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<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Regulatory Review, 3-5-2018, "Understanding and Addressing Controversies About Agency Guidance," https://www.theregreview.org/2018/03/05/parrillo-otis-understanding-addressing-controversies-agency-guidance/ ///AS fulltext: For individuals and firms who live under federal regulation, actual regulations are just the beginning of the story. Despite being voluminous and complex, regulations leave many matters open to interpretation, and they leave agency officials with discretion over implementation and enforcement. Individuals and firms want to know how the agency reads the ambiguous provisions and how it will use the discretion left it. And officials want individuals and firms to have that knowledge to facilitate voluntary compliance. So officials provide the public with lots of “guidance”: advisories, interpretive letters, enforcement manuals, fact sheets, FAQs, and more. Although ubiquitous, guidance is also controversial. It can be issued without the process that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) mandates for regulations—most prominently notice and comment—because it qualifies for the APA’s exemptions for interpretive rules and policy statements. Thus, guidance can be produced and altered much faster, and in higher volume, than regulations. What justifies this disparity, in the familiar telling, is that guidance, unlike a regulation, is not binding. It is only a suggestion of what the agency is inclined to do, not something the agency will follow in an automatic, ironclad manner. If an individual or firm wants to do something different, the agency is supposed to give fair consideration to that alternative approach. If officials treat guidance with this kind of flexibility, it does not seem so bad for the agency to be unconstrained in issuing guidance to begin with. Yet individuals and firms subject to regulation have long complained that, although guidance is officially nonbinding, it is coercive in real life. If true, this complaint reveals a giant loophole in the APA: Agencies can issue de facto regulations with little constraint simply by calling them “guidance.” The classic articulation of this fear was penned a quarter-century ago by former Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) chairman Robert Anthony, who said that the “capital problem” was that agencies will frequently issue guidance documents with the improper “intent or effect of imposing a practical binding norm upon the regulated or benefited public.” Anthony did little to elaborate on “effect” and instead focused largely on “intent,” for he believed agencies’ abuses were very often deliberate. Relatedly, the ACUS recommendation arising from Anthony’s report spoke exclusively in terms of intent, denouncing the issuance of documents other than regulations “that are intended to impose binding substantive standards.” Twenty-five years later, ACUS sponsored a new study of guidance to reexamine the subject in light of current administrative practice, and it has recently issued a new recommendation based on that study. The study draws on interviews with 135 individuals across agencies, industries, and NGOs, finding that, consistent with Anthony’s worries, regulated parties often (though not always) have no practical choice but to follow a guidance document. But the study also finds that Anthony was mistaken to view this phenomenon primarily in terms of the agency’s “intent” to produce this outcome. Rather, the problem of coercive guidance is far more often one of institution-level behavior that nobody fully intends. Coercive guidance therefore calls primarily for an institutional-reform response. Certain structural features of modern regulation impose a strong incentive on regulated parties to figure out what the agency wants and to do just that, regardless of the format in which the agency’s wants are expressed (regulation or guidance). For example, some regulatory schemes have pre-approval requirements, in which a regulated party must win the agency’s affirmative assent to obtain some legal advantage, such as a license or benefit. Think of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s requirement for pre-market approval of new drugs, or Medicare’s reimbursements to health providers. If the regulated party stands to suffer major losses from a denial or delay, it will do whatever it can to win the agency’s approval in the first go-around, and fast. That means following guidance. Other regulatory schemes create a strong incentive for a regulated party to maintain a positive image and relationship with the agency—most commonly, if the party is subject to repeated evaluations by the agency and if the law is so complicated that the party will inevitably fail to comply with some requirements some of the time. For example, banks work to win the trust of the agencies that supervise them, knowing these relationships may need to be “cashed in” someday. Also, most guidance is addressed to firms, and the firm is a “they,” not an “it.” The employees at a firm who confront agency guidance increasingly work in compliance departments, and they typically possess a disposition and socialization that may give them an overriding motivation to stay in the agency’s good graces. Finally, following guidance may be the best way to avoid the initiation of an enforcement proceeding, which firms often do not want to risk, regardless of how it turns out. Firms may seek to avoid enforcement altogether because markets may take it as a signal that the firm cannot be trusted by its counter-parties (as in accounting) or because the statutorily authorized sanctions are so draconian that many firms dare not refuse whatever “deal” the enforcers offer them and thus never get to a neutral adjudicator (as with Medicare exclusion). These structural features, present in various combinations in many although far from all regulatory schemes, often make it difficult for regulated parties to act out of line with agency guidance. This pressure occurs regardless of whether agency officials “intend” the documents to be coercive—it is hard-wired into the regulatory scheme. These pressures are diminished if agency officials are sufficiently open to considering alternative approaches to those delineated in a guidance document and the regulated entities know it. But agency officials are under institutional pressures that often lead them to be inflexible. Agencies are frequently under active and legitimate stakeholder pressure to be inflexible (that is, to maintain consistency). When regulated parties are competitors, an agency that departs from guidance in the case of one firm may put other firms at a competitive disadvantage. Individualized flexibility on guidance can also draw accusations of favoritism from NGOs, the media, and Congress. These concerns can be mitigated if the agency gives public rationales for guidance departures and makes the rationales applicable to similarly situated parties going forward. That approach provides flexibility, but in a principled, even-handed, and transparent manner. But that is easier said than done. Reason-giving requires officials to spend scarce time and money working up the explanation, usually obtaining approval from a higher-level official, which creates a bottleneck. There are also organizational obstacles to flexibility. The distinction between binding and nonbinding rules is not intuitive; training helps, but can be costly. In addition, some offices tend not to develop the kind of cooperative relationships with regulated parties that foster flexibility; this is particularly likely for enforcement offices, which are distinct from program offices. Finally, higher-level officials authorized to override their subordinates’ adherence to guidance are often loath to do so, because it feels like pulling the rug out from under the people who work for them. The new ACUS recommendation—which covers policy statements and may also be helpful for interpretive rules—sets forth a series of measures to foster flexibility in the face of these challenges. Some of the measures are low-cost and should be adopted universally, like making sure that policy statements include a disclaimer of binding status on the public, and ensuring that, if some agency employees are bound to follow a policy statement, other higher-level employees are authorized to depart from it. But other measures are not low cost. They will take up resources and managerial initiative that might be spent elsewhere. These measures include: publishing reasons for departures from a policy statement; training and monitoring frontline personnel to ensure they treat departure requests appropriately; fostering dialogue about departures through intermediaries like ombudspersons and associations; assigning departure authority to agency offices that have give-and-take relationships with regulated parties; and assigning appeals of departure denials to officials who do not regularly work with the people whose decisions might be overridden. As result, priorities about which measures to use will have to be set. The recent ACUS recommendation says that agencies should invest more in promoting flexible use of a policy statement when regulated parties are otherwise under strong pressure to comply with the statement or the statement has a significant impact on private interests. On the other hand, agencies should invest less in flexibility when legitimate concerns about the need for consistency dominate in the minds of officials and stakeholders. We have focused thus far on how guidance affects regulated parties. But it also affects third parties. For example, guidance may harm the beneficiaries of regulation, like citizens breathing polluted air, since some guidance may be practically favorable to regulated parties compared to the status quo. The agency might say it thinks a safety measure, previously viewed as necessary, actually is not, or that some activities that violate the law will be a “low priority” for enforcement. Thus the agency may effectively deregulate without APA procedures for amending or rescinding regulations, thereby blocking regulatory beneficiaries from participating in those decisions. Or guidance may harm other third parties like consumers by promoting installation of a costly but not legally required pollution control device. The remedy for this kind of problem could, theoretically, be the same as the remedy for guidance that unduly coerces regulated parties: The agency should treat the guidance flexibly on a case-by-case basis, generally adhering to the path outlined in the guidance—but not always. The idea is that an approach that allows or encourages some parties to harm others, unless done by notice and comment, should not give ironclad protection to those who may do harm. But this may not work very well in the real world. When an agency offers “safe harbors” that are not actually 100 percent safe, it puts regulated parties in a difficult position. Flexibility also may not do much to protect regulatory beneficiaries and interested third parties. It can help in situations where these parties, or NGOs representing them, can and do participate in individual cases and argue against applying the guidance. This may happen if the cases are big and salient, and if the NGOs are well-resourced and sophisticated—as seems to be the case for some U.S. Environmental Protection Agency permitting proceedings. But often these conditions do not hold. This brings us to the final part of the new recommendation, on getting members of the public to participate when an agency first adopts a policy statement. Public participation can be achieved through soliciting comments or through less formal means like workshops and targeted outreach to stakeholders. Such interaction may be quite valuable to regulated parties, and it may be the only time regulatory beneficiaries and interested third parties can practically provide input on the statement. The recommendation does not adopt any set formula for when to invite participation or how. Instead, it lays out factors for the agency to consider. On the one hand, participation can provide officials with better information and increased stakeholder acceptance of the policy statement (On the other hand, participation can backfire if the agency lacks the resources or inclination to be responsive to the views it hears.). Participation can also slow the adoption of a policy statement, potentially prolonging the limbo stage in which the statement is in published “draft” form, and might cause stakeholder confusion about whether to follow the statement. In the end, the quest to pursue a highly participatory process for crafting guidance might well eat up resources that could be used to formulate guidance on other subjects where stakeholders are in the dark. We do not expect the measures laid out in the recommendation to serve as a panacea for the various challenges that agency guidance presents. But we do hope that they provide agency officials and members of the public some useful ways to think about these conundrums and a broader toolkit of options to help address them.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>*They’re controversial. If that’s not true, they get put into place immediately. That makes it a double bind. Either they link to the net benefit because it’s controversial or it can perm because it can happen at the same time. </h4><p>Regulatory Review, 3-5-2018, "Understanding and Addressing Controversies About Agency Guidance," https://www.theregreview.org/2018/03/05/parrillo-otis-understanding-addressing-controversies-agency-guidance/ ///AS</p><p>For individuals and firms who live under federal regulation, actual regulations are just the beginning of the story. <u>Despite being voluminous and complex, <mark>regulations leave</mark> many <mark>matters open to interpretation</mark>, <mark>and</mark> they <mark>leave agency officials with discretion over implementation and enforcement. Individuals</mark> and firms <mark>want to know how the agency reads the</mark> ambiguous <mark>provisions</mark> and how it will use the discretion left it.</u> And officials want individuals and firms to have that knowledge to facilitate voluntary compliance. <u>So officials provide the public with lots of “guidance”: advisories, interpretive letters, enforcement manuals, fact sheets, FAQs, and more. Although ubiquitous, <mark>guidance is also controversial.</mark> It can be issued without the process that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) mandates for regulations—most prominently notice and comment—because it qualifies for the APA’s exemptions for interpretive rules and policy statements. Thus, guidance can be produced and altered much faster, and in higher volume, than regulations.</u> What justifies this disparity, in the familiar telling, is that <u><mark>guidance</mark>, unlike a regulation, <mark>is not binding. It is only a suggestion</mark> of what the agency is inclined to do, not something the agency will follow in an automatic, ironclad manner.</u> If an individual or firm wants to do something different, the agency is supposed to give fair consideration to that alternative approach. If officials treat guidance with this kind of flexibility, it does not seem so bad for the agency to be unconstrained in issuing guidance to begin with. Yet individuals and firms subject to regulation have long complained that, although guidance is officially nonbinding, it is coercive in real life. <u>If true, this complaint reveals a giant loophole in the APA: <mark>Agencies can issue de facto regulations with little constraint simply by calling them “guidance.”</mark> </u>The classic articulation of this fear was penned a quarter-century ago by former Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) chairman Robert Anthony, who said that the “capital problem” was that agencies will frequently issue guidance documents with the improper “intent or effect of imposing a practical binding norm upon the regulated or benefited public.” Anthony did little to elaborate on “effect” and instead focused largely on “intent,” for he believed agencies’ abuses were very often deliberate. Relatedly, the ACUS recommendation arising from Anthony’s report spoke exclusively in terms of intent, denouncing the issuance of documents other than regulations “that are intended to impose binding substantive standards.” Twenty-five years later, ACUS sponsored a new study of guidance to reexamine the subject in light of current administrative practice, and it has recently issued a new recommendation based on that study. The study draws on interviews with 135 individuals across agencies, industries, and NGOs, finding that, consistent with Anthony’s worries, regulated parties often (though not always) have no practical choice but to follow a guidance document. But the study also finds that Anthony was mistaken to view this phenomenon primarily in terms of the agency’s “intent” to produce this outcome. Rather, the problem of coercive guidance is far more often one of institution-level behavior that nobody fully intends. Coercive guidance therefore calls primarily for an institutional-reform response. Certain structural features of modern regulation impose a strong incentive on regulated parties to figure out what the agency wants and to do just that, regardless of the format in which the agency’s wants are expressed (regulation or guidance). For example, some regulatory schemes have pre-approval requirements, in which a regulated party must win the agency’s affirmative assent to obtain some legal advantage, such as a license or benefit. Think of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s requirement for pre-market approval of new drugs, or Medicare’s reimbursements to health providers. If the regulated party stands to suffer major losses from a denial or delay, it will do whatever it can to win the agency’s approval in the first go-around, and fast. That means following guidance. Other regulatory schemes create a strong incentive for a regulated party to maintain a positive image and relationship with the agency—most commonly, if the party is subject to repeated evaluations by the agency and if the law is so complicated that the party will inevitably fail to comply with some requirements some of the time. For example, banks work to win the trust of the agencies that supervise them, knowing these relationships may need to be “cashed in” someday. Also, most guidance is addressed to firms, and the firm is a “they,” not an “it.” The employees at a firm who confront agency guidance increasingly work in compliance departments, and they typically possess a disposition and socialization that may give them an overriding motivation to stay in the agency’s good graces. Finally, following guidance may be the best way to avoid the initiation of an enforcement proceeding, which firms often do not want to risk, regardless of how it turns out. Firms may seek to avoid enforcement altogether because markets may take it as a signal that the firm cannot be trusted by its counter-parties (as in accounting) or because the statutorily authorized sanctions are so draconian that many firms dare not refuse whatever “deal” the enforcers offer them and thus never get to a neutral adjudicator (as with Medicare exclusion). These structural features, present in various combinations in many although far from all regulatory schemes, often make it difficult for regulated parties to act out of line with agency guidance. This pressure occurs regardless of whether agency officials “intend” the documents to be coercive—it is hard-wired into the regulatory scheme. These pressures are diminished if agency officials are sufficiently open to considering alternative approaches to those delineated in a guidance document and the regulated entities know it. But agency officials are under institutional pressures that often lead them to be inflexible. Agencies are frequently under active and legitimate stakeholder pressure to be inflexible (that is, to maintain consistency). When regulated parties are competitors, an agency that departs from guidance in the case of one firm may put other firms at a competitive disadvantage. Individualized flexibility on guidance can also draw accusations of favoritism from NGOs, the media, and Congress. These concerns can be mitigated if the agency gives public rationales for guidance departures and makes the rationales applicable to similarly situated parties going forward. That approach provides flexibility, but in a principled, even-handed, and transparent manner. But that is easier said than done. Reason-giving requires officials to spend scarce time and money working up the explanation, usually obtaining approval from a higher-level official, which creates a bottleneck. There are also organizational obstacles to flexibility. The distinction between binding and nonbinding rules is not intuitive; training helps, but can be costly. In addition, some offices tend not to develop the kind of cooperative relationships with regulated parties that foster flexibility; this is particularly likely for enforcement offices, which are distinct from program offices. Finally, higher-level officials authorized to override their subordinates’ adherence to guidance are often loath to do so, because it feels like pulling the rug out from under the people who work for them. The new ACUS recommendation—which covers policy statements and may also be helpful for interpretive rules—sets forth a series of measures to foster flexibility in the face of these challenges. Some of the measures are low-cost and should be adopted universally, like making sure that policy statements include a disclaimer of binding status on the public, and ensuring that, if some agency employees are bound to follow a policy statement, other higher-level employees are authorized to depart from it. But other measures are not low cost. They will take up resources and managerial initiative that might be spent elsewhere. These measures include: publishing reasons for departures from a policy statement; training and monitoring frontline personnel to ensure they treat departure requests appropriately; fostering dialogue about departures through intermediaries like ombudspersons and associations; assigning departure authority to agency offices that have give-and-take relationships with regulated parties; and assigning appeals of departure denials to officials who do not regularly work with the people whose decisions might be overridden. As result, priorities about which measures to use will have to be set. The recent ACUS recommendation says that agencies should invest more in promoting flexible use of a policy statement when regulated parties are otherwise under strong pressure to comply with the statement or the statement has a significant impact on private interests. On the other hand, agencies should invest less in flexibility when legitimate concerns about the need for consistency dominate in the minds of officials and stakeholders. We have focused thus far on how guidance affects regulated parties. But it also affects third parties. For example, guidance may harm the beneficiaries of regulation, like citizens breathing polluted air, since some guidance may be practically favorable to regulated parties compared to the status quo. The agency might say it thinks a safety measure, previously viewed as necessary, actually is not, or that some activities that violate the law will be a “low priority” for enforcement. Thus the agency may effectively deregulate without APA procedures for amending or rescinding regulations, thereby blocking regulatory beneficiaries from participating in those decisions. Or guidance may harm other third parties like consumers by promoting installation of a costly but not legally required pollution control device. The remedy for this kind of problem could, theoretically, be the same as the remedy for guidance that unduly coerces regulated parties: The agency should treat the guidance flexibly on a case-by-case basis, generally adhering to the path outlined in the guidance—but not always. The idea is that an approach that allows or encourages some parties to harm others, unless done by notice and comment, should not give ironclad protection to those who may do harm. But this may not work very well in the real world. When an agency offers “safe harbors” that are not actually 100 percent safe, it puts regulated parties in a difficult position. Flexibility also may not do much to protect regulatory beneficiaries and interested third parties. It can help in situations where these parties, or NGOs representing them, can and do participate in individual cases and argue against applying the guidance. This may happen if the cases are big and salient, and if the NGOs are well-resourced and sophisticated—as seems to be the case for some U.S. Environmental Protection Agency permitting proceedings. But often these conditions do not hold. This brings us to the final part of the new recommendation, on getting members of the public to participate when an agency first adopts a policy statement. Public participation can be achieved through soliciting comments or through less formal means like workshops and targeted outreach to stakeholders. Such interaction may be quite valuable to regulated parties, and it may be the only time regulatory beneficiaries and interested third parties can practically provide input on the statement. The recommendation does not adopt any set formula for when to invite participation or how. Instead, it lays out factors for the agency to consider. On the one hand, participation can provide officials with better information and increased stakeholder acceptance of the policy statement (On the other hand, participation can backfire if the agency lacks the resources or inclination to be responsive to the views it hears.). Participation can also slow the adoption of a policy statement, potentially prolonging the limbo stage in which the statement is in published “draft” form, and might cause stakeholder confusion about whether to follow the statement. In the end, the quest to pursue a highly participatory process for crafting guidance might well eat up resources that could be used to formulate guidance on other subjects where stakeholders are in the dark. We do not expect the measures laid out in the recommendation to serve as a panacea for the various challenges that agency guidance presents. But we do hope that they provide agency officials and members of the public some useful ways to think about these conundrums and a broader toolkit of options to help address them.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Carlos Martinez 21 {editor of Invent the Future as well as author and researcher based in the UK} – (“Blaming China for the climate crisis is shameful nonsense,” Morning Star, published 05-11-2021, accessed 10-26-2022, https://morningstaronline.co.uk/article/blaming-china-climate-crisis-shameful-nonsense)//arlborough-wr/ fulltext: The West has followed a Cold War agenda of arlboroug the world’s most populous country, when in fact it is China that emits less per-person than the US and many of its other critics, while leading the way in renewable energy, reforestation and electric vehicles, writes CARLOS MARTINEZ IN the run-up to the Cop26 UN Climate Change Conference, currently taking place in Glasgow, politicians and media in the West conducted a coordinated and insistent campaign to shift responsibility for the climate crisis on to China. US President Joe Biden claimed in his closing statement to the G20 summit, the day before the start of Cop26, that China “basically didn’t show up in terms of any commitments to deal with climate change.” He further stated that meaningful progress on climate change negotiations is “going to require us to continue to focus on what China’s not doing.” Biden specifically arlboroug Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin for not attending the G20 summit in person, although he failed to mention that they did attend via video link. Several commentators on social media have noted that attending a climate change conference via Zoom produces significantly less emissions than arriving in a private jet and travelling round Glasgow in an 85-car motorcade, which is what Biden did at Cop26. Blaming China is nothing new of course and feeds in to the new Cold War that the US and its allies are cultivating, with a view to protecting and expanding the US-led imperialist system. China is an enemy, a “strategic competitor” — it must not be allowed to “win the 21st century.” When it comes to the global struggle to prevent climate catastrophe, pushing responsibility towards China has a further benefit beyond old-fashioned demonisation; it means shifting the responsibility away from the advanced capitalist countries which might otherwise be expected to fix a problem largely of their making. The “it’s all China’s fault” narrative rests on two key themes: first, that China has for the last few years been the world’s largest emitter (in absolute terms) of greenhouse gases; second, that China has committed to achieving carbon neutrality by 2060, whereas the US and Britain have said they will bring all greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by 2050. Such a narrative is flawed in five obvious ways. First, China is the world’s most populous country, with a population of 1.4 billion. Measured on a per capita basis, China’s emissions are very ordinary — around the same level as Bulgaria or New Zealand. To understand the relevance of the per capita calculation, just imagine China, which has more than four times the US’s population, is split into four different countries — that is, imagine that the wildest fantasies of the imperialist nations have been arlboro! Each one of these nations would have under half the emissions of the US. Second, the comparison of current annual emissions distorts the overall picture. Greenhouse gases don’t suddenly disappear from the atmosphere; carbon dioxide hangs around for hundreds of years. In terms of cumulative emissions — the quantity of excess greenhouse gases in the atmosphere right now — the US is responsible for 25 per cent, although it contains just 4 per cent of the world’s population. China meanwhile is responsible for 13 per cent of cumulative emissions, in spite of having 18 per cent of the world’s population. Over the course of 200 years, Europe, North America and Japan have become modern industrialised countries, burning enormous quantities of assorted fossil fuels and creating an environmental crisis. Now they want to both shift the blame onto others and pull up the ladder of development. Any reasonable person will agree that this is outright moral bankruptcy. Third, the reason China’s emissions have gone up in recent decades while the West’s emissions have gone down has essentially nothing to do with people in the rich countries compromising on their lifestyles or governments making impressive progress on arlboroughon; rather, it’s that the advanced capitalist countries have exported their emissions to the developing world. China as the “workshop of the world” means that products consumed in the West are very often produced in China. Chinese emissions are primarily caused by manufacturing and infrastructure development, not by luxury consumption. In fact, average household energy consumption in the US and Canada is eight times higher than in China. Fourth and related is the fact that China is a developing country. The leading capitalist countries of Europe, North America and Japan reached peak greenhouse gas emissions in the 1980s, after nearly two centuries of industrialization If they succeed in achieving net zero emissions by 2050, their journey from peak carbon to net zero will have taken six or seven decades. Before the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s economy was based overwhelmingly on small-scale agriculture. There was very little industry, very little transport infrastructure; only a tiny fraction of the population had access to modern energy. Since then, China’s use of fossil fuels has steadily increased as it has industrialised. If it meets its targets of reaching peak emissions by 2030 and zero carbon by 2060, both achievements will have taken less than half the time they took in the West. Fifth, China is already making extraordinary progress towards tackling climate change. It is unquestionably the world leader in renewable energy, with a total capacity greater than the US, the EU, Japan and Britain combined. For the last two decades, it has been making a concerted effort to reduce its reliance on coal, which currently makes up 56 per cent of its power mix, down from over 80 per cent. China’s forest coverage has increased from 12 per cent in the early 1980s to 23 per cent today. It has established national parks covering 230,000 square kilometres. Meanwhile it also leads the world in the production and use of electric cars, trains and buses. Around 99 per cent of the world’s electric buses are in China, along with 70 per cent of the world’s high-speed rail. Even leading US politicians have arlboroug China’s progress. Back in December 2019, setting out his vision for the US to accelerate its arlboroughon, John Kerry observed in an article for the New York Times that “China is becoming an energy superpower,” and it had “surpassed us for the lead in renewable energy technology.” He went on, “China is doing things we are afraid to do. They offer citizens large subsidies for purchasing electric vehicles from state-owned companies.” Of course, the world needs China — as the largest current emitter — to take serious action to reduce emissions. Indeed there is a clear consensus at all levels of Chinese government on tackling climate change, biodiversity and pollution. China is taking the project of constructing an “ecological arlborough” very seriously — it is hypocritical and nonsensical for the West to play the blame game and to push responsibility onto China. As it stands, the US and its allies are more committed to their new Cold War than they are to a safe future for humanity. This is exemplified by US import bans on Chinese solar panels, based on the unproven and libellous accusation that this industry makes use of slave labour in Xinjiang. Environmental catastrophe is knocking at the door. We need to get serious. The West must drop its policy of arlboroug and threatening China; it must adopt an approach of multilateralism and co-operation. The US, Europe, China and others should be collaborating on research and development for climate change adaptation and mitigation; on renewable energy systems; on artificial intelligence systems for monitoring weather patterns; on providing urgently needed support to the least-developed countries. China has been abundantly clear that it wants a close, collaborative relationship with the other major powers around environmental issues. The ball is in our court. Those of us in the West should be demanding our governments stop shirking their responsibilities, to build mutual trust with China and to do everything possible to keep Earth habitable for humanity.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The 1AC is engaged in <u>Cold War</u> logic that <u>expands imperialism</u> and <u>demonizes China</u>. The East isn’t the problem – we are</h4><p>Carlos <strong>Martinez 21</strong> {editor of Invent the Future as well as author and researcher based in the UK} – (“Blaming China for the climate crisis is shameful nonsense,” Morning Star, published 05-11-2021, accessed 10-26-2022, https://morningstaronline.co.uk/article/blaming-china-climate-crisis-shameful-nonsense)//arlborough-wr/</p><p><u>The West has followed a <strong>Cold War agenda</strong> of <strong>arlboroug the world’s most populous country</strong>, when in fact it is China that emits less per-person than the US and many of its other critics, while leading the way in renewable energy, reforestation and electric vehicles</u>, writes CARLOS MARTINEZ</p><p><u>IN the run-up to the Cop26 UN Climate Change Conference, currently taking place in Glasgow, politicians and media in the West conducted a coordinated and insistent campaign to shift responsibility for the climate crisis on to China.</p><p></u>US President Joe <u><mark>Biden claimed</mark> in his closing statement <mark>to</mark> the <mark>G20</mark> summit, the day before the start of Cop26, <mark>that China “basically didn’t show up</mark> in terms of any commitments to deal with climate change.” He further stated that meaningful progress on climate change negotiations is “going to require us to continue to focus on what China’s not doing.”</p><p></u>Biden specifically arlboroug<u> Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin for not attending the G20 summit in person, although he failed to mention that they did attend via video link. Several commentators on social media have noted that attending a climate change conference via Zoom produces significantly less emissions than arriving in a private jet and travelling round Glasgow in an 85-car motorcade, which is what Biden did at Cop26.</p><p><mark>Blaming China</mark> is nothing new of course and <mark>feeds in to </mark>the <strong>new Cold War</strong> that the US and its allies are cultivating, with a view to <strong><mark>protecting and expanding the</mark> US-led <mark>imperialist system</strong>. </mark>China is an <strong>enemy, a “strategic competitor”</strong> — it must not be allowed to “<strong>win</strong> the 21st century.”</p><p><mark>When it</mark> <mark>comes</mark> <mark>to</mark> the global struggle to prevent <mark>climate</mark> catastrophe, pushing responsibility towards China has a further benefit beyond old-fashioned<mark> demonisatio</mark>n; it <mark>means <strong>shifting</mark> the <mark>responsibility</strong></mark> <mark>away from the</mark> advanced <mark>capitalist countries which might</mark> otherwise be expected to <mark>fix a problem</mark> largely of their making.</p><p><mark>The “<strong>it’s all China’s fault</strong>” narrative</mark> rests on two key themes: first, that China has for the last few years been the world’s largest emitter (in absolute terms) of greenhouse gases; second, that China has committed to achieving carbon neutrality by 2060, whereas the US and Britain have said they will bring all greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by 2050.</p><p>Such a narrative <mark>is <strong>flawed</strong></mark> in five obvious ways.</p><p></u>First, <u>China is the world’s <strong>most populous country</u></strong>, with a population of 1.4 billion. <u>Measured <mark>on a <strong>per capita basis</strong>, China’s emissions are <strong>very ordinary</mark> — around the same level as Bulgaria or New Zealand.</p><p></u></strong>To understand the relevance of the per capita calculation, <u>just <mark>imagine China</mark>, which has more than four times the US’s population, <mark>is split into four</mark> different countries</u> — that is, imagine that the wildest fantasies of the imperialist nations have been arlboro! <u><mark>Each</u></mark> one of these nations <u><mark>would have <strong>under half the emissions of the US.</p><p></u></strong></mark>Second, <u>the comparison of <strong>current annual emissions distorts</strong> the overall picture. Greenhouse gases don’t suddenly disappear from the atmosphere; carbon dioxide hangs around for hundreds of years.</p><p><mark>In terms of <strong>cumulative emissions</u></strong></mark> — the quantity of excess greenhouse gases in the atmosphere right now — <u><mark>the US is responsible for 25 per cent</mark>, although <mark>it contains</mark> just <mark>4 per cent of the</mark> world’s <mark>population</mark>. <mark>China</mark> meanwhile <mark>is responsible for 13 per cent</u></mark> of cumulative emissions, <u><mark>in spite of having 18 per cent of</mark> <mark>the</mark> world’s <mark>population.</p><p></mark>Over the course of 200 years, Europe, North America and Japan have become modern industrialised countries, burning enormous quantities of assorted fossil fuels and creating an environmental crisis. Now they want to both <strong>shift the blame onto others and pull up the ladder of development</strong>.</u> Any reasonable person will agree that <u><strong>this is outright moral bankruptcy.</p><p></u></strong>Third, <u>the reason China’s emissions have gone up in recent decades while the West’s emissions have gone down has essentially nothing to do with people in the rich <strong>countries compromising on their lifestyles</strong> or governments making impressive progress on <strong>arlboroughon</strong>; rather, it’s that the advanced <mark>capitalist countries</mark> have <strong><mark>exported</mark> their <mark>emissions</strong></mark> to the developing world.</p><p>China as the “<strong>workshop of the world</strong>” means that <mark>products consumed in the West are</mark> very often <mark>produced in China.</mark> Chinese emissions are primarily caused by <strong>manufacturing and infrastructure development</strong>, not by luxury consumption. </u>In fact,<u> average <mark>household energy consumption in the US</mark> and Canada <mark>is <strong>eight times higher</strong></mark> than in China.</p><p></u>Fourth and related is the fact that <u>China is a developing country. </u>The<u> <mark>leading capitalist countries</mark> </u>of Europe, North America and Japan<u> <mark>reached peak</mark> greenhouse gas <mark>emissions</mark> in the 1980s, <mark>after</mark> nearly <mark>two centuries of</mark> <mark>industrialization</mark> If they succeed in achieving net zero emissions by 2050, their journey from peak carbon to net zero will have taken six or seven decades.</p><p>Before the</u> proclamation of the <u>People’s Republic of China</u> in 1949, <u><mark>China’s economy was based</mark> overwhelmingly <mark>on small-scale agriculture<strong></mark>. There was very little industry, very little transport infrastructure; only a tiny fraction of the population had access to modern energy.</p><p></strong>Since then, China’s use of fossil fuels has steadily increased as it has industrialised. If it meets <mark>its targets</mark> of reaching peak emissions by 2030 and zero carbon by 2060, both achievements <mark>will have taken <strong></mark>less than <mark>half the time they took</mark> in <mark>the West.</p><p></u></strong></mark>Fifth, <u><mark>China</mark> is already making <strong>extraordinary progress</strong> towards tackling climate change. It <mark>is</mark> <strong>unquestionably <mark>the </mark>world <mark>leader in renewable energy</strong></mark>, <mark>with a</mark> total <mark>capacity greater than the US, the EU, Japan and Britain combined.</u></mark> <u>For the last two decades, it has been making a <strong>concerted effort to reduce its reliance on coal</strong>, which currently makes up 56 per cent of its power mix, down from over 80 per cent.</p><p><mark>China’s <strong>forest coverage</strong></mark> has <mark>increased from 12 </mark>per cent in the early 1980s <mark>to 23 per cent</mark> today. It has established national parks covering 230,000 square kilometres. </u>Meanwhile <u>it also leads the world in the production and use of electric cars, trains and buses. Around <mark>99 per cent of the world’s electric buses are in China, </mark>along with 70 per cent of the world’s high-speed rail.</p><p></u>Even leading US politicians have arlboroug China’s progress. Back in December 2019, setting out his vision for the US to accelerate its arlboroughon, John Kerry observed in an article for the New York Times that “<u>China is becoming an energy superpower,” and it had “surpassed us for the lead in renewable energy technology.”</u> He went on, “<u><strong><mark>China is doing things we are afraid to</mark> do</strong>. <mark>They offer citizens large subsidies for</mark> purchasing <mark>electric vehicles</mark> from state-owned companies.”</p><p></u>Of course, the world needs China — as the largest current emitter — to take serious action to reduce emissions. Indeed <u><mark>there is a <strong>clear consensus</strong></mark> <mark>at all levels of Chinese government on tackling climate change</mark>, biodiversity and pollution.</p><p>China is taking the project of constructing an “<strong>ecological arlborough</strong>” very seriously — <mark>it is <strong>hypocritical and nonsensical</strong> for the West to play the <strong>blame game</strong></mark> and to push responsibility onto China.</p><p></u>As it stands<mark>, <u>the US</mark> and its allies are <strong><mark>more committed to their new Cold War than</mark> they are <mark>to</mark> a safe future</strong> for <mark>humanity</mark>. This is <mark>exemplified by US import bans on Chinese solar panels<strong></mark>, based on the unproven and libellous accusation that this industry makes use of slave labour in Xinjiang.</p><p></u></strong>Environmental catastrophe is knocking at the door. We need to get serious. <u><mark>The West must <strong>drop its</mark> policy of <mark>arlboroug</mark> and threatening China</strong>; <mark>it must adopt</mark> an approach of multilateralism and co-operation.</p><p>The US, Europe, China and others should be collaborating on research and development for climate change adaptation and mitigation; on renewable energy systems; on artificial intelligence systems for monitoring weather patterns; on providing urgently needed support to the least-developed countries.</p><p><mark>China</mark> has been <strong>abundantly clear</strong> that it <mark>wants a <strong>close, collaborative relationship</strong></mark> with the other major powers around environmental issues.</p><p><strong>The ball is in our court. </strong><mark>Those of us in the West should be <strong>demanding our governments stop shirking their responsibilities</strong>, to <strong>build mutual trust</strong></mark> with China and to do everything possible to keep Earth habitable for humanity.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Cohn 13. Nate Cohn covers elections, polling and demographics for The Upshot, a Times politics and policy site. Previously, he was a staff writer for The New Republic. Before entering journalism, he was a research assistant and Scoville Fellow at the Stimson Center, 2013, "Improving the Norms and Practices of Policy Debate," http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=5416.0;wap2 //RS fulltext: “Improving the Norms and Practices of Policy Debate,” Nov 24, So let me offer another possibility: the problem isn’t the topic, but modern policy debate. The unrealistic scenarios, exclusive focus on policy scholarship, inability to engage systemic impacts and philosophical questions. And so long as these problems characterize modern policy debate, teams will feel compelled to avoid it.¶ It might be tempting to assign the blame to “USFG should.” But these are bugs, not features of plan-focused, USFG-based, active voice topics. These bugs result from practices and norms that were initially and independently reasonable, but ultimately and collectively problematic. I also believe that these norms can and should be contested. I believe it would be possible for me to have a realistic, accessible, and inclusive discussion about the merits of a federal policy with, say, Amber Kelsie. Or put differently, I’m not sure I agree with Jonah that changing the topic is the only way to avoid being “a bunch of white folks talking about nuke war.”¶ The fact that policy debate is wildly out of touch—the fact that we are “a bunch of white folks talking about nuclear war”—is a damning indictment of nearly every coach in this activity. It’s a serious indictment of the successful policy debate coaches, who have been content to continue a pedagogically unsound game, so long as they keep winning. It’s a serious indictment of policy debate’s discontents who chose to disengage. ¶ That’s not to say there hasn’t been any effort to challenge modern policy debate on its own terms—just that they’ve mainly come from the middle of the bracket and weren’t very successful, focusing on morality arguments and various “predictions bad” claims to outweigh. ¶ Judges were receptive to the sentiment that disads were unrealistic, but negative claims to specificity always triumphed over generic epistemological questions or arguments about why “predictions fail.” The affirmative rarely introduced substantive responses to the disadvantage, rarely read impact defense. All considered, the negative generally won a significant risk that the plan resulted in nuclear war. Once that was true, it was basically impossible to win that some moral obligation outweighed the (dare I say?) obligation to avoid a meaningful risk of extinction.¶ There were other problems. Many of the small affirmatives were unstrategic—teams rarely had solvency deficits to generic counterplans. It was already basically impossible to win that some morality argument outweighed extinction; it was totally untenable to win that a moral obligation outweighed a meaningful risk of extinction; it made even less sense if the counterplan solved most of the morality argument. The combined effect was devastating: As these debates are currently argued and judged, I suspect that the negative would win my ballot more than 95 percent of the time in a debate between two teams of equal ability.¶ But even if a “soft left” team did better—especially by making solvency deficits and responding to the specifics of the disadvantage—I still think they would struggle. They could compete at the highest levels, but, in most debates, judges would still assess a small, but meaningful risk of a large scale conflict, including nuclear war and extinction. The risk would be small, but the “magnitude” of the impact would often be enough to outweigh a higher probability, smaller impact. Or put differently: policy debate still wouldn’t be replicating a real world policy assessment, teams reading small affirmatives would still be at a real disadvantage with respect to reality. . ¶ Why? Oddly, this is the unreasonable result of a reasonable part of debate: the burden of refutation or rejoinder, the responsibility of debaters to “beat” arguments. If I introduce an argument, it starts out at 100 percent—you then have to disprove it. That sounds like a pretty good idea in principle, right? Well, I think so too. But it’s really tough to refute something down to “zero” percent—a team would need to completely and totally refute an argument. That’s obviously tough to do, especially since the other team is usually going to have some decent arguments and pretty good cards defending each component of their disadvantage—even the ridiculous parts. So one of the most fundamental assumptions about debate all but ensures a meaningful risk of nearly any argument—even extremely low-probability, high magnitude impacts, sufficient to outweigh systemic impacts. ¶ There’s another even more subtle element of debate practice at play. Traditionally, the 2AC might introduce 8 or 9 cards against a disadvantage, like “non-unique, no- link, no-impact,” and then go for one and two. Yet in reality, disadvantages are underpinned by dozens or perhaps hundreds of discrete assumptions, each of which could be contested. By the end of the 2AR, only a handful are under scrutiny; the majority of the disadvantage is conceded, and it’s tough to bring the one or two scrutinized components down to “zero.”¶ And then there’s a bad understanding of probability. If the affirmative questions four or five elements of the disadvantage, but the negative was still “clearly ahead” on all five elements, most judges would assess that the negative was “clearly ahead” on the disadvantage. In reality, the risk of the disadvantage has been reduced considerably. If there was, say, an 80 percent chance that immigration reform would pass, an 80 percent chance that political capital was key, an 80 percent chance that the plan drained a sufficient amount of capital, an 80 percent chance that immigration reform was necessary to prevent another recession, and an 80 percent chance that another recession would cause a nuclear war (lol), then there’s a 32 percent chance that the disadvantage caused nuclear war. ¶ I think these issues can be overcome. First, I think teams can deal with the “burden of refutation” by focusing on the “burden of proof,” which allows a team to mitigate an argument before directly contradicting its content. ¶ Here’s how I’d look at it: modern policy debate has assumed that arguments start out at “100 percent” until directly refuted. But few, if any, arguments are supported by evidence consistent with “100 percent.” Most cards don’t make definitive claims. Even when they do, they’re not supported by definitive evidence—and any reasonable person should assume there’s at least some uncertainty on matters other than few true facts, like 2+2=4.¶ Take Georgetown’s immigration uniqueness evidence from Harvard. It says there “may be a window” for immigration. So, based on the negative’s evidence, what are the odds that immigration reform will pass? Far less than 50 percent, if you ask me. That’s not always true for every card in the 1NC, but sometimes it’s even worse—like the impact card, which is usually a long string of “coulds.” If you apply this very basic level of analysis to each element of a disadvantage, and correctly explain math (.4*.4*.4*.4*.4=.01024), the risk of the disadvantage starts at a very low level, even before the affirmative offers a direct response. ¶ Debaters should also argue that the negative hasn’t introduced any evidence at all to defend a long list of unmentioned elements in the “internal link chain.” The absence of evidence to defend the argument that, say, “recession causes depression,” may not eliminate the disadvantage, but it does raise uncertainty—and it doesn’t take too many additional sources of uncertainty to reduce the probability of the disadvantage to effectively zero—sort of the static, background noise of prediction.¶ Now, I do think it would be nice if a good debate team would actually do the work—talk about what the cards say, talk about the unmentioned steps—but I think debaters can make these observations at a meta-level (your evidence isn’t certain, lots of undefended elements) and successfully reduce the risk of a nuclear war or extinction to something indistinguishable from zero. It would not be a factor in my decision.¶ Based on my conversations with other policy judges, it may be possible to pull it off with even less work. They might be willing to summarily disregard “absurd” arguments, like politics disadvantages, on the grounds that it’s patently unrealistic, that we know the typical burden of rejoinder yields unrealistic scenarios, and that judges should assess debates in ways that produce realistic assessments. I don’t think this is too different from elements of Jonah Feldman’s old philosophy, where he basically said “when I assessed 40 percent last year, it’s 10 percent now.”¶ Honestly, I was surprised that the few judges I talked to were so amenable to this argument. For me, just saying “it’s absurd, and you know it” wouldn’t be enough against an argument in which the other team invested considerable time. The more developed argument about accurate risk assessment would be more convincing, but I still think it would be vulnerable to a typical defense of the burden of rejoinder. ¶ To be blunt: I want debaters to learn why a disadvantage is absurd, not just make assertions that conform to their preexisting notions of what’s realistic and what’s not. And perhaps more importantly for this discussion, I could not coach a team to rely exclusively on this argument—I’m not convinced that enough judges are willing to discount a disadvantage on “it’s absurd.” Nonetheless, I think this is a useful “frame” that should preface a following, more robust explanation of why the risk of the disadvantage is basically zero—even before a substantive response is offered.¶ There are other, broad genres of argument that can contest the substance of the negative’s argument. There are serious methodological indictments of the various forms of knowledge production, from journalistic reporting to think tanks to quantitative social science. Many of our most strongly worded cards come from people giving opinions, for which they offer very little data or evidence. And even when “qualified” people are giving predictions, there’s a great case to be extremely skeptical without real evidence backing it up. The world is a complicated place, predictions are hard, and most people are wrong. And again, this is before contesting the substance of the negative’s argument(!)—if deemed necessary.¶ So, in my view, the low probability scenario is waiting to be eliminated from debate, basically as soon as a capable team tries to do it.¶ That would open to the door to all of the arguments, previously excluded, de facto, by the prevalence of nuclear war impacts. It’s been tough to talk about racism or gender violence, since modest measures to mitigate these impacts have a difficult time outweighing a nuclear war. It’s been tough to discuss ethical policy making, since it’s hard to argue that any commitment to philosophical or ethical purity should apply in the face of an existential risk. It’s been tough to introduce unconventional forms of evidence, since they can’t really address the probability of nuclear war.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Reject absurd political scenarios – hidden assumptions, lack of credible authors supporting entire chains, and future political developments mean we don’t need to win more uncertainty to prove case outweighs.</h4><p><strong>Cohn 13.</strong> Nate Cohn covers elections, polling and demographics for The Upshot, a Times politics and policy site. Previously, he was a staff writer for The New Republic. Before entering journalism, he was a research assistant and Scoville Fellow at the Stimson Center, 2013, "Improving the Norms and Practices of Policy Debate," http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=5416.0;wap2 //RS</p><p>“Improving the Norms and Practices of Policy Debate,” Nov 24, So let me offer another possibility: the problem isn’t the topic, but modern policy debate. The unrealistic scenarios, exclusive focus on policy scholarship, inability to engage systemic impacts and philosophical questions. And so long as these problems characterize modern policy debate, teams will feel compelled to avoid it.¶ It might be tempting to assign the blame to “USFG should.” But these are bugs, not features of plan-focused, USFG-based, active voice topics. These bugs result from practices and norms that were initially and independently reasonable, but ultimately and collectively problematic. I also believe that these norms can and should be contested. <u>I believe it would be possible for me to have a realistic, accessible, and inclusive discussion about the merits of a federal policy with, say, Amber Kelsie.</u> Or put differently, I’m not sure I agree with Jonah that changing the topic is the only way to avoid being “a bunch of white folks talking about nuke war.”¶ The fact that policy debate is wildly out of touch—the fact that we are “a bunch of white folks talking about nuclear war”—is a damning indictment of nearly every coach in this activity. It’s a serious indictment of the successful policy debate coaches, who have been content to continue a pedagogically unsound game, so long as they keep winning. It’s a serious indictment of policy debate’s discontents who chose to disengage. ¶ That’s not to say there hasn’t been any effort to challenge modern policy debate on its own terms—just that they’ve mainly come from the middle of the bracket and weren’t very successful, focusing on morality arguments and various “predictions bad” claims to outweigh. ¶ <u>Judges were receptive to the sentiment that disads were unrealistic, but <mark>negative claims to specificity always triumphed</mark> over generic epistemological questions or <mark>arguments about why “predictions fail.”</u></mark> The affirmative rarely introduced substantive responses to the disadvantage, rarely read impact defense. All considered, the negative generally won a significant risk that the plan resulted in nuclear war. Once that was true, it was basically impossible to win that some moral obligation outweighed the (dare I say?) obligation to avoid a meaningful risk of extinction.¶ There were other problems. Many of the small affirmatives were unstrategic—teams rarely had solvency deficits to generic counterplans. <u>It was already basically impossible to win that some morality argument outweighed extinction;</u> <u>it was totally untenable to win that a moral obligation outweighed a meaningful risk of extinction</u>; it made even less sense if the counterplan solved most of the morality argument. <u>The combined effect was devastating: As these debates are currently argued and judged, I suspect that the negative would win my ballot more than 95 percent of the time in a debate between two teams of equal ability.</u>¶ But even if a “soft left” team did better—especially by making solvency deficits and responding to the specifics of the disadvantage—I still think they would struggle. They could compete at the highest levels, but, <u>in most debates, judges would still assess a small, but meaningful risk of a large scale conflict, including nuclear war and extinction. The risk would be small, but the “magnitude” of the impact would often be enough to outweigh a higher probability, smaller impact.</u> Or put differently: policy debate still wouldn’t be replicating a real world policy assessment, <u><mark>teams reading small affirmatives would still be at a real disadvantage with respect to reality</u></mark>. . ¶ Why? Oddly, this is the unreasonable result of a reasonable part of debate: the burden of refutation or rejoinder, the responsibility of debaters to “beat” arguments. <u>If I introduce an argument, it starts out at 100 percent—you then have to disprove it. That sounds like a pretty good idea in principle, right? Well, I think so too. But <mark>it’s </mark>really <mark>tough to refute something down to “zero” percent</mark>—a team would need to completely and totally refute an argument.</u> That’s obviously tough to do, especially since the other team is usually going to have some decent arguments and pretty good cards defending each component of their disadvantage—even the ridiculous parts. <u>So one of the most fundamental assumptions about debate all but <mark>ensures a meaningful risk of</mark> nearly <mark>any argument—even extremely low-probability, high magnitude impacts, sufficient to outweigh systemic impacts</mark>.</u> ¶ There’s another even more subtle element of debate practice at play. Traditionally, the 2AC might introduce 8 or 9 cards against a disadvantage, like “non-unique, no- link, no-impact,” and then go for one and two. Yet <u>in reality, <mark>disadvantages are underpinned by</mark> dozens or perhaps <mark>hundreds of discrete assumptions, each of which could be contested.</mark> By the end of the 2AR, <mark>only a handful are under scrutiny</u></mark>; the majority of the disadvantage is conceded, and it’s tough to bring the one or two scrutinized components down to “zero.”¶ And then <u><mark>there’s a bad understanding of probability. If the affirmative questions four</mark> or five <mark>elements of the disadvantage, but the negative was still “clearly ahead”</mark> on all five elements, most judges would assess that the negative was “clearly ahead” on the disadvantage. In reality, <mark>the risk of the disadvantage has been reduced</mark> considerably. If there was, say, an 80 percent chance that immigration reform would pass, an 80 percent chance that political capital was key, an 80 percent chance that the plan drained a sufficient amount of capital, an 80 percent chance that immigration reform was necessary to prevent another recession, and an 80 percent chance that another recession would cause a nuclear war (lol), then <mark>there’s a 32 percent chance that the disadvantage caused nuclear war.</u></mark> ¶ I think <u>these issues can be overcome.</u> First, I think <u>teams can <mark>deal with the “burden of refutation” by focusing on the “burden of proof,”</mark> which allows a team to mitigate an argument before directly contradicting its content.</u> ¶ Here’s how I’d look at it: modern policy debate has assumed that arguments start out at “100 percent” until directly refuted. But <u><mark>few</mark>, if any, <mark>arguments are supported by evidence consistent with “100 percent.”</mark> Most <mark>cards don’t make definitive claims</mark>.</u> Even when they do, <u><mark>they’re not supported by definitive evidence</mark>—and any reasonable person should assume there’s at least some uncertainty on matters other than few true facts, like 2+2=4.</u>¶ Take Georgetown’s immigration uniqueness evidence from Harvard. It says there “may be a window” for immigration. So, based on the negative’s evidence, what are the odds that immigration reform will pass? Far less than 50 percent, if you ask me. That’s not always true for every card in the 1NC, but sometimes it’s even worse—like the impact card, which is usually a long string of “coulds.” If you apply this very basic level of analysis to each element of a disadvantage, and correctly explain math (.4*.4*.4*.4*.4=.01024), the risk of the disadvantage starts at a very low level, even before the affirmative offers a direct response. ¶ <u>Debaters should also argue that the <mark>negative hasn’t introduced </mark>any <mark>evidence </mark>at all <mark>to defend a long</mark> list of unmentioned elements in the <mark>“internal link chain.”</u></mark> The <u>absence of evidence to defend the argument that, say, “recession causes depression,” may not eliminate the disadvantage, but it does raise uncertainty—and <mark>it doesn’t take </mark>too many <mark>additional </mark>sources of <mark>uncertainty to reduce the probability of the disadvantage to effectively zero</u></mark>—sort of the static, background noise of prediction.¶ Now, I do think it would be nice if a good debate team would actually do the work—talk about what the cards say, talk about the unmentioned steps—but I think debaters can make these observations at a meta-level (your evidence isn’t certain, lots of undefended elements) and successfully reduce the risk of a nuclear war or extinction to something indistinguishable from zero. It would not be a factor in my decision.¶ Based on my conversations with other policy judges, it may be possible to pull it off with even less work. They might be willing to summarily <u>disregard “absurd” arguments, like politics disadvantages, on the grounds that it’s patently unrealistic, that we know the typical burden of rejoinder yields unrealistic scenarios</u>, and that judges should assess debates in ways that produce realistic assessments. I don’t think this is too different from elements of Jonah Feldman’s old philosophy, where he basically said “when I assessed 40 percent last year, it’s 10 percent now.”¶ Honestly, I was surprised that the few judges I talked to were so amenable to this argument. For me, just saying “it’s absurd, and you know it” wouldn’t be enough against an argument in which the other team invested considerable time. The more developed argument about accurate risk assessment would be more convincing, but I still think it would be vulnerable to a typical defense of the burden of rejoinder. ¶ To be blunt: I want debaters to learn why a disadvantage is absurd, not just make assertions that conform to their preexisting notions of what’s realistic and what’s not. And perhaps more importantly for this discussion, I could not coach a team to rely exclusively on this argument—I’m not convinced that enough judges are willing to discount a disadvantage on “it’s absurd.” Nonetheless, I think <u>this is a useful “frame” that should preface a following, more robust explanation of why the risk of the disadvantage is basically zero</u>—even before a substantive response is offered.¶ There are other, broad genres of argument that can contest the substance of the negative’s argument. There are serious methodological indictments of the various forms of knowledge production, from journalistic reporting to think tanks to quantitative social science. Many of <u>our most strongly worded cards come from people giving opinions, for which they offer very little data or evidence.</u> And even <u>when “qualified” people are giving predictions, there’s a great case to be extremely skeptical without real evidence backing it up. </u>The world is a complicated place, predictions are hard, and most people are wrong. And again, this is before contesting the substance of the negative’s argument(!)—if deemed necessary.¶ So, in my view, the low probability scenario is waiting to be eliminated from debate, basically as soon as a capable team tries to do it.¶ That would open to the door to all of the arguments, previously excluded, de facto, by the prevalence of nuclear war impacts. <u><mark>It’s </mark>been <mark>tough to talk about racism or gender violence</mark>, since <mark>modest measures to mitigate these impacts have a difficult time outweighing a nuclear war.</u></mark> It’s been tough to discuss ethical policy making, since it’s hard to argue that any commitment to philosophical or ethical purity should apply in the face of an existential risk. It’s been tough to introduce unconventional forms of evidence, since they can’t really address the probability of nuclear war.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Mueller, 20 fulltext: (John; Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies @ Ohio State University, Senior Fellow @ Cato Institute, PhD @ University of California, Los Angeles; “Nuclear Alarmism: Proliferation and Terrorism”; June 24th, 2020; https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/nuclear-alarmism-proliferation-terrorism) Building a Bomb of One’s Own Because they are unlikely to be able to buy or steal a usable bomb and because they are further unlikely to have one handed off to them by an established nuclear state, the most plausible route for terrorists would be to manufacture the device themselves from purloined materials. That is the course identified by a majority of leading experts as the one most likely to lead to nuclear terrorism.44 The simplest design is a “gun” type of device in which masses of highly enriched uranium are hurled at each other within a tube. Such a device would be, as Allison acknowledges, “large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient.“45 The process of making such a weapon is daunting even in this minimal case. In particular, the task requires that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. To begin with, now and likely for the foreseeable future, stateless groups are incapable of manufacturing the requisite weapons‐​grade uranium themselves because the process requires an effort on an industrial scale. Moreover, they are unlikely to be supplied with the material by a state for the same reasons a state is unlikely to give them a workable bomb.46 Thus, they would need to steal or illicitly purchase the crucial material. A successful armed theft is exceedingly unlikely, not only because of the resistance of guards but also because chase would be immediate. A more plausible route would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the necessary fissile material. However, that approach requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or — either out of guile or incompetence — furnish them with stuff that is useless.47 Moreover, because of improved safeguards and accounting practices, it is decreasingly likely that the theft would remain undetected.48 That development is important because if any missing uranium is noticed, the authorities would investigate the few people who might have been able to assist the thieves, and one who seems suddenly to have become prosperous is likely to arrest their attention right from the start. Even one initially tempted by, seduced by, or sympathetic to, the blandishments of the smooth‐​talking foreign terrorists might soon develop sobering second thoughts and go to the authorities. Insiders tempted to assist terrorists might also come to ruminate over the fact that, once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins puts it none too delicately, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.“49 It is also relevant to note that over the years, known thefts of highly enriched uranium have totaled fewer than 16 pounds. That amount is far less than that required for an atomic explosion: for a crude bomb, more than 100 pounds are necessary to produce a likely yield of one kiloton. Moreover, none of those thieves was connected to al Qaeda, and, most arrestingly, none had buyers lined up — nearly all were caught while trying to peddle their wares. Indeed, concludes analyst Robin Frost, “There appears to be no true demand, except where the buyers were government agents running a sting.” Because there appears to be no commercial market for fissile material, each sale would be a one‐​time affair, not a continuing source of profit such as drugs, and there is no evidence of established underworld commercial trade in this illicit commodity.50 If terrorists were somehow successful in obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then have to transport it out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, probably while being pursued by security forces. Then, they would need to set up a large and well‐​equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and populate it with a select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, and machinists. The process would also require good managers and organizers. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task without generating consequential suspicions among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Pakistan, for example, maintains a strict watch on many of its nuclear scientists even after retirement.51 Some observers have insisted that it would be “easy” for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material.52 However, Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland’s Spiez Laboratory, conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint, the terrorist group “would most certainly be forced to redesign.” They also stress that the work, far from being “easy,” is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting and that the technical requirements “in several fields verge on the unfeasible.“53 Los Alamos research director Younger makes a similar argument, expressing his amazement at “self‐​declared ‘nuclear weapons experts,’ many of whom have never seen a real nuclear weapon,” who “hold forth on how easy it is to make a functioning nuclear explosive.” Information is available for getting the general idea behind a rudimentary nuclear explosive, but none is detailed enough for “the confident assembly of a real nuclear explosive.” Younger concludes, “To think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is far‐​fetched at best.“54 Under the best of circumstances, the process could take months or even a year or more, and it would all, of course, have to be carried out in utter secret even while local and international security police are likely to be on the intense prowl. In addition, people, or criminal gangs, in the area may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant comings and goings of technicians unlikely to be locals. The process of fabricating a nuclear device requires, then, the effective recruitment of people who at once have great technical skills and will remain completely devoted to the cause. In addition, a host of corrupted coconspirators, many of them foreign, must remain utterly reliable; international and local security services must be kept perpetually in the dark; and no curious outsider must get wind of the project over the months, or even years, it takes to pull off. The finished product could weigh a ton or more. Encased in lead shielding to mask radioactive emissions, it would then have to be transported to, as well as smuggled into, the relevant target country. Then, the enormous package would have to be received within the target country by a group of collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, and perhaps assembling the weapon. Then, they would have to detonate it somewhere under the fervent hope that the machine shop work has been proficient, that no significant shakeups occurred in the treacherous process of transportation, and that the thing — after all that effort — doesn’t prove to be a dud. The financial costs of the extended operation in its cumulating entirety could become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up, as well as people to pay — or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of dedication, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of an array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals who are competent and capable enough to be an effective ally in the project are likely to be both smart enough to see opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>No nuclear terror. </h4><p>Mueller, 20</p><p></strong>(John; Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies @ Ohio State University, Senior Fellow @ Cato Institute, PhD @ University of California, Los Angeles; “Nuclear Alarmism: Proliferation and Terrorism”; June 24th, 2020; https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/nuclear-alarmism-proliferation-terrorism)</p><p>Building a Bomb of One’s Own Because they are unlikely to be able to buy or steal a usable bomb and because they are further unlikely to have one handed off to them by an established nuclear state, <u><strong>the most plausible route for terrorists would be to manufacture the device themselves from purloined materials</u></strong>. That is the course identified by a majority of leading experts as the one most likely to lead to nuclear terrorism.44 The simplest design is a “gun” type of device in which masses of highly enriched uranium are hurled at each other within a tube. Such a device would be, as Allison acknowledges, “large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient.“45 <u><strong>The process</u></strong> of making such a weapon <u><strong>is daunting even in this minimal case</u></strong>. In particular, <u><strong>the task requires</u></strong> that <u><strong>a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence</u></strong>. To begin with, now and likely for the foreseeable future, <u><strong>stateless <mark>groups</mark> are <mark>incapable of manufacturing</mark> the requisite weapons‐​grade <mark>uranium</mark> themselves because the process requires an effort on an industrial scale</u></strong>. Moreover, <u><strong>they are <mark>unlikely to be supplied</mark> with the material <mark>by a state</mark> for the same reasons a state is unlikely to give them a workable bomb</u></strong>.46 <u><strong>Thus, they would need to steal or illicitly purchase the crucial material</u></strong>. <u><strong>A successful armed <mark>theft is </mark>exceedingly <mark>unlikely</mark>, not only <mark>because of</mark> the resistance of <mark>guards but also</mark> because <mark>chase</mark> would be immediate</u></strong>. A more plausible route would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the necessary fissile material. However, that approach requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or — either out of guile or incompetence — furnish them with stuff that is useless.47 <u><strong>Moreover, <mark>because of </mark>improved <mark>safeguards</mark> and accounting practices, <mark>it is</mark> decreasingly likely that the theft would remain un<mark>detected</u></strong></mark>.48 That development is important because if any missing uranium is noticed, the authorities would investigate the few people who might have been able to assist the thieves, and one who seems suddenly to have become prosperous is likely to arrest their attention right from the start. Even one initially tempted by, seduced by, or sympathetic to, the blandishments of the smooth‐​talking foreign terrorists might soon develop sobering second thoughts and go to the authorities. Insiders tempted to assist terrorists might also come to ruminate over the fact that, once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins puts it none too delicately, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.“49 It is also relevant to note that over the years, <u><strong>known thefts of h</u></strong>ighly <u><strong>e</u></strong>nriched <u><strong>u</u></strong>ranium <u><strong>have totaled fewer than 16 pounds. That amount is far less than that required for an atomic explosion: <mark>for a crude bomb</mark>, more than <mark>100 pounds </mark>are <mark>necessary</mark> to produce a likely yield of one kiloton</u></strong>. Moreover, none of those <u><strong><mark>thieves</u></strong></mark> was connected to al Qaeda, and, most arrestingly, none had buyers lined up — nearly all <u><strong><mark>were caught</u></strong></mark> while trying to peddle their wares. Indeed, concludes analyst Robin Frost, “There appears to be <u><strong><mark>no </mark>true <mark>demand</u></strong></mark>, except where the buyers were government agents running a sting.” Because there appears to be <u><strong><mark>no</mark> commercial <mark>market for fissile material</u></strong></mark>, each sale would be a one‐​time affair, not a continuing source of profit such as drugs, and there is no evidence of established underworld commercial trade in this illicit commodity.50 <u><strong>If</u></strong> terrorists were <u><strong>somehow</u></strong> successful in <u><strong>obtaining</u></strong> a sufficient mass of <u><strong>relevant material</u></strong>, they <u><strong>would then have to transport</u></strong> it out of the country <u><strong>over unfamiliar terrain</u></strong>, probably <u><strong>while</u></strong> being <u><strong>pursued by security forces</u></strong>. Then, they <u><strong><mark>would need</u></strong></mark> to set up a large and well‐​equipped <u><strong><mark>machine shop</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to manufacture</u></strong> a bomb <u><strong>and</u></strong> populate it with a select team of <u><strong>highly skilled <mark>scientists</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>technicians</u></strong>, and <u><strong>machinists</u></strong>. The process would also <u><strong>require</u></strong> good <u><strong><mark>managers</u></strong></mark> and <u><strong>organizers</u></strong>. The group <u><strong>would have to be assembled</u></strong> and retained for the monumental task <u><strong><mark>without</mark> generating consequential <mark>suspicions</u></strong></mark> among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Pakistan, for example, maintains a strict watch on many of its nuclear scientists even after retirement.51 <u><strong>Some</u></strong> observers have <u><strong>insisted</u></strong> that <u><strong>it would be “easy”</u></strong> for terrorists <u><strong>to assemble a crude bomb</u></strong> if they could get enough fissile material.52 <u><strong>However</u></strong>, Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two <u><strong>senior physicists</u></strong> in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland’s Spiez Laboratory, <u><strong>conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.”</u></strong> They point out that <u><strong>precise <mark>blueprints</mark> are <mark>required</u></strong></mark>, not just sketches and general ideas, <u><strong>and that even with a good blueprint, the terrorist group “would most certainly be forced to redesign.”</u></strong> They also stress that <u><strong>the <mark>work</mark>, far from being “easy,” <mark>is</mark> difficult, dangerous, and extremely <mark>exacting and</mark> that the technical <mark>requirements “in </mark>several <mark>fields</mark> verge on the <mark>unfeasible</mark>.“</u></strong>53<u> </u>Los Alamos research director Younger makes a similar argument, expressing his amazement at <u><strong>“self‐​declared ‘nuclear weapons experts,’ many of whom have never seen a real nuclear weapon,” who “hold forth on how easy it is to make a functioning nuclear explosive.”</u></strong> Information is available for getting the general idea behind a rudimentary nuclear explosive, but none is detailed enough for “the confident assembly of a real nuclear explosive.” Younger concludes, “To think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is far‐​fetched at best.“54 Under the best of circumstances, the <u><strong><mark>process</u></strong></mark> could take months or even a year or more, and it would all, of course, <u><strong><mark>have to be</u></strong></mark> carried out <u><strong>in utter <mark>secret</u></strong></mark> even <u><strong><mark>while</u></strong></mark> local and international security <u><strong><mark>police</u></strong></mark> are <u><strong>likely to be <mark>on</u></strong></mark> the intense <u><strong><mark>prowl</u></strong></mark>. In addition, <u><strong><mark>people</u></strong></mark>, or criminal gangs, <u><strong><mark>in the area </mark>may <mark>observe</u></strong></mark> with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant comings and goings of technicians unlikely to be locals. The process of <u><strong>fabricating</u></strong> a nuclear device <u><strong><mark>requires</u></strong></mark>, then, the effective <u><strong><mark>recruitment</u></strong></mark> of people who at once have great <u><strong>technical <mark>skills</u></strong></mark> and will remain <u><strong><mark>completely devoted</u></strong></mark> to the cause. In addition, a host of <u><strong>corrupted <mark>coconspirators</u></strong></mark>, many of them foreign, <u><strong>must remain</u></strong> <u><strong>utterly reliable</u></strong>; international and local <u><strong>security services</u></strong> must be kept perpetually <u><strong>in the dark</u></strong>; and no curious outsider must get wind of the project over the months, or even years, it takes to pull off. The <u><strong>finished <mark>product</u></strong></mark> could weigh a ton or more. Encased in lead shielding to mask radioactive emissions, it <u><strong><mark>would</u></strong></mark> then <u><strong><mark>have to be transported</u></strong></mark> to, as well as smuggled into, the relevant target country. Then, the enormous package would have to be <u><strong><mark>received</u></strong></mark> within the target country <u><strong><mark>by</u></strong></mark> a group of <u><strong><mark>collaborators</u></strong></mark> who are at once <u><strong>totally dedicated</u></strong> and <u><strong>technically <mark>proficient</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>at</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>handling</u></strong>, <u><strong>maintaining</u></strong>, and perhaps <u><strong><mark>assembling</mark> the weapon</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Then</u></strong></mark>, they would have to <u><strong><mark>detonate</u></strong></mark> it somewhere <u><strong><mark>under</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong>fervent <mark>hope</u></strong></mark> that the <u><strong>machine shop <mark>work</u></strong></mark> has been <u><strong><mark>proficient</u></strong></mark>, that no significant shakeups occurred in the treacherous process of transportation, and that the thing — after all that effort — doesn’t prove to be a dud. <u><strong>The <mark>financial costs</mark> of the extended operation in its cumulating entirety could become <mark>monumental</u></strong></mark>. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up, as well as people to pay — or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of dedication, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of an array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals who are competent and capable enough to be an effective ally in the project are likely to be both smart enough to see opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Akisato Suzuki 15, Irish Research Council Postdoctoral Fellow at the School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, April-June 2015, “Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests,” Research & Politics, p. 1-7. fulltext: Given these conflict-reducing/provoking effects of nuclear proliferation, what overall effect would nuclear proliferation have on a systemic propensity for conflict? This is difficult to answer, not only due to the controversy over whether nuclear states are more or less prone to conflict, but also because the existing theories do not explain whether those conflict-reducing/provoking effects are large enough to influence a systemic propensity for interstate conflict, given the ratio of nuclear states to non-nuclear states in the system. This challenge motivates the empirical examination of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict. Empirical investigation by Random Forests The interstate–systemic year data are used here to investigate the relationship between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for interstate conflict. The dependent variable is the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets (Palmer et al., 2015; version 4.01 is used) per systemic-year, standardized as the ratio to the number of states in the interstate system (Correlates of War Project, 2011) – hereafter, the ‘dispute–state ratio’. Observations one year ahead (t+1) are used to make sure that causal effects precede a variation in the dispute–state ratio.2 Two regressors are used to examine the effect of nuclear proliferation: the number of nuclear states in the interstate system; and a count of the years since the number of nuclear states changes (hereafter ‘nuclear year counter’), measuring the effect of new nuclear states (Horowitz, 2009). The data about nuclear states are from Gartzke and Kroenig (2009); additionally, the current paper codes North Korea as a nuclear state since 2009 (Table 1).3 The model also includes the number of democratic states (Polity2 score ⩾ 6 in Marshall, 2013) in the interstate system, the gross world product (Earth Policy Institute, 2012), and the binary variable of unipolarity (coded zero until 1989 and one from 1990; see Monteiro, 2011/2012); these three variables control for democratic peace (Russett and Oneal, 2001), capitalist peace (Gartzke, 2007), and polarity (Monteiro, 2011/2012) respectively. The number of nuclear states and these control variables suffer from multicollinearity (see Table A-9 in the online appendix), and this paer later explains how to resolve this problem. A lagged dependent variable is also included to address the temporal dependence of time-series data. The temporal scope is 1950–2009 (i.e. N=59) due to the data availability and the use of the dependent variable at t+1. The descriptive statistics of all variables are displayed in Table 2.4 As mentioned in the introduction, this paper uses the machine learning, non-parametric method Random Forests for the empirical investigation.5 Although it is unfamiliar to most political science and international relations analysts, Random Forests has been widely used in numerous scientific studies (Strobl et al., 2009: 324; Strobl et al., 2008). The popularity of the method is also apparent from the fact that Breiman’s (2001) original paper has been cited 12,721 times in the literature.6 Random Forests generates two useful analytics: first, ‘conditional variable importance’ measures how ‘important’ each regressor is, conditional on the remaining regressors (Hothorn et al., 2006; Strobl et al., 2007, 2008). This is analogous to statistical significance in conventional regression models. The significance threshold proposed by Strobl et al. (2009: 343) is whether the importance score of a regressor is negative, zero, or lower than the absolute value of the lowest negative score. If none applies, the regressor is considered as important; and the second relevant analytic is a partial dependence plot (Friedman, 2001). This estimates the marginal effect of each regressor on the dependent variable while taking the remaining regressors into consideration. Random Forests has three attractive and distinctive characteristics for the purposes of this paper: first, the estimation of conditional variable importance and partial dependence plots enable conventional applied researchers to interpret non-parametric analysis in an intuitive way; second, Random Forests can examine non-linearity (Strobl et al., 2009: 339–341), which is desirable because, as already noted, some theories expect non-linearity between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict; and finally, it can cope with potential interactions and multicollinearity between regressors (Strobl et al., 2009: 339–341; Strobl et al., 2008). As noted before, most of the regressors here are highly correlated, and also it is plausible to anticipate some interaction effect between them (e.g. the number of democratic states and the gross world product). The specific capabilities of Random Forests are therefore essential. The estimation of conditional variable importance shows that the nuclear year counter has a negative importance score.7 Thus, the nuclear year counter is not important in explaining the dispute–state ratio. This suggests that the optimist theory is supported. The remaining regressors have an importance score higher than the absolute value of the importance score of the nuclear year counter, meaning that they are all important. Controlling for democratic peace, capitalist peace, and polarity, the number of nuclear states is still a significant predictor in explaining a systemic propensity for interstate conflict. Figure 1 presents the partial dependence plots of the model.8 First, on average, a larger number of nuclear states is associated with a lower dispute–state ratio, although the changes from two nuclear states to three and from six to seven increase the ratio instead. Thus, the relationship is empirically non-linear, as Bueno de Mesquita and Riker (1982) and Intriligator and Brito (1981) expected in part. Overall, however, the optimist theory is supported, and the change from two nuclear states to nine nuclear states decreases the dispute–state ratio approximately from 0.228 to 0.18. This means that, if there are 194 states in the system (as there were in 2009), the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year decreases approximately from 44 to 35. This is a substantively significant decline. Second, the nuclear year counter shows a concave relationship with the dispute–state ratio, suggesting that new nuclear states are less prone to conflict than middle-aged nuclear states. Thus, the pessimist theory finds no support from either the variable importance estimation or the partial dependence plot. Finally, as for the control variables, the number of democratic states and the gross world product have a complex non-linear relationship with the dispute–state ratio, but if the number of democratic states and the gross world product are sufficiently large, they tend to decrease the dispute– state ratio. Their substantive effects are also significant, though not as much as the number of nuclear states. When comparing the effect of their lowest and highest values (23 and 94 in the number of democratic states and 7 and 71.2 in the gross world product), the number of democratic states decreases the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year approximately from 40 to 37, and the gross world product from 44 to 37. Unipolarity is also associated with a decline in the dispute–state ratio, suggesting that unipolarity is better than bipolarity in terms of a systemic propensity for interstate conflict; however, its effect is negligible, as it reduces the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year from 39 to 38. One caveat is, as explained in the online appendix, that the results of the number of democratic states and unipolarity are significantly sensitive to a parameter setting. Thus, these predictors are less robust, and the aforementioned points about them should be treated with caution. Discussion and concluding remarks The main findings reveal that the optimist expectation of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict is empirically supported:9 first, a larger number of nuclear states on average decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict; and second, there is no clear evidence that the emergence of new nuclear states increases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict. Gartzke and Jo (2009) argue that nuclear weapons themselves have no exogenous effect on the probability of conflict, because when a state is engaged in or expects to engage in conflict, it may develop nuclear weapons to keep fighting, or to prepare for, that conflict. If this selection effect existed, the analysis should overestimate the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear proliferation in the above model. Still, the results indicate that a larger number of nuclear states are associated with fewer disputes in the system. This conclusion, however, raises questions about how to reconcile this study’s findings with those of a recent quantitative dyadic-level study (Bell and Miller, 2015). The current paper finds that nuclear proliferation decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict, while Bell and Miller (2015) find that nuclear symmetry has no significant effect on dyadic conflict, but that nuclear asymmetry is associated with a higher probability of dyadic conflict. It is possible that nuclear proliferation decreases conflict through the conflict-mitigating effects of extended nuclear deterrence and/or fear of nuclear states’ intervention, to the extent that these effects overwhelm the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear–asymmetrical dyads. Thus, dyadic-level empirics cannot solely be relied on to infer causal links between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict. The systemic-level empirics deserve attention. The findings of this paper also have significant policy implications. The international community is sensitive to nuclear proliferation, and with Iran well on the way to developing full nuclear capabilities, it is crucial to understand the implications of nuclear proliferation for international security. This paper suggests that, at least in terms of a systemic propensity for interstate conflict, nuclear proliferation might be welcomed – although, given that nuclear asymmetry can provoke dyadic conflict, reducing this side effect of nuclear proliferation by some other measure will be desirable. Finally, this paper should not be seen as decisive evidence that nuclear proliferation contributes to international security in general. Nuclear proliferation may increase risks of nuclear weapons being leaked to terrorist groups (Bueno de Mesquita and Riker, 1982: 304) or used accidentally (Intriligator and Brito, 1981). It is untenable to assess the merits and demerits of nuclear proliferation only in terms of a systemic propensity for conflict. Additional research should examine these risks. Nonetheless, this paper makes a significant contribution to the literature by adding new empirics for a more comprehensive assessment of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>No impact to prolif---system-level empirics analyzed by the most sophisticated models concludes zero risk of prolif increasing conflict propensity---specifically answers their low-level aggression, preemption, and dyads warrants.</h4><p>Akisato <strong>Suzuki 15</strong>, Irish Research Council Postdoctoral Fellow at the School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, April-June 2015, “Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests,” Research & Politics, p. 1-7.</p><p><u>Given</u> these <u>conflict-reducing/provoking effects of nuclear proliferation, what <strong>overall effect</strong> would nuclear proliferation have on a <strong>systemic propensity for conflict?</u></strong> This is difficult to answer, not only due to the controversy over whether nuclear states are more or less prone to conflict, but also because the <u>existing theories do not explain whether</u> those <u>conflict-reducing/provoking effects are <strong>large enough to influence a systemic propensity for interstate conflict</u></strong>, given the ratio of nuclear states to non-nuclear states in the system. <u>This challenge motivates</u> the <u>empirical examination of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict</u>.</p><p>Empirical investigation by Random Forests</p><p>The <u>interstate–systemic year data are used here to investigate the relationship between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for interstate conflict. The dependent variable is the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets</u> (Palmer et al., 2015; version 4.01 is used) per systemic-year, standardized as the ratio to the number of states in the interstate system (Correlates of War Project, 2011) – <u><strong>hereafter, the ‘dispute–state ratio’</u></strong>. Observations one year ahead (t+1) are used to make sure that causal effects precede a variation in the dispute–state ratio.2</p><p><u>Two regressors are used to examine the effect of nuclear proliferation: the number of nuclear states in the interstate system; and a count of the years since the number of nuclear states changes (hereafter ‘<strong>nuclear year counter’</u></strong>), measuring the effect of new nuclear states (Horowitz, 2009). The data about nuclear states are from Gartzke and Kroenig (2009); additionally, the current paper codes North Korea as a nuclear state since 2009 (Table 1).3</p><p>The model also includes the number of democratic states (Polity2 score ⩾ 6 in Marshall, 2013) in the interstate system, the gross world product (Earth Policy Institute, 2012), and the binary variable of unipolarity (coded zero until 1989 and one from 1990; see Monteiro, 2011/2012); these three variables control for democratic peace (Russett and Oneal, 2001), capitalist peace (Gartzke, 2007), and polarity (Monteiro, 2011/2012) respectively. The number of nuclear states and these control variables suffer from multicollinearity (see Table A-9 in the online appendix), and this paer later explains how to resolve this problem. A lagged dependent variable is also included to address the temporal dependence of time-series data. The temporal scope is 1950–2009 (i.e. N=59) due to the data availability and the use of the dependent variable at t+1. The descriptive statistics of all variables are displayed in Table 2.4</p><p>As mentioned in the introduction, <u>this paper uses the <strong>machine learning, non-parametric method Random Forests</strong> for the empirical investigation</u>.5 Although it is unfamiliar to most political science and international relations analysts, <u>Random Forests has been widely used in numerous scientific studies</u> (Strobl et al., 2009: 324; Strobl et al., 2008). The popularity of the method is also apparent from the fact that Breiman’s (2001) original paper has been cited 12,721 times in the literature.6</p><p><u>Random Forests generates</u> two <u>useful analytics</u>: first, ‘<u><strong>conditional variable importance</strong>’ measures how ‘important’ each regressor is, conditional on the remaining regressors</u> (Hothorn et al., 2006; Strobl et al., 2007, 2008). This is analogous to statistical significance in conventional regression models. The significance threshold proposed by Strobl et al. (2009: 343) is whether the importance score of a regressor is negative, zero, or lower than the absolute value of the lowest negative score. If none applies, the regressor is considered as important; and the second relevant analytic is a partial dependence plot (Friedman, 2001). <u>This estimates the marginal effect of each regressor on the dependent variable while taking the remaining regressors into consideration</u>.</p><p><u>Random Forests has <strong>three</u></strong> attractive and <u><strong>distinctive characteristics</u></strong> for the purposes of this paper: first, the <u>estimation of conditional variable importance</u> and partial dependence plots <u>enable conventional applied researchers to interpret non-parametric analysis in an intuitive way</u>; second, <u>Random Forests can examine non-linearity</u> (Strobl et al., 2009: 339–341), which is <u>desirable because</u>, as already noted, <u>some theories expect non-linearity between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict</u>; and finally, <u>it can cope with potential interactions and multicollinearity between regressors</u> (Strobl et al., 2009: 339–341; Strobl et al., 2008). As noted before, most of the regressors here are highly correlated, and also it is plausible to anticipate some interaction effect between them (e.g. the number of democratic states and the gross world product). The <u><strong>specific capabilities</strong> of Random Forests are therefore <strong>essential</u></strong>.</p><p>The estimation of conditional variable importance shows that <u>the nuclear year counter has a negative importance score</u>.7 Thus, the nuclear year counter is not important in explaining the dispute–state ratio. <u>This suggests</u> that <u>the <strong>optimist theory is supported</strong>.</u> The remaining regressors have an importance score higher than the absolute value of the importance score of the nuclear year counter, meaning that they are all important. <u>Controlling for democratic peace, capitalist peace, and polarity, the number of nuclear states is <strong>still a significant predictor in explaining a systemic propensity for interstate conflict</u></strong>.</p><p>Figure 1 presents the partial dependence plots of the model.8 First, on average, <u>a larger number of nuclear states is associated with a lower dispute–state ratio</u>, although the changes from two nuclear states to three and from six to seven increase the ratio instead. Thus, the relationship is empirically non-linear, as Bueno de Mesquita and Riker (1982) and Intriligator and Brito (1981) expected in part. <u><strong>Overall</u></strong>, however, <u>the optimist theory is supported</u>, and <u>the change from two nuclear states to nine</u> nuclear states <u>decreases the dispute–state ratio</u> approximately from 0.228 to 0.18. This means that, if there are 194 states in the system (as there were in 2009), <u>the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets</u> per system-year <u>decreases</u> approximately <u>from <strong>44 to 35</strong>. This is a <strong>substantively significant decline</u></strong>.</p><p>Second, <u>the nuclear year counter shows a concave relationship with the dispute–state ratio, suggesting</u> that <u><strong>new nuclear states are less prone to conflict than middle-aged nuclear states</u></strong>. Thus, <u><strong>the pessimist theory finds no support</u></strong> from either the variable importance estimation or the partial dependence plot.</p><p>Finally, as for the control variables, the number of democratic states and the gross world product have a complex non-linear relationship with the dispute–state ratio, but if the number of democratic states and the gross world product are sufficiently large, they tend to decrease the dispute– state ratio. Their substantive effects are also significant, though not as much as the number of nuclear states. When comparing the effect of their lowest and highest values (23 and 94 in the number of democratic states and 7 and 71.2 in the gross world product), the number of democratic states decreases the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year approximately from 40 to 37, and the gross world product from 44 to 37. Unipolarity is also associated with a decline in the dispute–state ratio, suggesting that unipolarity is better than bipolarity in terms of a systemic propensity for interstate conflict; however, its effect is negligible, as it reduces the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year from 39 to 38. One caveat is, as explained in the online appendix, that the results of the number of democratic states and unipolarity are significantly sensitive to a parameter setting. Thus, these predictors are less robust, and the aforementioned points about them should be treated with caution.</p><p>Discussion and concluding remarks</p><p>The <u>main findings reveal</u> that <u>the optimist expectation of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict is empirically supported</u>:9 first, <u>a larger number of nuclear states on average decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict</u>; and second, <u>there is no clear evidence that the emergence of new nuclear states increases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict</u>. Gartzke and Jo (2009) argue that nuclear weapons themselves have no exogenous effect on the probability of conflict, because when a state is engaged in or expects to engage in conflict, it may develop nuclear weapons to keep fighting, or to prepare for, that conflict. If this selection effect existed, the analysis should overestimate the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear proliferation in the above model. Still, the results indicate that a larger number of nuclear states are associated with fewer disputes in the system.</p><p>This conclusion, however, raises questions about how to reconcile this study’s findings with those of a recent quantitative dyadic-level study (Bell and Miller, 2015). The current paper finds that nuclear proliferation decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict, while Bell and Miller (2015) find that nuclear symmetry has no significant effect on dyadic conflict, but that nuclear asymmetry is associated with a higher probability of dyadic conflict. It is possible that <u>nuclear proliferation decreases conflict through the conflict-mitigating effects of extended nuclear deterrence and/or fear of nuclear states’ intervention</u>, to the extent that <u>these effects <strong>overwhelm the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear–asymmetrical dyads</u></strong>. Thus, <u>dyadic-level empirics <strong>cannot solely be relied on to infer causal links</strong> between nuclear proliferation and a <strong>systemic</strong> propensity for conflict. The <strong>systemic-level empirics deserve attention</u></strong>.</p><p>The findings of this paper also have significant policy implications. The international community is sensitive to nuclear proliferation, and with Iran well on the way to developing full nuclear capabilities, it is crucial to understand the implications of nuclear proliferation for international security. This paper suggests that, at least <u>in terms of a <strong>systemic propensity for interstate conflict</strong>, nuclear proliferation might be welcomed</u> – <u>although, given that nuclear asymmetry can provoke dyadic conflict, reducing this side effect of nuclear proliferation by some other measure will be desirable</u>. Finally, <u>this paper should not be seen as decisive evidence that nuclear proliferation contributes to international security in general</u>. Nuclear proliferation may increase risks of nuclear weapons being leaked to terrorist groups (Bueno de Mesquita and Riker, 1982: 304) or used accidentally (Intriligator and Brito, 1981). It is untenable to assess the merits and demerits of nuclear proliferation only in terms of a systemic propensity for conflict. Additional research should examine these risks. <u>Nonetheless, this paper makes a significant contribution</u> to the literature <u>by <strong>adding new empirics</strong> for a more comprehensive assessment of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict</u>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Miller 2 Steven E. Miller, “The Utility of Nuclear Weapons and the Strategy of No-First-Use,” paper presented at Pugwash meeting, No. 279, London, United Kingdom, November 15–17, 2002. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/utility-nuclear-weapons-and-strategy-no-first-use fulltext: CAPABILITIES ABANDONED: MAKING NO FIRST USE REAL If NFU is to be more than a declaratory policy, then it must be meaningfully reflected in the war planning and force postures of the nuclear powers. Because the possibility of first use inheres in the possession of a nuclear arsenal, it is not easy to create a posture that effectively displays genuine fidelity to the NFU pledge. Because it is easy to proclaim NFU as a declaratory policy, little weight has been given in the past to the NFU pledges made by various nuclear powers. It seems safe to say, for example, that the United States and its NATO allies gave no credence whatsoever to the NFU commitment made by the Soviet Union. What must nuclear-armed states do if they wish to genuinely adopt a strategy of no-first-use? How might they make this a credible and reassuring step? How could they configure their forces so as to reflect a real NFU policy? In the context of anything like present nuclear forces, it is not clear that there is a wholly convincing answer to these questions - or at least, an answer that would be wholly convincing to a suspicious adversary. But an implication of NFU is that the present force postures must be left far behind. Then, as a general matter, the answer must be that a real NFU policy would have to ripple through the entire military posture and preparations of the nuclear-armed state. And the end result would need to be a doctrine that does not rely on first use and a nuclear force posture that has little or no capacity to be used first. War planning. NFU cannot be real if militaries develop war plans that include, or even depend upon, the expectation of first-use of nuclear weapons. It has long been a commonplace to note the gap that often exists in nuclear powers between declaratory policy and operation policy. The Soviet Union's NFU pledge, for example, coexisted with war plans for a European war that called for substantial use of nuclear weapons from the outset of hostilities.25 A genuine strategy of no-first use would need to be reflected in operational war plans. These would have to assume an entirely non-nuclear character and to extirpate all scenarios in which recourse is made to the first use of nuclear weapons. Eradicating the idea that nuclear first use is an option would have enormous implications. It would alter the expectations of politicians and commanders. It would (or should) influence military investment decisions - more conventional capability may be necessary, for example.26 It could affect public articulations of defense policy and military doctrine. In the Soviet period, Moscow's NFU pledge was undermined by a profusion of military writings that emphasized nuclear preemption and warfighting and otherwise were in tension with NFU. But a genuine NFU strategy would need to harmonize doctrinal expositions and political explanations of defense policy with the constraints of the NFU commitment. Changes in public rhetoric alone will not be sufficient to convince the world that a NFU strategy is firmly in place. But they could help send the message that NFU was being taken seriously. NATO presently proclaims at every occasion that nuclear weapons are essential and that nuclear first-use is an integral component of alliance military strategy. If NATO instead were to proclaim that nuclear weapons are irrelevant to most of the alliance's security needs and that it could not envision circumstances in which it would use nuclear weapons first, this would certainly set a very different tone. War planning, of course, is not a public activity, though it has public outcroppings. So though this is a necessary step if NFU is to be real, it must be coupled with other, more visible steps, if others are to be convinced that NFU is more than declaratory policy. Exercises and training. Militaries, goes the old aphorism, fight the way they train. Military organizations are honed through years training and exercises to operate in certain ways with certain expectations. If exercises sometimes or routinely involve scenarios that include nuclear first use, this will be visible to observers of the exercises and will be have impact on the way the military thinks and behaves. NFU cannot be real if militaries are practicing as if nuclear weapons will be used first. In the context of a strategy of NFU, exercises should ingrain the idea that first-use is entirely out of the picture and should not figure at all in the calculations of military commanders. Force Composition and Disposition. A strategy of NFU would require or permit dramatic alterations in force posture. A purely deterrent force could be much smaller and simpler than the present arsenals of the larger nuclear powers. There would be no need for emphasis on speed or offensive readiness. (Readiness for survivability would, of course, remain desirable.) The force postures most compatible with NFU, and most convincing to other powers, would possess little or no capability for first-use. This proposition - that states should seek to minimize the first-use capacities of their nuclear arsenals - has potentially profound implications for nuclear posture. It could lead far down a road toward latent, residual, undeployed nuclear capabilities. In effect, this would entail the aggressive pursuit of deep dealerting.27 In the context of a strategy of NFU, nuclear forces need only survive survive an attack and be capable of retaliation. No other demands are placed upon them. This means that all readiness measures associated with first use options are superfluous, unnecessary, and even undesirable. Some categories of nuclear weapons - nonstrategic nuclear forces, for example - would become expendable. Forward deployed weapons, such as the American nuclear capabilities deployed in Europe, would be neither necessary nor appropriate. With offensive readiness no longer important, there would be no reason to leave warheads routinely mated to delivery systems. There might be little reason, indeed, to possess actively deployed nuclear weapons. There might be no compelling reason to leave nuclear weapons in the custody of military organizations. So long as survivability could be assured, there might be an argument for keeping few, if any, fully assembled nuclear weapons in the arsenal. Following this logic still further, in this sort of nuclear environment, states might grow comfortable not only with NFU, but with the notion of no-early-second-use - retaliation does not need to be prompt in order to deter. The end point of this logic might be something like the capacities of present day Japan, which might be regarded as a massively dealerted nuclear power. It possesses nuclear expertise, delivery systems, and fissile material. In some weeks or months it could build nuclear weapons for retaliation if it needed to. But no one fears its first use options. Thus, the premise of NFU, if taken seriously, produces a logic that can lead in stunning directions. In short, once nuclear arsenals are limited to purely deterrent purposes, it becomes possible to envision substantial alterations of force posture that would give considerable reality to NFU commitments. For the larger nuclear powers, one could imagine much smaller forces, deeply dealerted, incapable of rapid use, perhaps with warheads unmated from delivery systems, perhaps with warheads withdrawn from regular deployment. This is a very different nuclear force, far from anything presently in view, but one entirely compatible with a world dominated by deterrence and NFU.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>The second plank results in deep de-alerting--that solves perception without going through Congress</h4><p>Miller 2</p><p><u></strong>Steven E. Miller, “The Utility of Nuclear Weapons and the Strategy of No-First-Use,” paper presented at Pugwash meeting, No. 279, London, United Kingdom, November 15–17, 2002. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/utility-nuclear-weapons-and-strategy-no-first-use</p><p></u>CAPABILITIES ABANDONED: MAKING NO FIRST USE REAL <u><mark>If NFU is to be more than</mark> a <mark>declaratory</mark> policy, then <mark>it must be</mark> meaningfully <mark>reflected in</mark> the war planning and <mark>force postures</mark> of the nuclear powers</u>. Because the possibility of first use inheres in the possession of a nuclear arsenal, it is not easy to create a posture that effectively displays genuine fidelity to the NFU pledge. Because it is easy to proclaim NFU as a declaratory policy, little weight has been given in the past to the NFU pledges made by various nuclear powers. It seems safe to say, for example, that<u> the United States and its NATO allies gave no credence whatsoever to the NFU commitment made by the Soviet Union</u>. What must nuclear-armed states do if they wish to genuinely adopt a strategy of no-first-use? How might they make this a credible and reassuring step? How could they configure their forces so as to reflect a real NFU policy? In the context of anything like present nuclear forces, it is not clear that there is a wholly convincing answer to these questions - or at least, an answer that would be wholly convincing to a suspicious adversary. But an implication of NFU is that the present force postures must be left far behind. Then, as a general matter, the answer must be that a real NFU policy would have to ripple through the entire military posture and preparations of the nuclear-armed state. And the end result would need to be a doctrine that does not rely on first use and a nuclear force posture that has little or no capacity to be used first. War planning. NFU cannot be real if militaries develop war plans that include, or even depend upon, the expectation of first-use of nuclear weapons. It has long been a commonplace to note the gap that often exists in nuclear powers between declaratory policy and operation policy. The Soviet Union's NFU pledge, for example, coexisted with war plans for a European war that called for substantial use of nuclear weapons from the outset of hostilities.25 A genuine strategy of no-first use would need to be reflected in operational war plans. These would have to assume an entirely non-nuclear character and to extirpate all scenarios in which recourse is made to the first use of nuclear weapons. <u><mark>Eradicating</mark> the idea that nuclear <mark>first use</mark> is an option <mark>would</mark> have enormous implications. It would alter the expectations of politicians and commanders. It would (or should) <mark>influence military </mark>investment <mark>decisions</mark> - more conventional capability may be necessary, for example.26 <strong><mark>It could affect public articulations</strong></mark> of defense policy and military doctrine</u>. In the Soviet period, Moscow's NFU pledge was undermined by a profusion of military writings that emphasized nuclear preemption and warfighting and otherwise were in tension with NFU. But a genuine NFU strategy would need to harmonize doctrinal expositions and political explanations of defense policy with the constraints of the NFU commitment. Changes in public rhetoric alone will not be sufficient to convince the world that a NFU strategy is firmly in place. But they could help send the message that NFU was being taken seriously. NATO presently proclaims at every occasion that nuclear weapons are essential and that nuclear first-use is an integral component of alliance military strategy. If NATO instead were to proclaim that nuclear weapons are irrelevant to most of the alliance's security needs and that it could not envision circumstances in which it would use nuclear weapons first, this would certainly set a very different tone. War planning, of course, is not a public activity, though it has public outcroppings. So though this is a necessary step if NFU is to be real, it must be coupled with other, more visible steps, if others are to be convinced that NFU is more than declaratory policy. Exercises and training. Militaries, goes the old aphorism, fight the way they train. Military organizations are honed through years training and exercises to operate in certain ways with certain expectations. <u><mark>If exercises</mark> sometimes or routinely <mark>involve</mark> scenarios that include nuclear <mark>first use</mark>, <mark>this will be visible to observers</mark> of the exercises and will be have impact on the way the <mark>military</mark> thinks and behaves. NFU cannot be real if militaries are practicing as if nuclear weapons will be used first. In the context of a strategy of NFU, exercises<mark> should ingrain</mark> the idea <mark>that first-use is</mark> entirely <mark>out of the picture</mark> and should not figure at all in the calculations of military commanders</u>. Force Composition and Disposition. A strategy of NFU would require or permit dramatic alterations in force posture. <u><mark>A pure</mark>ly <mark>deterrent</mark> force <mark>could be</mark> much <mark>smaller and simpler</mark> than the present arsenals of the larger nuclear powers. There would be no need for emphasis on speed or offensive readiness</u>. (Readiness for survivability would, of course, remain desirable.) The <u><mark>force postures </mark>most <mark>compatible with NFU, <strong>and most convincing to other powers</strong></mark>, <mark>would possess</mark> little or <mark>no capability for first-use</u></mark>. This proposition - that states should seek to minimize the first-use capacities of their nuclear arsenals - has potentially profound implications for nuclear posture. It could lead far down a road toward latent, residual, undeployed nuclear capabilities. In effect,<u> <mark>this would entail</mark> the <strong>aggressive pursuit of<mark> deep dealerting</strong></mark>.27 In the context of a strategy of NFU, <mark>nuclear forces need only survive</mark> survive <mark>an attack and be capable of retaliation</u></mark>. No other demands are placed upon them. This means that all readiness measures associated with first use options are superfluous, unnecessary, and even undesirable. Some categories of nuclear weapons - nonstrategic nuclear forces, for example - would become expendable. Forward deployed weapons, such as the American nuclear capabilities deployed in Europe, would be neither necessary nor appropriate. With offensive readiness no longer important, there would be no reason to leave warheads routinely mated to delivery systems. There might be little reason, indeed, to possess actively deployed nuclear weapons. There might be no compelling reason to leave nuclear weapons in the custody of military organizations. So long as survivability could be assured, there might be an argument for keeping few, if any, fully assembled nuclear weapons in the arsenal. Following this logic still further, in this sort of nuclear environment, states might grow comfortable not only with NFU, but with the notion of no-early-second-use - retaliation does not need to be prompt in order to deter. The end point of this logic might be something like the capacities of present day Japan, which might be regarded as a massively dealerted nuclear power. It possesses nuclear expertise, delivery systems, and fissile material. In some weeks or months it could build nuclear weapons for retaliation if it needed to. But no one fears its first use options. Thus, the premise of NFU, if taken seriously, produces a logic that can lead in stunning directions. In short,<u> once nuclear arsenals are limited to purely deterrent purposes, <mark>it becomes possible to</mark> envision substantial alterations of force posture that would <mark>give</mark> considerable reality to NFU <mark>commitments<strong></mark>. For the larger nuclear powers, one could imagine much smaller forces, deeply dealerted, incapable of rapid use, perhaps with warheads unmated from delivery systems, perhaps with warheads withdrawn from regular deployment. This is a very different nuclear force, far from anything presently in view, but one entirely compatible with a world dominated by deterrence and NFU. </p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Halberstam 11 (Jack, Professor of American Studies and Ethnicity, Gender Studies, and Comparative Literature @ USC, “The Queer Art of Failure,” Duke University Press, Page 54-59) fulltext: Stupidity conventionally means different things in relation to different subject positions; for example, stupidity in white men can signify new modes of domination, but stupidity in women of all ethnicities inevitably symbolizes their status as, in psychoanalytic terms, “castrated” or impaired. In relation to the theme of productive failure, stupidity and forgetfulness work hand in hand to open up new and different ways of being in relation to time, truth, being, living, and dying. I will return to Dory and her fishy forms of forgetting later, but I will start with some basic premises about stupidity. Stupidity Stupidity is as profoundly gendered as knowledge formations in general; thus while unknowing in a man is sometimes rendered as part of masculine charm, unknowing in a woman indicates a lack and a justification of a social order that anyway privileges men. Though we both punish and naturalize female stupidity, we not only forgive stupidity in white men, but we often cannot recognize it as such since white maleness is the identity construct most often associated with mastery, wisdom, and grand narratives. In other words, when a white male character in a film or novel is characterized as stupid or unknowing, this is quickly folded back into his general appeal as a winning form of vulnerability. (Think of Jack Nicholson’s character in As Good As It Gets [1997, directed by James L. Brooks], for example.) An elaborate example of the mastery of white male unknowing occurs in Zadie Smith’s hilarious novel, On Beauty (2006), which illuminates the ways we naturalize knowledge in relation to the white man. While her novel never does resolve into a racial polemic, it certainly punishes its white male hero for his unquestioned sense of his own mastery. On Beauty addresses questions about life, race, and politics by exploring the dramas of life in a New Eng land university named Wellington, a barely disguised version of Harvard. In a critical move at the novel’s conclusion, Smith brings her unknowing but masterful white male protagonist, Howard, to an ignominious end. Reviewers make much of Smith’s citation of Elaine Scarry’s book On Beauty and Justice in her title and E. M. Forster’s Howard’s End in her plot, and generally Smith’s novel has been read as a tribute to the humanistic impulses behind both Scarry’s belief that beauty and justice are related, indeed that one leads to the other, and Forster’s celebration of some vague notion of truth and human connection. However, the thrust of On Beauty leads readers in a rather different direction than the nods to Scarry and Forster imply. In fact On Beauty actually upends all the transparent alibis that dominant groups (in the case of Wellington, white male academics) give themselves in academia and elsewhere to justify their investments in anachronistic forms of knowledge. And so, while Howard is ostensibly writing a book that deconstructs the notion of genius with reference to Rembrandt, he continues to behave as if genius really does exist and as if it exists specifically in him. Howard himself believes that he does not need to write a book to showcase his own intellect because his intelligence is so self- evident and self- authorizing. Smith leads Howard through a series of comical humiliations in the course of the narrative, none of which humbles him or shakes his belief in his own greatness and his own appeal; then, at the conclusion of the novel, she shows him standing before an audience to present his great work, the centerpiece of his tenure case and the proof of his undying genius. The audience, which includes his estranged African American wife, Kiki, and their children, becomes increasingly uncomfortable as it becomes quite clear that Howard has nothing much to say. In fact he has no talk to give, having left his brief and unfinished manuscript on the backseat of his car, and he finds himself simply flipping through a PowerPoint presentation on Rembrandt’s paintings while the audience sits and watches. Some shift in their seats in embarrassment, but others read his brilliance into the mere “ordering” of the slides he shows. Ultimately Howard’s end is just that: it signifies the end to a particular model of knowing and being that is organized around the white male principle of genius and that has been institutionalized within a racially specific model of the university that believes in the direct links between beauty and justice. Howard’s end is also the end of the authorizing gestures of taste and valuation, in fact is the end of disciplinarity itself and the beginning of the multiple forms of subjugated knowledge that have already, steadily and definitively, replaced it. The spectacle of Howard clicking through a slideshow with nothing to say while still seducing a few admiring fans in the audience brings to mind countless other millennial dimbos. Since at least the year 2000 and the election of George W. Bush, Americans have shown themselves to be increasingly enamored with the heroic couplet of men and stupidity. As the election in 2004 proved, playing dumb means playing to “the people,” who, apparently, find intellectual acumen to be a sign of overeducation, elitism, and Washington insider status. As many critics have pointed out, no one could be more of a Washington insider than George W. Bush, the son of a former president and the brother of the governor of Florida. Even so, in both of his election campaigns Bush made a populist version of stupidity into a trademark and sold himself to the public as a down- home guy, a fun BBQ pal, a man’s man, a student privileged enough to go to Yale but “real” enough to only get Cs—in other words, an inarticulate, monolingual buffoon who was a safe bet for the White House because he was not trying to befuddle an increasingly uneducated populace with facts, figures, or, god forbid, ideas. His opponent in the election, John Kerry, was fluent in French, well educated, well spoken, and highly suspicious on all counts. Stupidity in women, as we know, is often expected in this maledominated culture, and some women cultivate it because they see it rewarded in popular icons, from Goldie Hawn to Jessica Simpson. Stupid women make men feel bigger, better, smarter. But what is the appeal in North America of the stupid man, and why does the representation of male stupidity not lead to male disempowerment? Stupidity in men is represented as, well, disarming (Adam Sandler), charming (Jerry Lewis), comforting (George W.), or innocent (Will Farrell in Elf, Tom Hanks in everything). Male stupidity masks the will to power that lies just behind the goofy grin, and it masquerades as some kind of internalization of feminist critiques. The clueless male in movies usually requires a spunky and intelligent woman to pull him along, educate and civilize him, and this masks the gender inequality that structures their relationship. Male stupidity is in fact a new form of macho, and it comes at a time when alternative masculinities have achieved some small measure of currency. It matters little whether we are discussing avant- garde film or popular film, because, in both, male unknowing facilitates male power. Pedro Almodovar’s critically acclaimed masterpiece of misogyny, Talk to Her (2004), is an aesthetically complex piece of work in which male stupidity allows for the complete decimation of two talented women. First, a ballet dancer and a female bullfighter are involved in separate accidents that render them comatose. Next, their comatose bodies become wallpaper while two unappealing and unremarkable male admirers flirt and coo across their mute and prone bodies. While the male leads are exposed as flawed, criminal even, deceptive, and conniving, the film still focuses on them while leaving the women inert, simple, silent. Stupidity, in other words, passes as complexity, and male complexity requires, again, female simplicity. While one could argue that Talk to Her is charting rather than investing in the kinds of misogyny that rescue male stupidity by projecting it onto women, other films with a similar theme confirm the fatal links between male bonding and a form of male pathos (pathetic stupidity) designed to tug at the heartstrings of the women who “love too much.” To give a prime example of this last kind of “male stupidity” film, the universally acclaimed Oscar contender Sideways pairs up nebbish, overly intellectual loser Miles (Paul Giamatti) with the patently stupid faded macho actor Jack (Thomas Haden Church) and turns their wine country odyssey into an exploration of wine, women, and wisdom, with the women providing access to first the wine and then the wisdom. The movie seems to be exposing male vulnerability, or making a spectacle of male stupidity, or anatomizing male arrogance, but in the end it is no different from any other buddy movie, recalling the dumb cute guy and smart ugly guy couples of Dean Martin and Jerry Lewis, Butch Cassidy and Sundance, even the much more appealing Jesse and Chester in Dude, Where’s My Car? But Sideways masquerades as a film about alternative masculinity by making male stupidity stand in for male vulnerability and then producing male vulnerability as irresistible to smart women. In fact popular and seemingly “dumb” films like Dude, Where’s My Car? (2000, directed by Danny Leiner) actually present far more elaborate understandings of the relations between male stupidity, social power, race, class, and gender than their intelligent counterparts. Male stupidity films like Dude, Where’s My Car?, Me, Myself and Irene (2000, directed by Bobby and Peter Farrelly), Bill and Ted’s Excellent Adventure (1989, directed by Stephen Herek), Austin Powers (1997, directed by Jay Roach), Dumb and Dumber (1994, directed by Peter Farrelly), Dumb and Dumberer (2003, directed by Troy Miller), Zoolander (2001, directed by Ben Stiller), and anything with Jim Carey or Adam Sandler, particularly Jim Carey, precisely because they are not trying to rescue male stupidity, manage to provide a pretty accurate map of the social webs that tie male unknowing to new forms of power. By mapping stupidity in this way we render it useful, provocative, and suggestive of precisely those temporally dissonant forms of knowing that Dory in Finding Nemo points to in her ephemeral loops of learning. In the close (too close?) reading of Dude, Where’s My Car? that follows, I try to grapple with stupidity on its own terms in order to open up other routes to transformative knowing; here I am not diagnosing male stupidity in the way I have so far, but exposing the logic of stupidity as a map of male power. I have chosen Dude, Where’s My Car? as a counterexample to the more artsy “male stupidity” films like Talk to Her and Sideways precisely because Dude takes itself less seriously and yet, through its complex time- loop narrative structure, actually reveals the architectures of white male stupidity and the kinds of social relations that it both blocks and makes pos-sible. I start with a plot summary, since saying what happens in Dude is actually a lot harder than it may seem; in fact “what happens” and “what does not happen” are a big part of the theory of stupidity and forgetting that the film advances. The plot summary, usually a rejected methodology in literary studies, reveals the stakes in repeating, looping, summarizing, forgetting, and knowing again. I attempt to inhabit the genre of Dude, the lexicon of Dude, the inspirational idiom of Dude in order to not know what it does not know, in order to forget what it forgets, in order to lose myself in its avenues of charming ignorance and spectacular silliness.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The academy should work to <u>queer knowledge</u> and deconstruct static notions of educational security – their belief in <u>educated agents</u> signifies a particular model of knowing internally complicit to the hegemonic conformity machine of the west </h4><p><strong>Halberstam 11</strong> (Jack, Professor of American Studies and Ethnicity, Gender Studies, and Comparative Literature @ USC, “The Queer Art of Failure,” Duke University Press, Page 54-59)</p><p>Stupidity conventionally means different things in relation to different subject positions; for example, <u><strong>stupidity in white men can signify new modes of domination, but stupidity in women of all ethnicities inevitably symbolizes their status as, in psychoanalytic terms, “castrated” or impaired</u></strong>. In relation to the theme of productive failure, <u><strong>stupidity and forgetfulness work hand in hand to open up new and different ways of being in relation to time, truth, being, living, and dying</u></strong>. I will return to Dory and her fishy forms of forgetting later, but I will start with some basic premises about stupidity. Stupidity Stupidity is as profoundly gendered as knowledge formations in general; <u><strong>thus while unknowing in a man is sometimes rendered as part of masculine charm, unknowing in a woman indicates a lack and a justification of a social order that anyway privileges men</u></strong>. <u><strong>Though we</u></strong> both <u><strong>punish and naturalize female stupidity</u></strong>, <u><strong>we not only forgive stupidity in white men, but we often cannot recognize it as such since white maleness is the identity construct most often associated with mastery, wisdom, </u></strong>and grand narratives. In other words, when a white male character in a film or novel is characterized as stupid or unknowing, this is quickly folded back into his general appeal as a winning form of vulnerability. (Think of Jack Nicholson’s character in As Good As It Gets [1997, directed by James L. Brooks], for example.) An elaborate example of the mastery of white male unknowing occurs in Zadie Smith’s hilarious novel, On Beauty (2006), which illuminates the ways we naturalize knowledge in relation to the white man. While her novel never does resolve into a racial polemic, it certainly punishes its white male hero for his unquestioned sense of his own mastery. On Beauty addresses questions about life, race, and politics by exploring the dramas of life in a New Eng land university named Wellington, a barely disguised version of Harvard. In a critical move at the novel’s conclusion, Smith brings her unknowing but masterful white male protagonist, Howard, to an ignominious end. Reviewers make much of Smith’s citation of Elaine Scarry’s book On Beauty and Justice in her title and E. M. Forster’s Howard’s End in her plot, and generally Smith’s novel has been read as a tribute to the humanistic impulses behind both Scarry’s belief that beauty and justice are related, indeed that one leads to the other, and Forster’s celebration of some vague notion of truth and human connection. However, the thrust of On Beauty leads readers in a rather different direction than the nods to Scarry and Forster imply. In fact On Beauty actually upends all the transparent alibis that dominant groups (in the case of Wellington, white male academics) give themselves in academia and elsewhere to justify their investments in anachronistic forms of knowledge. And so, while Howard is ostensibly writing a book that deconstructs the notion of genius with reference to Rembrandt, he continues to behave as if genius really does exist and as if it exists specifically in him. Howard himself believes that he does not need to write a book to showcase his own intellect because his intelligence is so self- evident and self- authorizing. Smith leads Howard through a series of comical humiliations in the course of the narrative, none of which humbles him or shakes his belief in his own greatness and his own appeal; then, at the conclusion of the novel, she shows him standing before an audience to present his great work, the centerpiece of his tenure case and the proof of his undying genius. The audience, which includes his estranged African American wife, Kiki, and their children, becomes increasingly uncomfortable as it becomes quite clear that Howard has nothing much to say. In fact he has no talk to give, having left his brief and unfinished manuscript on the backseat of his car, and he finds himself simply flipping through a PowerPoint presentation on Rembrandt’s paintings while the audience sits and watches. Some shift in their seats in embarrassment, but others read his brilliance into the mere “ordering” of the slides he shows. Ultimately <u><strong>Howard’s end is just that: it signifies the end to a particular model of knowing and being that is organized around the white male principle of genius and that has been institutionalized within a racially specific model of the university that believes in the direct links between beauty and justice</u></strong>. <u><strong>Howard’s end is also the end of the authorizing gestures of taste and valuation, in fact is the end of disciplinarity itself and the beginning of the multiple forms of subjugated knowledge that have already, steadily and definitively, replaced it.</u></strong> The spectacle of Howard clicking through a slideshow with nothing to say while still seducing a few admiring fans in the audience brings to mind countless other millennial dimbos<u><strong>. Since at least the year 2000 and the election of George W. Bush, Americans have shown themselves to be increasingly enamored with the heroic couplet of men and stupidity</u></strong>. <u><strong>As the election in 2004 proved, playing dumb means playing to “the people,” who, apparently, find intellectual acumen to be a sign of overeducation, elitism, and Washington insider status</u></strong>. As many critics have pointed out, no one could be more of a Washington insider than George W. Bush, the son of a former president and the brother of the governor of Florida. Even so, in both of his election campaigns Bush made a populist version of stupidity into a trademark and sold himself to the public as a down- home guy, a fun BBQ pal, a man’s man, a student privileged enough to go to Yale but “real” enough to only get Cs—in other words, an inarticulate, monolingual buffoon who was a safe bet for the White House because he was not trying to befuddle an increasingly uneducated populace with facts, figures, or, god forbid, ideas. His opponent in the election, John Kerry, was fluent in French, well educated, well spoken, and highly suspicious on all counts. Stupidity in women, as we know, is often expected in this maledominated culture, and some women cultivate it because they see it rewarded in popular icons, from Goldie Hawn to Jessica Simpson. Stupid women make men feel bigger, better, smarter. But what is the appeal in North America of the stupid man, and why does the representation of male stupidity not lead to male disempowerment? Stupidity in men is represented as, well, disarming (Adam Sandler), charming (Jerry Lewis), comforting (George W.), or innocent (Will Farrell in Elf, Tom Hanks in everything). Male <u><strong>stupidity masks the will to power that lies just behind the goofy grin, and it masquerades as some kind of internalization of feminist critiques</u></strong>. <u><strong>The clueless male in movies usually requires a spunky and intelligent woman to pull him along, educate and civilize him, and this masks the gender inequality that structures their relationship</u></strong>. Male stupidity is in fact a new form of macho, and it comes at a time when alternative masculinities have achieved some small measure of currency. It matters little whether we are discussing avant- garde film or popular film, because, in both, male unknowing facilitates male power. Pedro Almodovar’s critically acclaimed masterpiece of misogyny, Talk to Her (2004), is an aesthetically complex piece of work in which male stupidity allows for the complete decimation of two talented women. First, a ballet dancer and a female bullfighter are involved in separate accidents that render them comatose. Next, their comatose bodies become wallpaper while two unappealing and unremarkable male admirers flirt and coo across their mute and prone bodies. While the male leads are exposed as flawed, criminal even, deceptive, and conniving, the film still focuses on them while leaving the women inert, simple, silent. <u><strong>Stupidity,</u></strong> in other words, <u><strong>passes as complexity, and male complexity requires, again, female simplicity</u></strong>. While one could argue that Talk to Her is charting rather than investing in the kinds of misogyny that rescue male stupidity by projecting it onto women, other films with a similar theme confirm the fatal links between male bonding and a form of male pathos (pathetic stupidity) designed to tug at the heartstrings of the women who “love too much.” To give a prime example of this last kind of “male stupidity” film, the universally acclaimed Oscar contender Sideways pairs up nebbish, overly intellectual loser Miles (Paul Giamatti) with the patently stupid faded macho actor Jack (Thomas Haden Church) and turns their wine country odyssey into an exploration of wine, women, and wisdom, with the women providing access to first the wine and then the wisdom. The movie seems to be exposing male vulnerability, or making a spectacle of male stupidity, or anatomizing male arrogance, but in the end it is no different from any other buddy movie, recalling the dumb cute guy and smart ugly guy couples of Dean Martin and Jerry Lewis, Butch Cassidy and Sundance, even the much more appealing Jesse and Chester in Dude, Where’s My Car? But Sideways masquerades as a film about alternative masculinity by making male stupidity stand in for male vulnerability and then producing male vulnerability as irresistible to smart women. In fact popular and seemingly “dumb” films like Dude, Where’s My Car? (2000, directed by Danny Leiner) actually present far more elaborate understandings of the relations between male stupidity, social power, race, class, and gender than their intelligent counterparts. Male stupidity films like Dude, Where’s My Car?, Me, Myself and Irene (2000, directed by Bobby and Peter Farrelly), Bill and Ted’s Excellent Adventure (1989, directed by Stephen Herek), Austin Powers (1997, directed by Jay Roach), Dumb and Dumber (1994, directed by Peter Farrelly), Dumb and Dumberer (2003, directed by Troy Miller), Zoolander (2001, directed by Ben Stiller), and anything with Jim Carey or Adam Sandler, particularly Jim Carey, precisely because they are not trying to rescue male stupidity, manage to provide a pretty accurate map of the social webs that tie male unknowing to new forms of power. By mapping stupidity in this way we render it useful, provocative, and suggestive of precisely those temporally dissonant forms of knowing that Dory in Finding Nemo points to in her ephemeral loops of learning. In the close (too close?) reading of Dude, Where’s My Car? that follows, I try to grapple with stupidity on its own terms in order to open up other routes to transformative knowing; here I am not diagnosing male stupidity in the way I have so far, but exposing the logic of stupidity as a map of male power. I have chosen Dude, Where’s My Car? as a counterexample to the more artsy “male stupidity” films like Talk to Her and Sideways precisely because Dude takes itself less seriously and yet, through its complex time- loop narrative structure, actually reveals the architectures of white male stupidity and the kinds of social relations that it both blocks and makes pos-sible. I start with a plot summary, since saying what happens in Dude is actually a lot harder than it may seem; in fact “what happens” and “what does not happen” are a big part of the theory of stupidity and forgetting that the film advances. The plot summary, usually a rejected methodology in literary studies, reveals the stakes in repeating, looping, summarizing, forgetting, and knowing again. I attempt to inhabit the genre of Dude, the lexicon of Dude, <u><strong>the inspirational idiom of Dude in order to not know what it does not know, in order to forget what it forgets, in order to lose myself in its avenues of charming ignorance and spectacular silliness</u></strong>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Baum & Barrett 18, American research in the field of risk, executive director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, affiliated with Blue Marble Space Institute of Science and Columbia University Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Affiliate Scholar for the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, BS in optics and mathematics at University of Rochester, MS in Electrical Engineer, Northeastern University; risk and decision analyst based in Washington, D.C, focusing on risk assessment, PhD., Engineering & Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, BA of Science, Chemical Engineering, University of California, San Diego (Seth Baum; Anthony Barrett, 2018, “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks,” Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, https://sethbaum.com/ac/2018_Extreme.pdf) fulltext: 2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the los[e]s would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard risk equals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valu[e]ing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts. 3. Challenges To Analyzing GCR Given the goal of reducing GCR, one must know what the risks are and how they can be reduced. This requires diving into the details of the risks themselves—details that we largely skip in this paper—but it also requires attention to a few analytical challenges. The first challenge is the largely unprecedented nature of global catastrophes. Simply put, modern human civilization has never before ended. There have been several recent global catastrophes of some significance, the World Wars and the 1918 flu among them, but these clearly did not knock civilization out. Earlier catastrophes, including the prehistoric mass extinction events, the Toba volcanic eruption, and even the Black Death plague, all occurred before modern civilization existed. The GCR analyst is thus left to study risks of events that are in some way untested or unproven. But the lack of historical precedent does not necessarily imply a lack of ongoing risk. Indeed, the biggest mistake of naïve GCR analysis is to posit that, because no global catastrophe has previously occurred, therefore none will occur. This mistake comes in at least three forms. The first and most obviously false form is to claim that unprecedented events never occur. In our world of social and technological innovation, it is easy to see that this claim is false. But accounting for it in risk analysis still requires some care. One approach is to use what is known in probability theory as zero-failure data (Hanley 1983; Bailey 1997; Quigley and Revie 2011). Suppose that no catastrophe has occurred over n prior time periods—for example, there has been no nuclear war in the 65 years since two countries have had nuclear weapons. (The second country to build nuclear weapons was the Soviet Union, in 1949.) It can thus be said that there have been zero failures of nuclear deterrence in 65 cases. An approximate upper bound can then be estimated for the probability p of nuclear deterrence failure, i.e. the probability of nuclear war, occurring within an upcoming year. Specifically, p lies within the interval [0, u] with (1 – α) confidence, where u = 1 – α(1/n) gives the upper limit of the confidence interval. Thus for 95% confidence (α = 0.05), u = 1-0.05(1/65) = 0.05, meaning that there is a 95% chance that the probability of nuclear war within an upcoming year is somewhere between 0 and 0.05. Note that this calculation assumes (perhaps erroneously) that the 65 non-failures are independent random trials and that p is approximately constant over time, but it nonetheless provides a starting point for estimating the probability of unprecedented events. Barrett et al. (2013) uses a similar approach as part of a validation check of a broader risk analysis of U.S.-Russia nuclear war. The second form of the mistake is to posit that the ongoing existence of human civilization proves that global catastrophes will not occur. It is true that civilization’s continued existence despite some past threats should provide some comfort, but it should only provide some comfort. Consider this: if a global catastrophe had previously occurred, nobody would still be around to ponder the matter (at least for catastrophes causing human extinction). The fact of being able to observe one’s continued survival is contingent upon having survived. While it is easy to see that this is a mistake, it is harder to correct for it. Again, it requires careful application of probability theory, correcting for what is known as an observation selection effect (Bostrom 2002b, Ćirković 4 et al. 2010). The basic idea is to build the existence of the observer into probability estimates for catastrophes that would eliminate future observers. The result is probability estimates unbiased by the observer’s existence, with global catastrophe probability estimates typically revised upwards. The third form of the mistake is to posit that, because humanity has survived previous catastrophes, or risks of catastrophes, therefore it will survive future ones. This mistake is especially pervasive in discussions of nuclear war. People sometimes observe that no nuclear war has ever occurred and cite this as evidence to conclude that therefore nuclear deterrence and the fear of mutually assured destruction will indefinitely continue to keep the world safe (for discussion see Sagan and Waltz 2013). But there have been several near misses, from the 1962 Cuban missile crisis to the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident, and there is no guarantee that nuclear war will be avoided into the distant future. Similarly, just because no pandemic has ever killed the majority of people (Black Death killed about 22%), or just because early predictions about the rise of artificial intelligence proved false (they expected human-level AI within decades that have long since come and gone; see Crevier 1993; McCorduck 2004), it does not necessarily follow that no pandemics would be so lethal, or that AI cannot reach the lofty heights of the early predictions. Careful risk analysis can correct for the third form by looking at the full sequences of events that would lead to particular global catastrophes. For example, nuclear weapons in the United States are launched following a sequence of decisions by increasingly high ranking officials, ultimately including the President. This decision sequence can be built into a risk model, with model parameters estimated from historical data on how often each step in the decision sequence has been reached (Barrett et al. 2013). The more often near misses have occurred, and the nearer the misses were, the higher the probability of an eventual “hit” in the form of a nuclear war. The same analytic structure can be applied to other GCRs.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Prioritize magnitude</h4><p><strong>Baum & Barrett 18</strong>, American research in the field of risk, executive director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, affiliated with Blue Marble Space Institute of Science and Columbia University Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Affiliate Scholar for the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, BS in optics and mathematics at University of Rochester, MS in Electrical Engineer, Northeastern University; risk and decision analyst based in Washington, D.C, focusing on risk assessment, PhD., Engineering & Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, BA of Science, Chemical Engineering, University of California, San Diego (Seth Baum; Anthony Barrett, 2018, “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks,” Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, https://sethbaum.com/ac/2018_Extreme.pdf<u>)</p><p>2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important?</p><p></u>Taken literally, <u>a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather <strong>low threshold</strong> for what counts as a global catastrophe</u>. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, <u><mark>a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a</mark> <strong>significant <mark>portion</strong> of the globe</mark>.</u> Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). <u>Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause <strong>long-term declines</strong> in the <strong>trajectory of human civilization</u></strong> (Beckstead 2013), <u>that human civilization <strong>does not recover from</u></strong> (Maher and Baum 2013), <u>that <strong>drastically reduce humanity’s potential</strong> for <strong>future achievements</u></strong> (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that <u><mark>some catastrophes are</mark> vastly <mark>more important than others</mark>.</u> Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). <u><mark>Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might <strong>kill several hundred million people</u></strong></mark>. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, <u><mark>with nuclear winter</u></mark>, per Sagan, <u><mark>humanity could <strong>go extinct</strong>. The loss would be</mark> not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all <strong><mark>future generations</u></strong></mark>. To paraphrase Sagan, <u>the <strong>los[e]</strong>s would be billions and billions of lives</u>, or even more. Sagan estimated <u><strong><mark>500 trillion lives</u></strong></mark>, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. <u>The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the <strong>long-term fate</strong> of the universe</u>. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the <u>descendants of humanity to continue living for an <strong>infinite length of time</u></strong> or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, <u>the stakes with global catastrophes could be <strong>much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives</strong>.</u> Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, <u><mark>society should try <strong>500 trillion times harder</strong> to <strong>prevent a</mark> global <mark>catastrophe</strong> than it should to save a person’s life</u></mark>. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. <u>This suggests society should <mark>make</mark> <strong>extremely <mark>large investment</strong> in GCR reduction, at the expense of</mark> virtually <strong>all <mark>other objectives</strong></mark>.</u> Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. <u>Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest <strong>vast resource allocations</strong> should be <strong>redirected to reducing GCR</strong>.</u> This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard risk equals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. <u>This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause <strong>permanent harm</strong> to global human civilization</u>. The discussion thus far has assumed that <u>all human lives are <strong>valued equally</u></strong>. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. <u>Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations</u>. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. <u>Philosophers speak of an <strong>agent-neutral</strong>, <strong>objective</strong> “<strong>view from nowhere</strong>”</u> (Nagel 1986) <u>or a “<strong>veil of ignorance</strong>”</u> (Rawls 1971) in which <u>each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be.</u> <u>Such a perspective suggests <strong><mark>valu[e]</strong></mark>ing <strong><mark>everyone equally</strong></mark>, regardless of who they are or where or when they live</u>. <u><mark>This</u></mark> in turn <u><mark>suggests</mark> a <strong>very high <mark>value</strong> for reducing GCR</mark>, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.</p><p>3. Challenges To Analyzing GCR</p><p></u>Given the goal of reducing GCR, one must know what the risks are and how they can be reduced. This requires diving into the details of the risks themselves—details that we largely skip in this paper—but it also requires attention to a few analytical challenges. The first challenge is the largely unprecedented nature of global catastrophes. Simply put, modern human civilization has never before ended. There have been several recent global catastrophes of some significance, the World Wars and the 1918 flu among them, but these clearly did not knock civilization out. Earlier catastrophes, including the prehistoric mass extinction events, the Toba volcanic eruption, and even the Black Death plague, all occurred before modern civilization existed. The GCR analyst is thus left to study risks of events that are in some way untested or unproven. <u>But the lack of historical precedent does not necessarily imply a lack of ongoing risk. Indeed, <mark>the</mark> <strong>biggest <mark>mistake</strong> of <strong>naïve</mark> GCR <mark>analysis</strong> is to posit that, because no</mark> global <mark>catastrophe has</mark> previously <mark>occurred</mark>, therefore <mark>none will occur</mark>. This mistake comes in at least three forms. The <strong>first</strong> and most obviously false form is to claim that unprecedented events never occur</u>. In our world of social and technological innovation, it is easy to see that this claim is false. But accounting for it in risk analysis still requires some care. One approach is to use what is known in probability theory as zero-failure data (Hanley 1983; Bailey 1997; Quigley and Revie 2011). Suppose that no catastrophe has occurred over n prior time periods—for example, there has been no nuclear war in the 65 years since two countries have had nuclear weapons. (The second country to build nuclear weapons was the Soviet Union, in 1949.) It can thus be said that there have been zero failures of nuclear deterrence in 65 cases. An approximate upper bound can then be estimated for the probability p of nuclear deterrence failure, i.e. the probability of nuclear war, occurring within an upcoming year. Specifically, p lies within the interval [0, u] with (1 – α) confidence, where u = 1 – α(1/n) gives the upper limit of the confidence interval. Thus for 95% confidence (α = 0.05), u = 1-0.05(1/65) = 0.05, meaning that there is a 95% chance that the probability of nuclear war within an upcoming year is somewhere between 0 and 0.05. Note that this calculation assumes (perhaps erroneously) that the 65 non-failures are independent random trials and that p is approximately constant over time, but it nonetheless provides a starting point for estimating the probability of unprecedented events. Barrett et al. (2013) uses a similar approach as part of a validation check of a broader risk analysis of U.S.-Russia nuclear war. <u>The <strong>second</strong> form of the mistake is to posit that the ongoing existence of human civilization proves that global catastrophes will not occur</u>. It is true that civilization’s continued existence despite some past threats should provide some comfort, but it should only provide some comfort. Consider this: if a global catastrophe had previously occurred, nobody would still be around to ponder the matter (at least for catastrophes causing human extinction). The fact of being able to observe one’s continued survival is contingent upon having survived. While it is easy to see that this is a mistake, it is harder to correct for it. Again, it requires careful application of probability theory, correcting for what is known as an observation selection effect (Bostrom 2002b, Ćirković 4 et al. 2010). The basic idea is to build the existence of the observer into probability estimates for catastrophes that would eliminate future observers. The result is probability estimates unbiased by the observer’s existence, with global catastrophe probability estimates typically revised upwards. <u>The <strong>third</strong> form of <mark>the mistake is to posit that, because humanity has survived</mark> previous <mark>catastrophes</mark>, or risks of catastrophes, <mark>therefore it will survive future ones. This</mark> mistake <mark>is</mark> <strong>especially <mark>pervasive</strong> in <strong>discussions of nuclear war</strong>. People</mark> sometimes observe that no nuclear war has ever occurred and <mark>cite</mark> this as evidence to conclude that therefore nuclear deterrence and the fear of</u> <u><strong><mark>m</u></strong></mark>utually <u><strong><mark>a</u></strong></mark>ssured <u><strong><mark>d</u></strong></mark>estruction <u>will indefinitely continue to keep the world saf</u>e (for discussion see Sagan and Waltz 2013). But <u><mark>there have been</mark> several near <mark>misses</u></mark>, from <u>the 1962 Cuban missile crisis to the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident, and <mark>there is <strong>no guarantee</strong> that</mark> nuclear <mark>war will be avoided</mark> into the distant future</u>. Similarly, just because no pandemic has ever killed the majority of people (Black Death killed about 22%), or just because early predictions about the rise of artificial intelligence proved false (they expected human-level AI within decades that have long since come and gone; see Crevier 1993; McCorduck 2004), it does not necessarily follow that no pandemics would be so lethal, or that AI cannot reach the lofty heights of the early predictions. Careful risk analysis can correct for the third form by looking at the full sequences of events that would lead to particular global catastrophes. For example, nuclear weapons in the United States are launched following a sequence of decisions by increasingly high ranking officials, ultimately including the President. <u><mark>This decision sequence can be <strong>built into a risk model</strong>, with</mark> <strong>model <mark>parameters</strong> estimated from <strong>historical data</strong></mark> on how often each step in the decision sequence has been reached</u> (Barrett et al. 2013). <u><mark>The more often</mark> near <mark>misses</mark> have <mark>occurred, and the nearer the misses were, the <strong>higher the probability</strong> of</mark> an <strong>eventual “hit”</strong> in the <strong>form of a nuclear <mark>war</strong></mark>. The same analytic structure can be applied to other GCRs.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Rudiger 16 – Anja Rudiger, Ph.D. in Political Theory from the University of Kiel, former Director of Programs at the National Economic & Social Rights Initiative (“Human Rights and the Political Economy of Universal Health Care,” Health and Human Rights, Vol. 18, No. 2, pgs. 67-78, https://www.hhrjournal.org/2016/12/human-rights-and-the-political-economy-of-universal-health-care-designing-equitable-financing/) fulltext: Health system financing is a critical factor in securing universal health care and achieving equity in access and payment. The human rights framework offers valuable guidance for designing a financing strategy that meets these goals. This article presents a rights-based approach to health care financing developed by the human right to health care movement in the United States. Grounded in a human rights analysis of private, market-based health insurance, advocates make the case for public financing through progressive taxation. Financing mechanisms are measured against the twin goals of guaranteeing access to care and advancing economic equity. The added focus on the redistributive potential of health care financing recasts health reform as an economic policy intervention that can help fulfill broader economic and social rights obligations. Based on a review of recent universal health care reform efforts in the state of Vermont, this article reports on a rights-based public financing plan and model, which includes a new business tax directed against wage disparities. The modeling results suggest that a health system financed through equitable taxation could produce significant redistributive effects, thus increasing economic equity while generating sufficient funds to provide comprehensive health care as a universal public good. Introduction Universal health care is about more than our health—it is also a prescription for economic transformation, budget and tax reform, and public sector strengthening. It can catalyze economic redistribution in countries with fragmented market-based health systems, and resist austerity and privatization policies where universal systems already exist. If the human rights framework is to have a role in shaping this high-stakes political project, the right to health care has to be turned into a conceptual tool to guide systems change. Health systems goals put forward at the international, national, or sub-national level are not usually measured against human rights standards, and the policy instruments that implement reforms are not assessed for their consistency with the right to health care. In policy terms, universal health care is decidedly under-defined, which opens up space for periodic re-framing efforts based on evolving political contexts and interests, as the transition from the Alma-Ata Declaration’s Health For All to universal health coverage (UHC) illustrates.1 There is a lack of rights-based policy guidance to assess this shift from “care” to “coverage” and its apparent preference for an insurance business model over public service provision. To guide debates about the political economy of universal health care and inform the design of universal systems, it is incumbent on human rights advocates to establish the right to health care as a workable policy tool and engage with policymaking beyond general statements of values or legal defenses of individual rights. Right to health advocates must be able to define both the goals of a health system and the instruments and mechanisms conducive to achieving those goals. A rights-based framework of policy-relevant principles and standards for health system design, and particularly for financing, is needed to set parameters for modeling, implementing, and improving universal health care systems. This article presents a human rights approach to financing health care, along with the design of a financing mechanism for a sub-national universal system in the United States, including a predictive model simulating equitable revenue generation. This work, developed—with the author’s involvement—by the Vermont Workers’ Center’s (VWC) Healthcare Is a Human Right campaign (HCHR) between 2008 and 2015, includes a system assessment tool that evolved from a rights-based analytical framework designed to evaluate the most recent round of federal health care reform in the United States.2 Although grounded in international legal human rights norms, the example presented here does not make a legal case but offers a normative policy framework, informed by economic analysis and empirical data. All tools were developed collaboratively, with community participation, to advance grassroots human rights campaigns and foster the broad movement building—the coordinated developmental process that creates, strengthens, and sustains social movement infrastructure, membership and strategy—that is required to amass the political power necessary to effect systemic transformation. Human Rights and the US health care market Over the last decade, rights-based advocacy for universal, publicly financed health care has been gaining traction in the United States, notwithstanding the century-old resistance of industry interests and the failure of the recent federal reform, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), to challenge those interests.3 Although the ACA expanded access to the public Medicaid program, its mandate on individuals to purchase private insurance policies served to channel customers—and public subsidies—to the insurance industry, thus consolidating the private insurance market. While many health advocates responded with plans for improving the ACA, human rights campaigners pointed to the structural inequity of market-based health insurance and redoubled their organizing for a public health care system. The growing movement for the right to health care is best reflected in the Healthcare Is a Human Right Campaign Collaborative, a national movement building initiative inspired by the success of the eponymous campaign in Vermont, which became the first US state to enact a universal health care law and attempt a transition to a publicly financed universal system.4 The focus on health care financing by both policy makers and campaigners has its roots in the particular nature of the US health care crisis. In the only affluent country without a universal health system, the abundance of resources invalidates any argument for a progressive realization of human rights. Health care funding is plentiful (17% GDP in 2013), yet the mechanisms for raising and allocating those funds are deeply inequitable.5 While total health expenditure is twice as high as in most European countries, health disparities abound and outcomes are poor, with up to 100,000 deaths annually considered amenable to health care.6 Financial barriers are a key predictor of poor access to and quality of health care (oftentimes correlated with structural racism) and a leading cause of debt and impoverishment. The private, market-based insurance system does not function as an effective pre-payment mechanism, even with the public subsidies introduced by the ACA. Because of substantial user fees at the point of service, insurance coverage fails to correlate sufficiently with either improved access to care or ability to pay.7 Low-income people with private insurance rather than public (Medicaid, Medicare, or military) not only spend more of their income on health care than the wealthy, they are also more likely to have lower value insurance plans and delay or avoid getting needed care.8 It follows that universal health care advocacy is centered on promoting redistributive health care financing that facilitates both universal, equitable access to care and equity in the payment for care. Advocates have turned to human rights principles to inform the analysis and development of health-related economic and fiscal policies. The right to health care has been configured as a tool for shaping decisions about equity and resource redistribution.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The plan is key to redistribute wealth, eliminate income inequality, and guarantee health access for everyone</h4><p><strong>Rudiger 16 </strong>– Anja Rudiger, Ph.D. in Political Theory from the University of Kiel, former Director of Programs at the National Economic & Social Rights Initiative (“Human Rights and the Political Economy of Universal Health Care,” Health and Human Rights, Vol. 18, No. 2, pgs. 67-78, https://www.hhrjournal.org/2016/12/human-rights-and-the-political-economy-of-universal-health-care-designing-equitable-financing/)</p><p><u><strong>Health system financing is a critical factor in securing universal health care and achieving equity in access and payment</u></strong>. The human rights framework offers valuable guidance for designing a financing strategy that meets these goals. This article presents a rights-based approach to health care financing developed by the human right to health care movement in the United States. <u><strong>Grounded in a human rights analysis of private, market-based health insurance, advocates make the case for public financing through progressive taxation</u></strong>. <u><strong>Financing mechanisms are measured against the twin goals of guaranteeing access to care and advancing economic equity</u></strong>. <u><strong>The added focus on the redistributive potential of health care financing recasts health reform as an economic policy intervention that can help fulfill broader economic and social rights obligations</u></strong>. Based on a review of recent universal health care reform efforts in the state of Vermont, <u><strong>this article reports on a rights-based public financing plan and model, which includes a new business tax directed against wage disparities</u></strong>. The modeling results suggest that <u><strong>a health system financed through equitable taxation could produce significant redistributive effects</u></strong>, thus <u><strong>increasing economic equity while generating sufficient funds to provide comprehensive health care as a universal public good</u></strong>.</p><p>Introduction</p><p><u><strong>Universal health care</u></strong> is about more than our health—it <u><strong>is</u></strong> also <u><strong>a prescription for economic transformation, budget and tax reform, and public sector strengthening</u></strong>. <u><strong>It can catalyze economic redistribution in countries with fragmented market-based health systems, and resist austerity and privatization policies</u></strong> where universal systems already exist. If the human rights framework is to have a role in shaping this high-stakes political project, the right to health care has to be turned into a conceptual tool to guide systems change.</p><p>Health systems goals put forward at the international, national, or sub-national level are not usually measured against human rights standards, and the policy instruments that implement reforms are not assessed for their consistency with the right to health care. In policy terms, universal health care is decidedly under-defined, which opens up space for periodic re-framing efforts based on evolving political contexts and interests, as the transition from the Alma-Ata Declaration’s Health For All to universal health coverage (UHC) illustrates.1 There is a lack of rights-based policy guidance to assess this shift from “care” to “coverage” and its apparent preference for an insurance business model over public service provision. To guide debates about the political economy of universal health care and inform the design of universal systems, it is incumbent on human rights advocates to establish the right to health care as a workable policy tool and engage with policymaking beyond general statements of values or legal defenses of individual rights. Right to health advocates must be able to define both the goals of a health system and the instruments and mechanisms conducive to achieving those goals. A rights-based framework of policy-relevant principles and standards for health system design, and particularly for financing, is needed to set parameters for modeling, implementing, and improving universal health care systems.</p><p>This article presents a human rights approach to financing health care, along with the design of a financing mechanism for a sub-national universal system in the United States, including a predictive model simulating equitable revenue generation. This work, developed—with the author’s involvement—by the Vermont Workers’ Center’s (VWC) Healthcare Is a Human Right campaign (HCHR) between 2008 and 2015, includes a system assessment tool that evolved from a rights-based analytical framework designed to evaluate the most recent round of federal health care reform in the United States.2 Although grounded in international legal human rights norms, the example presented here does not make a legal case but offers a normative policy framework, informed by economic analysis and empirical data. All tools were developed collaboratively, with community participation, to advance grassroots human rights campaigns and foster the broad movement building—the coordinated developmental process that creates, strengthens, and sustains social movement infrastructure, membership and strategy—that is required to amass the political power necessary to effect systemic transformation.