through children in terms of money and fame (Gumm’s mother) or sex (Gumm’s father, whose object choice was young boys). The third story in Was is about a fictional gay man, a minor Hollywood actor named Jonathan, whose fame comes from being the monster in serial killer movies titled The Child Minder and who, as the book begins, is offered a part in a touring Wizard of Oz company while he is entering aids dementia. All of these stories are about the cruelty of optimism for people without control over the material condi- tions of their lives and whose relation to fantasy is all that protects them from being destroyed by other people and the nation. I cannot do justice here to the singularities of what optimism makes possible and impossible in this entire book but want to focus on a scene that makes the whole book possible. In this scene, Dorothy Gael encounters a substitute teacher, Frank Baum, in her rural Kansas elementary school.¶ “The children,” writes Ryman, “knew the Substitute was not a real teacher because he was so soft” (168). “Substitute” derives from the word “succeed,” and the sense of possibility around the changeover is deeply embedded in the word. A substitute brings optimism if he hasn’t yet been defeated—by life or by the students. He enters their lives as a new site for attachment, a dedramatized possibility. He is by definition a placeholder, a space of abeyance, an aleatory event. His coming is not personal—he is not there for anyone in particular. The amount of affect released around him says something about the intensity of the children’s available drive to be less dead, numb, neutralized, or crazy with habit; but it says nothing about what it would feel like to be in transit between the stale life and all its others, or whether that feeling would lead to something good.¶ Of course, often students are cruel to substitutes, out of excite- ment at the unpredictable and out of not having fear or transference to make them docile or even desiring of a recognition that has no time to be built. But this substitute is special to Dorothy: he is an actor, like her parents; he teaches them Turkish, and tells them about alternative histo- ries lived right now and in the past (171). Dorothy fantasizes about Frank Baum not in a narrative way, but with a mixture of sheer pleasure and defense: “Frank, Frank, as her uncle put his hands on her” (169); then she berates herself for her “own unworthiness” (169) because she knows “how beautiful you are and I know how ugly I am and how you could never have anything to do with me” (174). She says his name, Frank, over and over: it “seemed to sum up everything that was missing from her life” (169). Yet, face to face she cannot bear the feeling of relief from her life that the substitute’s being near provides for her. She alternately bristles and melts at his deference, his undemanding kindness. She mocks him and disrupts class to drown out her tenderness, but obeys him when he asks her to leave the room to just write something, anything.¶ What she comes back with is a lie, a wish. Her dog, Toto, had been murdered by her aunt and uncle, who hated him and who had no food to spare for him. But the story she hands in to the substitute is a substitute: it is about how happy she and Toto are. It includes sentences about how they play together and how exuberant he is, running around yelping “like he is saying hello to everything” (174). Imaginary Toto sits on her lap, licks her hand, has a cold nose, sleeps on her lap, and eats food that Auntie Em gives her to give him. The essay suggests a successful life, a life where love circulates and extends its sympathies, rather than the life she actually lives, where “[i]t was as if they had all stood back-to-back, shouting ‘love’ at the tops of their lungs, but in the wrong direction, away from each other” (221). It carries traces of all of the good experience Dorothy has ever had. The essay closes this way: “I did not call him Toto. That is the name my mother gave him when she was alive. It is the same as mine” (175).¶ Toto, Dodo, Dorothy: the teacher sees that the child has opened up something in herself, let down a defense, and he is moved by the brav- ery of her admission of identification and attachment. But he makes the mistake of being mimetic in response, acting soft toward her in a way he might imagine that she seeks to be: “I’m very glad,” he murmured, “that you have something to love as much as that little animal.” Dorothy goes ballistic at this response and insults Baum, but goes on to blurt out all of the truths of her life, in public, in front of the other students. She talks nonstop about being raped and hungry all the time, about the murder of her dog, and about her ineloquence: “I can’t say anything,” she closes (176). That phrase means she can’t do anything to change anything. From here she regresses to yelping and tries to dig a hole in the ground, to become the size she feels, and also to become, in a sense, an embodiment of the last thing she loved. After that, Dorothy goes crazy, lives in a fantasy world of her own, wandering homeless and free, especially, of the capacity to reflect on loss in the modalities of realism, tragedy, or melodrama. To protect her last iota of optimism, she goes crazy.¶ In Was, Baum goes on to write The Wizard of Oz as a gift of alternativity to the person who can’t say or do anything to change her life materially and who has taken in so much that one moment of relief from herself produces a permanent crack in the available genres of her survival. <u><strong>In “What Is a Minor Literature?” Deleuze and Guattari exhort people to become minor in exactly that way, to deterritorialize from the normal by digging a hole in sense, like a dog or a mole. Creating an impasse, a space of internal displacement, in this view, shatters the normal hierar- chies, clarities, tyrannies, and confusions of compliance with autonomous individuality</u></strong>. <u><strong>This strategy looks promising</u></strong> in the Ashbery poem. <u><strong>But <mark>in “Exchange Value,” a moment of relief produces a psychotic defense against the risk of loss in optimism</u></strong></mark>. For Dorothy Gael, in Was, <u><strong><mark>the optimism of attachment to another living being is itself the cruelest slap of all</u></strong></mark>.¶ From this cluster we can understand a bit more of the magnetic attraction to cruel optimism, with its suppression of the risks of attach- ment. <u><strong>A <mark>change of heart, a sensorial shift, intersubjectivity, or transference with a promising object cannot generate on its own the better good life</mark>: <mark>nor can</mark> the collaboration of a couple, brothers, or <mark>pedagogy</mark>. The vague futurities of normative optimism produce small self-interruptions as the utopias of structural inequality. The texts </u></strong>we have looked at here<u><strong> stage moments when it could become otherwise, but <mark>shifts in affective atmo- sphere are not equal to changing the world.</u></mark> They are, here, only pieces of an argument about the centrality of optimistic fantasy to reproducing and surviving in zones of compromised ordinariness. And that is one way to take the measure of the impasse of living in the overwhelmingly present moment.</p></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Fabian 19 (Christopher David; B.S. from the US Air Force Academy, M.S. from the University of North Dakota; January 2019; “A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy”; https://commons.und.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3456&context=theses; UND Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects; accessed 9/2/19) fulltext: Fundamentally, cooperation between the U.S. and China is based on maintaining the status quo of free access to space in accordance with existing international treaties and customary law. The primary laws governing the peaceful use of outer space, for which China and the U.S. are both signatories, include the Outer Space Treaty (OST), Rescue Agreement, Liability Convention, and Registration Convention.107 Article IV of the OST prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit and forbids the placement of any weapons on a celestial body. Although the OST requires the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, it does not prohibit conventional weapons in space or provide a definition for what could be considered a space weapon. The vagueness of the OST, particularly article IV, amounts to a crisis in space law and will be covered at length in later sections.108 Despite the previously mentioned ambiguity, this analysis will assume that cooperation entails both the adherence to existing legal regimes and the limitation of the capability to wage war in and from the space domain.109 This includes limiting space control and on-orbit force application capabilities. Alternatively, defection between the U.S. and China involves preventing free access to space through the manipulation of international law, the building and maintaining of space control capabilities, or the building and maintaining of on-orbit force application capabilities. These broad definitions are essential for two reasons: first, they acknowledge that the Sino-U.S. space policy game is nested inside a larger game of Sino-U.S. geostrategic relations, given that space power is a fundamental element of national power. Second, it accounts for the practical limitations in foundational, codified space law. China is highly incentivized by the prospects of mutual cooperation in space. Maintaining free access to space is analogous to free sea lines of communication, which are primarily guaranteed by U.S. military power. 110 This guarantee has allowed China to become the world’s largest importer and exporter, accumulating $4.3T of total trade in 2014 and catalyzing a massive economic resurgence. 111 Similarly, there is evidence that China aims to take advantage of free access to space to continue its national rejuvenation into post-industrial future. In 2013, General Secretary Xi Jinping announced the “China Dream” to rejuvenate China by building national pride, engineering an economic revolution, and rebuilding China’s military.112 Xi has linked a “space dream” as a means of fulfilling the “China Dream”.113 After the launch of the manned Shenzhou-10 mission in 2013 he stated, “The space dream is part of the dream to make China stronger. With the development of space programs, the Chinese people will take bigger strides to explore further into space,” and went on to compare the Chinese manned space program to the Long March.114 Similarly, Lt. Gen. Zhang Yulin stated, “The earth-moon space will be strategically important for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”115 The connection between China’s space program and national rejuvenation touted by CCP leaders is particularly strong in relation to the manned space program, which has ambitious development milestones planned until 2045.1 Space power and manned space accomplishments serve to benefit China in five ways. First, success in space forms a nationalist narrative and creates a positive focal point for national pride, counter to the negative images of the Tianamen Square massacre and China’s consistently poor human rights record. 117 Maintaining an independent and self-reliant space program helps the CCP craft a narrative based on technological development, social progress, and sustainable development. This lends legitimacy to CCP leadership of China and stokes nationalism. 118 Additionally, the dissemination and control of satellite communication gives the CCP a medium by which to propagate its own political interpretation of world events.119 Second, the economic benefit gained from China’s space program is essential to upholding the informal social contract between the Chinese people and the CCP, one that is based on continued economic growth and an increase in quality of life. China seeks to make its space program a driver of economic and technological advancement in a variety of ways. Primarily, they believe that spin-off technologies from the space program could have up to a 1:10 cost to benefit ratio.120 This creates a cycle where the Chinese space program generates technology, technology spurs economic development, and economic development supports the space program.121 The export of commercial space services will be a driver of economic development as a producer of both jobs and hard currency. 122 Additionally, the space industry spurs the development of a high technology industry by creating a market for high-skill labor and products. 123 The industrial and academic base required for the development of a strong space program is projected to have multi-order effects across other key industries and inspire young Chinese to pursue a career in the sciences.124 Next, the use of satellite application technologies is critical to China’s economic development.125 The use of geological, weather, and positional data is essential to developing China’s limited resources and guarding her fragile environment.126 A multitrillion-dollar infrastructure project called the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI) was announced by Xi in 2013. The purpose of this project is to harness latent Chinese industrial capacity to enhance strategic connection between China and the rest of the Eurasian landmass.127 China’s space development has been specifically linked to BRI by the China National Space Administration’s (CNSA) director of international cooperation, Jiang Hui. In a brief to the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), Hui highlighted a long term plan focused on building the Chinese space industry and leveraging space capabilities (particularly geospatial, communication, and navigation systems) to build a spatial information corridor.128 Third, China is using spacepower as a way to develop prestige and reap soft power gains. The success of the Chinese space program infers significant leadership connotation in the region and is intended to establish Beijing at the forefront of Asia’s technology and economic development. 129 Orbital accomplishments and space technology development is seen as a herald for advancement in agriculture, resource management, communications, and disaster management as well as a symbol of national scientific and economic infrastructures. Therefore, they play a deeply symbolic role in Asia, with significant prestige to be gained by accomplishing space “firsts” within the region. 130 Beijing has made an effort to translate the success of its space program for the purposes of seizing regional leadership, boosting soft power, and incorporating space into BRI. 131 It created the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) in 2008, which consists of China, Iran, Mongolia, Peru, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, and Thailand.132 China has donated ground systems, personnel training, and remote sensing data to member countries.133 Two other major Asian space cooperation organizations exist: the Japanese created and led Asian-Pacific Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) and the Indian created and led Center for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP).134 The purpose of these organizations is to reduce the costs of expensive space programs through resource pooling and increasing diplomatic ties between partner nations. Unfortunately, member nation overlap is mostly limited to smaller countries, and the presence of three competing organizations in the same region, each with similar missions led by separate space powers, may result in factionalism rather than cooperation.135 In addition to strengthening China economically, the export of commercial space services and the use of satellite application technologies may also have far reaching diplomatic benefits. China has served as an eager provider of space services and technologies to international markets, particularly for developing countries.136 Providing low-cost, partially subsidized space services to developing nations is a powerful diplomatic initiative relating to resource extraction and basing rights. 137 China provided Brazil a low-cost alternative to the LANDSAT remote sensing data via a cooperative venture called Chinese-Brazilian Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS). The cost was split 70/30 by China and Brazil.138 China manufactured, launched, and operated communications and imaging satellites for oil rich Venezuela.139 Similarly, China generously subsidized Nigeria’s first communications satellite for $550M as part of the BRI, with Nigerian oil rights serving as collateral.140 Bolivia enjoyed a similar arrangement, as 85% of its first communications satellite was subsidized by loans from China and built by the Great Wall Industry Corporation.141 Likewise, China designed, launched, and heavily subsidized a Pakistani geosynchronous communication satellite under BRI in exchange for Beidou ground stations in Karachi and Lahore. 142 This was followed by the development and launch of a remote sensing satellite in 2018.143 These acts of space diplomacy are consistent with China’s larger foreign policy efforts to open international markets. 144<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Xi deploys space cooperation to recuperate legitimacy</h4><p><strong>Fabian 19</strong> (Christopher David; B.S. from the US Air Force Academy, M.S. from the University of North Dakota; January 2019; “A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy”; https://commons.und.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3456&context=theses; UND Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects; accessed 9/2/19)</p><p>Fundamentally, <u><strong><mark>cooperation between the U.S. and China</strong> is based on</mark> maintaining</u> the status quo of <u><mark>free access to space</mark> in accordance <mark>with</u></mark> existing international <u>treaties and customary law. The primary laws governing</u> the peaceful use of <u>outer space</u>, for which China and the U.S. are both signatories, <u>include the</u> Outer Space Treaty (<u>OST</u>), <u>Rescue Agreement, Liability Convention, and Registration Convention</u>.107 Article IV of the OST prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit and forbids the placement of any weapons on a celestial body. Although the OST requires the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, it does not prohibit conventional weapons in space or provide a definition for what could be considered a space weapon. The vagueness of the OST, particularly article IV, amounts to a crisis in space law and will be covered at length in later sections.108 Despite the previously mentioned ambiguity, this analysis will assume that <u>cooperation entails both</u> the <u>adherence to <strong><mark>existing legal regimes</strong> and</u></mark> the <u><mark>limitation of</mark> the <strong>capability to wage <mark>war</strong></mark> in and from</u> the <u>space</u> domain.109 This includes limiting space control and on-orbit force application capabilities. Alternatively, defection between the U.S. and China involves preventing free access to space through the manipulation of international law, the building and maintaining of space control capabilities, or the building and maintaining of on-orbit force application capabilities. These broad definitions are essential for two reasons: first, they acknowledge that the <u>Sino-U.S. space policy</u> game <u>is nested inside a larger game of Sino-U.S. geostrategic relations, given that space</u> power <u>is a <strong>fundamental element of national power</u></strong>. Second, it accounts for the practical limitations in foundational, codified space law. <u><mark>China is <strong>highly incentivized</strong> by</u></mark> the prospects of <u><strong>mutual <mark>cooperation</strong> in space</u></mark>. Maintaining free access to space is analogous to free sea lines of communication, which are primarily guaranteed by U.S. military power. 110 This guarantee has allowed China to become the world’s largest importer and exporter, accumulating $4.3T of total trade in 2014 and catalyzing a massive economic resurgence. 111 Similarly, there is evidence that <u>China aims to take advantage of free access to space to continue</u> its <u><strong>national rejuvenation</u></strong> into post-industrial future. In 2013, General Secretary <u><strong><mark>Xi</u></strong></mark> Jinping <u><mark>announced the “<strong>China Dream</strong></mark>” to rejuvenate China <mark>by building <strong>national pride</u></strong></mark>, engineering <u>an economic revolution, and rebuilding China’s military</u>.112 <u><mark>Xi</mark> has <mark>linked</mark> a “<strong><mark>space</mark> dream</strong>” <mark>as a means</mark> of fulfilling the “China Dream”.</u>113 After the launch of the manned Shenzhou-10 mission in 2013 he stated, “<u>The space dream is</u> part of <u>the dream <mark>to <strong>make China stronger</strong>.</mark> With</u> the development of <u>space programs, the Chinese</u> people <u>will take</u> bigger <u>strides to explore further into space</u>,” and went on to compare the Chinese manned space program to the Long March.114 Similarly, Lt. Gen. Zhang Yulin stated, “The earth-moon <u><mark>space will be</mark> strategically important for <mark>the</u></mark> great <u><strong><mark>rejuvenation of the</mark> Chinese <mark>nation</u></strong></mark>.”115 The connection between China’s space program and national rejuvenation touted by CCP leaders is particularly strong in relation to the manned space program, which has ambitious development milestones planned until 2045.1 Space power and manned space accomplishments serve to benefit China in five ways. First, <u>success in <mark>space forms a <strong>nationalist narrative </strong>and creates a</mark> <strong>positive <mark>focal point </strong>for <strong>national pride</strong></mark>, counter to the negative images o</u>f the <u>Tianamen</u> Square massacre <u>and China’s</u> consistently <u>poor human rights record</u>. 117 <u>Maintaining a</u>n independent and self-reliant <u><mark>space</mark> program <mark>helps</mark> the CCP <strong><mark>craft a narrative</strong> based on technological</mark> development, social progress, and <mark>sustainable development. This <strong>lends legitimacy</mark> to CCP leadership</u></strong> of China <u><mark>and <strong>stokes nationalism</u></strong></mark>. 118 Additionally, the dissemination and <u>control of <strong>satellite communication</strong> gives the CCP a medium</u> by which <u>to propagate its</u> own political <u>interpretation of world events</u>.119 Second, <u><mark>the <strong>economic benefit</u></strong></mark> gained <u>from China’s space program <mark>is essential to</mark> upholding <mark>the</u></mark> informal <u><strong><mark>social contract</strong></mark> between the Chinese</u> people <u>and the CCP</u>, one that is <u>based on continued economic growth and</u> an increase in <u>quality of life. China seeks to make</u> its <u>space</u> program<u> a <strong>driver of economic and technological advancement</u></strong> in a variety of ways. Primarily, they believe that <u><mark>spin-off technologies</u></mark> from the space program <u>could <mark>have</u></mark> up to <u><mark>a <strong>1:10 cost</mark> to <mark>benefit ratio</u></strong></mark>.120 This creates a cycle where <u>the</u> Chinese <u>space program generates technology, technology spurs economic development, and economic development supports the space program</u>.121 The export of commercial space services will be a driver of economic development as a producer of both jobs and hard currency. 122 Additionally, <u>the space industry spurs</u> the development of <u>a <strong>high technology industry</strong> by creating a market for high-skill labor</u> and products. 123 <u>The industrial and academic base required for</u> the development of <u>a</u> strong <u><mark>space</mark> program is projected to <mark>have <strong>multi-order effects</strong> across</u></mark> other <u><strong><mark>key industries</strong></mark> and inspire young Chinese</u> to pursue a career in the sciences.124 Next, <u>the use of <strong><mark>satellite</u></strong></mark> application <u><strong>technologies</strong> is critical to China’s economic development</u>.125 The use of <u><mark>geological, weather, and positional data is essential</mark> to developing China’s</u> limited <u>resources and guarding her fragile environment.</u>126 A multitrillion-dollar infrastructure project called the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI) was announced by Xi in 2013. The purpose of this project is to harness latent Chinese industrial capacity to enhance strategic connection between China and the rest of the Eurasian landmass.127 <u>China’s space development has been </u>specifically <u>linked to BRI </u>by the China National Space Administration’s (CNSA) director of international cooperation, Jiang Hui. In a brief to the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), Hui highlighted a long term plan focused on building the Chinese space industry and leveraging space capabilities (particularly geospatial, communication, and navigation systems) to build a spatial information corridor.128 Third, <u><mark>China is using space</mark>power</u> as a way <u><mark>to develop <strong>prestige</strong> and</mark> reap <strong><mark>soft power</strong></mark> gains. The success of the Chinese space program</u> infers significant leadership connotation in the region and <u>is intended to establish Beijing at the <strong>forefront of Asia’s technology</u></strong> and economic <u><strong>development</u></strong>. 129 Orbital accomplishments and <u><mark>space</mark> technology</u> development <u>is</u> seen as <u>a <strong>herald</strong> for</u> advancement in <u>agriculture, resource management, communications, and disaster management as well as a symbol of national</u> scientific and economic <u>infrastructures</u>. Therefore, <u>they <mark>play a <strong>deeply symbolic role</strong></mark> in Asia, <mark>with <strong>significant prestige</u></strong></mark> to be gained <u>by accomplishing space “firsts” within the region</u>. 130 <u>Beijing</u> has <u>made an effort to translate</u> the success of <u>its space program for the purposes of seizing <strong>regional leadership</strong>, boosting <strong>soft power</strong>, and incorporating space into BRI</u>. 131 <u>It created the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) </u>in 2008, which consists of China, Iran, Mongolia, Peru, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, and Thailand.132 China has donated ground systems, personnel training, and remote sensing data to member countries.133 Two other major Asian space cooperation organizations exist: the Japanese created and led Asian-Pacific Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) and the Indian created and led Center for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP).134 The purpose of these organizations is to reduce the costs of expensive space programs through resource pooling and increasing diplomatic ties between partner nations. Unfortunately, member nation overlap is mostly limited to smaller countries, and the presence of three competing organizations in the same region, each with similar missions led by separate space powers, may result in factionalism rather than cooperation.135 In addition to strengthening China economically, <u><mark>the export of</u></mark> commercial <u><mark>space services</mark> and</u> the use of <u>satellite</u> application <u>technologies</u> <u>may</u> also <u>have <strong>far reaching diplomatic benefits</strong>. China</u> has <u>served as an eager provider of space services</u> and technologies <u>to <strong>international markets</u></strong>, particularly <u>for developing countries</u>.136 <u>Providing</u> low-cost, <u>partially subsidized space services to developing nations <mark>is a <strong>powerful diplomatic initiative</u></strong></mark> relating to resource extraction and basing rights. 