</p><p>Human Rights and the US health care market</p><p>Over the last decade, rights-based advocacy for universal, publicly financed health care has been gaining traction in the United States, notwithstanding the century-old resistance of industry interests and the failure of the recent federal reform, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), to challenge those interests.3 <u><strong>Although the ACA expanded access to the public Medicaid program, its mandate on individuals to purchase private insurance policies served to channel customers</u></strong>—and public subsidies—<u><strong>to the insurance industry</u></strong>, thus <u><strong>consolidating the private insurance market</u></strong>. While many health advocates responded with plans for improving the ACA, human rights <u><strong>campaigners pointed to the structural inequity of market-based health insurance and redoubled their organizing for a public health care system</u></strong>. The growing movement for the right to health care is best reflected in the Healthcare Is a Human Right Campaign Collaborative, a national movement building initiative inspired by the success of the eponymous campaign in Vermont, which became the first US state to enact a universal health care law and attempt a transition to a publicly financed universal system.4</p><p>The focus on health care financing by both policy makers and campaigners has its roots in the particular nature of the US health care crisis. In the only affluent country without a universal health system, the abundance of resources invalidates any argument for a progressive realization of human rights. Health care funding is plentiful (17% GDP in 2013), yet the mechanisms for raising and allocating those funds are deeply inequitable.5 While total health expenditure is twice as high as in most European countries, <u><strong>health disparities abound and outcomes are poor, with up to 100,000 deaths annually considered amenable to health care</u></strong>.6 <u><strong>Financial barriers are a key predictor of poor access to and quality of health care</u></strong> (oftentimes correlated with structural racism) and a leading cause of debt and impoverishment. <u><strong>The private, market-based insurance system does not function as an effective pre-payment mechanism</u></strong>, <u><strong>even with</u></strong> the <u><strong>public subsidies</u></strong> introduced by the ACA. <u><strong>Because of substantial user fees at the point of service</u></strong>, <u><strong>insurance coverage fails to correlate sufficiently with either improved access to care or ability to pay</u></strong>.7 Low-income people with private insurance rather than public (Medicaid, Medicare, or military) not only spend more of their income on health care than the wealthy, they are also more likely to have lower value insurance plans and delay or avoid getting needed care.8</p><p>It follows that <u><strong>universal health care advocacy is centered on promoting redistributive health care financing that facilitates both universal, equitable access to care and equity in the payment for care</u></strong>. Advocates have turned to human rights principles to inform the analysis and development of health-related economic and fiscal policies. The right to health care has been configured as a tool for shaping decisions about equity and resource redistribution.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Loren B. Thompson 16, Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates, a for-profit consultancy, “Why the Baltic States Are Where Nuclear War Is Most Likely To Begin,” National Interest, 7/20/16, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-baltic-states-are-where-nuclear-war-most-likely-17044 fulltext: Successive administrations failed to take any steps toward providing the U.S. with active defense against even a modest Russian attack. Plans to replace aging deterrent forces were repeatedly deferred, until some portions of the nuclear complex had become decrepit. And Washington continued to make security commitments in Russia's "near abroad" areas -- countries once satellites or integral parts of the Soviet Union -- as if the likelihood of nuclear conflict was close to zero. However, the possibility of nuclear war between America and Russia not only still exists, but is probably growing. And the place where it is most likely to begin is in a future military confrontation over three small Baltic states -- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Since those nations and several other Eastern European states joined NATO in 2004, the United States has been committed to defending their freedom and territorial integrity under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. Because NATO from its inception was aimed at containing the expansion of a nuclear country -- Russia -- a vital part of the U.S. security commitment to Europe consists of Washington's willingness to use its nuclear arsenal in defense of allies. The formal name for that strategy is "extended deterrence," and since 2004 it has included the Baltic states. Simply stated, the United States seeks to deter aggression or blackmail against NATO allies from a nuclear-armed Russia by threatening to use atomic weapons. The Obama Administration's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review confirmed that extended deterrence remains a pillar of U.S. global strategy. Although the credibility of extended deterrence ultimately resides in the U.S. strategic "triad" of long-range bombers and missiles, the posture review explicitly stated that the U.S. would preserve the ability to deploy nuclear weapons with suitably equipped tactical fighters in places like Europe. According to Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, the U.S. currently deploys about 200 B61 nuclear gravity bombs in Europe for use by American or allied forces in a future East-West war. The weapons are receiving life-extension modifications that will allow their use for decades to come, first on F-16 fighters and later on the stealthy F-35 fighter. Russia also deploys a sizable number of so-called "non-strategic" nuclear weapons in the European theater, although like the U.S. it does not disclose numbers or locations. While nuclear weapons could potentially be used in any number of future warfighting scenarios, there are multiple reasons to suspect that the greatest danger exists with regard to the three Baltic states. Here are eight of those reasons. First, both Washington and Moscow assign high strategic significance to the future disposition of the Baltic states. From Moscow's perspective, the three states are located close to the centers of Russian political and military power, and therefore are a potential base for devastating attacks. For instance, the distance between Lithuania's capital of Vilnius and Moscow is less than 500 miles -- a short trip for a supersonic aircraft. From Washington's perspective, failure to protect the Baltic states from Russian aggression could lead to the unraveling of America's most important alliance. Second, Washington has been very public about it commitment to the Baltic states. For instance, in 2014 President Obama stated during a visit to Estonia that defense of the three countries' capitals was "just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London." That is an extraordinary assertion considering that the population of metropolitan London (about 8 million) is greater than that of all three Baltic states combined (about 6 million), and that the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea is so close to the Russian heartland. Third, there is a disconnect between the rhetoric that Washington applies to Baltic security and the tactical situation that would likely obtain in a future war. Russia has massive local superiority in every form of military force, and the topography of the three states presents few obstacles to being quickly overrun. The RAND Corporation reported earlier this year that in a series of war games, Russian forces were always able to overcome indigenous defenders and reach Baltic capitals within a few days. The forces of other NATO nations had little time to respond. Fourth, for all of its talk about reinforcing NATO at the recent alliance summit ("we will defend every ally" President Obama said), there is scant evidence the U.S. is willing to make the kind of commitment of conventional forces needed to blunt a Russian invasion in the Baltic region. The proposed placement of NATO-led battalions in each state totaling about 1,000 soldiers each is widely described as a "tripwire" defense, meaning it might trigger a bigger alliance response but would not be able to prevent Moscow from reaching its military objectives quickly. Fifth, any counter-attack by NATO in the Baltics could easily be misconstrued by Moscow as a threat to its core interests, in part because some strikes against attacking forces would occur on Russian territory, and in part because Russia's fragile reconnaissance system would quickly be overwhelmed by the fog of war. Anthony Barrett of the RAND Corporation has recently produced a worrisome analysis detailing how an East-West conventional conflict along the Russian periphery could escalate to nuclear-weapons use through miscues or misjudgments. Sixth, both sides in any such conflict would have military doctrine potentially justifying the use of nuclear weapons to prevent defeat. In the case of Russia, it has stated repeatedly that it needs non-strategic nuclear weapons to cope with the superiority of NATO conventional forces, that it would use such weapons in order to protect its core assets and values, and even that nuclear weapons might sometimes be useful tools for de-escalating a conflict. Successive U.S. administrations have stressed that nuclear weapons underpin alliance commitments. Seventh, both sides have non-strategic nuclear weapons in theater ready for quick use if tactical circumstances dictate. For example, Hans Kristensen noted the presence of several nuclear-capable military systems in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad located between Lithuania and Poland. Although the Russians have not disclosed whether nuclear warheads are also located in the district, there is little doubt that hundreds could quickly be deployed to areas around the Baltic states in an escalating conflict. Nuclear-capable NATO jets could reach the area within hours. Eighth, new technologies are gradually being incorporated into forces on both sides that could accelerate the pace and confusion of a local conflict. For instance, the F-35 fighter that will replace F-16s in the tactical nuclear role cannot be tracked by Russian radar. The integrated air defenses that Russia has deployed in Kaliningrad and elsewhere on its territory could severely impede NATO use of local air space in support of ground forces, and Russian electronic-warfare capabilities could impede coordination of ground maneuvers. The bottom line is that all the ingredients are present in the eastern Baltic area for an East-West conflict escalating to nuclear weapons use. Neither side understands what actions might provoke nuclear use by the other, and once war began both sides would likely have a tenuous grasp of what was happening. The high stakes assigned to the outcome of such a conflict and the ready availability of "non-strategic" nuclear weapons in a context where either side might view their use as strategic in consequences is a prescription for catastrophe.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Baltic conflict escalates to nuclear use </h4><p>Loren B. <strong>Thompson 16,</strong> Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates, a for-profit consultancy, “Why the Baltic States Are Where Nuclear War Is Most Likely To<u><strong> Begin,” National Interest, 7/20/16, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-baltic-states-are-where-nuclear-war-most-likely-17044</p><p></u></strong>Successive administrations failed to take any steps toward providing the U.S. with active defense against even a modest Russian attack. Plans to replace aging deterrent forces were repeatedly deferred, until some portions of the nuclear complex had become decrepit. And <u>Washington continued to make <strong>security commitments</u></strong> <u>in Russia's "near abroad" areas -- </u>countries once satellites or integral parts of the Soviet Union<u> -- as</u> <u>if the likelihood of nuclear conflict was close to zero.</p><p><strong>However</u></strong>, <u>the <mark>possibility of <strong>nuclear war</strong></mark> between America and Russia not only still <strong>exists</u></strong>, <u>but <mark>is</u></mark> probably <u><strong><mark>growing</u></strong></mark>. And <u>the place where it is most likely to begin is in a future military confrontation <mark>over</mark> three small <strong><mark>Baltic s</mark>tates</u></strong> -- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. <u>Since those nations</u> and several other Eastern European states <u>joined NATO in 2004, the United States has been <strong>committed to defending </strong>their freedom and <strong>territorial integrity</strong> under <strong>Article V </strong>of the North Atlantic Treaty.</p><p></u>Because NATO from its inception was aimed at containing the expansion of a nuclear country -- Russia -- a vital part of the U.S. security commitment to Europe consists of Washington's willingness to use its nuclear arsenal in defense of allies. The formal name for that strategy is "extended deterrence," and since 2004 it has included the Baltic states. Simply stated, the United States seeks to deter aggression or blackmail against NATO allies from a nuclear-armed Russia by threatening to use atomic weapons.</p><p>The Obama Administration's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review confirmed that extended deterrence remains a pillar of U.S. global strategy. Although the credibility of extended deterrence ultimately resides in the U.S. strategic "triad" of long-range bombers and missiles, the posture review explicitly stated that the U.S. would preserve the ability to deploy nuclear weapons with suitably equipped tactical fighters in places like Europe.</p><p>According to Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, the U.S. currently deploys about 200 B61 nuclear gravity bombs in Europe for use by American or allied forces in a future East-West war. The weapons are receiving life-extension modifications that will allow their use for decades to come, first on F-16 fighters and later on the stealthy F-35 fighter. Russia also deploys a sizable number of so-called "non-strategic" nuclear weapons in the European theater, although like the U.S. it does not disclose numbers or locations.</p><p>While nuclear weapons could potentially be used in any number of future warfighting scenarios, there are multiple reasons to suspect that the greatest danger exists with regard to<u> the three Baltic states. Here are eight of those reasons.</p><p>First, <strong><mark>both</strong> <strong>Washington</strong> and <strong>Moscow</strong> assign</mark> <strong><mark>high strategic significance</strong></mark> <mark>to</mark> the future <strong><mark>disposition of the Baltic s</mark>tates</u></strong>. <u><mark>From Moscow's perspective</mark>, the three states are <mark>located close to</mark> the <mark>centers of Russian</mark> political and military <mark>power</mark>, and therefore are a <strong>potential base</strong> for devastating attacks</u>. For instance, the distance between Lithuania's capital of Vilnius and Moscow is less than 500 miles -- a short trip for a supersonic aircraft. <u><mark>From Washington's</mark> perspective, <mark>failure to protect</mark> the Baltic states from Russian aggression <mark>could lead to</mark> the <strong><mark>unraveling</strong></mark> <mark>of</mark> America's <strong>most important <mark>alliance</strong></mark>.</p><p>Second</u>, <u>Washington has been very <strong>public</strong> about it <strong>commitment to the Baltic states</u></strong>. For instance, in 2014 President Obama stated during a visit to Estonia that defense of the three countries' capitals was "just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London." That is an extraordinary assertion considering that the population of metropolitan London (about 8 million) is greater than that of all three Baltic states combined (about 6 million), and that the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea is so close to the Russian heartland.</p><p><u>Third, there is a <strong>disconnect</strong> between the <strong>rhetoric</strong> that Washington applies to Baltic security and the <strong>tactical situation</strong> that would likely obtain in a future war</u>. <u>Russia has <strong>massive local superiority</u></strong> in every form of military force, and the topography of the three states presents few obstacles to being quickly overrun. The RAND Corporation reported earlier this year that in a series of war games, Russian forces were always able to overcome indigenous defenders and reach Baltic capitals within a few days. The forces of other NATO nations had little time to respond.</p><p><u>Fourth, for all of its talk about reinforcing NATO at the recent alliance summit ("we will defend every ally" President Obama said), there is scant evidence the U.S. is willing to make the kind of commitment of conventional forces needed to blunt a Russian invasion in the Baltic region. The proposed placement of NATO-led battalions in each state totaling about 1,000 soldiers each is widely described as a "tripwire" defense, meaning it might trigger a bigger alliance response but would not be able to prevent Moscow from reaching its military objectives quickly.</p><p>Fifth, <strong><mark>any counter-attack</strong> by NATO</mark> in the Baltics <mark>could <strong>easily be misconstrued</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>by Moscow as a <strong>threat to its core interests</u></strong></mark>, <u>in part <mark>because some strikes</mark> against attacking forces <mark>would <strong>occur on Russian territory</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and</mark> in part because <mark>Russia's fragile <strong>reconnaissance</mark> system</strong> <mark>would</mark> <strong>quickly <mark>be overwhelmed</u></strong> <u>by the <strong>fog of war</mark>.</u></strong> Anthony Barrett of the RAND Corporation has recently produced a worrisome analysis detailing how an <u>East-West <mark>conventional conflict</mark> along the Russian periphery <mark>could</mark> <strong><mark>escalate to nuclear</mark>-weapons <mark>use</strong> through</mark> <strong>miscues</strong> or <strong><mark>misjudgments</strong></mark>.</p><p>Sixth, <mark>both sides</mark> in any such conflict would <mark>have</mark> <mark>military doctrine</mark> potentially <strong><mark>justifying</mark> the <mark>use of nuclear weapons</mark> to prevent defeat</u></strong>. <u>In the case of <mark>Russia</mark>, it has <mark>stated repeatedly</mark> that <mark>it <strong>needs</strong></mark> non-strategic <mark>nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s</mark> <mark>to</mark> <strong><mark>cope</u></strong> <u>with</mark> the <strong><mark>superiority of NATO</mark> conventional forces,</strong> <mark>that it would <strong>use such weapons</strong></mark> in order <mark>to <strong>protect its</mark> core <mark>assets</mark> and values</strong>, <mark>and</mark> even that <mark>nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s</mark> <mark>might</mark> sometimes <mark>be useful</mark> <strong>tools <mark>for de-escalating</strong></mark> a conflict. Successive <mark>U.S. administrations</mark> have <mark>stressed</mark> that <mark>nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s</mark> <strong><mark>underpin alliance commitments</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>Seventh, both sides have non-strategic nuclear weapons in theater <strong>ready for quick use</strong> if tactical circumstances</u> <u>dictate</u>. For example, Hans Kristensen noted the presence of several nuclear-capable military systems in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad located between Lithuania and Poland. Although the Russians have not disclosed whether nuclear warheads are also located in the district, there is little doubt that hundreds could quickly be deployed to areas around the Baltic states in an escalating conflict. Nuclear-capable NATO jets could reach the area within hours.</p><p><u><strong>Eighth, new technologies are gradually being incorporated into forces on both sides that could accelerate the pace and confusion of a local conflict. For instance, the F-35 fighter that will replace F-16s in the tactical nuclear role cannot be tracked by Russian radar. The integrated air defenses that Russia has deployed in Kaliningrad and elsewhere on its territory could severely impede NATO use of local air space in support of ground forces, and Russian electronic-warfare capabilities could impede coordination of ground maneuvers.</p><p></u></strong>The bottom line is that <u>all the ingredients are present in the eastern Baltic area for an East-West conflict <strong>escalating to nuclear weapons use.</u></strong> <u><mark>Neither side <strong>understands</strong> what actions might <strong>provoke nuclear use by the other</u></strong>, <u>and <strong>once war began</strong> both</mark> sides <mark>would</mark> likely <mark>have a</u> <u><strong>tenuous grasp </strong>of <strong>what was happenin</mark>g</u></strong>. <u>The <strong><mark>high stakes</u></strong> <u>assigned to the <strong>outcome</strong></mark> of such a conflict <mark>and</mark> the <strong><mark>ready availability</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>of</mark> "non-strategic" <mark>nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s</mark> in a context where either side might view their use as strategic in consequences <mark>is a <strong>prescription for catastrophe</mark>.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Kulesa 21 (Łukasz Kulesa - Deputy Head of Research at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, “Chapter 10: New Capabilities and Nuclear Deterrence in Europe”, Alliances, Nuclear Weapons and Escalation: Managing Deterrence in the 21st Century, Pages 119-122, 14 December 2021, MG) fulltext: The impact of new technologies and emerging military capabilities on nuclear deterrence is the subject of intense debate among experts, with multiple and often contradictory hypotheses. 14 Some assert that the nature of nuclear deterrence will be radically transformed and that the increased vulnerability of nuclear systems and improved defences will lead to the role of nuclear weapons becoming marginalised, an increase in the number of nuclear weapons or the adoption of more dangerous nuclear postures by some possessors (e.g. predelegation, launch-on-warning, pre-emption). But there are also more conservative predictions—namely that new technologies may not fully deliver on their disruptive promises and/or that their offensive advantages would be balanced by defensive countermeasures, leaving the role of nuclear deterrence more or less intact. The analysis conducted so far in this chapter seems to indicate that the European True Believers (in nuclear deterrence) remain unconvinced that any radical changes are approaching. The UK and France are taking steps to safeguard the functioning of their nuclear deterrence in a more challenging environment, utilising the assistance of new technologies. But they continue to see the role of nuclear weapons as ‘ultima ratio’ in escalation management and retaliation, to which no comparable alternative is likely to emerge. This is likely to remain the default position. The future trajectory of development and deployment of new non-nuclear capabilities by the US will have an impact on the alliance’s nuclear deterrence posture, especially regarding the rationale for maintaining US forwarddeployed nuclear forces in Europe and continuing NATO’s nuclear sharing. If US non-nuclear capabilities are seen as providing the same or perhaps a higher level of deterrence as nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, this may strengthen the case for their withdrawal to the US or complete elimination. One can envisage, for example, deployment of intermediate-range conventional hypersonic systems in Europe as substitutes for B61 nuclear bombs. In that case, the main axis of frictions may be between the US and those states that are particularly attracted to the forward deployment of nuclear weapons (even if they are not stationed on their territories), such as Poland and other eastern flank countries. These would most likely point out that Russia would treat the replacement of nuclear assets with non-nuclear ones as an invitation to escalate any crisis to the nuclear level, and that a nuclear-sharing model that includes direct involvement of a number of European allies cannot easily be replicated with regard to most of the new capabilities. A number of other political-military challenges may arise. First, we may face the emergence of a gap in thinking about escalation management and the employment of new capabilities between the US and its allies, with consequences for the nuclear sphere. The US is likely to maintain its preeminence in terms of the development and deployment of new technologies, and of formulating conceptual approaches as regards their use. Since individual NATO countries, most importantly the UK and France, aim to actively contribute their own ideas and approaches to discussions on issues such as artificial intelligence development, space and cyber policy, common NATO positions can be formulated. However, the US is likely to be far ahead of the majority of NATO allies. Further, the US and other technologically advanced allies may not be willing to share the full details of some of the more sensitive technologies they possess at NATO fora. The September 2021 announcement of the creation of the trilateral security partnership between the US, Australia and the UK (AUKUS) can be seen as potentially contributing to this trend. While the initial attention was focused on the nuclear-powered submarines, the participants also pledged closer cooperation on cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and other undersea capabilities. This may lead to strengthening the links and interoperability between the three countries, but would not engage NATO (which has a broad partnership relationship with Australia) as a whole. Consequently, in a crisis, allies may be surprised by certain US actions and their escalatory effects. This may not necessarily be caused by any lack of consultation or advanced warning but may happen because of their lack of understanding of the doctrinal, technological and military aspects of the US’s approach to operations. 15 The reverse may also be true. The US may be forced to react to developments arising from the employment of new technologies by some of its NATO allies, including a situation in which such an action escalates conflict to the nuclear threshold (e.g. cyber attack on the adversary’s nuclear command and control). The alliance’s response to this challenge will need to take the form of in-depth consultations, developing joint doctrinal documents and investment in simulations and wargaming. Second, integration of new capabilities and new domains into the deterrence and defence toolbox seems inevitable. Some changes will have important consequences at the tactical and operational levels (e.g. ubiquity of low-cost unmanned systems and their increased level of autonomy and effectiveness) and some may reach the strategic level. Any sudden devaluation of nuclear deterrence due to a technological breakthrough—for example, the end of ballistic missile submarines’ ‘near-invulnerability’—would have major ramifications and force the three NATO nuclear possessors to re-evaluate their posture, with major consequences for the alliance. But less revolutionary changes may be significant, as they would impact on traditional NATO approaches to burden and risk-sharing, deterrence and assurance. In the foreseeable future, a scenario of US military disengagement from NATO and Europe remains far-fetched, which means that Europe can rely on the full range of US capabilities when facing Russia. However, if the US or other allies were able to provide advanced strategic non-nuclear assets for common defence and deterrence, they may be inclined to reduce the ‘traditional’ contributions of their armed forces. The UK’s recent Integrated Review may pave the way, as it highlights the contribution of UK offensive cyber and precision strike capabilities (as well as nuclear forces) to NATO, while simultaneously reducing the size of its land forces. Other allies may follow the same logic. For example, some of the European states currently hosting US nuclear weapons may be interested in exploring the option of providing specific new capabilities to the alliance instead of continuing with their nuclear mission. However, the question would arise as to whether such a rebalancing and new division of labor would increase the credibility of deterrence or be seen as weakening NATO’s ability to provide the necessary levels of ‘boots on the ground’. Third, there is a danger of increased polarisation between the allies interested in making full use of the opportunities created by EDT and those advocating more restraint and engagement with potential adversaries as the best way to reduce the destabilising effects of new technologies. 16 In the NATO context, one can expect future discussions about the deployment of specific weapon systems, which may resemble Cold War–era debates between the proponents of strengthening deterrence and pursuing arms control. For example, should NATO countries move forward with, or rather aim to limit, the deployment of certain categories of autonomous or hypersonic systems, looking for similar restraint from Russia? Finally, NATO’s adversaries will have a vote in deciding the future role of nuclear weapons and new capabilities in the alliance’s deterrence mix. The further pursuit of new military technologies by Russia, and increased lethality of its own mix of offensive and defensive non-nuclear capabilities, will necessitate a periodical review and adaptation of NATO’s approach. The issue will become particularly pressing if Russia manages to achieve dominance on some non-nuclear ‘rungs’ of escalation—for example, hypersonic precision strike systems or counterspace capabilities. The alliance may then be forced to broaden the role of nuclear weapons to maintain the credibility of its deterrence strategy, including potentially an explicit threat of nuclear retaliation to non-nuclear strategic attacks, or prepare its own non-nuclear response, using a range of new technologies.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>Perception of US introduction of emerging tech to deter undermines the traditional justifications for nuclear presence. Shreds assurances and leads to war.</h4><p>Kulesa 21 </strong>(Łukasz Kulesa - Deputy Head of Research at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, “Chapter 10: New Capabilities and Nuclear Deterrence in Europe”, Alliances, Nuclear Weapons and Escalation: Managing Deterrence in the 21st Century, Pages 119-122, 14 December 2021, MG)</p><p><u>The impact of <strong>new technologies and emerging military capabilities</strong> on nuclear deterrence is the subject of intense debate among experts, with multiple and often contradictory hypotheses. </u>14 Some assert that the nature of<u> nuclear deterrence will be radically transformed </u>and that the increased vulnerability of nuclear systems and<u> improved defences will lead to the role of nuclear weapons becoming <strong>marginalised</strong>, an increase in the number of nuclear weapons or the adoption of more dangerous nuclear postures by some possessors </u>(e.g. predelegation, launch-on-warning, pre-emption). But there are also more conservative predictions—namely that new technologies may not fully deliver on their disruptive promises and/or that their offensive advantages would be balanced by defensive countermeasures, leaving the role of nuclear deterrence more or less intact. </p><p><u>The analysis conducted so far in this chapter seems to indicate that the European True Believers (in nuclear deterrence) remain unconvinced that any radical changes are approaching. The UK and France are taking steps to safeguard the functioning of their nuclear deterrence in a more challenging environment, utilising the assistance of new technologies. But they continue to see the role of nuclear weapons as ‘ultima ratio’ in escalation management and retaliation, to which no comparable alternative is likely to emerge. This is likely to remain the default position.</p><p>The future trajectory of development and deployment of new <strong><mark>non-nuclear capabilities by the US</strong></mark> will have an <mark>impact</mark> <mark>on</mark> the <strong><mark>alliance’s nuclear deterrence posture,</strong></mark> especially regarding the rationale for maintaining US forwarddeployed nuclear forces in Europe and continuing NATO’s nuclear sharing. <mark>If</mark> <mark>US</mark> <mark>non-nuclear capabilities</mark> are <strong><mark>seen as providing</mark> the same or perhaps a <mark>higher level of deterrence</strong></mark> as nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, this may strengthen the <mark>case</mark> <mark>for</mark> their <strong><mark>withdrawal</mark> to the US</strong> or <strong>complete elimination</u></strong>. One can envisage, for example, deployment of intermediate-range conventional hypersonic systems in Europe as substitutes for B61 nuclear bombs. <u>In that case, the main axis of frictions may be between the US and those states that are particularly attracted to the forward deployment of nuclear weapons (even if they are not stationed on their territories), such as Poland and other eastern flank countries. These would most likely point out that Russia would treat the replacement of <strong>nuclear assets with non-nuclear ones as an invitation to escalate any crisis to the nuclear level</strong>, and that a nuclear-sharing model that includes direct involvement of a number of European allies <strong>cannot easily be replicated</strong> with regard to most of the new capabilities. </p><p>A number of other political-military challenges may arise. First, we may face the emergence of a gap in thinking about <strong>escalation management</strong> and the employment of new capabilities between the US and its allies, with consequences for the nuclear sphere. The US is likely to maintain its preeminence in terms of the development and deployment of new technologies, and of formulating conceptual approaches as regards their use. Since individual NATO countries, most importantly the UK and France, aim to actively contribute their own ideas and approaches to discussions on issues such as <strong>artificial intelligence</strong> development, space and <strong>cyber</strong> policy, common NATO positions can be formulated. However, the US is likely to be far ahead of the majority of NATO allies. Further, the US and other technologically advanced allies may not be willing to share the full details of some of the more sensitive technologies they possess at NATO fora. </u>The September 2021 announcement of the creation of the trilateral security partnership between the US, Australia and the UK (AUKUS) can be seen as potentially contributing to this trend. While the initial attention was focused on the nuclear-powered submarines, <u>the participants also pledged closer cooperation on <strong>cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence</strong>, quantum technologies and other undersea capabilities. This may lead to strengthening the links and interoperability between the three countries, but would not engage NATO</u> (which has a broad partnership relationship with Australia) <u>as a whole. </p><p>Consequently, in a crisis, allies may be surprised by certain US actions and their escalatory effects</u>. This may not necessarily be caused by any lack of consultation or advanced warning <u>but may happen because of their lack of understanding of the doctrinal, technological and military aspects of the US’s approach to operations. 15 The reverse may also be true. The US may be <strong>forced to react to developments</strong> arising from the employment of <strong>new technologies by some of its NATO allies</strong>, including a situation in which such an action escalates conflict to the <strong>nuclear threshold </strong>(e.g. cyber attack on the adversary’s nuclear command and control)</u>. <u>The alliance’s response to this challenge will need to take the form of in-depth consultations, developing joint doctrinal documents and investment in simulations and wargaming. </p><p></u>Second, integration of new capabilities and new domains into the deterrence and defence toolbox seems inevitable. Some changes will have important consequences at the tactical and operational levels (e.g. ubiquity of low-cost unmanned systems and their increased level of autonomy and effectiveness) and some may reach the strategic level. <u>Any sudden devaluation of nuclear deterrence due to a technological breakthrough—for example, the end of ballistic missile submarines’ ‘near-invulnerability’—would have major ramifications and force the three NATO nuclear possessors to re-evaluate their posture, with major consequences for the alliance. But less revolutionary changes may be significant, as they would impact on traditional NATO approaches to burden and risk-sharing, deterrence and assurance. </p><p></u>In the foreseeable future, a scenario of US military disengagement from NATO and Europe remains far-fetched, which means that Europe can rely on the full range of US capabilities when facing Russia. <u>However, if the US or other allies were able to provide advanced strategic non-nuclear assets for common defence and deterrence, they may be inclined to reduce the ‘traditional’ contributions of their armed forces.</u> The UK’s recent Integrated Review may pave the way, as it highlights the contribution of UK offensive cyber and precision strike capabilities (as well as nuclear forces) to NATO, while simultaneously reducing the size of its land forces. Other allies may follow the same logic. <u>For example, some of the European states currently hosting US nuclear weapons may be interested in exploring the option of providing specific <strong>new capabilities</strong> to the alliance <strong><mark>instead</mark> <mark>of</mark> <mark>continuing</mark> with their <mark>nuclear mission</strong></mark>. However, the question would arise as to whether such a rebalancing and new division of labor would increase the credibility of deterrence or be seen as weakening NATO’s ability to provide the necessary levels of ‘boots on the ground’. </p><p>Third, there is a danger of <strong><mark>increased polarisation</strong></mark> <mark>between</mark> the <mark>allies</mark> interested in making full use of the opportunities created by EDT and those advocating more restraint and engagement with potential adversaries as the best way to reduce the destabilising effects of new technologies. 16 In the NATO context, one can expect future discussions about the deployment of specific weapon systems, which may resemble Cold War–era debates between the proponents of strengthening deterrence and pursuing arms control. </u>For <u>example, should NATO countries move forward with, or rather aim to limit, the deployment of certain categories of autonomous or hypersonic systems, looking for similar restraint from Russia? </p><p></u>Finally, NATO’s adversaries will have a vote in deciding the future role of nuclear weapons and new capabilities in the alliance’s deterrence mix. The further pursuit of new military technologies by Russia, and increased lethality of its own mix of offensive and defensive non-nuclear capabilities, will necessitate a periodical review and adaptation of NATO’s approach. The issue will become particularly pressing if Russia manages to achieve dominance on some non-nuclear ‘rungs’ of escalation—for example, hypersonic precision strike systems or counterspace capabilities. <u>The alliance may then be forced to broaden the role of nuclear weapons to maintain the credibility of its deterrence strategy, including potentially an <strong>explicit threat of nuclear retaliation to non-nuclear strategic attacks, or prepare its own non-nuclear response, using a range of new technologies.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Wahl 20—(Wahl - member of the directorate of the NGO World Economy, Ecology & Development; Drager – former staff coordinator in the European Parliament). Wahl, Peter, and Klaus Drager. 2020. “No, the European Union Shouldn’t Try to Become a New Superpower.” September 14, 2020. https://jacobinmag.com/2020/09/european-union-eurozone-eu-council. fulltext: The European Union did not grow from the grassroots. Its “informal mechanisms of power” (as Pierre Bourdieu might have put it) and the hierarchy that resulted from them have always been a decisive factor for integration. Talk of the “Franco-German engine” driving the Union merely paraphrases the reality that these two states’ partnership was for a long time a “hegemonic center of power” in the EU. On the one hand, the Franco-German couple was always at the top of the hierarchy of the European integration project. While France was the leading partner up until German reunification in 1990, since the end of the Cold War, this power balance has shifted. And during the post-2008 financial crisis and the connected Eurozone crisis, the relationship had been completely reversed. French president Emmanuel Macron is now trying to bring his country at least back up to par — as he states openly, “I have chosen a path that will restore France’s place among the nations of Europe.” Such ambitions inform Macron’s call for a Eurozone budget with a euro finance minister, his harsh criticism of the Germans’ mad bid for a “world championship” in current account surpluses, and France’s recent entry into the alliance of Southern states in favor of coronabonds. He thus seeks to compensate for France’s economic problems with the help of “Europe” — that is, a mainly rhetorical drive to “Make France great again!” on the international stage. This is evident in Macron’s foreign policy even beyond the EU, as he tries to play to French strengths such as its nuclear status and its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. The same is true when he declares NATO “brain-dead” or when he assigns co-responsibility to the West for the tensions with Moscow and pleads for a new policy of détente. Also controversial, from Berlin’s perspective, are Macron’s proposals on digital taxes for US corporations, his proposals on China policy, and his resistance to EU expansion in the Western Balkans. More recently, a further conflict has emerged between governing circles in France and Germany, this time regarding the Eastern Mediterranean. Against the backdrop of Greece and Turkey’s long-conflictual relations, a new territorial dispute has arisen over sea borders and the right to explore and exploit hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean. The legal situation is complex and cannot be painted in black and white. But France has taken a strong anti-Turkish line. Already in the Libyan conflict, France supported General Khalifa Haftar of the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army in a common front with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia, while Berlin and Brussels are instead in the camp of the UN-installed provisional government in Tripoli. This latter survives only thanks to massive military support from Turkey. When Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently built up a military challenge to Greece and Cyprus, Macron sent French warships, signaling that France is the protector of Greece and Cyprus and of the external borders of the EU. This is also self-interested, as French firm Elf wants a stake in exploring these same fields. The German government, however, is posing as a “mediator” between Greece/Cyprus and Turkey. By this it seeks to prevent an armed conflict between NATO members and, of course, keep the EU-Turkey deal on refugees going. A decisive new prong of French attempts to deploy an independent foreign policy — also to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Germany — is Macron’s use of the dramatic crisis in Lebanon and the close French-Lebanese ties dating to the colonial past. Lebanon was a so-called protectorate of France after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Macron has visited the country twice since the terrible explosion in Beirut’s harbor. Seeking to press for internal political reforms and threatening to withhold international assistance for Lebanon if these do not emerge, he is working to reassert France’s power in the Eastern Mediterranean. EU “Geopolitics” in Distress The EU’s foreign policy splits are also apparent in its discussions on Belarus, Russia, and the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline planned to run from northwestern Russia into Germany. After the alleged poisoning of Russian (right-wing, neoliberal) oppositionist Alexei Navalny, some Eastern European member states called for tough sanctions against Russia, and also against Alexander Lukashenko’s regime in Minsk. However, both Macron and German chancellor Angela Merkel have long tried to keep Lukashenko on board, as a “mediator” between the EU’s ambitions in the Ukrainian conflict and Vladimir Putin’s own. The EU lifted sanctions against Belarus some years ago, thus hoping to drive a wedge between Minsk and Moscow — and in this enjoying a certain success. There were increasing quarrels over economic issues, and Lukashenko started a see-saw policy between Russia and the EU. Furthermore, despite much criticism from the European Commission and a range of EU governments, the German chancellor stuck to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which is nearly finished. Yet earlier this month, Merkel indicated that the German government could change its mind on the pipeline — thus putting pressure on Putin to clarify the Navalny case. Beyond Eastern Europe, the EU is unable to agree on a common position toward Benjamin Netanyahu’s bid to make Jerusalem the capital of the Israeli state (a turn first welcomed by Alexis Tsipras’s government in 2015, long before Donald Trump) and to annex most parts of the (Palestinian) West Bank. The recent military coup in Mali was also a heavy blow to the joint Franco-German military intervention there (assisted by some African countries) aimed at stabilizing Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta’s corrupt regime. Faced with all these disputes, the “geo-strategic” European Commission proudly announced by its president Ursula von der Leyen — propagating the EU’s newly discovered “lust for power” — today lies in ruins. In reality, the Commission is not decisive in this — for it is the national governments of the EU’s member states that set its line (if they can agree on a foreign policy strategy at all). And it has become very obvious that on the question of proceeding to achieve “strategic sovereignty” for the Union — a power autonomous of the United States, Russia, and China — the current EU is “dis-united in diversity.” Not to be misunderstood: détente with Russia or China is fine in our view. But this goal shouldn’t be sought by means of the EU itself striving for the status of military and economic superpower. Leadership Weakness in the Center With the pandemic intensifying Germany’s economic supremacy, the political conflict within the EU is stepping up a notch — and it seems that the days of the undisputed Franco-German condominium are now over. Even before the summit, the duo failed to fill the Eurogroup chairmanship with Spain’s Nadia Calviño. Instead, an alliance of Dutch, Scandinavians, Austrians, and Baltic states pushed through Ireland’s Paschal Donohoe, a Fine Gael man and a staunch defender of Ireland’s low-tax regime. At the July summit, it emerged that the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, and Finland had formed a pact, a subcenter of power with enormous potential to blockade proceedings. The party-political mixture of this alliance is also remarkable. While the three Nordic countries are led by social democrats, the governments in the Hague and Vienna are led by right-wing liberal or conservative parties (in the Austrian case, conservatives in coalition with Greens). This is where the first consequences of Brexit become apparent. London was always the front man for that camp, reticent about further transfers of sovereignty to Brussels, while also pushing for more deregulation and liberalization of the Single Market. Other similarly minded states could long hide their own objections behind the UK’s (under various governments — from Margaret Thatcher to Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and David Cameron). But now they had to show their true colors. Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte, for example, declared before the pandemic that “after Brexit, the Netherlands would play a leading role” in opposing “more Europe.” He had underlined this in a speech to the EU Parliament in 2018, commenting, “More and more Europe is not the answer to the many problems people have in their daily lives. For some people the ‘ever closer union’ is still a goal in itself. Not for me.” This attitude is not only Rutte’s personal view. One should remember that, already in 2005, a Dutch referendum rejected (like France before it) the draft EU constitutional treaty. In another referendum, Danes voted against joining the euro, while Sweden did not even consider giving up its krona. The middling and smaller countries in the North are hostile to integration toward a federal state. They know that they would lose much more through further transfers of sovereignty than the big countries, which — thanks to their economic potential and the size of their population — could still assert their interests more easily. The new subcenter is not a temporary phenomenon but an expression of tectonic shifts that will permanently shape the EU’s further development. Indeed, moralizing references to the “Stingy Five” hide the fact that this conflict is not just about money. The underlying reason for it is, ultimately, a different idea of the future of integration than the supporters of “More Europe!” have. Moral judgments, especially those blinkered by Eurocentrism, only cloud a more realistic perception on the relationship between nation states. For when it comes to real solidarity, the Southern countries are no better — as shown, for instance, by spending on development aid. According to OECD figures, Denmark exactly meets the UN’s target of devoting 0.7 percent of GDP to such aid, Sweden exceeds it outright (1 percent), and even the Netherlands spends 0.6 percent. Meanwhile, Italy and Spain offer only 0.2 percent of GDP in solidarity with the poor countries of the Global South. East-West Conflict Another subcenter of power has also long existed: the Visegrád Group (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia). Although the Hungarian premier Viktor Orbán was the focus of attention at the summit, the group sticks together when it comes to demanding more money from EU funds. In particular, these states are sealing themselves off from accepting refugees and migration, and also from Brussels’ guidelines on the rule of law and democracy — denouncing them as an encroachment on their national sovereignty. Indeed, the attempt to use the crisis as a lever to “make an example” of Hungary has failed: the compromise in the Council’s final declaration means postponing the issue, keeping it in limbo. As Council president Charles Michel said, “There is still no complete clarity on the procedure.” Presumably, the conflict will break out again at the next opportunity. Orbán is already threatening that Hungary will not ratify the July Council agreement on the Recovery Program, if it comes with conditionalities regarding the rule of law. This eastern subcenter of power isn’t going to disappear soon, either — rather, it is likely to become even more solidified as the conflicts escalate. The Basic Problem: Imperial Overstretch In addition to the long-standing fragmentation — such as between the Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries, NATO members and non-members, Schengen area and non-Schengen states — these North-South and East-West divisions will increasingly leave their mark on the EU’s further development. The coronavirus pandemic shows once again that the EU structures and procedures, designed for fair-weather conditions in the 1990s and 2000s, are not up to the scale and complexity of the crises faced today. Pre-pandemic problems have not simply disappeared. These include an increasingly probable hard Brexit, the conflicts with the United States, the Cold War with China and Russia, the refugee crisis and migration, the defects of the euro, and, of course, climate change. The overall picture is taking on more and more of the features that we know from the decline of empires past. Due to overstretching and the resulting heterogeneity, the EU is visibly losing its ability of control and management. Its vulnerability to external shocks and internal conflicts is increasing. Of course, unlike classical empires, the current EU came about as a voluntary association. In making major decisions regarding the EU’s future, it operates by way of a hybrid combination of “supranational” EU structures and intergovernmentalism. And since the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992, it is a constitutionalized rules-based system (the neoliberal “iron cage”) concerning, for example, the Single Market, the Stability and Growth Pact, and the ever more restrictive euro-regime after 2010. The growing weakness of the center, its incapacity to implement substantial reforms even in their own ruling classes’ interests, the growing self-confidence of the periphery, and the strengthening subcenters are intensifying the centrifugal forces in the EU — and deepening its further fragmentation.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>3. No European leadership—<u>political infighting</u> and <u>lack of will</u> are too great.</h4><p><u><strong>Wahl 20</u></strong>—(Wahl - member of the directorate of the NGO World Economy, Ecology & Development; Drager – former staff coordinator in the European Parliament). Wahl, Peter, and Klaus Drager. 2020. “No, the European Union Shouldn’t Try to Become a New Superpower.” September 14, 2020. https://jacobinmag.com/2020/09/european-union-eurozone-eu-council.</p><p><u><strong>The European Union</u></strong> did not grow from the grassroots. Its <u><strong>“informal mechanisms of power”</u></strong> (as Pierre Bourdieu might have put it) <u><strong>and the hierarchy that resulted from them have always been a decisive factor for integration.</u></strong> Talk of the “Franco-German engine” driving the Union merely paraphrases the reality that these two states’ partnership was for a long time a “hegemonic center of power” in the EU. On the one hand, the Franco-German couple was always at the top of the hierarchy of the European integration project. While France was the leading partner up until German reunification in 1990, since the end of the Cold War, this power balance has shifted. And during the post-2008 financial crisis and the connected Eurozone crisis, the relationship had been completely reversed. French president Emmanuel Macron is now trying to bring his country at least back up to par — as he states openly, “I have chosen a path that will restore France’s place among the nations of Europe.” Such ambitions inform Macron’s call for a Eurozone budget with a euro finance minister, his harsh criticism of the Germans’ mad bid for a “world championship” in current account surpluses, and France’s recent entry into the alliance of Southern states in favor of coronabonds. He thus seeks to compensate for France’s economic problems with the help of “Europe” — that is, a mainly rhetorical drive to “Make France great again!” on the international stage. This is evident in Macron’s foreign policy even beyond the EU, as he tries to play to French strengths such as its nuclear status and its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. The same is true when he declares NATO “brain-dead” or when he assigns co-responsibility to the West for the tensions with Moscow and pleads for a new policy of détente. Also controversial, from Berlin’s perspective, are Macron’s proposals on digital taxes for US corporations, his proposals on China policy, and his resistance to EU expansion in the Western Balkans. More recently, a further <u><strong><mark>conflict has emerged</mark> between governing circles in France and Germany</u></strong>, this time <u><strong>regarding the Eastern Mediterranean</u></strong>. <u><strong>Against</u></strong> the backdrop of <u><strong>Greece and Turkey’s long-conflictual relations, a new territorial dispute has arisen <mark>over </mark>sea borders and <mark>the right to </mark>explore and exploit <mark>hydrocarbons</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>in the </mark>Eastern <mark>Mediterranean</mark>.</u></strong> The legal situation is complex and cannot be painted in black and white. But France has taken a strong anti-Turkish line. Already in the Libyan conflict, France supported General Khalifa Haftar of the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army in a common front with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia, while Berlin and Brussels are instead in the camp of the UN-installed provisional government in Tripoli. This latter survives only thanks to massive military support from Turkey. When Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently built up a military challenge to Greece and Cyprus, Macron sent French warships, signaling that France is the protector of Greece and Cyprus and of the external borders of the EU. This is also self-interested, as French firm Elf wants a stake in exploring these same fields. The German government, however, is posing as a “mediator” between Greece/Cyprus and Turkey. By this it seeks to prevent an armed conflict between NATO members and, of course, keep the EU-Turkey deal on refugees going. A decisive new prong of French attempts to deploy an independent foreign policy — also to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Germany — is Macron’s use of the dramatic crisis in Lebanon and the close French-Lebanese ties dating to the colonial past. Lebanon was a so-called protectorate of France after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Macron has visited the country twice since the terrible explosion in Beirut’s harbor. Seeking to press for internal political reforms and threatening to withhold international assistance for Lebanon if these do not emerge, he is working to reassert France’s power in the Eastern Mediterranean. <u><strong>EU “Geopolitics” in Distress </u></strong>The EU’s <u><strong>foreign policy splits are also apparent in its discussions on Belarus, Russia, and the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline</u></strong> planned to run from northwestern Russia into Germany<u><strong>. </u></strong>After the alleged poisoning of Russian (right-wing, neoliberal) oppositionist Alexei Navalny, <u><strong>some Eastern European member states called for tough sanctions against </u></strong>Russia, and also against Alexander <u><strong>Lukashenko’s regime in Minsk. However</u></strong>, both <u><strong>Macron and</u></strong> German chancellor Angela <u><strong>Merkel have</u></strong> long <u><strong>tried to keep Lukashenko on board</u></strong>, as a “mediator” between the EU’s ambitions in the Ukrainian conflict and Vladimir Putin’s own<u><strong>. </u></strong>The EU lifted sanctions against Belarus some years ago, thus hoping to drive a wedge between Minsk and Moscow — and in this enjoying a certain success. There were increasing quarrels over economic issues, and Lukashenko started a see-saw policy between Russia and the EU. Furthermore, despite much criticism from the European Commission and a range of EU governments, the German chancellor stuck to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which is nearly finished. Yet earlier this month, Merkel indicated that the German government could change its mind on the pipeline — thus putting pressure on Putin to clarify the Navalny case. <u><strong>Beyond Eastern Europe, <mark>the EU is unable to agree on a</u></strong></mark> common <u><strong><mark>position toward</u></strong></mark> Benjamin <u><strong>Netanyahu’s bid to make</u></strong> <u><strong>Jerusalem</u></strong> <u><strong>the capital of the <mark>Israel</mark>i state</u></strong> (a turn first welcomed by Alexis Tsipras’s government in 2015, long before Donald Trump) <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> to <u><strong>annex</u></strong> most parts of <u><strong>the (<mark>Palestin</mark>ian) West Bank<mark>.</mark> </u></strong>The recent military coup in Mali was also a heavy blow to the joint Franco-German military intervention there (assisted by some African countries) aimed at stabilizing Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta’s corrupt regime. Faced with all these disputes, the “geo-strategic” European Commission proudly announced by its president Ursula von der Leyen — propagating <u><strong>the EU’s</u></strong> newly discovered <u><strong>“lust for power”</u></strong> — today <u><strong>lies in ruins.</u></strong> In reality, <u><strong>the Commission is not decisive</u></strong> in this — for <u><strong>it is the national governments of the EU’s member states that set its line (if they can agree on a foreign policy strategy at all).</u></strong> And it has become very obvious that <u><strong><mark>on </mark>the question of <mark>proceeding to achieve “strategic sovereignty”</u></strong></mark> for the Union — <u><strong>a power <mark>autonomous of the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates, <mark>Russia</mark>, <mark>and China</mark> — <mark>the</u></strong></mark> current <u><strong><mark>EU is “dis-united in diversity.”</mark> </u></strong>Not to be misunderstood: détente with Russia or China is fine in our view. But this goal shouldn’t be sought by means of the EU itself striving for the status of military and economic superpower. <u><strong>Leadership Weakness in the Center</u></strong> With the pandemic intensifying Germany’s economic supremacy, <u><strong>the political conflict within the EU is stepping up a notch</u></strong> — and it seems that the days of the undisputed Franco-German condominium are now over<u><strong>.</u></strong> Even before the summit, the duo failed to fill the Eurogroup chairmanship with Spain’s Nadia Calviño. Instead, an alliance of Dutch, Scandinavians, Austrians, and Baltic states pushed through Ireland’s Paschal Donohoe, a Fine Gael man and a staunch defender of Ireland’s low-tax regime. At the July summit, it emerged that <u><strong><mark>the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, and Finland </mark>had <mark>formed a pact</u></strong></mark>, a subcenter of power with enormous potential <u><strong><mark>to blockade proceedings.</u></strong></mark> The party-political mixture of this alliance is also remarkable. <u><strong>While the </u></strong>three<u><strong> Nordic countries are led by social democrats, </u></strong>the governments in<u><strong> the Hague and Vienna are led by right-wing </u></strong>liberal or conservative<u><strong> parties</u></strong> (in the Austrian case, conservatives in coalition with Greens)<u><strong>.</u></strong> This is where the first consequences of Brexit become apparent. London was always the front man for that camp, reticent about further transfers of sovereignty to Brussels, while also pushing for more deregulation and liberalization of the Single Market. Other similarly minded states could long hide their own objections behind the UK’s (under various governments — from Margaret Thatcher to Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and David Cameron). But now they had to show their true colors. <u><strong>Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte</u></strong>, for example, <u><strong><mark>declared</u></strong></mark> before the pandemic that “after Brexit, the Netherlands would play a leading role” in opposing “more Europe.” He had underlined this in a speech to the EU Parliament in 2018, commenting, <u><strong>“More and <mark>more Europe is not the answer</mark> to the many problems people have in their daily lives<mark>.</mark> For some people the ‘ever closer union’ is still a goal in itself. Not for me.” This</u></strong> attitude <u><strong>is not only Rutte’s personal view.</u></strong> One should remember that, already in 2005, a Dutch referendum rejected (like France before it) the draft EU constitutional treaty. In another referendum, Danes voted against joining the euro, while Sweden did not even consider giving up its krona. The <u><strong><mark>middling and smaller countries</mark> in the North <mark>are hostile to integration</mark> toward a federal state<mark>. They know that they would lose</u></strong></mark> much more <u><strong><mark>through</mark> further <mark>transfers of sovereignty</u></strong></mark> than the big countries, which — thanks to their economic potential and the size of their population — could still assert their interests more easily<u><strong>. </u></strong>The new subcenter is not a temporary phenomenon but an expression of tectonic shifts that will permanently shape the EU’s further development. Indeed, moralizing references to the “Stingy Five” hide the fact that this conflict is not just about money. <u><strong>The underlying reason</u></strong> for it <u><strong>is</u></strong>, ultimately, <u><strong>a different idea of </u></strong>the<u><strong> future </u></strong>of<u><strong> integration than </u></strong>the<u><strong> supporters of “More Europe!” have.</u></strong> Moral judgments, especially those blinkered by Eurocentrism, only cloud a more realistic perception on the relationship between nation states. For when it comes to real solidarity, the Southern countries are no better — as shown, for instance, by spending on development aid. According to OECD figures, Denmark exactly meets the UN’s target of devoting 0.7 percent of GDP to such aid, Sweden exceeds it outright (1 percent), and even the Netherlands spends 0.6 percent. Meanwhile, Italy and Spain offer only 0.2 percent of GDP in solidarity with the poor countries of the Global South. <u><strong>East-West Conflict </u></strong>Another subcenter of power has also long existed: <u><strong><mark>the Visegrád Group</mark> (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia)</u></strong>. Although the Hungarian premier Viktor Orbán was the focus of attention at the summit, the group sticks together when it comes to demanding more money from EU funds. In particular, these states <u><strong><mark>are sealing</mark> themselves <mark>off from</u></strong></mark> accepting <u><strong><mark>refugees</mark> and migration, <mark>and</mark> also</u></strong> from <u><strong>Brussels’ guidelines on the rule of law and <mark>democracy</mark> — denouncing them as an encroachment on their </u></strong>national<u><strong> sovereignty<mark>.</mark> </u></strong>Indeed, the attempt to use the crisis as a lever to “make an example” of Hungary has failed: the compromise in the Council’s final declaration means postponing the issue, keeping it in limbo. As Council president Charles Michel said, “There is still no complete clarity on the procedure.” Presumably, the conflict will break out again at the next opportunity. Orbán is already threatening that Hungary will not ratify the July Council agreement on the Recovery Program, if it comes with conditionalities regarding the rule of law. This eastern subcenter of power isn’t going to disappear soon, either — rather, it is likely to become even more solidified as the conflicts escalate. The Basic Problem: Imperial Overstretch In addition to the long-standing fragmentation — such as between the Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries, NATO members and non-members, Schengen area and non-Schengen states — <u><strong><mark>these</u></strong> <u><strong>North-South</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>East-West</u></strong> <u><strong>divisions will</mark> increasingly <mark>leave their mark on</mark> the <mark>EU</mark>’s further <mark>development.</mark> </u></strong>The coronavirus pandemic shows once again that the EU structures and procedures, designed for fair-weather conditions in the 1990s and 2000s, are not up to the scale and complexity of the crises faced today. <u><strong>Pre-pandemic problems have not simply disappeared. These include</u></strong> an increasingly probable hard Brexit, the conflicts with the United States, the Cold War with <u><strong>China and Russia</u></strong>, the refugee crisis and <u><strong>migration</u></strong>, the defects of the euro, <u><strong>and</u></strong>, of course, <u><strong>climate change<mark>. The overall picture is</mark> taking on more and more of the features that we know from the <mark>decline of empire</mark>s past. Due to overstretching and the resulting heterogeneity, the EU is visibly <mark>losing </mark>its ability of <mark>control and management.</mark> </u></strong>Its vulnerability to external shocks and internal conflicts is increasing. Of course, unlike classical empires, the current EU came about as a voluntary association. In making major decisions regarding the EU’s future, it operates by way of a hybrid combination of “supranational” EU structures and intergovernmentalism. And since the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992, it is a constitutionalized rules-based system (the neoliberal “iron cage”) concerning, for example, the Single Market, the Stability and Growth Pact, and the ever more restrictive euro-regime after 2010. <u><strong>The growing weakness of the center</u></strong>, its incapacity to implement substantial reforms even in their own ruling classes’ interests, the growing self-confidence of the periphery, <u><strong>and the strengthening subcenters are intensifying</u></strong> the <u><strong>centrifugal forces in the EU — and deepening its further fragmentation</u></strong>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Fairlie et. al 16 (Robert W. Fairlie, Professor Department of Economics. University of California, Santa Cruz, Kanika Kapur, Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Dublin, Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, Susan Gates, senior economist, director of the Office of Research Quality Assurance at the RAND Corporation and a professor of economics at the Pardee RAND Graduate School, January 2016. “Job Lock: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design.” Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Volume 55, Issue 1, Pages 92-121. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/wol1/doi/10.1111/irel.12127/full) fulltext: Retirement, Social Security, and Other Potentially Confounding Factors One concern is that the age of 65 may be associated with other labor-force transitions. Other than changing jobs, individuals may retire or reduce their hours worked per week.20 Furthermore, Social Security and employer pension eligibility may also affect individuals at age 65. We investigate the role of these factors in this section. Retirement and other factors. Figure 7 displays retirement hazard rates in 2-month intervals around age 65. The dependent variable is whether the wage/ salary worker with 30+ hours in the initial survey month retires by the subsequent survey month. There does not appear to be an increase in retirement at the age 65 cutoff although there is some noise in the displayed retirement hazard rates. Appendix Table A5 reports regression estimates for the retirement probability using different bandwidths and polynomial orders. The results paint a consistent story: there is no evidence of a statistically significant positive effect on retirement.21 Although qualifying for Medicare at age 65 might reduce the influence of employer-based health insurance on retiring it may represent a small effect relative to loss of income. We also examine whether hours worked changes at the age 65 threshold, and find no evidence of a change. Results are in the Online Appendix. Other policy changes at age 65. Another issue with the regression discontinuity estimates is that there might exist policy-related confounding factors that lead to shifts in employment behavior at age 65, such as eligibility for Social Security or pensions. However, Social Security eligibility does not appear to confound our analysis of job mobility precisely at age 65 for two main reasons. First, the earliest age of eligibility for Social Security benefits is 62; benefits received by individuals at that point are reduced (in an actuarially neutral way) relative to what would be received if one were to retire at the full retirement age. Administrative data on Social Security benefits reveal that individuals are far more likely to begin claiming benefits at age 62 than at age 65 (Munnell and Sass 2007). In 2004, 56 percent of eligible men elected to receive Social Security benefits starting at age 62 compared with 23 percent when they turned 65. Second, while the full retirement age for full Social Security benefits was 65 for individuals born in 1937 or earlier (i.e., those reaching eligibility before 2003), Social Security reform enacted into law in 1983 increased the full retirement age by 2-month increments per year of birth beginning with the 1938 birth cohort until it reached 66 for those born in 1943.22 The cohorts affected by the reform reached their full retirement age in 2003–2010, which is covered in our sample period.23 For these cohorts, the propensity to claim Social Security exactly at age 65 has fallen dramatically because of the change in the full retirement age. For example, for the 1939 birth cohort with the full retirement age of 65 years and 4 months, almost 50 percent claimed Social Security at age 62, and about 16 percent claimed at 65 years and 4 months; however, there was no spike in the claiming rate at age 65 with only about 2 to 3 percent claiming in that month. Thus, the increase in the full retirement age further reduces the potential effect of the age 65 threshold on Social Security claiming behavior (Song and Manchester 2007).24 Similarly, age 65 does not appear to be a primary focal point for the accrual or availability of pension wealth. Under defined contribution retirement plans, pension wealth accrual does not vary substantially by age; pension wealth continues to increase as long as a person works. The critical age for individuals covered under defined contribution plans is 59.5 because at that age individuals can begin withdrawing from a 401(k) without penalty (Friedberg and Webb 2003). Under defined benefit plans, pension wealth accrual peaks at the age of early retirement eligibility, which is well before age 65. Pension wealth may continue to increase up to age 65 (Friedberg and Webb 2003; Poterba, Venti, and Weiss 2001). In both the case of Social Security and pensions the evidence provided in previous studies does not indicate a major change in take-up at age 65. Changes at other ages. We investigate whether there are any breaks in job mobility in other birth months. Investigating potential breaks at other ages provides a type of falsification test unless there is a different policy reason for thebreak. For example, eligibility for other social programs, such as Social Security, falls on birthdays or birth months, and there could be an independent “celebratory” birthday effect. Alternatively, if there was systematic miscoding in the age data, the age-65 effect may appear at a different birth year. To investigate this possibility, Table 5 reports estimates for job mobility regressions using all ages as cutoffs from age 60 to 70. Estimates from a linear specification with a bandwidth of 62 months are reported, but the findings are similar using a quadratic specification. The estimates do not indicate a statistically significant break at any age. Thus, we do not find evidence that job mobility increases discontinuously in any of the birth months when individuals turn ages 60 to 70. Conclusions A major concern with the U.S. focus on employer-provided health insurance is that it might restrict job mobility. The potential loss or disruption in healthinsurance coverage due to pre-existing condition limitations, waiting periods for coverage, changes in health plans and providers, and risk of high health costs while uninsured may dissuade many employees from leaving their job to seek a new one when it would otherwise be optimal. We take a new approach in the job-lock literature by examining the discontinuity created at age 65 through the qualification for Medicare. We find no evidence of an increase in job mobility after workers become eligible for Medicare. None of the RDD estimates are positive. The upper bound of 95-percent confidence intervals for these estimates can also rule out the existence of any job lock in some cases, and in most cases can rule out large levels of job lock for our sample of older workers. These results are robust to different bandwidths, polynomial orders for the age function, annual vs. monthly age measurement, and inclusion of controls for detailed individual and worker characteristics. It is important to note that our estimates are based on older workers and our results may not be directly comparable to job-lock estimates in the literature that apply to all workers. In examining the possibility that other factors confound the results for job lock, we do not find any evidence that retirement, work hours, sample densities, demographics, or work characteristics change at age 65. There also is no evidence that other policies potentially affecting job mobility occur at age 65. Age 65 is considered the full retirement age for Social Security for cohorts in 1937 or earlier, but benefit eligibility starts at age 62 and benefit levels increase smoothly up to age 65. Furthermore, for cohorts born after 1937, the full retirement age for Social Security benefits is after the 65th birthday, reducing the probability of claiming Social Security at age 65. The finding of no job lock for workers at age 65 suggests that employer provided health insurance does not substantially limit job mobility for older workers and possibly middle-aged workers. We find that older workers do not look markedly different than middle-aged workers with a large share remaining in the labor force and similar job mobility rates. The characteristics of job changes for older workers and overall labor force characteristics also do not differ substantially from middle-aged workers. Additionally, we might expect, a priori, that older workers are more likely to be affected by job lock because of higher demand for health care. Average annual total health-care expenditures for people ages 45 to 64 are $5843 compared with $2974 for people ages 18 to 44, and 89 percent of people ages 45 to 64 incur some expense. More than three quarters of those ages 45 to 64 have one or more chronic condition (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 2008). But, even with a higher demand for health care among older workers further research is needed to determine if the results presented here can be extrapolated to other age groups. Beyond the implications for the job-lock literature, these findings are important for understanding the labor-market decisions of a large and growing share of the labor force—the near-elderly. Workers ages 55 and over are projected to total more than 20 million by 2018. Increases in the Social Security normal retirement age to 67 and recently proposed increases in the Medicare eligibility age may result in an increased number of older workers balancing work and health insurance in the future.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Job lock is wrong for older people AND no early retirement from healthcare </h4><p><strong>Fairlie et. al 16 </strong>(Robert W. Fairlie, Professor Department of Economics. University of California, Santa Cruz, Kanika Kapur, Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Dublin, Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, Susan Gates, senior economist, director of the Office of Research Quality Assurance at the RAND Corporation and a professor of economics at the Pardee RAND Graduate School, January 2016. “Job Lock: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design.” Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Volume 55, Issue 1, Pages 92-121. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/wol1/doi/10.1111/irel.12127/full)</p><p><u>Retirement, Social Security, and Other Potentially Confounding Factors</u> <u>One concern is that the age of 65 may be associated with other labor-force transitions. Other than changing jobs, individuals may retire or reduce their hours worked per week.20 Furthermore, Social Security and employer pension eligibility may also affect individuals at age 65</u>. We investigate the role of these factors in this section. Retirement and other factors. Figure 7 displays retirement hazard rates in 2-month intervals around age 65. The dependent variable is whether the wage/ salary worker with 30+ hours in the initial survey month retires by the subsequent survey month. <u><strong>There does not appear to be an increase in retirement</u></strong> <u>at the age 65</u> cutoff although there is some noise in the displayed retirement hazard rates. Appendix Table A5 reports <u><strong><mark>regression estimates</strong></mark> for the retirement probability using different bandwidths and polynomial orders. <strong>The results <mark>paint a consistent story</u></strong></mark>: <u><mark>there is <strong>no evidence</strong> of a <strong>statistically significant positive effect on retirement</u></strong></mark>.21 <u><mark>Although qualifying for <strong>Medicare</strong></mark> at age 65 <mark>might reduce the influence of</mark> </u>employer-based<u> <mark>health insurance on retiring it</mark> may <mark>represent a <strong>small effect relative to loss of income</u></strong></mark>. <u>We also examine whether hours worked changes at the age 65 threshold, and find <strong>no evidence of a change</strong>.</u> Results are in the Online Appendix. Other policy changes at age 65. Another issue with the regression discontinuity estimates is that there might exist policy-related confounding factors that lead to shifts in employment behavior at age 65, such as eligibility for Social Security or pensions. However, Social Security eligibility does not appear to confound our analysis of job mobility precisely at age 65 for two main reasons. First, the earliest age of eligibility for Social Security benefits is 62; benefits received by individuals at that point are reduced (in an actuarially neutral way) relative to what would be received if one were to retire at the full retirement age. Administrative data on Social Security benefits reveal that individuals are far more likely to begin claiming benefits at age 62 than at age 65 (Munnell and Sass 2007). In 2004, 56 percent of eligible men elected to receive Social Security benefits starting at age 62 compared with 23 percent when they turned 65. Second, while the full retirement age for full Social Security benefits was 65 for individuals born in 1937 or earlier (i.e., those reaching eligibility before 2003), Social Security reform enacted into law in 1983 increased the full retirement age by 2-month increments per year of birth beginning with the 1938 birth cohort until it reached 66 for those born in 1943.22 The cohorts affected by the reform reached their full retirement age in 2003–2010, which is covered in our sample period.23 For these cohorts, the propensity to claim Social Security exactly at age 65 has fallen dramatically because of the change in the full retirement age. For example, for the 1939 birth cohort with the full retirement age of 65 years and 4 months, almost 50 percent claimed Social Security at age 62, and about 16 percent claimed at 65 years and 4 months; however, there was no spike in the claiming rate at age 65 with only about 2 to 3 percent claiming in that month. Thus, the increase in the full retirement age further reduces the potential effect of the age 65 threshold on Social Security claiming behavior (Song and Manchester 2007).24 Similarly, age 65 does not appear to be a primary focal point for the accrual or availability of pension wealth. Under defined contribution retirement plans, <u>pension wealth accrual does not vary substantially by age; pension wealth continues to increase as long as a person works.</u> <u>The critical age for individuals covered under defined contribution plans is 59.5 because at that age individuals can begin withdrawing from a 401(k) without penalty</u> (Friedberg and Webb 2003). Under defined benefit plans, pension wealth accrual peaks at the age of early retirement eligibility, which is well before age 65. Pension wealth may continue to increase up to age 65 (Friedberg and Webb 2003; Poterba, Venti, and Weiss 2001). In both the case of Social Security and pensions the evidence provided in previous studies does not indicate a major change in take-up at age 65. Changes at other ages. We investigate whether there are any breaks in job mobility in other birth months. Investigating potential breaks at other ages provides a type of falsification test unless there is a different policy reason for thebreak. For example, eligibility for other social programs, such as Social Security, falls on birthdays or birth months, and there could be an independent “celebratory” birthday effect. Alternatively, if there was systematic miscoding in the age data, the age-65 effect may appear at a different birth year. To investigate this possibility, Table 5 reports estimates for job mobility regressions using all ages as cutoffs from age 60 to 70. Estimates from a linear specification with a bandwidth of 62 months are reported, but the findings are similar using a quadratic specification. <u>The estimates do not indicate a statistically significant break at any age.</u> Thus, <u>we <strong>do not find evidence</strong> that job mobility increases discontinuously in any of the birth months when individuals turn ages 60 to 70</u>. <u><strong>Conclusions</u></strong> <u>A major concern with the U.S. focus on </u>employer-provided<u> health insurance is that it might restrict job mobility</u>. The potential loss or disruption in healthinsurance coverage due to pre-existing condition limitations, waiting periods for coverage, changes in health plans and providers, and risk of high health costs while uninsured may dissuade many employees from leaving their job to seek a new one when it would otherwise be optimal. <u>We take a new approach in the <strong>job-lock literature</strong> by examining the discontinuity created at age 65 through the qualification for <strong>Medicare</strong>.</u> <u><mark>We find <strong>no evidence</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>of an increase in <strong>job mobility</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>after workers become eligible for Medicare</u></mark>. <u><strong>None</strong> of the RDD estimates are positive</u>. The upper bound of 95-percent confidence intervals for these estimates can also rule out the existence of any job lock in some cases, and in most cases can rule out large levels of job lock for our sample of older workers. These results are robust to different bandwidths, polynomial orders for the age function, annual vs. monthly age measurement, and inclusion of controls for detailed individual and worker characteristics. It is important to note that our estimates are based on older workers and our results may not be directly comparable to job-lock estimates in the literature that apply to all workers. <u>In examining the possibility that other factors confound the results for job lock, <strong><mark>we do not find any evidence that retirement</u></strong></mark>, work hours, sample densities, demographics, or work characteristics <u><mark>change at <strong>age 65</u></strong></mark>. <u>There also is no evidence that other policies potentially affecting job mobility occur at age 65</u>. Age 65 is considered the full retirement age for Social Security for cohorts in 1937 or earlier, but benefit eligibility starts at age 62 and benefit levels increase smoothly up to age 65. Furthermore, for cohorts born after 1937, the full retirement age for Social Security benefits is after the 65th birthday, reducing the probability of claiming Social Security at age 65. <u>The finding of no job lock for workers at age 65 suggests that employer provided <strong><mark>health insurance</strong></mark> <mark>does <strong>not substantially limit</strong></mark> <mark>job mobility for older workers</mark> and possibly middle-aged workers. We find that older workers do not look markedly different than middle-aged workers with a large share remaining in the labor force and similar job mobility rates</u>. The characteristics of job changes for older workers and overall labor force characteristics also do not differ substantially from middle-aged workers. Additionally, we might expect, a priori, that older workers are more likely to be affected by job lock because of higher demand for health care. Average annual total health-care expenditures for people ages 45 to 64 are $5843 compared with $2974 for people ages 18 to 44, and 89 percent of people ages 45 to 64 incur some expense. More than three quarters of those ages 45 to 64 have one or more chronic condition (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 2008). But, even with a higher demand for health care among older workers further research is needed to determine if the results presented here can be extrapolated to other age groups. <u>Beyond the implications for the job-lock literature, these findings are important for understanding the labor-market decisions of a large and growing share of the labor force—the near-elderly.</u> <u>Workers ages 55 and over are projected to total more than 20 million by 2018. </u>Increases in the Social Security normal retirement age to 67 and recently proposed increases in the Medicare eligibility age may result in an increased number of older workers balancing work and health insurance in the future. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Noy & Uher ’22 — Ilan Noy; Chair, Economics of Disasters, Victoria University of Wellington. Professor, Economics, Victoria University of Wellington. Tomáš Uher; Research Fellow, Economics & Finance, Victoria University of Wellington. January 15, 2022; "Four New Horsemen of An Apocalypse? Solar Flares, Super-Volcanoes, Pandemics, And Artificial Intelligence”; Economics of Disasters & Climate Change fulltext: Active regions on the surface of the sun can produce solar flares, which are jets of solar energy and coronal mass ejections (sudden release of plasma accompanied by a magnetic field) (Kahler 1992). These phenomena are produced when local regions of the sun's magnetic field suddenly change configuration (Knipp and Biesecker 2015) and are typically interconnected, occurring within a relatively short period of time. The resulting electromagnetic radiation can create disruptions of the Earth's magnetic field (termed geomagnetic storms), commonly known as “space weather events” (Schwenn 2006). The most important implication of these events is in terms of disruptions to electricity-powered technology. Due to the global economy’s increasing reliance on such technologies, it has grown increasingly more vulnerable to the impacts of space weather.Footnote1 An extended power outage that lasts for weeks or months, affecting a large population (potentially tens of millions), can easily become a major catastrophe, and even a systemic threat to society. Societal Impacts of Severe Space Weather and Solar Flares Space weather events have been associated with a multitude of negative, mainly technological, direct economic consequences such as blocked radio communications, satellite damage and malfunctions, disruption to rail networks and wireless networks, and global navigation systems such as GPS (Cannon et al. 2013; Eroshenko et al. 2010). However, the most consequential possible effect is extensive damage to electricity transformers and therefore potentially long-term disruption to the electricity transmission infrastructure (Khurshid et al. 2020; Kappenman 2012). Such a disruption would cause severe problems with the supply of many basic services, including the access to pumped potable water, and the loss of all perishable foods and medications that depend on refrigeration (National Research Council 2009; Kappenman 2012). The observed history of space weather in modern economies is very limited. The biggest geomagnetic storm of the last few decades happened in 1989 and caused transformer damage in multiple countries and an approximately 9 h-long power outages for over 6 million inhabitants of Quebec (Lakhina et al. 2004; Barnes and Van Dyke 1990). The most severe directly observed events were the storms of 1859 (the Carrington Event) and 1921, which were roughly three times as powerful as the 1989 event and are typically considered to be a 1 in a 100-year events (Kappenman 2010). However, since economies at the time were not so dependent on electricity (especially, of course, in 1859), the impact of both these events was much less severe than the impacts of the 1989 event and consisted mostly of disruption to the telegraph service (Boteler 2006). While these historical events are associated only with relatively mild societal impacts, a similar event today would have severe global consequences. Many of the studies attempting to analyse the future potential impacts of such an event focus on the economic effects associated with major power outages. A study by Kappenman (2010) estimates that a Carrington storm hitting the United States could put more than 200 large power transformers at risk of permanent damage and cause severe damages to the power grid, leading to long-lasting (months or potentially years) blackouts for approximately 130 million people in the US and a full recovery time of 4–10 years. The total cost of a long-term power outage affecting a significant area is estimated at USD 1–2 trillion during the first year (National Research Council 2009). In a report for Lloyd’s, Maynard et al. (2013) points out that the duration of the power outage depends largely on the availability of spare transformers. These authors estimate that, in the worst-case scenario of no spare transformers, a Carrington-like event would lead to a power outage in the US affecting 20–40 million people and lasting 5 months. They estimate an associated economic loss of USD 0.5–2.6 trillion.Footnote2 Moran et al. (2014) analyse the economic impacts of space weather from a global perspective and conclude that “a severe space-weather event could be the worst natural disaster in modern history” (p. 8). Assuming a power outage lasting 1 year for an event of a magnitude between the 1989 storm and the Carrington event (with annual probability of occurrence likely to be higher than 1%), the authors conclude a major disruption of global supply chains affecting all industries and estimate a global economic loss of up to USD 3.4 trillion (5.6% of global GDP) in the first year. Oughton et al. (2016) find that an extended power outage in the US caused by a similar space weather event would lead to global economic losses with respect to global supply chain disruptions valued at USD 0.5–2.7 trillion. Using a globally integrated economic model to account for the post-event dynamic responses of global trade, they estimate a decrease of global GDP by up to USD 1.1 trillion over a five-year period. The economic loss to the US manufacturing industry is estimated to be USD 350 billion with approximately half of the losses being indirect (roughly equally split between the losses associated with upstream and downstream disruptions to the supply chain). The losses to the US insurance industry are estimated to be up to USD 334 billion, with 90% of the losses caused by service interruption within property insurance policies. In another paper, Oughton et al. (2017) suggest that a severe geomagnetic storm, causing a power outage for 66% of the population in the US, would create a daily economic loss of USD 41.5 billion. Approximately half of the total economic loss is estimated to be inflicted indirectly outside of the blackout zone due to supply chain disruptions; Moran et al. (2014) reach similar conclusion for the global economy. Oughton et al. (2019) estimate an economic impact of a significant geomagnetically-induced power grid failure in the UK and distinguish between scenarios in terms of the ability to forecast the event. They find that a 1 in a 100-year event with the current level of forecasting would cause a GDP loss of GBP 2.9 billion in the UK, but an enhanced forecasting ability based on further investment in this technology would bring the loss down significantly, to GBP 0.9 billion. In all these modelling exercises, power outages for a significant portion of the population are assumed to lead to cascading effects over many sectors. National Research Council (2009) emphasised banking and finance, government services and emergency response. Eventually, however, all economic sectors would be adversely affected (Moran et al. 2014; Riley et al. 2018). Apart from the sectoral vulnerability to power outages due to the reliance on electricity, Moran et al. (2014) note that the global economic production system today is made even more vulnerable due to the common use of practices such as just-in-time production, reduced inventories, and increased reliance on long-distance supply chains with many links. More difficult to model, but maybe not less important to evaluate, is the public response to such an event. Hapgood et al. (2021) suggest that a power grid disruption caused by a severe space weather event would lead to panic buying and stockpiling of essential goods such as petrol, bottled water, non-perishable foods, and toilet paper. There could be various flow-on effects from this panic. Ultimately, the longer-term economic consequences of that are unclear. It is uncontroversial that an extended power outage for a significant portion of the population would lead to disastrous economic impacts. However, the potential of space weather events of the magnitudes discussed above to cause such extended power outages are questioned by studies such as NERC (2010, 2012) and Cannon et al. (2013). They argue that extensive power grid hardware damage is unlikely, and the more probable consequence is a temporary system collapse due to voltage instability. In their view, this will result in only short-term stoppages in electricity supply and thus modest economic consequences. Superflares Research focusing on the risk of even more severe space weather events is scarce, partially because there have so far been no direct observations of “superflares” in our solar system. Some evidence suggests that a superflare 100 times stronger than the Carrington event may have happened in AD 775 (Melott and Thomas 2012; Usoskin et al. 2013; Mekhaldi et al. 2015) and may have led to regional changes in the Earth’s surface temperature (Sukhodolov et al. 2017). The nature of this AD 775 event, however, is inconclusive (Cliver et al. 2014; Stephenson 2015; Neuhäuser and Neuhäuser 2015). Another extremely powerful event possibly happened in AD 993 (Miyake et al. 2013; Mekhaldi et al. 2015). Furthermore, astronomical observations of other sun-like stars in our galaxy suggest that such events are indeed possible (Maehara et al. 2012; Nogami et al. 2014). Lingam and Loeb (2017a) propose that the most powerful superflares might have been the cause of some of the previous mass extinction events and that a very rare superflare with energy 100,000 times larger than the Carrington event might be able to destroy the ozone layer and lead to widespread destruction of ecosystems with potentially existential consequences. In a follow-up paper, Lingam and Loeb (2017b) suggest that the societal vulnerability to superflares in terms of economic damage is increasing rapidly, due to the growth of technological infrastructure. They propose a mitigation strategy of setting up a protective shield between the Earth and the Sun to avoid these dire consequences.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Solar flares cause extinction.</h4><p><strong>Noy &</strong> <strong>Uher ’22</strong> — Ilan Noy; Chair, Economics of Disasters, Victoria University of Wellington. Professor, Economics, Victoria University of Wellington. Tomáš Uher; Research Fellow, Economics & Finance, Victoria University of Wellington. January 15, 2022; "Four New Horsemen of An Apocalypse? Solar Flares, Super-Volcanoes, Pandemics, And Artificial Intelligence”; Economics of Disasters & Climate Change</p><p><u><strong>Active regions</u></strong> <u>on the</u> surface of the <u>sun can <strong>produce <mark>solar flares</u></strong></mark>, <u>which are <strong>jets</strong> of</u> solar <u>energy <mark>and</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>c</u></strong></mark>oronal <u><strong><mark>m</u></strong></mark>ass <u><strong><mark>e</u></strong></mark>jection<u><strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark> (sudden release of plasma accompanied by a magnetic field) (Kahler 1992). These phenomena are produced when local regions of the sun's magnetic field suddenly change configuration (Knipp and Biesecker 2015) and are typically interconnected, occurring within a relatively short period of time. <u>The <mark>resulting</mark> <strong>electromagnetic <mark>radiation</strong></mark> can <mark>create <strong>disruptions</strong> of the</u></mark> <u>Earth's</u> <u>magnetic <mark>field</u></mark> (termed geomagnetic storms), commonly known as “space weather events” (Schwenn 2006). The most important implication of these events is in terms of disruptions to electricity-powered technology. <u>Due to the</u> global <u>economy’s <strong>increasing reliance</u></strong> <u>on</u> such <u><mark>technologies</u></mark>, <u>it has <mark>grown</u></mark> increasingly <u><strong><mark>more vulnerable</u></strong> <u>to</mark> the impacts</u> <u>of</u> <u><strong><mark>space weather</u></strong></mark>.Footnote1 An extended power outage that lasts for weeks or months, affecting a large population (potentially tens of millions), can easily become a major catastrophe, and even a systemic threat to society. Societal Impacts of Severe Space Weather and Solar Flares <u>Space weather events</u> have been <u>associated</u> <u>with a <strong><mark>multitude</strong> of negative</u></mark>, mainly <u>technological</u>, <u>direct</u> economic <u><strong><mark>consequences</strong></mark> such as blocked radio</u> <u>communications</u>, <u><strong><mark>sat</u></strong></mark>ellite <u><strong><mark>damage</u></strong></mark> and malfunctions, <u><strong><mark>disruption to</mark> rail networks</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>wireless <mark>networks</u></strong></mark>, and global navigation systems such as GPS (Cannon et al. 2013; Eroshenko et al. 2010). However, <u>the most</u> <u>consequential</u> possible <u>effect is <strong><mark>extensive</mark> damage</u></strong> <u>to electricity</u> <u><strong>transformers</u></strong> <u>and</u> therefore potentially <u><strong><mark>long-term disruption</u></strong> <u>to</mark> the electricity</u> <u>transmission <strong><mark>infrastructure</u></strong></mark> (Khurshid et al. 2020; Kappenman 2012). Such a disruption would cause severe problems with the supply of many basic services, including the access to pumped potable water, and the loss of all perishable foods and medications that depend on refrigeration (National Research Council 2009; Kappenman 2012). The observed history of space weather in modern economies is very limited. The biggest geomagnetic storm of the last few decades happened in 1989 and caused transformer damage in multiple countries and an approximately 9 h-long power outages for over 6 million inhabitants of Quebec (Lakhina et al. 2004; Barnes and Van Dyke 1990). The most severe directly observed events were the storms of 1859 (the Carrington Event) and 1921, which were roughly three times as powerful as the 1989 event and are typically considered to be a 1 in a 100-year events (Kappenman 2010). However, since economies at the time were not so dependent on electricity (especially, of course, in 1859), the impact of both these events was much less severe than the impacts of the 1989 event and consisted mostly of disruption to the telegraph service (Boteler 2006). <u>While these</u> historical <u>events are associated only</u> <u>with</u> <u><strong>relatively</u></strong> mild societal <u>impacts</u>, <u>a <strong>similar event</u></strong> today <u>would <mark>have</mark> <strong>severe <mark>global consequences</u></strong></mark>. Many of the studies attempting to analyse the future potential impacts of such an event focus on the economic effects associated with major power outages. A study by Kappenman (2010) estimates that a Carrington storm hitting the United States could put more than 200 large power transformers at risk of permanent damage and cause severe damages to the power grid, leading to long-lasting (months or potentially years) blackouts for approximately 130 million people in the US and a full recovery time of 4–10 years. The total cost of a long-term power outage affecting a significant area is estimated at USD 1–2 trillion during the first year (National Research Council 2009). In a report for Lloyd’s, Maynard et al. (2013) points out that the duration of the power outage depends largely on the availability of spare transformers. These authors estimate that, in the worst-case scenario of no spare transformers, a Carrington-like event would lead to a power outage in the US affecting 20–40 million people and lasting 5 months. They estimate an associated economic loss of USD 0.5–2.6 trillion.Footnote2 Moran et al. (2014) analyse the economic impacts of space weather from a global perspective and conclude that “a severe space-weather event could be the worst natural disaster in modern history” (p. 8). Assuming a power outage lasting 1 year for an event of a magnitude between the 1989 storm and the Carrington event (with annual probability of occurrence likely to be higher than 1%), the authors conclude a major disruption of global supply chains affecting all industries and estimate a global economic loss of up to USD 3.4 trillion (5.6% of global GDP) in the first year. Oughton et al. (2016) find that an extended power outage in the US caused by a similar space weather event would lead to global economic losses with respect to global supply chain disruptions valued at USD 0.5–2.7 trillion. Using a globally integrated economic model to account for the post-event dynamic responses of global trade, they estimate a decrease of global GDP by up to USD 1.1 trillion over a five-year period. The economic loss to the US manufacturing industry is estimated to be USD 350 billion with approximately half of the losses being indirect (roughly equally split between the losses associated with upstream and downstream disruptions to the supply chain). The losses to the US insurance industry are estimated to be up to USD 334 billion, with 90% of the losses caused by service interruption within property insurance policies. In another paper, Oughton et al. (2017) suggest that a severe geomagnetic storm, causing a power outage for 66% of the population in the US, would create a daily economic loss of USD 41.5 billion. Approximately half of the total economic loss is estimated to be inflicted indirectly outside of the blackout zone due to supply chain disruptions; Moran et al. (2014) reach similar conclusion for the global economy. Oughton et al. (2019) estimate an economic impact of a significant geomagnetically-induced power grid failure in the UK and distinguish between scenarios in terms of the ability to forecast the event. They find that a 1 in a 100-year event with the current level of forecasting would cause a GDP loss of GBP 2.9 billion in the UK, but an enhanced forecasting ability based on further investment in this technology would bring the loss down significantly, to GBP 0.9 billion. In all these modelling exercises, <u>power outages</u> for a significant portion of the population are <u>assumed to <strong>lead to <mark>cascad</mark>ing effects</strong> over many sectors</u>. National Research Council (2009) emphasised banking and finance, government services and emergency response. Eventually, however, all economic sectors would be adversely affected (Moran et al. 2014; Riley et al. 2018). Apart from the sectoral vulnerability to power outages due to the reliance on electricity, Moran et al. (2014) note that the global economic production system today is made even more vulnerable due to the common use of practices such as just-in-time production, reduced inventories, and increased reliance on long-distance supply chains with many links. More difficult to model, but maybe not less important to evaluate, is the public response to such an event. Hapgood et al. (2021) suggest that a power grid disruption caused by a severe space weather event would lead to panic buying and stockpiling of essential goods such as petrol, bottled water, non-perishable foods, and toilet paper. There could be various flow-on effects from this panic. Ultimately, the longer-term economic consequences of that are unclear. It is uncontroversial that an extended power outage for a significant portion of the population would lead to disastrous economic impacts. However, the potential of space weather events of the magnitudes discussed above to cause such extended power outages are questioned by studies such as NERC (2010, 2012) and Cannon et al. (2013). They argue that extensive power grid hardware damage is unlikely, and the more probable consequence is a temporary system collapse due to voltage instability. In their view, this will result in only short-term stoppages in electricity supply and thus modest economic consequences. Superflares Research focusing on the risk of even more severe space weather events is scarce, partially because there have so far been no direct observations of “superflares” in our solar system. Some evidence suggests that a superflare 100 times stronger than the Carrington event may have happened in AD 775 (Melott and Thomas 2012; Usoskin et al. 2013; Mekhaldi et al. 2015) and may have led to regional changes in the Earth’s surface temperature (Sukhodolov et al. 2017). The nature of this AD 775 event, however, is inconclusive (Cliver et al. 2014; Stephenson 2015; Neuhäuser and Neuhäuser 2015). Another extremely powerful event possibly happened in AD 993 (Miyake et al. 2013; Mekhaldi et al. 2015). Furthermore, astronomical observations of other sun-like stars in our galaxy suggest that such events are indeed possible (Maehara et al. 2012; Nogami et al. 2014). Lingam and Loeb (2017a) propose that the most powerful <u><strong>superflares</u></strong> might have <u>been the <strong><mark>cause</strong></mark> of</u> some of the <u><strong>previous mass <mark>extinction</u></strong></mark> <u>events</u> <u>and</u> that a very rare <u>superflare</u> with energy 100,000 times <u>larger than</u> the <u>Carrington</u> event might <u>be able to <strong>destroy the ozone layer</u></strong> <u>and lead to widespread</u> <u><strong>destruction of ecosystems</u></strong> <u>with</u> potentially <u><strong>existential consequences</u></strong>. In a follow-up paper, Lingam and Loeb (2017b) suggest that the societal vulnerability to superflares in terms of economic damage is increasing rapidly, due to the growth of technological infrastructure. They propose a mitigation strategy of setting up a protective shield between the Earth and the Sun to avoid these dire consequences.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Hirsh ’19 [Michael; December 27; senior correspondent; Foreign Policy, “Why the Liberal International Order Will Endure Into the Next Decade,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/27/why-liberal-international-order-will-endure-next-decade-2020-democracy/] fulltext: Title: Why the Liberal International Order Will Endure Into the Next Decade Subtitle: It’s true that democracy, globalism, and free trade are under assault, but they may prove stronger than the forces arrayed against them in the 2020s. It’s become fashionable to wonder whether the liberal international order can survive the malign forces that have been lining up against it during the 2010s—what the Wall Street Journal called the “Decade of Disruption.” But based on recent trends, it’s a fair bet that democracy, globalism, and open trade will endure handily into the third decade of the 21st century. Start with the state of democracy. Nothing has been more alarming to internationalists than the one-two punch of U.S. President Donald Trump and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who have taken power in two of the world’s oldest and most important democracies by awakening the old demons of nationalism. With Trump focusing his ire on NATO and the World Trade Organization, and Johnson stalking out of the European Union, the two leaders have transformed the once-hallowed “special relationship” from a bulwark of global stability (sullied though it was by the Iraq War) into what looks more like a wrecking ball. Elsewhere, illiberalism has overtaken young democracies, such as Hungary and Poland, and even threatened mature ones with the rapid rise of nationalist parties such as the Alternative for Germany and Norbert Hofer’s anti-immigrant Freedom Party of Austria. In the world’s largest democracy, India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party appear to be sending the same message. And there are considerable doubts about whether the democratic body politic possesses an immune system strong enough to fight off a plague of cyber-generated misinformation and disinformation, and systemic hacking by such autocrats as Russian President Vladimir Putin. But democracy just won’t give up, and in 2019—which could justly be called the year of global protest—it kept reinventing itself at the grassroots. This has been happening in the most unlikely of places around the globe, in countries such as Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, Chile, and above all in Hong Kong, where thousands of determined protesters have braved bullets and tear gas, embarrassing Chinese President Xi Jinping even as he brutally consolidates his autocratic rule on the mainland. Perhaps the U.S. and British democracies are becoming decadent—and 2020 will tell us a lot about that question come November—but the idea of democracy remains a powerful, ever-replenishing urge that, as sociologists and political scientists have long told us, only gets stronger the more that income and educational levels increase around the world. The international economy is also undergoing some severe stress tests—and surviving remarkably intact. The year 2019 began with deep-seated fears that Trump’s trade wars would help trigger a global recession—and among the most concerned was Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell, who midway through the year suggested he and other central bank chiefs simply didn’t know how bad things could get. “The thing is,” Powell said, “there isn’t a lot of experience in responding to global trade tensions.” Growth and investment are still slowing due in large part to the uncertainty Trump has created, but fears of a recession have receded. It turns out the U.S. president cannot single-handedly return the United States to the days of Smoot-Hawley—even his fellow neonationalist Boris Johnson believes in free trade—and the domino effect of retaliatory tariffs that followed in the 1930s, setting the stage for world war. (In June 1930, under the Smoot-Hawley Act, the United States raised tariffs to an average of 59 percent on more than 25,000 imports; just about every other nation reacted in tit-for-tat protectionist fashion, severely depressing the global economy.) Today, the complexities of a deeply integrated global economy and its supply chains may prove too much to undo—even for the most powerful person on the planet. And what of the institutions of the international system? The United States has always had an uneasy relationship with its post-World War II progeny, principally the United Nations, the WTO, and NATO—despite helping create them—and Trump only gave expression to an American id that was long seething under the surface. True, Trump is demeaning these institutions to an unprecedented degree and demanding far more of them. But he’s only saying more stridently what was said by, say, President Barack Obama, who also criticized the NATO allies for being free-riders, and former President George W. Bush, whose administration privately mocked the alliance and sneered at the U.N. (Another little-remembered precursor to Trump was President Bill Clinton’s feisty first-term trade representative, Mickey Kantor, who once said he wasn’t interested in free-trade “theology” and preferred that Americans behave like mercantilists.) Trump is making a serious run at denuding the WTO by taking down its appellate court, but even that institution is likely to outlast a 73-year-old president who, at most, has only four more years in office to wreak havoc on the global system. This is especially likely because he is now mostly alone in his anti-globalist passion with the departure of his deeply ideological national security advisor, the militant John Bolton. Let’s not forget either that the advent of Trump and Johnson represents a legitimate backlash to major policy errors made by the elites who have dominated the international system. George W. Bush led the Republican Party badly astray with his strategically disastrous Iraq War and fecklessness over the deregulation of Wall Street, which set the stage for the biggest financial crash since 1929 and the Great Recession. That turned voters off to traditional Republican thinking and opened the door to Trump’s unlikely takeover of the party. Something similar happened in Britain, when Bush’s partner in these neoliberal economic delusions and his ally in an unnecessary war, the once-popular Labour leader Tony Blair, set the stage for Labour’s eventual handoff to the socialist Jeremy Corbyn. (A shift that was, in turn, analogous to the ascent of Sen. Bernie Sanders, Sen. Elizabeth Warren, and the left inside the U.S. Democratic Party in response to the rise of Trump’s 2016 presidential rival Hillary Clinton, who was seen as pro-war and too friendly to Wall Street.) But the larger point is that Trump and Johnson are only the latest stresses to a system that, since the end of the Cold War, has suffered some pretty major ones and yet endured. In the quarter-century since then, financial markets collapsed several times, and the global economy has remained intact. Islamist terrorists have struck at major capitals around the world, and a clash of civilizations hasn’t ensued. The world’s two largest economies, the United States and China, incessantly bicker, but they’re still doing business. Ivory tower realists continue to be dead wrong in their predictions that the international system will fall back into anarchy, even when politicians like Trump are doing their best to make that happen. On the realist view, the so-called West and its institutions should have disintegrated after the Cold War with the disappearance of the Soviet Union; as Owen Harries wrote in Foreign Affairs in 1993, “The political ‘West’ is not a natural construct but a highly artificial one. It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile ‘East’ to bring it into existence and to maintain its unity. It is extremely doubtful whether it can now survive the disappearance of that enemy.”<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Order’s <u>resilient</u>, BUT <u>alt causes</u>.</h4><p><strong>Hirsh ’19</strong> [Michael; December 27; senior correspondent; Foreign Policy, “Why the Liberal International Order Will Endure Into the Next Decade,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/27/why-liberal-international-order-will-endure-next-decade-2020-democracy/]</p><p>Title: Why <u>the <strong>L</u></strong>iberal <u><strong>I</u></strong>nternational <u><strong>O</u></strong>rder <u>Will Endure Into the Next Decade</p><p></u>Subtitle: It’s true that democracy, globalism, and free trade are under assault, but they may <u><strong>prove stronger</strong> than the forces arrayed against them in the 2020s</u>.</p><p>It’s become fashionable to wonder whether <u><mark>the <strong>l</strong></mark>iberal <strong><mark>i</strong></mark>nternational <strong><mark>o</strong></mark>rder can survive</u> the malign forces that have been lining up against it during the 2010s—what the Wall Street Journal called the “Decade of Disruption.” But <u>based on <strong>recent trends</strong>, it’s a <strong>fair bet</strong> that democracy, globalism, and open trade <mark>will <strong>endure</mark> handily</strong> <mark>into the <strong>third decade</mark> of the 21st century</u></strong>.</p><p>Start with the state of democracy. Nothing has been more alarming to internationalists than the one-two punch of U.S. President Donald Trump and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who have taken power in two of the world’s oldest and most important democracies by awakening the old demons of nationalism. With Trump focusing his ire on NATO and the World Trade Organization, and Johnson stalking out of the European Union, the two leaders have transformed the once-hallowed “special relationship” from a bulwark of global stability (sullied though it was by the Iraq War) into what looks more like a wrecking ball. Elsewhere, illiberalism has overtaken young democracies, such as Hungary and Poland, and even threatened mature ones with the rapid rise of nationalist parties such as the Alternative for Germany and Norbert Hofer’s anti-immigrant Freedom Party of Austria. In the world’s largest democracy, India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party appear to be sending the same message. And there are considerable doubts about whether the democratic body politic possesses an immune system strong enough to fight off a plague of cyber-generated misinformation and disinformation, and systemic hacking by such autocrats as Russian President Vladimir Putin.</p><p>But <u><mark>democracy</mark> <strong>just <mark>won’t give up</u></strong></mark>, and in 2019—which could justly be called the year of global protest—<u>it kept <strong><mark>reinventing</mark> itself</strong> <mark>at the grassroots</mark>. This has been happening <mark>in</mark> <strong>the most <mark>unlikely</mark> of <mark>places</mark> around the globe</strong>, in countries such as Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, Chile, and</u> above all in <u>Hong Kong</u>, where thousands of determined protesters have braved bullets and tear gas, embarrassing Chinese President Xi Jinping even as he brutally consolidates his autocratic rule on the mainland. Perhaps the U.S. and British democracies are becoming decadent—and 2020 will tell us a lot about that question come November—but <u><strong><mark>the idea</mark> of democracy</strong> <mark>remains</mark> a <strong>powerful, <mark>ever-replenishing</mark> urge</strong> <mark>that</mark>, as <strong>sociologists and political <mark>scientists</strong></mark> have <strong>long <mark>told us</strong></mark>, <strong>only <mark>gets stronger</strong> the more</mark> that <mark>income and education</mark>al levels <mark>increase</mark> around the world</u>.</p><p><u><mark>The</u></mark> international <u><mark>economy is</u></mark> also <u><mark>undergoing</mark> <strong>some severe <mark>stress</mark> tests</strong>—and <strong><mark>surviving</mark> remarkably <mark>intact</u></strong></mark>. The year 2019 began with deep-seated fears that Trump’s trade wars would help trigger a global recession—and among the most concerned was Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell, who midway through the year suggested he and other central bank chiefs simply didn’t know how bad things could get. “The thing is,” Powell said, “there isn’t a lot of experience in responding to global trade tensions.” Growth and investment are still slowing due in large part to the uncertainty Trump has created, but fears of a recession have receded. It turns out the U.S. president cannot single-handedly return the United States to the days of Smoot-Hawley—even his fellow neonationalist Boris Johnson believes in free trade—and the domino effect of retaliatory tariffs that followed in the 1930s, setting the stage for world war. (In June 1930, under the Smoot-Hawley Act, the United States raised tariffs to an average of 59 percent on more than 25,000 imports; just about every other nation reacted in tit-for-tat protectionist fashion, severely depressing the global economy.)</p><p>Today, <u>the <strong><mark>complexities</strong> of</mark> a <strong>deeply <mark>integrated</mark> global <mark>economy</strong> and</mark> <strong>its <mark>supply chains</strong></mark> may prove <strong><mark>too much to undo</u></strong></mark>—even for the most powerful person on the planet.</p><p>And what of the institutions of the international system? The United States has always had an uneasy relationship with its post-World War II progeny, principally the United Nations, the WTO, and NATO—despite helping create them—and Trump only gave expression to an American id that was long seething under the surface. True, Trump is demeaning these institutions to an unprecedented degree and demanding far more of them. But he’s only saying more stridently what was said by, say, President Barack Obama, who also criticized the NATO allies for being free-riders, and former President George W. Bush, whose administration privately mocked the alliance and sneered at the U.N. (Another little-remembered precursor to Trump was President Bill Clinton’s feisty first-term trade representative, Mickey Kantor, who once said he wasn’t interested in free-trade “theology” and preferred that Americans behave like mercantilists.)</p><p>Trump is making a serious run at denuding the WTO by taking down its appellate court, but even that institution is likely to outlast a 73-year-old president who, at most, has only four more years in office to wreak havoc on the global system. This is especially likely because he is now mostly alone in his anti-globalist passion with the departure of his deeply ideological national security advisor, the militant John Bolton.</p><p>Let’s not forget either that the advent of Trump and Johnson represents a legitimate backlash to major policy errors made by the elites who have dominated the international system. George W. Bush led the Republican Party badly astray with his strategically disastrous Iraq War and fecklessness over the deregulation of Wall Street, which set the stage for the biggest financial crash since 1929 and the Great Recession. That turned voters off to traditional Republican thinking and opened the door to Trump’s unlikely takeover of the party. Something similar happened in Britain, when Bush’s partner in these neoliberal economic delusions and his ally in an unnecessary war, the once-popular Labour leader Tony Blair, set the stage for Labour’s eventual handoff to the socialist Jeremy Corbyn. (A shift that was, in turn, analogous to the ascent of Sen. Bernie Sanders, Sen. Elizabeth Warren, and the left inside the U.S. Democratic Party in response to the rise of Trump’s 2016 presidential rival Hillary Clinton, who was seen as pro-war and too friendly to Wall Street.)</p><p>But the larger point is that Trump and Johnson are <u>only the latest stresses to a <mark>system</mark> that, since the <strong>end of the Cold War</strong>, has <mark>suffered</mark> <strong>some pretty major ones</strong> and <strong><mark>yet endured</strong>. In the quarter-century</mark> since then, financial <mark>markets <strong>collapsed</mark> several times</strong>, and <mark>the</mark> global <mark>economy</u></mark> has <u><strong><mark>remained intact</u></strong></mark>. Islamist <u><mark>terrorists</u></mark> have <u><mark>struck</u></mark> at <u><strong>major <mark>capitals</mark> around the world</strong>, and a <mark>clash of civ</mark>ilizations <strong><mark>hasn’t ensued</u></strong></mark>. The world’s two largest economies, <u>the <mark>U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>and China</mark>, <strong>incessantly <mark>bicker</strong>, but</mark> they’re <strong>still <mark>do</mark>ing <mark>business</strong></mark>. Ivory tower realists continue to be <strong><mark>dead wrong</strong></mark> in their predictions that <mark>the</mark> international <mark>system will <strong>fall</mark> back into anarchy</u></strong>, even when politicians like Trump are doing their best to make that happen. On the realist view, the so-called West and its institutions should have disintegrated after the Cold War with the disappearance of the Soviet Union; as Owen Harries wrote in Foreign Affairs in 1993, “The political ‘West’ is not a natural construct but a highly artificial one. It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile ‘East’ to bring it into existence and to maintain its unity. It is extremely doubtful whether it can now survive the disappearance of that enemy.”</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Drury 17 – journalist for VICE, citing Ian Shield, associate lecturer in international relations at Anglia Ruskin University, Vladimir Zhirinovsky who is a Russian lawmaker, Keri Giles, associate fellow with the UK foreign-policy think tank Chatham House, a RAND study (Colin, “What Would Happen if Russia and Europe Went to War?,” VICE, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4xe5a3/what-would-happen-if-russia-and-europe-went-to-war) fulltext: But peace is not inevitable. If you think Europe can't descend into a bar fight like drunks at closing time again, know you're not the first to believe it. Some people dreamed something similar during the Concert of Europe—a system put in place to uphold the balance of power in the mid-19th century—and again in the four decades of calm that followed the 1870–71 Franco-Prussian conflict. The second period ended with WWI. So they misjudged that. Could we also have misjudged the proximity of mass conflict in the 21st century? Some say so. Security experts are increasingly investigating scenarios where a stronger Russia on one side and Europe's NATO allies on the other go from diplomatic tensions to full on slapping each other. This, they stress, is unlikely. But if global events have taught us anything, it's that unlikely doesn't mean impossible. In fact, the above could happen in three simple steps. One: Donald Trump makes good on his hints and pulls the US out of NATO. Two: An emboldened Vladimir Putin decides to help himself to the Baltic states—Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia—he has long believed should be part of Russia. Three: Given these states have been NATO members since 2004, the rest of the alliance—the UK, Germany, France, and others—go to their aid. The result? "Hiroshimas and Nagasakis everywhere," reckoned the Russian lawmaker Vladimir Zhirinovsky when discussing the possibility last year. So that's not ideal. But could Russia and Europe really go to war? And if they did, how would that work out? Be warned: As Keir Giles, associate fellow with the UK foreign-policy think tank Chatham House, that is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization based in London tells me, "There's not much good news." WATCH: The Special Ops Olympics—War Games 1. Tensions Rise Tensions between Russia and Europe are always high. Even so, the present unease is ominous. On one hand, Russia has been holding major nuclear drills for 40 million citizens, sending submarines into the territorial waters of other nations and running mock bombing missions on the edge of British airspace. Forcibly annexing part of another country, This behavior isn't generally viewed as good neighborliness, either. Yet NATO isn't entirely averse to mucking things up. The alliance has almost 10,000 troops in countries that border Russia, while a two-week war game featuring thousands of personnel and 50 aircrafts is being held in Scotland right now. The enemy state in such rehearsals is often given a somewhat unambiguous name: the Reds. 2. The Flash Point It's not wildly anti-Russian to say the current administration favors the countries that border the Baltic Sea—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Putin believes these former Soviet states should never have become independent: Each has a large Russian population and strategically excellent sea ports. He's certainly not keen on them being NATO members and sees the alliance—not without rationale—as encircling Russia. "If you compress a spring," he warned in 2014, "eventually it will snap back." With America gone, that snap back could happen instantly. "They would move on the Baltic states more or less immediately," says Giles, who is also director of the Conflict Studies Research Center in Oxfordshire. "Putin believes Russian security requires the Baltic states under its domain. But you need to look further. It's hard to put a definitive border on how far ambitious Russians think the frontier should expand. But certainly you're looking at Poland and Finland too." 3. Internet Down! Shots Fired! Photo by Sean MacEntee via Flickr In 2015, a study by research institute the RAND Corporation concluded it would take just 60 hours for Russia to overrun Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Giles, however, believes the signs would be there sometime in advance. "There would be a noticeable rise in Russian diplomacy and media focusing on issues that could give rationale for an armed intervention," he says. On some pretense, such as a peacekeeping mission, thousands of troops would gather on the border. In the days before any invasion or attack, the target's internet would be shut down or disrupted by specialist telecommunications soldiers. Power supplies would fail, and ATMs would stop functioning . Cellphones and TV signals would be jammed. Perhaps most ominously, personalized texts would be sent direct to opposition officials, soldiers, and citizens, creating confusion and panic. In some cases, these texts would appear to come from someone already in the recipient's phone book. "In the right circumstances, this could be enough," says Giles. "Russia doesn't need to roll tanks across a border. They can stage an attack without a military presence. Misinformation and civil disorder could lead to regime change with a client government of Moscow taking charge. That would meet Russia's security and economic objectives." And if no such regime change happened? Think hybrid warfare: all the above combined with the sudden movement of troops into the country. "We don't know how exactly an occupation would look, but Russia does practice this scenario," says Giles. "What we do know is it would be over pretty swiftly." 4. NATO: Fight or Fall Once diplomacy fails, the hard fact is that a US-less NATO almost certainly doesn't have the firepower to win a war with Russia. We'll ignore nuclear weapons for now and keep things conventional. Russia has more men (the reserves alone are 2.5 million strong) and hardware. As a single country, its chain of command is better streamlined. Soldiers are battle-hardened from Ukraine and Syria. After a decade of $40 billion-a-year military upgrades, its weaponry—such as the Pantsir-S1, a tank that can literally destroy cruise missiles—is superior too. It's also possible some NATO members would withdraw—in particular Turkey, given the warm relationship between President Putin and President Recep Erdoğan. That's 600,000 men—the second-biggest contingent after the US—gone. The result would be the last of NATO facing an existential decision: Fight and probably lose, or, in this scenario, cut the Baltic states loose. Or, as Ian Shield, associate lecturer in international relations at Anglia Ruskin University, puts it: "The choice would be between reneging on the treaty—which would certainly lead to the disintegration of NATO and probably, by extension, the whole European order—or participating in a cataclysmic war extending up to nuclear weapons." Rock and a hard place, basically. 5. War on the Ground Ballistic short range missiles. Photo via Wikimedia Let's carry on gaming, though, and say NATO engages Russia. How does that go? Not well for either side, says Shields: "On any battlefield, there would be annihilation—although these wouldn't be battlefields like we have previously known. Missiles and artillery have far greater range and precision, meaning enemy posts, infrastructure, armories, and even entire towns could be destroyed from within home territory. What you have is fewer individual battles but far greater destruction. If neither side backed down, entire swathes of Europe—it's impossible to know where—would be reduced to rubble. The death tolls would be unimaginable." Britain wouldn't be safe; the English Channel has become a hopelessly outdated moat. "Russian aircrafts wouldn't need to even enter British airspace," says Shields. "They could land precision strikes from well outside." Both sides would wrestle for control of the seas around Scandinavia. Cyber attacks, meanwhile, could shut down transport infrastructure, hospitals, media, and utilities. Russia's main advantage amid the carnage would be two-fold. First, because it has more weaponry and men, it can, essentially, keep blasting away longer. Second, its sheer landmass means it could better absorb the devastation: NATO could wipe out every single structure hundreds of miles into its adversary's territory, and Moscow wouldn't even be scratched. 6. Going Nuclear As any history student knows, it doesn't matter if you have 7,000 nuclear weapons (Russia) or 200 (Britain and France); their cataclysmic qualities level things up. The thought goes that the pressing of the red button means MAD: mutually assured destruction. If one side starts throwing warheads about, the other responds in kind. Both adversaries are wiped out. Right? Wrong. "What Russia has in its arsenal that the West doesn't is tactical nuclear weapons," explains Giles. "These are not big city-leveling nukes, but ones that can destroy battlefields or neighborhoods. The West had these weapons but got rid of them. So its only response to a tactical nuclear strike would be a full nuclear attack. Which is self-defeating because it would also ensure their own destruction. The West is missing several rungs on the escalation ladder that Russia has built into its strategy." Nonetheless, once things go nuclear, it all becomes unpredictable: cities wiped out, millions dead. At this point, even the most advanced strategists tend to stop plotting possible paths. 7. But Cheer Up If the US leaving NATO is a gateway to Armageddon, the good news is it seems increasingly unlikely. Trump probably won't ditch the alliance. That's because it doesn't only keep the US secure; it's also politically and economically advantageous. It gives Washington influence in Europe and protects a vast and prosperous continent that—and this is important—spends much of its wealth with American companies. That said, maybe it's still worth remembering peace here really does hang by threads. Maybe go out and play more.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>EU-Russia war goes nuclear and escalates to extinction—the US gets drawn in</h4><p><strong>Drury 17</strong> – journalist for VICE, citing Ian Shield, associate lecturer in international relations at Anglia Ruskin University, Vladimir Zhirinovsky who is a Russian lawmaker, Keri Giles, associate fellow with the UK foreign-policy think tank Chatham House, a RAND study (Colin, “What Would Happen if Russia and Europe Went to War?,” VICE, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4xe5a3/what-would-happen-if-russia-and-europe-went-to-war)</p><p>But peace is not inevitable. If you think Europe can't descend into a bar fight like drunks at closing time again, know you're not the first to believe it. Some people dreamed something similar during the Concert of Europe—a system put in place to uphold the balance of power in the mid-19th century—and again in the four decades of calm that followed the 1870–71 Franco-Prussian conflict. The second period ended with WWI. So they misjudged that. Could we also have misjudged the proximity of mass conflict in the 21st century? Some say so. Security experts are increasingly investigating scenarios where a stronger Russia on one side and Europe's NATO allies on the other go from diplomatic tensions to full on slapping each other. This, they stress, is unlikely. But if global events have taught us anything, it's that unlikely doesn't mean impossible. In fact, the above could happen in three simple steps. One: Donald Trump makes good on his hints and pulls the US out of NATO. Two: An emboldened Vladimir <u><mark>Putin decides to help himself to the Baltic states</u></mark>—Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia—<u>he has long believed should be part</u> of Russia. Three: <u>Given these states have been NATO members since 2004, the rest of the alliance—<mark>the UK, Germany, France</mark>, and others—<mark>go to their aid</u></mark>. <u>The result? "<strong><mark>Hiroshimas and Nagasakis everywhere</u></strong></mark>," reckoned the Russian lawmaker Vladimir Zhirinovsky when discussing the possibility last year. So that's not ideal. But could Russia and Europe really go to war? And if they did, how would that work out? Be warned: As Keir Giles, associate fellow with the UK foreign-policy think tank Chatham House, that is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization based in London tells me, "There's not much good news." WATCH: The Special Ops Olympics—War Games 1. Tensions Rise <u>Tensions between Russia and Europe are always high. Even so, the present unease is ominous.</u> On one hand, <u><mark>Russia has been</mark> <mark>holding</mark> major <mark>nuclear</mark> <mark>drills for 40 million</mark> citizens, <mark>sending submarines</mark> <mark>into</mark> the territorial waters of <mark>other nations </mark>and <mark>running mock bombing missions</mark> on the edge of British airspace</u>. <u>Forcibly annexing part of another country, This behavior isn't generally viewed as good neighborliness</u>, either. Yet NATO isn't entirely averse to mucking things up. The alliance has almost 10,000 troops in countries that border Russia, while a two-week war game featuring thousands of personnel and 50 aircrafts is being held in Scotland right now. The enemy state in such rehearsals is often given a somewhat unambiguous name: the Reds. 2. The Flash Point It's not wildly anti-Russian to say the current administration favors the countries that border the Baltic Sea—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Putin believes these former Soviet states should never have become independent: Each has a large Russian population and strategically excellent sea ports. He's certainly not keen on them being NATO members and sees the alliance—not without rationale—as encircling Russia. "If you compress a spring," he warned in 2014, "eventually it will snap back." With America gone, that snap back could happen instantly. "They would move on the Baltic states more or less immediately," says Giles, who is also director of the Conflict Studies Research Center in Oxfordshire. "Putin believes Russian security requires the Baltic states under its domain. But you need to look further. It's hard to put a definitive border on how far <u>ambitious Russians think the frontier should expand. But certainly you're looking at Poland and Finland too</u>." 3. Internet Down! Shots Fired! Photo by Sean MacEntee via Flickr In 2015, a study by research institute the RAND Corporation concluded <u>it would take <mark>just 60 hours for Russia to overrun Lithuania</u></mark>, Latvia, and Estonia. Giles, however, believes the signs would be there sometime in advance. "<u>There would be a noticeable rise in Russian diplomacy <mark>and</mark> <mark>media focus</mark>ing on issues <mark>that </mark>could <mark>give rationale for an armed intervention</mark>,"</u> he says. <u>On some pretense, such as a peacekeeping mission, thousands of troops would gather on the border</u>. In the days before any invasion or attack, <u>the target's <mark>internet would be shut down</u></mark> or disrupted by specialist telecommunications soldiers. Power supplies would fail, and ATMs would stop functioning . Cellphones and TV signals would be jammed. Perhaps most ominously, <u>personalized <mark>texts would be sent</mark> direct <mark>to opposition officials</mark>, soldiers, and citizens, creating confusion</u> and panic. In some cases, these texts would appear to come from someone already in the recipient's phone book. "In the right circumstances, this could be enough," says Giles. "Russia doesn't need to roll tanks across a border. They can stage an attack without a military presence. <u><mark>Misinformation and civil disorder could lead to regime change with a client government</mark> of Moscow <mark>taking charge</u></mark>. That would meet Russia's security and economic objectives." And if no such regime change happened? Think hybrid warfare: all the above combined with the sudden movement of troops into the country. "We don't know how exactly an occupation would look, but <u><strong><mark>Russia does practice</mark> this scenario</u></strong>," says Giles. "What we do know is it would be over pretty swiftly." 4. NATO: Fight or Fall <u>Once diplomacy fails, the hard fact is that a <mark>US-less NATO</mark> almost certainly <mark>doesn't have the firepower to win </mark>a war with Russia</u>. We'll ignore nuclear weapons for now and keep things conventional. Russia has more men (the reserves alone are 2.5 million strong) and hardware. As a single country, its chain of command is better streamlined. Soldiers are battle-hardened from Ukraine and Syria. After a decade of $40 billion-a-year military upgrades, its weaponry—such as the Pantsir-S1, a tank that can literally destroy cruise missiles—is superior too. <u>It's also possible some NATO members would withdraw</u>—in particular Turkey, given the warm relationship between President Putin and President Recep Erdoğan. That's 600,000 men—the second-biggest contingent after the US—gone. <u>The result would be the last of NATO facing an existential decision: Fight and probably lose, or, in this scenario, cut the Baltic states loose</u>. Or, as Ian Shield, associate lecturer in international relations at Anglia Ruskin University, puts it: "<u>The choice would be between reneging on the treaty—which would certainly lead to the disintegration of NATO and probably, by extension, the whole European order</u>—or participating in a cataclysmic war extending up to nuclear weapons." Rock and a hard place, basically. 5. War on the Ground Ballistic short range missiles. Photo via Wikimedia Let's carry on gaming, though, and say NATO engages Russia. How does that go? Not well for either side, says Shields: "On any battlefield, <u>there would be annihilation</u>—although these wouldn't be battlefields like we have previously known. Missiles and artillery have far greater range and precision, meaning enemy posts, infrastructure, armories, and even entire towns could be destroyed from within home territory. What you have is fewer individual battles but far greater destruction. If neither side backed down, <u>entire swathes of <mark>Europe</u></mark>—it's impossible to know where—<u><mark>would be </mark>reduced to <mark>rubble</mark>. The death tolls would be unimaginable</u>." <u>Britain wouldn't be safe</u>; the English Channel has become a hopelessly outdated moat. "Russian aircrafts wouldn't need to even enter British airspace," says Shields. "They could land precision strikes from well outside." <u>Both sides would wrestle for control of the seas around Scandinavia. <mark>Cyber attacks</mark>, meanwhile, could <mark>shut down</mark> transport <mark>infrastructure</mark>, <mark>hospitals</mark>, <mark>media, and utilities</u></mark>. Russia's main advantage amid the carnage would be two-fold. First, because it has more weaponry and men, it can, essentially, keep blasting away longer. Second, its sheer landmass means it could better absorb the devastation: <u>NATO could wipe out every single structure hundreds of miles into its adversary's territory, and Moscow wouldn't even be scratched</u>. 6. Going Nuclear As any history student knows, it doesn't matter if you have 7,000 nuclear weapons (Russia) or 200 (Britain and France); their cataclysmic qualities level things up. The thought goes that the pressing of the red button means MAD: mutually assured destruction. <u>If one side starts throwing warheads about, the other responds in kind</u>. Both adversaries are wiped out. Right? Wrong. "What Russia has in its arsenal that the West doesn't is tactical nuclear weapons," explains Giles. "These are not big city-leveling nukes, but ones that can destroy battlefields or neighborhoods. The West had these weapons but got rid of them. So its only response to a tactical nuclear strike would be a full nuclear attack. Which is self-defeating because it would also ensure their own destruction. The West is missing several rungs on the escalation ladder that Russia has built into its strategy." Nonetheless, <u>once things go nuclear, it all becomes unpredictable: <mark>cities wiped out, millions dead</mark>. At this point, even the most advanced strategists tend to stop plotting possible paths</u>. 7. But Cheer Up If <u><strong>the US leaving NATO is a gateway to Armageddon</u></strong>, the good news is it seems increasingly unlikely. <u>Trump probably won't ditch <mark>the alliance</u></mark>. That's because it<u> <mark>doesn't only keep the US secure; it's also politically and economically advantageous</mark>. It gives Washington influence in <mark>Europe</mark> and protects a vast and prosperous continent that—and this is important—<mark>spends much of its wealth with American companies</u></mark>. That said, maybe <u><strong>it's still worth remembering <mark>peace</mark> here <mark>really does hang by threads</u></strong></mark>. Maybe go out and play more.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Zambernardi, 15—University of Bologna (Lorenzo, “Politics is too important to be left to political scientists: A critique of the theory–policy nexus in International Relations”, European Journal of International Relations 1–21, April 2015, dml) fulltext: There are two main reasons why the notion of applied social science still appears to be unsound. The first one has to do with the need for policymaking to rely on some degree of prediction (Chernoff, 2009; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2013: 436; Merton and Lerner, 1951: 304). As Herbert Simon (2001: 32, 60) explained, while ‘basic’ science describes the world and makes generalizations about collected phenomena, ‘applied’ science is grounded on the predictive power of the knowledge we possess.6 Indeed, choosing one policy rather than another means having some expectations about the effects of the policy itself. As Bueno de Mesquita (2009) rightly contends, you can shape and engineer the future only if you are able to make accurate predictions. However, even if one overlooks the fact that IR scholars have systematically tried (Gaddis, 1992–1993: 10)7 but failed to predict major events such as the Iranian Revolution, the peaceful end of the Cold War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and, more recently, the Arab Spring, available studies show that experts are not much better at predicting future outcomes than common people. In his Expert Political Judgment, Philip Tetlock (2005) has shown that experts, largely political scientists, area study specialists and economists working in academic and non-academic institutions, are not very good at predicting future developments. They are better than the ‘unwashed masses’ (i.e. Berkeley undergrads), but no better than relatively simple statistical procedures and attentive readers of newspapers. Moreover, Tetlock found that knowledge of a specific issue might make one a better forecaster, but being a specialist can actually reduce the ability to predict future developments: ‘we reach the point of diminishing marginal predictive returns for knowledge disconcertingly quickly’ (Tetlock, 2005: 59). That leads to a paradoxical situation in which more knowledge means a lower capacity of being a reliable forecaster. Tetlock’s conclusion is quite depressing for those scholars who wish to influence policymaking: In this age of academic hyper-specialization, there is no reason for supposing that contributors to top journals — distinguished political scientists, area study specialists, economists, and so on — are any better than journalists or attentive readers of the New York Times in ‘reading’ emerging situations. (Tetlock, 2005: 233)8 If the ability to predict is a necessary requirement for an applied science but IR scholars are only slightly better at predicting than the general public, why should they be credited with a privileged epistemological standpoint in the policymaking process? Here, I am not suggesting that policymakers can master political subjects better than scholars; as Henry Nau (2008: 636) points out, ‘neither profession can make a superior claim to social knowledge.’ Nor do I contend that prediction is impossible. In fact, some limited prediction is possible but, again, experts of international politics are not much better at forecasting than practitioners and laypeople. Although failure to predict might not pose any problems for a scientific study of politics — as explaining (Keil, 2010; Lepgold and Nincic, 2001: 89; Singer, 1990: 74) or scenario analysis (Bernstein et al., 2000) can be sufficient goals9 — it does have detrimental implications for a social science that aspires to advise, drive and change politics. Advising, designing and planning are all based on the assumption that social scientists are much better at prediction than the general public. Yet, such a claim is, at present, unsubstantiated. The second reason why the argument for an applied IR theory seems misguided is concerned with the issue of the knowledge generated within the discipline. In particular, there is no agreement among scholars about what we know and how international politics works. Even if we neglect the problems concerning prediction and go for a pragmatic attitude to political knowledge — an attitude by which the latter is simply what investigators agree upon (Friedrichs and Kratochwil, 2009; Peirce, 1992[1878]: 138–139) — scholars do not agree about what we know and about the best means to reach political goals. Interestingly, disagreement on these important areas can be found not only between different epistemological approaches, but also among like-minded scholars working within the same theory of knowledge and even within the same school, tradition, research programme or paradigm. The problem lies not solely in the fact that there are several theories aiming to explain one and the same political phenomenon, but rather in the fact that it has become impossible to establish the scientific validity of the knowledge produced in the discipline. Despite the presence of agreed-upon rules to determine theory acceptance (Bueno de Mesquita, 2004; Christensen and Snyder, 1997; Elman and Elman, 2002; Hopf, 1998; Lake, 2013; Legro and Moravcsik, 1999; Vasquez, 1997), there is still sharp disagreement on the progress of IR. Indeed, the widespread (though not universal10) adoption of the criteria suggested by Imre Lakatos (1970) — the methodology of scientific research programmes — has not generated consensus on the progress in terms of knowledge achieved by the discipline. If some of the main theorists of some of the main schools of IR claim that their research programmes are all progressive (Di Cicco and Levy, 2003; Keohane and Martin, 2003; Lee Ray, 2003; Moravcsik, 2003) and, therefore, all scientific and cumulative, then one could infer that none of them is probably truly progressive, at least in Lakatos’s terms. For Lakatos, judgement on progress is not simply a contest between theory and empirical evidence, but rather a three-cornered contest between competing theories and empirical evidence. Moreover, besides awarding a promising future to their research programmes, some of these scholars have also claimed that their rivals’ theoretical programmes are ‘degenerative’ and, thus, outside the scope of science (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999; Vasquez, 1997). Thus, not only do meta-theoretical debates about epistemology and ontology appear irresolvable (Monteiro and Ruby, 2009; Sil and Katzenstein, 2010a: 417), but so are empirically testable questions rarely resolved. Indeed, there is no consensus on what causes war, on the economic and political sources of democracy, on when states should intervene abroad, and on other major issues concerning international politics. The debate over these questions seems interminable.11 The fact that strong disagreement also exists in the hard sciences is not good news for IR theory. Although scientific research always implies the assumption of fallibility and the knowledge produced is often subject to change, that does not mean that the natural and social sciences are essentially identical. Dismissing the differences in accuracy, prediction and control between the natural sciences and social sciences as ‘mere matters of degree’ is an old but untenable strategy in order to defend the scientific study of politics (Crick, 1959: 218). Indeed, differences in degree might soon turn into differences in kind. The modest success of IR theory in developing a body of policy-relevant knowledge barely comparable to the one generated by the natural sciences suggests that the so-called scientific method has not yet been able to produce remarkable results when employed in the study of international politics. Hayek’s and Morgenthau’s critiques of applied social science still appear to be valid, though many students of international politics think and write that such an unsuccessful record does not question the possibility of an applied political science. If no theory or method can deliver any truly predictive knowledge of international politics, then policy must be insensitive to theoretical and empirical findings. This is why, despite being concerned with relevant political issues and emphasizing any potential dangers and mistakes, IR theory should not directly inform policy. French statesman Georges Clemenceau famously remarked that ‘war is too important to be left to the generals.’ Paraphrasing Clemenceau, I would argue that politics is too important to be left to political scientists. Suggesting that policies are to ignore scientific conjectures, however, does not imply that there should be no role for IR theory and no point in theorizing about international politics and foreign policy. Being practically relevant does not equate to directly affecting policy. The argument developed here does not deny the importance of IR scholarship, which, far from claiming any direct influence of a scientist kind, can have practical relevance in two different functions. The first one refers to the role of theory in political judgement. In particular, I would argue that theory is an important tool for the intellectual development of policymakers. From this viewpoint, no broad line of demarcation should be drawn between the practitioner and the scholar. The second function, on the other hand, is concerned with IR scholarship as a whole and involves its unintended effects on policymaking. Such influence is indirect, yet no less important. Here, I contend that a broad line of demarcation should be drawn between decision-making and IR theory. Despite the fact that these two implications might appear to be inconsistent at first sight, as I will try to show in the next two sections, they tend to reduce the scholar’s role but not the function of scholarship. IR as a tool of self-education While, at present, point prediction appears impossible in international politics, what about the most common type of forecasting in social science — that is, probabilistic predictions? Apart from Bueno de Mesquita perhaps, no scholar would claim to have developed the right formula for forecasting future outcomes. Proponents of statistical models, for example, would argue that the predictions they make are probabilistic and the variables they employ are ‘probability-raisers’ (Grynaviski, 2013: 824). In relation to the theory–policy nexus, however, facts and figures cast in probabilistic terms cannot solve the dilemmas of policy. Although scholars might be content with knowing that there is a certain relationship between variables, policymakers cannot act according to probabilistic propositions in the particular, individual cases that they have to face. In matters of war and peace, for instance, where many lives may be at stake, the error term is something that cannot be ignored: ‘How, for example, can the cost of thinking rather too well of a particular speculation within pure theory be compared to the pain, sufferance and death which follow errors in the application of theory?’ (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986: 34). Practitioners are not interested in distinguishing between approximations and exact results not because they fail to understand the epistemological limits of the social sciences and the complex nature of political reality, but because they often face issues and circumstances that are unique. Since a variable ruled out of a theory on account of its rare or scarce influence on a particular phenomenon might have a major effect under specific circumstances, generalizations are of little help to practitioners. Likewise, knowledge of causal mechanisms and processes, highly valuable for understanding how variables are connected to one another, does not solve the problem of whether the case that a policymaker is facing is either a particular case of a general class of events or a contingency characterized by unique features.12 Thus, general propositions about causal chains and mechanisms are also of limited use for policymaking. As George and Bennett (2004: 277) acknowledge: ‘No theory or systematic generic knowledge can provide policy specialists with detailed, high-confidence prescriptions for action in each contingency that arises. Such policy-relevant theory and knowledge does not exist and is not feasible.’ By clarifying the problems and risks involved in certain situations, theory can contribute to informing policy. However, scientific knowledge cannot replace political deliberation; many instances in international politics are so unique that the idea that generalizations can be employed to conduct foreign policy appears misguided.13 What ‘makes men foolish or wise, understanding or blind, as opposed to knowledgeable or learned or well informed’, writes Isaiah Berlin (1999: 24), ‘is the perception of these unique flavours of each situation as it is, in its specific differences.’ To these ‘unique flavours’, IR conceived as a scientific enterprise has not much to offer. Good political judgement might not be illusory; the illusion is to think that judgement can be replaced with rational calculation or probabilistic inference. Acting on the highest probabilities available, indifference to the ‘particular’ and blindness to the individual circumstances is a very dangerous path to take in international politics. Thus, it is necessary to understand the nature, the structure and the issues of a particular context regardless of universal formulas and general rules. As Isaiah Berlin (1999: 45) argued: What makes statesmen, like drivers of cars, successful is that they do not think in general terms — that is, they do not primarily ask themselves in what respect a given situation is like or unlike other situations in the long course of human history... Hence, every situation must be understood in its own distinctiveness and a particular decision should not be the rigid application of a mathematical formula, but rather a deliberation based on critical reflection over the specific situation in which one needs to act.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>More <u>predictable</u> and <u>real world</u>–you’re an educator who only has the ability to criticize their framing of the world—prioritize <u>epistemological interrogation</u>—policy relevance is an <u>immaterial concern</h4><p></u><strong>Zambernardi, 15</strong>—University of Bologna (Lorenzo, “Politics is too important to be left to political scientists: A critique of the theory–policy nexus in International Relations”, European Journal of International Relations 1–21, April 2015, dml) </p><p><u>There are two</u> main <u>reasons why</u> the notion of <u>applied social science still appears</u> to be <u>unsound</u>. <u>The first</u> one <u>has to do with the <mark>need for policymaking to rely on</mark> some degree of <mark>prediction</u></mark> (Chernoff, 2009; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2013: 436; Merton and Lerner, 1951: 304). As Herbert Simon (2001: 32, 60) explained, <u>while ‘basic’ science describes the world and makes generalizations about collected phenomena, ‘applied’ science is grounded on the predictive power of the knowledge we possess</u>.6 Indeed, <u>choosing one policy rather than another means having some expectations about the effects of the policy itself</u>. As Bueno de Mesquita (2009) rightly contends, <u><mark>you can shape</mark> and engineer <mark>the future <strong>only if you</mark> are able to <mark>make accurate predictions</strong></mark>. </u>However, <u>even if one overlooks the fact that IR <mark>scholars have <strong>systematically</mark> tried</u></strong> (Gaddis, 1992–1993: 10)7 <u><strong>but <mark>failed</strong> to predict</mark> major <mark>events</u></mark> such as the Iranian Revolution, the peaceful end of the Cold War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and, more recently, the Arab Spring, <u>available studies show that <mark>experts are not much better at predicting </mark>future outcomes <mark>than common people</u></mark>. In his Expert Political Judgment, Philip Tetlock (2005) has shown that <u>experts</u>, largely political scientists, area study specialists and economists working in academic and non-academic institutions, <u>are not very good at predicting future developments</u>. <u>They are</u> better than the ‘unwashed masses’ (i.e. Berkeley undergrads), but <u>no better than relatively simple statistical procedures and attentive readers of newspapers</u>. Moreover, Tetlock found that knowledge of a specific issue might make one a better forecaster, but <u>being a specialist can actually reduce the ability to predict future developments: ‘we reach the point of diminishing marginal predictive returns for knowledge disconcertingly quickly’</u> (Tetlock, 2005: 59). <u>That leads to a paradoxical situation in which <mark>more knowledge means <strong>a lower capacity of being a reliable forecaster</u></strong></mark>. Tetlock’s conclusion is quite depressing for those scholars who wish to influence policymaking: <u>In this age of academic hyper-specialization, there is no reason</u> for supposing <u>that</u> contributors to top journals — distinguished <u>political scientists</u>, area study specialists, <u>economists</u>, and so on — <u>are any better</u> than journalists or attentive readers of the New York Times <u>in ‘reading’ emerging situations</u>. (Tetlock, 2005: 233)8 If the ability to predict is a necessary requirement for an applied science but IR scholars are only slightly better at predicting than the general public, <u>why should they be credited with a privileged epistemological standpoint in the policymaking process?</u> Here, I am not suggesting that policymakers can master political subjects better than scholars; as Henry Nau (2008: 636) points out, ‘neither profession can make a superior claim to social knowledge.’ Nor do I contend that prediction is impossible. In fact, some limited prediction is possible but, again, experts of international politics are not much better at forecasting than practitioners and laypeople. Although <u><mark>failure to predict</u></mark> might not pose any problems for a scientific study of politics — as explaining (Keil, 2010; Lepgold and Nincic, 2001: 89; Singer, 1990: 74) or scenario analysis (Bernstein et al., 2000) can be sufficient goals9 — it <u><mark>does have <strong>detrimental implications</strong> for </mark>a social <mark>science that <strong>aspires to </mark>advise, drive and <mark>change politics</u></strong></mark>. <u>Advising, designing and planning are all based on the assumption that social scientists are much better at prediction than the general public. Yet, such a claim is</u>, at present, <u>unsubstantiated.</u> The second reason why the argument for an applied IR theory seems misguided is concerned with the issue of the knowledge generated within the discipline. In particular, there is no agreement among scholars about what we know and how international politics works. <u><mark>Even if we neglect </mark>the<mark> </mark>problems concerning <mark>prediction and go for a pragmatic attitude to political knowledge</u></mark> — an attitude by which the latter is simply what investigators agree upon (Friedrichs and <u><strong>Kratochwil</u></strong>, 2009; Peirce, 1992[1878]: 138–139) — <u><mark>scholars do not agree about what we know and about the best means to reach political goals</u></mark>. Interestingly, disagreement on these important areas can be found not only between different epistemological approaches, but also among like-minded scholars working within the same theory of knowledge and even within the same school, tradition, research programme or paradigm. The problem lies not solely in the fact that there are several theories aiming to explain one and the same political phenomenon, but rather in the fact that <u>it has become impossible to establish the scientific validity of the knowledge produced in the discipline</u>. Despite the presence of agreed-upon rules to determine theory acceptance (Bueno de Mesquita, 2004; Christensen and Snyder, 1997; Elman and Elman, 2002; Hopf, 1998; Lake, 2013; Legro and Moravcsik, 1999; Vasquez, 1997), there is still sharp disagreement on the progress of IR. Indeed, the widespread (though not universal10) adoption of the criteria suggested by Imre Lakatos (1970) — the methodology of scientific research programmes — has not generated consensus on the progress in terms of knowledge achieved by the discipline. If some of the main theorists of some of the main schools of IR claim that their research programmes are all progressive (Di Cicco and Levy, 2003; Keohane and Martin, 2003; Lee Ray, 2003; Moravcsik, 2003) and, therefore, all scientific and cumulative, then one could infer that none of them is probably truly progressive, at least in Lakatos’s terms. For Lakatos, judgement on progress is not simply a contest between theory and empirical evidence, but rather a three-cornered contest between competing theories and empirical evidence. Moreover, besides awarding a promising future to their research programmes, some of these scholars have also claimed that their rivals’ theoretical programmes are ‘degenerative’ and, thus, outside the scope of science (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999; Vasquez, 1997). Thus, not only do meta-theoretical debates about epistemology and ontology appear irresolvable (Monteiro and Ruby, 2009; Sil and Katzenstein, 2010a: 417), but so are empirically testable questions rarely resolved. Indeed, there is no consensus on what causes war, on the economic and political sources of democracy, on when states should intervene abroad, and on other major issues concerning international politics. The debate over these questions seems interminable.11 The fact that strong disagreement also exists in the hard sciences is not good news for IR theory. Although scientific research always implies the assumption of fallibility and the knowledge produced is often subject to change, that does not mean that the natural and social sciences are essentially identical. <u>Dismissing the differences in accuracy, prediction and control</u> between the natural sciences and social sciences <u>as ‘mere matters of degree’ is an old but untenable strategy in order to defend the scientific study of politics</u> (Crick, 1959: 218). Indeed, <u>differences in degree might soon turn into differences in kind</u>. <u>The modest success of IR theory in developing a body of policy-relevant knowledge</u> barely comparable to the one generated by the natural sciences <u>suggests that the so-called scientific method has not yet been able to produce remarkable results when employed in the study of international politics.</u> Hayek’s and Morgenthau’s critiques of applied social science still appear to be valid, though many students of international politics think and write that such an unsuccessful record does not question the possibility of an applied political science. If no theory or method can deliver any truly predictive knowledge of international politics, then <u><mark>policy must be insensitive to theoretical and empirical findings</u></mark>. This is why, <u><mark>despite</mark> being concerned with relevant political issues and <mark>emphasizing</mark> any <mark>potential dangers</mark> and mistakes, <mark>IR theory <strong>should not directly inform policy</u></strong></mark>. French statesman Georges Clemenceau famously remarked that ‘war is too important to be left to the generals.’ Paraphrasing Clemenceau, I would argue that <u><mark>politics is too important to be left to political scientists.</mark> Suggesting that policies are to ignore scientific conjectures</u>, however, <u>does not imply that there should be no role for IR theory and no point in theorizing about international politics and foreign policy</u>. <u><mark>Being practically relevant does not equate to </mark>directly <mark>affecting policy</u></mark>. The argument developed here does not deny the importance of <u>IR scholarship</u>, which, far from claiming any direct influence of a scientist kind, <u>can have practical relevance</u> in two different functions. The first one refers to the role of theory in political judgement. In particular, I would argue that <u><mark>theory is</mark> an <mark>important t</mark>ool <mark>for</mark> <strong>the <mark>intellectual development of policymakers</u></strong></mark>. From this viewpoint, <u>no broad line of demarcation should be drawn between the practitioner and the scholar</u>. The second function, on the other hand, is concerned with IR scholarship as a whole and involves its unintended effects on policymaking. Such influence is indirect, yet no less important. Here, I contend that a broad line of demarcation should be drawn between decision-making and IR theory. Despite the fact that these two implications might appear to be inconsistent at first sight, as I will try to show in the next two sections, they tend to reduce the scholar’s role but not the function of scholarship. IR as a tool of self-education <u>While</u>, at present, <u>point prediction appears impossible in international politics, what about</u> the most common type of forecasting in social science — that is, <u>probabilistic predictions?</u> Apart from Bueno de Mesquita perhaps, <u>no scholar would claim to have developed the right formula for forecasting future outcomes</u>. Proponents of statistical models, for example, would argue that the predictions they make are probabilistic and the variables they employ are ‘probability-raisers’ (Grynaviski, 2013: 824). In relation to the theory–policy nexus, however, <u><mark>facts</mark> and figures <mark>cast in probabilistic terms <strong>cannot solve the dilemmas of policy</strong></mark>. Although scholars might be content with knowing that there is a certain relationship between variables, <mark>policymakers cannot act according to probabilistic propositions </mark>in the particular, individual cases that they have to face. <mark>In matters of war </mark>and peace</u>, for instance, <u>where many lives may be at stake, the <mark>error term is <strong>something that cannot be ignored</strong></mark>: ‘How, for example, can the cost of thinking rather too well of a particular speculation within pure theory be compared to the pain, sufferance and death which follow errors in the application of theory</u>?’ (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986: 34). Practitioners are not interested in distinguishing between approximations and exact results not because they fail to understand the epistemological limits of the social sciences and the complex nature of political reality, but because they often face issues and circumstances that are unique. Since a variable ruled out of a theory on account of its rare or scarce influence on a particular phenomenon might have a major effect under specific circumstances, generalizations are of little help to practitioners. Likewise, <u>knowledge of causal mechanisms and processes</u>, highly valuable for <u>understanding how variables are connected to one another, does not solve the problem of whether the case that a policymaker is facing is either a particular case of a general class of events or a contingency characterized by unique features</u>.12 Thus, <u>general propositions about causal chains and mechanisms are also of limited use for policymaking</u>. As George and Bennett (2004: 277) acknowledge: ‘No theory or systematic generic knowledge can provide policy specialists with detailed, high-confidence prescriptions for action in each contingency that arises. <u>Such <mark>policy-relevant theory </mark>and knowledge <strong><mark>does not exist</strong> and <strong>is not feasible</strong></mark>.’ </u>By clarifying the problems and risks involved in certain situations, theory can contribute to informing policy. However, scientific knowledge cannot replace political deliberation; many instances in international politics are so unique that the idea that generalizations can be employed to conduct foreign policy appears misguided.13 What ‘makes men foolish or wise, understanding or blind, as opposed to knowledgeable or learned or well informed’, writes Isaiah Berlin (1999: 24), ‘is the perception of these unique flavours of each situation as it is, in its specific differences.’ To these ‘unique flavours’, IR conceived as a scientific enterprise has not much to offer. <u>Good political judgement might not be illusory; the illusion is to think that judgement can be replaced with rational calculation or probabilistic inference. Acting on the highest probabilities available, indifference to the ‘particular’</u> <u>and</u> blindness to the <u>individual circumstances is a very dangerous path to take</u> in international politics. Thus, <u><mark>it is necessary to understand</mark> <strong>the nature</strong>, <strong><mark>the structure</strong> and <strong>the issues</strong> of a particular context</u></mark> regardless of universal formulas and general rules. As Isaiah Berlin (1999: 45) argued: What makes statesmen, like drivers of cars, successful is that they do not think in general terms — that is, they do not primarily ask themselves in what respect a given situation is like or unlike other situations in the long course of human history... Hence, <u>every situation must be understood in its own distinctiveness and <mark>a particular decision should</u></mark> not <u><mark>be</u></mark> the rigid application of a mathematical formula, but rather <u><mark>a deliberation <strong>based on critical reflection</strong> </mark>over the specific situation in which one needs to act.</u> </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: --BLUE – TOP-LEVEL fulltext: --GREEN – AT: WARMING DEFENSE Ben Ehrenreich 21, writes about climate change for The Nation. His work has appeared in Harper’s Magazine, The New York Times Magazine, the London Review of Books, and Los Angeles magazine. In 2011, he was awarded a National Magazine Award. His last book, The Way to the Spring: Life and Death in Palestine, based on his reporting from the West Bank, was one of The Guardian’s Best Books of 2016. He is also the author of two novels, Ether and The Suitors., author of Desert Notebooks: A Roadmap for the End of Time, which was published by Counterpoint Press, published 3-18-2021, https://newrepublic.com/article/161575/climate-change-effects-hurtling-toward-global-suicide, Rez. Even with the grim opportunity presented by the Covid-19 pandemic, which slowed the economy so much that growth in fossil fuel production dropped an almost unprecedented 7 percent last year, governments—ours very much included—have so far dumped much more stimulus spending into high-carbon industries than into renewable energy. It’s as if our economic system, and the politics it breeds, will not allow us to diverge from the straight path to self-obliteration. The faith nonetheless persists: The market will provide. It has not done so yet, but renewables are perhaps finally cheap enough—cheaper at last than conventional energy sources—that the transition is now inevitable. So the credo goes. The change that is coming will be largely technological: a bold new era of “green growth.” Modern societies erected on dirty coal and oil can be jacked up and shifted to cleaner forms of energy like an old house in need of a new foundation. Government may have a larger role in this transition than neoliberal dogma has recently allowed, but its primary task will still be to encourage innovation and feed the markets by shepherding the resulting growth. It is no coincidence that some version of this faith, so all-pervasive now that it does not register as a piety, has been reshaping the planet for almost precisely as long as fossil energy—first coal, then oil—has been altering the atmosphere. Capitalism is guided by a carbon creed, an ecstatic vision of a market that chugs along eternally, needing only new inputs—the earth itself, commodified as minerals, or water, housing, health care, or almost any living thing—to spew out wealth that can be shoveled back into the machine, converting more and more of the biosphere into zeros in a digital account: more fleshless, magical money that can be invested once again. If appetites are bottomless, and apparently they are, shouldn’t growth be endless too? The market’s grip on the political imagination so effectively blinds us to alternatives that we are unable fully to grasp that this is the basic script that the new administration is following. Even the Green New Deal does not substantively diverge from it. The climate crisis, an existential threat to planetary life, must be sold to Wall Street and the public at large as a growth opportunity. On January 31, John Kerry, acting as Biden’s new climate envoy, enthused to CNN’s Fareed Zakaria about “literally millions of jobs” that would soon be created, about all the “new products coming online,” and about oil companies’ newfound passion for “carbon capture and storage and so forth.” The private sector, he said, “has already made the decision that there is money to be made here, that’s capitalism, and they are investing in that future.” If that makes you nervous, it shouldn’t, Kerry insisted. The changes ahead would be like the analog-to-digital shift of the 1990s, only better: “the important point, Fareed, for people to really focus on is it’s a very exciting economic transition.” If Kerry struck a cheerier tone than that of the doomsaying consensus in the scientific community, it wasn’t just a question of polishing a turd. “Green growth” is mainstream climate discourse. A “green transition” that does not significantly alter existing economic structures—or their vast inequities—is still, for most climate advocates, the only imaginable way forward. Kerry was speaking a made-for-TV version of the sole language available to him—one that in its most basic assumptions excludes the possibility of fundamental social transformation, and of any heresy that casts doubt on the Great God Growth. The one thing all those thousands of scientists agree on is our only hope—that the economic structures that mediate our relation to the planet must be profoundly altered—is the one thing that Kerry and Biden are quite careful not to consider at all. In climate policy jargon, the crucial concept is “decoupling.” The notion lies deep in the hidden heart of the “sustainable development goals” held dear by international bodies such as the United Nations and the World Bank: Economic growth can be safely divorced from the ecological damage that it has heretofore almost universally wreaked. If the train of capital appears to be hurtling us toward the abyss, we can cut the engine loose and cruise someplace more comfortable: same train, same speed, different destination. Like millions of clean-tech jobs and a crisis-induced transition magically unlocking unimaginable wealth, it is an attractive and reassuring idea. The only problem is that there is next to no evidence that anything analogous has ever occurred, or that it is likely to occur in the future. Examples of successful decoupling tend to involve shifts in the location rather than the nature of industrial production: Rich countries green their economies by offshoring the manufacture of the goods they consume to China and countries in the global south, which they can then chastise for their lax emissions standards. But Earth’s atmosphere is not divided by national boundaries. Greenhouse gases cause the same degree of global warming no matter where they are produced, and to the extent that this kind of decoupling is a meaningful measure of anything, it is only of the colonial relations that still set the terms for the shell game of global capital. What policy wonks call “absolute decoupling”—the only kind that would do the climate any good—turns out to be a fantasy akin to a perpetual motion machine, a chimera of growth unhindered by material constraints. One recent analysis of 835 peer-reviewed articles on the subject found that the kind of massive and speedy reductions in emissions that would be necessary to halt global warming “cannot be achieved through observed decoupling rates.” The mechanism on which mainstream climate policy is betting the future of the species, and on which the possibility of green growth rests, appears to be a fiction. This fiction is nonetheless fundamental to the very math used by international climate institutions. In 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s benchmark Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5oC—which announced in no uncertain terms that global emissions must be decreased by nearly half by 2030 and reach net zero by 2050 to avoid cataclysm at an almost unthinkable scale—set out a number of possible scenarios for policymakers to consider. It relied on algorithmic models linking greenhouse gas emissions and their climate impacts to various socioeconomic “pathways.” Whatever other variables they accounted for, though, all of the scenarios envisioned by the IPCC assumed the continuation of economic growth comparable to the past half-century’s. Even as they acknowledged levels of atmospheric carbon unseen in the last three million years, they were unable to conceive of an economy that does not perpetually expand. Fredric Jameson’s oft-cited dictum that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism was baked into the actual modeling. At the same time, all but one of the ­IPCC’s scenarios that envision us successfully limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius rely on the use of technology to remove carbon from the atmosphere after the fact. (The one exception involves converting an area more than half the size of the United States to forest. None of the scenarios imagines that we can reach the 1.5 degrees Celsius target by cutting emissions alone.) But the technology in question is at this point largely speculative. “No proposed technology is close to deployment at scale,” the report’s authors concede, and “there is substantial uncertainty” about possible “adverse effects” on the environment. The international body, in other words, is more willing to gamble on potentially destructive technologies that do not currently exist than to even run the math on a more substantive economic transformation. A version of this same wager animates the Biden climate plan, which, as Canada, the European Union, the U.K., and South Korea all have, commits to “net-zero emissions no later than 2050.” (China plans to reach the same goal by 2060.) This sounds like great news, and is without doubt worlds better than the status quo ante of no ambitions at all. But “net zero” is a slippery notion. It does not mean zero at all. To avoid exceeding 1.5 degrees Celsius of warming, emissions need to fall 7.6 percent every year for the next 10 years. Even with the pandemic-induced slowdown, global emissions shrank only 6.4 percent in 2020. Since, as Biden reassured a nervous oil industry during the campaign, “We’re not getting rid of fossil fuels for a long time,” net-zero calculations assume some degree of “overshoot”—i.e., they stipulate that we’re not going to be able to cut emissions fast enough, and that we’ll therefore have to rely on those same untested carbon removal technologies to eventually bring us to zero. But a planet is not a balance sheet. The climate has tipping points—the collapse of the Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets and the Himalayan glaciers, the deterioration of Atlantic Ocean currents, the melting of the permafrost, the transition of the Amazon from rain forest to savannah. We are perilously close to hitting some of them already: In February, 31 people were killed and 165 went missing when a chunk of a Himalayan glacier broke off, releasing an explosive burst of meltwater and debris. In the most nightmarish scenario, which could be tripped with less than 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) of warming, those tipping points could begin to trigger one another and cascade, locking us in, as one widely cited study put it, to “conditions that would be inhospitable to current human societies and to many other contemporary species.” Without major emissions cuts, we may reach 2 degrees Celsius of warming before 2050. That’s a heavy risk to bet against, but there it is, pulsing away inside the net-zero promises that not only politicians but corporate boards have been proudly rolling out. Over the last two years, more and more corporations in fossil fuel–intensive industries—BP, Shell, Maersk, GM, Ford, Volkswagen, at least a dozen major airlines—have made similar pledges. Shell’s plan alone would require tree planting over an area nearly the size of Brazil. By the estimate of the NGO ActionAid, “there is simply not enough available land on the planet to accommodate all of the combined corporate and government ‘net zero’ plans” for offsets and carbon-sinking tree plantations. To save this planet, it appears we’ll need another one. This is what currently counts as pragmatism.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Their authors function within a capitalism echo-chamber which makes their data baked – ignores offshoring and tech failures</h4><p>--<mark>BLUE</mark> – TOP-LEVEL</p><p>--<mark>GREEN</mark> – AT: WARMING DEFENSE</p><p>Ben <strong>Ehrenreich 21</strong>, writes about climate change for The Nation. His work has appeared in Harper’s Magazine, The New York Times Magazine, the London Review of Books, and Los Angeles magazine. In 2011, he was awarded a National Magazine Award. His last book, The Way to the Spring: Life and Death in Palestine, based on his reporting from the West Bank, was one of The Guardian’s Best Books of 2016. He is also the author of two novels, Ether and The Suitors., author of Desert Notebooks: A Roadmap for the End of Time, which was published by Counterpoint Press, published 3-18-2021, https://newrepublic.com/article/161575/climate-change-effects-hurtling-toward-global-suicide<u>, Rez.</p><p></u>Even with the grim opportunity presented by the Covid-19 pandemic, which slowed the economy so much that growth in fossil fuel production dropped an almost unprecedented 7 percent last year, governments—ours very much included—have so far <u><strong>dumped much more stimulus spending into high-carbon industries than into renewable energy</u></strong>. <u>It’s as if our economic system, and the politics it breeds, will not allow us to diverge from the straight <strong>path to self-obliteration</strong>.</p><p>The faith</u> nonetheless <u>persists: The <strong>market will provide</u></strong>. <u>It has not done so yet, but renewables are perhaps finally cheap enough—cheaper at last than conventional energy sources—that the transition is now inevitable.</u> So the credo goes. <u>The change that is coming will be largely technological: a bold new era of “<strong>green growth</strong>.” Modern societies erected on dirty coal and oil can be jacked up and shifted to cleaner forms of energy like an old house in need of a new foundation</u>. <u>Government may have a larger role in this transition than neoliberal dogma has recently allowed, but its primary task will still be to encourage innovation and feed the markets by shepherding</u> the resulting <u>growth<strong>.</p><p></strong>It is no coincidence</u> that <u>some version of this faith</u>, <u>so</u> all-<u>pervasive now that it does not register as a piety, has been reshaping the planet for almost</u> precisely <u>as long as fossil energy—first coal, then oil—has been altering the atmosphere</u>. <u><strong>Capitalism is guided by a carbon creed, an ecstatic vision of a market that chugs along eternally, needing only new inputs</u></strong>—<u>the earth itself, commodified as minerals, or water, housing, health care, or almost any living thing</u>—<u><strong>to spew out wealth that can be shoveled back into the machine,</u></strong> <u>converting more and more of the biosphere into zeros in a digital account</u>: <u><strong>more fleshless, magical money that can be invested once again</u></strong>. <u>If appetites are bottomless, and apparently they are, shouldn’t growth be endless too?</p><p><strong><mark>The market</mark>’s grip on the political imagination so effectively <mark>blinds us to alternatives</mark> that we are unable fully to grasp that this is the basic script that the new administration is following</u></strong>. Even the Green New Deal does not substantively diverge from it. <u><strong>The climate crisis</u></strong>, <u>an existential threat to planetary life, must be sold to Wall Street and the public at large as a <strong>growth opportunity</u></strong>. On January 31, John <u>Kerry</u>, acting as Biden’s new climate envoy, <u>enthused</u> <u>to</u> CNN’s Fareed <u>Zakaria about “literally millions of jobs” that would soon be created</u>, about all the “new products coming online,” and about oil companies’ newfound passion for “carbon capture and storage and so forth.” The private sector, he said, “has already made the decision that there is money to be made here, that’s capitalism, and they are investing in that future.” If that makes you nervous, it shouldn’t, Kerry insisted. The changes ahead would be like the analog-to-digital shift of the 1990s, only better: “the important point, Fareed, for people to really focus on is it’s a very exciting economic transition.”</p><p><u>If Kerry struck a cheerier tone than that of the doomsaying consensus in the scientific community, it wasn’t just a question of polishing a turd</u>. <u>“Green growth” is mainstream climate discourse</u>. <u><strong>A “green transition” that does not significantly alter existing economic structures</u></strong>—or their vast inequities—<u><strong>is still</u></strong>, for most climate advocates, <u><strong>the only imaginable way forward</u></strong>. Kerry was speaking a made-for-TV version of the sole language available to him—one that in its most basic assumptions <u>excludes the possibility of fundamental social transformation, and of any heresy that casts doubt on the <strong>Great God Growth</strong>. The one thing all those thousands of scientists agree on is our only hope—that the economic structures that mediate our relation to the planet must be profoundly altered—is the one thing that Kerry and Biden are quite careful not to consider at all.</p><p></u>In climate policy jargon, the crucial concept is “<u><strong><mark>decoupling</u></strong></mark>.” The <u>notion lies deep in the hidden heart of the “sustainable development goals” held dear by international bodies such as the United Nations and the World Bank</u>: Economic growth can be safely divorced from the ecological damage that it has heretofore almost universally wreaked. If <u>the train of capital appears to be hurtling us toward the abyss, we can cut the engine loose and cruise someplace more comfortable: <strong>same train</strong>, <strong>same speed, different destination.</u></strong> Like millions of clean-tech jobs and a crisis-induced transition magically unlocking unimaginable wealth, it is an attractive and reassuring idea. <u>The only problem is that <strong><mark>there is</mark> next to <mark>no evidence</strong></mark> that <mark>anything analogous</mark> has <mark>ever occurred</mark>, or that it is likely to occur in the future.</p><p></u>Examples of <u>successful decoupling tend to involve <strong>shifts in the location</strong> rather than the nature of industrial production:</u> <u><strong><mark>Rich countries green their economies by offshoring</u></strong></mark> the <u>manufacture</u> of the goods they consume <u><mark>to</mark> China and</u> countries in <u><mark>the global south</u>, <u><strong>which they can</mark> then <mark>chastise for</mark> their <mark>lax </mark>emissions <mark>standards</mark>. </u></strong>But <u>Earth’s atmosphere is not divided by national boundaries</u>. Greenhouse <u>gases cause the same degree of global warming no matter where they are produced</u>, <u>and to the extent that </u>this kind of <u><mark>decoupling is a</mark> meaningful <mark>measure</mark> of anything, <strong>it is only <mark>of</mark> the <mark>colonial relations</mark> that still set the terms for the shell game of global capital.</p><p></strong>What policy wonks call “absolute decoupling</u>”—the only kind that would do the climate any good—<u><strong>turns out to be a fantasy akin to a perpetual motion machine, a chimera of growth unhindered by material constraints</u></strong>. <u>One recent analysis of <strong><mark>835 peer-reviewed articles</strong></mark> on the subject <mark>found</mark> that the kind of <mark>massive and speedy reductions in emissions</mark> that would be necessary to halt global warming “<mark>cannot be achieved through observed</mark> decoupling <mark>rates</u></mark>.” The <u><mark>mechanism on which mainstream</mark> climate <mark>policy is betting the future of the species,</mark> and on which the possibility of green growth rests, <mark>appears to be</mark> a <strong><mark>fiction.</p><p></mark>This fiction is nonetheless fundamental to the very math used by international climate institutions</u></strong>. In <u>2018</u>, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s <u>benchmark Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5oC</u>—which announced in no uncertain terms that global emissions must be decreased by nearly half by 2030 and reach net zero by 2050 to avoid cataclysm at an almost unthinkable scale—<u>set out a number of possible scenarios for <mark>policymakers</mark> to consider</u>. <u><strong>It <mark>relied on</mark> algorithmic <mark>models</mark> linking greenhouse gas emissions and their climate impacts to various socioeconomic “pathways</u></strong>.” <u>Whatever other variables they accounted for, though, all of the scenarios envisioned by the IPCC assumed the continuation of economic growth comparable to the past half-century’s</u>. Even as they acknowledged levels of atmospheric carbon unseen in the last three million years, <u><strong>they were <mark>unable to conceive of an economy that does not</mark> perpetually <mark>expand</u></strong></mark>. Fredric <u>Jameson’s oft-cited dictum that it is <strong><mark>easier to imagine the end of the world than</mark> the end of <mark>capitalism was baked into</mark> the actual <mark>modeling</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>At the same time, all but one of the ­IPCC’s scenarios that envision us successfully limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius rely on the use of technology to remove carbon from the atmosphere after the fact. (The one exception involves converting an area more than half the size of the United States to forest. None of the scenarios imagines that we can reach the 1.5 degrees Celsius target by cutting emissions alone.) But the <u><mark>tech</mark>nology in question <mark>is</mark> at this point largely <strong><mark>speculative</u></strong></mark>. “<u>No proposed technology is close to deployment at scale,” the report’s authors concede, <mark>and</mark> “there is substantial <strong><mark>uncertainty</u></strong>” <u><strong>about</mark> possible “<mark>adverse effects” on the environment</u></strong></mark>. <u>The international body</u>, in other words, <u><strong>is more willing to gamble on potentially destructive technologies that do not currently exist than to even run the math on a more substantive economic transformation.</p><p></u></strong>A version of this same wager animates the Biden climate plan, which, as Canada, the European Union, the U.K., and South Korea all have, commits to “<u>net-zero emissions no later than 2050</u>.” (China plans to reach the same goal by 2060.) This <u>sounds like great news, and is without doubt worlds better than the status quo ante of no ambitions at all.</u> <u><strong>But “net zero” is a slippery notion</u></strong>. <u>It does not mean zero at all. To avoid exceeding 1.5 degrees Celsius of warming, emissions need to fall 7.6 percent every year for the next 10 years. Even with the pandemic-induced slowdown, global emissions shrank only 6.4 percent in 2020. Since</u>, as <u>Biden</u> <u>reassured a nervous oil industry</u> during the campaign, “<u>We’re not getting rid of fossil fuels for a long time,” net-zero calculations assume some degree of “overshoot</u>”—i.e., <u><strong>they stipulate that we’re not going to be able to cut emissions fast enough, and that we’ll therefore have to rely on those same untested carbon removal technologies to eventually bring us to zero.</p><p>But a <mark>planet is not a balance sheet</mark>. </strong>The climate <mark>has tipping points</u></mark>—the <u><strong><mark>collapse of</mark> the Antarctic</strong> and <strong>Greenland <mark>ice</strong> sheets</mark> and the Himalayan <mark>glaciers</mark>, the deterioration of <strong>Atlantic Ocean <mark>currents</strong></mark>, the melting of the <strong><mark>permafrost</strong></mark>, the <mark>transition of the <strong>Amazon</strong></mark> from <strong>rain forest to savannah</strong>.</u> <u><strong><mark>We are</mark> perilously close to <mark>hitting</mark> some of <mark>them</mark> already</u></strong>: <u>In February</u>, 31 people were killed and 165 went missing when a <u>chunk of a Himalayan glacier broke off</u>, <u>releasing an explosive burst of meltwater and debri</u>s. <u>In the most nightmarish scenario, which could be tripped with less than 2 degrees Celsius</u> (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) of warming, <u><strong>those <mark>tipping points could</mark> begin to trigger one another and <mark>cascade</u></strong>, <u>locking us in</mark>, as one widely cited study put it, to “<strong><mark>conditions</mark> that would be <mark>inhospitable to</mark> current <mark>human societies</strong></mark> and to many other contemporary species</u>.” <u><strong>Without major emissions cuts, we may reach 2 degrees Celsius of warming <mark>before 2050.</p><p></u></strong></mark>That’s a heavy risk to bet against, but there it is, pulsing away inside the net-zero promises that not only politicians but corporate boards have been proudly rolling out. Over the last two years, more and more corporations in fossil fuel–intensive industries—BP, Shell, Maersk, GM, Ford, Volkswagen, at least a dozen major airlines—have made similar pledges. <u>Shell’s plan alone would require tree planting over an area nearly the size of Brazil</u>. By the estimate of the NGO ActionAid, “<u><strong><mark>there is </mark>simply <mark>not enough </mark>available <mark>land</mark> on the planet <mark>to accommodate</mark> all of the combined corporate and government <mark>‘net zero’ plans</mark>” </strong>for offsets and carbon-sinking tree plantations</u>. <u><strong>To save this planet, it appears we’ll need another one. This is what currently counts as pragmatism.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Baum ’19 - executive director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, Ph.D in Geography Seth Baum, “Risk-Risk Tradeoff Analysis of Nuclear Explosives for Asteroid Deflection,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, May 31, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3397559. fulltext: The most severe asteroid collisions and nuclear wars can cause global environmental effects. The core mechanism is the transport of particulate matter into the stratosphere, where it can spread worldwide and remain aloft for years or decades. Large asteroid collisions create large quantities of dust and large fireballs; the fire heats the dust so that some portion of it rises into the stratosphere. The largest collisions, such as the 10km Chicxulub impactor, can also eject debris from the collision site into space; upon reentry into the atmosphere, the debris heats up enough to spark global fires (Toon, Zahnle, Morrison, Turco, & Covey, 1997). The fires are a major impact in their own right and can send additional smoke into the stratosphere. For nuclear explosions, there is also a fireball and smoke, in this case from the burning of cities or other military targets. While in the stratosphere, the particulate matter blocks sunlight and destroys ozone (Toon et al., 2007). The ozone loss increases the amount of ultraviolet radiation reaching the surface, causing skin cancer and other harms (Mills, Toon, Turco, Kinnison, & Garcia, 2008). The blocked sunlight causes abrupt cooling of Earth’s surface and in turn reduced precipitation due to a weakened hydrological cycle. The cool, dry, and dark conditions reduce plant growth. Recent studies use modern climate and crop models to examine the effects for a hypothetical IndiaPakistan nuclear war scenario with 100 weapons (50 per side) each of 15KT yield. The studies find agriculture declines in the range of approximately 2% to 50% depending on the crop and location.11 Another study compares the crop data to existing poverty and malnourishment and estimates that the crop declines could threaten starvation for two billion people (Helfand, 2013). However, the aforementioned studies do not account for new nuclear explosion fire simulations that find approximately five times less particulate matter reaching the stratosphere, and correspondingly weaker global environmental effects (Reisner et al., 2018). Note also that the 100 weapon scenario used in these studies is not the largest potential scenario. Larger nuclear wars and large asteroid collisions could cause greater harm. The largest asteroid collisions could even reduce sunlight below the minimum needed for vision (Toon et al., 1997). Asteroid risk analyses have proposed that the global environmental disruption from large collisions could cause one billion deaths (NRC, 2010) or the death of 25% of all humans (Chapman, 2004; Chapman & Morrison, 1994; Morrison, 1992), though these figures have not been rigorously justified (Baum, 2018a). The harms from asteroid collisions and nuclear wars can also include important secondary effects. The food shortages from severe global environmental disruption could lead to infectious disease outbreaks as public health conditions deteriorate (Helfand, 2013). Law and order could be lost in at least some locations as people struggle for survival (Maher & Baum, 2013). Today’s complex global political-economic system already shows fragility to shocks such as the 2007- 2008 financial crisis (Centeno, Nag, Patterson, Shaver, & Windawi, 2015); an asteroid collision or nuclear war could be an extremely large shock. The systemic consequences of a nuclear war would be further worsened by the likely loss of major world cities that serve as important hubs in the global economy. Even a single detonation in nuclear terrorism would have ripple effects across the global political-economic system (similar to, but likely larger than, the response prompted by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001). It is possible for asteroid collisions to cause nuclear war. An asteroid explosion could be misinterpreted as a nuclear attack, prompting nuclear attack that is believed to be retaliation. For example, the 2013 Chelyabinsk event occurred near an important Russian military installation, prompting concerns about the event’s interpretation (Harris et al., 2015). The ultimate severity of an asteroid collision or violent nuclear conflict use would depend on how human society reacts. Would the reaction be disciplined and constructive: bury the dead, heal the sick, feed the hungry, and rebuild all that has fallen? Or would the reaction be disorderly and destructive: leave the rubble in place, fight for scarce resources, and descend into minimalist tribalism or worse? Prior studies have identified some key issues, including the viability of trade (Cantor, Henry, & Rayner, 1989) and the self-sufficiency of local communities (Maher & Baum, 2013). However, the issue has received little research attention and remains poorly understood. This leaves considerable uncertainty in the total human harm from an asteroid collision or nuclear weapons use. Previously published point estimates of the human consequences of asteroid collisions12 and nuclear wars (Helfand, 2013) do not account for this uncertainty and are likely to be inaccurate. Of particular importance are the consequences for future generations, which could vastly outnumber the present generation. If an asteroid collision or nuclear war would cause human extinction, then there would be no future generations. Alternatively, if survivors fail to recover a large population and advanced technological civilization, then future generations would be permanently diminished. The largest long-term factor is whether future generations would colonize space and benefit from its astronomically large amount of resources (Tonn, 1999). However, it is not presently known which asteroid collisions or nuclear wars (if any) would cause the permanent collapse of human civilization and thus the loss of the large future benefits (Baum et al., 2019). Given the enormous stakes, prudent risk management would aim for very low probabilities of permanent collapse (Tonn, 2009). It should be noted that the severity of violent nuclear conflict could depend on more than just the effects of nuclear explosions, because the overall conflict scenario could include non-nuclear violence. Indeed, it is possible for the nuclear explosions to constitute a relatively small portion of the total severity, as was the case in World War II. 4.4 Risk of Violent Non-Nuclear Conflict Finally, it is necessary to discuss the risk of violent non-nuclear conflict. Only a small portion of violent non-nuclear conflicts are applicable, specifically the portion affected by nuclear weapons. More precisely, this section discusses non-nuclear conflicts involving one or more countries that possess nuclear weapons at some point during the lifetime of a nuclear deflection program. Nuclear deterrence theory predicts that nuclear-armed adversaries will not initiate major wars against each other because both sides could be destroyed in a nuclear war. However, the theory does permit limited, small-scale violent conflicts between nuclear-armed countries. These conflicts likely would not involve nuclear weapons. Indeed, nuclear deterrence may even make small violent conflicts more likely, because the countries know that neither side wants to escalate the conflict into major war. This idea is known as the stability-instability paradox: nuclear deterrence brings stability with respect to major wars but instability with respect to minor conflicts. Empirical support for the stability-instability paradox has been found by some research (Rauchhaus, 2009),while other research has found no significant effect of the possession of nuclear weapons on the probability of conflicts of any scale (Bell & Miller, 2015; Gartzke & Jo, 2009). If countries fully disarm their nuclear arsenals, such that they would never have nuclear weapons again, then there would be no nuclear deterrence to prevent the onset of major wars. A simple risk analysis could assume that the risk of major wars would be comparable to the risk prior to the development of nuclear weapons. The two twentieth century World Wars combined for around 100 million deaths in 50 years,13 suggesting an annualized risk of two million deaths. However, two World Wars do not make for a robust dataset. Indeed, the robustness of these two data points is called into question by historical analysis finding that both world wars might not have occurred in the reasonably plausible event that the 1914 assassination of Archduke Ferdinand had failed (Lebow, 2014). Similarly, another historical analysis finds that the U.S. and Soviet Union would probably not have waged major war against each other even in the absence of nuclear deterrence (Mueller, 1988). Furthermore, these past events are not necessarily applicable to the future conditions of a post-nuclear-disarmament world. To the best of the present author’s knowledge, no studies have analyzed the risk of major wars in a post-nucleardisarmament world.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Major collisions cause extinction</h4><p><u><strong>Baum ’19 </u></strong>- executive director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, Ph.D in Geography</p><p>Seth Baum, “Risk-Risk Tradeoff Analysis of Nuclear Explosives for Asteroid Deflection,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, May 31, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3397559.</p><p><u><strong>The most severe <mark>asteroid collisions </mark>and nuclear wars can <mark>cause global environmental effects</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The core mechanism is the transport of particulate matter into the stratosphere</u></strong>, <u><strong>where it can spread worldwide and</u></strong> <u><strong>remain aloft for</u></strong> years or <u><strong>decades</u></strong>. <u><strong>Large asteroid <mark>collisions create</u></strong></mark> large quantities of <u><strong>dust and <mark>large fireballs</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong>the fire heats the dust so that some portion of it rises into the stratosphere</u></strong>. <u><strong>The largest <mark>collisions</u></strong></mark>, such as the 10km Chicxulub impactor, can also <u><strong><mark>eject debris</u></strong></mark> from the collision site <u><strong><mark>into space</u></strong></mark>; upon <u><strong><mark>reentry</u></strong></mark> into the atmosphere, the debris <u><strong>heats up enough to <mark>spark global fires</u></strong></mark> (Toon, Zahnle, Morrison, Turco, & Covey, 1997). The fires <u><strong>are <mark>a major impact in their own right</mark> and can send additional smoke into the stratosphere</u></strong>. For nuclear explosions, there is also a fireball and smoke, in this case from the burning of cities or other military targets. While in the stratosphere, <u><strong>the particulate matter blocks sunlight and destroys ozone</u></strong> (Toon et al., 2007). <u><strong>The <mark>ozone loss</mark> <mark>increases</mark> the amount of <mark>u</mark>ltra<mark>v</mark>iolet <mark>radiation</u></strong></mark> reaching the surface, <u><strong>causing skin cancer and other harms</u></strong> (Mills, Toon, Turco, Kinnison, & Garcia, 2008). T<u><strong>he <mark>blocked sunlight causes abrupt cooling</mark> of Earth’s surface <mark>and</mark> in turn <mark>reduced precipitation</u></strong></mark> due to a weakened hydrological cycle. The <u><strong>cool, dry, and dark <mark>conditions</mark> <mark>reduce plant growth</u></strong></mark>. Recent studies use modern climate and crop models to examine the effects for <u><strong>a hypothetical IndiaPakistan nuclear war scenario with 100 weapons</u></strong> (50 per side) each of 15KT yield. The studies <u><strong>find agriculture declines</u></strong> in the range of <u><strong>approximately</u></strong> 2% to <u><strong>50%</u></strong> depending on the crop and location.11 Another study compares the crop data to existing poverty and malnourishment and estimates that the <u><strong><mark>crop declines</mark> could <mark>threaten starvation for two billion people</u></strong></mark> (Helfand, 2013). However, the aforementioned studies do not account for new nuclear explosion fire simulations that find approximately five times less particulate matter reaching the stratosphere, and correspondingly weaker global environmental effects (Reisner et al., 2018). Note also that <u><strong>the 100 weapon scenario</u></strong> used in these studies <u><strong>is not the largest potential scenario</u></strong>. Larger nuclear wars and large asteroid collisions could cause greater harm. <u><strong>The <mark>largest</mark> asteroid <mark>collisions could</mark> even <mark>reduce sunlight below the minimum needed for vision</u></strong></mark> (Toon et al., 1997). Asteroid risk analyses have proposed that <u><strong>the global environmental disruption from large collisions could cause one billion deaths</u></strong> (NRC, 2010) <u><strong>or</u></strong> the death of <u><strong>25% of all humans</u></strong> (Chapman, 2004; Chapman & Morrison, 1994; Morrison, 1992), though these figures have not been rigorously justified (Baum, 2018a). The harms from asteroid collisions and nuclear wars can also include important secondary effects. The <u><strong><mark>food shortages</mark> from severe global environmental disruption could <mark>lead to infectious disease outbreaks</mark> as public health conditions deteriorate</u></strong> (Helfand, 2013). Law and order could be lost in at least some locations as people struggle for survival (Maher & Baum, 2013). <u><strong>Today’s complex global political-economic system already shows fragility to shocks</u></strong> such as the 2007- 2008 financial crisis (Centeno, Nag, Patterson, Shaver, & Windawi, 2015); <u><strong>an asteroid collision</u></strong> or nuclear war <u><strong>could be an extremely large shock</u></strong>. <u><strong>The systemic consequences of a nuclear war would be further worsened by the likely loss of major world cities</u></strong> that serve as important hubs in the global economy. Even a single detonation in nuclear terrorism would have ripple effects across the global political-economic system (similar to, but likely larger than, the response prompted by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001). <u><strong>It is possible for asteroid collisions to cause nuclear war</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>An</mark> <mark>asteroid</mark> explosion <mark>could be misinterpreted as a nuclear attack</mark>, <mark>prompting</mark> nuclear attack that is believed to be <mark>retaliation</mark>.</u></strong> For example, the 2013 <u><strong>Chelyabinsk</u></strong> event <u><strong>occurred near an important Russian military installation</u></strong>, prompting concerns about the event’s interpretation (Harris et al., 2015). The ultimate severity of an asteroid collision or violent nuclear conflict use would depend on how human society reacts. <u><strong>Would the reaction be disciplined</u></strong> and constructive: bury the dead, heal the sick, feed the hungry, and rebuild all that has fallen<u><strong>?</u></strong> <u><strong>Or would the reaction be disorderly and destructive</u></strong>: leave the rubble in place, fight for scarce resources, and descend into minimalist tribalism or worse<u><strong>?</u></strong> Prior studies have identified some key issues, including the viability of trade (Cantor, Henry, & Rayner, 1989) and the self-sufficiency of local communities (Maher & Baum, 2013). However, the issue has received little research attention and remains poorly understood. <u><strong>This leaves considerable uncertainty in the total human harm from an asteroid collision</u></strong> or nuclear weapons use. Previously <u><strong><mark>published</u></strong></mark> point <u><strong><mark>estimates</mark> of the human consequences</u></strong> of asteroid collisions12 and nuclear wars (Helfand, 2013) <u><strong>do not account for this uncertainty and <mark>are likely to be inaccurate</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>Of particular importance</u></strong> are the consequences for future generations, <u><strong>which could vastly outnumber the present generation</u></strong>. <u><strong>If an asteroid collision or nuclear war would cause human extinction, then <mark>there would be no future generations</u></strong></mark>. Alternatively, if survivors fail to recover a large population and advanced technological civilization, then <u><strong>future generations would be permanently diminished.</u></strong> The largest long-term factor is whether future generations would colonize space and benefit from its astronomically large amount of resources (Tonn, 1999). However, it is not presently known which asteroid collisions or nuclear wars (if any) would cause the permanent collapse of human civilization and thus the loss of the large future benefits (Baum et al., 2019). Given the enormous stakes, <u><strong>prudent risk management would aim for very low probabilities of permanent collapse </u></strong>(Tonn, 2009). It should be noted that <u><strong>the severity of violent nuclear conflict could depend on more than just the effects of nuclear explosions, because the overall conflict scenario could include non-nuclear violence. </u></strong>Indeed, <u><strong>it is possible for the <mark>nuclear explosions</mark> to <mark>constitute a relatively small portion of </mark>the <mark>total severity</u></strong></mark>, as was the case in World War II. 4.4 Risk of Violent Non-Nuclear Conflict Finally, <u><strong>it is necessary to discuss the risk of violent non-nuclear conflict</u></strong>. Only a small portion of violent non-nuclear conflicts are applicable, specifically the portion affected by nuclear weapons. More precisely, this section discusses non-nuclear conflicts involving one or more countries that possess nuclear weapons at some point during the lifetime of a nuclear deflection program. <u><strong>Nuclear deterrence</u></strong> theory predicts that nuclear-armed adversaries will not initiate major wars against each other because both sides could be destroyed in a nuclear war. However, the <u><strong>theory does permit limited, small-scale violent conflicts between nuclear-armed countries</u></strong>. These <u><strong>conflicts</u></strong> likely <u><strong>would not involve nuclear weapons.</u></strong> Indeed, <u><strong>nuclear deterrence may</u></strong> even <u><strong>make</u></strong> <u><strong>small</u></strong> violent <u><strong>conflicts more likely</u></strong>, because the countries know that neither side wants to escalate the conflict into major war. This idea is <u><strong>known as the stability-instability paradox</u></strong>: nuclear deterrence <u><strong>brings</u></strong> stability with respect to major wars but <u><strong>instability with respect to minor conflicts. Empirical support</u></strong> for the stability-instability paradox <u><strong>has been found by some research</u></strong> (Rauchhaus, 2009),while other research has found no significant effect of the possession of nuclear weapons on the probability of conflicts of any scale (Bell & Miller, 2015; Gartzke & Jo, 2009). If countries fully disarm their nuclear arsenals, such that they would never have nuclear weapons again, then there would be no nuclear deterrence to prevent the onset of major wars. A simple risk analysis could assume that the risk of major wars would be comparable to the risk prior to the development of nuclear weapons. The two twentieth century World Wars combined for around 100 million deaths in 50 years,13 suggesting an annualized risk of two million deaths. However, two World Wars do not make for a robust dataset. Indeed, the robustness of these two data points is called into question by historical analysis finding that both world wars might not have occurred in the reasonably plausible event that the 1914 assassination of Archduke Ferdinand had failed (Lebow, 2014). Similarly, another historical analysis finds that the U.S. and Soviet Union would probably not have waged major war against each other even in the absence of nuclear deterrence (Mueller, 1988). Furthermore, these past events are not necessarily applicable to the future conditions of a post-nuclear-disarmament world. To the best of the present author’s knowledge, no studies have analyzed the risk of major wars in a post-nucleardisarmament world.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Dr. Sanjay Gupta 17, Associate Chief of the Neurosurgery Service at Grady Memorial Hospital, Chief Medical Correspondent for CNN, Assistant Professor of Neurosurgery at the Emory University School of Medicine, MD from the University of Michigan, “The Big One is Coming, and It's Going to be a Flu Pandemic”, CNN, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/07/health/flu-pandemic-sanjay-gupta/ fulltext: Experts say we are "due" for one. When it happens, they tell us, it will probably have a greater impact on humanity than anything else currently happening in the world. And yet, like with most people, it is probably something you haven't spent much time thinking about. After all, it is human nature to avoid being consumed by hypotheticals until they are staring us squarely in the face. Such is the case with a highly lethal flu pandemic. And when it comes, it will affect every human alive today. Pandemic flu is apolitical and does not discriminate between rich and poor. Geographical boundaries are meaningless, and it can circle the globe within hours. In terms of potential impact on mankind, the only thing that comes close is climate change. And, like climate change, pandemic flu is so vast, it can be challenging to wrap your head around it. When most people hear "flu," they typically think of seasonal flu. No doubt, seasonal flu can be deadly, especially for the very young and old, as well as those with compromised immune systems. For most people, however, the seasonal flu virus, which mutates just a little bit every year, is not particularly severe because our immune systems have already probably seen a similar flu virus and thus know how to fight it. It's called native immunity or protection, and almost all of us have some degree of it. Babies are more vulnerable because they haven't been exposed to the seasonal flu and older people because their immune systems may not be functioning as well. Pandemic flu is a different animal, and you should understand the difference. Panˈdemik/: pan means "all"; demic (or demographic) means "people." It is well-named, because pandemic flu spreads easily throughout the world. Unlike seasonal flu, pandemics occur when a completely new or novel virus emerges. This sort of virus can emerge directly from animal reservoirs or be the result of a dramatic series of mutations -- so-called reassortment events -- in previously circulating viruses. In either case, the result is something mankind has never seen before: a pathogen that can spread easily from person to defenseless person, our immune systems never primed to launch any sort of defense. Our only hope With pandemic flu, we cannot solely rely on our bodies' ability to fight. A vaccine is our only real hope. That fact is part of the reason the number 24 has been stuck in my head the past few months as I have been working on the CNN original film "Unseen Enemy." I have become convinced that if we can develop and deploy a pandemic flu vaccine just 24 weeks faster than is currently projected, the impact could change the course of human history. Twenty-four weeks faster could mean the difference between 20,000 people dying in the next flu pandemic or more than 20 million people dying. In the 20th century alone, we experienced serious flu pandemics. The Spanish Flu of 1918 was an unprecedented catastrophe. Experts' best estimates (before there was more formal census and record-keeping) were that 20% to 40% of the world became ill and more than 50 million people died. In the United States alone, approximately 675,000 people died in just the eight months between September 1918 and April 1919. Some people died the same day they became ill, and others died within a few days from complications of the flu, such as pneumonia or meningitis. Forty years later, the Asian flu of 1958 and 1959 had a global death toll as high as 2 million and an estimated 70,000 of those in the US alone. Early in 1968, the year before I was born, the Hong Kong flu began. By September, it made its way around the world, including the United States, and became widespread by December. It is believed that the number of those infected peaked during the fall, when kids were at school, transmitting the virus more freely. Still, as many as a million people died, 34,000 in the US alone between September 1968 and March 1969. We are overdue We have learned a lot over the past 100 years and are better prepared because of it. In the developed world, at least, we have the ability to ease suffering with antivirals, breathing machines and antibiotics for secondary bacterial infections. Experts can also more quickly characterize pathogens causing outbreaks. Although it took several years to identify the virus causing AIDS, for example, it took only a few weeks to identify the SARS virus. We are also much faster at developing vaccines. According to research compiled by the science publication Mosaic, a typhoid vaccine was first tested in 1896 but only developed into a safe and effective vaccine nearly a hundred years later, in 1994. It took just 12 years, however, to develop a safe and effective Ebola vaccine (2003 to 2015). And, last week, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases announced initiation of a phase II trial for a Zika vaccine that started in August with the hope it may be ready for emergency use by 2018. Most important, our production capabilities have increased tremendously around the world. In 2006, according to the World Health Organization, we had the ability to make only 350 million doses of flu vaccine, but now, in theory, we could make 5.4 billion doses of flu vaccine if we harnessed and aligned manufacturing facilities all over the world. 24 weeks faster? Would it ever be possible, however, to create and distribute a vaccine 24 weeks faster -- in six weeks instead of 30 weeks -- and save more than 20 million lives? For starters, the way we typically make flu vaccine is still pretty antiquated and hasn't changed much in nearly 70 years. We rely largely on hens' eggs to incubate and replicate the virus, which is too slow of a process to respond rapidly to pandemic flu. Richard Hatchett, CEO of the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, told me that recent scientific advances, however, are fully transforming the speed at which vaccines can be developed and approved. Genomic techniques can be used to map the DNA or RNA of a new pathogen, genetically to engineer and mass-produce the same DNA or RNA and then inject it into the human body, leading to the production of antibodies to fight the virus. This method results in a new type of vaccine, a DNA vaccine. Faster development and production is one critical step to shortening the vaccine process by 24 weeks. Another is more robust surveillance systems everywhere in the world. As we were reminded with Ebola and Zika, an infection anywhere can be an infection everywhere. The first time an ill patient shows up at a hospital anywhere on the planet with a novel virus, the clock starts ticking. Improved surveillance means that hospital staff has to be astute enough to recognize that the patient doesn't fit the normal patterns we were taught in medical school and start to investigate further After that, there has to be speedy and accurate identification of the virus, purification and sequencing of the genetic material and then immediate sharing of the knowledge (via the cloud) enabling researchers everywhere to get to work on the development of new vaccines. After this genetically engineered vaccine is developed, it would have to be manufactured in the billions and then distributed to every city in the world. Join the conversation See the latest news and share your comments with CNN Health on Facebook and Twitter. To make this a reality, it will take unprecedented partnerships between governments, even those at odds with each other. It will take the public and private sector working together every step of the way to ensure that the newly created vaccine can be distributed, trusted and administered. It will take research and development money, as it always does, to bolster the techniques and infrastructure I described and make them available everywhere. And it will take accepting that a pandemic of flu is likely in our lifetime. But with preparation and imagination, it need not be as nearly catastrophic as it was 50 or 100 years ago. Make no mistake, outbreaks -- sudden, unexpected and localized eruptions of infection -- are inevitable. But, as epidemiologist Larry Brilliant (who spearheaded the effort to eradicate Small Pox), puts it: pandemics can be optional. This is how.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>We’re <u>overdue</u> for pandemic <u>flu</u>---extinction</h4><p>Dr. Sanjay<strong> Gupta 17</strong>, Associate Chief of the Neurosurgery Service at Grady Memorial Hospital, Chief Medical Correspondent for CNN, Assistant Professor of Neurosurgery at the Emory University School of Medicine, MD from the University of Michigan, “The Big One is Coming, and It's Going to be a Flu Pandemic”, CNN, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/07/health/flu-pandemic-sanjay-gupta/</p><p><u><strong>Experts say <mark>we are "due" for one</strong></mark>. When it happens</u>, they tell us, <u><mark>it will</mark> probably <mark>have a <strong>greater impact on humanity than anything else</strong></mark> currently happening in the world</u>. And yet, like with most people, it is probably something you haven't spent much time thinking about. After all, it is human nature to avoid being consumed by hypotheticals until they are staring us squarely in the face. Such is the case with <u><strong><mark>a highly lethal flu pandemic</u></strong></mark>. And when it comes, it <u><strong><mark>will affect every human</u></strong></mark> alive today. Pandemic flu is apolitical and does not discriminate between rich and poor. <u>Geographical boundaries are meaningless, and <mark>it can circle the globe <strong>within hours</u></strong></mark>. In terms of potential impact on mankind, the only thing that comes close is climate change. And, like climate change, pandemic flu is so vast, it can be challenging to wrap your head around it. When most people hear "flu," they typically think of seasonal flu. No doubt, seasonal flu can be deadly, especially for the very young and old, as well as those with compromised immune systems. For most people, however, the seasonal flu virus, which mutates just a little bit every year, is not particularly severe because our immune systems have already probably seen a similar flu virus and thus know how to fight it. It's called native immunity or protection, and almost all of us have some degree of it. Babies are more vulnerable because they haven't been exposed to the seasonal flu and older people because their immune systems may not be functioning as well. <u>Pandemic flu is a different</u> animal, <u>and you should understand the difference</u>. Panˈdemik/: pan means "all"; demic (or demographic) means "people." It is well-named, because <u>pandemic <mark>flu <strong>spreads easily</strong></mark> throughout the world</u>. Unlike seasonal flu, pandemics occur when a completely new or novel virus emerges. <u>This</u> sort of <u><mark>virus can emerge</mark> directly <mark>from animal reservoirs or be the result of</mark> a dramatic series of <mark>mutations</u></mark> -- so-called reassortment events -- in previously circulating viruses. In either case, the result is something mankind has never seen before: a pathogen that can spread easily from person to defenseless person, our immune systems never primed to launch any sort of defense. Our only hope With pandemic flu, we cannot solely rely on our bodies' ability to fight. <u>A vaccine is our <strong>only real hope</u></strong>. That fact is part of the reason the number 24 has been stuck in my head the past few months as I have been working on the CNN original film "Unseen Enemy." I have become convinced that if we can develop and deploy a pandemic flu vaccine just 24 weeks faster than is currently projected, the impact could change the course of human history. Twenty-four weeks faster could mean the difference between 20,000 people dying in the next flu pandemic or more than 20 million people dying. In the 20th century alone, we experienced serious flu pandemics. <u>The Spanish Flu of 1918 was an unprecedented catastrophe.</u> Experts' best estimates (before there was more formal census and record-keeping) were that 20% to 40% of the world became ill and more than 50 million people died. In the United States alone, approximately 675,000 people died in just the eight months between September 1918 and April 1919. Some people died the same day they became ill, and others died within a few days from complications of the flu, such as pneumonia or meningitis. Forty years later, the Asian flu of 1958 and 1959 had a global death toll as high as 2 million and an estimated 70,000 of those in the US alone. Early in 1968, the year before I was born, the Hong Kong flu began. By September, it made its way around the world, including the United States, and became widespread by December. It is believed that the number of those infected peaked during the fall, when kids were at school, transmitting the virus more freely. Still, as many as a million people died, 34,000 in the US alone between September 1968 and March 1969. <u><strong>We are overdue </u></strong>We have learned a lot over the past 100 years and are better prepared because of it. In the developed world, at least, we have the ability to ease suffering with antivirals, breathing machines and antibiotics for secondary bacterial infections. Experts can also more quickly characterize pathogens causing outbreaks. Although it took several years to identify the virus causing AIDS, for example, it took only a few weeks to identify the SARS virus. We are also much faster at developing vaccines. According to research compiled by the science publication Mosaic, a typhoid vaccine was first tested in 1896 but only developed into a safe and effective vaccine nearly a hundred years later, in 1994. It took just 12 years, however, to develop a safe and effective Ebola vaccine (2003 to 2015). And, last week, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases announced initiation of a phase II trial for a Zika vaccine that started in August with the hope it may be ready for emergency use by 2018. Most important, our production capabilities have increased tremendously around the world. In 2006, according to the World Health Organization, we had the ability to make only 350 million doses of flu vaccine, but now, in theory, we could make 5.4 billion doses of flu vaccine if we harnessed and aligned manufacturing facilities all over the world. 24 weeks faster? Would it ever be possible, however, to create and distribute a vaccine 24 weeks faster -- in six weeks instead of 30 weeks -- and save more than 20 million lives? For starters, the way we typically make flu vaccine is still pretty antiquated and hasn't changed much in nearly 70 years. We rely largely on hens' eggs to incubate and replicate the virus, which is too slow of a process to respond rapidly to pandemic flu. Richard Hatchett, CEO of the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, told me that recent scientific advances, however, are fully transforming the speed at which vaccines can be developed and approved. Genomic techniques can be used to map the DNA or RNA of a new pathogen, genetically to engineer and mass-produce the same DNA or RNA and then inject it into the human body, leading to the production of antibodies to fight the virus. This method results in a new type of vaccine, a DNA vaccine. Faster development and production is one critical step to shortening the vaccine process by 24 weeks. Another is more robust surveillance systems everywhere in the world. As we were reminded with Ebola and Zika, an infection anywhere can be an infection everywhere. The first time an ill patient shows up at a hospital anywhere on the planet with a novel virus, the clock starts ticking. Improved surveillance means that hospital staff has to be astute enough to recognize that the patient doesn't fit the normal patterns we were taught in medical school and start to investigate further After that, there has to be speedy and accurate identification of the virus, purification and sequencing of the genetic material and then immediate sharing of the knowledge (via the cloud) enabling researchers everywhere to get to work on the development of new vaccines. After this genetically engineered vaccine is developed, it would have to be manufactured in the billions and then distributed to every city in the world. Join the conversation See the latest news and share your comments with CNN Health on Facebook and Twitter. To make this a reality, it will take unprecedented partnerships between governments, even those at odds with each other. It will take the public and private sector working together every step of the way to ensure that the newly created vaccine can be distributed, trusted and administered. It will take research and development money, as it always does, to bolster the techniques and infrastructure I described and make them available everywhere. And it will take accepting that a pandemic of flu is likely in our lifetime. But with preparation and imagination, it need not be as nearly catastrophic as it was 50 or 100 years ago. Make no mistake, <u><strong><mark>outbreaks</u></strong></mark> -- sudden, unexpected and localized eruptions of infection -- <u><strong><mark>are inevitable</strong>. But</mark>,</u> as epidemiologist Larry Brilliant (who spearheaded the effort to eradicate Small Pox), puts it: <u><mark>pandemics can be <strong>optional</u></mark>. This is how.</p></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: CPA 8-3-22, center for preventative action aims to help policymakers devise timely and practical strategies to prevent and mitigate armed conflict around the world, especially in places that pose the greatest risk to U.S. interests.  CPA accomplishes this by commissioning in-depth reports, convening meetings of experts, and consulting with representatives of governments, international organizations, civil society groups, corporations, and the media. The center’s Global Conflict Tracker informs the general public about threats to international peace and security by providing a reliable and regularly updated online source of information about ongoing conflicts, “Confrontation with Iran”, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/confrontation-between-united-states-and-iran fulltext: Background Forty years after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, relations between the United States and Iran are as tense as they have ever been. As Iran advances its nuclear program and trains proxy forces throughout the Middle East, the potential for conflict continues to increase. Iran has pursued a nuclear program since at least 1957, with varying degrees of success. By the late 1980s during a brutal war with Iraq, Iran decided to develop nuclear weapons to ensure its security and, consequently, Iran pursued nuclear agreements with China and Russia throughout the 1990s to support its ongoing research into the development of nuclear weapons. Under growing scrutiny and international pressure, in 2003-04 Iran agreed to terminate its nuclear weapons program, insisting only that it maintain its nuclear centrifuges for nuclear energy. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) discovered and exposed that Iran had continued to pursue nuclear weapons later in 2003 and a coalition of countries known as the P5+1—the United States, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom—began a series of negotiations in an effort to constrain Iran’s nuclear program and prevent the development of nuclear weapons. To encourage Iran to cease uranium enrichment and come to the negotiating table, the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Iran in 2006. The sanctions resulted in 20 percent domestic unemployment and a severe contraction of Iran’s gross domestic product, which in part enabled Hassan Rouhani to win Iran’s presidential election in 2013—he campaigned on promises to lift sanctions and restore the economy. Over the next two years, the United States convened several rounds of bilateral talks and led the P5+1 in negotiations with Iran, which resulted in official agreement on the JCPOA in 2015. Once key parties had signed the agreement, the UN Security Council approved resolution 2231, which paved the way for sanctions relief. The JCPOA requires Iran to reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium by 98 percent for fifteen years, cut the number of operating centrifuges by two-thirds for ten years, and provide International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors access to enrichment facilities within twenty-four days if the IAEA suspects violations. Moreover, if the IAEA confirms violations, the JCPOA allows for the immediate reinstatement of sanctions. After the JCPOA entered into force on January 16, 2016, Iran received sanctions relief that totaled nearly $100 billion. Though Iran’s nuclear ambitions were restricted by the JCPOA, Iran’s regional ambitions continued to grow. Iran has continued to arm and train Shiite militants through its Quds Force—the IRGC’s international arm—which has led to sectarian divisions. The Quds Force has provided advanced armed drones to Hezbollah in Lebanon, trained and funded more than one hundred thousand Shiite fighters in Syria, supplied ballistic missiles and drones to Yemen’s Houthis, and helped Shiite militias in Iraq build missile capabilities. The U.S. government considers Iran to be the foremost state sponsor of terrorism—spending more than one billion dollars on terrorist financing annually—and there are between 140,000 and 185,000 IRGC-Quds Force partner forces in Afghanistan, Gaza, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen. Iran has also continued to develop ballistic missiles, which, according to the United States, violates UN resolution 2231. In response, the United States continues to impose sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile program and the IRGC through the Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017 and the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. Because the JCPOA only addressed Iran’s nuclear program—and not its revisionism or ballistic missile programs—the Trump administration asserted that the agreement was a stopgap. Thus, in May 2018, President Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA, pledging to seek a more comprehensive deal. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo subsequently issued twelve requirements for a new agreement, which Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei responded to by proposing seven conditions for remaining in the JCPOA. Since May 2018, the Trump administration has reimposed and raised new sanctions against Iran and demanded that European countries withdraw from the JCPOA as part of a new containment strategy. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom refused to do so and have since attempted to devise a backchannel for trade with Iran; the Trump administration responded by threatening European allies and European companies with consequences should they continue to do business with Iran. Iran’s oil exports have since decreased by more than half. U.S. sanctions have sparked the worst economic crisis Iran has faced in forty years and emboldened Iranian hardliners. Concerns A worsening conflict with Iran would have significant economic, political, and security implications for the United States. Should the United States and Iran engage in military conflict, Iran could attempt to block the Strait of Hormuz, through which 30 percent of the world’s oil flows, which would raise oil prices globally. Moreover, the United States risks isolating itself from already beleaguered allies: in June 2019, NATO refused to commit to working with the United States to secure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. A U.S.-Iran confrontation could trigger an escalation of proxy warfare in countries like Syria and Yemen, or an increase in Iranian missile strikes targeting the seventy thousand U.S. troops in the Middle East. Recent Developments Since the United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018, tensions have risen between the United States and Iran. While the Donald J. Trump administration pursues a strategy of maximum pressure to bring Iran to the negotiating table, Iran has begun to contravene the JCPOA’s restrictions on its nuclear program. In April 2019, the United States designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a terrorist organization—the first time the United States classified part of another government as such. In May 2019, after intelligence suggested Iran and its militias were preparing to attack U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria, the United States deployed B-52 nuclear-capable bombers, an aircraft carrier strike group, and additional Patriot missile batteries to the Middle East to deter Iran. The same week, Iran announced a sixty-day deadline for sanctions relief before exceeding the JCPOA’s cap on uranium enrichment levels and later threatened to exceed uranium stockpile limits. Also in May 2019, following a rocket attack on Baghdad’s Green Zone in Iraq—which U.S. defense officials blamed on Iran—and the release of images of missiles on IRGC boats in the Persian Gulf that U.S. intelligence officials cited as signs of a growing Iranian threat, nonemergency U.S. government employees were evacuated from Iraq. Over the next month, six oil tankers in or near the Strait of Hormuz were attacked, which U.S. government officials have also blamed on Iran, and the United States deployed an additional 2,500 troops to the Middle East. Escalating military tension has been matched by increasingly bellicose rhetoric from government officials. In June, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif warned that the United States “cannot expect to stay safe,” and President Trump cautioned that there’s “always a chance” of war with Iran. Tensions peaked in late June 2019 after Iran downed a U.S. Global Hawk drone in the Strait of Hormuz. In response, President Trump approved—and quickly canceled—a retaliatory strike, instead ordering a cyberattack on the IRGC and Iran’s missile systems and imposing new sanctions on Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and top Iranian military commanders. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and other U.S. government officials briefed Congress on Iran’s ties with al-Qaeda, raising concerns from Congressional leadership that President Trump would approve a war with Iran by citing the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, which grants the president authority to target al-Qaeda and countries supporting the group. On July 1, 2019, Iran exceeded the JCPOA’s cap on uranium stockpiles. Later in July, the United States downed an Iranian drone in the Strait of Hormuz after the drone approached a U.S. Navy ship.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Iran-US nuclear war is devastating – oil price increase, US isolation, proxy warfare </h4><p><strong>CPA 8-3</strong>-22, center for preventative action aims to help policymakers devise timely and practical strategies to prevent and mitigate armed conflict around the world, especially in places that pose the greatest risk to U.S. interests.  CPA accomplishes this by commissioning in-depth reports, convening meetings of experts, and consulting with representatives of governments, international organizations, civil society groups, corporations, and the media. The center’s Global Conflict Tracker informs the general public about threats to international peace and security by providing a reliable and regularly updated online source of information about ongoing conflicts, “Confrontation with Iran”, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/confrontation-between-united-states-and-iran</p><p>Background Forty years after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, <u>relations between</u> the <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and Iran are as tense as they have ever been</u>. As <u>Iran advances its nuclear program</u> <u>and trains proxy forces throughout the Middle East</u>, the<u> potential for conflict continues to increase. </u>Iran has pursued a nuclear program since at least 1957, with varying degrees of success. By the late 1980s during a brutal war with Iraq, <u>Iran decided to develop nuclear weapons to ensure its security and, consequently, Iran pursued nuclear agreements with China and Russia throughout the 1990s to support its ongoing research</u> into the development of nuclear weapons. Under growing scrutiny and international pressure, in 2003-04 Iran agreed to terminate its nuclear weapons program, insisting only that it maintain its nuclear centrifuges for nuclear energy. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) discovered and exposed that Iran had continued to pursue nuclear weapons later in 2003 and a coalition of countries known as the P5+1—the United States, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom—began a series of negotiations in an effort to constrain Iran’s nuclear program and prevent the development of nuclear weapons. To encourage Iran to cease uranium enrichment and come to the negotiating table, the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Iran in 2006. The sanctions resulted in 20 percent domestic unemployment and a severe contraction of Iran’s gross domestic product, which in part enabled Hassan Rouhani to win Iran’s presidential election in 2013—he campaigned on promises to lift sanctions and restore the economy. Over the next two years, the United States convened several rounds of bilateral talks and led the P5+1 in negotiations with Iran, which resulted in official agreement on the JCPOA in 2015. Once key parties had signed the agreement, the UN Security Council approved resolution 2231, which paved the way for sanctions relief. The JCPOA requires Iran to reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium by 98 percent for fifteen years, cut the number of operating centrifuges by two-thirds for ten years, and provide International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors access to enrichment facilities within twenty-four days if the IAEA suspects violations. Moreover, if the IAEA confirms violations, the JCPOA allows for the immediate reinstatement of sanctions. After the JCPOA entered into force on January 16, 2016, Iran received sanctions relief that totaled nearly $100 billion. Though Iran’s nuclear ambitions were restricted by the JCPOA, Iran’s regional ambitions continued to grow. Iran has continued to arm and train Shiite militants through its Quds Force—the IRGC’s international arm—which has led to sectarian divisions. The Quds Force has provided advanced armed drones to Hezbollah in Lebanon, trained and funded more than one hundred thousand Shiite fighters in Syria, supplied ballistic missiles and drones to Yemen’s Houthis, and helped Shiite militias in Iraq build missile capabilities. The U.S. government considers Iran to be the foremost state sponsor of terrorism—spending more than one billion dollars on terrorist financing annually—and there are between 140,000 and 185,000 IRGC-Quds Force partner forces in Afghanistan, Gaza, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen. Iran has also continued to develop ballistic missiles, which, according to the United States, violates UN resolution 2231. In response, the United States continues to impose sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile program and the IRGC through the Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017 and the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. Because the JCPOA only addressed Iran’s nuclear program—and not its revisionism or ballistic missile programs—the Trump administration asserted that the agreement was a stopgap. Thus, in May 2018, President Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA, pledging to seek a more comprehensive deal. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo subsequently issued twelve requirements for a new agreement, which Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei responded to by proposing seven conditions for remaining in the JCPOA. Since May 2018, the Trump administration has reimposed and raised new sanctions against Iran and demanded that European countries withdraw from the JCPOA as part of a new containment strategy. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom refused to do so and have since attempted to devise a backchannel for trade with Iran; the Trump administration responded by threatening European allies and European companies with consequences should they continue to do business with Iran. Iran’s oil exports have since decreased by more than half. U.S. sanctions have sparked the worst economic crisis Iran has faced in forty years and emboldened Iranian hardliners. Concerns A worsening conflict with Iran would have significant economic, political, and security implications for the United States. Should the United States and Iran engage in military conflict, Iran could attempt to block the Strait of Hormuz, through which 30 percent of the world’s oil flows, which would raise oil prices globally. Moreover, the United States risks isolating itself from already beleaguered allies: in June 2019, NATO refused to commit to working with the United States to secure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. A U.S.-Iran confrontation could trigger an escalation of proxy warfare in countries like Syria and Yemen, or an increase in Iranian missile strikes targeting the seventy thousand U.S. troops in the Middle East. Recent Developments Since the United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018, tensions have risen between the United States and Iran. While the Donald J. Trump administration pursues a strategy of maximum pressure to bring Iran to the negotiating table, Iran has begun to contravene the JCPOA’s restrictions on its nuclear program. In April 2019, the United States designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a terrorist organization—the first time the United States classified part of another government as such. In May 2019, after intelligence suggested Iran and its militias were preparing to attack U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria, the United States deployed B-52 nuclear-capable bombers, an aircraft carrier strike group, and additional Patriot missile batteries to the Middle East to deter Iran. The same week, Iran announced a sixty-day deadline for sanctions relief before exceeding the JCPOA’s cap on uranium enrichment levels and later threatened to exceed uranium stockpile limits. Also in May 2019, following a rocket attack on Baghdad’s Green Zone in Iraq—which U.S. defense officials blamed on Iran—and the release of images of missiles on IRGC boats in the Persian Gulf that U.S. intelligence officials cited as signs of a growing Iranian threat, nonemergency U.S. government employees were evacuated from Iraq. Over the next month, six oil tankers in or near the Strait of Hormuz were attacked, which U.S. government officials have also blamed on Iran, and the United States deployed an additional 2,500 troops to the Middle East. Escalating military tension has been matched by increasingly bellicose rhetoric from government officials. In June, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif warned that the United States “cannot expect to stay safe,” and President Trump cautioned that there’s “always a chance” of war with Iran. Tensions peaked in late June 2019 after Iran downed a U.S. Global Hawk drone in the Strait of Hormuz. In response, President Trump approved—and quickly canceled—a retaliatory strike, instead ordering a cyberattack on the IRGC and Iran’s missile systems and imposing new sanctions on Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and top Iranian military commanders. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and other U.S. government officials briefed Congress on Iran’s ties with al-Qaeda, raising concerns from Congressional leadership that President Trump would approve a war with Iran by citing the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, which grants the president authority to target al-Qaeda and countries supporting the group. On July 1, 2019, Iran exceeded the JCPOA’s cap on uranium stockpiles. Later in July, the United States downed an Iranian drone in the Strait of Hormuz after the drone approached a U.S. Navy ship.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: William S. Eubanks 9 II, Associate Attorney at Meyer Glitzenstein & Crystal, LL.M. in Environmental Law, Summa Cum Laude, Vermont Law School, J.D., Magna Cum Laude, North Carolina Central University School of Law, “A Rotten System: Subsidizing Environmental Degradation and Poor Public Health with Our Nation's Tax Dollars”, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, June 2009, 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 213, Lexis fulltext: VI. Towards A More Just Agricultural Policy: Subsidizing Sustainable Agriculture We have to produce food differently. The ADM/Cargill model of industrial agribusiness is heading toward its Waterloo. As oil and gas deplete, we will be left with sterile soils and farming organized at an unworkable scale. Many lives will depend on our ability to fix this. Farming will soon return much closer to the center of American economic life. It will necessarily have to be done more locally, at a smaller and finer scale, and will require [*296] more human labor. Despite what many scientists and farmers think to be the best available farming practices for environmental protection and a nutritious food supply, our nation's agricultural policies under the Farm Bill have strayed quite far from these practices to placate the agribusiness and food processing industries. The average commodity crop farmer now produces enough corn and soybeans to feed at least 129 Americans some food item processed from his crops. However, that same commodity farmer sends no healthy fruits and vegetables to the market and amazingly can no longer feed his own family from his massive fields. Heavy corn-producing states such as Iowa now import more than 80% of the food consumed by the residents of those states. Our food production system under the Farm Bill, which should ideally encourage production of healthy food for our nation, is actually creating "food deserts" where food is difficult to come by and the food that is available consists of saturated fats and little to no nutrition. This system promotes larger and larger megafarms, but as Michael Pollan and other scholars note, we must remember the lessons learned by the Soviet Union as its national stability "foundered precisely on the issue of food." The move to industrial agriculture prompted the Soviet collapse because the Soviets "sacrificed millions of small farms and farmers," but their system of industrial agriculture "never managed to do what a food system has to do: feed the nation." Each day, the U.S. system [*297] resembles the failed Soviet industrial agricultural system slightly more as it moves away from the 1940s American system, which was composed of farms roughly homogenous both in small size and in variety of crops and on-farm livestock. Although there are very stark differences between the political, social, and economic structures of the former Soviet Union and modern American society, one thing is clear from the comparison: our commodity crop farming system is no longer sensible, assuming it ever made sense to begin with. Given the widespread environmental degradation and public health concerns that are caused by our current federal agricultural policies, it is time for Congress to utilize the Farm Bill to effectively overhaul our agricultural system. Fortunately, there are diverse policy solutions available to revise this system and remedy past wrongs. The remainder of this Article will emphasize one promising policy solution that can mitigate and potentially solve the major problems of industrial commodity crop agriculture in the United States: subsidizing sustainable agriculture to normalize the market. Although a truly free market without subsidies would be ideal, such as the system currently operating in New Zealand, the vast subsidy infrastructure currently embedded in the Farm Bill would be difficult to pull out from under the feet of farmers that depend on those subsidies to survive. As seen in previous Parts, more than [*298] seventy years of Farm Bill policy have led to vast changes in the American agricultural system by forcing capital allocation and aggregation in large farms and few crops. Therefore, instead of immediately eliminating the Farm Bill subsidies on which many farms now rely for survival, Congress should shift a fair portion of these subsidies to farmers implementing sustainable agricultural methods. As discussed in Part II, past conservation programs erred in only targeting large commodity crop growers. A more workable policy solution, however, would be to offer these subsidy incentives to all farmers based on their farming practices, regardless of what crop they cultivate. This would create a much more just system than the current subsidy framework that excludes 60% of American farmers from any subsidies whatsoever. Coincidentally, farmers that never see Farm Bill subsidies are typically the same farmers that grow our nation's healthy fruits and vegetables. California provides a vivid example of the current failures of the Farm Bill's subsidy program. "With 2,000 miles of waterways, nearly 30,000 farms, and over $ 30 billion in annual on-farm revenues," California is the leading state in terms of annual agricultural sales. Despite topping the nation's agricultural sales, more than 90% of California's farmers receive no agricultural subsidies. Of the few farmers that do receive Farm Bill subsidies, most are cotton and rice farmers. How important are these neglected Californian farmers to the American marketplace? Californian farmers are invaluable to our nation's agricultural system because the state "contributes more than 12.5% of the total U.S. agricultural market value and nearly half of all fruits, nuts, and vegetables." By ignoring these farmers and precluding them from receiving Farm Bill subsidies, Congress is prioritizing monocultures of corn, soybean, wheat, cotton, and rice at the expense of sound agricultural, nutritional, and environmental practices. [*299] Sustainable agriculture, however, can change these policies for the better. First, a definition for "sustainable agriculture" is appropriate since the term can be somewhat amorphous in a vacuum. According to leading sustainable agriculture scholar Dr. James Horne, sustainable agriculture "encompasses a variety of philosophies and farm techniques … [that] are low chemical, resource and energy conserving, and resource efficient." Although it did little to encourage such agriculture, the 1990 Farm Bill defined sustainable agriculture as: An integrated system of plant and animal production practices having a site-specific application that will, over the long term, satisfy human food and fiber needs; enhance environmental quality and the natural resource base upon which the agricultural economy depends; make the most efficient use of nonrenewable resources and on-farm/ranch resources; integrate, where appropriate, natural biological cycles and controls; sustain the economic viability of farm/ranch operations; and enhance the quality of life for farmers/ranchers and society as a whole. As most agricultural experts note, it is important to understand that "sustainable agriculture does not mandate a specific set of farming practices." Rather, sustainable practices vary from place to place depending on the ecosystem, precipitation, and other factors, but "there are myriad approaches to farming that may be sustainable." The more important overarching goal of sustainable agriculture is the "stewardship of both natural and human resources … including concern over the living and working conditions of farm laborers, consumer health and safety, and the needs of rural communities." Despite the promise of sustainable agriculture to solve the numerous problems discussed in Parts I, II, III, IV, and V, the Farm Bill has been surprisingly silent as to how to encourage of such practices. This is likely due to pleas from certain campaign contributors that are also the largest beneficiaries of Farm Bill [*300] subsidies: agribusiness and food processors. As early as 1994, the President's Council on Sustainable Development chartered a Sustainable Agricultural Task Force composed of agricultural experts to present strategies that could alleviate the problems identified in this Article. In the mid-1990s, the Task Force made key policy recommendations that were intended to serve as critical updates to the Farm Bill. Ignored for more than a decade, it is now time for Congress to listen to those experts and other proponents of sustainable agriculture in order to address the most serious environmental and health problems triggered by the Farm Bill.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Third plank solves the case by subsidizing sustainable agriculture.</h4><p>William S. <u><strong>Eubanks 9</u></strong> II, Associate Attorney at Meyer Glitzenstein & Crystal, LL.M. in Environmental Law, Summa Cum Laude, Vermont Law School, J.D., Magna Cum Laude, North Carolina Central University School of Law, “A Rotten System: Subsidizing Environmental Degradation and Poor Public Health with Our Nation's Tax Dollars”, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, June 2009, 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 213, Lexis</p><p>VI. Towards A More Just Agricultural Policy: Subsidizing Sustainable Agriculture</p><p><u><strong>We have to produce food differently. The</u></strong> ADM/Cargill <u><strong>model of <mark>industrial ag</u></strong></mark>ribusiness<u><strong><mark> is heading toward its Waterloo</u></strong></mark>. As oil and gas deplete, we will be left with sterile soils and farming organized at an unworkable scale. Many lives will depend on our ability to fix this. <u><strong><mark>Farming will</u></strong></mark> soon return much closer to the center of American economic life. It will necessarily <u><strong><mark>have to be</mark> done <mark>more locally, </mark>at a smaller</u></strong> and finer <u><strong>scale</u></strong>, and will require [*296] more human labor.</p><p>Despite what many scientists and farmers think to be the best available farming practices for environmental protection and a nutritious food supply, our nation's <u><strong>ag</u></strong>ricultural <u><strong>policies under the Farm Bill have strayed quite far from these practices to placate</u></strong> the <u><strong>agribusiness</u></strong> and food processing industries. The average commodity crop farmer now produces enough corn and soybeans to feed at least 129 Americans some food item processed from his crops. However, that same commodity farmer sends no healthy fruits and vegetables to the market and amazingly can no longer feed his own family from his massive fields. Heavy corn-producing states such as Iowa now import more than 80% of the food consumed by the residents of those states. Our food production system under <u><strong>the Farm Bill, which should</u></strong> ideally <u><strong>encourage production of healthy food</u></strong> for our nation, <u><strong>is actually creating "food deserts"</u></strong> where food is difficult to come by and the food that is available consists of saturated fats and little to no nutrition.</p><p><u><strong><mark>This</mark> system <mark>promotes larger</mark> and larger <mark>megafarms</u></strong></mark>, but as Michael Pollan and other scholars note, we must remember the lessons learned by the Soviet Union as its national stability "foundered precisely on the issue of food." The move to industrial agriculture prompted the Soviet collapse because the Soviets "sacrificed millions of small farms and farmers," but their system of industrial agriculture "never managed to do what a food system has to do: feed the nation." Each day, the U.S. system [*297] resembles the failed Soviet industrial agricultural system slightly more as it moves away from the 1940s American system, which was composed of farms roughly homogenous both in small size and in variety of crops and on-farm livestock. Although there are very stark differences between the political, social, and economic structures of the former Soviet Union and modern American society, one thing is clear from the comparison: our commodity crop farming system is no longer sensible, assuming it ever made sense to begin with. Given the widespread environmental degradation and public health concerns that are caused by our current federal agricultural policies, <u><strong>it is time for Congress to utilize the Farm Bill to effectively overhaul our agricultural system</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong>Fortunately, there are diverse policy solutions available to revise this system and remedy past wrongs</u></strong>. The remainder of this Article will emphasize <u><strong><mark>one</mark> promising policy <mark>solution</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong>can mitigate and</u></strong> potentially <u><strong>solve the major problems of industrial commodity crop agriculture in the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates: <u><strong><mark>subsidizing sustainable ag</mark>riculture <mark>to normalize the market</u></strong></mark>. Although a truly free market without subsidies would be ideal, such as the system currently operating in New Zealand, <u><strong>the vast subsidy infrastructure currently embedded in the Farm Bill would be difficult to pull out from under the feet of farmers that depend on those subsidies to survive</u></strong>. As seen in previous Parts, more than [*298] seventy years of Farm Bill policy have led to vast changes in the American agricultural system by forcing capital allocation and aggregation in large farms and few crops. Therefore, <u><strong>instead of immediately eliminating the Farm Bill subsidies on which many farms now rely for survival, <mark>Congress should shift</mark> a fair portion of these <mark>subsidies to</mark> farmers implementing <mark>sustainable ag</mark>ricultural methods</u></strong>. As discussed in Part II, past conservation programs erred in only targeting large commodity crop growers. <u><strong>A more workable policy solution</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>would be <mark>to offer</mark> these subsidy <mark>incentives to all</mark> farmers <mark>based on</mark> their <mark>farming practices, regardless of</mark> what <mark>crop</mark> they cultivate. This would create a <mark>much more just </mark>system <mark>than the current</mark> subsidy <mark>framework that excludes 60%</mark> of American farmers from any subsidies whatsoever</u></strong>.</p><p>Coincidentally, <u><strong><mark>farmers that never see</mark> Farm Bill <mark>subsidies</mark> are typically the same farmers that <mark>grow</mark> our nation's <mark>healthy fruits </mark>and vegetables</u></strong>. California provides a vivid example of the current failures of the Farm Bill's subsidy program. "With 2,000 miles of waterways, nearly 30,000 farms, and over $ 30 billion in annual on-farm revenues," California is the leading state in terms of annual agricultural sales. Despite topping the nation's agricultural sales, more than 90% of California's farmers receive no agricultural subsidies. Of the few farmers that do receive Farm Bill subsidies, most are cotton and rice farmers. How important are these neglected Californian farmers to the American marketplace? Californian farmers are invaluable to our nation's agricultural system because the state "contributes more than 12.5% of the total U.S. agricultural market value and nearly half of all fruits, nuts, and vegetables." <u><strong>By <mark>ignoring these</mark> farmers and precluding them from receiving</u></strong> Farm Bill <u><strong>subsidies, Congress <mark>is prioritizing monocultures</u></strong></mark> of corn, soybean, wheat, cotton, and rice <u><strong>at the expense of sound agricultural</u></strong>, nutritional, and environmental <u><strong>practices.</p><p></u></strong> [*299] <u><strong>Sustainable agriculture, however, can change these policies for the better. First, a definition for "sustainable agriculture" is appropriate since the term can be somewhat amorphous in a vacuum</u></strong>. According to leading sustainable agriculture scholar Dr. James Horne, <u><strong>sustainable agriculture "encompasses a variety of philosophies and farm techniques … [that] are low chemical, resource and energy conserving, and resource efficient."