137 China provided Brazil a low-cost alternative to the LANDSAT remote sensing data via a cooperative venture called Chinese-Brazilian Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS). The cost was split 70/30 by China and Brazil.138 China manufactured, launched, and operated communications and imaging satellites for oil rich Venezuela.139 Similarly, China generously subsidized Nigeria’s first communications satellite for $550M as part of the BRI, with Nigerian oil rights serving as collateral.140 Bolivia enjoyed a similar arrangement, as 85% of its first communications satellite was subsidized by loans from China and built by the Great Wall Industry Corporation.141 Likewise, China designed, launched, and heavily subsidized a Pakistani geosynchronous communication satellite under BRI in exchange for Beidou ground stations in Karachi and Lahore. 142 This was followed by the development and launch of a remote sensing satellite in 2018.143 <u>These acts of space diplomacy are consistent with China’s</u> larger <u>foreign policy efforts to open international markets</u>. 144</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Margulies and Metcalf 11 [*Joseph Margulies is a Clinical Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. He was counsel of record for the petitioners in Rasul v. Bush and Munaf v. Geren. He now is counsel of record for Abu Zubaydah, for whose torture (termed harsh interrogation by some) Bush Administration officials John Yoo and Jay Bybee wrote authorizing legal opinions. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at workshops at the American Bar Foundation and the 2010 Law and Society Association Conference in Chicago. Margulies expresses his thanks in particular to Sid Tarrow, Aziz Huq, Baher Azmy, Hadi Nicholas Deeb, Beth Mertz, Bonnie Honig, and Vicki Jackson. **Hope Metcalf is a Lecturer, Yale Law School. Metcalf is co-counsel for the plaintiffs/petitioners in Padilla v. Rumsfeld, Padilla v. Yoo, Jeppesen v. Mohammed, and Maqaleh v. Obama. She has written numerous amicus briefs in support of petitioners in suits against the government arising out of counterterrorism policies, including in Munaf v. Geren and Boumediene v. Bush. Metcalf expresses her thanks to Muneer Ahmad, Stella Burch Elias, Margot Mendelson, Jean Koh Peters, and Judith Resnik for their feedback, as well as to co-teachers Jonathan Freiman, Ramzi Kassem, Harold Hongju Koh and Michael Wishnie, whose dedication to clients, students and justice continues to inspire.] “Terrorizing Academia” http://www.swlaw.edu/pdfs/jle/jle603jmarguilies.pdf fulltext: But by framing the Bush Administration’s response as the latest in a series of regrettable but temporary deviations from a hypothesized liberal norm, the legal academy ignored the more persistent, and decidedly illiberal, authoritarian tendency in American thought to demonize communal “others” during moments of perceived threat. Viewed in this light, what the dominant narrative identified as a brief departure caused by a military crisis is more accurately seen as part of a recurring process of intense stigmatization tied to periods of social upheaval, of which war and its accompanying repressions are simply representative (and particularly acute) illustrations. It is worth recalling, for instance, that the heyday of the Ku Klux Klan in this country, when the organization could claim upwards of 3 million members, was the early-1920s, and that the period of greatest Klan expansion began in the summer of 1920, almost immediately after the nation had “recovered” from the Red Scare of 1919–20.7 Klan activity during this period, unlike its earlier and later iterations, focused mainly on the scourge of the immigrant Jew and Catholic, and flowed effortlessly from the anti-alien, anti-radical hysteria of the Red Scare. Yet this period is almost entirely unaccounted for in the dominant post-9/11 narrative of deviation and redemption, which in most versions glides seamlessly from the madness of the Red Scare to the internment of the Japanese during World War II.8 And because we were studying the elephant with the wrong end of the telescope, we came to a flawed understanding of the beast. In Part IV, we argue that the interventionists and unilateralists came to an incomplete understanding by focusing almost exclusively on what Stuart Scheingold called “the myth of rights”—the belief that if we can identify, elaborate, and secure judicial recognition of the legal “right,” political structures and policies will adapt their behavior to the requirements of the law and change will follow more or less automatically.9 Scholars struggled to define the relationship between law and security primarily through exploration of structural10 and procedural questions, and, to a lesser extent, to substantive rights. And they examined the almost limitless number of subsidiary questions clustered within these issues. Questions about the right to habeas review, for instance, generated a great deal of scholarship about the handful of World War II-era cases that the Bush Administration relied upon, including most prominently Johnson v. Eisentrager and Ex Parte Quirin. 11 Regardless of political viewpoint, a common notion among most unilateralist and interventionist scholars was that when law legitimized or delegitimized a particular policy, this would have a direct and observable effect on actual behavior. The premise of this scholarship, in other words, was that policies “struck down” by the courts, or credibly condemned as lawless by the academy, would inevitably be changed—and that this should be the focus of reform efforts. Even when disagreement existed about the substance of rights or even which branch should decide their parameters, it reflected shared acceptance of the primacy of law, often to the exclusion of underlying social or political dynamics. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, for instance, may have thought, unlike the great majority of their colleagues, that the torture memo was “standard fare.”12 But their position nonetheless accepted the notion that if the prisoners had a legal right to be treated otherwise, then the torture memo authorized illegal behavior and must be given no effect.13 Recent developments, however, cast doubt on two grounding ideas of interventionist and unilateralist scholarship—viz., that post-9/11 policies were best explained as responses to a national crisis (and therefore limited in time and scope), and that the problem was essentially legal (and therefore responsive to condemnation by the judiciary and legal academy). One might have reasonably predicted that in the wake of a string of Supreme Court decisions limiting executive power, apparently widespread and bipartisan support for the closure of Guantánamo during the 2008 presidential campaign, and the election of President Barack Obama, which itself heralded a series of executive orders that attempted to dismantle many Bush-era policies, the nation would be “returning” to a period of respect for individual rights and the rule of law. Yet the period following Obama’s election has been marked by an increasingly retributive and venomous narrative surrounding Islam and national security. Precisely when the dominant narrative would have predicted change and redemption, we have seen retreat and retrenchment. This conundrum is not adequately addressed by dominant strands of post-9/11 legal scholarship. In retrospect, it is surprising that much post-9/11 scholarship appears to have set aside critical lessons from previous decades as to the relationship among law, society and politics.14 Many scholars have long argued in other contexts that rights—or at least the experience of rights—are subject to political and social constraints, particularly for groups subject to historic marginalization. Rather than self-executing, rights are better viewed as contingent political resources, capable of mobilizing public sentiment and generating social expectations.15 From that view, a victory in Rasul or Boumediene no more guaranteed that prisoners at Guantánamo would enjoy the right to habeas corpus than a victory in Brown v. Board16 guaranteed that schools in the South would be desegregated.17 Rasul and Boumediene, therefore, should be seen as part (and probably only a small part) of a varied and complex collection of events, including the fiasco in Iraq, the scandal at the Abu Ghraib prison, and the use of warrantless wiretaps, as well as seemingly unrelated episodes like the official response to Hurricane Katrina. These and other events during the Bush years merged to give rise to a powerful social narrative critiquing an administration committed to lawlessness, content with incompetence, and engaged in behavior that was contrary to perceived “American values.”18 Yet the very success of this narrative, culminating in the election of Barack Obama in 2008, produced quiescence on the Left, even as it stimulated massive opposition on the Right. The result has been the emergence of a counter-narrative about national security that has produced a vigorous social backlash such that most of the Bush-era policies will continue largely unchanged, at least for the foreseeable future.19 Just as we see a widening gap between judicial recognition of rights in the abstract and the observation of those rights as a matter of fact, there appears to be an emerging dominance of proceduralist approaches, which take as a given that rights dissolve under political pressure, and, thus, are best protected by basic procedural measures. But that stance falls short in its seeming readiness to trade away rights in the face of political tension. First, it accepts the tropes du jour surrounding radical Islam—namely, that it is a unique, and uniquely apocalyptic, threat to U.S. security. In this, proceduralists do not pay adequate heed to the lessons of American history and sociology. And second, it endorses too easily the idea that procedural and structural protections will protect against substantive injustice in the face of popular and/or political demands for an outcome-determinative system that cannot tolerate acquittals. Procedures only provide protection, however, if there is sufficient political support for the underlying right. Since the premise of the proceduralist scholarship is that such support does not exist, it is folly to expect the political branches to create meaningful and robust protections. In short, a witch hunt does not become less a mockery of justice when the accused is given the right to confront witnesses. And a separate system (especially when designed for demonized “others,” such as Muslims) cannot, by definition, be equal.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>2. Policymaking – discursive analysis is a pre-requisite to policy implementation – their reliance on restrictions miss the fact that we must question the structures and <u>not</u> the law – prefer specific evidence</h4><p><strong>Margulies and Metcalf 11</strong> [*Joseph Margulies is a Clinical Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. He was counsel of record for the petitioners in Rasul v. Bush and Munaf v. Geren. He now is counsel of record for Abu Zubaydah, for whose torture (termed harsh interrogation by some) Bush Administration officials John Yoo and Jay Bybee wrote authorizing legal opinions. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at workshops at the American Bar Foundation and the 2010 Law and Society Association Conference in Chicago. Margulies expresses his thanks in particular to Sid Tarrow, Aziz Huq, Baher Azmy, Hadi Nicholas Deeb, Beth Mertz, Bonnie Honig, and Vicki Jackson. **Hope Metcalf is a Lecturer, Yale Law School. Metcalf is co-counsel for the plaintiffs/petitioners in Padilla v. Rumsfeld, Padilla v. Yoo, Jeppesen v. Mohammed, and Maqaleh v. Obama. She has written numerous amicus briefs in support of petitioners in suits against the government arising out of counterterrorism policies, including in Munaf v. Geren and Boumediene v. Bush. Metcalf expresses her thanks to Muneer Ahmad, Stella Burch Elias, Margot Mendelson, Jean Koh Peters, and Judith Resnik for their feedback, as well as to co-teachers Jonathan Freiman, Ramzi Kassem, Harold Hongju Koh and Michael Wishnie, whose dedication to clients, students and justice continues to inspire.] “Terrorizing Academia” http://www.swlaw.edu/pdfs/jle/jle603jmarguilies.pdf</p><p>But <u>by <mark>framing the </mark>Bush Administration’s <mark>response as the latest in a series of </mark>regrettable but <mark>temporary deviations from a </mark>hypothesized <mark>liberal norm, </mark>the legal academy<mark> ignored the more persistent</mark>, and decidedly illiberal, authoritarian <mark>tendency </mark>in American thought <mark>to demonize </mark>communal “<mark>others</mark>” during moments of perceived threat</u>. Viewed <u>in this light, what the dominant narrative identified as a brief departure caused by a military crisis is more accurately seen as part of a recurring process of intense stigmatization</u> tied to periods of social upheaval, <u>of which war and its accompanying repressions are simply</u> representative (and particularly acute) <u>illustrations. <mark>It is worth recalling</u></mark>, for instance, <u><mark>that the heyday of the Ku Klux Klan </mark>in this country</u>, when the organization could claim upwards of 3 million members, <u><mark>was the early-1920s</mark>, and that the period of greatest Klan expansion began in the summer of 1920</u>, almost immediately <u>after the nation had “recovered” from the Red Scare of 1919–20.</u>7 <u>Klan activity during this period</u>, unlike its earlier and later iterations, <u>focused</u> mainly <u>on the scourge of the immigrant Jew and Catholic, and flowed effortlessly from the anti-alien, anti-radical hysteria of the Red Scare</u>. Yet <u><strong><mark>this </mark>period <mark>is </mark>almost <mark>entirely unaccounted for in the dominant post-9/11 narrative of deviation and redemption</strong></mark>, which in most versions glides seamlessly from the madness of the Red Scare to the internment of the Japanese during World War II.</u>8 <u><strong>And <mark>because we were studying the elephant with the wrong end of the telescope, we came to a flawed understanding </mark>of the beast</u></strong>. In Part IV, we argue that the <u><mark>interventionists</u> </mark>and unilateralists <u><mark>came to an incomplete understanding by focusing </mark>almost <mark>exclusively on</u> </mark>what Stuart Scheingold called “the myth of rights”—<u><mark>the belief that if we </mark>can identify, elaborate, and <mark>secure </mark>judicial recognition of <mark>the legal “right,” political structures and policies will adapt </mark>their behavior to the requirements of the law <mark>and change will follow more or less automatically</u></mark>.9 Scholars struggled to define the relationship between law and security primarily through exploration of structural10 and procedural questions, and, to a lesser extent, to substantive rights. And they examined the almost limitless number of subsidiary questions clustered within these issues. Questions about the right to habeas review, for instance, generated a great deal of scholarship about the handful of World War II-era cases that the Bush Administration relied upon, including most prominently Johnson v. Eisentrager and Ex Parte Quirin. 11 <u>Regardless of political viewpoint, a common notion</u> among most unilateralist and interventionist scholars <u>was that when law legitimized or delegitimized a particular policy, this would have a direct and observable effect on actual behavior. The premise</u> of this scholarship, in other words, <u>was that policies “struck down” by the courts, or</u> credibly <u>condemned as lawless by the academy, would inevitably be changed—and that this should be the focus of reform efforts</u>. Even when disagreement existed about the substance of rights or even which branch should decide their parameters,<u> <strong><mark>it reflected </mark>shared <mark>acceptance of </mark>the primacy of <mark>law</u></strong></mark>, often <u><strong><mark>to the exclusion of underlying social or political dynamics</u></strong></mark>. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, for instance, may have thought, unlike the great majority of their colleagues, that the torture memo was “standard fare.”12 But their position nonetheless accepted the notion that if the prisoners had a legal right to be treated otherwise, then the torture memo authorized illegal behavior and must be given no effect.13 <u><strong>Recent developments, however, cast doubt on two grounding ideas</u></strong> of interventionist and unilateralist scholarship—viz., <u>that post-9/11 policies were best explained as responses to a national crisis (and therefore limited in time and scope), and that the problem was essentially legal (and therefore responsive to condemnation by the judiciary and legal academy). <strong>One might have</u></strong> reasonably <u><strong>predicted that in the wake of a string of Supreme Court decisions limiting executive power</u></strong>, apparently widespread and bipartisan support for the closure of Guantánamo during the 2008 presidential campaign, and the election of President Barack Obama, which itself heralded a series of executive orders that attempted to dismantle many Bush-era policies, <u><strong>the nation would be “returning” to a period of respect for individual rights and the rule of law. Yet <mark>the period following Obama’s election has been marked by an increasingly retributive and venomous narrative surrounding </mark>Islam and national <mark>security</u></strong></mark>. Precisely <u><strong>when the dominant narrative would have predicted change and redemption, we have seen retreat and retrenchment</u></strong>. <u>This conundrum is not adequately addressed by dominant strands of post-9/11 legal scholarship</u>. In retrospect, <u><strong>it is surprising that much post-9/11 scholarship appears to have set aside critical lessons from previous decades as to the relationship among law, society and politics</u></strong>.14 <u>Many scholars</u> have long <u>argue</u>d <u>in other contexts that rights</u>—or at least the experience of rights—<u>are subject to political and social constraints, particularly for groups subject to historic marginalization</u>. Rather than self-executing, <u>rights are better viewed as contingent political resources, capable of mobilizing public sentiment and generating social expectations</u>.15 <u><strong>From that view<mark>, a victory in Rasul </mark>or Boumediene <mark>no more guaranteed that prisoners at Guantánamo would enjoy the right to habeas corpus than a victory in Brown v. Board</u></strong></mark>16 <u><strong><mark>guaranteed </mark>that</u></strong> schools in <u><strong><mark>the South would be desegregated</u></strong></mark>.17 Rasul and Boumediene, therefore, should be seen as part (and probably only a small part) of a varied and complex collection of events, including the fiasco in Iraq, the scandal at the Abu Ghraib prison, and the use of warrantless wiretaps, as well as seemingly unrelated episodes like the official response to Hurricane Katrina. These and other events during the Bush years merged to give rise to a powerful social narrative critiquing an administration committed to lawlessness, content with incompetence, and engaged in behavior that was contrary to perceived “American values.”18 Yet the very success of this narrative, culminating in the election of Barack Obama in 2008, produced quiescence on the Left, even as it stimulated massive opposition on the Right. The result has been the emergence of a counter-narrative about national security that has produced a vigorous social backlash such that most of the Bush-era policies will continue largely unchanged, at least for the foreseeable future.19 <u>Just as we see a widening gap between judicial recognition of rights in the abstract and the observation of those rights as a matter of fact, there appears to be an emerging dominance of proceduralist approaches, which take as a given that rights dissolve under political pressure, and, thus, are best protected by basic procedural measures</u>. But <u><mark>that stance falls short</mark> in its seeming readiness to trade away rights in the face of political tension. <strong><mark>First</strong>, it accepts the tropes</u> </mark>du jour <u><mark>surrounding radical </mark>Islam</u>—namely, <u>that it is a</u> unique, and uniquely apocalyptic, <u><mark>threat </mark>to</u> U.S. <u>security</u>. In this, <u>proceduralists do not pay adequate heed to the lessons of American history and sociology</u>. And <u><strong><mark>second</strong>, it endorses too easily the idea that </mark>procedural and <mark>structural protections will protect against </mark>substantive <mark>injustice </mark>in the face of popular and/or political demands for an outcome-determinative system that cannot tolerate acquittals. <mark>Procedures only provide protection</mark>, however, <mark>if there is </mark>sufficient <mark>political support </mark>for the underlying right. Since the premise</u> of the proceduralist scholarship <u>is that such support does not exist, it is folly to expect the political branches to create meaningful and robust protections. <strong>In short, <mark>a witch hunt does not become less a mockery of justice when the accused is given the right to confront witnesses. And a separate system </mark>(especially when designed for demonized “others,” such as Muslims) <mark>cannot, by definition, be equal</mark>.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Mooney and Dennis 18 Chris Mooney and Brady Dennis, Reporters for the Washington Post, “The world has barely 10 years to get climate change under control, U.N. scientists say.” The Washington Post. October 7, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/10/08/world-has-only-years-get-climate-change-under-control-un-scientists-say/?utm_term=.25de27d0202d fulltext: --Also an answer to CCS! The world stands on the brink of failure when it comes to holding global warming to moderate levels, and nations will need to take “unprecedented” actions to cut their carbon emissions over the next decade, according to a landmark report by the top scientific body studying climate change. With global emissions showing few signs of slowing and the United States — the world’s second-largest emitter of carbon dioxide — rolling back a suite of Obama-era climate measures, the prospects for meeting the most ambitious goals of the 2015 Paris agreement look increasingly slim. To avoid racing past warming of 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit) over preindustrial levels would require a “rapid and far-reaching” transformation of human civilization at a magnitude that has never happened before, the group found. “There is no documented historic precedent” for the sweeping change to energy, transportation and other systems required to reach 1.5 degrees Celsius, the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) wrote in a report requested as part of the 2015 Paris climate agreement. At the same time, however, the report is being received with hope in some quarters because it affirms that 1.5 degrees Celsius is still possible — if emissions stopped today, for instance, the planet would not reach that temperature. It is also likely to galvanize even stronger climate action by focusing on 1.5 degrees Celsius, rather than 2 degrees, as a target that the world cannot afford to miss. “Frankly, we’ve delivered a message to the governments,” said Jim Skea, a co-chair of the IPCC panel and professor at Imperial College London, at a press event following the document’s release. “It’s now their responsibility … to decide whether they can act on it.” He added, “What we’ve done is said what the world needs to do.” The transformation described in the document is breathtaking, and the speed of change required raises inevitable questions about its feasibility. Most strikingly, the document says the world’s annual carbon dioxide emissions, which amount to more than 40 billion tons per year, would have to be on an extremely steep downward path by 2030 to either hold the world entirely below 1.5 degrees Celsius, or allow only a brief “overshoot” in temperatures. Overall reductions in emissions in the next decade would probably need to be more than 1 billion tons per year, larger than the current emissions of all but a few of the very largest emitting countries. By 2050, the report calls for a total or near-total phaseout of the burning of coal. 