</u></strong> Although it did little to encourage such agriculture, <u><strong>the 1990 Farm Bill defined sustainable agriculture as:</p><p>An integrated system of</u></strong> plant and animal production <u><strong>practices having a site-specific application that will</u></strong>, over the long term, <u><strong>satisfy</u></strong> human <u><strong>food</u></strong> and fiber <u><strong>needs; enhance environmental quality</u></strong> and the natural resource base upon which the agricultural economy depends; <u><strong>make</u></strong> the most <u><strong>efficient use of nonrenewable resources</u></strong> and on-farm/ranch resources; <u><strong>integrate</u></strong>, where appropriate, <u><strong>natural biological cycles and controls</u></strong>; sustain the economic viability of farm/ranch operations; and enhance the quality of life for farmers/ranchers and society as a whole.</p><p>As most agricultural experts note, it is important to understand that <u><strong>"sustainable agriculture does not mandate a specific set of farming practices." Rather, sustainable practices vary</u></strong> from place to place depending on the ecosystem, precipitation, and other factors, but "there are myriad approaches to farming that may be sustainable." <u><strong>The more important overarching goal of sustainable agriculture is</u></strong> the "<u><strong>stewardship of both natural and human resources</u></strong> … including concern over the living and working conditions of farm laborers, consumer health and safety, and the needs of rural communities."</p><p><u><strong>Despite the promise of sustainable agriculture to solve the numerous problems</u></strong> discussed in Parts I, II, III, IV, and V, <u><strong>the Farm Bill has been surprisingly silent as to how to encourage of such practices</u></strong>. This is likely due to pleas from certain campaign contributors that are also the largest beneficiaries of Farm Bill [*300] subsidies: agribusiness and food processors. As early as 1994, the President's Council on Sustainable Development chartered a Sustainable Agricultural Task Force composed of agricultural experts to present strategies that could alleviate the problems identified in this Article. In the mid-1990s, the Task Force made key policy recommendations that were intended to serve as critical updates to the Farm Bill. Ignored for more than a decade, <u><strong><mark>it is</mark> now <mark>time for Congress</mark> to listen to those experts and other proponents of sustainable agriculture in order <mark>to address the</mark> most serious environmental and health <mark>problems </mark>triggered by the Farm Bill</u></strong>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Crist, 7 (Eileen Crist, 2007, “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse”, http://journal.telospress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/2007/141/29.full.pdf+html) fulltext: While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planet’s ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the one issue that trumps all others. Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve “the problem.” Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the sun’s rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by “changing our whole style of living.”16 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, “the one lifeline we can use immediately.”17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. “The Montreal protocol,” he submits, “marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.”18 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planet’s predicament. Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naïve not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, the root cause of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis—among numerous other catastrophes—climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can save it from impending tipping points.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge ever 1964 work, an entire socio-cultural-economic life—from (actual or aspired to) ways of eating and lodging, transportation, entertainment, or emoting and thinking—“binds the consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers and, through the latter, to the whole.” Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon, 1991), p. 12. Horkheimer and Adorno traced the origins of the collective’s participation in its own domination to the “historical” moment that magical control over nature (and over the deities of nature) was relinquished to a specific elite or clique in exchange for self and social preservation. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1972), pp. 21–22. After the decisive turn when the social body became implicated in its own domination, “what is done to all by the few, always occurs as the subjection of individuals by the many: social repression always exhibits the masks of repression by a collective” (ibid.). And elsewhere: “The misplaced love of the common people for the wrong which is done them is a greater force than the cunning of the authorities” (ibid., p. 134). In light of such astute observations offered by critical theorists, neo-Marxist and anarchist analyses that indict corporate and/or state power for the troubled natural and social worlds are, at best, only partially true. 20. More than thirty years ago, environmental philosopher Arne Naess articulated the influential distinction between “shallow” and “deep” ecology, characterized by the focus on symptoms of the environmental crisis, on the one hand, versus critical attention to underlying causes of problems, on the other. Notwithstanding its unfortunate elitist overtones—implying that some environmental thinkers are capable of reflecting deeply, while others flounder with superficialities—the shallow-deep distinction has been significant for two compelling reasons. One, it clarified how “symptomology” leads merely to technical piecemeal solutions; and two, it showed how underlying causes, left unaddressed, eventually generate more nasty symptoms. In other words, shallow ecological thinking is technical and narrow: when we think about climate change as “the problem”—as opposed to confronting the limitless expansionism of the capitalist enterprise as the problem—we arguably become shallow in our thinking. Arne Naess, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long- Range Ecology Movements,” in George Sessions, ed., Deep Ecology for the Twenty-First Century (1973; Boston: Shambhala, 1995), pp. 151–55. on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisis—a crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global warming for biodiversity, 23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem losses—indeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate change may temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will not put an end to—will barely address—the ongoing destruction of life on Earth.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Their apocalyptic warming focus trades off with environmentalism – turns its own end</h4><p><u><strong>Crist, 7</u> <u></strong>(Eileen Crist, 2007, “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse”, http://journal.telospress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/2007/141/29.full.pdf+html)</p><p>While</u> <u>the <mark>dangers of climate change are real</u></mark>, <u>I argue that <mark>there are</mark> even <mark>greater dangers in representing it as the most urgent problem</mark> we face. Framing climate change in <mark>such</mark> a manner</u> deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it <u><mark>encourages</mark> the <mark>restriction of</mark> proposed <mark>solutions to the technical realm</mark>,</u> by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; <u><mark>and</mark> it <mark>detracts attention from the planet’s ecological predicament as a whole</u></mark>, by virtue of claiming the limelight for th<u>e</u> one issue that trumps all others. <u>Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization</u>, <u>and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals</u> that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve “the problem.” <u>Whether <mark>the call</mark> is <mark>for</mark> reviving <mark>nuclear power</mark>, boosting the installation of <mark>wind turbines</mark>, using</u> a variety of <u>renewable</u> <u>energy sources,</u> increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, <u>developing</u> <u><mark>carbon-sequestering</u></mark> technologies, <u>or placing <mark>mirrors in space</u></mark> to deflect the sun’s rays, <u>the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. </u>In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by “changing our whole style of living.”16 <u>But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy</u> as, in his words, “the one lifeline we can use immediately.”17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. “The Montreal protocol,” he submits, “marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.”18 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. <u>Yet</u> the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that <u>dealing</u> <u>with global problems treaty-by-treaty <mark>is no solution</mark> to the planet’s predicament. </u>Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naïve not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, <u><mark>if greenhouse gases were restricted</mark> successfully <mark>by</mark> means of <mark>tech</mark>nological shifts and innovations, <mark>the root cause of the ecological crisis</mark> as a whole <mark>would remain unaddressed</u></mark>. <u><mark>The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction</mark>, land-use, waste proliferation, <mark>and consumption, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged,</mark> continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. </u>Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis—among numerous other catastrophes—climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can save it from impending tipping points.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge ever 1964 work, an entire socio-cultural-economic life—from (actual or aspired to) ways of eating and lodging, transportation, entertainment, or emoting and thinking—“binds the consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers and, through the latter, to the whole.” Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon, 1991), p. 12. Horkheimer and Adorno traced the origins of the collective’s participation in its own domination to the “historical” moment that magical control over nature (and over the deities of nature) was relinquished to a specific elite or clique in exchange for self and social preservation. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1972), pp. 21–22. After the decisive turn when the social body became implicated in its own domination, “what is done to all by the few, always occurs as the subjection of individuals by the many: social repression always exhibits the masks of repression by a collective” (ibid.). And elsewhere: “The misplaced love of the common people for the wrong which is done them is a greater force than the cunning of the authorities” (ibid., p. 134). In light of such astute observations offered by critical theorists, neo-Marxist and anarchist analyses that indict corporate and/or state power for the troubled natural and social worlds are, at best, only partially true. 20. More than thirty years ago, environmental philosopher Arne Naess articulated the influential distinction between “shallow” and “deep” ecology, characterized by the focus on symptoms of the environmental crisis, on the one hand, versus critical attention to underlying causes of problems, on the other. Notwithstanding its unfortunate elitist overtones—implying that some environmental thinkers are capable of reflecting deeply, while others flounder with superficialities—the shallow-deep distinction has been significant for two compelling reasons. One, it clarified how “symptomology” leads merely to technical piecemeal solutions; and two, it showed how underlying causes, left unaddressed, eventually generate more nasty symptoms. In other words, shallow ecological thinking is technical and narrow: when we think about climate change as “the problem”—as opposed to confronting the limitless expansionism of the capitalist enterprise as the problem—we arguably become shallow in our thinking. Arne Naess, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long- Range Ecology Movements,” in George Sessions, ed., Deep Ecology for the Twenty-First Century (1973; Boston: Shambhala, 1995), pp. 151–55. on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. In what follows, I will focus specifically on how <u><mark>climate-change discourse encourages</mark> the continued <mark>marginalization of the biodiversity crisis</u></mark>—a crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global warming for biodiversity, 23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. <u>Climate change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem losses—indeed, is doing so already. But while <mark>technologically preempting the worst of climate change</mark> may temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will not put an end to—<mark>will barely address—the ongoing destruction of life on Earth.</p></u></mark><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Kennedy 14 — Randall Kennedy, Michael R. Klein Professor at Harvard Law School, Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Member of the American Philosophical Association, served as a Law Clerk to Justice Thurgood Marshall of the United States Supreme Court, holds a J.D. from Yale Law School, 2014 (“Black America's Promised Land: Why I Am Still a Racial Optimist,” American Prospect, November 10th, Available Online at http://prospect.org/article/black-americas-promised-land-why-i-am-still-racial-optimist, Accessed 07-26-2016) fulltext: Today, at a moment when progress has stalled, we need to recall how dramatically and unexpectedly conditions sometimes change. Until recently who’d-a thunk it possible for the president to be an African American? In the 1980s, I used to ask law students how long affirmative action programs ought to last. Champions of such programs, seeking to ensure their longevity, would say that affirmative action would be needed until the country elected a black president. That reply would elicit appreciative laughter as listeners supposed that that formula would preserve affirmative action for at least a century. But then along came Barack Obama and with him the remark that soon became a cliché: “I never thought that I’d live to see a black president.” Obama’s election is much more than a monument to one politician’s talent and good fortune. Changes in public attitudes, law, and custom have clearly elevated the fortunes of African Americans as individuals and black America as a collectivity. Hard facts may give plausibility to the pessimistic tradition, but they make the optimistic tradition compelling. Despite the many wrongs that remain to be righted, blacks in America confront fewer racist impediments now than ever before in the history of the United States. The courage, intelligence, persistence, idealism, and sacrifice of Fannie Lou Hamer and Rosa Parks, Julian Bond and Bob Moses, Medgar Evers and Bayard Rustin, Viola Liuzzo and Vernon Dahmer—and countless other tribunes for racial justice—have not been expended for naught. The facts of day-to-day life allow blacks to sing more confidently than ever before James Weldon Johnson’s magnificent hymn “Lift Every Voice and Sing,” often referred to as the Black National Anthem: Sing a song full of the faith that the dark past has taught us Sing a song full of the hope that the present has brought us Facing the rising sun of our new day begun Let us march on till victory is won. My optimism involves more than a sociological prediction. I am also swayed by my intuition regarding which of these hypotheses—the pessimistic or the optimistic—will do the most good. Hope is a vital nutrient for effort; without it, there is no prospect for achievement. The belief that we can overcome makes more realistic the possibility that we shall overcome. Optimism gives buoyancy to thinking that might otherwise degenerate into nihilism, encourages solidarity in those who might otherwise be satisfied by purely selfish indulgence, invites strategic planning that can usefully harness what might otherwise be impotent indignation, and inspires efforts that might otherwise be avoided due to fatalism. On Election Day 1996, exit polling showed General Colin Powell beating President Bill Clinton by a comfortable margin. But Powell was not Clinton’s opponent. Senator Bob Dole was. Powell had considered seeking the Republican Party nomination but declined in the end to do so. Before he made that decision, polls suggested that he could win the nomination and the general election, but friends were skeptical. Powell recalls that Earl Graves, the publisher of Black Enterprise magazine, told him, “Look, man … [w]hen [white voters] go in that booth, they ain’t going to vote for you.” Maybe Graves was correct. Real voting might have produced different results from the polls. Furthermore, whereas the actual candidates had suffered a year of merciless scrutiny on the campaign trail, Powell on Election Day was a mere hypothetical candidate who suffered from none of the wear and tear that a presidential contest exacts. At the end of a campaign, the general might not have remained so attractive. Still, Powell’s apparent popularity does provide a basis for conjecturing that America’s readiness to elect a black president had been an unrecognized part of the political landscape for longer than many had appreciated. Powell may well have denied himself the opportunity to make a successful historic leap by being self-defeatingly pessimistic. A major fear of many blacks is that acknowledging progress will prompt underestimation of racial obstacles that blacks at every socioeconomic level continue to face. When Americans are polled about their perceptions of racial affairs, whites are typically more upbeat than blacks. The more affluent they are, the more upbeat white observers tend to be. Inordinately impressed by progress, they all too often prematurely declare victory over racism. Although complacency nourished by an overly rosy view of racial affairs is a real danger, I stand by my conviction that a clear-eyed assessment favors black optimism. Who, after all, have been the figures most beneficial to blacks? Was it the Martin Delany who decamped for Africa, thinking America to be irremediably racist? Or was it the Martin Delany who returned, recruited blacks for the Union, and participated significantly in Southern politics during Reconstruction? Was it the pre-1966 Stokely Carmichael who sang “We Shall Overcome” in the splendid early days of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)? Or was it the post-1966 Stokely Carmichael (later renamed Kwame Ture) whose impatient bitterness helped to destroy the SNCC and rationalize an indulgent exile to Guinea that squandered a substantial talent? Was it my long-time colleague of blessed memory, Derrick Bell, who posited the permanence of racist white dominance? Or was it a student who rightly admired Professor Bell but eschewed his pessimism and followed a different path, a black student who, years later, put Bell’s hypothesis to a test by seeking the highest elected office in the land under the slogan “Yes We Can!”? That student, of course, was Barack Obama, and his presidency has been the setting for much debate between pessimists and optimists. Some detractors, perhaps the angriest, started from a position of raised expectations. They thought that Obama embodied the “audacity of hope” and that he would somehow bring about sweeping changes. Disappointed, they have expressed themselves in the angry, accusatory rhetoric of betrayal. Obama, Cornel West charges, “posed as a progressive and turned out to be counterfeit.” Others condemn Obama but without disappointment. They see their low expectations as having been validated. Certain pessimists have maintained that Obama’s election indicated little in terms of “real” racial progress. They even discount the symbolic significance of his ascendancy, stressing his exceptionality. Although he calls himself black, Obama is the offspring of a black African father and a white American mother and is thus distinguished genealogically from most African Americans. Much was made of his Muslim-sounding name. But some observers maintain that popular acceptance of that, too, should be viewed skeptically. It would have signaled more, they argue, had America elected a black person raised in, say, Detroit with a name such as Tyrone Washington or Jamal Jefferson. Pessimists argue that, substantively, the Obama presidency has delivered no more to blacks than would have been delivered by any other centrist-liberal Democrat (say, Hillary Clinton), and that in certain respects the Obama presidency delivered less because Obama sought excessively to prove that he was a president for all Americans and not merely black Americans. They contend that Obama’s blackness was an asset that he used for personal marketing and that the white establishment seized upon for advertising, “The United States cannot sensibly be accused of practicing or condoning racism! It just elected a black president!” Pessimists will now also enlist the horrifying events in Ferguson, Missouri, to reinforce their claim that despite the civil rights movement, antidiscrimination legislation, affirmative action, and the election of Obama, the narrative of race relations in America is a doleful tale—not a march upward from slavery to freedom, but a trek sideways from plantation to ghetto. What is an optimist in the waning years of the Obama presidency to say in the face of this challenge? Obama’s election signaled a dramatic, substantive change in racial beliefs and attitudes. In 1960, his victory would have been impossible: Too many whites would have been unwilling to vote for a black candidate—any black candidate—because of doubts about the capacities of anyone of black African ancestry. Recall that there were no black cabinet officers until Johnson appointed Robert Weaver as secretary of housing and urban development in 1966, and no black Supreme Court justices until Johnson nominated Thurgood Marshall in 1967. The specter of black intellectual and characterological deficiency stunted the careers of many talented blacks, and still does. That Obama was able to win the presidency—twice—is a sign that rumors of racial inferiority, while still extant, are much diminished in influence. In thinking about the meaning of Obama, it is important, too, to focus on the special status of the presidency. The person who occupies that office is not only the head of the executive branch of the federal government, the person who nominates all federal judges, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and thus a person with the wherewithal to destroy most, if not all, of humankind. The president is also the nation’s mourner-in-chief, booster-in-chief, spouse-in-chief, and parent-in-chief. That a black man has been the master of the White House for the past six years does indeed reflect and reinforce a remarkable socio-psychological transformation in the American racial scene. If that is “tokenism,” give us more of it. I have emphasized progress that blacks have made in absolute terms: where they stood 50 years ago and where they stand today. But what about the position of blacks relative to whites—those yawning gaps in wealth, income, educational attainment, and risk of imprisonment that have remained unclosed and that have, in some ways, widened even further during Obama’s tenure? There is no use denying that reality. America remains racially stratified and will continue to be long after the Obama presidency. There is also no use, however, in denying other facets of the American racial reality. One is a comparative view. In considering the appropriate attitude to adopt toward America—allegiance, for example, or dis-affiliation—it is sensible to compare the United States to other divided societies. Negrophobia in America is, alas, all too present. But it pales in comparison with the prejudice against racial, ethnic, religious, and national minorities in many countries around the globe. As bad as the American racial problem is, as urgently as it calls for concentrated attention, its condition is less dire and more encouraging than might be gleaned from an analysis that views the American situation in isolation, divorced from international comparisons. There is also no good purpose served by ignoring manifestations of progress that display themselves even in heartrending crises. Consider the events in Ferguson. The killing of the unarmed teenager, the callous inattentiveness to his body, the militarized police response to protest, and the dubious investigation by local authorities of this tragic death display much of what is terrible in American race relations: an atavistic fear of young black men; quick resort to excessive force against African Americans; racial residential separation; black powerlessness that foments resentment; white dominance that encourages contempt; an utter lack of mutual trust. But the events in Ferguson have also revealed other responses. The federal government took note of what happened and actively involved itself via the president, attorney general, and the director of the FBI. The Ferguson tragedy became the leading news story all over the country. Blacks have not been the only ones calling the police to account and demanding reform. Whites from various walks of life, including right-wing politicians like Rand Paul, have also been doing so. Never in American history, in analogous circumstances, has there been a higher level of interracial empathy. Overcoming the racial burdens—individual, communal, institutional—that encumber us will take unremitting effort, major deployments of intelligence and imagination, daunting amounts of time, huge expenditures of money, and the resolute conviction that America’s racial affairs can and will improve. Is the uncertain prospect of a better future worth that investment? The lessons of American history and a comparison of our society with others around the world impel me to say yes. I am a racial optimist. Only time will tell whether my faith is wise.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Racial pessimism is <u>fatalistic</u> and <u>wrong</u>.</h4><p><strong>Kennedy 14</strong> — Randall Kennedy, Michael R. Klein Professor at Harvard Law School, Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Member of the American Philosophical Association, served as a Law Clerk to Justice Thurgood Marshall of the United States Supreme Court, holds a J.D. from Yale Law School, 2014 (“Black America's Promised Land: Why I Am Still a Racial Optimist,” American Prospect, November 10th, Available Online at http://prospect.org/article/black-americas-promised-land-why-i-am-still-racial-optimist, Accessed 07-26-2016)</p><p><u>Today, at a moment when progress has stalled, we need to recall how dramatically and unexpectedly conditions sometimes change. Until recently who’d-a thunk it possible for the president to be an African American?</u> In the 1980s, I used to ask law students how long affirmative action programs ought to last. Champions of such programs, seeking to ensure their longevity, would say that affirmative action would be needed until the country elected a black president. That reply would elicit appreciative laughter as listeners supposed that that formula would preserve affirmative action for at least a century. But then along came Barack Obama and with him the remark that soon became a cliché: “I never thought that I’d live to see a black president.”</p><p><u>Obama’s election is much more than a monument to one politician’s talent and good fortune. Changes in public attitudes, law, and custom have clearly elevated the fortunes of African Americans as individuals and black America as a collectivity. Hard facts may give plausibility to the pessimistic tradition, but they make the optimistic tradition compelling. Despite the many wrongs that remain to be righted, blacks in America confront fewer racist impediments now than ever before in the history of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u>The courage, intelligence, persistence, idealism, and sacrifice of Fannie Lou Hamer and Rosa Parks, Julian Bond and Bob Moses, Medgar Evers and Bayard Rustin, Viola Liuzzo and Vernon Dahmer—and countless other tribunes for racial justice—have not been expended for naught. The facts of day-to-day life allow blacks to sing more confidently than ever before</u> James Weldon <u>Johnson’s magnificent hymn “Lift Every Voice and Sing,” often referred to as the Black National Anthem</u>:</p><p>Sing a song full of the faith that the dark past</p><p> has taught us</p><p>Sing a song full of the hope that the present</p><p> has brought us</p><p>Facing the rising sun of our new day begun</p><p>Let us march on till victory is won.</p><p><u>My optimism involves more than a sociological prediction</u>. I am also swayed by my intuition regarding which of these hypotheses—the pessimistic or the optimistic—will do the most good. <u>Hope is a vital nutrient for effort; without it, there is no prospect for achievement. The belief that we can overcome makes more realistic the possibility that we shall overcome. Optimism gives buoyancy to thinking that might otherwise degenerate into nihilism, encourages solidarity in those who might otherwise be satisfied by purely selfish indulgence, invites strategic planning that can usefully harness what might otherwise be impotent indignation, and inspires efforts that might otherwise be avoided due to fatalism</u>.</p><p>On Election Day 1996, exit polling showed General Colin Powell beating President Bill Clinton by a comfortable margin. But Powell was not Clinton’s opponent. Senator Bob Dole was. Powell had considered seeking the Republican Party nomination but declined in the end to do so. Before he made that decision, polls suggested that he could win the nomination and the general election, but friends were skeptical. Powell recalls that Earl Graves, the publisher of Black Enterprise magazine, told him, “Look, man … [w]hen [white voters] go in that booth, they ain’t going to vote for you.” Maybe Graves was correct. Real voting might have produced different results from the polls. Furthermore, whereas the actual candidates had suffered a year of merciless scrutiny on the campaign trail, Powell on Election Day was a mere hypothetical candidate who suffered from none of the wear and tear that a presidential contest exacts. At the end of a campaign, the general might not have remained so attractive. Still, Powell’s apparent popularity does provide a basis for conjecturing that America’s readiness to elect a black president had been an unrecognized part of the political landscape for longer than many had appreciated. Powell may well have denied himself the opportunity to make a successful historic leap by being self-defeatingly pessimistic.</p><p><u>A major fear of many blacks is that acknowledging progress will prompt underestimation of racial obstacles that blacks at every socioeconomic level continue to face. When Americans are polled about their perceptions of racial affairs, whites are typically more upbeat than blacks. The more affluent they are, the more upbeat white observers tend to be. Inordinately impressed by progress, they all too often prematurely declare victory over racism.</p><p>Although complacency nourished by an overly rosy view of racial affairs is a real danger, I stand by my conviction that a clear-eyed assessment favors black optimism. Who</u>, after all, <u>have been the figures most beneficial to blacks? Was it the Martin Delany who decamped for Africa, thinking America to be irremediably racist? Or was it the Martin Delany who returned, recruited blacks for the Union, and participated significantly in Southern politics during Reconstruction? Was it the pre-1966 Stokely Carmichael who sang “We Shall Overcome” in the splendid early days of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee</u> (SNCC)<u>? Or was it the post-1966 Stokely Carmichael</u> (later renamed Kwame Ture) <u>whose impatient bitterness helped to destroy the SNCC and rationalize an indulgent exile to Guinea that squandered a substantial talent? Was it</u> my long-time colleague of blessed memory, <u>Derrick Bell</u>, <u>who posited the permanence of racist white dominance? Or was it a student who rightly admired Professor Bell but eschewed his pessimism and followed a different path, a black student who, years later, put Bell’s hypothesis to a test by seeking the highest elected office in the land under the slogan “Yes We Can!”?</p><p>That student</u>, of course, <u>was</u> Barack <u>Obama, and his presidency has been the setting for much debate between pessimists and optimists. Some detractors, perhaps the angriest, started from a position of raised expectations. They thought that Obama embodied the “audacity of hope” and that he would somehow bring about sweeping changes. Disappointed, they have expressed themselves in the angry, accusatory rhetoric of betrayal</u>. Obama, Cornel West charges, “posed as a progressive and turned out to be counterfeit.” Others condemn Obama but without disappointment. They see their low expectations as having been validated.</p><p><u>Certain pessimists have maintained that Obama’s election indicated little in terms of “real” racial progress. They even discount the symbolic significance of his ascendancy, stressing his exceptionality</u>. Although he calls himself black, Obama is the offspring of a black African father and a white American mother and is thus distinguished genealogically from most African Americans. Much was made of his Muslim-sounding name. But some observers maintain that popular acceptance of that, too, should be viewed skeptically. It would have signaled more, they argue, had America elected a black person raised in, say, Detroit with a name such as Tyrone Washington or Jamal Jefferson. <u>Pessimists argue that, substantively, the Obama presidency has delivered no more to blacks than would have been delivered by any other centrist-liberal Democrat</u> (say, Hillary Clinton), <u>and that in certain respects the Obama presidency delivered less because Obama sought excessively to prove that he was a president for all Americans and not merely black Americans. They contend that Obama’s blackness was an asset that he used for personal marketing and that the white establishment seized upon for advertising</u>, “The United States cannot sensibly be accused of practicing or condoning racism! It just elected a black president!” <u>Pessimists will now also enlist the horrifying events in Ferguson</u>, Missouri, <u>to reinforce their claim that despite the civil rights movement, antidiscrimination legislation, affirmative action, and the election of Obama, the narrative of race relations in America is a doleful tale—not a march upward from slavery to freedom, but a trek sideways from plantation to ghetto</u>.</p><p>What is an optimist in the waning years of the Obama presidency to say in the face of this challenge?</p><p><u>Obama’s election signaled a dramatic, substantive change in racial beliefs and attitudes. In 1960, his victory would have been impossible: Too many whites would have been unwilling to vote for a black candidate</u>—any black candidate—because of doubts about the capacities of anyone of black African ancestry. <u>Recall that there were no black cabinet officers until Johnson appointed Robert Weaver as secretary of housing and urban development in 1966, and no black Supreme Court justices until Johnson nominated Thurgood Marshall in 1967. The specter of black intellectual and characterological deficiency stunted the careers of many talented blacks, and still does. That Obama was able to win the presidency—twice—is a sign that rumors of racial inferiority, while still extant, are much diminished in influence</u>.</p><p>In thinking about the meaning of Obama, <u>it is important</u>, too, <u>to focus on the special status of the presidency. The person who occupies that office is not only the head of the executive branch</u> of the federal government, <u>the person who nominates all federal judges, the commander-in-chief</u> of the armed forces, <u>and thus a person with the wherewithal to destroy most</u>, if not all, <u>of humankind. The president is also the nation’s mourner-in-chief, booster-in-chief, spouse-in-chief, and parent-in-chief. That a black man has been the master of the White House</u> for the past six years <u>does</u> indeed <u>reflect and reinforce a remarkable socio-psychological transformation in the American racial scene. If that is “tokenism,” give us more of it</u>.</p><p>I have emphasized progress that blacks have made in absolute terms: where they stood 50 years ago and where they stand today. But what about the position of blacks relative to whites—those yawning gaps in wealth, income, educational attainment, and risk of imprisonment that have remained unclosed and that have, in some ways, widened even further during Obama’s tenure? There is no use denying that reality. America remains racially stratified and will continue to be long after the Obama presidency.</p><p>There is also no use, however, in denying other facets of the American racial reality. One is a comparative view. In considering the appropriate attitude to adopt toward America—allegiance, for example, or dis-affiliation—it is sensible to compare the United States to other divided societies. <u>Negrophobia in America is</u>, alas, <u>all too present. But it pales in comparison with the prejudice against racial, ethnic, religious, and national minorities in many countries around the globe. As bad as the American racial problem is, as urgently as it calls for concentrated attention, its condition is less dire and more encouraging than might be gleaned from an analysis that views the American situation in isolation, divorced from international comparisons</u>.</p><p><u>There is also no good purpose served by ignoring manifestations of progress that display themselves even in heartrending crises. Consider</u> the events in <u>Ferguson. The killing of the unarmed teenager, the callous inattentiveness to his body, the militarized police response to protest, and the dubious investigation by local authorities</u> of this tragic death <u>display much of what is terrible in American race relations: an atavistic fear of young black men; quick resort to excessive force against African Americans; racial residential separation; black powerlessness that foments resentment; white dominance that encourages contempt; an utter lack of mutual trust. But the events in Ferguson have also revealed other responses. The federal government took note of what happened and actively involved itself via the president, attorney general, and the director of the FBI. The Ferguson tragedy became the leading news story all over the country. Blacks have not been the only ones calling the police to account and demanding reform. Whites from various walks of life</u>, <u>including right-wing politicians</u> like Rand Paul, <u>have also been doing so. Never in American history, in analogous circumstances, has there been a higher level of interracial empathy</u>.</p><p><u>Overcoming the racial burdens—individual, communal, institutional—that encumber us will take unremitting effort, major deployments of intelligence and imagination, daunting amounts of time, huge expenditures of money, and the resolute conviction that America’s racial affairs can and will improve. Is the uncertain prospect of a better future worth that investment? The lessons of American history and a comparison of our society with others around the world impel me to say yes. I am a racial optimist. Only time will tell whether my faith is wise.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Kirkpatrick & Hubbard 9/19 (David, international correspondent based in the London bureau of the New York Times, and Ben, Beirut bureau chief for The Times, The New York Times, “Attack on Saudi Oil Facilities Tests U.S. Guarantee to Defend Gulf,” published September 19th, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/19/world/middleeast/saudi-iran-attack-oil.html, accessed 9/28/19, JME.) fulltext: The oil-rich monarchies of the Persian Gulf have relied for decades on the promise of protection by the United States military, a commitment sealed by the rollback of the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and reinforced by a half dozen American military bases that sprang up around the region. Now that commitment is facing its most serious test since the first gulf war: an attack last Saturday by a swarm of at least 17 missiles and drones that crippled Saudi Arabia’s most critical oil installation and temporarily knocked out 5 percent of the world’s oil supply. Washington and Riyadh blamed Iran, despite its denials, and President Trump threatened that the United States was “locked and loaded.” Yet despite months of such bravado, Mr. Trump has been hesitant to take military action that might risk an expanded conflagration. For better or worse, such a muted response could signal another turning point for the region. “It is enormous,” said Gregory Gause, a scholar of the region at Texas A&M University. “This is the most serious challenge since the invasion of Kuwait to the status of the United States as a great power that would protect the free flow of energy from the region, and unless there is a big change in the response from the Trump administration I think Gulf leaders will start to question the value of that security commitment.” Confounding expectations on all sides of the Persian Gulf, the attack and its aftermath have laid bare a cascade of revelations about the regional balance of power. The stunning success of the attack has shown that billions of dollars in Saudi military spending has left the kingdom’s central industry vulnerable, and it has demonstrated to the world that the increasing availability of low-flying cruise missiles and drones may have rendered many other defense systems perilously obsolete. It has also shown the world a new side of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the hard charging and often impulsive de facto ruler of the kingdom: He, too, has been forced in this case to back away from immediate retribution against his nemesis, Iran. If Iran carried out the attack directly, as Washington and Riyadh say, then it has taken a brazen step beyond its familiar strategy of working through allied militant groups to strike at its foes, evidently surprising the White House. Seeking to exact a price from the United States for its sanctions on Iranian oil sales, Tehran may also now be emboldened to carry out further attacks, calculating that President Trump will balk at another war in the region. The attack on Saudi Arabia was just the latest in a string of recent attacks carried out by Iran or a proxy — including attacks on oil tankers and the downing of an American drone — with little or no cost to Iran. Attack on Saudi Oil Facilities Tests U.S. Guarantee to Defend Gulf Debris from missiles that the Saudi government says were used in last weekend’s attack. And President Trump, focused on his re-election, has so far shown himself less willing to match Iran’s escalation than his ferocious tweets about “obliteration” and “the official end of Iran” had suggested. He recently fired the adviser most hawkish on Iran, John R. Bolton, the former national security adviser. And instead of emphasizing the traditional American interest in the free flow of oil, he appears to have returned to a view he espoused before his election — “Saudi Arabia should fight their own wars,” as he wrote in a tweet in 2014. That Iran would seek in some way to attack Saudi oil production, though, was hardly unexpected. Experts had predicted for months that the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign of sanctions against Iran’s oil sales would drive it to lash out against the oil production of Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf States. The rulers of those Arab states had previously accused President Obama of trying to pull back from the American commitment to the region. They faulted him for negotiating a 2015 deal with Iran to limit its nuclear program in exchange for relief from economic sanctions without further constraining its military or other activities. And the Gulf leaders were outraged when Mr. Obama called off a planned strike against Syria, an Iranian ally, for using chemical weapons against civilians. Now some prominent voices in the Arab Gulf States accuse Mr. Trump of an even greater betrayal. “Trump, in his response to Iran, is even worse than Obama,” said Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a prominent political scientist in the United Arab Emirates. Instead of reversing the perceived pullback as Gulf leaders had expected, Mr. Abdulla argued, President Trump let down his Arab partners by failing to respond more forcefully to Iranian aggressions. The United States has said that Iran was behind naval mines that damaged five oil tankers in the Persian Gulf this spring, and in June Iran boasted of shooting down an American surveillance drone. Yet President Trump did little in retaliation for the tanker attacks and called off a planned airstrike against Iran in response to the downing of the drone. “His inaction gave a green light to this,” Mr. Abdulla said. “Now an Arab Gulf strategic partner has been massively attacked by Iran — which was provoked by Trump, not by us — and we hear Americans saying to us, you need to defend yourselves!” “It is an utter failure and utter disappointment in this administration,” he added. Mr. Trump has not ruled out a military strike, and senior national security officials met Thursday to refine a list of potential targets should President Trump go that route. Still, he has made clear his opposition to another war, and has ordered new sanctions. But Iran is already under acute economic pressure from the existing sanctions, which use the reach of the American financial system to try to choke off Iranian oil exports anywhere in the world. After pulling out of the 2015 nuclear deal, the Trump administration implemented the sweeping new penalties this spring to try to force Iran to accept a more restrictive agreement. Iranian leaders have denounced the sanctions as “economic warfare,” and they appear to have orchestrated an escalating series of attacks that threaten the flow of Persian Gulf oil in order to inflict some of the same pain on the United States and Washington’s Arab allies. “The Iranians do feel cornered,” Professor Gause said, and that is why they appear to be taking more aggressive action than they have in the past. “This is an effort by Iran to break out of what they see as strangulation.” The oil installation in the eastern city of Abqaiq burned after the attack. Defending the administration’s policies, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo argued this week that the sanctions may have limited Iran’s ability to strike with even more sophisticated missiles or drones. “They’d have more complex ones but for the sanctions we put in place that have prevented them from getting access to money, most importantly, but also parts, spare parts, information technology,” he told reporters on a trip to Saudi Arabia. Iranian leaders have denied responsibility for the attack last weekend, but at the same time they have openly reveled in its success. It showed the United States “that playing with the lion’s tail carries serious dangers and if they take action against Iran there will be no tomorrow for them,” Brig. Gen. Hossein Dehghan of the elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp boasted Thursday, Iranian news media reported. The Iranians may have previously worried about Mr. Trump’s threatening tweets and hawkish advisers, said Suzanne Maloney, an Iran scholar at Brookings Institution. “But now they see that he is not going to follow through on the bluff that he has carried out on behalf of the American people,” she said. Others analysts argued that the alarms from the Persian Gulf about an American retreat were overblown under President Obama and remain so under President Trump. American warships are patrolling the gulf to help protect tanker traffic. American satellite and surveillance drones patrol the skies. The many large American military bases deter invasions or other large-scale military actions. But President Trump’s combination of tough threats and a weak response “is the worst of both worlds,” argued Jeremy Shapiro, research director of the European Council on Foreign Relations and a former State Department official in the Obama administration. “It would be foolish to counter this escalation with an escalation, but it was foolish to get into this position in the first place,” he argued, leaving the Trump administration “to choose between an unwise escalation or a humiliating climb-down.” Experts on military technology said Saudi Arabia should not be faulted for failing to stop the attack. Like those of other countries, Saudi Arabia’s defenses were designed to stop ballistic missiles. This attack appears to have been carried out with low-flying cruise missiles or drones that would escape detection by most radar systems. “I don’t think that there is any country that could have defended any better than Saudi Arabia did, and that includes the United States,” said Peter Roberts, director of military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute, an international research institute. Yet the attack appears to have caused some rethinking by Crown Prince Mohammed. Soon after he was first named defense minister, in 2015, he plunged the kingdom into a military campaign in neighboring Yemen to drive from power a faction backed by Iran. Saudi media outlets proclaimed that the prince was asserting the kingdom’s power and leading a new drive to roll back Iranian influence. President Hassan Rouhani of Iran this week. Iran may be emboldened to carry out further attacks, calculating that President Trump will balk at another war. “The Iranians, they’re the cause of problems in the Middle East, but they are not a big threat to Saudi Arabia,” the prince boasted confidently to Time magazine in 2018. “Saudi Arabia’s economy is double the size of the Iranian economy,” he said, adding that Iran’s army was “not among the top five” in the Middle East. “We will work so that the battle is for them in Iran, and not in Saudi Arabia,” he promised on a Saudi news channel. Yet the damage to the oil installation was a painful lesson in the potential costs of a wider conflict, at a time when the Saudi military remains bogged down in Yemen and Prince Mohammed has been pushing for a public sale of the Saudi state oil company. The Saudi decision to call for an international investigation and not immediate retribution may be the choice of a chastened prince, analysts said. “I think there has a been a calculation that the costs might be too high,” said Rebecca Wasser, a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Perception of pulling out of the region causes more strikes—strong posture key</h4><p><strong>Kirkpatrick & Hubbard 9/19 (David, international correspondent based in the London bureau of the New York Times, and Ben, Beirut bureau chief for The Times, The New York Times, “Attack on Saudi Oil Facilities Tests U.S. Guarantee to Defend Gulf,” published September 19th, 2019, </strong>https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/19/world/middleeast/saudi-iran-attack-oil.html<strong>, accessed 9/28/19, JME.)</p><p></strong>The oil-rich monarchies of the Persian Gulf have relied for decades on the promise of protection by the United States military, a commitment sealed by the rollback of the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and reinforced by a half dozen American military bases that sprang up around the region. Now that commitment is facing its most serious test since the first gulf war: an attack last Saturday by a swarm of at least 17 missiles and drones that crippled Saudi Arabia’s most critical oil installation and temporarily knocked out 5 percent of the world’s oil supply. Washington and Riyadh blamed Iran, despite its denials, and President <u>Trump threatened that the United States was “locked and loaded.” Yet despite months of such bravado, Mr. <mark>Trump has been hesitant to take military action</mark> that might risk an expanded conflagration</u>. For better or worse, such a muted response could signal another turning point for the region. “It is enormous,” said Gregory Gause, a scholar of the region at Texas A&M University. “This is the most serious challenge since the invasion of Kuwait to the status of the United States as a great power that would protect the free flow of energy from the region, and unless there is a big change in the response from the Trump administration I think Gulf leaders will start to question the value of that security commitment.” Confounding expectations on all sides of the Persian Gulf, the attack and its aftermath have laid bare a cascade of revelations about the regional balance of power. The stunning success of the attack has shown that billions of dollars in Saudi military spending has left the kingdom’s central industry vulnerable, and it has demonstrated to the world that the increasing availability of low-flying cruise missiles and drones may have rendered many other defense systems perilously obsolete. It has also shown the world a new side of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the hard charging and often impulsive de facto ruler of the kingdom: He, too, has been forced in this case to back away from immediate retribution against his nemesis, Iran. <u>If Iran carried out the attack directly</u>, as Washington and Riyadh say, <u>then it has taken a brazen step beyond its familiar strategy of working through allied militant groups to strike at its foes, evidently surprising the White House. Seeking to exact a price from the United States for its sanctions on Iranian oil sales, <strong><mark>Tehran may </mark>also <mark>now be emboldened to carry out further attacks, calculating</mark> that President <mark>Trump will balk at another war in the region</strong></mark>. <mark>The attack</mark> on Saudi Arabia <mark>was</mark> just <mark>the latest</mark> in a string of recent attacks</u> carried out by Iran or a proxy — including attacks on oil tankers and the downing of an American drone — <u><mark>with little</mark> </u>or no <u><mark>cost to Iran</u></mark>. Attack on Saudi Oil Facilities Tests U.S. Guarantee to Defend Gulf Debris from missiles that the Saudi government says were used in last weekend’s attack. And President <u><mark>Trump</u></mark>, focused on his re-election, <u><mark>has</mark> so far <mark>shown himself less willing to match Iran’s escalation</mark> than his ferocious tweets</u> about “obliteration” and “the official end of Iran” had suggested. He recently fired the adviser most hawkish on Iran, John R. Bolton, the former national security adviser. And instead of emphasizing the traditional American interest in the free flow of oil, <u><mark>he appears to have returned to a view</mark> he espoused before his election</u> — “<u><strong><mark>Saudi Arabia should fight their own wars</mark>,</u></strong>” as he wrote in a tweet in 2014. That Iran would seek in some way to attack Saudi oil production, though, was hardly unexpected. <u>Experts had predicted for months that the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign of sanctions against Iran’s oil sales would drive it to lash out</u> against the oil production of Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf States. The rulers of those Arab states had previously accused President Obama of trying to pull back from the American commitment to the region. They faulted him for negotiating a 2015 deal with Iran to limit its nuclear program in exchange for relief from economic sanctions without further constraining its military or other activities. And the Gulf leaders were outraged when Mr. Obama called off a planned strike against Syria, an Iranian ally, for using chemical weapons against civilians. Now some prominent voices in the Arab Gulf States accuse Mr. Trump of an even greater betrayal. “Trump, in his response to Iran, is even worse than Obama,” said Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a prominent political scientist in the United Arab Emirates. <u><strong><mark>Instead of reversing the perceived pullback</strong></mark> as Gulf leaders had expected</u>, Mr. Abdulla argued, President <u><mark>Trump let down his Arab partners by failing to respond </mark>more <mark>forcefully to Iranian aggressions</u></mark>. The United States has said that Iran was behind naval mines that damaged five oil tankers in the Persian Gulf this spring, and in June Iran boasted of shooting down an American surveillance drone. Yet President <u>Trump did little in retaliation for the tanker attacks and called off a planned airstrike against Iran in response to the downing of the drone. “His inaction gave a green light to this,</u>” Mr. Abdulla said. “Now an Arab Gulf strategic partner has been massively attacked by Iran — which was provoked by Trump, not by us — and we hear Americans saying to us, you need to defend yourselves!” “It is an utter failure and utter disappointment in this administration,” he added. Mr. Trump has not ruled out a military strike, and senior national security officials met Thursday to refine a list of potential targets should President Trump go that route. Still, he has made clear his opposition to another war, and has ordered new sanctions. But Iran is already under acute economic pressure from the existing sanctions, which use the reach of the American financial system to try to choke off Iranian oil exports anywhere in the world. After pulling out of the 2015 nuclear deal, the Trump administration implemented the sweeping new penalties this spring to try to force Iran to accept a more restrictive agreement. Iranian leaders have denounced the sanctions as “economic warfare,” and they appear to have orchestrated an escalating series of attacks that threaten the flow of Persian Gulf oil in order to inflict some of the same pain on the United States and Washington’s Arab allies. “The Iranians do feel cornered,” Professor Gause said, and that is why they appear to be taking more aggressive action than they have in the past. “This is an effort by Iran to break out of what they see as strangulation.” The oil installation in the eastern city of Abqaiq burned after the attack. Defending the administration’s policies, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo argued this week that <u>the <mark>sanctions</mark> may have <mark>limited Iran’s ability to strike with</mark> even <mark>more sophisticated missiles</mark> or drones. “They’d have more complex ones but for the sanctions we put in place that have <mark>prevented them from getting access to money</mark>, most importantly, but also parts, spare parts, information technology</u>,” he told reporters on a trip to Saudi Arabia. Iranian leaders have denied responsibility for the attack last weekend, but at the same time they have openly reveled in its success. It showed the United States “that playing with the lion’s tail carries serious dangers and if they take action against Iran there will be no tomorrow for them,” Brig. Gen. Hossein Dehghan of the elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp boasted Thursday, Iranian news media reported. <u>The Iranians may have previously worried about Mr. <mark>Trump’s</mark> threatening tweets</u> and hawkish advisers, said Suzanne Maloney, an Iran scholar at Brookings Institution. “<u>But now they see that he is <mark>not going to follow through on the bluff</mark> that he has carried out on behalf of the American people</u>,” she said. Others analysts argued that the alarms from the Persian Gulf about an American retreat were overblown under President Obama and remain so under President Trump. American warships are patrolling the gulf to help protect tanker traffic. American satellite and surveillance drones patrol the skies. The many large American military bases deter invasions or other large-scale military actions. But President Trump’s combination of tough threats and a weak response “is the worst of both worlds,” argued Jeremy Shapiro, research director of the European Council on Foreign Relations and a former State Department official in the Obama administration. “It would be foolish to counter this escalation with an escalation, but it was foolish to get into this position in the first place,” he argued, leaving the Trump administration “to choose between an unwise escalation or a humiliating climb-down.” Experts on military technology said Saudi Arabia should not be faulted for failing to stop the attack. Like those of other countries, Saudi Arabia’s defenses were designed to stop ballistic missiles. This attack appears to have been carried out with low-flying cruise missiles or drones that would escape detection by most radar systems. “I don’t think that there is any country that could have defended any better than Saudi Arabia did, and that includes the United States,” said Peter Roberts, director of military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute, an international research institute. Yet the attack appears to have caused some rethinking by Crown Prince Mohammed. Soon after he was first named defense minister, in 2015, he plunged the kingdom into a military campaign in neighboring Yemen to drive from power a faction backed by Iran. Saudi media outlets proclaimed that the prince was asserting the kingdom’s power and leading a new drive to roll back Iranian influence. President Hassan Rouhani of Iran this week. Iran may be emboldened to carry out further attacks, calculating that President Trump will balk at another war. “The Iranians, they’re the cause of problems in the Middle East, but they are not a big threat to Saudi Arabia,” the prince boasted confidently to Time magazine in 2018. “Saudi Arabia’s economy is double the size of the Iranian economy,” he said, adding that Iran’s army was “not among the top five” in the Middle East. “We will work so that the battle is for them in Iran, and not in Saudi Arabia,” he promised on a Saudi news channel. Yet the damage to the oil installation was a painful lesson in the potential costs of a wider conflict, at a time when the Saudi military remains bogged down in Yemen and Prince Mohammed has been pushing for a public sale of the Saudi state oil company. The Saudi decision to call for an international investigation and not immediate retribution may be the choice of a chastened prince, analysts said. “I think there has a been a calculation that the costs might be too high,” said Rebecca Wasser, a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Alexander 10, Michelle Alexander, author of The New Jim Crow, former director of the Racial Justice Project of the ACLU, and senior fellow of the Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity, currently working at the Moritz College of Law, “The New Jim Crow: How the War on Drugs Gave Birth to a Permanent American Undercaste,” March 28, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michelle-alexander/the-new-jim-crow-how-the_b_490386.html fulltext: Ever since Barack Obama lifted his right hand and took his oath of office, pledging to serve the United States as its 44th president, ordinary people and their leaders around the globe have been celebrating our nation’s “triumph over race.” Obama’s election has been touted as the final nail in the coffin of Jim Crow, the bookend placed on the history of racial caste in America. Obama’s mere presence in the Oval Office is offered as proof that “the land of the free” has finally made good on its promise of equality. There’s an implicit yet undeniable message embedded in his appearance on the world stage: this is what freedom looks like; this is what democracy can do for you. If you are poor, marginalized, or relegated to an inferior caste, there is hope for you. Trust us. Trust our rules, laws, customs, and wars. You, too, can get to the promised land. Perhaps greater lies have been told in the past century, but they can be counted on one hand. Racial caste is alive and well in America. Most people don’t like it when I say this. It makes them angry. In the “era of colorblindness” there’s a nearly fanatical desire to cling to the myth that we as a nation have “moved beyond” race. Here are a few facts that run counter to that triumphant racial narrative: *There are more African Americans under correctional control today -- in prison or jail, on probation or parole -- than were enslaved in 1850, a decade before the Civil War began. *As of 2004, more African American men were disenfranchised (due to felon disenfranchisement laws) than in 1870, the year the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified, prohibiting laws that explicitly deny the right to vote on the basis of race. *A black child born today is less likely to be raised by both parents than a black child born during slavery. The recent disintegration of the African American family is due in large part to the mass imprisonment of black fathers. *If you take into account prisoners, a large majority of African American men in some urban areas have been labeled felons for life. (In the Chicago area, the figure is nearly 80%.) These men are part of a growing undercaste -- not class, caste -- permanently relegated, by law, to a second-class status. They can be denied the right to vote, automatically excluded from juries, and legally discriminated against in employment, housing, access to education, and public benefits, much as their grandparents and great-grandparents were during the Jim Crow era. Excuses for the Lockdown There is, of course, a colorblind explanation for all this: crime rates. Our prison population has exploded from about 300,000 to more than 2 million in a few short decades, it is said, because of rampant crime. We’re told that the reason so many black and brown men find themselves behind bars and ushered into a permanent, second-class status is because they happen to be the bad guys. The uncomfortable truth, however, is that crime rates do not explain the sudden and dramatic mass incarceration of African Americans during the past 30 years. Crime rates have fluctuated over the last few decades -- they are currently are at historical lows -- but imprisonment rates have consistently soared. Quintupled, in fact. And the vast majority of that increase is due to the War on Drugs. Drug offenses alone account for about two-thirds of the increase in the federal inmate population, and more than half of the increase in the state prison population. The drug war has been brutal -- complete with SWAT teams, tanks, bazookas, grenade launchers, and sweeps of entire neighborhoods -- but those who live in white communities have little clue to the devastation wrought. This war has been waged almost exclusively in poor communities of color, even though studies consistently show that people of all colors use and sell illegal drugs at remarkably similar rates. In fact, some studies indicate that white youth are significantly more likely to engage in illegal drug dealing than black youth. Any notion that drug use among African Americans is more severe or dangerous is belied by the data. White youth, for example, have about three times the number of drug-related visits to the emergency room as their African American counterparts. That is not what you would guess, though, when entering our nation’s prisons and jails, overflowing as they are with black and brown drug offenders. In some states, African Americans comprise 80%-90% of all drug offenders sent to prison. This is the point at which I am typically interrupted and reminded that black men have higher rates of violent crime. That’s why the drug war is waged in poor communities of color and not middle-class suburbs. Drug warriors are trying to get rid of those drug kingpins and violent offenders who make ghetto communities a living hell. It has nothing to do with race; it’s all about violent crime. Again, not so. President Ronald Reagan officially declared the current drug war in 1982, when drug crime was declining, not rising. From the outset, the war had little to do with drug crime and nearly everything to do with racial politics. The drug war was part of a grand and highly successful Republican Party strategy of using racially coded political appeals on issues of crime and welfare to attract poor and working class white voters who were resentful of, and threatened by, desegregation, busing, and affirmative action. In the words of H.R. Haldeman, President Richard Nixon’s White House Chief of Staff: “[T]he whole problem is really the blacks. The key is to devise a system that recognizes this while not appearing to.” A few years after the drug war was announced, crack cocaine hit the streets of inner-city communities. The Reagan administration seized on this development with glee, hiring staff who were to be responsible for publicizing inner-city crack babies, crack mothers, crack whores, and drug-related violence. The goal was to make inner-city crack abuse and violence a media sensation, bolstering public support for the drug war which, it was hoped, would lead Congress to devote millions of dollars in additional funding to it. The plan worked like a charm. For more than a decade, black drug dealers and users would be regulars in newspaper stories and would saturate the evening TV news. Congress and state legislatures nationwide would devote billions of dollars to the drug war and pass harsh mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes -- sentences longer than murderers receive in many countries. Democrats began competing with Republicans to prove that they could be even tougher on the dark-skinned pariahs. In President Bill Clinton’s boastful words, “I can be nicked a lot, but no one can say I’m soft on crime.” The facts bear him out. Clinton’s “tough on crime” policies resulted in the largest increase in federal and state prison inmates of any president in American history. But Clinton was not satisfied with exploding prison populations. He and the “New Democrats” championed legislation banning drug felons from public housing (no matter how minor the offense) and denying them basic public benefits, including food stamps, for life. Discrimination in virtually every aspect of political, economic, and social life is now perfectly legal, if you’ve been labeled a felon. Facing Facts But what about all those violent criminals and drug kingpins? Isn’t the drug war waged in ghetto communities because that’s where the violent offenders can be found? The answer is yes... in made-for-TV movies. In real life, the answer is no. The drug war has never been focused on rooting out drug kingpins or violent offenders. Federal funding flows to those agencies that increase dramatically the volume of drug arrests, not the agencies most successful in bringing down the bosses. What gets rewarded in this war is sheer numbers of drug arrests. To make matters worse, federal drug forfeiture laws allow state and local law enforcement agencies to keep for their own use 80% of the cash, cars, and homes seized from drug suspects, thus granting law enforcement a direct monetary interest in the profitability of the drug market. The results have been predictable: people of color rounded up en masse for relatively minor, non-violent drug offenses. In 2005, four out of five drug arrests were for possession, only one out of five for sales. Most people in state prison have no history of violence or even of significant selling activity. In fact, during the 1990s -- the period of the most dramatic expansion of the drug war -- nearly 80% of the increase in drug arrests was for marijuana possession, a drug generally considered less harmful than alcohol or tobacco and at least as prevalent in middle-class white communities as in the inner city. In this way, a new racial undercaste has been created in an astonishingly short period of time -- a new Jim Crow system. Millions of people of color are now saddled with criminal records and legally denied the very rights that their parents and grandparents fought for and, in some cases, died for. Affirmative action, though, has put a happy face on this racial reality. Seeing black people graduate from Harvard and Yale and become CEOs or corporate lawyers -- not to mention president of the United States -- causes us all to marvel at what a long way we’ve come. Recent data shows, though, that much of black progress is a myth. In many respects, African Americans are doing no better than they were when Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated and uprisings swept inner cities across America. Nearly a quarter of African Americans live below the poverty line today, approximately the same percentage as in 1968. The black child poverty rate is actually higher now than it was then. Unemployment rates in black communities rival those in Third World countries. And that’s with affirmative action! When we pull back the curtain and take a look at what our “colorblind” society creates without affirmative action, we see a familiar social, political, and economic structure -- the structure of racial caste. The entrance into this new caste system can be found at the prison gate. This is not Martin Luther King, Jr.’s dream. This is not the promised land. The cyclical rebirth of caste in America is a recurring racial nightmare.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The criminalization of Marihuana has actively contributed to the policing, jailing, and killing of black people. Simply legalizing Marihuana ignores the history of antiblackness that has been intrinsically tied to the Marihuana market. Failure to account for that history of violence locks in systems of power that make it possible for white, upper-class, big-marihuana farmers to exploit people of color – it’s not enough to redirect our strategies for legalization – power structures that rely on the state will always fail.</h4><p><strong>Alexander 10</strong>, Michelle Alexander, author of The New Jim Crow, former director of the Racial Justice Project of the ACLU, and senior fellow of the Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity, currently working at the Moritz College of Law, “The New Jim Crow: How the War on Drugs Gave Birth to a Permanent American Undercaste,” March 28, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michelle-alexander/the-new-jim-crow-how-the_b_490386.html</p><p>Ever since Barack Obama lifted his right hand and took his oath of office, pledging to serve the United States as its 44th president, ordinary people and their leaders around the globe have been celebrating our nation’s “triumph over race.” Obama’s election has been touted as the final nail in the coffin of Jim Crow, the bookend placed on the history of racial caste in America. Obama’s mere presence in the Oval Office is offered as proof that “the land of the free” has finally made good on its promise of equality. There’s an implicit yet undeniable message embedded in his appearance on the world stage: this is what freedom looks like; this is what democracy can do for you. If you are poor, marginalized, or relegated to an inferior caste, there is hope for you. Trust us. Trust our rules, laws, customs, and wars. You, too, can get to the promised land. Perhaps greater lies have been told in the past century, but they can be counted on one hand. Racial caste is alive and well in America. Most people don’t like it when I say this. It makes them angry. <u><strong>In the “era of colorblindness” there’s a nearly fanatical desire to cling to the myth that we as a nation have “moved beyond” race. Here are a few facts that run counter to that triumphant racial narrative: *<mark>There are more African Americans under correctional control today</mark> -- in prison or jail, on probation or parole -- <mark>than were enslaved in 1850</u></strong></mark>, a decade before the Civil War began. <u><strong>*<mark>As of 2004, more African American men were disenfranchised</mark> (due to felon disenfranchisement laws) <mark>than in 1870, the year the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified</u></strong></mark>, prohibiting laws that explicitly deny the right to vote on the basis of race. <u><strong>*<mark>A black child born today is less likely to be raised by both parents than a black child born during slavery</u></strong></mark>. The recent disintegration of the African American family is due in large part to the mass imprisonment of black fathers. <u><strong>*<mark>If you take into account prisoners, a large majority of African American men in some urban areas have been labeled felons for life.</u></strong></mark> (In the Chicago area, the figure is nearly 80%.) <u><strong><mark>These men are part of a growing undercaste</mark> -- not class, caste -- <mark>permanently relegated, by law, to a second-class status</mark>. They can be denied the right to vote, automatically excluded from juries, and legally discriminated against in employment, housing, access to education, and public benefits, much as their grandparents and great-grandparents were during the Jim Crow era.</u></strong> Excuses for the Lockdown There is, of course, a colorblind explanation for all this: crime rates. Our prison population has exploded from about 300,000 to more than 2 million in a few short decades, it is said, because of rampant crime. We’re told that the reason so many black and brown men find themselves behind bars and ushered into a permanent, second-class status is because they happen to be the bad guys. The uncomfortable truth, however, is that <u><strong><mark>crime rates do not explain the</mark> sudden and dramatic <mark>mass incarceration of African Americans</mark> during the past 30 years. <mark>Crime rates</mark> have fluctuated over the last few decades -- they are currently <mark>are at historical lows</mark> -- <mark>but imprisonment rates have</mark> consistently <mark>soared</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Quintupled, in fact</u></strong></mark>. And <u><strong><mark>the vast majority of that increase is due to the War on Drugs</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Drug offenses</mark> alone <mark>account for about two-thirds of the increase in the federal inmate population, and more than half of the increase in the state prison population.</u></strong></mark> The drug war has been brutal -- complete with SWAT teams, tanks, bazookas, grenade launchers, and sweeps of entire neighborhoods -- but those who live in white communities have little clue to the devastation wrought. <u><strong><mark>This war has been waged almost exclusively in poor communities of color,</mark> even though studies consistently show that people of all colors use and sell illegal drugs at remarkably similar rates.</u></strong> In fact, some studies indicate that white youth are significantly more likely to engage in illegal drug dealing than black youth. Any notion that drug use among African Americans is more severe or dangerous is belied by the data. White youth, for example, have about three times the number of drug-related visits to the emergency room as their African American counterparts. That is not what you would guess, though, when entering our nation’s prisons and jails, overflowing as they are with black and brown drug offenders. In some states, African Americans comprise 80%-90% of all drug offenders sent to prison. This is the point at which I am typically interrupted and reminded that black men have higher rates of violent crime. That’s why the drug war is waged in poor communities of color and not middle-class suburbs. Drug warriors are trying to get rid of those drug kingpins and violent offenders who make ghetto communities a living hell. It has nothing to do with race; it’s all about violent crime. Again, not so. President Ronald Reagan officially declared the current drug war in 1982, when drug crime was declining, not rising. From the outset, the war had little to do with drug crime and nearly everything to do with racial politics. The drug war was part of a grand and highly successful Republican Party strategy of using racially coded political appeals on issues of crime and welfare to attract poor and working class white voters who were resentful of, and threatened by, desegregation, busing, and affirmative action. In the words of H.R. Haldeman, President Richard Nixon’s White House Chief of Staff: “[T]he whole problem is really the blacks. The key is to devise a system that recognizes this while not appearing to.” <u><strong>A few years <mark>after the drug war was announced, crack cocaine hit the streets</mark> of inner-city communities. The <mark>Reagan</mark> administration <mark>seized on this development with glee, hiring staff who were to be responsible for publicizing inner-city crack babies, crack mothers, crack whores, and drug-related violence.</mark> The goal was to make inner-city crack abuse and violence a media sensation, bolstering public support for the drug war which, it was hoped, would lead Congress to devote millions of dollars in additional funding to it. The plan worked like a charm. <mark>For more than a decade, black drug dealers and users would be regulars in newspaper stories and would saturate the evening TV news. Congress and state legislatures nationwide would devote billions of dollars to the drug war and pass harsh mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes</u></strong></mark> -- sentences longer than murderers receive in many countries. Democrats began competing with Republicans to prove that they could be even tougher on the dark-skinned pariahs. In President Bill Clinton’s boastful words, “I can be nicked a lot, but no one can say I’m soft on crime.” The facts bear him out. Clinton’s “tough on crime” policies resulted in the largest increase in federal and state prison inmates of any president in American history. But Clinton was not satisfied with exploding prison populations. He and the “New Democrats” championed legislation banning drug felons from public housing (no matter how minor the offense) and denying them basic public benefits, including food stamps, for life. <u><strong>Discrimination in virtually every aspect of political, economic, and social life is now perfectly legal, if you’ve been labeled a felon. </u></strong>Facing Facts But what about all those violent criminals and drug kingpins? Isn’t the drug war waged in ghetto communities because that’s where the violent offenders can be found? The answer is yes... in made-for-TV movies. In real life, the answer is no. <u><strong>The drug war has never been focused on rooting out drug kingpins or violent offenders. Federal funding flows to those agencies that increase dramatically the volume of drug arrests, not the agencies most successful in bringing down the bosses</u></strong>. What gets rewarded in this war is sheer numbers of drug arrests. To make matters worse, <u><strong><mark>federal drug forfeiture laws allow</mark> state and local law enforcement <mark>agencies to keep for their own use 80% of the cash, cars, and homes seized from drug suspects</mark>, thus <mark>granting law enforcement a direct monetary interest in the profitability of the drug market</mark>. <mark>The results have been predictable</mark>: <mark>people of color rounded up en masse for</mark> relatively <mark>minor, non-violent drug offenses</mark>.</u></strong> In 2005, four out of five drug arrests were for possession, only one out of five for sales. Most people in state prison have no history of violence or even of significant selling activity. In fact, during the 1990s -- the period of the most dramatic expansion of the drug war -- nearly 80% of the increase in drug arrests was for marijuana possession, a drug generally considered less harmful than alcohol or tobacco and at least as prevalent in middle-class white communities as in the inner city. In this way, <u><strong><mark>a new racial undercaste has been created</mark> in an astonishingly short period of time -- <mark>a new Jim Crow</mark> system. Millions of people of color are now saddled with criminal records and legally denied the very rights that their parents and grandparents fought for and, in some cases, died for.</u></strong> Affirmative action, though, has put a happy face on this racial reality. Seeing black people graduate from Harvard and Yale and become CEOs or corporate lawyers -- not to mention president of the United States -- causes us all to marvel at what a long way we’ve come. <u><strong><mark>Recent data shows</mark>, though, <mark>that much of black progress is a myth.</u></strong></mark> In many respects, African Americans are doing no better than they were when Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated and uprisings swept inner cities across America. <u><strong><mark>Nearly a quarter of African Americans live below the poverty line today,</mark> approximately <mark>the same percentage as in 1968</mark>. <mark>The black child poverty rate is actually higher now than it was then</mark>. <mark>Unemployment rates in black communities rival those in Third World countries</mark>. <mark>And that’s with affirmative action!</mark> <mark>When we pull back the curtain and take a look at what our “colorblind” society creates without affirmative action, we see a familiar social, political, and economic structure -- the structure of racial caste</mark>. The entrance into this new caste system can be found at the prison gate. <mark>This is not Martin Luther King, Jr.’s dream. This is not the promised land.</u></strong></mark> The cyclical rebirth of caste in America is a recurring racial nightmare.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Alford 20 - Aaron J. Alford, Medium, January 13th, 2020 “Disaster Pornography and the American Media”[ HYPERLINK "https://medium.com/@aaronjalford1/disaster-pornography-and-the-american-media-f01ee1cb4512" https://medium.com/@aaronjalford1/disaster-pornography-and-the-american-media-f01ee1cb4512] Accessed 1/30/20 SAO fulltext: Most of us are familiar with the concept of pornography, at least sexual pornography: Images or media meant to titillate your arousal. Similarly, the images of catastrophe and destruction presented by the news media are like a drug, used by first world nations to feed off the suffering of the rest of the world. Images of death and violence from non-western countries are extracted and reprocessed for consumption by you, the consumer. The production of disaster porn is, as Baudrillard proclaimed, charity cannibalism and incentives the perpetuation of oppressive conditions in order to sustain and prolong our enjoyment. “We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it. We see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West.” — Baudrillard In short, disaster pornography shows us images of suffering and our efforts to stop suffering, which gives us a little dopamine hit. Our news media is trying to get you addicted to violence, so they can sell you more ads. Disaster pornography is the new drug. Or should I say, old drug. Producing and reproducing suffering Somehow, what Baudrillard warned of the year I was born is still going full force, unchecked, unchallenged, and no one is calling it out. Baudrillard said “Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media.” Now I can already hear you scoffing at my ridiculous claims, but consider these examples. The New York Times Sells the Iran missiles as “an Action Movie” The Iran war effort is being pushed, as I write, by American media. Take for example the New York Times coverage of a missile strike compared to Al Jazeera’s coverage of the same missile strike. One is factual, the other wants you to imagine your favorite Iron Man movie. The New York Times wants to feed your wildest fantasies about the glory of war, and how beautiful it is. Al Jazeera, the non-western source, simply reported the facts. The big difference is the framing. NBC Worships Trump’s Missile Attacks on Syria Consider another example, NBC’s Brian Williams coverage of a missile attacks on Syrian air bases in which he described the wanton destruction as “beautiful missiles.” He said he was “tempted to quote the great Leonard Cohen” in that he is “guided by the beauty of our weapons.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lJz9q7pfXkY The U.S’s Cycle of support and betrayal of the Kurds To better understand this cycle, look no further than the U.S’s support and then sudden betrayal of the Kurds. During the gulf war, there was a huge push for “humanitarian protections” for the Kurds, even after Saddam Hussein had already crushed them while the west stood by drinking our tea. In 2003, we start a war against Saddam Hussein, which perpetuates the instability that feeds our love for disaster even more. Then ISIS comes out of that chaos, and we are even more fed. Then the Kurds defeat ISIS, popular opinion of the Kurds goes up in the wake of the Syrian civil war and destruction of ISIS, only to have our president abandon them to be genocided on the Syrian border by fucking Turkey. You see, we never cared about the Kurds, only the images they gave us. Only their suffering, only their death, was enough to sate the American appetite for war, violence, and suffering. The election of Donald Trump Baudrillard argued that when the disaster market from around the world slows down, the west will turn inward and produce its own spectacles of disaster. Brexit and the election of white nationalists in America are great examples of what Baudrillard warned of. Another example of this cycle of catastrophe is president Donald Trump’s election. Donald Trump received 2 billion dollars of free television coverage in 2016 leading up to his election. The media could not get enough of this crazy television host billionaire who thought he would be a good president. The truth is that the media always wanted him to be the president, the source of constant disasters both here and abroad. Donald Trump is a president who: Impulse killed an Iranian General without a declaration of war Cut taxes for the rich and raised taxes on the poor Put children, including babies, in cages at the border Bullied a 15 year old climate activist on Twitter Has been accused of sexual misconduct by at least 17 women Betrayed our ally the Kurds and genocidal Turkey Has actively supported a Saudi Arabian genocide in Yemen Started a trade war with China for no apparent reason Attempted to bribe Ukrainian officials into meddling with our election, and got impeached for it Nominated a rapist to the Supreme Court Supported known child molester Roy Moore for congress Paid of a porn star to stay quiet about how he cheated on his wife with her Is best friends with Steve Bannon, a outspoken fascist and white nationalist Said that there were good people on both sides of a dispute between white supremacists and people protesting white supremacy Pardoned a sheriff in Arizona who advocates for concentration camps Consistently uses anti-Semitic tropes and promotes division I mean, the list goes on from here, but you get my point. Donald Trump is a walking disaster maker, and the media worships him for it. Hell, Republicans worship him for it. Even when the media and right wing establishment claim to disagree with him, they put him and his hateful rhetoric on the pedestal. The truth is, no matter what they tell you, the owners of American media want his reelection. It is just too good for their bottom line. A president who creates disaster’s like these is exactly what the American media needs to keep American addicted and the profits rolling in. How then shall we live? Disaster pornography relies on a cycle of production and consumption. The West is complicit in the creation of numerous disasters all around the world. When Donald Trump fucked with Iran, it provoked a response from Iran which is now played back by our media as a justification for further western intervention. This cycle didn’t just start, it’s been going on since before I was born. The west does not respond to disasters, we fucking create them. It’s a process, by which we sell our souls to the devil. Although I fear this description is unfair — to the devil. So how do we stop it? How we prevent the cycle of disaster, images, disaster? It’s simple; stop watching disaster porn. I don’t mean stop watching the news, but I do mean to stop listening to the neo-liberal pundits, the discourse of fear, and the spectacles of violence displayed for your pleasure. Listen to news sources who have some god damned respect for humanity. (This means not Fox News OR CNN, if that wasn’t clear). “We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of poverty of the ‘other half of the world’. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty — charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence.” — Baudrillard So I ask you today, to denounce with me the exploitation of disaster for our own selfish needs. Say no to the staged spectacle and eventually the market for these simulated disasters will dry up. When the market of staged disasters is no longer where we look, we will again be able to recognize real human suffering when we encounter it, and act to resolve it. Rather than ignoring the suffering of the underpaid, overworked, and exploited around us, we will finally be able to recognize their suffering as legitimate, rather than looking to the news for our moral compass.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Link 2: Images of suffering fuel violence </h4><p><strong>Alford 20 - Aaron J. Alford, Medium, January 13th, 2020</strong> “Disaster Pornography and the American Media”[ HYPERLINK "https://medium.com/@aaronjalford1/disaster-pornography-and-the-american-media-f01ee1cb4512" https://medium.com/@aaronjalford1/disaster-pornography-and-the-american-media-f01ee1cb4512] Accessed 1/30/20 SAO </p><p>Most of us are familiar with the concept of pornography, at least sexual pornography: Images or media meant to titillate your arousal. Similarly, <u>the <mark>images of catastrophe and destruction </mark>presented by the news media <mark>are like a drug, used by first world nations to feed off the suffering of the rest of the world</u></mark>. Images of death and violence from non-western countries are extracted and reprocessed for consumption by you, the consumer. The production of disaster porn is, as Baudrillard proclaimed, charity cannibalism and incentives the perpetuation of oppressive conditions in order to sustain and prolong our enjoyment. “We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it. We see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West.” — Baudrillard In short, disaster pornography shows us images of suffering and our efforts to stop suffering, which gives us a little dopamine hit. <u><strong><mark>Our news media is trying to get you addicted to violence, so they can sell you more ads</u></strong></mark>. Disaster pornography is the new drug. Or should I say, old drug. Producing and reproducing suffering Somehow, what Baudrillard warned of the year I was born is still going full force, unchecked, unchallenged, and no one is calling it out. Baudrillard said “Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media.” Now I can already hear you scoffing at my ridiculous claims, but consider these examples. The New York Times Sells the Iran missiles as “an Action Movie” <u><mark>The Iran war effort is being pushed</u></mark>, as I write, <u><mark>by American media</u></mark>. Take for example the New York Times coverage of a missile strike compared to Al Jazeera’s coverage of the same missile strike. One is factual, the other wants you to imagine your favorite Iron Man movie. <u><mark>The <strong>New York Times wants to feed your wildest fantasies</strong> about the glory of war, </u></mark>and how beautiful it is.<u><mark> Al Jazeera, </mark>the non-western source, <mark>simply reported the facts. </u></mark>The big difference is the framing. NBC Worships Trump’s Missile Attacks on Syria Consider another example, NBC’s Brian Williams coverage of a missile attacks on Syrian air bases in which he described the wanton destruction as “beautiful missiles.” He said he was “tempted to quote the great Leonard Cohen” in that he is “guided by the beauty of our weapons.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lJz9q7pfXkY The U.S’s Cycle of support and betrayal of the Kurds To better understand this cycle, look no further than the U.S’s support and then sudden betrayal of the Kurds. During the gulf war, there was a huge push for “humanitarian protections” for the Kurds, even after Saddam Hussein had already crushed them while the west stood by drinking our tea. In 2003, we start a war against Saddam Hussein, which perpetuates the instability that feeds our love for disaster even more. Then ISIS comes out of that chaos, and we are even more fed. Then the Kurds defeat ISIS, popular opinion of the Kurds goes up in the wake of the Syrian civil war and destruction of ISIS, only to have our president abandon them to be genocided on the Syrian border by fucking Turkey. You see, we never cared about the Kurds, only the images they gave us. Only their suffering, only their death, was enough to sate the American appetite for war, violence, and suffering. The election of Donald Trump Baudrillard argued that <u><mark>when the disaster market </u></mark>from around the world<u> <mark>slows down, the west will </u></mark>turn inward and <u><strong><mark>produce its own spectacles of disaster</u></strong></mark>. Brexit and the election of white nationalists in America are great examples of what Baudrillard warned of. Another example of this cycle of catastrophe is president Donald Trump’s election. <u><mark>Donald Trump received 2 billion dollars of free </mark>television <mark>coverage </mark>in 2016</u> leading up to his election. The media could not get enough of this crazy television host billionaire who thought he would be a good president. The truth is that <u><mark>the media </mark>always <mark>wanted him </u></mark>to be the president, the source of constant disasters both here and abroad. <u><mark>Donald Trump is a president who: Impulse killed an Iranian General</u> </mark>without a declaration of war Cut taxes for the rich and raised taxes on the poor <u><mark>Put</u> </mark>children, including <u><mark>babies, in cages</u> </mark>at the border <u><mark>Bullied a 15 year old</u> </mark>climate activist on Twitter Has been accused of sexual misconduct by at least 17 women Betrayed our ally the Kurds and genocidal Turkey Has actively supported a Saudi Arabian genocide in Yemen Started a trade war with China for no apparent reason Attempted to bribe Ukrainian officials into meddling with our election, and <u><mark>got impeached</u> </mark>for it Nominated a rapist to the Supreme Court <u><mark>Supported known child molester</u> </mark>Roy Moore for congress Paid of a porn star to stay quiet about how he cheated on his wife with her Is best friends with Steve Bannon, a outspoken fascist and white nationalist Said that there were good people on both sides of a dispute between white supremacists and people protesting white supremacy Pardoned a sheriff in Arizona who advocates for concentration camps Consistently uses anti-Semitic tropes and promotes division I mean, the list goes on from here, but you get my point. Donald Trump is<u><mark> <strong>a walking disaster maker, and the media worships him for it</strong>.</u></mark> Hell, Republicans worship him for it. Even when the media and right wing establishment claim to disagree with him, they put him and his hateful rhetoric on the pedestal. The truth is, no matter what they tell you, the owners of American media want his<u><mark> reelection. </u></mark>It<u><mark> is </mark>just <mark>too good for their bottom line.</u></mark> A president who creates disaster’s like these is exactly what the American media needs to keep American addicted and the profits rolling in. How then shall we live? Disaster pornography relies on a cycle of production and consumption. The West is complicit in the creation of numerous disasters all around the world. When Donald Trump fucked with Iran, it provoked a response from Iran which is now played back by our media as a justification for further western intervention. This cycle didn’t just start, it’s been going on since before I was born. The west does not respond to disasters, we fucking create them. It’s a process, by which we sell our souls to the devil. Although I fear this description is unfair — to the devil. So how do we stop it? How we prevent the cycle of disaster, images, disaster? It’s simple; <u><strong>stop watching </u></strong>disaster porn. I don’t mean stop watching the news, but I do mean to <u><mark>stop listening to</u></mark> the neo-liberal pundits,<u><mark> the discourse of fear, and the spectacles of violence displayed for your pleasure. </u></mark>Listen to news sources who have some god damned respect for humanity. (This means not Fox News OR CNN, if that wasn’t clear). “We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of poverty of the ‘other half of the world’. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty — charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence.” — Baudrillard So I ask you today, to denounce with me the exploitation of disaster for our own selfish needs. <u><strong><mark>Say no to the staged spectacle and eventually the market for these simulated disasters will dry up</strong>. </u></mark>When the market of staged disasters is no longer where we look<u><mark>, we will again be able to recognize real human suffering </u></mark>when we encounter it,<u><mark> and act to resolve it.</mark> </u>Rather than ignoring the suffering of the underpaid, overworked, and exploited around us, we will finally be able to recognize their suffering as legitimate, rather than looking to the news for our moral compass.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Walter Russell Mead 12, Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College, 7/28, “The Energy Revolution 4: Hot Planet?” http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/28/the-energy-revolution-4-hot-planet/ fulltext: Capitalism is not, Monbiot is forced to admit, a fragile system that will easily be replaced. Bolstered by huge supplies of oil, it is here to stay. Industrial civilization is, as far as he can now see, unstoppable. Gaia, that treacherous slut, has made so much oil and gas that her faithful acolytes today cannot protect her from the consequences of her own folly.¶ Welcome to the New Green Doom: an overabundance of oil and gas is going to release so much greenhouse gas that the world is going to fry. The exploitation of the oil sands in Alberta, warn leading environmentalists, is a tipping point. William McKibben put it this way in an interview with Wired magazine in the fall of 2011:¶ I think if we go whole-hog in the tar sands, we’re out of luck. Especially since that would doubtless mean we’re going whole-hog at all the other unconventional energy sources we can think of: Deepwater drilling, fracking every rock on the face of the Earth, and so forth.¶ Here’s why the tar sands are important: It’s a decision point about whether, now that we’re running out of the easy stuff, we’re going to go after the hard stuff. The Saudi Arabian liquor store is running out of bottles. Do we sober up, or do we find another liquor store, full of really crappy booze, to break into?¶ A year later, despite the success of environmentalists like McKibben at persuading the Obama administration to block a pipeline intended to ship this oil to refineries in the US, it’s clear (as it was crystal clear all along to anyone with eyes to see) that the world has every intention of making use of the “crappy liquor.”¶ Again, for people who base their claim to world leadership on their superior understanding of the dynamics of complex systems, greens prove over and over again that they are surprisingly naive and crude in their ability to model and to shape the behavior of the political and economic systems they seek to control. If their understanding of the future of the earth’s climate is anything like as wish-driven, fact-averse and intellectually crude as their approach to international affairs, democratic politics and the energy market, the greens are in trouble indeed. And as I’ve written in the past, the contrast between green claims to understand climate and to be able to manage the largest and most complex set of policy changes ever undertaken, and the evident incompetence of greens at managing small (Solyndra) and large (Kyoto, EU cap and trade, global climate treaty) political projects today has more to do with climate skepticism than greens have yet understood. Many people aren’t rejecting science; they are rejecting green claims of policy competence. In doing so, they are entirely justified by the record.¶ Nevertheless, the future of the environment is not nearly as dim as greens think. Despairing environmentalists like McKibben and Monbiot are as wrong about what the new era of abundance means as green energy analysts were about how much oil the planet had.¶ The problem is the original sin of much environmental thought: Malthusianism. If greens weren’t so addicted to Malthusian horror narratives they would be able to see that the new era of abundance is going to make this a cleaner planet faster than if the new gas and oil had never been found.¶ Let’s be honest. It has long been clear to students of history, and has more recently begun to dawn on many environmentalists, that all that happy-clappy carbon treaty stuff was a pipe dream and that nothing like that is going to happen. A humanity that hasn’t been able to ban the bomb despite the clear and present dangers that nuclear weapons pose isn’t going to ban or even seriously restrict the internal combustion engine and the generator.¶ The political efforts of the green movement to limit greenhouse gasses have had very little effect so far, and it is highly unlikely that they will have more success in the future. The green movement has been more of a group hug than a curve bending exercise, and that is unlikely to change. If the climate curve bends, it will bend the way the population curve did: as the result of lots of small human decisions driven by short term interest calculations rather than as the result of a grand global plan.¶ The shale boom hasn’t turned green success into green failure. It’s prevented green failure from turning into something much worse. Monbiot understands this better than McKibben; there was never any real doubt that we’d keep going to the liquor store. If we hadn’t found ways to use all this oil and gas, we wouldn’t have embraced the economics of less. True, as oil and gas prices rose, there would be more room for wind and solar power, but the real winner of an oil and gas shortage is… coal. To use McKibben’s metaphor, there is a much dirtier liquor store just down the road from the shale emporium, and it’s one we’ve been patronizing for centuries. The US and China have oodles of coal, and rather than walk to work from our cold and dark houses all winter, we’d use it. Furthermore, when and if the oil runs out, the technology exists to get liquid fuel out of coal. It isn’t cheap and it isn’t clean, but it works.¶ The newly bright oil and gas future means that we aren’t entering a new Age of Coal. For this, every green on the planet should give thanks.¶ The second reason why greens should give thanks for shale is that environmentalism is a luxury good. People must survive and they will survive by any means necessary. But they would much rather thrive than merely survive, and if they can arrange matters better, they will. A poor society near the edge of survival will dump the industrial waste in the river without a second thought. It will burn coal and choke in the resulting smog if it has nothing else to burn.¶ Politics in an age of survival is ugly and practical. It has to be. The best leader is the one who can cut out all the fluff and the folderol and keep you alive through the winter. During the Battle of Leningrad, people burned priceless antiques to stay alive for just one more night.¶ An age of energy shortages and high prices translates into an age of radical food and economic insecurity for billions of people. Those billions of hungry, frightened, angry people won’t fold their hands and meditate on the ineffable wonders of Gaia and her mystic web of life as they pass peacefully away. Nor will they vote George Monbiot and Bill McKibben into power. They will butcher every panda in the zoo before they see their children starve, they will torch every forest on earth before they freeze to death, and the cheaper and the meaner their lives are, the less energy or thought they will spare to the perishing world around them.¶ But, thanks to shale and other unconventional energy sources, that isn’t where we are headed. We are heading into a world in which energy is abundant and horizons are open even as humanity’s grasp of science and technology grows more secure. A world where more and more basic human needs are met is a world that has time to think about other goals and the money to spend on them. As China gets richer, the Chinese want cleaner air, cleaner water, purer food — and they are ready and able to pay for them. A Brazil whose economic future is secure can afford to treasure and conserve its rain forests. A Central America where the people are doing all right is more willing and able to preserve its biodiversity. And a world in which people know where their next meal is coming from is a world that can and will take thought for things like the sustainability of the fisheries and the protection of the coral reefs.¶ A world that is more relaxed about the security of its energy sources is going to be able to do more about improving the quality of those sources and about managing the impact of its energy consumption on the global commons. A rich, energy secure world is going to spend more money developing solar power and wind power and other sustainable sources than a poor, hardscrabble one.¶ When human beings think their basic problems are solved, they start looking for more elegant solutions. Once Americans had an industrial and modern economy, we started wanting to clean up the rivers and the air. Once people aren’t worried about getting enough calories every day to survive, they start wanting healthier food more elegantly prepared.¶ A world of abundant shale oil and gas is a world that will start imposing more environmental regulations on shale and gas producers. A prosperous world will set money aside for research and development for new technologies that conserve energy or find it in cleaner surroundings. A prosperous world facing climate change will be able to ameliorate the consequences and take thought for the future in ways that a world overwhelmed by energy insecurity and gripped in a permanent economic crisis of scarcity simply can’t and won’t do.¶ Greens should also be glad that the new energy is where it is. For Monbiot and for many others, Gaia’s decision to put so much oil into the United States and Canada seems like her biggest indiscretion of all. Certainly, a United States of America that has, in the Biblical phrase, renewed its youth like an eagle with a large infusion of fresh petro-wealth is going to be even less eager than formerly to sign onto various pie-in-the-sky green carbon treaties.¶ But think how much worse things would be if the new reserves lay in dictatorial kleptocracies. How willing and able would various Central Asia states have been to regulate extraction and limit the damage? How would Nigeria have handled vast new reserves whose extraction required substantially more invasive methods?¶ Instead, the new sources are concentrated in places where environmentalists have more say in policy making and where, for all the shortcomings and limits, governments are less corruptible, more publicly accountable and in fact more competent to develop and enforce effective energy regulations. This won’t satisfy McKibben and Monbiot (nothing that could actually happen would satisfy either of these gentlemen), but it is a lot better than what we could be facing.¶ Additionally, if there are two countries in the world that should worry carbon-focused greens more than any other, they are the United States and China. The two largest, hungriest economies in the world are also home to enormous coal reserves. But based on what we now know, the US and China are among the biggest beneficiaries of the new cornucopia. Gaia put the oil and the gas where, from a carbon point of view, it will do the most good. In a world of energy shortages and insecurity, both the US and China would have gone flat out for coal. Now, that is much less likely.¶ And there’s one more reason why greens should thank Gaia for shale. Wind and solar aren’t ready for prime time now, but by the time the new sources start to run low, humanity will have mastered many more technologies that can used to provide energy and to conserve it. It’s likely that Age of Shale hasn’t just postponed the return of coal: because of this extra time, there likely will never be another age in which coal is the dominant industrial fuel. It’s virtually certain that the total lifetime carbon footprint of the human race is going to be smaller with the new oil and gas sources than it would have been without them.¶ Neither the world’s energy problems nor its climate issues are going away any time soon. Paradise is not beckoning just a few easy steps away. But the new availability of these energy sources is on balance a positive thing for environmentalists as much as for anyone else.¶ Perhaps, and I know this is a heretical thought, but perhaps Gaia is smarter than the greens.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Economic decline makes de-carbonization impossible and triggers <u>mass global starvation</u> – no transition away from growth </h4><p>Walter Russell<strong> Mead 12</strong>, Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College, 7/28, “The Energy Revolution 4: Hot Planet?” http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/28/the-energy-revolution-4-hot-planet/</p><p><u>Capitalism is not</u>, Monbiot is forced to admit, <u>a fragile system that will easily be replaced</u>. <u>Bolstered by huge supplies of oil, <strong>it is here to stay</u></strong>. <u>Industrial civilization is</u>, as far as he can now see, <u>unstoppable</u>. Gaia, that treacherous slut, has made so much oil and gas that her faithful acolytes today cannot protect her from the consequences of her own folly.¶ Welcome to the New Green Doom: an overabundance of oil and gas is going to release so much greenhouse gas that the world is going to fry. The exploitation of the oil sands in Alberta, warn leading environmentalists, is a tipping point. William McKibben put it this way in an interview with Wired magazine in the fall of 2011:¶ I think if we go whole-hog in the tar sands, we’re out of luck. Especially since that would doubtless mean we’re going whole-hog at all the other unconventional energy sources we can think of: Deepwater drilling, fracking every rock on the face of the Earth, and so forth.¶ Here’s why the tar sands are important: It’s a decision point about whether, now that we’re running out of the easy stuff, we’re going to go after the hard stuff. The Saudi Arabian liquor store is running out of bottles. Do we sober up, or do we find another liquor store, full of really crappy booze, to break into?¶ A year later, despite the success of environmentalists like McKibben at persuading the Obama administration to block a pipeline intended to ship this oil to refineries in the US, it’s clear (as it was crystal clear all along to anyone with eyes to see) that the world has every intention of making use of the “crappy liquor.”¶ Again, for people who base their claim to world leadership on their superior understanding of the dynamics of complex systems, <u>greens prove over and over again that they are surprisingly naive and crude in their ability to model and to <strong>shape the behavior of the political and economic systems</strong> they seek to control</u>. If their understanding of the future of the earth’s climate is anything like as wish-driven, fact-averse and intellectually crude as their approach to international affairs, democratic politics and the energy market, the greens are in trouble indeed. And as I’ve written in the past, the contrast between green claims to understand climate and to be able to manage the largest and most complex set of policy changes ever undertaken, and the evident incompetence of greens at managing small (Solyndra) and large (Kyoto, EU cap and trade, global climate treaty) political projects today has more to do with climate skepticism than greens have yet understood. Many people aren’t rejecting science; they are rejecting green claims of policy competence. In doing so, they are entirely justified by the record.¶ Nevertheless, the future of the environment is not nearly as dim as greens think. Despairing environmentalists like McKibben and Monbiot are as wrong about what the new era of abundance means as green energy analysts were about how much oil the planet had.¶ The problem is the original sin of much environmental thought: Malthusianism. If greens weren’t so addicted to Malthusian horror narratives they would be able to see that the new era of abundance is going to make this a cleaner planet faster than if the new gas and oil had never been found.¶ Let’s be honest. It has long been clear to students of history, and has more recently begun to dawn on many environmentalists, that all that happy-clappy carbon treaty stuff was a pipe dream and that nothing like that is going to happen. A humanity that hasn’t been able to ban the bomb despite the clear and present dangers that nuclear weapons pose isn’t going to ban or even seriously restrict the internal combustion engine and the generator.¶ The political efforts of the green movement to limit greenhouse gasses have had very little effect so far, and it is highly unlikely that they will have more success in the future. <u>The green movement has been more of a group hug than a curve bending exercise</u>, and that is unlikely to change. If the climate curve bends, it will bend the way the population curve did: as the result of lots of small human decisions driven by short term interest calculations rather than as the result of a grand global plan.¶ <u>The shale boom hasn’t turned green success into green failure. It’s prevented green failure from turning into something much worse</u>. Monbiot understands this better than McKibben; there was never any real doubt that we’d keep going to the liquor store. If we hadn’t found ways to use all this oil and gas, we wouldn’t have embraced the economics of less. True, as oil and gas prices rose, there would be more room for wind and solar power, but the real winner of an oil and gas shortage is… coal. To use McKibben’s metaphor, there is a much dirtier liquor store just down the road from the shale emporium, and it’s one we’ve been patronizing for centuries. The US and China have oodles of coal, and rather than walk to work from our cold and dark houses all winter, we’d use it. Furthermore, when and if the oil runs out, the technology exists to get liquid fuel out of coal. It isn’t cheap and it isn’t clean, but it works.¶ The newly bright oil and gas future means that we aren’t entering a new Age of Coal. For this, every green on the planet should give thanks.¶ The second reason why greens should give thanks for shale is that <u>environmentalism is a <strong>luxury</strong> good</u>. People must survive and they will survive by any means necessary. But they would much rather thrive than merely survive, and if they can arrange matters better, they will. <u>A poor society near the edge of survival will <strong>dump the industrial waste in the river</strong> without a second thought. It will <strong>burn coal</strong> and choke in the resulting smog if it has nothing else to burn.</u>¶ <u>Politics in an age of survival is ugly and practical</u>. It has to be. The best leader is the one who can cut out all the fluff and the folderol and keep you alive through the winter. <u>During the Battle of Leningrad, people burned priceless antiques to stay alive for just one more night.</u>¶ <u>An age of energy shortages and high prices translates into an age of <strong>radical food and economic insecurity for billions</strong> of people. Those <strong>billions of hungry, frightened, angry people won’t fold their hands and meditate</u></strong> on the ineffable wonders of Gaia and her mystic web of life <u>as they pass peacefully away.</u> Nor will they vote George Monbiot and Bill McKibben into power. <u>They will <strong>butcher every panda in the zoo</strong> before they see their children starve, they will <strong>torch every forest on earth</strong> before they freeze to death</u>, and the cheaper and the meaner their lives are, the less energy or thought they will spare to the perishing world around them.¶<u><strong> </u></strong>But, thanks to shale and other unconventional energy sources, that isn’t where we are headed. <u>We are heading into a world in which energy is abundant and horizons are open even as humanity’s grasp of science and technology grows more secure. A world where more and more basic human needs are met is a world that <strong>has time to think about other goals and the money to spend on them</strong>. As China gets richer, the Chinese want cleaner air, cleaner water, purer food — and they are ready and able to pay for them</u>. A <u>Brazil whose economic future is secure can afford to treasure and conserve its rain forests</u>. A Central America where the people are doing all right is more willing and able to preserve its biodiversity. <u>And a world in which people know where their next meal is coming from is a world that can and will take thought for things like the <strong>sustainability of the fisheries</strong> and the <strong>protection of the coral reefs</strong>.¶ </u>A world that is more relaxed about the security of its energy sources is going to be able to do more about improving the quality of those sources and about managing the impact of its energy consumption on the global commons. <u>A rich, energy secure world is going to spend more money developing <strong>solar</strong> power <strong>and wind</strong> power and other sustainable sources than a poor, hardscrabble one.¶ </u>When human beings think their basic problems are solved, they start looking for more elegant solutions. <u>Once Americans had an industrial and modern economy, we <strong>started wanting to clean up the rivers and the air</strong>. Once people aren’t worried about getting enough calories every day to survive, they start <strong>wanting healthier food</u></strong> more elegantly prepared.¶ A world of abundant shale oil and gas is a world that will start imposing more environmental regulations on shale and gas producers. <u>A prosperous world will set money aside for research and development for new technologies that conserve energy or find it in cleaner surroundings</u>. <u>A prosperous world facing climate change will be able to <strong>ameliorate the consequences</strong> and take thought for the future in ways that a world overwhelmed by energy insecurity and <strong>gripped in a permanent economic crisis of scarcity simply can’t and won’t do</strong>.</u>¶ Greens should also be glad that the new energy is where it is. For Monbiot and for many others, Gaia’s decision to put so much oil into the United States and Canada seems like her biggest indiscretion of all. Certainly, a United States of America that has, in the Biblical phrase, renewed its youth like an eagle with a large infusion of fresh petro-wealth is going to be even less eager than formerly to sign onto various pie-in-the-sky green carbon treaties.¶ But think how much worse things would be if the new reserves lay in dictatorial kleptocracies. How willing and able would various Central Asia states have been to regulate extraction and limit the damage? How would Nigeria have handled vast new reserves whose extraction required substantially more invasive methods?¶ Instead, <u>the new sources are concentrated in places where environmentalists have more say in policy making and where, for all the shortcomings and limits, governments are less corruptible, more publicly accountable and in fact more competent to develop and enforce effective energy regulations. </u>This won’t satisfy McKibben and Monbiot (nothing that could actually happen would satisfy either of these gentlemen), but it is a lot better than what we could be facing.¶ Additionally, if there are two countries in the world that should worry carbon-focused greens more than any other, they are the United States and China. The two largest, hungriest economies in the world are also home to enormous coal reserves. But based on what we now know, the US and China are among the biggest beneficiaries of the new cornucopia. Gaia put the oil and the gas where, from a carbon point of view, it will do the most good. <u>In a world of energy shortages and insecurity, both the US and China would have <strong>gone flat out for coal</u></strong>. Now, that is much less likely.¶ And there’s one more reason why greens should thank Gaia for shale. Wind and solar aren’t ready for prime time now, but by the time the new sources start to run low, humanity will have mastered many more technologies that can used to provide energy and to conserve it. It’s likely that Age of Shale hasn’t just postponed the return of coal: because of this extra time, there likely will never be another age in which coal is the dominant industrial fuel. It’s virtually certain that the total lifetime carbon footprint of the human race is going to be smaller with the new oil and gas sources than it would have been without them.¶ Neither the world’s energy problems nor its climate issues are going away any time soon. Paradise is not beckoning just a few easy steps away. But the new availability of these energy sources is on balance a positive thing for environmentalists as much as for anyone else.¶<u> Perhaps, and I know this is a heretical thought, but perhaps Gaia is smarter than the greens.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Rajiv Malhotra 04, President of the Infinity Foundation, 1-21-2004, "Preventing America's Nightmare," Rediff India Abroad, http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/jan/21rajiv.htm, Date Accessed: 10-10-2016 fulltext: Any US strategic plan for "controlled instability" in India would be a major blunder and could easily blow up in unimaginable ways. A destabilization of India would bring into the public theater the tens of thousands of madrassas in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, as suppliers of angry young men for jihad. Once set into motion, this avalanche would be unstoppable, and would acquire a life of its own. The consequences for the US would be far more dreadful than the security threats it faces already. Given the cataclysmic nature of this risk, the burden of proof should shift to those exploiting the sociopolitical cleavages in India's unity: They need to prove that such destabilizing pressures will not eventually result in the Talibanization of India. As past US strategies in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and other places have proven, the game of destabilizing with the hope of also maintaining control is very dangerous and unachievable. It is similar to amateur scientists playing with a nuclear reactor hoping to keep it from blowing up. Talibanization of South Asia Indians are rightfully relishing the positive news on India's economic front, but must not forget that Pakistan remains the world's leading supplier of jihadi outsourcing. The macro trends are simultaneously accelerating in opposite directions: One trend is the high probability that India will succeed in rapid economic expansion using several knowledge industries -- this is the positive scenario. In the opposite direction, there are political undercurrents, both external and internal, that point towards possible calamities (discussed below). While being overall optimistic about India, we should also take seriously the major threats it faces. My hypothetical catastrophic scenario about India's destabilization is based on examining various kinds of internal and external cleavages. The role of Hindutva politics in driving religious tensions has already been placed under extensive international spotlight. However, many of the human rights whistleblowers have a conflict-of-interest, because as part of the foreign-based network of activist-scholars they exploit divisiveness in dangerous ways. They condemn Hindutva while turning a blind eye to insurgencies and other forms of communal violence within the subcontinent. Furthermore, scholars play critical roles, often under the garb of "human rights," in channeling foreign intellectual and material support to exacerbate India's internal cleavages. These include i. the insurgencies in Kashmir, Nepal (now spilling over to India), and northeast states, and ii. the separatist movements of Dalitistan, Dravidianism, Naxalism and others. These cleavages are too easily dismissed by many Indian optimists, as manageable localized nuisances. However, besides seriously dampening India's economic growth rates, these insurgencies are rapidly being exploited by foreign nexuses which sponsor armies of well-trained and well-funded Indian activist-scholars who operate via NGOs. Foreign-funded NGOs in India are not to be confused with voluntary organizations in the West. India's foreign-funded NGOs are to be seen more as private companies using grant money, hiring Westernized Indians at salaries that can be several times higher than average market rates in India. Meanwhile, there are tens of thousands of voluntary organizations in India that are based on genuine local voices, but these are not given prominence by the media. In addition to the internal cleavages, the following four kinds of potential calamities are inherently outside India's control. If and when any two or three of them were to occur simultaneously, they would send shockwaves through the heart of India, threatening its sovereignty. At the very least, the crisis precipitated would cripple India's economic progress, as markets would look for suppliers in other more stable countries. In the worst case, it could precipitate India's breakup. These potential calamities outside India's control are: A few consecutive years of bad monsoons, causing economic and socio-political havoc; All-out prolonged war with Pakistan (even conventional); The overthrow of Musharraf by pro-Taliban forces in collaboration with the notorious ISI; Trade war against India's technology-driven exports, caused by eastern labor and/or political backlashes combined with mismanagement of India's brand. If enough of the above four events were to occur at once, the separatist movements mentioned earlier could get activated with Indian-American sepoys abetting the process. This could tear India apart in a series of insurrections. I know of many desi scholars who would jump with glee that the revolution had finally arrived! Therefore, US strategists must ask the following question: If India were to melt-down or balkanize into what many desi South Asianists celebrate as "sub-national" groups -- i.e. separatist movements -- what might be the broader geopolitical implications? India divided into approximately twenty separate and conflicting sovereign nations could appear to be the world's largest market for US arms manufacturers. It could also supply millions of cheap cyber-Shudras (outsourced laborers) without being organized with the cohesion and clout of another China-like competitor. The US would hire them to do cheap work, but the money would come back to the US as they would buy weapons to kill each other in the name of "freedom fights." If this strategy were to be adopted, the present divisive scholarship in South Asian Studies would, indeed, serve a useful purpose, by exacerbating the internal conflicts within India. The army of such scholars would turn out to be useful in running the show in a balkanized India. However, a destabilized region would, more likely than not, succumb to Talibanization pressures from neighbors and from within India. South Asian madrassas (estimated at many tens of thousands in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) would become a massive supplier of unemployable angry [people] men, to feed a plethora of insurgencies. The most likely scenario would be the Islamization of India, of the radical Taliban kind, and not of the peaceful Sufi kind. A takeover of India would be a quantum leap for the Pan-Islamic (dar-ul-islam) movement, because an Islamized India would make it virtually impossible for the ASEAN countries to prevent a similar takeover. This would become America's worst imaginable nightmare, a hundred times more calamitous than what it faces today in Afghanistan and Iraq combined. India's fate over the next quarter century (between the optimistic scenario and the catastrophic scenario) will determine the winner in the global clash of civilizations. America's analysis of India's pivotal role must determine whether divisive scholarship is a good or a bad thing to encourage further. This puts a new light on the decades of Western scholarship that has already assumed a life of its own in the form of the careers of hundreds of Indians working under Western sponsorship. The high-leverage pressure points, where scholarship needs to be re-examined include Kashmir separatism, Khalistan separatism, Northeast and Assam separatism, Dalitistan separatism, Dravidianism, Naxalite violence in Central India, Maoist insurgencies in Nepal, the proto-Taliban sleeper cells in madrassas, and, last but not least, certain divisive Christian proselytizing missions. The truth is that many scholars and Western institutions are dangerously armed to intellectually encourage insurgencies across India. Western institutions must introspect whether they should remain the blood supply of the intellectual vampire of Indian separatism, or whether they must drive a stake through its heart before it is too late. They must admit that they have inadvertently relied too much upon elite armchair Indian revolutionaries. The divide-and-study academic theories about India have already gone very far in precipitating internal clashes on the ground in India. Today's separatists in India (who see "Hindu" as a four-letter word and like to imagine themselves as liberators of the "downtrodden" from its backwardness and oppression) will one day be seen in the same light as jihadis are seen today. Will the Western institutions that are now sheltering and promoting these separatist ideologies like to go down in history as catalysts of Taliban-like movements? A strong India is good for America I have focused mainly on the negative arguments -- i.e. why a weakened India could produce a terrible outcome -- only because this argument is seldom being discussed. But there are compelling positive arguments as to why the US should want India to succeed. The consequences of helping one billion Indians approach first-class world citizenship status would expand markets and allow the US to continue its prosperous role as the leader of innovation. There are many critical industries in which India will remain weak and in which US firms are especially strong, and these will turbo-charge US exports to a prosperous India. The USA must reduce its dependency on Europe. In the long term, it cannot depend upon China being a benign trading partner. It has no clear path available to lift the Islamic world out of oil dependency and into secularism and democracy. It needs a strong India. An economically strong India would eventually rub off on Pakistan and Bangladesh, and would lead to regional economic advancement and stability. Therefore, supporting a unified India should be a strategic imperative for US interests to bring stability across Asia.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Indian instability creates a <u>massive terrorist save haven</u> and <u>collapses regional stability</u>---The <u>magnitude of the internal link</u> is <u>significantly larger</u> than every empirical example</h4><p>Rajiv <u><strong>Malhotra 04, President of the Infinity Foundation, 1-21-2004, "Preventing America's Nightmare," Rediff India Abroad, http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/jan/21rajiv.htm, Date Accessed: 10-10-2016</p><p>Any</u></strong> US strategic plan <u><strong>for "controlled <mark>instability" in India </mark>would be a major blunder and <mark>could easily blow up </mark>in unimaginable ways. A <mark>destabilization</mark> of India <mark>would bring </mark>into the public theater the tens of <mark>thousands of madrassas in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India</u></strong></mark>, as suppliers of angry young men for jihad. <u><strong><mark>Once set into motion, this </mark>avalanche <mark>would be unstoppable, and would acquire a life of its own</mark>. The consequences for the US would be far more dreadful than the security threats it faces already.</p><p></u></strong>Given the cataclysmic nature of this risk, the burden of proof should shift to those exploiting the sociopolitical cleavages in India's unity: They need to prove that such destabilizing pressures will not eventually result in the Talibanization of India. As past US strategies in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and other places have proven, the game of destabilizing with the hope of also maintaining control is very dangerous and unachievable. It is similar to amateur scientists playing with a nuclear reactor hoping to keep it from blowing up.</p><p>Talibanization of South Asia</p><p>Indians are rightfully relishing the positive news on India's economic front, but must not forget that Pakistan remains the world's leading supplier of jihadi outsourcing. The macro trends are simultaneously accelerating in opposite directions: One trend is the high probability that India will succeed in rapid economic expansion using several knowledge industries -- this is the positive scenario. In the opposite direction, there are political undercurrents, both external and internal, that point towards possible calamities (discussed below). While being overall optimistic about India, we should also take seriously the major threats it faces.</p><p>My hypothetical catastrophic scenario about India's destabilization is based on examining various kinds of internal and external cleavages. The role of Hindutva politics in driving religious tensions has already been placed under extensive international spotlight. However, many of the human rights whistleblowers have a conflict-of-interest, because as part of the foreign-based network of activist-scholars they exploit divisiveness in dangerous ways.</p><p>They condemn Hindutva while turning a blind eye to insurgencies and other forms of communal violence within the subcontinent. Furthermore, scholars play critical roles, often under the garb of "human rights," in channeling foreign intellectual and material support to exacerbate India's internal cleavages. These include i. the insurgencies in Kashmir, Nepal (now spilling over to India), and northeast states, and ii. the separatist movements of Dalitistan, Dravidianism, Naxalism and others.</p><p>These cleavages are too easily dismissed by many Indian optimists, as manageable localized nuisances. However, besides seriously dampening India's economic growth rates, these insurgencies are rapidly being exploited by foreign nexuses which sponsor armies of well-trained and well-funded Indian activist-scholars who operate via NGOs.</p><p>Foreign-funded NGOs in India are not to be confused with voluntary organizations in the West. India's foreign-funded NGOs are to be seen more as private companies using grant money, hiring Westernized Indians at salaries that can be several times higher than average market rates in India.</p><p>Meanwhile, there are tens of thousands of voluntary organizations in India that are based on genuine local voices, but these are not given prominence by the media.</p><p>In addition to the internal cleavages, the following four kinds of potential calamities are inherently outside India's control. If and when any two or three of them were to occur simultaneously, they would send shockwaves through the heart of India, threatening its sovereignty. At the very least, the crisis precipitated would cripple India's economic progress, as markets would look for suppliers in other more stable countries. In the worst case, it could precipitate India's breakup. These potential calamities outside India's control are: </p><p>A few consecutive years of bad monsoons, causing economic and socio-political havoc; </p><p>All-out prolonged war with Pakistan (even conventional); </p><p>The overthrow of Musharraf by pro-Taliban forces in collaboration with the notorious ISI; </p><p>Trade war against India's technology-driven exports, caused by eastern labor and/or political backlashes combined with mismanagement of India's brand.</p><p>If enough of the above four events were to occur at once, the separatist movements mentioned earlier could get activated with Indian-American sepoys abetting the process. This could tear India apart in a series of insurrections. I know of many desi scholars who would jump with glee that the revolution had finally arrived!</p><p>Therefore, US strategists must ask the following question: <u><strong><mark>If India were to melt-down</mark> or balkanize <mark>into</mark> what many desi South Asianists celebrate as <mark>"sub-national" groups</u></strong></mark> -- i.e. separatist movements -- what might be the broader geopolitical implications?</p><p>India divided into approximately twenty separate and conflicting sovereign nations could appear to be the world's largest market for US arms manufacturers. It could also supply millions of cheap cyber-Shudras (outsourced laborers) without being organized with the cohesion and clout of another China-like competitor. The US would hire them to do cheap work, but the money would come back to the US as they would buy weapons to kill each other in the name of "freedom fights."</p><p><u><strong>If this strategy were to be adopted, the present divisive scholarship in South Asian Studies would, indeed, serve a useful purpose, by exacerbating the internal conflicts within India. The army of such scholars would turn out to be useful in running the show in a balkanized India.</p><p></u></strong>However, <u><strong><mark>a destabilized region would</mark>, more likely than not, <mark>succumb to Talibanization pressures from neighbors and from within India. South Asian madrassas</u></strong></mark> (estimated at many tens of thousands in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) <u><strong><mark>would become a massive supplier of unemployable angry [people]</u></strong></mark> men, <u><strong><mark>to feed a plethora of insurgencies</mark>.</u></strong> The most likely scenario would be the Islamization of India, of the radical Taliban kind, and not of the peaceful Sufi kind. <u><strong><mark>A takeover of India would be a quantum leap</mark> for the Pan-Islamic</u></strong> (dar-ul-islam) <u><strong>movement, because <mark>an Islamized India would make it </mark>virtually <mark>impossible for </mark>the <mark>ASEAN countries to prevent a similar takeover. This would become America's worst</mark> imaginable <mark>nightmare, a hundred times more calamitous than</u></strong></mark> what it faces today in <u><strong><mark>Afghanistan and Iraq combined.</p><p></u></strong></mark>India's fate over the next quarter century (between the optimistic scenario and the catastrophic scenario) will determine the winner in the global clash of civilizations.</p><p>America's analysis of India's pivotal role must determine whether divisive scholarship is a good or a bad thing to encourage further. This puts a new light on the decades of Western scholarship that has already assumed a life of its own in the form of the careers of hundreds of Indians working under Western sponsorship.</p><p>The high-leverage pressure points, where scholarship needs to be re-examined include Kashmir separatism, Khalistan separatism, Northeast and Assam separatism, Dalitistan separatism, Dravidianism, Naxalite violence in Central India, Maoist insurgencies in Nepal, the proto-Taliban sleeper cells in madrassas, and, last but not least, certain divisive Christian proselytizing missions. The truth is that many scholars and Western institutions are dangerously armed to intellectually encourage insurgencies across India.</p><p>Western institutions must introspect whether they should remain the blood supply of the intellectual vampire of Indian separatism, or whether they must drive a stake through its heart before it is too late. They must admit that they have inadvertently relied too much upon elite armchair Indian revolutionaries.</p><p>The divide-and-study academic theories about India have already gone very far in precipitating internal clashes on the ground in India. Today's separatists in India (who see "Hindu" as a four-letter word and like to imagine themselves as liberators of the "downtrodden" from its backwardness and oppression) will one day be seen in the same light as jihadis are seen today. Will the Western institutions that are now sheltering and promoting these separatist ideologies like to go down in history as catalysts of Taliban-like movements?</p><p><u><strong>A strong India is good for America</p><p></u></strong>I have focused mainly on the negative arguments -- i.e. why a weakened India could produce a terrible outcome -- only because this argument is seldom being discussed. But <u><strong>there are compelling positive arguments as to why the US should want India to succeed.</p><p>The consequences of helping one billion Indians approach first-class world citizenship status would expand markets and allow the US to continue its prosperous role as the leader of innovation.</u></strong> There are many critical industries in which India will remain weak and in which US firms are especially strong, and these will turbo-charge US exports to a prosperous India.</p><p><u><strong>The USA must reduce its dependency on Europe. In the long term, it cannot depend upon China being a benign trading partner. It has no clear path available to lift the Islamic world out of oil dependency and into secularism and democracy. It needs a strong India.</p><p><mark>An economically strong India would</mark> eventually <mark>rub off </mark>on Pakistan and Bangladesh,<mark> and </mark>would <mark>lead to regional economic advancement and stability</mark>.</u></strong> Therefore, supporting <u><strong>a unified India should be a strategic imperative for US interests to bring stability across Asia.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Johnson, 10-20-2019 (Rebecca Johnson, Rebecca Johnson, from the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy and International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), "Women, Peace And Disarmament: Intersecting Identities And Security Imperatives," FiLiA, https://filia.org.uk/latest-news/2020/2/10/feminist-challenges-to-war, accessed on 11-9-2021) AB *brackets denote edits made by card cutter to modify ableist language and a typo. fulltext: 1) Women, Peace and Disarmament: Intersecting identities and security imperatives (Rebecca Johnson) When FiLiA asked me to convene a panel on women and peace this year, I wanted to go beyond UN Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, Greenham herstories and banning bombs, important though all these are. With Nounou Booto Meeti from East Africa and the Centre for Peace, Security and Armed Violence Prevention, and Bonnie Jenkins former US State Department Counsel and the founder of Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation, we will look at different ways to build solidarity and strengthen feminist nonviolence and actions that oppose not just weapons and war, but also the destructive policies and practices that reinforce institutional violence, injustice and climate destruction. The aim of this panel is to open conversations in FiLiA on feminist challenges to war and patriarchal violence perpetrated through militarism, racism, misogyny, and economic and political marginalisation of diverse peoples. We hope to discuss some of the ways in which women and girls can individually and collectively become more effective in changing the world to bring about justice, peace and disarmament, without which there cannot be security. Words such as security, peace, disarmament, identity and intersectionality are open to question depending on "from where we stand[are]". In her book with that title, Professor Cynthia Cockburn, discussed some of these contested meanings in women's activism. One of Britain's most perceptive feminist-peace writers and activists as well as a co-founder of London Women in Black , Cynthia sadly left us in September, aged 85. Her title reflects the important axiom of feminism that the personal is political. African-American lawyer Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term 'intersectionality' in 1989 to describe the ways in which Black women experience connecting forms and levels of discrimination and marginalisation based on their race and gender. Nowadays, the term is widely used to denote the interactions between a range of discriminations and oppressions, requiring multilayered strategies for building justice and equality. Building on the insights of Black and feminist activists, we've learned to expose the power structures underlying discussions of "identity", and illuminate the ways in which the structures of oppression operate so that they can be more effectively addressed in all their forms. Feminist solidarity requires that we look at the personal and political implications of who we are and where we come from, and use the resources and power we have to enable others who have less As Pragna Patel noted in her powerful opening analysis to FiLiA2019, there are also dangers in how 'intersectionality' has become co-opted to justify divisive identity politics and blur the lines of power. The dangers of this are legion. Most of us develop our identities through the intersections of life and experience connected with our places of birth and upbringing, race/ethnicity, class/caste, sex/gender/sexuality, resources and education. These and other characteristics of identity intersect with personal and familial experiences of security and insecurity, including sexual and other forms of abuse and violence. For liberation and progressive change, it is necessary that we recognise our relative privileges and oppressions. In so doing, we must challenge ourselves, and also do our best to recognise the power dynamics when privileged actors mobilise arguments about identity oppression to further their own personal and political interests and ambitions at the expense of others' genuine needs and struggles for rights and justice. Oppression intersects at many points in our lives, and it should come as no surprise that many of us have at times sought refuge in thoughts about being born into the wrong family or wrong body, wishing we could have been someone different. Such yearnings are embedded in patriarchal inequalities, injustice and exclusion from equal opportunities and power. Wishing to be someone different, including at times of a different gender or racial identity, is not about being in the wrong bodies, but in wrong social constructs. When I was bullied and unhappy after my family settled in England when I was seven, I used to wish that I was had been born an only child (and the boy that my sisters had hoped for). Since I am the youngest daughter of eight children born to a loving but impractical couple that raised us in a puritanically fundamentalist community in Paraguay, North Dakota and Pennsylvania, it doesn't take much psychology to see why I thought that changing the circumstances of my birth would solve my problems. But of course no such change was on the cards. Over time I found out that I am who I am, and it's up to me to reject efforts by others to make me feel that my upbringing, body and family are something to be ashamed of. The point is not to change our bodies or cover up our experiences, but to accept and use all the aspects of who we are to develop into the authentic and multifaceted people we are capable of becoming. Instead of cosmetic pretence, we need to create cultures of diversity and solidarity to eliminate the heavy burdens imposed by patriarchy. Through my feminist lens, that is the essence of security and peace-building. From this background, I see war and militarism as the armed wings of patriarchy. Militarism and war are the primary patriarchal means to project fear, power and control over other peoples and enable the imposition of religious and economic belief systems, colonialism, capitalism and sexual violence. Through arming and fetishising violence, militarism continues to drive and enable gendered systems of oppression and violence against women and children. From the distant past and across most if not all cultures, militarism has been constructed and perpetuated to subdue and defeat everyone and everything that gets in the way of those in power. It defends and spreads exploitative extraction and seizure of natural resources, land-grabs and myriad economic and religious practices that have enslaved people and destroyed billions of lives and homes. Patriarchy needs militarism to implement its wars against women, diversity, nature and Mother Earth. From "scorched earth" practices to doctrines of "mutual assured destruction", militarism contributes massively to environmental and climate destruction, while continuing to weaponise technologies that project existential threats such as nuclear war into our future. When we talk of women, peace and security, we have to distinguish feminist from patriarchal objectives. Patriarchal discourses on peace or security are generally framed in terms of power and weapons. Defence of women and children are portrayed as justifications for war and large military capabilities. By contrast, feminists have demonstrated that violence against women is embedded in the racism, colonialist-capitalist expansionism, destruction and warmongering policies that are the causes, drivers and consequences of militarism and war. As well as abusing power in the the institutions of state, predators also operate in places of education, aid, and civil society peace and development organisations, where the vulnerable are often befriended and groomed before being abused. Collusion in sexual violence is another patriarchal hallmark. And this enabling complicity is not only practised by men or right-wingers. Feminist activists expose how power, status and resources are distributed and manpulated [manipulated]. Although there is now a growing #MeToo consciousness, complainants still pay a high price for exposing men with status who are good at self promotion and manipulation. Punishment and threats are used to undermine female victims and whistleblowers who make accusations of racist or sexual harassment against privileged males, while perpetrators with positions, platforms and resources still get away with threatening the security, safety and equal opportunities of marginalised people, especially women and girls Building peace and justice requires ending collusion in racism, sexual violence and abuses of power, no matter how or by whom such abusive behaviours are dressed up and defended. The questions we need to ask are: whose security, peace and defence are we supporting? achieved by what methods and under what conditions? What does security and peace mean to you? How can we individually and collectively tackle security challenges we face and do more to build peace in the world? How can we respect the rights, spaces and strategies of women and girls with different experiences of threat and oppression, while also building feminist solidarity, effective campaigning, and movements to work across the intersections and achieve peace and security for all of us? Our environment and climate are at risk of irrevocable and existential destruction, while 13,000 nuclear weapons are in the hands of nine macho leaders who treat nuclear use and war as a virility test. As well as being climate deniers and conflict promoters, some of these leaders stand personally accused as perpetrators of sexual and racial harassment and misconduct. All of them devote obscene amounts of their nations' resources on militarism and deadly weapons. They appear to equate security with their own military-industrial freedom of action, while putting the security, survival and well-being of women and, indeed, all living creatures at risk with their policies and practices. I do not generally identify as a pacifist, but I believe that we can achieve much higher levels of personal and political peace and security through collective nonviolent action for systemic change. Violence can sometimes change governments or personnel at the top, but active nonviolence is a far more effective way to bring about positive political, social and structural change, without which humanity cannot survive. The institutional violence and profiteering embedded in military-industrial establishments are direct causes of today's wars, nuclear threats and inability to tackle the climate emergency. My nonviolence is intertwined with my feminism, and owes much to my experiences at Greenham Common, learning from the Suffragettes, Black Sash, Vandana Shiva, Whangari Maathai, Lijon Eknilang... and the networks of feminist rebels who for centuries have mobilised against patriarchal destruction with nonviolent resistence, courage and imagination. It's not that I don't acknowledge the writings and speeches of patriarchal gurus of nonviolence in the 20th centuries. We learned much from their struggles, including their limitations. As leaders with patriarchal assumptions about male roles, women, spirituality and power, transforming their own cultures was beyond them. It is not beyond us when we practise collective nonviolence, with mutual respect and shared power and leadership. I remember Audre Lorde's 1979 essay "The master's tools will never dismantle the master's house" (Lorde 2017). We need both to live in this brutal and unjust world, and to transform it. Not just to dismantle patriarchy, but to imagine and build something much better in its place. By comparison with the 1980s, there is now more discussion of gender roles and impacts in relation to armed conflict, but we still face considerable resistance to recognizing gendered impacts of weapons, and feminist strategies for disarmament and security. If the tools we currently use limit what can be done, we have three choices: do our best with what we've got; adapt the tools to increase their effectiveness for more challenges; or design new tools for transformative purposes. And we have to make these choices while living in today's world, with all the patriarchal weapons, mindsets, and institutions of power, oppression and insecurity. That makes our work difficult, but not impossible. After many years of working at the interface between grassroots feminist activism and disarmament 'think tank' work incorporating treaty-making and the 'women, peace, security' and gender agendas, from 2008 onwards I've prioritised establishing the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) in Geneva, as a global humanitarian disarmament campaign to get a multilaterally negotiated, universally applicable treaty to ban and eliminate nuclear weapons. We achieved a significant breakthrough with the UN negotiations and adoption of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, aka Nuclear Ban Treaty), which in turn followed from principles and strategies developed through the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and 2008 Cluster Munitions Convention. These disarmament agreements owe much to feminist as well as humanitarian politics and practice from the 1970s onwards. I'll turn now to Nounou who has put together this powerpoint showing how she got involved in feminist mobilising for women and peace, including working in East Africa and internationally for disarmament treaties such as these. She will be followed by Bonnie Jenkins, and we hope to leave plenty of time for questions, comments and discussion at the end.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>Challenging patriarchal hierarchies, militarist fear-mongering, and unsustainable policymaking is essential to evading planetary extinction. The Aff is aligned with black feminist solidarity movements to retool law for true emancipation. </h4><p>Johnson</strong>, 10-20-<strong>2019</strong> (Rebecca Johnson, Rebecca Johnson, from the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy and International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), "Women, Peace And Disarmament: Intersecting Identities And Security Imperatives," FiLiA, https://filia.org.uk/latest-news/2020/2/10/feminist-challenges-to-war, accessed on 11-9-2021) AB *brackets denote edits made by card cutter to modify ableist language and a typo.</p><p>1) Women, Peace and Disarmament: Intersecting identities and security imperatives (Rebecca Johnson)</p><p><u>When FiLiA asked me to convene a panel on women and peace this year, I wanted to go beyond UN Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, Greenham herstories and banning bombs, important though all these are.</p><p></u>With Nounou Booto Meeti from East Africa and the Centre for Peace, Security and Armed Violence Prevention, and Bonnie Jenkins former US State Department Counsel and the founder of Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation, we will look at different ways to <u><mark>build solidarity and</mark> strengthen feminist</u> nonviolence and <u>actions that <mark>oppose</mark> not just <mark>weapons</mark> and <mark>war</mark>, but also the destructive policies <mark>and practices that reinforce institutional violence, injustice and climate destruction.</mark> <strong>The aim</u></strong> of this panel <u><strong>is to open conversations </u></strong>in FiLiA <u><strong>on feminist challenges to war and patriarchal violence perpetrated through militarism, racism, misogyny, and economic and political marginalisation of diverse peoples.</u></strong> We hope to discuss some of the ways in which women and girls can individually and <u>collectively</u> become more effective in <u><strong>changing the world to bring about justice, peace and disarmament, without which there cannot be security.</p><p></strong>Words such as security, peace, disarmament, identity and intersectionality are open to question depending on "from where we </u>stand<u>[are]".</u> In her book with that title, Professor Cynthia Cockburn, discussed some of these contested meanings in women's activism. One of Britain's most perceptive feminist-peace writers and activists as well as a co-founder of London Women in Black , Cynthia sadly left us in September, aged 85. Her title reflects <u><strong>the important axiom of feminism that the personal is political.</p><p></u></strong>African-American lawyer Kimberlé <u>Crenshaw coined the term <mark>'intersectionality'</u></mark> in 1989 <u>to describe the ways in which Black women experience connecting forms and levels of discrimination and marginalisation based on their race and gender. Nowadays, the term is widely used to denote the interactions between a range of discriminations and oppressions, <mark>requiring <strong>multilayered strategies for building justice and equality.</p><p></strong>Building on</mark> the insights of <mark>Black</mark> and <mark>feminist activists, </mark>we've learned to <strong><mark>expose</mark> the <mark>power structures underlying</mark> discussions of <mark>"identity",</strong> and illuminate</mark> the ways in which the <mark>structures of oppression</mark> operate <mark>so</mark> that <mark>they can be</mark> more effectively <mark>addressed</mark> in all their forms. Feminist solidarity requires that we look at the personal and political implications of who we are and where we come from, and use the resources and power we have to enable others who have less</p><p></u>As Pragna Patel noted in her powerful opening analysis to FiLiA2019, there are also dangers in how 'intersectionality' has become co-opted to justify divisive identity politics and blur the lines of power. The dangers of this are legion. Most of us develop our identities through the intersections of life and experience connected with our places of birth and upbringing, race/ethnicity, class/caste, sex/gender/sexuality, resources and education. These and other characteristics of identity intersect with personal and familial experiences of security and insecurity, including sexual and other forms of abuse and violence.</p><p>For liberation and progressive change, it is necessary that we recognise our relative privileges and oppressions. In so doing, we must challenge ourselves, and also do our best to recognise the power dynamics when privileged actors mobilise arguments about identity oppression to further their own personal and political interests and ambitions at the expense of others' genuine needs and struggles for rights and justice.</p><p><u>Oppression intersects at many points in our lives</u>, and it should come as no surprise that many of us have at times sought refuge in thoughts about being born into the wrong family or wrong body, wishing we could have been someone different. Such yearnings are embedded in patriarchal inequalities, injustice and exclusion from equal opportunities and power. Wishing to be someone different, including at times of a different gender or racial identity, is not about being in the wrong bodies, but in wrong social constructs.</p><p><u>When I was bullied and unhappy after my family settled in England when I was seven, I used to wish that I was had been born an only child (and the boy that my sisters had hoped for). Since I am the youngest daughter of eight children born to a loving but impractical couple that raised us in a puritanically fundamentalist community in Paraguay, North Dakota and Pennsylvania, it doesn't take much psychology to see why I thought that changing the circumstances of my birth would solve my problems. But of course no such change was on the cards. Over time I found out that I am who I am, and it's up to me to reject efforts by others to make me feel that my upbringing, body and family are something to be ashamed of.</p><p></u>The point is not to change our bodies or cover up our experiences, but to accept and use all the aspects of who we are to develop into the authentic and multifaceted people we are capable of becoming. Instead of cosmetic pretence, <u><strong><mark>we need</mark> to create <mark>cultures of diversity and solidarity to eliminate</mark> the heavy <mark>burdens imposed by patriarchy.</mark> </strong>Through my feminist lens, that is the essence of security and peace-building.</p><p></u>From this background, I see <u><strong>war and militarism as the armed wings of patriarchy.</p><p><mark>Militarism and war are the primary patriarchal means to project fear, power and control over</mark> other <mark>people</mark>s <mark>and enable the imposition of</mark> religious and <mark>economic</mark> belief <mark>systems, colonialism, capitalism and sexual violence.</p><p></strong>Through</mark> arming and <mark>fetishising violence, militarism</mark> continues to <mark>drive and enable gendered</mark> systems of <mark>oppression and violence</mark> against women and children. From the distant past and across most if not all cultures, <mark>militarism</mark> has been constructed and perpetuated to subdue and defeat everyone and everything that gets in the way of those in power.<strong> It <mark>defends and spreads exploitative extraction</mark> and seizure of natural resources<mark>, land-grabs and</mark> myriad economic and religious <mark>practices that</mark> have <mark>enslaved people and destroyed billions of lives and homes. </strong>Patriarchy needs militarism to implement</mark> its <mark>wars</mark> </u>against women, diversity, nature and Mother Earth<mark>.<u> <strong>From "scorched earth"</mark> practices <mark>to</mark> doctrines of <mark>"m</mark>utual <mark>a</mark>ssured <mark>d</mark>estruction", <mark>militarism contributes</mark> massively <mark>to environmental</mark> and climate <mark>destruction, while continuing to weaponise tech</mark>nologies <mark>that project existential threats such as nuclear war</mark> into our future.</p><p></u></strong>When we talk of women, peace and security, <u>we have to distinguish feminist from patriarchal objectives. Patriarchal discourses on peace or security are generally framed in terms of power and weapons<strong>. Defence of women and children are portrayed as justifications for war and large military capabilities.</p><p></strong>By contrast, feminists have demonstrated that <mark>violence against women is <strong>embedded in</mark> the <mark>racism, colonialist-capitalist expansionism, destruction and warmongering policies that are the causes, drivers and consequences of militarism and war.</strong></mark> As well as abusing power in the</u> the <u>institutions of state, predators also operate in places of education, aid, and civil society peace and development organisations, where the vulnerable are often befriended and groomed before being abused. Collusion in sexual violence is another patriarchal hallmark.</u> And <u><strong>this enabling <mark>complicity is not only practised by men or right-wingers.</p><p></strong></mark>Feminist activists expose how power, status and resources are distributed and</u> manpulated <u>[manipulated]. Although there is now a growing #MeToo consciousness, complainants still pay a high price for exposing men with status who are good at self promotion and manipulation. Punishment and threats are used to undermine female victims and whistleblowers who make accusations of racist or sexual harassment against privileged males, while perpetrators with positions, platforms and resources still get away with threatening the security, safety and equal opportunities of marginalised people, especially women and girls</p><p><strong>Building peace and justice requires ending collusion in racism, sexual violence and abuses of power, no matter how or by whom such abusive behaviours are dressed up and defended.</p><p>The questions <mark>we need to ask</mark> are: <mark>whose security, peace and defence are we supporting</mark>? achieved <mark>by what methods and under what conditions?</p><p></strong></mark>What does security and peace mean to you? How can we individually and collectively tackle security challenges we face and do more to build peace in the world?</p><p>How can we respect the rights, spaces and strategies of women </u>and girls <u>with different experiences of threat and oppression, while also building feminist solidarity, effective campaigning, and movements to work across the intersections and achieve peace and security for all of us?</p><p>Our environment and climate are at risk of irrevocable and existential destruction, while 13,000 nuclear weapons are in the hands of nine macho leaders who treat nuclear use and war as a virility test. As well as being climate deniers and conflict promoters, some of these leaders stand personally accused as perpetrators of sexual and racial harassment and misconduct. All of them devote obscene amounts of their nations' resources on militarism and deadly weapons. <strong><mark>They</mark> appear to <mark>equate security with</mark> their own <mark>military-industrial freedom</mark> of action,</strong><mark> while putting the</mark> security, <mark>survival</mark> and well-being <mark>of</mark> </u>women and, indeed, <u><strong><mark>all living creatures</strong> at risk</mark> with their policies and practices.</p><p></u>I do not generally identify as a pacifist, but I believe that we can achieve much higher levels of personal and political peace and security through collective nonviolent action for systemic change. Violence can sometimes change governments or personnel at the top, but active nonviolence is a far more effective way to bring about positive political, social and structural change, without which humanity cannot survive. <u>The institutional violence and profiteering embedded in military-industrial establishments are direct causes of today's wars, nuclear threats and inability to tackle the climate emergency.</p><p><strong>My nonviolence is intertwined with my feminism, and owes much to my experiences at Greenham Common, learning from the Suffragettes, Black Sash, Vandana Shiva, Whangari Maathai, Lijon Eknilang... and the networks of feminist rebels who for centuries have mobilised against patriarchal destruction with nonviolent resistence, courage and imagination. It's not that I don't acknowledge the writings and speeches of patriarchal gurus of nonviolence in the 20th centuries. We learned much from their struggles, including their limitations. As leaders with patriarchal assumptions about male roles, women, spirituality and power, transforming their own cultures was beyond them. It is not beyond us when we practise collective nonviolence, with mutual respect and shared power and leadership.</p><p></u></strong>I remember Audre Lorde's 1979 essay "The master's tools will never dismantle the master's house" (Lorde 2017). <u><strong><mark>We need </mark>both <mark>to live in this brutal and unjust world, and </mark>to <mark>transform it. Not just to dismantle patriarchy, but to imagine and build something</mark> much <mark>better in its place.</mark> </strong>By comparison with the 1980s, there is now more discussion of gender roles and impacts in relation to armed conflict, but we still face <strong>considerable resistance to recognizing gendered impacts of weapons, and feminist strategies for disarmament and security.</p><p>If the tools we currently use limit what can be done, <mark>we</mark> have three choices: <mark>do our best with what we've got; adapt</mark> the <mark>tools to increase</mark> their <mark>effectiveness</mark> for more challenges; <mark>or design new tools for transformative purposes.</mark> And <mark>we have to make these choices</mark> while living in today's world, <mark>with all</mark> the <mark>patriarchal weapons, mindsets, and institutions of power, oppression and insecurity.</mark> That makes our work difficult, but not impossible.</p><p></u></strong>After many years of working at the interface between grassroots feminist activism and disarmament 'think tank' work incorporating treaty-making and the 'women, peace, security' and gender agendas, from 2008 onwards I've prioritised establishing the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) in Geneva, as a global humanitarian disarmament campaign to get a multilaterally negotiated, universally applicable treaty to ban and eliminate nuclear weapons. We achieved a significant breakthrough with the UN negotiations and adoption of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, aka Nuclear Ban Treaty), which in turn followed from principles and strategies developed through the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and 2008 Cluster Munitions Convention.</p><p><strong>These disarmament agreements owe much to feminist as well as humanitarian politics and practice from the 1970s onwards. I'll turn now to Nounou who has put together this powerpoint showing how she got involved in feminist mobilising for women and peace, including working in East Africa and internationally for disarmament treaties such as these. She will be followed by Bonnie Jenkins, and we hope to leave plenty of time for questions, comments and discussion at the end.</p></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Viljar Veebel 19. Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College. 06/01/2019. “Researching Baltic Security Challenges after the Annexation of Crimea.” Journal on Baltic Security, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 41–52. fulltext: It should also be noted in this respect that the most recent reports of the RAND Corporation are more modest in their assessments compared with the results of the previous studies. For example, a study by Scott Boston and co-authors entitled ‘Assessing the conventional force imbalance in Europe: Implications for countering Russian local superiority’, argues that based on their analysis, there is no reason to believe that Russian conventional aggression against NATO is likely to take place. However, they also emphasize that steps should be taken to mitigate potential areas of vulnerability in the interest of ensuring a stable security relationship between all NATO members and Russia. The authors conclude that NATO has sufficient resources, personnel, and equipment to enhance conventional deterrence against Russia (Boston et al., 2018). More specifically, most conventional threat scenarios clearly point to the same problematic issue: the possibility that Russia could isolate the Baltic countries from its Western allies by closing the ‘Suwalki gap’ (called also ‘Kaliningrad corridor’), a 110–115 kilometre wide land border between Lithuania and Poland. One of the most comprehensive studies on this matter is a research by Leszek Elak and Zdzislaw Sliwa, ‘The Suwalki Gap – NATOʼs fragile hot spot’. The article analyses various characteristics of the Kaliningrad region from the military perspective as well as suggests in a very detailed manner the potential tactics that could be used in military aggressions within the Suwalki gap. Elak and Sliwa conclude that the loss of the land connection between the West and the Baltic countries would allow Russia freedom of action over an extended period of time. Furthermore, they argue that if the terrain is lost, it will require significant efforts to control the area again. The authors stress that the Kaliningrad region is critical for Russia to gain time, which is the third important operational factor supporting other two factors, such as space and force, enabling the desired speed to reach the desired end state (Elak and Sliwa, 2016). This issue is further elaborated, for example, in the articles ‘Kaliningrad: A useless sliver of Russia or the cause of a new Fulda gap?’ by Vaidas Saldžiūnas (2016), ‘Why it would be rational for Russia to escalate in Kaliningrad and Suwalki corridor?’ by Viljar Veebel (2018d), ‘Kaliningrad oblast as the forward anti-access/area denial hub’ by Zdzislaw Sliwa (2018), and others. 3 Studies on potential nuclear escalation scenarios The question whether Russia would use its nuclear forces in the Baltic region has also intrigued many academics and military experts recently. One of the most radical discussions in this field is a blog post by Loren B. Thompson, ‘Why the Baltic states are where nuclear war is most likely to begin’. He argues that the likelihood of nuclear war between Russia and the United States is probably growing and is the reason why it is most likely going to start is a future military confrontation over three Baltic countries. Thompson describes eight reasons why nuclear weapons could potentially be used in future warfighting scenarios with regard to the Baltics and argues that according to the bottom-line scenario, the East–West conflict escalates into the use of nuclear weapons in the Baltic area, and neither side of the conflict understands what actions might provoke nuclear use by the other. Thompson comes to a somewhat surprising conclusion – at least in the eyes of the Baltic countries – that the United States needs to reassess the situation, suggesting that it would make no sense to tie security of the United States to countries of ‘such modest importance that are situated in such unpromising tactical circumstances’ (Thompson, 2016). Potential nuclear conflict escalation scenarios are in more detail discussed in another publication, a NATO playbook entitled ‘Preventing escalation in the Baltics’ by Ulrich Kühn. The author argues that the risk of escalating a wider conflict between Russia and NATO is dangerously high particularly in the case of the Baltic countries because it would be difficult for NATO to defend the region. Kühn suggest three possible escalation scenarios, i.e., deliberate escalation, inadvertent escalation, and accidental escalation. All three scenarios also involve nuclear threats; however, two of the scenarios stop short of actual Russian nuclear-weapon usage (Kühn, 2018). The analysis provides an interesting hypothetical construct for the experts at both the transatlantic and local levels, as it points to many practical issues in regard to the nuclear deterrence from the NATO’s political decision-making process to the role of domestic policies in tackling such a crisis. Conflict escalation scenarios that involve nuclear capabilities are discussed also in other studies. For example, in a study called ‘Reducing the risk of nuclear war in the Nordic/Baltic region’ by Barry Blechman and co-authors, two scenarios of conventional war ending in the exchange of nuclear weapons are constructed (namely, ‘Escalation in Estonia’ and ‘Regional War’). Although the authors emphasize that the scenarios are purely illustrative and the probability of nuclear use is low, they argue that it is useful to reduce these risks even further and suggest two initiatives, such as a strengthening of the Alliance’s conventional military capabilities and particularly the ability to move quickly into the Baltic region, as well as to establish a Baltic nuclear weapons free zone, or at least examining the possibility to do so (for further discussion, see Blechman et at., 2015). Jüri Luik and Tomas Jermalavičius in their article ‘A plausible scenario of nuclear war in Europe, and how to deter it: A perspective from Estonia’ point to various alarming signs, e.g., Russia’s large-scale exercises incorporate limited nuclear strike scenarios against NATO as part of Russia’s ‘escalation to de-escalate’ strategy; Russia is expanding the range of its tactical delivery systems, the country’s political rhetoric includes nuclear threats toward the West, and so on. They emphasize that the Alliance’s range of response options to such threats and limited nuclear war scenarios has shrunk considerably and that the Alliance lacks a collective will to call those threats a bluff (Luik and Jermalavičius, 2017). A large part of the research in this field more or less considers it likely that Russia could use its nuclear forces in the Baltic region. However, there are also articles that oppose this conviction. For example, Viljar Veebel and Illimar Ploom in ‘The deterrence credibility of NATO and the readiness of the Baltic states to employ the deterrence instruments’ disagree with the idea that the Baltic countries could be under potential nuclear attack, which could in turn evolve to a nuclear war. They argue that although Russia and NATO as potential conflict parties have a striking capability, it would be irrational for both of them to execute a nuclear strike even as a measure of last resort. The authors stress that it is hard to believe that Russia has any rational motivation to use nuclear weapons in the Baltic countries because a large share of the population in the Baltic countries are Russian-speaking. Likewise, in case of a potential conflict, territorial proximity of Russia and the Baltic countries, as well as Russia’s possible further ambition to legitimate the annexation comes into play. The argument of irrationality applies also to the NATO alliance as it would raise a question about morality and escalation should NATO consider using nuclear attack as a preventative measure. In addition, there are several logical gaps in the chain of arguments justifying the use of nuclear weapons against Russia if the latter has fully or partially invaded the Baltic countries. The authors hereby point to the following questions: First, how could the strategic use of nuclear weapons against Russia be believable in a regional conflict? Second, how would it help to solve the conflict which has already started? Third, what would be the possible positive outcome for NATO, having initiated mutually assured destruction with Russia to stop the occupations of Baltics? (Veebel and Ploom, 2018a).<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Doesn’t go nuclear</h4><p>Viljar <strong>Veebel 19</strong>. Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College. 