'Understanding the Arctic is really a key to understanding the whole global system' Mark Furze, a geoscientist and professor at MacEwan University, discusses the importance of understanding how climate change is impacting the Arctic. (Alice Li/TWP) “It’s like a deafening, piercing smoke alarm going off in the kitchen. We have to put out the fire,” said Erik Solheim, executive director of the U.N. Environment Program. He added that the need to either stop emissions entirely by 2050 or find some way to remove as much carbon dioxide from the air as humans put there “means net zero must be the new global mantra.” The radical transformation also would mean that, in a world projected to have more than 2 billion additional people by 2050, large swaths of land currently used to produce food would instead have to be converted to growing trees that store carbon and crops designated for energy use. The latter would be used as part of a currently nonexistent program to get power from trees or plants and then bury the resulting carbon dioxide emissions in the ground, leading to a net subtraction of the gas from the air — bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, or BECCS. “Such large transitions pose profound challenges for sustainable management of the various demands on land for human settlements, food, livestock feed, fibre, bioenergy, carbon storage, biodiversity and other ecosystem services,” the report states. The document in question was produced relatively rapidly for the cautious and deliberative IPCC, representing the work of nearly 100 scientists. It went through an elaborate peer-review process involving tens of thousands of comments. The final 34-page “summary for policymakers” was agreed to in a marathon session by scientists and government officials in Incheon, South Korea, over the past week. (none) The report says the world will need to develop large-scale “negative emissions” programs to remove significant volumes of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Although the basic technologies exist, they have not caught on widely, and scientists have strongly questioned whether such a program can be scaled up in the brief period available. The bottom line, Sunday’s report found, is that the world is woefully off target. Current promises made by countries as part of the Paris climate agreement would lead to about 3 degrees Celsius (5.4 degrees Fahrenheit) of warming by the end of the century, and the Trump administration recently released an analysis assuming about 4 degrees Celsius (7.2 degrees Fahrenheit) by 2100 if the world takes no action. The IPCC is considered the definitive source on the state of climate science, but it also tends to be conservative in its conclusions. That’s because it is driven by a consensus-finding process, and its results are the product of not only science, but negotiation with governments over its precise language. In Sunday’s report, the body detailed the magnitude and unprecedented nature of the changes that would be required to hold warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, but it held back from taking a specific stand on the feasibility of meeting such an ambitious goal. (An early draft had cited a “very high risk” of warming exceeding 1.5 degrees Celsius; that language is now gone, even if the basic message is still easily inferred.) “If you’re expecting IPCC to jump up and down and wave red flags, you’re going to be disappointed,” said Phil Duffy, president of the Woods Hole Research Center. “They’re going to do what they always do, which is to release very cautious reports in extremely dispassionate language.” Some researchers, including Duffy, are skeptical of the scenarios that the IPCC presents that hold warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, particularly the reliance on negative-emissions technologies to keep the window open. “Even if it is technically possible, without aligning the technical, political and social aspects of feasibility, it is not going to happen,” added Glen Peters, research director of the Center for International Climate Research in Oslo. “To limit warming below 1.5 C, or 2 C for that matter, requires all countries and all sectors to act.” Underscoring the difficulty of interpreting what’s possible, the IPCC gave two separate numbers in the report for Earth’s remaining “carbon budget,” or how much carbon dioxide humans can emit and still have a reasonable chance of remaining below 1.5 degrees Celsius. The upshot is that humans are allowed either 10 or 14 years of current emissions, and no more, for a two-thirds or better chance of avoiding 1.5 degrees Celsius. The already limited budget would shrink further if other greenhouse gases, such as methane, aren’t controlled or if and when Arctic permafrost becomes a major source of new emissions. But either way — in a move that may be contested — researchers have somewhat increased the carbon budget in comparison with where the IPCC set it in 2013, giving another reason for hope. The new approach buys some time and “resets the clock for 1.5 degrees Celsius to ‘five minutes to midnight,’ ” said Oliver Geden, head of the research division of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. The report is sure to be the central focus of attention this December in Poland when the next meeting of the parties to the Paris climate agreement is held, and countries begin to contemplate how they can up their ambition levels, as the agreement requires them to do over time. Meanwhile, the report clearly documents that a warming of 1.5 degrees Celsius would be very damaging and that 2 degrees — which used to be considered a reasonable goal — could approach intolerable in parts of the world. “1.5 degrees is the new 2 degrees,” said Jennifer Morgan, executive director of Greenpeace International, who was in Incheon for the finalization of the report. Specifically, the document finds that instabilities in Antarctica and Greenland, which could usher in sea-level rise measured in feet rather than inches, “could be triggered around 1.5°C to 2°C of global warming.” Moreover, the total loss of tropical coral reefs is at stake because 70 to 90 percent are expected to vanish at 1.5 degrees Celsius, the report finds. At 2 degrees, that number grows to more than 99 percent. The report found that holding warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius could save an Alaska-size area of the Arctic from permafrost thaw, muting a feedback loop that could lead to still more global emissions. The occurrence of entirely ice-free summers in the Arctic Ocean goes from one per century to one per decade between 1.5 and 2 degrees, it found — one of many ways in which the mere half a degree has large real-world consequences. Risks of extreme heat and weather events just rise and rise as temperatures do, meaning these would be worse worldwide the more it warms. To avoid that, in barely more than 10 years, the world’s percentage of electricity from renewables such as solar and wind power would have to jump from the current 24 percent to something more like 50 or 60 percent. Coal and gas plants that remain in operation would need to be equipped with technologies, collectively called carbon capture and storage (CCS), that prevent them from emitting carbon dioxide into the air and instead funnel it to be buried underground. By 2050, most coal plants would shut down. Cars and other forms of transportation, meanwhile, would need to be shifting strongly toward being electrified, powered by these same renewable energy sources. At present, transportation is far behind the power sector in the shift to low-carbon fuel sources. Right now, according to the International Energy Agency, only 4 percent of road transportation is powered by renewable fuels, and the agency has projected only a 1 percent increase by 2022.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Warming is <u>inevitable</u> absent a shift to <u>zero emissions</u><strong> --- we’re busting through the carbon budget and renewables and CCS don’t arrive in time</h4><p>Mooney and Dennis 18</p><p></strong>Chris Mooney and Brady Dennis, Reporters for the Washington Post, “The world has barely 10 years to get climate change under control, U.N. scientists say.” The Washington Post. October 7, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/10/08/world-has-only-years-get-climate-change-under-control-un-scientists-say/?utm_term=.25de27d0202d</p><p><u>--Also an answer to CCS!</p><p><mark>The world stands on <strong>the brink of failure</strong> </mark>when it comes <mark>to holding</mark> global <mark>warming to moderate levels, and nations will need</mark> to take “<mark>unprecedented” actions to cut</mark> their carbon <mark>emissions</mark> over the next decade, according to a landmark report by the top scientific body studying climate change.</p><p><mark>With</mark> global emissions showing few signs of slowing and <mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates — <u><mark>the world’s <strong>second-largest emitter</strong></mark> of carbon dioxide — <mark>rolling back</mark> a suite of Obama<mark>-era climate measures, the prospects for meetin</mark>g </u>the most ambitious goals of the 2015 <u><mark>Paris</u></mark> agreement <u><strong><mark>look increasingly slim.</u></strong> <u>To avoid</u></mark> racing past warming of <u><mark>1.5 degrees</u></mark> Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit) <u>over preindustrial levels <mark>would</mark> <mark>require</mark> a “rapid and far-reaching” <mark>transformation</mark> of human civilization <strong><mark>at a magnitude that has never happened before</strong></mark>, the group found.</p><p></u>“<u><mark>There is no documented historic precedent” for the sweeping change</mark> to energy, transportation and other systems required to reach 1.5 degrees Celsius, the</u> U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (<u>IPCC) wrote in a report requested as part of the 2015 Paris climate agreement.</p><p></u>At the same time, however, the report is being received with hope in some quarters because it affirms that 1.5 degrees Celsius is still possible — <u><mark>if emissions <strong>stopped today</strong></mark>, for instance, <mark>the planet would not reach that temperature</u></mark>. It is also likely to galvanize even stronger climate action by focusing on 1.5 degrees Celsius, rather than 2 degrees, as a target that the world cannot afford to miss.</p><p><u>“Frankly, we’ve delivered a message to the governments,” said Jim Skea, a co-chair of the IPCC panel and professor at Imperial College London, at a press event following the document’s release. “It’s now their responsibility … to decide whether they can act on it.” He added, “What we’ve done is said what the world needs to do.”</p><p>The transformation described in the document is breathtaking, and <mark>the <strong>speed of change required</strong> raises i</mark>nevitable <mark>questions about</mark> its <mark>feasibility</mark>.</p><p></u>Most strikingly, <u>the document says the world’s annual carbon dioxide emissions, which amount to more than 40 billion tons per year, would have to be on an extremely steep downward path by 2030 to either hold the world entirely below 1.5 degrees Celsius, or allow only a brief “overshoot” in temperatures.</p><p>Overall reductions in emissions in the next decade would probably need to be more than 1 billion tons per year, larger than the current emissions of all but a few of the very largest emitting countries</u>. By 2050, <u>the report calls <strong>for <mark>a total</mark> or near-total <mark>phaseout</strong> of</mark> the burning of <mark>coal</mark>.</p><p></u>'Understanding the Arctic is really a key to understanding the whole global system'</p><p>Mark Furze, a geoscientist and professor at MacEwan University, discusses the importance of understanding how climate change is impacting the Arctic. (Alice Li/TWP)</p><p>“<u>It’s like a deafening, piercing smoke alarm going off in the kitchen. <mark>We have to put out the fire</u>,”</mark> said Erik Solheim, executive director of the U.N. Environment Program. He added that <u>the need <mark>to</mark> either <mark>stop emissions entirely by 2050</u></mark> or find some way to remove as much carbon dioxide from the air as humans put there “<u><strong><mark>means net zero must be the new global mantra</u></strong></mark>.”</p><p>The radical transformation also would mean that, in a world projected to have more than 2 billion additional people by 2050, large swaths of land currently used to produce food would instead have to be converted to growing trees that store carbon and crops designated for energy use. The latter would be used as part of <u><strong><mark>a currently nonexistent program</strong> to get power</u></mark> from trees or plants and then bury the resulting carbon dioxide emissions in the ground, <u><mark>leading to</mark> a net <mark>subtraction of </mark>the <mark>gas</mark> from the air</u> — bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, or BECCS.</p><p><u>“Such large transitions pose profound challenges for sustainable management of the various demands on land for human settlements, food, livestock feed, fibre, bioenergy, carbon storage, biodiversity and other ecosystem services,” the report states.</p><p></u>The document in question was produced relatively rapidly for the cautious and deliberative IPCC, <u>representing <mark>the work</mark> of nearly 100 scientists</u>. It <u><mark>went through an elaborate peer-review process involving tens of thousands of comments</mark>. The final 34-page “summary for policymakers” was agreed to in a marathon session by scientists and government officials in Incheon, South Korea, over the past week.</p><p></u>(none)</p><p>The report says the world will need to develop large-scale “<u><mark>negative emissions</u></mark>” programs to remove significant volumes of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Although the basic <u>technologies</u> exist, they <u><strong><mark>have not caught on widely</strong></mark>, and <mark>scientists</mark> have strongly <mark>questioned whether</mark> such <mark>a program <strong>can be scaled up</mark> in the brief period available.</p><p></strong>The bottom line</u>, Sunday’s report found, <u>is that</u> <u>the world is woefully off target.</p><p></u>Current promises made by countries as part of the <u>Paris</u> climate agreement <u>would lead to about 3 degrees Celsius</u> (5.4 degrees Fahrenheit) <u>of warming by the end of the century, and the Trump administration recently released an analysis assuming about 4 degrees Celsius (7.2 degrees Fahrenheit) by 2100 if the world takes no action.</p><p><mark>The IPCC</mark> is considered <strong>the definitive source</strong> on the state of climate science, but it also <mark>tends to be <strong>conservative</strong></mark> in its conclusions.</u> That’s because <u>it is driven by a consensus-finding process, and its results are the product of not only science, but negotiation with governments over its precise language.</p><p></u>In Sunday’s report, the body detailed the magnitude and unprecedented nature of the changes that would be required to hold warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, but it held back from taking a specific stand on the feasibility of meeting such an ambitious goal. (An early draft<u> had cited a “very high risk” of warming exceeding 1.5 degrees Celsius; that language is now gone, even if the basic message is still easily inferred.)</p><p></u>“<u>If you’re expecting IPCC to jump up and down and wave red flags, you’re going to be disappointed</u>,” said Phil Duffy, president of the Woods Hole Research Center. “<u>They’re going to do what they always do, which is to release very cautious reports in extremely dispassionate language.”</p><p></u>Some researchers, including Duffy, are skeptical of the scenarios that the IPCC presents that hold warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, particularly the reliance on <u>negative-emissions technologies</u> to keep the window open.</p><p>“Even if it is technically possible, <u>without aligning the technical, political and social aspects of feasibility, it is not going to happen</u>,” added Glen Peters, research director of the Center for International Climate Research in Oslo. “To limit warming below 1.5 C, or 2 C for that matter, requires all countries and all sectors to act.”</p><p>Underscoring the difficulty of interpreting what’s possible, the IPCC gave two separate numbers in the report <u>for <mark>Earth’s remaining “carbon budget</u></mark>,” or how much carbon dioxide humans can emit and still have a reasonable chance of remaining below 1.5 degrees Celsius. The upshot <u><mark>is</u></mark> that humans are allowed either <u><mark>10</mark> or 14 <mark>years of current emissions, and <strong>no more</mark>,</strong> for a two-thirds or better chance of avoiding 1.5 degrees Celsius.</p><p>The already limited budget would shrink further if other greenhouse gases, such as methane, aren’t controlled or if and when Arctic permafrost becomes a major source of new emissions.</p><p></u>But either way — in a move that may be contested — researchers have somewhat increased the carbon budget in comparison with where the IPCC set it in 2013, giving another reason for hope.</p><p>The new approach buys some time and “resets the clock for 1.5 degrees Celsius to ‘five minutes to midnight,’ ” said Oliver Geden, head of the research division of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.</p><p><u>The report is sure to be the central focus of attention this December in Poland when the next meeting of the parties to the Paris climate agreement is held, and countries begin to contemplate how they can up their ambition levels, as the agreement requires them to do over time.</p><p></u>Meanwhile, the report clearly documents that <u>a warming of <mark>1.5 degrees</mark> Celsius would be very damaging and that 2 degrees — which used to be considered a reasonable goal — <strong><mark>could approach intolerable</strong></mark> in parts of the world.</p><p></u>“<u>1.5 degrees is the new 2 degrees</u>,” said Jennifer Morgan, executive director of Greenpeace International, who was in Incheon for the finalization of the report.</p><p>Specifically, the document finds that instabilities in Antarctica and Greenland, which could usher in sea-level rise measured in feet rather than inches, “could be triggered around 1.5°C to 2°C of global warming.” Moreover, the total loss of tropical coral reefs is at stake because 70 to 90 percent are expected to vanish at 1.5 degrees Celsius, the report finds. At 2 degrees, that number grows to more than 99 percent.</p><p><u>The report found that holding warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius could save an Alaska-size area of the Arctic from permafrost thaw, muting a feedback loop that could lead to still more global emissions. The occurrence of entirely ice-free summers in the Arctic Ocean goes from one per century to one per decade between 1.5 and 2 degrees, it found — one of many ways in which the mere half a degree has large real-world consequences.</p><p>Risks of extreme heat and weather events just rise and rise as temperatures do, meaning these would be worse worldwide the more it warms.</p><p></u>To avoid that, in barely more than 10 years, <u>the world’s percentage of electricity from renewables such as solar and wind power would have to jump from the current 24 percent to something more like 50 or 60 percent. Coal and gas plants that remain in operation would need to be equipped with</u> technologies, collectively called carbon capture and storage (<u>CCS), that prevent them from emitting carbon dioxide into the air and instead funnel it to be buried underground. By 2050, most coal plants would shut down.</p><p></u>Cars and other forms of transportation, meanwhile, would need to be shifting strongly toward being electrified, powered by these same renewable energy sources. At present, <u>transportation is far behind the power sector in the shift to low-carbon fuel sources</u>. Right now, according to the International Energy Agency, <u><mark>only 4 percent of</mark> road <mark>transportation is powered by renewable fuels</mark>, and the agency has projected only a 1 percent increase by 2022.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Robinson 10 (Andy McLaverty-Robinson, political theorist and activist based in the UK, “In Theory Why Deleuze (still) matters: States, war-machines and radical transformation,“ September 2010, https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-deleuze-war-machine/)//JRD fulltext: So what, in Deleuzian theory, is the alternative to the state? Deleuze and Guattari argue for a type of assemblage (social group or cluster of relations) which they refer to as the ‘war-machine’, though with the proviso that certain kinds of ‘war-machines’ can also be captured and used by states. This should not be considered a militarist theory, and the term ‘war-machine’ is in many respects misleading. It is used because Deleuze and Guattari derive their theory from Pierre Clastres’ theory of the role of ritualised (often non-lethal) warfare among indigenous groups. Paul Patton has suggested that the war-machine would be better called a metamorphosis-machine, others have used the term ‘difference engine’, a machine of differentiation, and there is a lot of overlap with the idea of autonomous groups or movements in how the war-machine is theorised. We should also remember that ‘machine’ in Deleuze and Guattari simply refers to a combination of forces or elements; it does not have overtones of instrumentalism or of mindless mechanisms – a social group, an ecosystem, a knight on horseback are all ‘machines’. The term ‘war-machine’ has the unfortunate connotations of brutal military machinery and of uncontrollable militarist apparatuses such as NATO, which operate with a machine-like rigidity and inhumanity (c.f. the phrase ‘military-industrial complex’). For Deleuze and Guattari, these kinds of statist war-machines are also war-machines of a sort, because they descend from a historical process through which states ‘captured’ or incorporated autonomous social movements (particularly those of nomadic indigenous societies) and made them part of the state so as to contain their subversive power. Early states learned to capture war-machines because they were previously vulnerable to being destroyed by the war-machines of nomadic stateless societies, having no similar means of response. Hence, armies are a kind of hybrid social form, containing some of the power of autonomous war-machines but contained in such a way as to harness it to state instrumentalism and inhumanity. Captured in this way, war-machines lose their affirmative force, becoming simply machines of purposeless destruction – having lost the purpose of deterritorialisation (see below), they take on the purpose of pure war as a goal in itself. Deleuze and Guattari argue that state-captured war-machines are regaining their autonomy in a dangerous way, tending to replace limited war in the service of a state’s goals with a drive to total war. This drive is expressed for instance in the ‘war on terror’ as permanent state of emergency. There was a recent controversy about Israeli strategists adopting Deleuzian ideas, which reflects the continuities between state war-machines and autonomous war-machines, but depends on a selective conceptual misreading in which the drive to total war denounced by Deleuze and Guattari is explicitly valorised. The Israeli army is a captured war-machine in the worst possible sense, pursuing the destruction of others’ existential territories in order to accumulate destructive power for a state. For Deleuze and Guattari, it is not the Israeli army but the Palestinian resistance which is a war-machine in the full sense. The autonomous war-machine, as opposed to the state-captured war-machine, is a form of social assemblage directed against the state, and against the coalescence of sovereignty. The way such machines undermine the state is by exercising diffuse power to break down concentrated power, and through the replacement of ‘striated’ (regulated, marked) space with ‘smooth’ space (although the war-machine is the ‘constituent element of smooth space’, I shall save discussion of smooth space for some other time). In Clastres’ account of Amazonian societies, on which Deleuze and Guattari’s theory is based, this is done by means of each band defending its own autonomy, and reacting to any potential accumulation of power by other bands. One could similarly think of how neighbourhood gangs resist subordination by rival gangs, or how autonomous social movements resist concentrations of political power. Autonomous social movements, such as the European squatters’ movement, the Zapatistas, and networks of protest against summits, are the principal example Deleuze and Guattari have in mind of war-machines in the global North, though they also use the concept in relation to Southern guerrilla and popular movements such as the Palestinian intifada and the Vietnamese resistance to American occupation, and also in relation to everyday practices of indigenous groups resisting state control. One could also argue that the ‘war-machine’ is implicit in practices of everyday resistance of the kind studies by James Scott. Marginal groups, termed ‘minorities’ in Deleuzian theory, often coalesce as war-machines because the state-form is inappropriate for them. According to Deleuze and Guattari, war is not the aim of the war-machine (except when it is captured by the state); rather, war-machines tend to end up in a situation of war with states because of the incommensurability of the war-machine with the state and with striated space. War-machines end up in conflict with states because their goal is the ‘deterritorialisation’ of the rigid fixities of state space, often to create space for difference or for particular ways of life. Think for instance of squatters’ movements: in themselves they do not aim for conflict, but rather, seek different kinds of arrangements of space by forming new combinations of unused geographical spaces with otherwise ‘spaceless’ social groups. Yet such movements are often forced into conflict with the machinery of state repression because the state ignores, or refuses to recognise these new articulations. As I write this, the JB Spray squat in Nottingham is continuing a campaign of resistance to reoccupation by state forces acting on behalf of capitalist owners who have no intent of putting the space to use. This is a struggle I would very much encourage readers to support (see this article and related links for details; contact 07817493824 or email jbspray[at]hotmail.co.uk). It is also a clear, local example of how autonomous social movements are forced into conflict by the state’s drive to repress difference. War-machines are also associated with the formation of special types of groups which are variously termed ‘bands’, ‘packs’ and ‘multiplicities’. These groups are seen as operating as dense local clusters of emotionally-intense connections, strongly differentiated from the ‘mass’, which is a type of group based on large scale, lack of intensity and vertical integration. ‘Packs’ or ‘bands’ instead form as unstable groups, avoiding fixed hierarchies (any leaders emerging are subject to rapid succession), usually with small numbers, and dispersed through space rather than concentrated in particular sites. Their diffusion is enabled by a multiplicity of objectives which resonate through horizontal, molecular connections rather than being represented in overarching structures. They tend to detach materials from the connections in which they are inserted in the dominant system, instead reconstructing different ‘universes’ or perspectives around other ways of seeing and relating. One can think for instance of the way groups of children reconstruct urban spaces as spaces of play, finding new, dissident uses for objects such as shopping trollies. For Deleuze and Guattari, the process of forming ‘bands’ or ‘packs’ is necessarily dangerous, risking the self-destructive implosion of small groups, but also offering hopeful possibilities of forming ways of relating which are more open to difference than those prevalent in the dominant system. Deleuze and Guattari’s usefulness for radical activism is by no means limited to this particular pair of concepts, but this way of thinking about social transformation raises useful questions and provides insights into how autonomous groups differ from dominant hierarchical forms of social collectivity. For instance, this theory points towards the need to avoid duplicating statist ways of relating within autonomous spaces, and to avoid coalescing in formal organisations which ultimately lead back into the state-form (albeit usually through the addition of axioms). It also suggests the inevitability of antagonism between radical movements and the state, even when the goal of a radical movement is simply to defend or express its own difference. Strategically, therefore, autonomous activists need to be prepared to ‘ward off’ the state, both within movements (by challenging statist ways of thinking and acting) and in relation to the wider context (by resisting state repression). According to Deleuze and Guattari, there is a basic incompatibility between state ‘antiproduction’ and the flourishing of difference, and this requires overcoming the former. This requires attention to the creation and defence of autonomous spaces, in full awareness of their underlying transformative potential.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>–Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari</h4><p><strong>Robinson 10<u></strong> (Andy McLaverty-Robinson, political theorist and activist based in the UK, “In Theory Why Deleuze (still) matters: States, war-machines and radical transformation,“ September 2010, https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-deleuze-war-machine/)//JRD</p><p>So <strong>what</u></strong>, in Deleuzian theory, <u><strong>is</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>alternative</strong> to the <strong>state</strong>?</u> <u>Deleuze and Guattari argue for a <strong>type</strong> of <strong>assemblage</u></strong> (social group or cluster of relations) <u>which they refer to as the ‘<strong>war-machine’</strong>, though with the <strong>proviso</strong> that <strong>certain kinds</strong> of ‘war-machines’ can also be <strong>captured</strong> and <strong>used</strong> by <strong>states</strong>.</u> This should not be considered a militarist theory, and the term ‘war-machine’ is in many respects misleading. It is used because Deleuze and Guattari derive their theory from Pierre Clastres’ theory of the role of ritualised (often non-lethal) warfare among indigenous groups. Paul Patton has suggested that the war-machine would be better called a metamorphosis-machine, others have used the term ‘difference engine’, a machine of differentiation, and there is a lot of overlap with the idea of autonomous groups or movements in how the war-machine is theorised. We should also remember that ‘machine’ in Deleuze and Guattari simply refers to a combination of forces or elements; it does not have overtones of instrumentalism or of mindless mechanisms – a social group, an ecosystem, a knight on horseback are all ‘machines’. <u>The <strong>term ‘war-machine’</strong> has the <strong>unfortunate</strong> <strong>connotations</strong> of brutal <strong>military machinery</strong> and of uncontrollable militarist <strong>apparatuses</strong> such as <strong>NATO</strong>, which operate with a <strong>machine-like rigidity</strong> and <strong>inhumanity</strong> </u>(c.f. the phrase ‘military-industrial complex’). For Deleuze and Guattari, <u>these kinds of <strong>statist</strong> <strong>war-machines</strong> are also <strong>war-machines</strong> of a sort, <strong>because</strong> they <strong>descend</strong> from a <strong>historical</strong> <strong>process</strong> through <strong>which</strong> <strong>states</strong> ‘<strong>captured’</strong> or <strong>incorporated</strong> <strong>autonomous</strong> social <strong>movements</u></strong> (particularly those of nomadic indigenous societies) <u>and <strong>made</strong> <strong>them</strong> <strong>part</strong> of the <strong>state</strong> so as to <strong>contain</strong> their <strong>subversive</strong> <strong>power</strong>.</u> <u>Early states <strong>learned</strong> to <strong>capture</strong> <strong>war-machines</strong> because they were <strong>previously</strong> <strong>vulnerable</strong> to being <strong>destroyed</strong> by the <strong>war-machines</strong> of <strong>nomadic</strong> <strong>stateless</strong> societies</u>, <u><strong>having</strong> no <strong>similar</strong> means of <strong>response</strong>.</u> Hence, <u>armies are a kind of <strong>hybrid</strong> <strong>social</strong> form,</u> <u><strong>containing</strong> some of the <strong>power</strong> of <strong>autonomous</strong> <strong>war-machines</strong> but <strong>contained</strong> in such a way as to <strong>harness</strong> it to <strong>state</strong> <strong>instrumentalism</strong> and <strong>inhumanity</strong>.</u> Captured in this way, <u><strong>war-machines</strong> lose their <strong>affirmative</strong> <strong>force</strong>,</u> <u>becoming simply machines of <strong>purposeless</strong> <strong>destruction</u></strong> – <u>having <strong>lost</strong> the purpose of <strong>deterritorialisation</u></strong> (see below), <u>they take on the <strong>purpose</strong> of <strong>pure war</strong> as a goal in itself. Deleuze and Guattari argue that <strong>state-captured war-machines</strong> are <strong>regaining</strong> their <strong>autonomy</strong> in a <strong>dangerous</strong> way</u>, <u>tending to <strong>replace</strong> <strong>limited</strong> war in the service of a <strong>state’s goals with a drive to total war.</u></strong> <u>This drive is expressed for instance in the ‘<strong>war on terror’</strong> as <strong>permanent state of emergency.</u></strong> There was a recent controversy about Israeli strategists adopting Deleuzian ideas, which reflects the continuities between state war-machines and autonomous war-machines, but depends on a selective conceptual misreading in which the drive to total war denounced by Deleuze and Guattari is explicitly valorised. <u>The <strong>Israeli army</strong> is a <strong>captured</strong> <strong>war-machine</strong> in the worst possible sense, <strong>pursuing</strong> the <strong>destruction</strong> of <strong>others’</strong> <strong>existential</strong> <strong>territories</strong> in order to <strong>accumulate</strong> <strong>destructive</strong> power for a <strong>state</strong>.</u> For Deleuze and Guattari, <u>it is <strong>not the Israeli army</strong> but the <strong>Palestinian</strong> <strong>resistance</strong> which is a <strong>war-machine</strong> in the <strong>full sense</strong>.</u> <u>The <strong>autonomous</strong> war-machine, as <strong>opposed</strong> to the <strong>state</strong>-<strong>captured</strong> war-machine, is a form of <strong>social</strong> <strong>assemblage</strong> directed <strong>against</strong> the <strong>state</strong>, and <strong>against</strong> the coalescence of <strong>sovereignty</strong>.</u> <u>The way such <strong>machines</strong> <strong>undermine</strong> the state is by <strong>exercising</strong> <strong>diffuse power</strong> to break down <strong>concentrated</strong> <strong>power</strong>, and through the <strong>replacement</strong> of ‘<strong>striated’</u></strong> (regulated, marked) <u><strong>space</strong> with ‘<strong>smooth’ space</u></strong> (although the war-machine is the ‘constituent element of smooth space’, I shall save discussion of smooth space for some other time). In Clastres’ account of Amazonian societies, on which Deleuze and Guattari’s theory is based, <u>this is done by means of each band <strong>defending</strong> its own <strong>autonomy</strong>, and <strong>reacting</strong> to any <strong>potential</strong> <strong>accumulation</strong> of power by <strong>other</strong> bands.</u> <u>One could similarly think of how </u>neighbourhood gangs resist subordination by rival gangs, or how <u><strong>autonomous</strong> <strong>social</strong> movements <strong>resist</strong> <strong>concentrations</strong> of <strong>political</strong> <strong>power</strong>. Autonomous <strong>social</strong> <strong>movements</strong>, such as the <strong>European squatters’ movement</strong>, the <strong>Zapatistas,</strong> and networks of <strong>protest against summits</strong>, are the principal example</u> Deleuze and Guattari have in mind of war-machines in the global North, <u>though they also use the concept in relation to <strong>Southern guerrilla</strong> and popular movements such as the <strong>Palestinian intifada </strong>and the <strong>Vietnamese</strong> <strong>resistance</strong> to <strong>American</strong> <strong>occupation</strong>, and also in <strong>relation</strong> to <strong>everyday</strong> <strong>practices</strong> of <strong>indigenous</strong> groups <strong>resisting</strong> <strong>state</strong> <strong>control</strong>.</u> One could also argue that <u>the ‘war-machine’ is implicit in practices of everyday resistance</u> of the kind studies by James Scott. <u><strong>Marginal</strong> <strong>groups</u></strong>, termed ‘minorities’ in Deleuzian theory, <u>often <strong>coalesce</strong> as war-machines because the <strong>state-form</strong> is <strong>inappropriate</strong> for them.</u> According to Deleuze and Guattari, <u><strong>war</strong> is <strong>not the aim</strong> of the <strong>war-machine</u></strong> (<u><strong>except</strong> when it is <strong>captured by the state</u></strong>); <u>rather, war-machines tend to end up in a <strong>situation</strong> of <strong>war</strong> with states <strong>because</strong> of <strong>the incommensurability</strong> of the war-machine with the <strong>state</strong> and with <strong>striated space</strong>.</u> <u>War-machines end up in <strong>conflict</strong> with <strong>states</strong> because their goal is the ‘<strong>deterritorialisation’</strong> of the <strong>rigid</strong> <strong>fixities</strong> of <strong>state</strong> <strong>space</strong>, often to <strong>create space for difference</strong> or for <strong>particular</strong> ways of <strong>life</strong>.</u> Think for instance <u>of squatters’ movements</u>: in themselves they <u><strong>do not aim for conflict</strong>, but rather, seek <strong>different</strong> kinds of <strong>arrangements</strong> of space by forming <strong>new combinations</strong> of unused <strong>geographical</strong> <strong>spaces</strong> with otherwise ‘<strong>spaceless’ social groups</strong>.</u> <u>Yet such movements are <strong>often</strong> <strong>forced</strong> into <strong>conflict</strong> with the <strong>machinery of state repression</strong> because the state ignores, or <strong>refuses</strong> to <strong>recognise</strong> these <strong>new articulations</strong>.</u> As I write this, the JB Spray squat in Nottingham is continuing a campaign of resistance to reoccupation by state forces acting on behalf of capitalist owners who have no intent of putting the space to use. This is a struggle I would very much encourage readers to support (see this article and related links for details; contact 07817493824 or email jbspray[at]hotmail.co.uk). It is also a clear, local example of how <u>autonomous social movements are <strong>forced</strong> into <strong>conflict</strong> by the <strong>state’s</strong> <strong>drive</strong> to <strong>repress</strong> <strong>difference</strong>. War-machines are also associated with the <strong>formation of special types</strong> of groups which are <strong>variously</strong> <strong>termed</strong> ‘bands’, ‘packs’ and ‘<strong>multiplicities’</strong>.</u> These groups are seen as operating as dense local clusters of emotionally-intense connections, strongly differentiated from the ‘mass’, which is a type of group based on large scale, lack of intensity and vertical integration. ‘<u>Packs’ or ‘bands’ instead form as <strong>unstable groups</strong>, <strong>avoiding</strong> fixed <strong>hierarchies</strong> (any leaders emerging are subject to rapid succession), usually with <strong>small numbers</strong>, and <strong>dispersed</strong> <strong>through</strong> space rather than <strong>concentrated</strong> in <strong>particular</strong> <strong>sites</strong>.</u> <u>Their diffusion is enabled by a <strong>multiplicity</strong> of <strong>objectives</strong> which resonate through <strong>horizontal</u></strong>, <u><strong>molecular</strong> <strong>connections</strong> rather than being <strong>represented</strong> in <strong>overarching</strong> <strong>structures</strong>.</u> <u>They tend to <strong>detach</strong> <strong>materials</strong> from the <strong>connections</strong> in which they are inserted in the <strong>dominant</strong> <strong>system</strong>, instead reconstructing <strong>different</strong> ‘<strong>universes’</strong> or perspectives around <strong>other</strong> <strong>ways</strong> of seeing and relating.</u> One can think for instance of the way groups of children reconstruct urban spaces as spaces of play, finding new, dissident uses for objects such as shopping trollies. For Deleuze and Guattari, the process of forming ‘bands’ or ‘packs’ is necessarily dangerous, risking the self-destructive implosion of small groups, but also offering hopeful possibilities of forming ways of relating which are more open to difference than those prevalent in the dominant system. <u>Deleuze and Guattari’s usefulness for <strong>radical</strong> <strong>activism</strong> is by <strong>no means limited</strong> to this <strong>particular</strong> <strong>pair</strong> of concepts, but this <strong>way of thinking</strong> about <strong>social transformation</strong> raises <strong>useful questions</strong> and provides <strong>insights</strong> into how <strong>autonomous</strong> <strong>groups</strong> differ from <strong>dominant hierarchical forms</strong> of social collectivity. </u>For instance, <u>this theory points towards the <strong>need</strong> to <strong>avoid duplicating</strong> statist ways of <strong>relating</strong> <strong>within autonomous spaces</strong>, and to avoid <strong>coalescing</strong> in <strong>formal organisations</strong> which ultimately <strong>lead</strong> <strong>back</strong> into the <strong>state-form</u></strong> (albeit usually through the addition of axioms). <u>It </u>also <u>suggests the <strong>inevitability</strong> of <strong>antagonism</strong> between <strong>radical</strong> <strong>movements</strong> and the state, even when the <strong>goal</strong> of a <strong>radical movement</strong> is simply to <strong>defend</strong> or express its own <strong>difference</strong>.</u> Strategically, therefore, <u><strong>autonomous activists</strong> need to be <strong>prepared</strong> to ‘<strong>ward off’ the state</strong>, both within movements</u> (<u>by <strong>challenging statist</strong> ways of <strong>thinking</strong> and <strong>acting</strong>)</u> <u>and in relation to the <strong>wider context</strong> (by resisting state repression).</u> According to Deleuze and Guattari, <u>there is a <strong>basic incompatibility</strong> between state ‘<strong>antiproduction’ and the flourishing of difference</u></strong>, <u>and this requires overcoming the former.</u> <u>This requires <strong>attention</strong> to the creation and <strong>defence of autonomous spaces,</strong> in full awareness of their underlying <strong>transformative potential.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Nikola Schmidt ’19, Department of Political Science at the Institute of Political Studies at Charles University, “Chapter 1 Introduction: Planetary Defense as the Unique Historical Opportunity to Shape Our Shared Destiny”, 2019, Planetary Defense, Space and Society, https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/634091/mod_resource/content/1/Planetary%20Defence.pdf *edited for gendered language fulltext: This book uses an interdisciplinary approach to investigate the idea of protecting the Earth’s biosphere from asteroids and comets. A viable Planetary Defense (PD) capability cannot emerge or be constructed without analyzing philosophical perceptions of morality and its consecutive impact on international politics. It is a project that should be pursued from a perspective involving the whole of humanity, as it directly impacts the very survival of our species and our planet’s biosphere. Rationally speaking, it does, but politically it certainly adds more questions. Deniers of the planetary defense necessity argument may have political objectives and incentives that are not directly linked to the planetary defense project, but certainly will influence related decision-making on the international stage. In the prevailing nature of the nation state paradigm, politics is not so much about foreign policy as it is about domestic policy and their inevitable interrelation (Fearon 1998). The current nation-based democratic process is constrained by the domination of domestic policy issues—that is, the agenda people vote for first. The actions of any sovereign state on the international level are not motivated only by foreign policy interests of that state, but should be understood as a two-level game where domestic motivations precede international ones (Putnam 1988). We can say that all people tend to want to save the world, but the question is how big is the one – their one – they are saving?2 Saving humanity can for some be leverage for domestic political objectives. Moreover, the objective of planetary defense ought to have an apparent rationale since we already have the technical capability to mitigate such a celestial collision. However, the moral call remains unclear, because not all are willing to consider the overall picture of our shared responsibility, which is fully required for survival and flourishing of [hu]mankind within the fragile surrounding biosphere that we depend on. We may be at the beginning of engaging a three-level game—domestic, foreign and global—as we stand clearly in front of global challenges such as a potential asteroid impact, and also environmental issues that do not respect nation state borders but have potential to influence human flourishing with no regard on our nationalities. There is a list of arguments that impede the project of planetary defense. In a unilateral scenario, where a superpower takes on the task of preventing a collision, some fear that the leading nation would turn the smaller states into followers without ever considering letting them meaningfully contribute; hence it would deepen the political periphery—or the unequal influence and development between certain nations—on a global political scale (Gourevitch 1978). We already observed this tendency during the talks concerning the Code of Conduct in space. Following the perspective of traditional geopolitics, the United States considered more broad Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) as undesirable, as Washington could lose its leading position in space, and because all the situational awareness data concerning the orbital debris was already shared at a bilateral level with nations that actually needed them (Listner 2015) Another argument points to the low frequency of celestial collisions. Such reasoning tends to amplify the necessity of statistical probability in decision making, while neglecting the fact that a single unpredicted collision can wipe out civilization as we know it. If we take the latter position, we must deal with a moral and rational dimension of such a mission. However, morality is not direct and clear. Its application through technology raises unintended, colossal political dilemmas. The base rationale might be clear—the survival of our species and the biosphere—but at its core, this is also derived from the moral foundations of particular philosophical traditions. This debate has recently been sparked in the discipline of International Relations. In this light, social science should have the courage to once again investigate the right and morally desirable path for the future of [hu]mankind. We can either deny the statistics arguing that the last extinction event caused by asteroid impact occurred 67 million years ago (Chicxulub) and think in the traditional geopolitical way of the interstate world system, or we can start thinking as a species with a new awareness of the hazards in our Solar System neighborhood, determined to pass through another threshold to survive and flourish in the universe. We need to take a broader pragmatic perspective and think in terms of the overview effect, perceiving our fate from the orbital perspective. The fact that humanity already possesses the technology to proceed does not on its own make it an easily defendable political motive. Which state, society, religion, or civilization should proceed? What can the others do justifiably against the will of a nation willing to act if they realize that the project threatens them in some way? Are there others (Merton 1968, p. 287)—meaning other than just one civilization on Earth? Should we all proceed together? Who is “all”? Who leads? These are critical questions that naturally arise when talking about the planetary defense endeavor. By answering or elaborating on them, we slowly walk toward concepts of applicable democratic procedures and global democracy, global governance or even a global government—simply any cosmopolitan political system. This last term can easily cause goosebumps among the majority of current political science scholars, being written off as too idealistic or even aggressive, especially for those who are inclined toward neorealist thinking. The application of cosmopolitan ideas to planetary defense is a gargantuan objective that should respect the foundations of philosophical knowledge in different cultures dating back over many millennia, especially since the intentions are supposed to be defended globally. We aim for a balanced theoretical perspective in this book, and thus cosmopolitanism is not understood here as the only solution, but rather as a procedural exercise for the study of the highest ideal on our way to finding a feasible policy for the political and technological infrastructure of planetary defense. We decided to approach the issue of planetary defense from a multidisciplinary perspective to give the audience a wider view of the different topics scientists are thinking about. Cosmopolitanism generally falls into the idealist school of thought. However, implementing global peace using moralist language can be interpreted as an imperial form of behavior by the state that promotes it (Coates 2000). It might be even self-destructive for the proposing state, as we can observe in any neorealist argument placing attention on national power. The questions of peace and its implementation have been well studied and criticized, especially since the events of 9/11 and the subsequent state-building agenda in Afghanistan and Iraq.3 The critical response to the idea of possible democratic peace implementation within a state or local society has over the last 17 years been strong and broad among almost all universities with international relations departments around the world. This experience shows us how the legitimacy of the global application of universal values can devolve to the benefit of the neorealist argument of interstate anarchy, the principal sign of a systemically inevitable environment of international relations that cannot be changed by international institutions (Mearsheimer 1994). Or, it can be blamed as pure geopolitics by language in critical geopolitical studies (Dalby 2007). A planetary defense endeavor can be easily blamed by neorealists as hidden power politics, and from critical geopoliticians, as a discursive occupation of the globe. We disagree of course; for us, planetary defense is the best political agenda to overcome international tensions and promote interstellar exploration as a species, as it puts emphasis on the cosmopolitan identity, which has already been a norm in space for 50 years through the promotion of the UN Outer Space Treaty. If we adhere to cosmopolitanism as the solution for planetary defense and as a feasible and implementable plan on the interstate level, we will certainly face the well-known neorealist counter-argument that the reality of anarchy between states is not solvable (Waltz 1996) and that the argument of universal values is flawed, as the experiment of neoliberal state-building is ethically bankrupt (Richmond 2009). However, neoliberal institutionalists contend that international institutions are built on shared values (Keohane and Martin 1995) and that cooperation under anarchy is not totally impossible (Axelrod and Keohane 1985). The European Union in its decades-long process is certainly based more on the belief in a better future rather than on pragmatic self-centered national power politics of separate European states (Pollack 2008). If the European Union does not disintegrate under the flash of emotional populism we are currently living through, it can provide us guidance on how to think bigger than in national terms. Universal morality is not then a mere idealistic vision; it is the main motivation for deeper political cooperation and it is worth the attempt. The overview effect shows how politics come from ideas, from the perspective we take, from the position we meaningfully advocate for, stimulated by a view of our home from space. Neorealism received a strong constructivist criticism by Wendt’s argument that anarchy is what states make of it (Wendt 1992). The overview effect can also be understood as a proposal for how to think to overcome the anarchy. In the end, for Wendt, the solution is an inevitable cosmopolitan state (Wendt 2003), which will arrive naturally when we overcome our skepticism, suspicion and disbelief as we did at the end of the Cold War (Wendt 1992). Politics come from ideas. There is a chance for this project on a global scale that depends on our will to proceed with it; it can set up the foundations for unprecedented international cooperation. Global security perspectives are necessary, and a cosmopolitan approach is the only way to overcome tiny struggles between states that prevent us from solving crucially important issues. Thus has Burke introduced his new theory called security cosmopolitanism, asking us to imagine the world that we can achieve to solve the issues on which our survival and flourishing fully depend (Burke 2013). There are already some observable outcomes that show this is not just mere idealism. The International Space Station was founded as a project of international cooperation and succeeded tremendously (Manzione 2002); The European Space Agency with its equal model of project distribution between European nations would be the next example, as would the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN). We also have examples of failures and setbacks, such as Russia’s recent cancelled membership in the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), an institution designed to give meaningful civilian nuclear projects to former Soviet nuclear scientists to avoid investment in nuclear weaponry and promote international nuclear civilian research. High-stakes world politics influenced by a single delusional politician have continually been a problem (Byman and Pollack 2001), but they are not proof of the inevitable interstate anarchy—in fact, such events explain the opposite. Individuals do influence politics, but the politics of others can mutually influence them as well; the whole system can contain these risk-prone individuals and still be strong enough to contain their negative will—it’s not the agent, nor the political structure but both what constitute the political life (Wendt 1987). Planetary defense as the ultimate global cooperation endeavor can tame narrowminded politicians with short-term ambitions and pave the road for a future Solar System regime. A planetary defense program can even help to deal with the current low threat, but constantly growing problem of orbital debris. Dealing with global space threats requires creative, constructive and critical processes that see saving [hu]mankind as a higher priority than preserving the current status quo of international relations. Intergovernmentalism seems to be a stable, growing process, but the question is whether this current political model is desirable. With the rising complexity of the system, the system framework will tend to collapse thanks to a rising number of possible vetoes (Jervis 1997). This is not because of the systemic character of international systems as perceived by neorealism, but because of a structural problem of intergovernmental global politics; a problem well discussed in European integration and accentuated by federalists (Burgess 2000). The mission to save the world undoubtedly has a moral dimension. Philosophical traditions vary, and we cannot ignore these varieties if we want to understand and anticipate the consequences of huge policy proposals concerning the defense of the Earth and the preservation of our species and biosphere. Let us now elaborate on the philosophical concept of morality.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Planetary defense geared towards <u>global-risk assessment</u> and <u>unconditional international cooperation</u> creates the foundations for cosmopolitan identity that creates a universal ethic of care for the biosphere that <u>breaks down</u> unequal influence and development between nations – skepticism or blanket reject of our proposal without <u>detailed refutation</u><strong> cedes the political realm to neorealist thinkers that are obsessed with sovereign power projection</h4><p>Nikola Schmidt ’19, Department of Political Science at the Institute of Political Studies at Charles University, “Chapter 1 Introduction: Planetary Defense as the Unique Historical Opportunity to Shape Our Shared Destiny”, 2019, Planetary Defense, Space and Society, </strong>https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/634091/mod_resource/content/1/Planetary%20Defence.pdf<strong> *edited for gendered language</p><p></strong>This book uses an interdisciplinary approach to investigate <u>the idea of protecting the Earth’s biosphere from asteroids and comets</u>. <u>A viable <mark>Planetary Defense</u></mark> (PD) <u>capability <mark>cannot emerge</mark> or be constructed <mark>without analyzing</mark> philosophical perceptions of <mark>morality and its</mark> consecutive <mark>impact on</mark> international <mark>politics</u></mark>. <u>It is <mark>a project</mark> that should be <mark>pursued from</u></mark> a perspective involving <u><mark>the <strong>whole of humanity</u></strong>, <u>as it</mark> directly <mark>impacts the</mark> very <mark>survival of our</mark> species and our planet’s <mark>biosphere</u></mark>. Rationally speaking, it does, but politically it certainly adds more questions. <u><mark>Deniers</mark> of the planetary defense necessity argument may <mark>have political</mark> objectives and <mark>incentives</mark> that are <mark>not directly linked to the</mark> planetary defense <mark>project, but</u></mark> certainly <u>will <mark>influence</u></mark> related <u><mark>decision-making</mark> on the international stage</u>. In the prevailing nature of the nation state paradigm, <u>politics is not so much about foreign policy as it is about domestic policy and their inevitable interrelation</u> (Fearon 1998). The current nation-based democratic process is constrained by the domination of domestic policy issues—that is, the agenda people vote for first. <u>The actions of any sovereign state on the international level are not motivated only by foreign policy interests of that state, but should be understood as a two-level game where domestic motivations precede international ones</u> (Putnam 1988). We can say that all people tend to want to save the world, but the question is how big is the one – their one – they are saving?2 <u>Saving humanity can for some be leverage for domestic political objectives. Moreover, <mark>the objective of planetary defense ought to have</mark> an apparent <mark>rationale since we</mark> <strong>already <mark>have the technical capability</strong> to mitigate such a</mark> celestial <mark>collision</u></mark>. However, <u>the moral call remains unclear, because not all are <mark>willing to consider the</mark> overall picture of our <mark>shared responsibility</u></mark>, <u>which <mark>is</mark> fully <mark>required for survival</mark> and flourishing of [hu]mankind <mark>within the fragile</mark> surrounding <mark>biosphere</mark> that we depend on</u>. We may be at the beginning of engaging a three-level game—domestic, foreign and global—as we stand clearly in front of global challenges such as a potential asteroid impact, and also environmental issues that do not respect nation state borders but have potential to influence human flourishing with no regard on our nationalities. <u>There is a list of <mark>arguments that impede</mark> the project of <mark>planetary defense</u></mark>. <u>In <mark>a unilateral scenario</u></mark>, where a superpower takes on the task of preventing a collision, <u>some fear that the leading nation would turn the smaller states into followers without ever considering letting them meaningfully contribute</u>; hence <u><strong>it <mark>would deepen</mark> the</u></strong> political periphery—or the <u><strong><mark>unequal influence and development between</mark> certain <mark>nations</u></strong></mark>—on a global political scale (Gourevitch 1978). <u>We already observed this tendency during the talks concerning the Code of Conduct in space</u>. Following the perspective of traditional geopolitics, the United States considered more broad Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) as undesirable, as Washington could lose its leading position in space, and because all the situational awareness data concerning the orbital debris was already shared at a bilateral level with nations that actually needed them (Listner 2015) <u><mark>Another</mark> argument <mark>points to</mark> the <mark>low frequency of</mark> celestial <mark>collisions</u></mark>. <u><mark>Such reasoning tends to amplify the necessity of</mark> statistical <mark>probability</mark> in decision making, <mark>while <strong>neglecting</mark> the fact</strong> <mark>that <strong>a single</mark> unpredicted <mark>collision</strong> can wipe out civilization</mark> as we know it</u>. If we take the latter position, we must deal with a moral and rational dimension of such a mission. However, morality is not direct and clear. Its application through technology raises unintended, colossal political dilemmas. The base rationale might be clear—the survival of our species and the biosphere—but at its core, this is also derived from the moral foundations of particular philosophical traditions. This debate has recently been sparked in the discipline of International Relations. In this light, <u>social science should have the courage to once again investigate the right and morally desirable path for the future of [hu]mankind.<strong> </strong><mark>We can</mark> either <mark>deny the statistics</mark> arguing <mark>that the last extinction event caused by asteroid</mark> impact <mark>occurred</mark> 67 million years ago</u> (Chicxulub) <u>and think in the traditional geopolitical way of the interstate world system</u>, <u><mark>or we can start thinking </mark>as a species <mark>with</mark> a new <mark>awareness of</mark> the <mark>hazards</mark> in our Solar System neighborhood, determined to pass through another threshold <mark>to <strong>survive and flourish</strong></mark> in the universe</u>. <u><strong>We need to take a broader pragmatic perspective and think in terms of the overview effect</u></strong>, perceiving our fate from the orbital perspective. <u>The fact that humanity already possesses the technology to proceed does not on its own make it an easily defendable political motive</u>. Which state, society, religion, or civilization should proceed? What can the others do justifiably against the will of a nation willing to act if they realize that the project threatens them in some way? Are there others (Merton 1968, p. 287)—meaning other than just one civilization on Earth? <u>Should we all proceed together? Who is “all”? Who leads? These are critical questions that naturally arise when talking about the planetary defense endeavor</u>. <u>By answering or elaborating on them, we slowly walk toward <mark>concepts of</mark> applicable <mark>democratic procedures and</mark> global democracy</u>, global governance or even a global government—<u><strong>simply <mark>any cosmopolitan</mark> political <mark>system</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>This</mark> last <mark>term can</mark> easily <mark>cause goosebumps among</mark> the majority of current political science <mark>scholars, being written off as</mark> too <mark>idealistic</u></mark> or even aggressive, <u><mark>especially for those</mark> who are <mark>inclined toward neorealist thinking</u></mark>. <u>The application of cosmopolitan ideas to planetary defense is a gargantuan objective that should respect the foundations of philosophical knowledge in different cultures dating back over many millennia</u>, especially since the intentions are supposed to be defended globally. <u>We aim for a balanced theoretical perspective</u> in this book, <u>and thus cosmopolitanism is not understood here as the only solution, but rather as a procedural exercise for the study of the highest ideal on our way to finding a feasible policy for the political and technological infrastructure of planetary defense</u>. We decided to approach the issue of planetary defense from a multidisciplinary perspective to give the audience a wider view of the different topics scientists are thinking about. <u><mark>Cosmopolitanism</u></mark> generally falls into the idealist school of thought. However, implementing global peace using moralist language can be interpreted as an imperial form of behavior by the state that promotes it (Coates 2000). It <u><mark>might be</mark> even <mark>self-destructive for the</mark> proposing <mark>state</u></mark>, <u>as we can observe <mark>in</mark> any neorealist argument placing attention on <mark>national power</u>.</mark> The questions of peace and its implementation have been well studied and criticized, especially since the events of 9/11 and the subsequent state-building agenda in Afghanistan and Iraq.3 <u>The critical response to the idea of possible democratic peace implementation within a state or local society has over the last 17 years been strong and broad among almost all universities with international relations departments around the world</u>. This experience shows us how the legitimacy of the global application of universal values can devolve to the benefit of the neorealist argument of interstate anarchy, the principal sign of a systemically inevitable environment of international relations that cannot be changed by international institutions (Mearsheimer 1994). Or, it can be blamed as pure geopolitics by language in critical geopolitical studies (Dalby 2007). <u>A planetary defense endeavor can be easily blamed by neorealists as hidden power politics</u>, and from critical geopoliticians, as a discursive occupation of the globe. <u><strong>We disagree of course</u></strong>; for us, <u><mark>planetary defense is the <strong>best</mark> political <mark>agenda</strong> to overcome</mark> international <mark>tensions and promote</mark> interstellar <mark>exploration</mark> as a species, <mark>as it puts emphasis on</mark> the <mark>cosmopolitan identity</u></mark>, which has already been a norm in space for 50 years through the promotion of the UN Outer Space Treaty. <u>If we adhere to cosmopolitanism as the solution for planetary defense and as a feasible and implementable plan on the interstate level, we will certainly face <mark>the</mark> well-known <mark>neorealist</mark> counter-<mark>argument that</mark> the reality of <mark>anarchy between states is not solvable</u></mark> (Waltz 1996) and that the argument of universal values is flawed, as the experiment of neoliberal state-building is ethically bankrupt (Richmond 2009). <u><mark>However</mark>, neoliberal institutionalists contend that international institutions are built on shared values</u> (Keohane and Martin 1995) <u>and that <mark>cooperation</mark> under anarchy <mark>is not</mark> totally <mark>impossible</u></mark> (Axelrod and Keohane 1985). The European Union in its decades-long process is certainly based more on the belief in a better future rather than on pragmatic self-centered national power politics of separate European states (Pollack 2008). If the European Union does not disintegrate under the flash of emotional populism we are currently living through, it can provide us guidance on how to think bigger than in national terms. <u><mark>Universal morality</mark> is <strong>not then a mere idealistic vision</strong>; it <mark>is the <strong>main motivation for</mark> deeper political <mark>cooperation</strong></mark> and it is worth the attempt.<strong> </strong>The overview effect shows how politics come from ideas, from the perspective we take, <strong>from the position we meaningfully advocate for</strong>, stimulated by a view of our home from space</u>. Neorealism received a strong constructivist criticism by Wendt’s argument that anarchy is what states make of it (Wendt 1992). <u>The overview effect can also be understood as a proposal for how to think to overcome the anarchy.</u> In the end, for Wendt, <u>the solution is an inevitable cosmopolitan state</u> (Wendt 2003), <u>which will arrive naturally when we overcome our skepticism, suspicion and disbelief</u> as we did at the end of the Cold War (Wendt 1992). Politics come from ideas. <u>There is a chance for <mark>this project on a global scale</mark> that depends on our will to proceed with it; it <mark>can set up the foundations for <strong>unprecedented</mark> international <mark>cooperation</u></strong></mark>. <u>Global security perspectives are necessary</u>, and a cosmopolitan approach is the only way to overcome tiny struggles between states that prevent us from solving crucially important issues. Thus has Burke introduced his new theory called security cosmopolitanism, asking us to imagine the world that we can achieve to solve the issues on which our survival and flourishing fully depend (Burke 2013). <u>There are already some observable outcomes that show this is not just mere idealism</u>. <u>The I</u>nternational <u>S</u>pace <u>S</u>tation <u>was founded as a project of international cooperation and succeeded tremendously</u> (Manzione 2002); The European Space Agency with its equal model of project distribution between European nations would be the next example, as would the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN). We also have examples of failures and setbacks, such as Russia’s recent cancelled membership in the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), an institution designed to give meaningful civilian nuclear projects to former Soviet nuclear scientists to avoid investment in nuclear weaponry and promote international nuclear civilian research. <u>High-stakes world politics influenced by a single delusional politician have continually been a problem</u> (Byman and Pollack 2001), <u>but they are not proof of the inevitable interstate anarchy</u>—<u>in fact, such events explain the opposite</u>. <u><strong><mark>Individuals</mark> do <mark>influence politics</u></strong></mark>, but the politics of others can mutually influence them as well; the whole system can contain these risk-prone individuals and still be strong enough to contain their negative will—it’s not the agent, nor the political structure but both what constitute the political life (Wendt 1987). <u><strong><mark>Planetary defense as the</mark> ultimate global cooperation <mark>endeavor can tame</mark> narrowminded <mark>politicians with short-term ambitions</mark> and pave the road for a future Solar System regime</u></strong>. A planetary defense program <u>can even help to deal with the current low threat, but constantly growing problem of orbital debris</u>. <u><mark>Dealing with global space threats requires</mark> creative, constructive and critical <mark>processes that see saving [hu]mankind as a <strong>higher priority</strong> than preserving the</mark> current <mark>s</mark>tatus <mark>quo</mark> of international relations</u>. <u>Intergovernmentalism seems to be a stable, growing process</u>, but the question is whether this current political model is desirable. <u>With the rising complexity of the system, the system framework will tend to collapse thanks to a rising number of possible vetoes</u> (Jervis 1997). This is not because of the systemic character of international systems as perceived by neorealism, but because of a structural problem of intergovernmental global politics; a problem well discussed in European integration and accentuated by federalists (Burgess 2000). <u>The mission to save the world undoubtedly has a moral dimension.</u> Philosophical traditions vary, and <u>we cannot ignore these varieties if we want to understand and anticipate the consequences of huge policy proposals concerning the defense of the Earth and the preservation of our species and biosphere</u>. Let us now elaborate on the philosophical concept of morality.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Pawlett ’15 [William Pawlett, Senior lecturer in media, communication, and cultural studies at the university of Wolverhampton, UK. “Georges Bataille: The Sacred and Society,” Language edited.] fulltext: For Bataille, ‘pure, uncalculated violence’ is morally preferable to ‘The reasoned organisation of war and conquest’ (Bataille, 1988a, p. 54). Violence is, for Bataille, an inevitable and ineradicable dimension of human existence: the only alternatives are between the forms of the manifestation of violence. On one hand, the sacred and its unleashing, for Bataille, is the realm of pure and uncalculated violence. Religion, on the other hand, is a ‘subterfuge’, a staging or dramatisation of extreme violence within social boundaries, in contrast to war which is a destructive realisation of extreme violence beyond territorial boundaries. Where a society stages sacrificial ritual, violence remains within the group’s social boundaries. For Bataille, sacred or sacrificial violence sunders the degrading order of work and duration; it establishes communication between chosen members of the community and their divinities and ‘save[s] the rest from the mortal danger of contagion . . . the community is saved from ruination’ (p. 59). The scope of violence then is limited by giving it a localised space for its terrifying and spectacular dramatisation. /// Further, Bataille insists, the sacrificial victim should be none other than the sovereign, the ruler upon whom is conferred a divine status and immense fortune precisely because they accept, unreservedly, a sacrificial destiny. Though informed by prestigious ethnographic and folkloric studies, a significant problem in Bataille’s argument is that such forms of sacrificial kingship seem to have been ‘compromised’ by substitute (or symbolic) sacrificial victims even in archaic social formations. That is to say, the sovereign would be replaced by a substitute sacrificial victim, and so the sovereign would be sacrificed ‘symbolically’, rather than actually being killed. Further, it might seem that this internal consumption of violence is meaningful only within relatively small, tribal societies. From this point of view, while Bataille’s contentions are legitimate as an extrapolation of the meaning of sacrifice from the work of Durkheim (1995, originally published in 1912), Mauss and Hubert (1964, originally published in 1898) and Georges Dumézil (1988, originally published in 1948), they have also been criticised as bordering on romanticism (Habermas, 1987; Nehamas, 1989). /// Yet Bataille’s argument is more sophisticated and nuanced that his critics allow. If sacrifice is primarily an internal form of violence4 (internal to a clan, community or society) then war and conquest involve the directing of a portion of this violence onto external enemies. This external channelling is, for Bataille, morally repugnant because it involves a deferral, accumulation and rationalisation of the unleashing of violence. Violence breaks free from its ritual limits and accelerates beyond containment, becoming far more destructive. While violence still breaks the profane routines of society, it does so for the allegedly ‘rational’ purpose of accumulating wealth or territory – that is for growth. Clearly, externalised and rationalised violence involves far larger numbers of victims than does sacrifice. Standing armies are developed. Warfare, throughout modernity, has increasingly affected non-combatants. No member of society is, in any sense, protected from violence – indeed, all are made vulnerable with the emergence of ‘total war’ and the threat of nuclear holocaust [annihilation] in the twentieth century. Crucially, the deferral and channelling of violence also opens up the space for the hypocrisies of ideology and propaganda which attempt to further rationalise the directing of violence onto external enemies by depicting enemies as lower, inferior or inhuman. /// For Bataille, the social and epistemological conditions for racial hatred and ethnic violence are set up only through the externalisations of violent excesses that are characteristic of modernity. We might say that a religious social system is more honest (or rather less dishonest) about its violence than a ‘rational’, ideologically managed social system. Finally, the acquisitive and exploitative drive for continual growth generates new and unforeseen manifestations of the accursed share, new outlets for the catastrophic squandering of resources that cannot be contained within ritual or any other limits. The channelling of the accursed share into military, colonial and ideological violence does not make these societies more stable; it does not protect or shelter its people at the expense of others, but actually condemns society to serial conflict, to an endless circulation of violence, a violence ‘set free on all sides’ (Bataille, 1989a, p. 85). If sacrificing 20,000 people per year is a monstrous aberration, is the ‘sacrifice’ of thousands of road users and pedestrians killed and injured in accidents across all developed nations any less monstrous? The major difference seems to be only that the deaths caused by traffic accidents are absolutely meaningless, whereas the deaths in Aztec sacrificial rites were charged with meaning. /// Bataille acknowledges that tendencies towards the externalisation of violence were present, if inchoate, in Aztec society even at the time of the earliest ethnographic accounts. Yet clearly, sacrificial violence was the central social dynamic. Bataille recounts how prisoners of war, taken by the Aztecs and destined for sacrifice, were made ‘insiders’ by being treated well, adorned and sometimes given concubines, enjoying a life of privilege for up to a year before their immolation. Of course, Bataille does not contend that such victims were thereby willing, and he frequently notes that the powerful within even small-scale or archaic ‘collective’ cultures used religion to control and abuse their people (Bataille, 1988, p. 60). Aztec ritual, at the time of the Spanish invasion, was a degraded, ‘compromised’ form of sacrificial kingship, yet it is still able to illustrate a profound moral difference from the conditions of modern societies. /// In stark contrast to Aztec society, the European industrial revolution made possible an immense growth in wealth and energy during the nineteenth century, and there was relative peace in Europe between 1815 and 1914. Isn’t this clear evidence of the economic and moral superiority of Western, industrialised cultures? For Bataille, this growth of wealth and prosperity was, in fact, accompanied by a terrible impoverishment in the conditions of life, especially for the working classes. Further, the excess energy generated by industrial production was, in time, turned to catastrophically violent ends: ‘the two world wars organised the greatest orgies of wealth – and of human beings – that history has recorded’ (p. 37). The development and accumulation of resources such as armies, machine guns, tanks and war planes channelled growth into catastrophe as millions of lives were annihilated on a scale previously unimaginable. In other words, growth as simple profit or unlimited accumulation can never continue for long – rather growth, left unchecked, will generate new, uncontrollable and catastrophic expenditures. The horrors of the trenches and the death camps, and of nuclear devastation, massively exceed and disable any possible sense of the ‘good’, of benefits or ‘profits’ – even figuratively such as lessons learned by humankind. By contrast, the violence of the potlatch was largely symbolic (scant consolation for the slaves who were sacrificed) and even Aztec society at the height of its sacrificial fervour never practised ‘sacrifice’ on the scale of Passchendaele, Auschwitz, Hiroshima or Afghanistan. Indeed, Aztec violence was strictly limited to feast days, military expeditions and festivals. Applying Bataille’s perspective, such limits allow, activate and contain the expression of the accursed share. We might sum up this argument by simply saying that if the sacrificial violence of the Aztecs, Tlingit and Kwakiutl was terrifying, the violence unleashed by modernity is far, far worse. ///<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Violence is inevitable – this debate is only a question of what form it should take. We either expend pointlessly to satiate violent drives or try and fail to manage them, condemning society to serial conflict. </h4><p><strong>Pawlett ’15 </strong>[William Pawlett, Senior lecturer in media, communication, and cultural studies at the university of Wolverhampton, UK. “Georges Bataille: The Sacred and Society,” Language edited.]</p><p>For Bataille, <u><strong>‘pure, uncalculated violence’ is morally preferable to ‘The reasoned organisation of war and conquest’</u></strong> (Bataille, 1988a, p. 54). <u><strong><mark>Violence is</u></strong>,</mark> for Bataille, <u><strong><mark>an inevitable</mark> and ineradicable <mark>dimension of</mark> human <mark>existence: the only alternatives are between the forms</mark> of the manifestation <mark>of violence</mark>.</u></strong> On one hand, <u><strong><mark>the sacred</mark> and its unleashing</u></strong>, for Bataille, <u><strong><mark>is the realm of</mark> pure and <mark>uncalculated violence</u></strong></mark>. Religion, on the other hand, is a ‘subterfuge’, a staging or dramatisation of extreme violence within social boundaries, in contrast to <u><strong>war</u></strong> which <u><strong>is a destructive realisation of extreme violence beyond territorial boundaries</u></strong>. <u><strong>Where a society stages <mark>sacrificial ritual</mark>, violence <mark>remains within the group</mark>’s social boundaries</u></strong>. For Bataille, sacred or sacrificial violence sunders the degrading order of work and duration; it establishes communication between chosen members of the community and their divinities and ‘save[s] the rest from the mortal danger of contagion . . . the community is saved from ruination’ (p. 59). <u><strong><mark>The scope of violence </mark>then <mark>is limited by </mark>giving it <mark>a localised space for its</mark> terrifying and spectacular <mark>dramatisation</u></strong></mark>. /// Further, Bataille insists, <u><strong><mark>the sacrificial victim should be none other than the sovereign</mark>, the ruler <mark>upon whom is conferred</mark> a divine status and immense <mark>fortune</mark> precisely <mark>because they accept</mark>, unreservedly, <mark>a sacrificial destiny</u></strong></mark>. Though informed by prestigious ethnographic and folkloric studies, a significant problem in Bataille’s argument is that such forms of sacrificial kingship seem to have been ‘compromised’ by substitute (or symbolic) sacrificial victims even in archaic social formations. That is to say, the sovereign would be replaced by a substitute sacrificial victim, and so the sovereign would be sacrificed ‘symbolically’, rather than actually being killed. Further, it might seem that this internal consumption of violence is meaningful only within relatively small, tribal societies. From this point of view, while Bataille’s contentions are legitimate as an extrapolation of the meaning of sacrifice from the work of Durkheim (1995, originally published in 1912), Mauss and Hubert (1964, originally published in 1898) and Georges Dumézil (1988, originally published in 1948), they have also been criticised as bordering on romanticism (Habermas, 1987; Nehamas, 1989). /// Yet Bataille’s argument is more sophisticated and nuanced that his critics allow. <u><strong><mark>If sacrifice is </mark>primarily an <mark>internal</mark> form of <mark>violence</u></strong>4</mark> (internal to a clan, community or society) <u><strong>then <mark>war </mark>and conquest <mark>involve </mark>the <mark>directing </mark>of a portion of this <mark>violence onto external enemies</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>This <mark>external channelling is</u></strong></mark>, for Bataille, <u><strong>morally <mark>repugnant because it involves a</mark> deferral, accumulation and <mark>rationalisation of</mark> the unleashing of <mark>violence</mark>. Violence breaks free from its ritual limits and accelerates beyond containment, becoming far more destructive</u></strong>. <u><strong>While violence still breaks the profane routines of society, it does so for the allegedly ‘rational’ purpose of accumulating wealth or territory – that is for growth. Clearly, <mark>externalised</mark> and rationalised <mark>violence involves far larger numbers of victims than</mark> does <mark>sacrifice. Standing armies are developed. Warfare</mark>, throughout modernity, has <mark>increasingly affected non-combatants</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>No member of society is, in any sense, protected from violence – indeed, <mark>all are made vulnerable with </mark>the emergence of ‘total war’ and <mark>the threat of nuclear</mark> holocaust [<mark>annihilation</mark>] in the twentieth century</u></strong>. <u><strong>Crucially, the deferral and <mark>channelling</mark> of violence also opens up the space for the hypocrisies of ideology and propaganda which attempt to further<mark> rationalise </mark>the <mark>directing </mark>of <mark>violence onto external enemies by depicting enemies as</mark> lower, inferior or <mark>inhuman</u></strong></mark>. /// For Bataille, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> social and epistemological <mark>conditions for racial hatred and </mark>ethnic <mark>violence are set up only through the externalisations of violent excesses</u></strong></mark> that are characteristic of modernity. We might say that <u><strong>a religious social system is more honest</u></strong> (or rather less dishonest) <u><strong>about its violence than a ‘rational’, ideologically managed social system. </u></strong>Finally, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> acquisitive and exploitative <mark>drive for continual growth generates </mark>new and unforeseen manifestations of the accursed share,<mark> new outlets for the catastrophic squandering </mark>of resources that cannot be contained within ritual or any other limits. The <mark>channelling of the accursed share into military</mark>, colonial and ideological <mark>violence does not make </mark>these <mark>societies more stable</mark>; it does not protect or shelter its people at the expense of others, <mark>but </mark>actually <mark>condemns society to serial conflict</mark>, to an endless circulation of violence, a violence ‘set free on all sides’</u></strong> (Bataille, 1989a, p. 85). If sacrificing 20,000 people per year is a monstrous aberration, is the ‘sacrifice’ of thousands of road users and pedestrians killed and injured in accidents across all developed nations any less monstrous? The major difference seems to be only that the deaths caused by traffic accidents are absolutely meaningless, whereas the deaths in Aztec sacrificial rites were charged with meaning. /// Bataille acknowledges that tendencies towards the externalisation of violence were present, if inchoate, in Aztec society even at the time of the earliest ethnographic accounts. Yet clearly, sacrificial violence was the central social dynamic. Bataille recounts how prisoners of war, taken by the Aztecs and destined for sacrifice, were made ‘insiders’ by being treated well, adorned and sometimes given concubines, enjoying a life of privilege for up to a year before their immolation. Of course, Bataille does not contend that such victims were thereby willing, and he frequently notes that the powerful within even small-scale or archaic ‘collective’ cultures used religion to control and abuse their people (Bataille, 1988, p. 60). Aztec ritual, at the time of the Spanish invasion, was a degraded, ‘compromised’ form of sacrificial kingship, yet it is still able to illustrate a profound moral difference from the conditions of modern societies. /// In stark contrast to Aztec society, <u><strong>the European industrial revolution made possible an immense growth in wealth and energy during the nineteenth century</u></strong>, and there was relative peace in Europe between 1815 and 1914. Isn’t this clear evidence of the economic and moral superiority of Western, industrialised cultures? For Bataille, <u><strong>this growth of wealth and prosperity was, in fact, accompanied by a terrible impoverishment in the conditions of life, especially for the working classes</u></strong>. Further, <u><strong>the excess energy generated by industrial production was, in time, turned to catastrophically violent ends: ‘the <mark>two world wars organised</mark> the greatest orgies of wealth – and of human beings – that history has recorded</u></strong>’ (p. 37). <u><strong>The development and <mark>accumulation of</mark> resources such as <mark>armies</mark>, machine guns, <mark>tanks and war planes</mark> channelled growth into catastrophe <mark>as millions</mark> of lives <mark>were annihilated</mark> on a scale previously unimaginable. In other words, <mark>growth as</mark> simple profit or unlimited <mark>accumulation </mark>can never continue for long – rather growth, left unchecked, <mark>will generate</mark> new, uncontrollable and <mark>catastrophic expenditures</u></strong>. <u><strong>The horrors of the trenches</mark> and the death camps, <mark>and</mark> of <mark>nuclear devastation, massively exceed</mark> and disable any possible sense of the ‘good’, of benefits or ‘profits’ – even figuratively such as lessons learned by humankind</u></strong>. By contrast, <u>the <mark>violence of the potlatch</mark> was largely symbolic</u> (scant consolation for the slaves who were sacrificed) and even Aztec society at the height of its sacrificial fervour never practised ‘sacrifice’ on the scale of Passchendaele, Auschwitz, Hiroshima or Afghanistan. Indeed, Aztec violence was strictly limited to feast days, military expeditions and festivals. Applying Bataille’s<u> perspective, such limits allow, activate and contain the expression of the accursed share. We might sum up this argument by simply saying that if the sacrificial violence of the Aztecs, Tlingit and Kwakiutl was terrifying, the violence unleashed by modernity is far, far worse. ///</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Park 11 (Lisa, Assistant Professor in the Ethnic Studies Department and the Urban Studies and Planning Program at the University of California, San Diego. She is co-author of The Silicon Valley of Dreams: Environmental Injustice, Immigrant Workers, and the High-tech Global Economy (2002). International Journal of Sociology of the Family Vol. 37, No. 1, POLICING MOTHERHOOD (Spring 2011), pp. 27-47. “CRIMINALIZING IMMIGRANT MOTHERS: Public Charge, Health Care, and Welfare Reform”, JSTOR) NREM/Lil’ GBN fulltext: Public charge is a federal immigration law to describe an "alien who has become (for deportation purposes) or is likely to become (for admission or adjustment of status purposes) primarily dependent on the government for subsistence, as demonstrated by either the receipt of public cash assistance for income maintenance, or institutionalization for long-term care at government expense" (USCIS 1999.) It is used as an administrative tool to exclude or deport those immigrants perceived to be or to have the possibility of becoming a burden on the state. Pregnancy has long been categorized as a public burden with respect to low-income immigrant women. Scholars consider this designation as part of a continuing tradition of "selective immigration" that began in 1875 (Luibheid, 2002: 9). This was solidified with the Immigration Law of 1891, which provided the institutional mechanism for federal officials to inspect and exclude immigrants on the basis of public charge. At this time, Public Health Service agents were required to inspect and issue a medical certificate to all incoming immigrants for "loathsome or a dangerous contagious disease," including pregnancy (Fairchild, 2003: 14). According to historian Martha Gardner (2005: 89), "Between 1880 and 1924, 'likely to become public charge' (LPC) provided a catch-all category of exclusion through which vast numbers of women found themselves deported as potential paupers for moral, marital, physical, and economic deficiencies." Gardner points out that while laws against poverty were usually applied to both men and women immigrants, LPC singled out women as the social mores of the early 20th century linked immorality to indigence and, subsequently, poverty alleviation policies increasingly focused on women's morality and their "proper" role within the family. From 1895 to 1915, LPC designations accounted for two-thirds of all exclusions from entry to the U.S. (Gardner, 2005: 91). By the end of the Great Depression, public charge designations largely disappeared from the federal immigration agency's exclusionary repertoire. Then, in the mid-1990s, it reappeared with new health care fraud detection programs in California (Park, 2001). In particular, prenatal care access and utilization by low-income immigrant women was targeted. This paper addresses how and why public charge resurfaced to criminate low-income immigrant mothers in the 1990s. As part of a larger project on the impact of immigration and welfare policies on prenatal care access for low-income immigrant women in California, I began this research in 1998. In addition to analyzing the local, state, and federal policies, my research team This content downloaded from 67.194.23.38 on Fri, 06 Jul 2018 18:33:57 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 30 International Journal of Sociology of the Family and I interviewed 196 safety-net health care providers, immigrant health advocates, government officials and low-income immigrant women in San Diego County, the San Francisco Bay Area, Los Angeles, and the Central Valley. For this paper, I will first discuss the significance of neoliberalism, as a specific historical moment, which set the conditions for the resurgence of public charge. I next outline in greater detail a lawsuit brought by Mrs. R. against the Medicaid Fraud Detection program, which exposed the illegal actions of this government program. I then place this program in the larger political context of public charge and the Welfare Reform of 1996. Here, I show how immigrant mothers are affected by this federal legislation and delineate the new institutional linkages formed between issues of immigration and health care. Finally, I discuss the implications of public charge on the criminalization of immigrant motherhood. Policing Immigrant Motherhood in Neoliberalism. While the notion of immigrants as public burdens is not new, re-assertions of formal, state designations of public charge policy are critical political moments that highlight the role of immigrants during crucial, historic shifts in national ideology. In this latest iteration in the 1990s, public charge enters the scene once again, teasing the rights of migrants within transnational free market governmental practices.3 In many respects, the timing appeared perfect. As immigrant women s labor becomes more central to everyday life, their presence is increasingly destabilized and marginalized as burdensome. Sanford Schram (1995: 61) observed, even before the passage of major welfare and immigration reforms in 1996, . .an ongoing 'privatization of public assistance' - a retrenchment of public welfare programs and the corresponding elaboration of a network of substitute services, often in the form of private aid." Unlike entitlements or rights, publicly funded programs including welfare and health care were increasingly stripped of dignity and privatized into a humiliating form of individual charity. The consequences are extensive. Schram correctly predicted greater fragmentation and less accessibility, visibility, and effectiveness in the provision of social services, which diminished what litde protection existed from structural issues that cause poverty including declining wages and eroding worker protections, racism and the dismantling of civil rights, unaffordable and inadequate childcare, underfunded public schools, and diminished access to higher education (Marchevsky and Theoharis, 2006: 10). Instead, poverty is individualized as personal moral failings so that the solution centers on disciplining non-normative bodies to perform in certain ways. This content downloaded from 67.194.23.38 on Fri, 06 Jul 2018 18:33:57 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Criminalizing Immigrant Mothers: Public Charge, Health Care... This logic allowed for the justification of policing poor women by defining dependency as a pathological disease indicative of those with such weak moral constitution that they are unable to self-regulate and make the "right" choices. In their analysis, Marchesvky and Theoharis (2006: vii) assess, "To confess one's dependencies is to forfeit one's individuality and rights in the American state." Dependency, then, becomes intertwined with whether or not one is deserving of rights indicative of social citizenship and almost entirely separate from actual need. In fact, a decade after key western nations enacted neoliberal policies, Ricky Solinger (2002: 62) argues that in the 1980s the "core, essential attribute of a person in the state of dependency" was solidified as "the absence of the capacity to make sensible choices." She writes that dependency and choice become fixed in an antithetical relationship with each other, creating the necessary justification for greater restrictions on women's behavior (Solinger, 2002: 65). By the 1990s, low-income immigrant women are firmly circumscribed as dependent public burdens. For Asian and Latino immigrants, their purported dependency as a public charge is used to criminalize particular legal behavior as "illegal," regardless of their actual citizenship status. The formal re-surfacing of public charge was achieved by simultaneously capitalizing on the modes of racialization and gendering that already existed within state institutions while at the same time utilizing new forms of fear and anxiety associated with immigrants in the "War on Terror" (See Fernandes, 2007; Maira, 2009; Nguyen, 2005). The purpose of this manufactured and enforced dependency is to preserve the political and economic vulnerability of immigrants during a time of unimpeded demand for their labor. Public charge policy is a technology4 of what Nicholas De Genova calls "deportability." Writing on Mexican immigrants specifically, De Genova (2005: 8) states, "It is deportability, and not deportation as such, that has historically rendered Mexican labor to be a distinctly disposable commodity." He argues that U.S. immigration authorities do not actually intend to deport all undocumented migrants. On the contrary, it is deportability, not deportation that ensures that some are deported in order that most may remain as workers, whose pronounced and protracted legal vulnerability may be sustained indefinitely. Similarly, the possibility of deportation through public charge maintains the vulnerable social location of immigrants (regardless of their legal citizenship status) and stricdy polices their behavior. In the end, neoliberalism promises that less government and more privatization will lead to greater individual freedom. This assertion raises a crucial question: "For whom?" In the case of many immigrants who are part This content downloaded from 67.194.23.38 on Fri, 06 Jul 2018 18:33:57 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms International Journal of Sociology of the Family of the growing working poor, less government in the form of state services has led instead to greater state surveillance (a different but continued government presence) and a diminishment of individual rights and freedoms (Schram 2000). In his astute analysis, Matthew Sparke (2006) points out that as much as neoliberalism trumpets ^-regulation, in practice, it is a form of re regulation. He writes that whether at the macro level of government policy (in the form of free trade, financial deregulation, welfare reform, etc) or at the micro level of governmentality (audits, performance assessments, cultural cultivation of self-policing entrepreneurial individualism), these governmental practices are all forms of statecraft (see also Jayasuriya, 2006). This re-configured governance produces a multi-tiered state in which the freedoms and rights of some are maintained by the reciprocal restriction on those same freedoms and rights of others. Rather than greater rights in return for greater "personal responsibility," low-income immigrants must allow increased government policing of their movements as proof that they are in fact making the right "choices" and taking "personal responsibility”.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Perm do the alt – public charge is a neoliberal justification to exclude and render immigrants as disposable labor</h4><p><strong>Park 11</strong> (Lisa, Assistant Professor in the Ethnic Studies Department and the Urban Studies and Planning Program at the University of California, San Diego. She is co-author of The Silicon Valley of Dreams: Environmental Injustice, Immigrant Workers, and the High-tech Global Economy (2002). International Journal of Sociology of the Family Vol. 37, No. 1, POLICING MOTHERHOOD (Spring 2011), pp. 27-47. “CRIMINALIZING IMMIGRANT MOTHERS: Public Charge, Health Care, and Welfare Reform”, JSTOR) NREM/Lil’ GBN</p><p> <u>Public charge is a federal immigration law to describe an "alien who has become</u> (for deportation purposes) or is likely to become (for admission or adjustment of status purposes) primarily <u>dependent on the government</u> for subsistence, as demonstrated by either the receipt of public cash assistance for income maintenance, or institutionalization for long-term care at government expense" (USCIS 1999.) <u>It is used as an administrative tool to exclude or deport those immigrants perceived to be or to have the possibility of <strong>becoming a burden on the state</strong>.</u> Pregnancy has long been categorized as a public burden with respect to low-income immigrant women. Scholars consider this designation as <u>part of a continuing tradition of "selective immigration</u>" that began in 1875 (Luibheid, 2002: 9). This was solidified with the Immigration Law of 1891, which <u>provided the institutional mechanism for federal officials to inspect and exclude immigrants on the basis of public charge. At</u> this time, Public Health Service agents were required to inspect and <u>issue a medical certificate to all incoming immigrants for "loathsome or a dangerous contagious disease</u>," including pregnancy (Fairchild, 2003: 14). According to historian Martha Gardner (2005: 89), "Between 1880 and 1924, 'likely to become public charge' (LPC) provided a catch-all category of exclusion through which vast numbers of women found themselves deported as potential paupers for moral, marital, physical, and economic deficiencies." Gardner points out that while laws against poverty were usually applied to both men and women immigrants, LPC singled out women as the social mores of the early 20th century linked immorality to indigence and, subsequently, poverty alleviation policies increasingly focused on women's morality and their "proper" role within the family. From 1895 to 1915, <u>LPC designations accounted for</u> two-thirds of all <u>exclusions</u> from entry to the U.S. (Gardner, 2005: 91). By the end of the Great Depression, <u>public charge</u> designations largely disappeared from the federal immigration agency's exclusionary repertoire. Then, in the mid-1990s, it <u><strong>reappeared with new health care fraud detection programs</u></strong> in California (Park, 2001). In particular, prenatal <u>care access and utilization</u> by low-income immigrant women <u>was targeted</u>. This paper addresses how and why public charge resurfaced to criminate low-income immigrant mothers in the 1990s. As part of a larger project on the impact of immigration and welfare policies on prenatal care access for low-income immigrant women in California, I began this research in 1998. In addition to analyzing the local, state, and federal policies, my research team This content downloaded from 67.194.23.38 on Fri, 06 Jul 2018 18:33:57 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 30 International Journal of Sociology of the Family and I interviewed 196 safety-net health care providers, immigrant health advocates, government officials and low-income immigrant women in San Diego County, the San Francisco Bay Area, Los Angeles, and the Central Valley. For this paper, I will first discuss the significance of neoliberalism, as a specific historical moment, which set the conditions for the resurgence of public charge. I next outline in greater detail a lawsuit brought by Mrs. R. against the Medicaid Fraud Detection program, which exposed the illegal actions of this government program. I then place this program in the larger political context of public charge and the Welfare Reform of 1996. Here, I show how immigrant mothers are affected by this <u>federal legislation and delineate the new institutional linkages formed between issues of immigration and health care.</u> Finally, I discuss <u>the implications of public charge on</u> the criminalization of immigrant motherhood. Policing Immigrant Motherhood in <u><strong>Neoliberalism</u></strong>. While the notion of immigrants as public burdens is not new, re-assertions of formal, state designations of <u>public charge policy are critical political moments that highlight</u> the role of <u>immigrants during crucial, historic shifts in national ideology</u>. In this latest iteration in the 1990s, <u>public charge</u> enters the scene once again, <u>teasing</u> the <u>rights</u> of migrants <u><strong>within transnational free market governmental practices</u></strong>.3 In many respects, the timing appeared perfect. As <u>immigrant</u> women s <u>labor</u> <u>becomes</u> more central to everyday life, their presence is increasingly <u>destabilized and marginalized as burdensome</u>. Sanford Schram (1995: 61) observed, even before the passage of major welfare and immigration reforms in 1996, . .an ongoing 'privatization of public assistance' - a retrenchment of public welfare programs and the corresponding elaboration of a network of substitute services, often in the form of private aid." Unlike entitlements or rights, <u>publicly funded programs</u> including welfare and health care <u>were increasingly stripped of dignity and privatized</u> into a humiliating form of individual charity. <u><strong>The consequences are extensive</u></strong>. Schram correctly predicted <u>greater fragmentation and less accessibility</u>, visibility, and effectiveness in the provision of social services, which diminished what litde protection existed from structural <u>issues that cause poverty including declining wages and eroding worker protections, racism and the dismantling of civil rights, unaffordable and inadequate childcare, underfunded public schools, and diminished access to higher education</u> (Marchevsky and Theoharis, 2006: 10). Instead, poverty is individualized as personal moral failings so that the solution centers on disciplining non-normative bodies to perform in certain ways. This content downloaded from 67.194.23.38 on Fri, 06 Jul 2018 18:33:57 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Criminalizing Immigrant Mothers: Public Charge, Health Care... This logic allowed for the justification of policing poor women by defining dependency as a pathological disease indicative of those with such weak moral constitution that they are unable to self-regulate and make the "right" choices. In their analysis, Marchesvky and Theoharis (2006: vii) assess, "<u><strong>To confess one's dependencies</strong> is to forfeit one's individuality and rights in the American state."</u> Dependency, then, becomes intertwined with whether or not one is deserving of rights <u>indicative of social citizenship</u> and almost entirely separate from actual need. In fact, <u>a decade after</u> key western nations enacted <u><strong>neoliberal policie</u></strong>s, Ricky Solinger (2002: 62) argues that in the 1980s the "<u>core, essential attribute of a person in the state of dependency" was solidified as "the absence of the capacity to make sensible choices</u>." She writes that <u>dependency and choice become fixed in an antithetical relationship with each other, <strong>creating the necessary justification for greater restrictions</u></strong> on women's behavior (Solinger, 2002: 65). By the 1990s, low-income immigrant women are firmly circumscribed as dependent public burdens. For Asian and Latino immigrants, their purported dependency as a public charge is used to criminalize particular legal behavior as "illegal," regardless of their actual citizenship status. The formal re-surfacing of public charge was achieved by simultaneously capitalizing on the modes of racialization and gendering that already existed within state institutions while at the same time utilizing <u>new forms of fear and anxiety associated with immigrants</u> in the "War on Terror" (See Fernandes, 2007; Maira, 2009; Nguyen, 2005). The purpose of this manufactured and enforced dependency is <u>to preserve the political and economic vulnerability of immigrants during a time of unimpeded demand for their labor</u>. <u>Public charge policy is a technology</u>4 of what Nicholas De Genova calls "deportability." Writing on Mexican immigrants specifically, De Genova (2005: 8) states, "It is deportability, and not deportation as such, that has historically <u>rendered</u> Mexican <u>labor to be a distinctly <strong>disposable commodity</u></strong>." He argues that U.S. immigration authorities do not actually intend to deport all undocumented migrants. On the contrary, it is deportability, not deportation that ensures that some are deported in order that most may remain as workers, whose pronounced and protracted legal vulnerability may be sustained indefinitely. Similarly, the possibility of deportation through public charge maintains the vulnerable social location of immigrants (regardless of their legal citizenship status) and stricdy polices their behavior. In the end, <u><strong>neoliberalism promises</u></strong> that <u>less government and more privatization will lead to greater individual freedom. This assertion raises a crucial question: "<strong>For whom?"</u></strong> <u>In the case of many immigrants who are part</u> This content downloaded from 67.194.23.38 on Fri, 06 Jul 2018 18:33:57 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms International Journal of Sociology of the Family of the growing <u>working poor</u>, <u>less government in the form of state services has led instead to greater state surveillance</u> (a different but continued government presence) <u>and a diminishment of individual rights and freedoms</u> (Schram 2000). In his astute analysis, Matthew Sparke (2006) points out that as much as <u>neoliberalism trumpets</u> ^-regulation, in practice, it is a form of <u>re regulation</u>. He writes that whether at the <u>macro level of government policy</u> (in the form of free trade, financial deregulation, welfare reform, etc) or at the micro level of governmentality (audits, performance assessments, cultural cultivation of self-policing entrepreneurial individualism), these <u>governmental practices are all forms of statecraft </u>(see also Jayasuriya, 2006). This re-<u>configured governance produces a multi-tiered state in which the freedoms and rights of some are maintained by the reciprocal restriction on those same freedoms and rights of others.</u> Rather than greater rights in return for greater "personal responsibility," low-income immigrants must allow increased government policing of their movements as proof that they are in fact making the right "choices" and taking "personal responsibility”. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Michael T. Klare 19. Professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, Review of The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War Over Small Stakes by Michael O’Hanlon. October 2019. Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-10/features/global-flashpoints-risks-escalation fulltext: How will a great-power nuclear war erupt? How can its outbreak be prevented? These questions have bedeviled nuclear strategists and peace advocates since the dawn of the Atomic Age and are gaining fresh urgency as tensions among China, Russia, and the United States intensify. Theorists generally assume that such a horrific cataclysm would occur when the major powers have amassed large nuclear arsenals, have primed these weapons for early use, and have reached a fever pitch of hostility. Under these conditions, it is feared, any outbreak of armed hostilities could lead swiftly to a clash of major conventional forces and, were one side or another to face overwhelming defeat, the early use of nuclear weapons. Historically, it was believed that such incidents would arise along NATO-Soviet borders or in the North Atlantic, where the warships of the major powers often crossed paths. To avert a nuclear catastrophe, global leaders labored over the years to reduce tensions among the major powers through U.S.-Soviet summits, UN sessions, intense diplomacy, and so forth and to reduce the size and alert status of their nuclear arsenals. Unfortunately, less effort has been directed at identifying potential flashpoints and reducing the risk of uncontrolled escalatory spirals. This lack of attention is especially critical in the current era of great power competition, says Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution in his new book The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War Over Small Stakes. He claims that although the probability of a deliberate, full-scale military assault by one of the major powers against another is extremely low, significant risks remain for minor aggressions to escalate quickly. There is considerable potential for a limited Russian intrusion into one of the Baltic republics or a Chinese seizure of a Japanese-claimed island in the East China Sea to spin out of control, possibly triggering the use of nuclear weapons. Under existing U.S. military doctrine, he explains, any assault on a NATO country or a U.S. treaty ally, however trivial, should automatically prompt a full-scale military drive to reverse the intrusion and punish the aggressor. Such an endeavor would require a full-scale mobilization of U.S. and allied forces and still might not succeed, or if it did, it might so alarm enemy officials that they might resort to launching nuclear weapons. Fearing such an outcome, U.S. leaders might allow the original intrusion to stand, thereby jeopardizing U.S. alliances and inviting further aggression, with every likelihood that all-out war would eventually follow. This, he explains, is what constitutes the “Senkaku paradox”: In the event of a limited enemy aggression, say in the uninhabited Senkaku Islands of the East China Sea, “a large-scale U.S. and allied response could seem massively disproportionate.” On the other hand, “a nonresponse would be unacceptable, and inconsistent with American treaty obligations.” What is needed are credible responses that fall between the extremes of acquiescence to aggression and military escalation. O’Hanlon proposes an “asymmetric defense” consisting of economic penalties and limited military actions. These could include sanctions aimed at critical nodes of the aggressor’s economy, such as energy, banking, and transport, along with air and missile strikes against key logistical targets, such as pipelines, port facilities, and oil tankers. At the same time, the United States and its allies would reinforce defense positions near the initial conflict. The aim of all this would not be to reverse the original intrusion but rather to demonstrate that any further aggression would be met with intensified economic hardship and a brutal confrontation with U.S. and allied armies. In assessing U.S. strategic options, O’Hanlon focuses on three potential flashpoints: the Baltic region, the East China Sea, and Taiwan. Of all conceivable war-igniting scenarios involving the great powers, he suggests, the most likely are a Russian attempt to seize a sliver of eastern Estonia or Latvia, where Russian speakers are in the majority; a Chinese occupation of one of the Senkaku Islands, claimed both by China, which calls them the Diaoyu’s, and Japan; and a Chinese naval blockade of Taiwan to thwart any Taiwanese move toward independence. In any of these scenarios, O’Hanlon claims, U.S. military policy would presuppose a rapid and harsh response. Yet, any U.S. drive to dislodge Russian or Chinese forces from those locations would require a major commitment of force and, given recent improvements in those countries’ combat capabilities (especially through the acquisition of high-tech weaponry), might not prove easy to accomplish. A U.S. victory would be the most likely outcome, but could prompt Russia or China to employ nuclear weapons. Far better, he argues, to counter such assaults with asymmetric moves, such as attacks on vital energy infrastructure located outside the Russian or Chinese heartland, along with the reinforcement of positions in areas near the original intrusion. O’Hanlon deserves credit for seeking credible alternatives to all-out war as a response to low-stakes challenges of these sorts. His emphasis on economic tools of coercion, as opposed to full-scale military mobilization, merits close attention by U.S. strategists. He also performs an important service by shining a spotlight on those potential flashpoints. Clearly, unless greater effort is made to understand and defuse the sources of friction in all three, other efforts to avert catastrophe could come to naught. That said, many of his recommendations deserve careful scrutiny. Would Russian or Chinese leaders consider attacks on their energy facilities and logistical chokepoints as acceptable retribution? Perhaps such moves would incite them to undertake even harsher countermeasures of their own. To punish China for any future misbehavior in the East China Sea or in waters off Taiwan, for example, he proposes blocking Chinese oil imports from the Persian Gulf, a venture that he estimates will require four to six U.S. aircraft carriers and supporting vessels and would likely initiate a major naval conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. Although certainly superior to the immediate onset of full-scale war, asymmetrical moves of this sort do not necessarily promise a pacific outcome. Surely, O’Hanlon could have devoted more attention to preventative and diplomatic endeavors, such as confidence-building measures and power-sharing arrangements, such as for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Indeed, the deeper lesson to be drawn from The Senkaku Paradox is the difficulty in envisioning any outcomes from future U.S.-Russian or U.S.-Chinese military encounters that do not risk a nuclear escalation. Modern conventional weapons are capable of inflicting immense damage on vital military infrastructure, including, conceivably, nuclear command-and-control facilities, so it is easy to envision Russia or China responding with battlefield nuclear weapons. Asymmetric responses are a welcome contribution to the discussion of alternative options, but a far more thorough reassessment of U.S. strategy is required, aimed at reducing U.S. risk of military entanglement in far-off hotspots and putting more space between conventional combat and the onset of nuclear war.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Senkaku conflict <u>goes nuclear</u>---<u>doctrine</u>, <u>domestic pressure</u> and <u>US alliance commitments</u> ensure <u>escalation</u>.</h4><p>Michael T. <strong>Klare 19</strong>. Professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, Review of The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War Over Small Stakes by Michael O’Hanlon. October 2019. Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-10/features/global-flashpoints-risks-escalation</p><p>How will a great-power nuclear war erupt? How can its outbreak be prevented? These questions have bedeviled nuclear strategists and peace advocates since the dawn of the Atomic Age and are gaining fresh urgency as tensions among China, Russia, and the United States intensify. Theorists generally assume that such a horrific cataclysm would occur when the major powers have amassed large nuclear arsenals, have primed these weapons for early use, and have reached a fever pitch of hostility. Under these conditions, it is feared, any outbreak of armed hostilities could lead swiftly to a clash of major conventional forces and, were one side or another to face overwhelming defeat, the early use of nuclear weapons. Historically, it was believed that such incidents would arise along NATO-Soviet borders or in the North Atlantic, where the warships of the major powers often crossed paths. To avert a nuclear catastrophe, global leaders labored over the years to reduce tensions among the major powers through U.S.-Soviet summits, UN sessions, intense diplomacy, and so forth and to reduce the size and alert status of their nuclear arsenals. Unfortunately, <u>less effort has been directed at <strong>identifying potential flashpoints</strong> and reducing the risk of <strong>uncontrolled escalatory spirals</strong>. This lack of attention is especially critical in the current era of great power competition, </u>says Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution in his new book The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War Over Small Stakes. <u>He claims that although the probability of a deliberate, full-scale military assault by one of the major powers against another is extremely low, <strong>significant risks remain</strong> for <strong>minor aggressions</strong> to <strong>escalate quickly</strong>. <mark>There is considerable</mark> <mark>potential for</u></mark> a limited Russian intrusion into one of the Baltic republics or a <u><strong><mark>Chinese seizure</strong> of <strong>a Japanese-claimed island</strong> in the <strong>E</strong></mark>ast<mark> <strong>C</strong></mark>hina <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>ea t<mark>o <strong>spin out of control</u></strong>, </mark>possibly <u><strong>triggering the use of nuclear weapons.</u></strong> <u><mark>Under existing</mark> U.S. military <mark>doctrine</u></mark>, he explains, <u><mark>any assault</mark> on a</u> NATO country or a <u>U.S. treaty ally</u>, however trivial, <u><mark>should</mark> automatically <mark>prompt a <strong>full-scale military drive</strong></mark> to reverse the intrusion and punish the aggressor</u>. <u>Such an endeavor would require a full-scale mobilization of U.S. and allied forces and still might not succeed, or if it did, it <mark>might</mark> so <strong><mark>alarm enemy officials</strong></mark> that they might resort <mark>to <strong>launching nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark>. <u>Fearing such an outcome, U.S. leaders might allow the original intrusion to stand, thereby jeopardizing U.S. alliances and inviting further aggression, with every likelihood that all-out war would eventually follow. </u>This, he explains, is what constitutes the “Senkaku paradox”: <u><mark>In the event</mark> of a <mark>limited</mark> enemy <mark>aggression</u></mark>, say <u><mark>in the</u></mark> uninhabited <u><strong><mark>Senkaku</u></strong></mark> Islands of the East China Sea, “<u><mark>a large-scale <strong>U.S. and allied response</strong> could seem <strong>massively</mark> <mark>disproportionate</u></strong></mark>.” <u><mark>On the other hand, “a nonresponse would be <strong>unacceptable</strong>, and</mark> <strong><mark>inconsistent with</mark> American <mark>treaty obligations</u></strong></mark>.” What is needed are credible responses that fall between the extremes of acquiescence to aggression and military escalation. O’Hanlon proposes an “asymmetric defense” consisting of economic penalties and limited military actions. These could include sanctions aimed at critical nodes of the aggressor’s economy, such as energy, banking, and transport, along with air and missile strikes against key logistical targets, such as pipelines, port facilities, and oil tankers. At the same time, the United States and its allies would reinforce defense positions near the initial conflict. The aim of all this would not be to reverse the original intrusion but rather to demonstrate that any further aggression would be met with intensified economic hardship and a brutal confrontation with U.S. and allied armies. In assessing U.S. strategic options, O’Hanlon focuses on three potential flashpoints: the Baltic region, the East China Sea, and Taiwan. Of all conceivable war-igniting scenarios involving the great powers, he suggests, the most likely are a Russian attempt to seize a sliver of eastern Estonia or Latvia, where Russian speakers are in the majority; a Chinese occupation of one of the Senkaku Islands, claimed both by China, which calls them the Diaoyu’s, and Japan; and a Chinese naval blockade of Taiwan to thwart any Taiwanese move toward independence. In any of these scenarios, O’Hanlon claims, U.S. military policy would presuppose a rapid and harsh response. Yet, <u><mark>any U.S. drive to dislodge</u></mark> Russian or <u><mark>Chinese forces</mark> from those locations would <strong><mark>require a major</mark> <mark>commitment of force</strong> and, given</mark> recent improvements in those countries’ combat capabilities (especially through the acquisition of <strong><mark>high-tech weaponr</mark>y</strong>), might <strong><mark>not prove easy to accomplish</u></strong>.</mark> <u><mark>A U.S. victory</mark> would be the most likely outcome, but <mark>could prompt</u></mark> Russia or <u><strong><mark>China</strong> to <strong>employ nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark>. Far better, he argues, to counter such assaults with asymmetric moves, such as attacks on vital energy infrastructure located outside the Russian or Chinese heartland, along with the reinforcement of positions in areas near the original intrusion. O’Hanlon deserves credit for seeking credible alternatives to all-out war as a response to low-stakes challenges of these sorts. His emphasis on economic tools of coercion, as opposed to full-scale military mobilization, merits close attention by U.S. strategists. He also performs an important service by shining a spotlight on those potential flashpoints. Clearly, unless greater effort is made to understand and defuse the sources of friction in all three, other efforts to avert catastrophe could come to naught. That said, many of his recommendations deserve careful scrutiny. Would Russian or Chinese leaders consider attacks on their energy facilities and logistical chokepoints as acceptable retribution? Perhaps such moves would incite them to undertake even harsher countermeasures of their own. To punish China for any future misbehavior in the East China Sea or in waters off Taiwan, for example, he proposes blocking Chinese oil imports from the Persian Gulf, a venture that he estimates will require four to six U.S. aircraft carriers and supporting vessels and would likely initiate a major naval conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. Although certainly superior to the immediate onset of full-scale war, <u><strong><mark>asymmetrical moves</u></strong></mark> of this sort <u><strong><mark>do not necessarily promise a pacific outcome</u></strong></mark>. Surely, O’Hanlon could have devoted more attention to preventative and diplomatic endeavors, such as confidence-building measures and power-sharing arrangements, such as for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Indeed, <u><mark>the</mark> deeper <mark>lesson</u></mark> to be drawn from The Senkaku Paradox <u><mark>is the <strong>difficulty in envisioning any outcomes</strong></mark> from future</u> U.S.-Russian or <u><strong>U.S.-Chinese military encounters</strong> <mark>that do not risk a <strong>nuclear escalation</strong>.</u> <u>Modern</mark> <mark>conventional weapons</mark> are capable of <mark>inflict</mark>ing immense <mark>damage on vital military infrastructure</mark>, <mark>including</mark>, conceivably, nuclear <mark>c</mark>ommand-<mark>and-c</mark>ontrol facilities</u>, so <u><strong><mark>it is easy to envision</u></strong></mark> Russia or <u><strong><mark>China</strong> responding with <strong>battlefield nuclear weapons</mark>.</u></strong> Asymmetric responses are a welcome contribution to the discussion of alternative options, but a far more thorough reassessment of U.S. strategy is required, aimed at reducing U.S. risk of military entanglement in far-off hotspots and putting more space between conventional combat and the onset of nuclear war.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Spratt and Dunplop 19, David Spratt [Research Director for Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration, Melbourne, and co-author of Climate Code Red: The case for emergency action] & Ian Dunlop [member of the Club of Rome. Formerly an international oil, gas and coal industry executive, chairman of the Australian Coal Association, chief executive of the Australian Institute of Company Directors, and chair of the Australian Greenhouse Office Experts Group on Emissions Trading 1998-2000], “Existential climate-related security risk: A scenario approach,” Breakthrough - National Centre for Climate Restoration, May 2019, pg. 8-10, beckert. Brackets in original text fulltext: 2020–2030: Policy-makers fail to act on evidence that the current ​Paris Agreement path — in which global human-caused greenhouse emissions do not peak until 2030 — will lock in at least 3°C of warming. The case for a global, climate-emergency mobilisation of labour and resources to build a zero-emission economy and carbon drawdown in order to have a realistic chance of keeping warming well below 2°C is politely ignored. As projected by Xu and Ramanathan, by 2030 carbon dioxide levels have reached 437 parts per million — which is unprecedented in the last 20 million years — and warming reaches 1.6°C.18 2030–2050: Emissions peak in 2030, and start to fall consistent with an 80 percent reduction in fossil-fuel energy intensity by 2100 compared to 2010 energy intensity. This leads to warming of 2.4°C by 2050, consistent with the Xu and Ramanathan “baseline-fast” scenario.19 However, another 0.6°C of warming occurs — taking the total to 3°C by 2050 — due to the activation of a number of carbon-cycle feedbacks and higher levels of ice albedo and cloud feedbacks than current models assume. [It should be noted that this is far from an extreme scenario: the low-probability, high-impact warming (five percent probability) can exceed 3.5–4°C by 2050 in the Xu and Ramanathan scheme.] 2050: By 2050, there is broad scientific acceptance that system tipping-points for the West Antarctic Ice Sheet and a sea-ice-free Arctic summer were passed well before 1.5°C of warming, for the Greenland Ice Sheet well before 2°C, and for widespread permafrost loss and large-scale Amazon drought and dieback by 2.5°C. The “hothouse Earth” scenario has been realised, and Earth is headed for another degree or more of warming, especially since human greenhouse emissions are still significant.20 While sea levels have risen 0.5 metres by 2050, the increase may be 2–3 metres by 2100, and it is understood from historical analogues that seas may eventually rise by more than 25 metres. Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and 55 percent of the global population, are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions, beyond the threshold of human survivability. The destabilisation of the Jet Stream has very significantly affected the intensity and geographical distribution of the Asian and West African monsoons and, together with the further slowing of the Gulf Stream, is impinging on life support systems in Europe. North America suffers from devastating weather extremes including wildfires, heatwaves, drought and inundation. The summer monsoons in China have failed, and water flows into the great rivers of Asia are severely reduced by the loss of more than one-third of the Himalayan ice sheet. Glacial loss reaches 70 percent in the Andes, and rainfall in Mexico and central America falls by half. Semi-permanent El Nino conditions prevail. Aridification emerges over more than 30 percent of the world’s land surface. Desertification is severe in southern Africa, the southern Mediterranean, west Asia, the Middle East, inland Australia and across the south-western United States. Impacts: A number of ecosystems collapse, including coral reef systems, the Amazon rainforest and in the Arctic. Some poorer nations and regions, which lack capacity to provide artificially-cooled environments for their populations, become unviable. Deadly heat conditions persist for more than 100 days per year in West Africa, tropical South America, the Middle East and South-East Asia, contributing to more than a billion people being displaced from the tropical zone. Water availability decreases sharply in the most affected regions at lower latitudes (dry tropics and subtropics), affecting about two billion people worldwide. Agriculture becomes nonviable in the dry subtropics. Most regions in the world see a significant drop in food production and increasing numbers of extreme weather events, including heat waves, floods and storms. Food production is inadequate to feed the global population and food prices skyrocket, as a consequence of a one-fifth decline in crop yields, a decline in the nutrition content of food crops, a catastrophic decline in insect populations, desertification, monsoon failure and chronic water shortages, and conditions too hot for human habitation in significant food-growing regions. The lower reaches of the agriculturally-important river deltas such as the Mekong, Ganges and Nile are inundated, and significant sectors of some of the world’s most populous cities — including Chennai, Mumbai, Jakarta, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh City, Shanghai, Lagos, Bangkok and Manila — are abandoned. Some small islands become uninhabitable. Ten percent of Bangladesh is inundated, displacing 15 million people. Even for 2°C of warming, more than a billion people may need to be relocated and In high-end scenarios, the scale of destruction is beyond our capacity to model, with a high likelihood of human civilisation coming to an end.21 National security consequences: For pragmatic reasons associated with providing only a sketch of this scenario, we take the conclusion of the ​Age of Consequences ‘Severe’ 3°C scenario developed by a group of senior US national-security figures in 2007 as appropriate for our scenario too: Massive nonlinear events in the global environment give rise to ​massive nonlinear societal events.​ In this scenario, nations around the world will be ​overwhelmed by the scale of change and pernicious challenges, such as pandemic disease. The internal cohesion of nations will be under great stress, including in the United States, both as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and changes in agricultural patterns and water availability. The flooding of coastal communities around the world, especially in the Netherlands, the United States, South Asia, and China, has the potential to challenge regional and even national identities.​ Armed conflict between nations over resources, such as the Nile and its tributaries, is likely and nuclear war is possible. The social consequences range from increased religious fervor to ​outright chaos.​ In this scenario, climate change provokes ​a permanent shift in the relationship of humankind to nature​’.22 (emphasis added) DISCUSSION This scenario provides a glimpse into a world of “outright chaos” on a path to the end of human civilisation and modern society as we have known it, in which the challenges to global security are simply overwhelming and political panic becomes the norm. Yet the world is currently completely unprepared to envisage, and even less deal with, the consequences of catastrophic climate change.23 What can be done to avoid such a probable but catastrophic future? It is clear from our preliminary scenario that dramatic action is required this decade if the “hothouse Earth” scenario is to be avoided. To reduce this risk and protect human civilisation, a massive global mobilisation of resources is needed in the coming decade to build a zero-emissions industrial system and set in train the restoration of a safe climate. This would be akin in scale to the World War II emergency mobilisation. There is an increasing awareness that such a response is now necessary. Prof. Kevin Anderson makes the case for a Marshall Plan-style construction of zero-carbon-dioxide energy supply and major electrification to build a zero-carbon industrial strategy by “a shift in productive capacity of society akin to that in World War II”.24 Others have warned that “only a drastic, economy-wide makeover within the next decade, consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C”, would avoid the transition of the Earth System to the Pliocene-like conditions that prevailed 3-3.3 million years ago, when temperatures were ~3°C and sea levels 25 metres higher.25 It should be noted here that the 1.5° goal is not safe for a number of Earth System elements, including Arctic sea-ice, West Antarctica and coral reefs.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Warming causes <u>extinction</u> and <u>guarantees</u> every other impact—only total economic makeover solves.</h4><p><u>Spratt and Dunplop 19</u>, David Spratt [Research Director for Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration, Melbourne, and co-author of Climate Code Red: The case for emergency action] & Ian Dunlop [member of the Club of Rome. Formerly an international oil, gas and coal industry executive, chairman of the Australian Coal Association, chief executive of the Australian Institute of Company Directors, and chair of the Australian Greenhouse Office Experts Group on Emissions Trading 1998-2000], “Existential climate-related security risk: A scenario approach,” Breakthrough - National Centre for Climate Restoration, May 2019, pg. 8-10, beckert. Brackets in original text</p><p>2020–2030: <u><mark>Policy-makers fail to act</u></mark> on evidence that the current ​Paris Agreement path — in which global human-caused greenhouse emissions do not peak until 2030 — will lock in at least 3°C of warming. <u>The case for a global</u>, climate-emergency <u><mark>mobilisation of labour</mark> and resources to <mark>build a zero-emission economy</mark> and carbon drawdown in order to have a realistic chance of keeping warming well below 2°C is politely ignored</u>. As projected by Xu and Ramanathan, by 2030 carbon dioxide levels have reached 437 parts per million — which is unprecedented in the last 20 million years — and warming reaches 1.6°C.18 2030–2050: <u>Emissions peak in 2030</u>, and start to fall consistent with an 80 percent reduction in fossil-fuel energy intensity by 2100 compared to 2010 energy intensity. This leads to warming of 2.4°C by 2050, consistent with the Xu and Ramanathan “baseline-fast” scenario.19 However, another 0.6°C of warming occurs — taking the total to 3°C by 2050 — due to the activation of a number of carbon-cycle feedbacks and higher levels of ice albedo and cloud feedbacks than current models assume. [It should be noted that this is far from an extreme scenario: the low-probability, high-impact warming (five percent probability) can exceed 3.5–4°C by 2050 in the Xu and Ramanathan scheme.] 2050: <u><mark>By 2050</u></mark>, there is broad scientific acceptance that system tipping-points for the West Antarctic Ice Sheet and a sea-ice-free Arctic summer were passed well before 1.5°C of warming, for the Greenland Ice Sheet well before 2°C, and for widespread permafrost loss and large-scale Amazon drought and dieback by 2.5°C. <u>The “<strong><mark>hothouse Earth</strong></mark>” scenario <mark>has been realised</u></mark>, and Earth is headed for another degree or more of warming, especially since human greenhouse emissions are still significant.20 While sea levels have risen 0.5 metres by 2050, the increase may be 2–3 metres by 2100, and <u>it is understood from historical analogues that seas may eventually rise by more than 25 metres</u>. Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and <u><mark>55 percent of</mark> the global <mark>population</mark>, <mark>are subject t</mark>o more than 20 days a year of <strong>lethal heat</strong> conditions</u>, <u><mark>beyond</mark> the threshold of human <mark>survivability</u></mark>. The destabilisation of the Jet Stream has very significantly affected the intensity and geographical distribution of the Asian and West African monsoons and, together with the further slowing of the Gulf Stream, is impinging on life support systems in Europe. North America suffers from devastating weather extremes including wildfires, heatwaves, drought and inundation. The summer monsoons in China have failed, and water flows into the great rivers of Asia are severely reduced by the loss of more than one-third of the Himalayan ice sheet. Glacial loss reaches 70 percent in the Andes, and rainfall in Mexico and central America falls by half. Semi-permanent El Nino conditions prevail. Aridification emerges over more than 30 percent of the world’s land surface. Desertification is severe in southern Africa, the southern Mediterranean, west Asia, the Middle East, inland Australia and across the south-western United States. Impacts: A number of <u><strong><mark>ecosystems collapse</strong></mark>, including coral reef systems, the Amazon rainforest and in the Arctic</u>. Some <u>poorer nations and <mark>regions</u></mark>, which lack capacity to provide artificially-cooled environments for their populations, <u><strong><mark>become unviable</u></strong></mark>. Deadly heat conditions persist for more than 100 days per year in West Africa, tropical South America, the Middle East and South-East Asia, <u>contributing to <strong><mark>more than a billion</mark> people <mark>being displaced</strong></mark> from the tropical zone</u>. <u><strong><mark>Water availability decreases</mark> sharply</u></strong> in the most affected regions at lower latitudes (dry tropics and subtropics), <u><mark>affecting</mark> about <strong><mark>two billion</strong></mark> people worldwide</u>. Agriculture becomes nonviable in the dry subtropics. <u>Most regions in the world see a significant drop in food production and increasing numbers of extreme weather events, including heat waves, floods and storms.</u> Food production is inadequate to feed the global population and <u><mark>food prices skyrocket</u></mark>, as a consequence of a one-fifth decline in crop yields, a decline in the nutrition content of food crops, a catastrophic decline in insect populations, desertification, monsoon failure and chronic water shortages, and conditions too hot for human habitation in significant food-growing regions. The lower reaches of the agriculturally-important river deltas such as the Mekong, Ganges and Nile are inundated, and significant sectors of some of the world’s most populous cities — including Chennai, Mumbai, Jakarta, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh City, Shanghai, Lagos, Bangkok and Manila — are abandoned. Some small islands become uninhabitable. Ten percent of Bangladesh is inundated, displacing 15 million people. Even for 2°C of warming, more than a billion people may need to be relocated and In high-end scenarios, <u>the scale of <mark>destruction is</mark> beyond our capacity to model, with a <strong><mark>high likelihood of human civilisation coming to an end</u></strong></mark>.21 National security consequences: For pragmatic reasons associated with providing only a sketch of this scenario, we take the conclusion of the ​Age of Consequences ‘Severe’ 3°C scenario developed by a group of senior US national-security figures in 2007 as appropriate for our scenario too: Massive <u>nonlinear events in the global environment give rise to ​massive nonlinear societal events</u>.​ In this scenario, nations around the world will be ​overwhelmed by the scale of change and pernicious challenges, such as pandemic disease. The <u><mark>internal cohesion </mark>of nations <mark>will be under great stress</mark>, <strong><mark>including</mark> in the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u></strong>, both as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and changes in agricultural patterns and water availability. The <u><mark>flooding</u></mark> of coastal communities around the world, especially in the Netherlands, the United States, South Asia, and China, <u><mark>has</mark> the <mark>potential to challenge</mark> regional and even <mark>national identities</u></mark>.​ <u><strong><mark>Armed conflict</strong></mark> between nations <mark>over resources</u></mark>, such as the Nile and its tributaries, <u><mark>is likely</mark> and <strong><mark>nuclear war</strong> </mark>is possible</u>. The social consequences range from increased religious fervor to ​outright chaos.​ In this scenario, climate change provokes ​a permanent shift in the relationship of humankind to nature​’.22 (emphasis added) DISCUSSION This scenario provides a glimpse into a world of “outright chaos” on a path to the end of human civilisation and modern society as we have known it, in which the challenges to global security are simply overwhelming and political panic becomes the norm. Yet the world is currently completely unprepared to envisage, and even less deal with, the consequences of catastrophic climate change.23 What can be done to avoid such a probable but catastrophic future? It is clear from our preliminary scenario that dramatic action is required this decade if the “hothouse Earth” scenario is to be avoided. To reduce this risk and protect human civilisation, a <u>massive global mobilisation of resources is needed in the coming decade to build a zero-emissions industrial system</u> and set in train the restoration of a safe climate. This would be akin in scale to the World War II emergency mobilisation. There is an increasing awareness that such a response is now necessary. Prof. Kevin Anderson makes the case for a Marshall Plan-style construction of zero-carbon-dioxide energy supply and major electrification to build a zero-carbon industrial strategy by “a shift in productive capacity of society akin to that in World War II”.24 Others have warned that “<u><strong><mark>only a drastic, economy-wide makeover within the next decade</u></strong></mark>, consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C”, <u><mark>would avoid</mark> the <mark>transition</mark> of the Earth System <mark>to</mark> the Pliocene-like conditions that prevailed 3-3.3 million years ago, when temperatures were <mark>~3°C</u></mark> and sea levels 25 metres higher.25 It should be noted here that the 1.5° goal is not safe for a number of Earth System elements, including Arctic sea-ice, West Antarctica and coral reefs.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Dallavalle and Parenti 19 [Dante Dallavalle---adjunct professor of economics at John Jay College, City University of New York. and Christian Parenti---associate professor of economics at John Jay College, City University of New York, Jacobin, “The Limits of “Experiencing” the Climate Crisis”, https://jacobinmag.com/2019/08/climate-crisis-northeast-extreme-weather/] While most of the world bakes, burns, and floods, the US East Coast, the cockpit of American capitalism, has largely avoided extreme weather events, lulling many into a false sense of security. Confronting the climate crisis requires thinking beyond our everyday experiences. fulltext: July 2019 was the hottest month ever recorded. Across much of the planet, the summer offered glimpses of the hellscape promised by our civilization’s current “business as usual” approach to the climate crisis. Another summer, another terrible warning. And yet, there is little political response. Solutions move slowly, if at all. Central in this dilemma is the problem of experience; or rather the limited utility of experience alone in understanding both the scientific realities of climate change and the political-economic realities of its causes and possible solutions. As Karl Marx put it: “If there were no difference between essence and appearance, there would be no need for science.” Let us begin with the weather and then address the economy. Extreme Peripheries In India, this summer brought record-breaking monsoon rains and mass flooding. Three million people were displaced, whole villages destroyed, many scores killed. Across the Arctic, from Siberia to Alaska and the Canadian Yukon, hot weather has spurred on an unprecedented number of fires. Even Greenland had fires. By mid-summer between 250 and 300 fire “hot spots” were being recorded everyday — four to five times higher than most previous years. In Siberia, as July ended, about three million hectares, or an area larger than Massachusetts and Rhode Island combined, was burning. Worse yet, soot and ash from the fires, traveling hundreds of miles and settling upon Arctic ice will, by darkening the ice, absorb more heat and accelerate melting. On the first day of August, Greenland’s ice sheet released an estimated 12.5 billion tons of ice into the ocean, the largest single-day volume loss on record. As one climate scientist pointed out, the amount of ice lost on July 31 and August 1 was enough to cover Florida in almost five inches of water. Rapid ice sheet melting means rapidly rising sea levels. According to one recent report polar ice sheet melting has already contributed a half-inch of sea-level rise since 1972. And in a sign of acceleration half of that total occurred in only the last eight years. Strange Calm in The Northeast Amidst this panorama of doom appears a grave political irony: the US Northeast and mid-Atlantic, though they have experienced very dramatic average warming as well as record-breaking winter cold snaps recently, have largely avoided truly destructive extreme weather events since Superstorm Sandy in 2012. California suffers regular massive forest fires, much of the Midwest is water logged and ripped up by tornadoes, the Gulf Coast and Carolinas have been hammered by hurricanes. But in the Northeast megalopolis, the BosWash Corridor, a strange illusion of normality prevails. Even as the Northeast has seen the greatest increase in average warming of any region in the country, it has managed to avoid prolonged, deadly, extreme heat waves. For the fifty million people who live there and depend on the regional infrastructure, not suffering catastrophic floods or fires or deadly heat waves is a blessing. But this relative calm also helps instill political somnambulism. Clearly polluter-funded disinformation is the primary reason people are not more worried about climate change. But the lack of catastrophic extreme weather in the Northeast also plays a role. All over the world, but especially in the United States, people tend to discount scientific abstractions and instead rely on their own, immediate, empirical experience. In the country’s most important center of political, financial, and media decision-making, this obtuse empiricism amplifies polluter-promoted political inaction. In other words, if Wall Street were flooding, DC’s roofs were being ripped off by monster winds, and New Jersey’s suburbs were burning while scorched black bears galloped toward the sea, we would likely see far more pushback against fossil fuel-funded disinformation. We might even see new social movements emerging among beleaguered renters, workers, and indebted homeowners. With movements we would see the more urgency and action from politicians, pundits, and other members of the professional-managerial class. Sloppy Jet Stream To some extent the Greenland thaw, the European heat wave, the Artic fires, even the intensity of the South Asian monsoon, and the illusion of relatively normal weather in the US Northeast, all seem to be linked by the phenomenon of an increasingly erratic northern polar jet stream. Jet streams are the systems of winds that move eastward across the Earth. They are formed by a combination of the spinning of the Earth on its axis and the temperature differentials between the equator and the poles. The northern and southern hemispheres each have a polar and a subtropical jet stream. The northern polar jet stream plays a major role in governing day-to-day weather across the northern hemisphere. The bigger the differences in temperature between masses of air, the stronger and faster are the winds of the jet streams. But now, anthropogenic climate change is heating the poles faster than the lower latitudes; and the Arctic is heating faster than anywhere else. This northern warming diminishes the temperature differentials that power the northern polar jet stream. As the northern jet stream weakens, it slows. As it slows, it starts to wobble and shift course. Or at least that is one prominent scientific theory attempting to explain the increasingly weird and wavy behavior of the northern jet stream. Scientific debate about jet stream patterns is hampered, in part, by lack of detailed historical data. Unlike surface temperatures and sea levels, the jet streams, occurring as they do up in the atmosphere, have not been measured in great detail over a long period. This sloppier, meandering northern jet stream seems to be shifting further north over Europe and Russia, allowing hot air to push up from the south. This summer’s European heat wave is associated with this trapped or “blocked” jet stream. This pattern of warm, dry air reaching unusually far north is also accelerating the rapid melting of Greenland’s ice sheet. But for the last half-decade or so the jet stream over the East Coast of North America has been normal and even sometimes dipped unusually far south relative to the whole pattern, pulling down cool polar air with it, occasionally giving us those old-school wintertime polar blasts. Along with fewer hurricanes making landfall, all of this is providing the Northeast megalopolis with the illusion of normal weather. We say “illusion” because, as the Washington Post recently reported, the Northeast is actually much hotter than it was a century ago and is heating faster than anywhere else in the lower forty-eight states. In fact, the average temperature in New Jersey is now 2 degrees Celsius hotter than it was a hundred years ago. Knowledge vs. Experience According to Media Matters, only twenty-two of the fifty largest US newspapers covered the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) 2018 report. Among other things, that report announced a new, lower, threshold for dangerous climate tipping points: 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial temperatures, rather than the previously estimated 2 degrees Celsius. The failure of more than half our top newspapers to cover this is partly the product of the well-funded climate-denial machine detailed by Naomi Oreskes in her book Merchants of Doubt. And it is partly due to pressure from right-leaning owners and advertisers. And partly due to the careerist obedience of too many reporters and editors. That said, one cannot but suspect that the broader American propensity for obtuse empiricism also helps reinforce the denial. This obtuse empiricism is a mentality best summed up as, “If it’s not happening to me, right now, it must not really be happening.” It is the mindset displayed by fossil-fuel-funded Republican Senator Jim Inhofe throwing a snowball on the floor of the Senate during the cold and snowy February of 2015. And while it is tempting to cast climatological empiricism as a rube’s problem, the truth is we all suffer from it. Nor have our scientists always been helpful in disabusing us of our experientially based misapprehensions. For too long meteorologists and climate scientists, though transcending a simple experiential empiricism, nonetheless adhered to an overly rigid esprit de corps of scientific detachment, which caused most to stay politically mute. Thankfully that is now changing. Over the last two decades Jim Hansen has famously led the way, acting as something of a climate science Paul Revere. In 2017, thousands of scientists marched and rallied in DC and hundreds of other cities to demand climate action. Now, Michael Mann of the Earth System Science Center at Penn State has called for better and more truthful coverage of the inextricable articulation of a changing climate and extreme weather events.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Confronting warming requires thinking <u>beyond</u> ourselves </h4><p><strong>Dallavalle and Parenti 19</strong> [<u>Dante Dallavalle</u>---adjunct professor of economics at John Jay College, City University of New York. and <u>Christian Parenti</u>---associate professor of economics at John Jay College, City University of New York, Jacobin, “The Limits of “Experiencing” the Climate Crisis”, https://jacobinmag.com/2019/08/climate-crisis-northeast-extreme-weather/]</p><p>While most of the world bakes, burns, and floods, the US East Coast, the cockpit of American capitalism, has largely avoided extreme weather events, lulling many into a false sense of security. <u><mark>Confronting</u></mark> the <u><mark>climate</u></mark> crisis <u><strong><mark>requires thinking beyond</u></strong> <u>our everyday experiences</u>.</p><p><u></mark>July 2019 was the <strong>hottest month</strong> ever recorded</u>. Across much of the planet, the <u>summer offered glimpses of</u> the <u>hellscape promised by</u> our civilization’s current “<u><strong>business as usual</u></strong>” approach to the climate crisis.</p><p>Another summer, another terrible warning. And yet, there is little political response. Solutions move slowly, if at all.</p><p><u><mark>Central in this dilemma is the</mark> problem of <strong>experience</u></strong>; <u>or rather the <strong><mark>limited utility of experience alone</strong> </mark>in understanding both the scientific realities of climate change and the political-economic realities</u> of its causes and possible solutions.</p><p>As Karl Marx put it: “If there were no difference between essence and appearance, there would be no need for science.”</p><p>Let us begin with the weather and then address the economy.</p><p><u>Extreme Peripheries</p><p><mark>In India</u></mark>, this <u>summer brought record-breaking monsoon rains and mass flooding</u>. <u><strong><mark>Three million people were displaced</u></strong></mark>, whole villages destroyed, many scores killed. Across the Arctic, <u>from Siberia to Alaska</u> and the Canadian Yukon, <u><mark>hot weather</u></mark> has <u><mark>spurred</u></mark> on <u>an <strong><mark>unprecedented</strong> number of <strong>fires</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Even Greenland had fires</u></strong>. By mid-summer between 250 and <u>300 fire “hot spots” were being recorded</u> everyday — four to five times higher than most previous years. <u>In Siberia</u>, as July ended, about three million hectares, or <u>an area larger than Massachusetts and Rhode Island combined, was <strong>burning</strong>.</p><p></u>Worse yet, soot and ash from the fires, traveling hundreds of miles and settling upon Arctic ice will, by darkening the ice, absorb more heat and accelerate melting. On the first day of August, Greenland’s ice sheet released an estimated 12.5 billion tons of ice into the ocean, the largest single-day volume loss on record. As one climate scientist pointed out, the amount of ice lost on July 31 and August 1 was enough to cover Florida in almost five inches of water.</p><p>Rapid ice sheet melting means rapidly rising sea levels. According to one recent report polar ice sheet melting has already contributed a half-inch of sea-level rise since 1972. And in a sign of acceleration half of that total occurred in only the last eight years.</p><p>Strange Calm in The Northeast</p><p><u>Amidst this panorama of doom appears a grave political irony</u>: <u>the US Northeast and mid-Atlantic</u>, though they have experienced very dramatic average warming as well as record-breaking winter cold snaps recently, <u>have</u> largely <u><strong>avoided truly destructive extreme weather</u></strong> events since Superstorm Sandy in 2012.</p><p><u><mark>California suffers regular</u></mark> massive <u><mark>forest fires</u></mark>, much of <u><strong><mark>the Midwest is water logged and ripped up by tornadoes</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>the Gulf Coast</mark> and Carolinas <mark>have been hammered by hurricanes</u></mark>. But in <u>the Northeast</u> megalopolis, the BosWash Corridor, a strange illusion of <u><strong>normality prevails</u></strong>. Even as the Northeast has seen the greatest increase in average warming of any region in the country, it has managed to avoid prolonged, deadly, extreme heat waves.</p><p><u>For the fifty million people who live there</u> and depend on the regional infrastructure, not suffering catastrophic floods or fires or deadly heat waves is a blessing. But this relative <u>calm</u> also <u>helps instill <strong>political somnambulism.</p><p></u></strong>Clearly <u><mark>polluter-funded disinformation is the <strong>primary reason</strong> people are not more worried</u></mark> about climate change. But <u>the lack of catastrophic extreme weather</u> in the Northeast also <u>plays a role.</p><p>All over the world</u>, but <u><strong><mark>especially in the United States</u></strong>, <u>people tend to discount scientific abstractions and </mark>instead <mark>rely on their <strong>own, </mark>immediate, empirical <mark>experience</u></strong></mark>. In the country’s most important center of political, financial, and media decision-making, this <u>obtuse empiricism <strong>amplifies</strong> polluter-promoted political inaction.</p><p></u>In other words, if Wall Street were flooding, DC’s roofs were being ripped off by monster winds, and New Jersey’s suburbs were burning while scorched black bears galloped toward the sea, we would likely see far more pushback against fossil fuel-funded disinformation. We might even see new social movements emerging among beleaguered renters, workers, and indebted homeowners. With movements we would see the more urgency and action from politicians, pundits, and other members of the professional-managerial class.</p><p>Sloppy Jet Stream</p><p>To some extent the Greenland thaw, the European heat wave, the Artic fires, even the intensity of the South Asian monsoon, and the illusion of relatively normal weather in the US Northeast, all seem to be linked by the phenomenon of an increasingly erratic northern polar jet stream.</p><p>Jet streams are the systems of winds that move eastward across the Earth. They are formed by a combination of the spinning of the Earth on its axis and the temperature differentials between the equator and the poles. The northern and southern hemispheres each have a polar and a subtropical jet stream. The northern polar jet stream plays a major role in governing day-to-day weather across the northern hemisphere.</p><p>The bigger the differences in temperature between masses of air, the stronger and faster are the winds of the jet streams. But now, anthropogenic climate change is heating the poles faster than the lower latitudes; and the Arctic is heating faster than anywhere else.</p><p>This northern warming diminishes the temperature differentials that power the northern polar jet stream. As the northern jet stream weakens, it slows. As it slows, it starts to wobble and shift course. Or at least that is one prominent scientific theory attempting to explain the increasingly weird and wavy behavior of the northern jet stream.</p><p>Scientific debate about jet stream patterns is hampered, in part, by lack of detailed historical data. Unlike surface temperatures and sea levels, the jet streams, occurring as they do up in the atmosphere, have not been measured in great detail over a long period.</p><p>This sloppier, meandering northern jet stream seems to be shifting further north over Europe and Russia, allowing hot air to push up from the south. This summer’s European heat wave is associated with this trapped or “blocked” jet stream. This pattern of warm, dry air reaching unusually far north is also accelerating the rapid melting of Greenland’s ice sheet.</p><p>But for the last half-decade or so the jet stream over the East Coast of North America has been normal and even sometimes dipped unusually far south relative to the whole pattern, pulling down cool polar air with it, occasionally giving us those old-school wintertime polar blasts. Along with fewer hurricanes making landfall, all of this is providing the Northeast megalopolis with the illusion of normal weather.</p><p>We say “illusion” because, as the Washington Post recently reported, the Northeast is actually much hotter than it was a century ago and is heating faster than anywhere else in the lower forty-eight states. In fact, the average temperature in New Jersey is now 2 degrees Celsius hotter than it was a hundred years ago.</p><p>Knowledge vs. Experience</p><p>According to Media Matters, only twenty-two of the fifty largest US newspapers covered the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) 2018 report. Among other things, that report announced a new, lower, threshold for dangerous climate tipping points: 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial temperatures, rather than the previously estimated 2 degrees Celsius.</p><p>The failure of more than half our top newspapers to cover this is partly the product of the well-funded climate-denial machine detailed by Naomi Oreskes in her book Merchants of Doubt. And it is partly due to pressure from right-leaning owners and advertisers. And partly due to the careerist obedience of too many reporters and editors. That said, one cannot but suspect that the broader American propensity for obtuse empiricism also helps reinforce the denial.</p><p>This obtuse empiricism is a mentality best summed up as, “If it’s not happening to me, right now, it must not really be happening.” It is the mindset displayed by fossil-fuel-funded Republican Senator Jim Inhofe throwing a snowball on the floor of the Senate during the cold and snowy February of 2015. And while it is tempting to cast climatological empiricism as a rube’s problem, the truth is we all suffer from it.</p><p>Nor have our scientists always been helpful in disabusing us of our experientially based misapprehensions. <u><mark>For too long meteorologists and climate scientists</u></mark>, though transcending a simple experiential empiricism, nonetheless <u><mark>adhered to</mark> an <mark>overly rigid</mark> esprit de corps of <mark>scientific detachment</u></mark>, which caused most to stay politically mute.</p><p>Thankfully <u><strong><mark>that is now changing.</u></strong></mark> Over the last two decades Jim <u>Hansen</u> has <u>famously led the way, acting as</u> something of a <u><strong>climate</u></strong> science <u><strong>Paul Revere</u></strong>. In 2017, thousands of scientists marched and rallied in DC and hundreds of other cities to demand climate action. Now, Michael Mann of the Earth System Science Center at Penn State has called for better and more truthful coverage of the inextricable articulation of a changing climate and extreme weather events.</p><|im_end|>