06/01/2019. “Researching Baltic Security Challenges after the Annexation of Crimea.” Journal on Baltic Security, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 41–52.</p><p>It should also be noted in this respect that the most recent reports of the RAND Corporation are more modest in their assessments compared with the results of the previous studies. For example, a study by Scott Boston and co-authors entitled ‘Assessing the conventional force imbalance in Europe: Implications for countering Russian local superiority’, argues that based on their analysis, <u><mark>there is</u> <u><strong>no reason to believe</mark> that Russian <mark>conventional aggression</mark> against NATO <mark>is likely</mark> to take place</u></strong>. However, they also emphasize that steps should be taken to mitigate potential areas of vulnerability in the interest of ensuring a stable security relationship between all NATO members and Russia. The authors conclude that NATO has sufficient resources, personnel, and equipment to enhance conventional deterrence against Russia (Boston et al., 2018).</p><p>More specifically, <u>most conventional threat scenarios clearly point to the same problematic issue: the possibility that Russia could isolate the Baltic countries from its Western allies by closing the</u> <u><strong>‘Suwalki gap’</u></strong> (called also ‘Kaliningrad corridor’), <u>a 110–115 kilometre wide land border between Lithuania and Poland</u>. One of the most comprehensive studies on this matter is a research by Leszek Elak and Zdzislaw Sliwa, ‘The Suwalki Gap – NATOʼs fragile hot spot’. The article analyses various characteristics of the Kaliningrad region from the military perspective as well as suggests in a very detailed manner the potential tactics that could be used in military aggressions within the Suwalki gap. Elak and Sliwa conclude that the loss of the land connection between the West and the Baltic countries would allow Russia freedom of action over an extended period of time. Furthermore, they argue that if the terrain is lost, it will require significant efforts to control the area again. The authors stress that the Kaliningrad region is critical for Russia to gain time, which is the third important operational factor supporting other two factors, such as space and force, enabling the desired speed to reach the desired end state (Elak and Sliwa, 2016). This issue is further elaborated, for example, in the articles ‘Kaliningrad: A useless sliver of Russia or the cause of a new Fulda gap?’ by Vaidas Saldžiūnas (2016), ‘Why it would be rational for Russia to escalate in Kaliningrad and Suwalki corridor?’ by Viljar Veebel (2018d), ‘Kaliningrad oblast as the forward anti-access/area denial hub’ by Zdzislaw Sliwa (2018), and others.</p><p>3 Studies on potential nuclear escalation scenarios</p><p><u>The question whether Russia would use</u> its <u><strong>nuclear force</strong>s in the Baltic region has</u> <u><strong>also intrigued many</u></strong> academics and military experts recently. One of the most radical discussions in this field is a blog post by Loren B. Thompson, ‘Why the Baltic states are where nuclear war is most likely to begin’. He argues that the likelihood of nuclear war between Russia and the United States is probably growing and is the reason why it is most likely going to start is a future military confrontation over three Baltic countries. Thompson describes eight reasons why nuclear weapons could potentially be used in future warfighting scenarios with regard to the Baltics and argues that according to the bottom-line scenario, the East–West conflict escalates into the use of nuclear weapons in the Baltic area, and neither side of the conflict understands what actions might provoke nuclear use by the other. Thompson comes to a somewhat surprising conclusion – at least in the eyes of the Baltic countries – that the United States needs to reassess the situation, suggesting that it would make no sense to tie security of the United States to countries of ‘such modest importance that are situated in such unpromising tactical circumstances’ (Thompson, 2016).</p><p>Potential nuclear conflict escalation scenarios are in more detail discussed in another publication, a NATO playbook entitled ‘Preventing escalation in the Baltics’ by Ulrich Kühn. The author argues that the risk of escalating a wider conflict between Russia and NATO is dangerously high particularly in the case of the Baltic countries because it would be difficult for NATO to defend the region. Kühn suggest three possible escalation scenarios, i.e., deliberate escalation, inadvertent escalation, and accidental escalation. All three scenarios also involve nuclear threats; however, two of the scenarios stop short of actual Russian nuclear-weapon usage (Kühn, 2018). The analysis provides an interesting hypothetical construct for the experts at both the transatlantic and local levels, as it points to many practical issues in regard to the nuclear deterrence from the NATO’s political decision-making process to the role of domestic policies in tackling such a crisis.</p><p>Conflict escalation scenarios that involve nuclear capabilities are discussed also in other studies. For example, in a study called ‘Reducing the risk of nuclear war in the Nordic/Baltic region’ by Barry Blechman and co-authors, two scenarios of conventional war ending in the exchange of nuclear weapons are constructed (namely, ‘Escalation in Estonia’ and ‘Regional War’). Although the authors emphasize that the scenarios are purely illustrative and <u>the <mark>probability of nuclear use is</u> <u><strong>low</u></strong></mark>, they argue that it is useful to reduce these risks even further and suggest two initiatives, such as a strengthening of the Alliance’s conventional military capabilities and particularly the ability to move quickly into the Baltic region, as well as to establish a Baltic nuclear weapons free zone, or at least examining the possibility to do so (for further discussion, see Blechman et at., 2015). Jüri Luik and Tomas Jermalavičius in their article ‘A plausible scenario of nuclear war in Europe, and how to deter it: A perspective from Estonia’ point to various alarming signs, e.g., Russia’s large-scale exercises incorporate limited nuclear strike scenarios against NATO as part of Russia’s ‘escalation to de-escalate’ strategy; Russia is expanding the range of its tactical delivery systems, the country’s political rhetoric includes nuclear threats toward the West, and so on. They emphasize that the Alliance’s range of response options to such threats and limited nuclear war scenarios has shrunk considerably and that the Alliance lacks a collective will to call those threats a bluff (Luik and Jermalavičius, 2017).</p><p>A large part of the research in this field more or less considers it likely that Russia could use its nuclear forces in the Baltic region. However, there are also articles that oppose this conviction. For example, Viljar Veebel and Illimar Ploom in ‘The deterrence credibility of NATO and the readiness of the Baltic states to employ the deterrence instruments’ disagree with the idea that the Baltic countries could be under potential nuclear attack, which could in turn evolve to a nuclear war. They argue that <u><mark>although Russia and NATO</mark> as potential conflict parties <strong><mark>have</mark> a <mark>striking capability</strong>, it would be</u> <u><strong>irrational for both</mark> of them</u></strong> <u><mark>to</mark> execute a nuclear <mark>strike</u> <u><strong>even as a</mark> measure of <mark>last resort</u></strong></mark>. The authors stress that <u><mark>it is</u> <u><strong>hard to believe</u></strong></mark> <u>that <mark>Russia</u> <u>has</u> <u><strong>any</mark> rational <mark>motivation to use nuc</strong></mark>lear weapon<strong><mark>s in the Baltic</u></strong></mark> countrie<u><strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark> because <u>a large share of <mark>the population</mark> in the Baltic countries <mark>are</u> <u><strong>Russian-speaking</u></strong></mark>. Likewise, <u>in case of a potential conflict,</u> <u><strong><mark>territorial proximity</u></strong></mark> <u>of Russia and the Baltic countries, <mark>as well as</mark> Russia’s possible further <mark>ambition to</u> <u><strong>legitimate</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>annexation</u></strong> <u>comes <strong>in</strong></mark>to play</u>. The argument of <u>irrationality</u> <u><strong>applies also to</u></strong> the <u><strong>NATO</u></strong> alliance <u>as it would raise a question about</u> <u><strong>morality and escalation</u></strong> <u>should NATO consider</u> using <u>nuclear attack as a preventative measure. In addition, <mark>there are</mark> several <strong><mark>logical gaps</u></strong></mark> <u>in the chain of arguments justifying the use of nuclear weapons against Russia</u> if the latter has fully or partially invaded the Baltic countries. The authors hereby point to the following questions: First, <u><mark>how could</mark> the <mark>strategic use</mark> of nuclear weapons against Russia <mark>be <strong>believable in a regional conflict?</u></strong></mark> Second, <u><mark>how would it</u> <u><strong>help</mark> to solve the conflict</u></strong> which has already started? Third, <u><mark>what would be the <strong>possible positive outcome for NATO</strong>, having</u> <u><strong>initiated m</strong></mark>utually <strong><mark>a</strong></mark>ssured <strong><mark>d</strong></mark>estruction</u> with Russia to stop the occupations of Baltics? (Veebel and Ploom, 2018a).</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Goodin & Niemeyer ‘3 (Robert; Simon; 2003; Australian National University; “When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy”; Political Studies; Vol. 50; p. 627-649) fulltext: What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Impact 3 is <u>self-questioning</u> – the process of researching, thinking about, and reflecting on a topic prior to debating it <u>changes minds</u>. Without a predictable, limited resolution teams will resort to gut reactions that <u>entrench biases</u>. </h4><p><strong>Goodin & Niemeyer ‘3 </strong>(Robert; Simon; 2003; Australian National University; “When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy”; Political Studies; Vol. 50; p. 627-649)</p><p>What happened <u>in</u> this particular case, as in <u>any particular case</u>, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. <u>Exaggerated claims and counter-claims</u> had <u><strong>become</strong> entrenched, and unreflective public opinion <strong>polarized</strong> around them</u>. In this circumstance, <u>the effect</u> of the information phase <u>of <mark>deliberative processes</mark> was to <strong><mark>brush away</strong></mark> those highly <mark>polarized attitudes, <strong>dispel</strong></mark> the <mark>myths</mark> and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, <mark>and <strong>liberate</strong> people to act</mark> upon their attitudes</u> toward the protection of rainforest itself. <u><mark>The key</mark> point</u>, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, <u>is</u> that <u>that <mark>happened</u></mark> in the earlier stages of deliberation – <u><strong><mark>before</mark> the formal <mark>discussions</u></strong></mark> (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. <u><strong>Talking among themselves</u></strong>, as a jury, <u><strong>did very little</u></strong> of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. <u>Suppose that</u> instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what <u>we have at the outset</u> is <u>mass ignorance or mass apathy</u> or non-attitudes. There again, <u><mark>people’s <strong>engaging</strong> with the issue</u></mark> – focusing on it, <u><strong><mark>acquiring information</strong></mark> about it, <strong><mark>thinking hard</strong> about it</mark> – would</u> be something that is likely to <u><mark>occur earlier</u></mark> rather than later <u>in the deliberative process</u>. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. <u>There is much</u> in the large <u>literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change</u> to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. <u><mark>Before deliberation</mark>, individuals may not</u> have <u>give</u>n <u>the issue much thought or bothered to engage</u> in <u>an extensive process of reflection</u>.32 <u>In such cases, positions may be arrived</u> at <u>via</u> peripheral routes, taking <u><strong>cognitive shortcuts</strong> or arriving at <strong>‘top of the head’ conclusions</strong> or even</u> simply <u><strong>following the lead</strong> <strong>of others</u></strong> believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. <u>Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, <mark>there may be <strong>inconsistencies</strong> in logic</mark> and the formation of positions, <mark>based on</u></mark> partial information or <u><strong><mark>incomplete information processing</u></strong></mark>. In contrast, <u>‘central’ routes to</u> <u>the development of attitudes involve</u> the application of <u>more deliberate effort</u> to the matter at hand, <u>in a way</u> that is more <u>akin to</u> the <u>internal-reflective deliberative ideal</u>. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that <u>we lead our ordinary lives</u> largely <u>on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without</u> much <u>thought</u> or reflection. <u>When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines</u> – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, <u>when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we</u> easily <u>retrieve what we think but we cannot</u> so easily <u>retrieve the reasons why</u>. <u><mark>That</u></mark> more <u><strong><mark>fully reasoned assessment</u></strong></mark> – the sort of thing we have been calling <u><strong>internal-<mark>reflective deliberation</strong></mark> – <mark>requires us to call</mark> up <mark>reasons</u></mark> from stored memory <u><mark>rather than just consulting</mark> our</u> running on-line ‘<u>summary <mark>judgments’</u></mark>. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, <u>what prompts that shift from online to more <strong>deeply reflective deliberation</strong> is</u> not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for <u><strong>fixing one’s attention on a topic</u></strong>, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even <u>in the context of a group discussion, this shift</u> from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing <u>is likely to occur earlier rather than later</u> in the process, often <u>before the formal discussion ever begins</u>. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that <u>elements of the pre-discursive process are</u> likely to prove <u>crucial to</u> the <u><strong>shaping and reshaping</u></strong> of <u>people’s attitudes</u> in a citizens’ jury-style process. <u>The</u> initial <u>processes of <strong><mark>focusing attention on a topic</strong></mark>, providing information about it <mark>and inviting people to <strong>think hard</u></strong></mark> about it <u>is likely to</u> provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, <u><mark>alter</u></mark>ing <u>not just the information people have</u> about the issue <u>but also <mark>the way people<strong> process that information</strong> and</u></mark> hence (perhaps) what they <u><strong><mark>think about the issue</u></strong></mark>. What happens once <u>people</u> have <u>shift</u>ed <u>into this</u> more <u><strong>internal-reflective mode</u></strong> is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and <u><mark>they</u></mark> then <u><mark>may</u></mark> (or may not) <u><mark>be <strong>open</strong> to argument</mark> and counter-argument, <mark>with talk <strong>actually changing minds</u></strong></mark>. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 <u>Our claim is</u> instead merely <u>that the earliest steps in the</u> jury <u>process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue</u> at hand <u>and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will</u> invariably <u><strong>matter more</strong> than</u> deliberative democrats of <u>a more discursive stripe</u> would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, <u>the <mark>pre-discursive phases</u></mark> of the jury process <u>will</u> invariably <u><mark>have a <strong>considerable impact</strong> on changing the way jurors approach an issue</u></mark>. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that <u>informal, pre-group deliberation</u> – ‘deliberation within’ – <u>will</u> inevitably <u>do much of the work that deliberative democrats</u> ordinarily <u>want to attribute to</u> the more <u>formal discursive processes</u>. <u>What are the preconditions for that happening?</u> To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • <u>A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue</u>. <u>Ordinary politics involve many issues at once</u>. • <u>A citizens’ jury is</u> often <u>supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders</u> (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). <u>In ordinary</u> mass <u>politics, there is rarely</u> any equivalent <u><strong>common ground</strong> on which debates are conducted</u>. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • <u>Participating in</u> something called <u>a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes</u> certain <u>very particular norms: norms concerning</u> the ‘<u>impartiality’</u> appropriate to jurors; <u>norms concerning the ‘common good’</u> orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that <u>citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in</u> all <u>those ways</u>. But <u>if being special</u> in all those ways <u>makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process</u>, then <u>those are design features</u> that <u>we ought</u> try <u>to mimic</u> as best we can <u>in ordinary</u> mass <u>politics as well</u>. <u>There are various ways that</u> that <u>might be done</u>. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. <u><mark>Issues might be sequenced for <strong>debate</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>resolution</strong>, to avoid</mark> too much <mark>competition for</mark> people’s time and <mark>attention</u></mark>. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying <u>those features</u> that <u>need to be replicated in <strong>real-world politics</strong> in order to achieve that goal</u> – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Ferguson’12 (Roderick A. Ferguson is the co-director of the Racialized Body research cluster at UIC. Prior to his appointment there, he was professor of race and critical theory in the Department of American Studies at the University of Minnesota, serving as chair of the department from 2009 to 2012. In the fall of 2013, he was the Old Dominion Visiting Faculty for the Council of the Humanities and the Center for African American Studies at Princeton University. In 2004, he was Scholar in Residence for the “Queer Locations” Seminar at the University of California’s Humanities Research Institute in Irvine, California. From 2007 to 2010, he was associate editor of the American Studies Association’s flagship journal American Quarterly. “Reorder of Things : The University and Its Pedagogies of Minority Difference” 2012. Pgs. 14-16)NAE fulltext: As a critique of institutional belonging, Self-Portrait 2000 grapples with the potential malignancies of recognition. Indeed, the collage narrates a transition— that is, the shift from the figure of Western man as the basis of agency and representation to that of minoritized cultures, subjects, and differences as contenders in the quest for acceptance, normativity and lawfulness. But through its substitution of a plane crash for an actual portrait of Piper, the piece refuses any humanist celebration of Man’s minoritized replacements. Never giving us a picture of minoritized people or one of Piper, the piece withholds the visage of the very figures that the moment and the collage were supposed to represent. In Self-Portrait 2000, the institutional and artistic forms that are supposedly best equipped for representing people in general, and minoritized people in particular— the state, the academy, the portrait— are utterly incapable of representing those subjects and can offer only a wrecked depiction instead. In doing so, Self-Portrait 2000 refuses the affirmations that constitute minority nationalisms. We might contrast the absence of a biographical image in Self-Portrait 2000 with revolutionary and cultural nationalisms’ presumption that they can make institutional, state, and administrative forms in their own image. Indeed, we can think of various cultural and revolutionary nationalist projects as attempts to stamp their own visages upon institutional contexts. Such attempts are not idiosyncratic or insignificant but conventional and definitive for minority nationalisms. In the context of the sixties and seventies, such attempts were not only expressed in terms of the fabled take over of the state form but in terms of epistemological, administrative, and institutional reflection as well— ostensibly launched by the actual takeover of academic buildings and the erection of departments, centers, and programs. The triumphant and anticolonial slogan of “Massa day done” applied, then, not only to the state but to other modern institutions as well, particularly the academy. Self-Portrait 2000 refutes this fable of reflection that posits dominant institutions as potential mirrors for minority culture and difference. Instead, the collage seems to suggest that institutions— if mirrors at all— are ones that can offer only dim likenesses. In this way, we might read Self-Portrait 2000 as a rebuttal to the boasts of institutions, that in their archival capacities they can adequately reflect minoritized cultures and differences. We may go even further and say that Self-Portrait 2000 exhibits and expresses the critical possibilities of minority cultural forms, particularly in post– civil rights moments. By “critical possibilities” I mean the potential of those cultural forms to offer accounts of institutional modes— not simply the disfranchisements and betrayals of institutions, but also the rules of inclusion and the anatomies of recognition and legitimacy; not simply how we are entrapped, but also how we might achieve provisional forms of freedom and insurgency. As a critical formation, powerful strains of women-of-color feminism have historically offered a critical suspicion to bourgeois, cultural, and revolutionary nationalist desires for recognition and institutional legitimacy. Indeed, women-of-color feminists have often theorized minority nationalisms not as formations insulated from state nationalism but as ironically entwined with its ideologies and discourses. Plainly put, such interventions have sought to discern the institutional models at play in minority nationalisms. In a similar gesture, Jacques Derrida offers a reading of cultural forms as records and articulators of institutional practices and logics. Again, in Eyes of the University, he writes: with students and the research community, in every operation we pursue together (a reading, an interpretation, the construction of a theoretical model, the rhetoric of an argumentation, the treatment of historical material, and even a mathematical formalization), we posit or acknowledge that an institutional concept is at play, a type of contract signed, an image of the ideal seminar constructed, a socius implied, repeated, or displaced, invented, transformed, threatened, or destroyed. An institution is not merely a few walls or some outer structures surrounding, protecting, guaranteeing, or restricting the freedom of our work; it is also and already the structure of our interpretation. 26 Here Derrida points to the fact that institutions are not simply things that are embodied externally in the form of buildings and paperwork. Institutions are also modes of interpretation that are embodied materially, discursively, and subjectively, modes offering visions of community and communal engagement. Commenting on the interpretative and textual aspects of institutions, Derrida goes on to say that [the] interpretation of a theorem, poem, or philosopheme, or theologeme is only produced by simultaneously proposing an institutional model, either by consolidating an existing one that enables the interpretation, or by constituting a new one in accordance with this interpretation. Declared or clandestine, this proposal calls for the politics of a community of interpreters gathered around this text, and at the same time of a global society, a civil society with or without a State, a veritable regime enabling the inscription of that community. 27 Derrida’s argument about the simultaneity of institution-building and hermeneutical practices accurately suggests the place of interpretation and textuality in institutional struggle. Institutions are the outcome and locations of imagined communities, with interpretative modes representing the brick and mortar of those imaginations. The ethnic and women’s movements moved to the heart of this relationship between institutionality and textuality. Indeed, the admission of women and people of color into predominantly white universities and colleges forced new modes of interpretation and new institutional visions within the American academy. At the same time, the student movements and student demands had to negotiate with and appeal to prevailing institutional structures. The student movements of the sixties and seventies constituted and inspired interpretative communities that would propose institutional models that were both disruptive and recuperative of existing institutions. In sum, the relationship between institutionality and textuality accounted for a constitutive contradiction within the student movements— their simultaneous estrangement from and appeals to institutional power. We can actually situate Self-Portrait 2000 within this critical genealogy. Self-Portrait 2000 tries to delineate the overlapping institutional models that have come to characterize the post– civil rights moment. The collage asks us to rethink the presumption that the major institutions of civil society— the academy, the state, and capital— have fostered institutional concepts that protect and shelter minoritized differences and cultures. It asks us to consider how those differences and cultures have been archived in power’s newest arrangement and how they have attempted to close critical universes established in the name of new formations around race, gender, and sexuality.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The alternative is a refusal of the 1AC. Only by refusing the 1AC can we push the commodified forms of resistance outside of the confines of the academy in order to disinvest from the forms of recognition that make Western Man possible and violent in order to create new interpretations of performance that destroy the academic institutions that make legibility possible. </h4><p><strong>Ferguson’12</strong> (Roderick A. Ferguson is the co-director of the Racialized Body research cluster at UIC. Prior to his appointment there, he was professor of race and critical theory in the Department of American Studies at the University of Minnesota, serving as chair of the department from 2009 to 2012. In the fall of 2013, he was the Old Dominion Visiting Faculty for the Council of the Humanities and the Center for African American Studies at Princeton University. In 2004, he was Scholar in Residence for the “Queer Locations” Seminar at the University of California’s Humanities Research Institute in Irvine, California. From 2007 to 2010, he was associate editor of the American Studies Association’s flagship journal American Quarterly<u>. “Reorder of Things : The University and Its Pedagogies of Minority Difference” 2012. Pgs. 14-16)NAE</p><p>As a critique of institutional belonging, Self-Portrait 2000 grapples with the potential malignancies of recognition. Indeed, the collage narrates a transition— that is<mark>, the shift from the figure of Western man as the basis of agency and representation to that of minoritized cultures,</mark> subjects, and <mark>differences as contenders in the quest for acceptance, normativity and lawfulness</mark>.</u> But through its substitution of a plane crash for an actual portrait of Piper<u>, <mark>the piece refuses any humanist celebration of Man’s minoritized replacements</mark>. Never giving us a picture of minoritized people or one of Piper, the piece withholds the visage of the very figures that the moment and the collage were supposed to represent. </u>In Self-Portrait 2000, <u>the institutional and artistic forms that are supposedly best equipped for representing people in general, and minoritized people in particular— <mark>the state, the academy, the portrait— are utterly incapable of representing those subjects and can offer only a wrecked depiction </mark>instead.</u> In doing so, <u><mark>Self-Portrait 2000 refuses the affirmations that constitute minority nationalisms</mark>.</u> <u>We might contrast the absence of a biographical image in Self-Portrait 2000 with revolutionary and cultural nationalisms’ presumption that they can make institutional, state, and administrative forms in their own image.</u> Indeed, <u>we can think of various <mark>cultural and revolutionary nationalist projects</mark> as attempts to <mark>stamp their own visages upon institutional contexts</mark>.</u> <u>Such attempts are not idiosyncratic or insignificant but conventional and definitive for minority nationalisms</u>. In the context of the sixties and seventies, <u>such attempts were not only expressed in terms of the fabled take over of the state form but in terms of epistemological, administrative, and institutional reflection as well— ostensibly launched by the actual takeover of academic buildings and the erection of departments, centers, and programs.</u> The triumphant and anticolonial slogan of “Massa day done” applied, then, not only to the state but to other modern institutions as well, particularly the academy. <u>Self-Portrait 2000 refutes this fable of reflection that posits dominant institutions as potential mirrors for minority culture and difference.</u> Instead, <u>the collage seems to suggest that <mark>institutions</u></mark>— if mirrors at all— <u>are ones that <mark>can offer only dim likenesses</mark>.</u> In this way, <u>we might read Self-Portrait 2000 as a rebuttal to the boasts of institutions, that in their archival capacities they can adequately reflect minoritized cultures and differences.</u> <u><mark>We may go even further and say that Self-Portrait 2000 exhibits and expresses the critical possibilities of minority cultural forms</mark>, particularly in post– civil rights moments.</u> <u><mark>By “critical possibilities” I mean the potential of those cultural forms to offer accounts of</mark> institutional modes— not simply the disfranchisements and betrayals of institutions, but also the rules of <mark>inclusion and the anatomies of recognition and legitimacy</mark>; not simply how we are entrapped<mark>, but also how we might achieve provisional forms of freedom and insurgency</u></mark>. As a critical formation<u>, powerful strains of women-of-color feminism have historically offered a critical suspicion to bourgeois, cultural, and revolutionary nationalist desires for recognition and institutional legitimacy.</u> Indeed<mark>, <u>women-of-color feminists have often theorized minority nationalisms not as formations insulated from state nationalism but as</mark> ironically <mark>entwined with its ideologies and discourses</mark>.</u> Plainly put, <u>such interventions have sought to discern the institutional models at play in minority nationalisms.</u> In a similar gesture, Jacques Derrida offers a reading of cultural forms as records and articulators of institutional practices and logics. Again, in Eyes of the University, he writes: with students and the research community<u>, in every operation we pursue together</u> (a reading, an interpretation, the construction of a theoretical model, the rhetoric of an argumentation, the treatment of historical material, and even a mathematical formalization), <u>we posit or acknowledge that an institutional concept is at play, a type of contract signed, an image of the ideal seminar constructed, a socius implied, repeated, or displaced, invented, transformed, threatened, or destroyed. <mark>An institution is not merely a few walls or some outer structures surrounding,</mark> protecting, guaranteeing, or restricting <mark>the freedom of our work; it is also and already the structure of our interpretation</mark>.</u> 26 Here Derrida points to the fact <u>that <mark>institutions are not simply things that are embodied externally</mark> in the form of buildings and paperwork<mark>. Institutions are</mark> also <mark>modes of interpretation that are embodied</mark> materially, discursively, and subjectively, modes offering <mark>visions of community and communal engagement.</u></mark> Commenting on the interpretative and textual aspects of institutions, Derrida goes on to say that [the] interpretation of a theorem, poem, or philosopheme, or theologeme is only produced by simultaneously proposing an institutional model, either by consolidating an existing one that enables the interpretation, or by constituting a new one in accordance with this interpretation. Declared or clandestine<u>, this proposal calls for the politics of a community of interpreters gathered around this text, and at the same time of a global society, a civil society with or without a State, a veritable regime enabling the inscription of that community.</u> 27 Derrida’s argument about the simultaneity of institution-building and hermeneutical practices accurately suggests the place of interpretation and textuality in institutional struggle<u>. Institutions are the outcome and locations of imagined communities, with interpretative modes representing the brick and mortar of those imaginations.</u> The ethnic and women’s movements moved to the heart of this relationship between institutionality and textuality. Indeed, <u><mark>the admission of women and people of color into predominantly white universities and colleges forced new modes of interpretation and new institutional visions within the</mark> American <mark>academy</mark>.</u> At the same time, <u>the student movements and student demands had to negotiate with and appeal to prevailing institutional structures.</u> The student movements of the sixties and seventies constituted and inspired interpretative communities that would propose institutional models that were both disruptive and recuperative of existing institutions. In sum, <u>the relationship between institutionality and textuality accounted for a constitutive contradiction within the student movements— their simultaneous estrangement from and appeals to institutional power. </u>We can actually situate Self-Portrait 2000 within this critical genealogy. Self-Portrait 2000 tries to delineate the overlapping institutional models that have come to characterize the post– civil rights moment<u>. <mark>The collage asks us to rethink the presumption that the major institutions of civil society</mark>— the academy, the state, and capital— <mark>have fostered institutional concepts that protect and shelter minoritized differences</mark> and cultures.</u> <u>It asks us to consider how <mark>those differences and cultures have been archived in power’s newest arrangement<strong></mark> and how they have attempted to close critical universes established in the name of new formations around race, gender, and sexuality.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Fabian 19 [Christopher David, Bachelor of Science, USAFA. Master of Science in Space Studies Thesis. “A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy” January 2019 https://commons.und.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3456&context=theses] fulltext: Morgan points out that the nature of space deterrence has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War. First, a decoupling of space and nuclear warfare has destroyed the tacit red lines that guaranteed an attack on space systems would result in nuclear retaliation.60 Furthermore, technologies have been developed that allow for incremental escalation and nonlethal functional kills of space assets.61 A paradigm is created where escalation is probable, but the extent to which it will happen is unknown. This is a problem for Sino-U.S. space relations because China is a nuclear capable power who believes itself to have achieved nuclear deterrence with the United States, yet does not have the implied strategic understanding that it took the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. four decades to build. The rules of the game have changed, but the danger of nuclear apocalypse is still real and a risk of miscalculation has increased. Morgan echoes Johnson-Freese’s assertion that the dual-use phenomenon complicates deterrence and extends the reasoning on offensive dominance by adding valuable insight on the state of first-strike stability. In short, first-strike stability is difficult to maintain because the disproportionate gain from a first strike outweighs any cost a recipient can impose in response. The United States’ overwhelming reliance on and comparative advantage from space based effects gives a prospective attacker very high payoff and satellites being relatively soft targets increases the likelihood of success and further adds to the benefit of a first-strike.62 Conversely, the emphasis on system based warfare means that an effective attack on space assets drastically reduces the ability of the U.S. to impose costs. Also, its overreliance on space and the fragility of the space environment require an asymmetric response to both avoid a tit-for-tat spiral and protect the continued use of the domain. Furthermore, a lack of space situational awareness (SSA) prevents a rapid response.63 Chinese military planners are acutely aware of the asymmetric advantage to be gained from a first-strike in space and have integrated it into military doctrine. This further strengthens the argument of space warfare as a flash point in East Asia. The structural factors examined in the literature thus far paint a bleak picture for a peaceful restructuring of East Asia. However, a bipartisan grand strategy that preempts conflict, is sustained and refined over decades, and has an acute sense of both a competitor and one’s own culture and history may be able to subvert structural determinism.64 When imperfect rationality and miscalculation results in deterrence failure it is difficult to underestimate the importance of understanding a competitor’s decision making apparatus. Strategic culture, political climate, and soft power interactions are the core of this apparatus. Joan Johnson-Freese, who is equal parts East Asia policy and space policy expert, asserts that, “it might be generally possible to grasp the mechanics of the Chinese space program without the benefits of historical information, but the likelihood of truly understanding the policy aspects without this contextual information is slightly less, and attempts at analysis and extrapolation become superficial at best.”65 Likewise, competitive strategy will be ineffective absent an understanding of one’s own limitations. Resources such as latent military capacity, budget, political capitol, strategic culture, and soft power/international prestige should be easy to calculate, but many times within the space program’s short history the failure to grasp internal limitations has been a stumbling block. Henry Kissinger’s On China is a nuanced examination of Chinese strategic culture that benefits from the author’s understanding of Chinese history and the nation’s role in late20th/early-21st century global power politics. He conveys a unified message through On China, that continual diplomatic engagement between the two powers is the key to peace and develops two motifs throughout the work. First, misapprehension of Chinese intent by western powers has repeatedly resulted in conflict, which could be avoided with better understanding of Chinese strategic culture. Traditional Chinese strategic culture, shaped for millennia by geography and Confucian principals, was not destroyed by Mao and the communist revolution as many assert. Kissinger uses the traditional martial games of wei qi (go) and chess to exemplify Chinese and western strategic cultures respectively. Where wei qi teaches the art of strategic flexibility by emphasizing encirclement, protracted and asymmetric warfare, generating unperceptively small advantages, and momentum; chess teaches total victory achieved by attrition, decisive moves, centers of gravity, and symmetry. Carl von Clausewitz teaches that war is policy by other means, inferring war as a distinct phase of politics; while Sun Tsu emphasizes victory before fighting by achieving psychological advantage with military means as a small part of overall strategy. The ideal Chinese military conflict is geographically limited and easily contained; the American way of war concludes only upon total victory. Kissinger then describes the feedback loop that results from conflicting strategic perspectives. The western desire for control threatens Chinese freedom of maneuver and exacerbates their siege mentality. In response, China assumes a policy of active defense (preemption) in order to maintain the strategic initiative. This, in turn, is seen as hostile by the west and typically results in escalation in order to establish deterrence through cost imposition. The western idea of deterrence is incompatible with ambiguity and flexibility while Chinese preemption demands it.67 This results in a distinguishable pattern. First, a state consolidates power on China’s periphery, surrounding China and threatening its structural integrity on both physical and psychological levels. Second, ever aware of shi, Chinese strategists employ measures to maintain their strategic flexibility and prevent total encirclement. Third, the peripheral power misinterprets preemption for aggression and escalates the conflict. At this point, China is either able to contain the threat and achieve its geopolitical aims or it is too weak to do so and is thrown into existential crisis. In the 20th century, this pattern has been exemplified by Chinese involvement in the Korean War and its continued support of an independent state to buffer the U.S. alliance bloc from a historical ingress point to the Chinese mainland; its own Vietnam War to prevent the emergence of a competitive power bloc led by Vietnam in Southeast Asia; and Chinese political maneuvering against the Soviet Union to prevent its consolidation of power over the Eurasian landmass. Disregarding the similarities between these disputes and the current Sino-U.S. position in East Asia is impossible.68 Second, the Sino-centric worldview is rising in China as she emerges from a century of humiliation to become an economic and military superpower. The over-proselytized American belief that the implementation of democracy should be the end goal of global politics and unapologetically moralist positions conflict with Sino-centrism. It is seen by China as an extension of colonial interventionism and a threat to their fiercely held autonomy. U.S. diplomacy is often contingent on the improvement of China’s human rights record. Widespread support for China’s various separatist movements and public outcry over the Tiananmen Square incident has exacerbated this problem. American reluctance to recognize the legitimacy of a communist government, give up democratization as long term policy goals, or give China its due in international relations has weakened Sino-U.S. relations. America’s moralist rather than pragmatic approach to policy threatens China’s delicate social order and undermines CCP legitimacy, resulting in missed diplomatic opportunities. Other policy analysts are certainly influenced by Kissinger, but add their own insight into Chinese Strategic culture. Kenneth Johnson and Andrew Scobell writing for the Strategic Studies Institute both attribute the apparent cognitive dissonance in Chinese policy to a curious blend of Confucian ideals and realpolitik thought, supporting Kissinger’s assertion that Confucianism is not dead. There is a cult of defense within China, accompanying a deeply held belief that China’s strategic culture is overwhelmingly pacifist. However, preemptive action is permissible as long as it can be a justifiable “defense” of Chinese strategic interests.70 In addition, China bemoans aggressive territorial expansion and hegemony by force. This historical sensitivity has only been exacerbated by the “century of humiliation” at the hands of European powers.71 However, the benevolent expansion of influence and the use of force for Chinese national unification is just. Furthermore, the Chinese fear of encirclement could cause a disproportionate reaction to the U.S. force realignment and restructuring of alliances in East Asia. This could exacerbate the worsening of the security dilemma that alliance forming typically causes. Joan-Johnson Freese emphasizes the influence of Confucianism in internal decision making and the penchant for isolationism. Confucianism emphasizes peace, order, and knowing one’s place within society. This invites authoritarianism and the Chinese people have little experience with participation in the political process. Rather, there is an instability lurking beneath the calm surface of society that leaders must constrain and satisfy in order to maintain their mandate to rule. The social contract has a simple results based nature where political stability and prosperity is exchanged for the continued political power. The Chinese Communist Party then is less beholden to communist ideology than it is to continued prosperity. Also, despite the negative connotation of nepotism in the West, it is an institution of Chinese culture (known as Guan Xi). From the outsider, the familial ties, importance of relationships, compartmentalization, and ambiguity in the Chinese bureaucracy are confusing and frustrating. This research paints the picture of the U.S. and China as diametrically opposed cultures that are almost designed to create misunderstanding between the two. Therefore, being aware of cultural and political sensitives is necessary to create sound strategy. Michael Pillsbury identifies 16 psycho-cultural pressure points where, if correctly considered in reassurance, cost imposition, or dissuasion strategies, will yield disproportionately effects whether they be positive or negative. Each of these factors are referred to as “fears”. Eleven of the sixteen fears are linked to the ability of the U.S. military to project power into East Asia and the strategic sea lines of communication from the Strait of Malacca to the Bohai Gulf, which is contingent on the ability to deliver space effects in support of U.S. military operation. Pillsbury identifies the fear of attack on their anti-satellite capabilities as a specific Chinese fear, but warfighting in the space domain is intrinsically linked to the other 11. Another of the sixteen fears is the fear of escalation and loss of control. This is particularly important because the Chinese view ASAT weaponry as a legitimate cost imposition option designed to limit conflict. Contrast that with the American strategy of threatening escalation in order to prevent the spread of the conflict into space and implicit red lines that fail to account for limited conflict in a strategic domain. Space’s role in soft power links it to two final fears, the fear of regional competitors and the fear of internal instability. Space technology development is essential to the CCP’s techno-nationalist narrative as it is assigned great importance internally to strengthen CCP’s mandate to rule and externally to legitimize China as a regional leader.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>US-China <u>miscalc</u> and <u>nuclear war</u> likely absent SSA coop – plan <u>familiarizes</u> each with <u>institutional climates</h4><p></u><strong>Fabian 19</strong> [Christopher David, Bachelor of Science, USAFA. Master of Science in Space Studies Thesis. “A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy” January 2019 https://commons.und.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3456&context=theses]</p><p>Morgan points out that the nature of space deterrence has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War. First, a decoupling of space and nuclear warfare has destroyed the tacit red lines that guaranteed an attack on space systems would result in nuclear retaliation.60 Furthermore, technologies have been developed that allow for incremental escalation and nonlethal functional kills of space assets.61 A paradigm is created where escalation is probable, but the extent to which it will happen is unknown. This is a problem for Sino-U.S. space relations because China is a nuclear capable power who believes itself to have achieved nuclear deterrence with the United States, yet does not have the implied strategic understanding that it took the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. four decades to build. The rules of the game have changed, but the <u><strong><mark>danger of nuclear apocalypse</mark> is</u></strong> still <u><strong>real</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> <u>a risk of <strong><mark>miscalc</u></strong></mark>ulation <u>has <strong><mark>increased</strong></mark>.</u> Morgan echoes Johnson-Freese’s assertion that the dual-use phenomenon complicates deterrence and extends the reasoning on offensive dominance by adding valuable insight on the state of first-strike stability. In short, first-strike stability is difficult to maintain because the disproportionate gain from a first strike outweighs any cost a recipient can impose in response. The United States’ overwhelming reliance on and comparative advantage from space based effects gives a prospective attacker very high payoff and satellites being relatively soft targets increases the likelihood of success and further adds to the benefit of a first-strike.62 Conversely, the emphasis on system based warfare means that an effective attack on space assets drastically reduces the ability of the U.S. to impose costs. Also, its overreliance on space and the fragility of the space environment require an asymmetric response to both avoid a tit-for-tat spiral and protect the continued use of the domain. Furthermore, a lack of space situational awareness (SSA) prevents a rapid response.63 Chinese military planners are acutely aware of the asymmetric advantage to be gained from a first-strike in space and have integrated it into military doctrine. This further strengthens the argument of space warfare as a flash point in East Asia. The structural factors examined in the literature thus far paint a bleak picture for a peaceful restructuring of East Asia. However, <u>a</u> bipartisan grand <u>strategy that preempts conflict</u>, is sustained and refined over decades, <u>and has <mark>an acute sense of</u></mark> both a <u><mark>competitor</u></mark> and one’s own <u><strong><mark>culture</u></strong></mark> and history <u>may</u> be able to <u><strong><mark>subvert</mark> </strong>structural determinism</u>.64 When imperfect rationality and <u><strong><mark>miscalc</u></strong></mark>ulation results in deterrence failure <u><mark>it is difficult to underestimate</mark> the <mark>importance of <strong>understanding a competitor’s decision</mark> making <mark>apparatus.</strong></mark> <strong><mark>Strategic culture</u></strong></mark>, political climate, and soft power <u><mark>interactions are</mark> the <strong><mark>core</strong></mark> of this apparatus.</u> Joan <u>Johnson-Freese</u>, who is equal parts <u>East Asia</u> policy <u>and space policy expert</u>, <u>asserts</u> that, “<u><mark>it might be</u></mark> generally <u><mark>possible to grasp</mark> the <mark>mechanics of the <strong>Chinese space program</strong></mark> </u>without the benefits of historical information, <u>but</u> the likelihood of <u><strong><mark>truly understanding</u></strong></mark> the policy aspects <u><strong><mark>without</u></strong></mark> this <u><strong><mark>contextual info</u></strong></mark>rmation <u><mark>is</u></mark> slightly less, and attempts at analysis and extrapolation become <u><strong><mark>superficial at best</u></strong></mark>.”65 Likewise, <u><strong><mark>competitive strategy will be ineffective</u></strong></mark> absent an understanding of one’s own limitations. Resources such as latent military capacity, budget, political capitol, strategic culture, and soft power/international prestige should be easy to calculate, but many times within the space program’s short history the failure to grasp internal limitations has been a stumbling block. Henry Kissinger’s On China is a nuanced examination of Chinese strategic culture that benefits from the author’s understanding of Chinese history and the nation’s role in late20th/early-21st century global power politics. He conveys a unified message through On China, that <u>continual <strong>diplomatic <mark>engagement</u></strong></mark> <u>between the two</u> powers <u><mark>is</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>key to peace</u></strong></mark> and develops two motifs throughout the work. First, <u><strong><mark>misapprehension of Chinese intent</strong></mark> by western powers <strong>has <mark>repeatedly resulted in conflict</strong></mark>, which <strong><mark>could be avoided</strong> with</mark> better <strong><mark>understanding</strong></mark> of Chinese <strong><mark>strategic culture.</strong></mark> </u>Traditional Chinese strategic culture, shaped for millennia by geography and Confucian principals, was not destroyed by Mao and the communist revolution as many assert. Kissinger uses the traditional martial games of wei qi (go) and chess to exemplify Chinese and western strategic cultures respectively. Where wei qi teaches the art of strategic flexibility by emphasizing encirclement, protracted and asymmetric warfare, generating unperceptively small advantages, and momentum; chess teaches total victory achieved by attrition, decisive moves, centers of gravity, and symmetry. Carl von Clausewitz teaches that war is policy by other means, inferring war as a distinct phase of politics; while Sun Tsu emphasizes victory before fighting by achieving psychological advantage with military means as a small part of overall strategy. The ideal Chinese military conflict is geographically limited and easily contained; the American way of war concludes only upon total victory. Kissinger then describes the <u><strong><mark>feedback loop</u></strong></mark> that <u><mark>results from <strong>conflicting</strong></mark> strategic <strong><mark>perspectives</u></strong></mark>. The western desire for control threatens Chinese freedom of maneuver and exacerbates their siege mentality. In response, China assumes a policy of active defense (preemption) in order to maintain the strategic initiative. This, in turn, is seen as hostile by the west and typically results in escalation in order to establish deterrence through cost imposition. The western idea of deterrence is incompatible with ambiguity and flexibility while Chinese preemption demands it.67 This results in a distinguishable pattern. First, a state consolidates power on China’s periphery, surrounding China and threatening its structural integrity on both physical and psychological levels. Second, ever aware of shi, Chinese strategists employ measures to maintain their strategic flexibility and prevent total encirclement. Third, the peripheral power misinterprets preemption for aggression and escalates the conflict. At this point, China is either able to contain the threat and achieve its geopolitical aims or it is too weak to do so and is thrown into existential crisis. In the 20th century, this pattern has been exemplified by Chinese involvement in the Korean War and its continued support of an independent state to buffer the U.S. alliance bloc from a historical ingress point to the Chinese mainland; its own Vietnam War to prevent the emergence of a competitive power bloc led by Vietnam in Southeast Asia; and Chinese political maneuvering against the Soviet Union to prevent its consolidation of power over the Eurasian landmass. Disregarding the similarities between these disputes and the current Sino-U.S. position in East Asia is impossible.68 Second, the Sino-centric worldview is rising in China as she emerges from a century of humiliation to become an economic and military superpower. The over-proselytized American belief that the implementation of democracy should be the end goal of global politics and unapologetically moralist positions conflict with Sino-centrism. It is seen by China as an extension of colonial interventionism and a threat to their fiercely held autonomy. U.S. diplomacy is often contingent on the improvement of China’s human rights record. Widespread support for China’s various separatist movements and public outcry over the Tiananmen Square incident has exacerbated this problem. American reluctance to recognize the legitimacy of a communist government, give up democratization as long term policy goals, or give China its due in international relations has weakened Sino-U.S. relations. America’s moralist rather than pragmatic approach to policy threatens China’s delicate social order and undermines CCP legitimacy, resulting in missed diplomatic opportunities. Other policy analysts are certainly influenced by Kissinger, but add their own insight into Chinese Strategic culture. Kenneth Johnson and Andrew Scobell writing for the Strategic Studies Institute both attribute the apparent cognitive dissonance in Chinese policy to a curious blend of Confucian ideals and realpolitik thought, supporting Kissinger’s assertion that Confucianism is not dead. There is a cult of defense within China, accompanying a deeply held belief that China’s strategic culture is overwhelmingly pacifist. However, preemptive action is permissible as long as it can be a justifiable “defense” of Chinese strategic interests.70 In addition, China bemoans aggressive territorial expansion and hegemony by force. This historical sensitivity has only been exacerbated by the “century of humiliation” at the hands of European powers.71 However, the benevolent expansion of influence and the use of force for Chinese national unification is just. Furthermore, the Chinese fear of encirclement could cause a disproportionate reaction to the U.S. force realignment and restructuring of alliances in East Asia. This could exacerbate the worsening of the security dilemma that alliance forming typically causes. Joan-Johnson Freese emphasizes the influence of Confucianism in internal decision making and the penchant for isolationism. Confucianism emphasizes peace, order, and knowing one’s place within society. This invites authoritarianism and the Chinese people have little experience with participation in the political process. Rather, there is an instability lurking beneath the calm surface of society that leaders must constrain and satisfy in order to maintain their mandate to rule. The social contract has a simple results based nature where political stability and prosperity is exchanged for the continued political power. The Chinese Communist Party then is less beholden to communist ideology than it is to continued prosperity. Also, despite the negative connotation of nepotism in the West, it is an institution of Chinese culture (known as Guan Xi). <u>From the outsider</u>, the familial ties, importance of relationships, <u>compartmentalization</u>, <u>and ambiguity in the Chinese bureaucracy are confusing</u> and frustrating. This <u><mark>research paints</u></mark> the picture of the <u><mark>U.S. and China</mark> as <strong><mark>diametrically opposed cultures</u></strong></mark> that are almost <u><strong><mark>designed to create misunderstanding</u></strong></mark> between the two. <u>Therefore, <mark>being aware of cultur</mark>al</u> and political <u>sensitives <mark>is <strong>necessary</strong></mark> to create sound strategy</u>. Michael Pillsbury identifies 16 psycho-cultural pressure points where, if correctly considered in reassurance, cost imposition, or dissuasion strategies, will yield disproportionately effects whether they be positive or negative. Each of these factors are referred to as “fears”. Eleven of the sixteen fears are linked to the ability of the U.S. military to project power into East Asia and the strategic sea lines of communication from the Strait of Malacca to the Bohai Gulf, which is contingent on the ability to deliver space effects in support of U.S. military operation. Pillsbury identifies the fear of attack on their anti-satellite capabilities as a specific Chinese fear, but warfighting in the space domain is intrinsically linked to the other 11. Another of the sixteen fears is the fear of escalation and loss of control. This is particularly important because the Chinese view ASAT weaponry as a legitimate cost imposition option designed to limit conflict. Contrast that with the American strategy of threatening escalation in order to prevent the spread of the conflict into space and implicit red lines that fail to account for limited conflict in a strategic domain. Space’s role in soft power links it to two final fears, the fear of regional competitors and the fear of internal instability. Space technology development is essential to the CCP’s techno-nationalist narrative as it is assigned great importance internally to strengthen CCP’s mandate to rule and externally to legitimize China as a regional leader. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Puar ‘17 Jasbir Puar is an Associate Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies at Rutgers University and has a Ph.D. in Ethnic Studies from UC Berkeley. “Crip Nationalism: From Narrative Prosthesis to Disaster Capitalism,” Chapter 2 in “The Right to Maim: Debility, Capacity, Disability” Language edited NT 18 rc/pat fulltext: Neoliberal investments in the body as portfolio, as site of entrepreneurship, entail transition of some disabled bodies from the disciplinary institutions of containment, quarantine, and expulsion into forms of incorporative biopolitical control. David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder argue that “disabled people have shifted from modernity’s exception (a line of defect to be isolated and eradicated) to postmodernist [neoliberal] exceptionality (failing bodies resuscitated by an increasingly medicalized state). In this latter state, the ontology of disability retrieves a formerly fallen object and makes it newly available for cultural rehabilitation,” a euphemism for producing cultural docility.45 Mitchell and Snyder track this shift of people with disabilities located from “a former era of economic burden” of paternalistic, institutional, and welfare regimes when disabled people were “social pariahs,” to what they term “objects of care” that impel the investment of service economies and neoliberal strategies of intervention and rehabilitation—“a ‘hot’ ticket item for potential research and funding schemes.” Mitchell and Snyder’s claim situates the disabled body as the site of extreme productivity— and thus, profitability— precisely through its lack of conventional productive laboring value. Once excluded from the labor system because of their “unproductivity,” disabled bodies have become the “sites for the exercise of the primitive accumulation that fuels capitalism.” This productivity is thus not “measured by his or her ability to produce goods and ser vices that satisfy social/human needs,” as Erevelles points out, but rather “based solely on capitalist exploitative demands for increasing profit.”48 And yet, despite this profitability, Mitchell and Snyder argue that the disabled non/laborer is also a resistant non-capacitated body, implicitly challenging the incomplete liberal proj ect of docility by refusing to assimilate into a laboring capacity. In echoing Russell and Malhotra’s conviction that disability reveals a central contradiction, a paradox even, of capitalism, Mitchell and Snyder laud Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s rerouting from the worker as the paradigmatic resistant subject in Marxist theory to “living labor” or “non- productive bodies,” as the nascent site of dissent. No longer able to locate a single site of re sis tance to capitalism in a “ simple, agonistic division of labor,” Mitchell and Snyder ask, “Where does re sistance manifest itself once a concept of the workers’ revolution no longer seems tenable and how will this re sis tance govern itself without the institution of new hierarchies of in equality?”49 In other words, the undermining of capitalism will come from those who cannot or will not work, from those whose “capacities make them ‘unfit’ for labor.”50 This unfitness, they argue, proves “imminently productive” because these bodies inhabit and generate alternative biopo liti cal scripts of consumption, family, and nation.51 They evidence this assertion by averring that “the disabled people that we know are some of the worst consumers on the planet because they have neither the means, the interest, nor the gullibility of mistaking meaning with market . . . disabled artists in the U.S. live some of the most sparingly non- consumptive lives and, yet, this is what we admire about them the most.”52 I will leave aside for a moment the geopolitical inflections fueling certitude regarding the passé potential of organized resistance at the point of production. The claim about the inherent resistant capacity of the non-productive disabled laborer bears a complex relation to Mitchell and Snyder’s earlier conviction that disabled bodies have now transitioned into objects of care that represent a unique site for the capture of every element for capitalist profit. Do the individual consumption practices of disabled people (artists) mitigate, even remotely, the profitability of the sites of primitive accumulation that objects of care generate? Further, the resistance of non-consumptive lives pales in a global economic context where, as Gayatri Spivak reminds us, humanistic training in consumerism is foreclosed for populations whose labor creates consumer opportunities for others. The (individual) capacity to consume—or to refuse to consume—is already predicated on the privileged position of the consumer-citizen. Mitchell and Snyder lionize the non-laboring debilitated body as the new threshold of resistance — a crypto- capacity — via their positions as improper producers as well as consumers. But this formulation, as much as it would seem empowering to embrace, actually relies on the occlusion of the centrality of debilitation to the workings of capitalism. It effaces the unflinching need for “social pariahs” available for injury, excluded from the economies that hail certain bodies worthy of being objects of care, however compromised this inclusion may be. There are surely individuals with disabilities [disabled people] who perhaps neither labor nor consume “properly,” but any resistance this may signal is not an a priori feature of being disabled. Further, populations that are not roped into an economy of rehabilitative objects of care are sites of profit precisely for their availability for injury, their inability to labor, their exclusion from adequate health care, and their ideological production as lazy, criminal, and burdensome. While these populations may well enact various forms of resistance to capitalism, they do not escape the violent pro cesses of primitive accumulation that extract profit from the disposability that threatens these exact populations. Mitchell and Snyder further vacillate between the figures of the resistant non- productive unfit non/worker and that very same worker as incorporated into capitalist sites of profit. They argue that “we are increasingly approaching a time when all that formerly passed as the undesirability of life in a disabled body proves increasingly ‘advantageous’ from the standpoint of an immaterial labor market.” The immaterial labor market is a reference to technologies that allow for productivity to be redefined against the grain of the “laboring body”— for example, fostering virtual participation in workplaces for mobility- impaired individuals. However, these very same technologies, driven by the conventional laboring body, produce vastly debilitated populations across the globe, from Chinese laborers in Apple factories who commit suicide, to wheelchair technology that enhances mobility developed in Israel 48 on the backs of Palestinian oppression and immobility, to the mountains of e-waste hand-sanded by the working poor in India, to the neo colonial extraction of minerals and natural substances from resource- rich areas for the purposes of manufacturing hardware. Is it possible that the figure of the non-productive disabled body becomes something of a fetish in Mitchell and Snyder’s text, recoding resistance as a form of automatic capacitation, an onto-crypto-capacity? This body occludes, to some extent, populations that are neither positioned as resistant to capitalism nor promoted as objects of care. Rather these populations are constructed as objects of imminent disposability, continually subjected to paternalistic austerity regimes, violent institutionalization, and debilitation that is not in any way redeemable through cultural rehabilitation. (Cultural rehabilitation as an ave nue to normalization can be eschewed only if in fact it is an available possibility to turn away from.) Their debilitation functions as a form of value extraction for otherwise disposable bodies. Lauding the inherent resistance to capitalism of disabled bodies as well as the advantages of the immaterial labor market for people with disabilities both depend on three factors: first, the assumption or invocation of the identity or grouping of disabled people as an a priori given; which then, secondly, entails the substantial occlusion of the manufacturing of disability, that is, capitalist exploitation as an ongoing process of debilitation; which then, thirdly, submerges the supplemental relation between objects of care and social pariahs or objects of disposability — disability as a potential site of cultural incorporation and debilitation of populations made available and/or targeted for injury—in a neoliberal economy that profits from both. The burden-to-care periodization is one that therefore racializes as well as temporospatializes: between eugenics as it has been and the biopolitics of inclusion of the now (described as “post- imperialist”), a split that largely speaks to liberal spaces of privilege; and between the pro gress of the West/developed nations and the disarray of the rest/developing nations. ///<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Fantasies of disabled bodies as <u>inherently resistant</u> to capitalism mystifies how disability becomes a site of <u>value extraction</u> and papers over <u>Western privilege</u><strong>.</h4><p>Puar ‘17 </p><p></strong>Jasbir Puar is an Associate Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies at Rutgers University and has a Ph.D. in Ethnic Studies from UC Berkeley. “Crip Nationalism: From Narrative Prosthesis to Disaster Capitalism,” Chapter 2 in “The Right to Maim: Debility, Capacity, Disability” Language edited NT 18 rc/pat</p><p><u><mark>Neoliberal investments</mark> in the body as portfolio, as site of entrepreneurship</u>, <u>entail <mark>transition</mark> of some <mark>disabled bodies from</mark> the <mark>disciplinary institutions</mark> of containment, quarantine, and expulsion <mark>into</mark> forms of <mark>incorporative</mark> biopolitical <mark>control</u></mark>. David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder argue that “disabled people have shifted from modernity’s exception (a line of defect to be isolated and eradicated) to postmodernist [neoliberal] exceptionality (failing bodies resuscitated by an increasingly medicalized state). In this latter state, the ontology of disability retrieves a formerly fallen object and makes it newly available for cultural rehabilitation,” a euphemism for producing cultural docility.45 Mitchell and Snyder track this shift of people with <u><mark>disabilities</u></mark> located from “a former era of economic burden” of paternalistic, institutional, and welfare regimes when disabled people were “social pariahs,” <u>to what they term “objects of care” that <mark>impel</mark> the investment of service economies and <mark>neoliberal</mark> strategies of <mark>intervention and rehabilitation</u></mark>—<u>“a ‘hot’ ticket item for potential <mark>research and funding schemes</u></mark>.” </p><p><u><strong>Mitchell and Snyder’s claim</strong> <mark>situate</u></mark>s <u><mark>the disabled body as the site of extreme</mark> productivity</u>— <u>and thus</u>, <u><mark>profitability</u></mark>— <u>precisely <mark>through its lack of conventional</mark> productive <mark>laboring value</u></mark>. Once excluded from the labor system because of their “unproductivity,” disabled bodies have become the “sites for the exercise of the primitive accumulation that fuels capitalism.” This productivity is thus not “measured by his or her ability to produce goods and ser vices that satisfy social/human needs,” as Erevelles points out, but rather “based solely on capitalist exploitative demands for increasing profit.”48 </p><p>And yet, despite this profitability, Mitchell and Snyder argue that the disabled non/laborer is also a resistant non-capacitated body, implicitly challenging the incomplete liberal proj ect of docility by refusing to assimilate into a laboring capacity. In echoing Russell and Malhotra’s conviction that disability reveals a central contradiction, a paradox even, of capitalism, Mitchell and Snyder laud Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s rerouting from the worker as the paradigmatic resistant subject in Marxist theory to “living labor” or “non- productive bodies,” as the nascent site of dissent. No longer able to locate a single site of re sis tance to capitalism in a “ simple, agonistic division of labor,” Mitchell and Snyder ask, “Where does re sistance manifest itself once a concept of the workers’ revolution no longer seems tenable and how will this re sis tance govern itself without the institution of new hierarchies of in equality?”49 In other words, the undermining of capitalism will come from those who cannot or will not work, from those whose “capacities make them ‘unfit’ for labor.”50 This unfitness, they argue, proves “imminently productive” because these bodies inhabit and generate alternative biopo liti cal scripts of consumption, family, and nation.51 They evidence this assertion by averring that “the disabled people that we know are some of the worst consumers on the planet because they have neither the means, the interest, nor the gullibility of mistaking meaning with market . . . disabled artists in the U.S. live some of the most sparingly non- consumptive lives and, yet, this is what we admire about them the most.”52</p><p>I will leave aside for a moment the geopolitical inflections fueling certitude regarding the passé potential of organized resistance at the point of production. The claim about the inherent resistant capacity of the non-productive disabled laborer bears a complex relation to Mitchell and Snyder’s earlier conviction that disabled bodies have now transitioned into objects of care that represent a unique site for the capture of every element for capitalist profit. Do the individual consumption practices of disabled people (artists) mitigate, even remotely, the profitability of the sites of primitive accumulation that objects of care generate? Further, <u><strong><mark>the resistance of non-consumptive lives pales in a global economic context where</u></strong></mark>, as Gayatri Spivak reminds us, humanistic training in consumerism is foreclosed for populations whose labor creates consumer opportunities for others. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> (individual) <mark>capacity to consume—or to refuse to consume—is</mark> already <mark>predicated on the privileged position of the consumer-citizen</u></strong></mark>. Mitchell and Snyder lionize the non-laboring debilitated body as the new threshold of resistance — a crypto- capacity — via their positions as improper producers as well as consumers. But this formulation, as much as it would seem empowering to embrace, actually relies on the occlusion of the centrality of debilitation to the workings of capitalism. It effaces the unflinching need for “social pariahs” available for injury, excluded from the economies that hail certain bodies worthy of being objects of care, however compromised this inclusion may be. There are surely individuals with disabilities [disabled people] who perhaps neither labor nor consume “properly,” but any resistance this may signal is not an a priori feature of being disabled. Further, populations that are not roped into an economy of rehabilitative objects of care are sites of profit precisely for their availability for injury, their inability to labor, their exclusion from adequate health care, and their ideological production as lazy, criminal, and burdensome. While these populations may well enact various forms of resistance to capitalism, they do not escape the violent pro cesses of primitive accumulation that extract profit from the disposability that threatens these exact populations. </p><p>Mitchell and Snyder further vacillate between the figures of the resistant non- productive unfit non/worker and that very same worker as incorporated into capitalist sites of profit. They argue that “we are increasingly approaching a time when all that formerly passed as the undesirability of life in a disabled body proves increasingly ‘advantageous’ from the standpoint of an immaterial labor market.” The immaterial labor market is a reference to technologies that allow for productivity to be redefined against the grain of the “laboring body”— for example, fostering virtual participation in workplaces for mobility- impaired individuals. However, these very same technologies, driven by the conventional laboring body, produce vastly debilitated populations across the globe, from Chinese laborers in Apple factories who commit suicide, to wheelchair technology that enhances mobility developed in Israel 48 on the backs of Palestinian oppression and immobility, to the mountains of e-waste hand-sanded by the working poor in India, to the neo colonial extraction of minerals and natural substances from resource- rich areas for the purposes of manufacturing hardware. </p><p>Is it possible that <u>the figure of <mark>the non-productive disabled body becomes</mark> something of <mark>a fetish</mark> in Mitchell and Snyder’s text</u>, <u><mark>recoding resistance as</mark> a form of <mark>automatic capacitation</u></mark>, <u>an onto-crypto-capacity</u>? <u><mark>This</mark> body <mark>occludes</u></mark>, to some extent, <u><mark>populations</mark> that are <mark>neither</mark> positioned as <mark>resistant to capitalism nor</mark> promoted as <mark>objects of care</u></mark>. Rather these populations are constructed as objects of imminent disposability, continually subjected to paternalistic austerity regimes, violent institutionalization, and debilitation that is not in any way redeemable through cultural rehabilitation. (Cultural rehabilitation as an ave nue to normalization can be eschewed only if in fact it is an available possibility to turn away from.) <u><mark>Their debilitation functions a</mark>s a form of <mark>value extraction for otherwise disposable bodies</u></mark>. <u>Lauding <mark>the inherent resistance</mark> to capitalism <mark>of disabled bodies</mark> as well as the advantages of the immaterial labor market for people with disabilities both depend on three factors</u>: first, the assumption or invocation of the identity or grouping of disabled people as an a priori given; which then, secondly, <u><mark>entails the</mark> substantial <mark>occlusion of</mark> the manufacturing of disability</u>, that is, <u><strong><mark>capitalist exploitation as a</mark>n ongoing <mark>process of debilitation</u></strong></mark>; <u><mark>which</mark> then</u>, thirdly, <u><mark>submerges the</mark> supplemental <mark>relation between</mark> objects of care and social pariahs or objects of disposability</u> — <u><mark>disability as a</mark> potential <mark>site of cultural incorporation and debilitation of populations</mark> made available and/or <mark>targeted for injury</u></mark>—in a neoliberal economy that profits from both. The burden-to-care periodization is one that therefore racializes as well as temporospatializes: between eugenics as it has been and the biopolitics of inclusion of the now (described as “post- imperialist”), a split that largely speaks to liberal spaces of privilege; and between the pro gress of the West/developed nations and the disarray of the rest/developing nations. ///</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Manuel, Stanford Lecturer and Carter, RiceHadleyGates research associate, ‘18 [Anja and Leo, Foreign Policy, 10-2-2018, “America Needs a Blockchain Strategy ASAP,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/02/america-needs-a-blockchain-strategy-asap/, DOA: 8-14-2021, NREM] fulltext: The news is rife with wild promises made by blockchain advocates and the exaggerated suspicions of its opponents. By enabling the creation of cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin, ether, and XRP, blockchains have made some people fabulously wealthy while also, at times, facilitating fraud and money laundering. Although the technology is still in its early stages, we can attest—not least, because one of us serves on the board of a financial technology company that developed one of these cryptocurrencies—that it has enormous potential. But so far, little has been written about the blockchain’s potential uses in the national security space, where blockchain technology could be enormously useful. If mishandled, however, it could also pose dangers. To maximize the former and mitigate the latter, it would be wise for the United States to take advantage of its early technological lead before competitors inevitably catch up. Fortunately, there are myriad ways it could do so. First, a brief introduction to the basic technology: The blockchain is a decentralized ledger distributed across a network of computers, or nodes, that records transactions in real time. It adds new and unique “blocks” to a “chain” after the transactions are verified through consensus across the network. In simple terms, if Bob pays Jen, each computer in the network will receive a detailed record of the transaction, with sensitive information encrypted, and will then verify that Bob has sufficient funds and hasn’t already spent them elsewhere. After being confirmed, the transaction is permanently added to a block of other verified transactions and attached to the end of the chain, making it unalterable, easy to trace, and exceedingly difficult to forge. The blockchain is sometimes described as a “trustless” system. It eliminates the need for banks or other middlemen, because every node verifies and re-enforces each transaction, logging a history that is both public and immutable. It cuts costs for users and, in some cases, increases speed and efficiency. Although many blockchains (such as bitcoin and ethereum) currently can only process a fraction of the number of transactions per second that major credit card companies can, there are efforts underway in the industry to speed up the process. Blockchains could revolutionize sectors including financial services, health care, data storage, and corporate supply chain management. They also have important applications for national security. Blockchains, for instance, could change supply chain management for defense contracting. One of the Defense Department’s chief concerns regarding new defense systems is that the components are manufactured all over the world, so it is possible that suppliers close to a foreign government could install undetectable backdoors for spying. Faulty microchips or skulking spyware are real risks in today’s opaque global supply chains. The blockchain’s accurate and detailed ledger could reduce these risks by tracking what each subcontractor supplies and ensuring that each component is traceable. For example, if a microchip is produced in China for a plane’s onboard computer, a Defense Department auditor could see who made it, when it was installed, and how it was modified. Each action would be added to the blockchain, providing a detailed, unalterable contract history. Blockchains could also securely manage the identification of contractors and government employees. Anyone who has applied for a security clearance knows how cumbersome and paper-based the process is. With the blockchain, personal information gathered during a security screening could be verified, disaggregated, and encrypted, the inserted into a blockchain, after which the original data could be erased from all individual servers. Individuals would have greater control over who can access what aspects of their personal information by attaching permissions to specific elements of their encrypted digital ID. For example, an individual might allow a potential employer access to specific Social Security information, while providing only a driver’s license number to another. Because comprehensive personal data would no longer be stored in one central server, hacks like the one into the U.S. Office of Personnel Management in 2015 could become a thing of the past, and the blockchain would minimize the risks of identity theft and manipulation. The government could also use blockchains to secure interagency communications and improve digital record-keeping. Rather than storing key information in a single agency’s archives, the blockchain would provide a decentralized database that many agencies could access. For example, in a multi-agency law enforcement sting, an FBI investigator could add new evidence to a joint blockchain, which is time-stamped, digitally signed, and instantaneously shared across all permissioned entities. Someone like leaker Chelsea Manning could easily have been prevented from gaining access to every State Department cable, because she clearly had no “need to know.” The blockchain eliminates the need to secure permission each time one agency requires access to data and makes transparent who accessed what. In cybersecurity, the distributed and immutable nature of the blockchain would allow for rapid recognition of hacks and timely responses. Because each block in a chain is encrypted with its own unique identifier (or “hash”) along with that of the previous block, it is impossible to manipulate any one block without changing each subsequent block in the chain. To do this would require massive computing power and would be immediately evident to each node in the system. It is therefore much easier to detect an attack and quickly identify how data is being manipulated. There are, of course, some obstacles and potential downsides to the use of blockchains in the world of national security. Even more than with other groundbreaking technologies, blockchains are still an internationally ungoverned space. Where academic researchers largely from the United States dominated the early days of the internet, blockchains are truly cross-border, with millions around the world participating. Fraudulent initial coin offerings and other get rich quick schemes have already created confusion and could even hamper further innovation. While the blockchain is encrypted, it is vulnerable where it meets the real world, and human error can occur. A blockchain ledger is still only as safe as the hardware security modules protecting its digital access keys. Hacks of cryptocurrency exchanges have become common, and up to one-third of all bitcoins are thought to be missing. A hack on a single node will not compromise a widely distributed system, but if the network is concentrated within a few large mining operations, another ethereum heist could occur. To strengthen network security and be deployable at scale—as in the case of a government agency—industry leaders should coordinate and develop a more comprehensive blockchain security architecture. Adding to the confusion, the largest blockchains can be very slow and insecure, so companies are creating increasing numbers of private blockchains. This leads to a proliferation of isolated networks and incompatible technologies. The U.S. government does not need to wait for these uncertainties to be resolved to make blockchain a useful tool for national security. Although the government would stifle innovation if it rushed to regulate quality standards for blockchains, but it would be wise to help the best technologies win by investing in them and encouraging defense contractors to build on the most stable, secure, and speedy platforms. The government can also discourage contractors from building on inefficient and less secure “proof of work” blockchains that use vast amounts of energy and have negative impacts on the environment. The government should also promote active competition and emphasize the public use aspects of blockchain through small investments and grants. DARPA has already begun contracting start-ups to research the applicability of blockchain technology for secure weapons data storage and encrypted communications. DIUx, the Pentagon’s tech incubator, and the CIA-founded In-Q-Tel should follow suit. Promising programs have also begun at the state level. For example, Delaware contracted start-ups to develop a blockchain for contracts and securely storing archival records. These partnerships help distribute the cost of research and development, and they strengthen ties between federal agencies and Silicon Valley’s best and brightest. They also help build the public’s trust in the blockchain. In addition, the government can coax the industry to adopt quality standards and best practices. A federal “regulatory sandbox” would allow companies to test their technologies in a controlled setting while government regulators ascertain a proper regulatory framework. Canada launched such a sandbox in 2017, which provided limited-time registrations for blockchain companies while ensuring consumer privacy and other protections. If the United States stalls too long, rival governments that invest heavily in blockchain research and development may co-opt the industry and set their own standards. Lichtenstein and Malta are early movers in establishing legal frameworks for blockchain. In July, Malta passed three laws that established internal governance requirements and certification procedures to better protect both consumers and businesses. While no one is concerned about Malta and Lichtenstein, it would be unhelpful if China, Russia, or other governments antagonistic to the United States determined the standards in this critical new technology. That’s why U.S. businesses and lawmakers must work quickly to maintain a leading role in blockchain technology.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Pioneering blockchain standards enables the U.S. to <u>lead the industry</u> – otherwise <u>China</u> takes the lead – <u>threatens<strong> national security. </h4><p>Manuel, Stanford Lecturer and Carter, RiceHadleyGates research associate, ‘18</p><p></u></strong>[Anja and Leo, Foreign Policy, 10-2-2018, “America Needs a Blockchain Strategy ASAP,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/02/america-needs-a-blockchain-strategy-asap/, DOA: 8-14-2021, NREM] </p><p>The news is rife with wild promises made by <u>blockchain</u> advocates and the exaggerated suspicions of its opponents. By enabling the creation of cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin, ether, and XRP, blockchains have made some people fabulously wealthy while also, at times, facilitating fraud and money laundering. Although the technology is still in its early stages, we can attest—not least, because one of us serves on the board of a financial technology company that developed one of these cryptocurrencies—that it <u>has enormous potential</u>.</p><p>But so far<u>, little has been written about the blockchain’s potential uses in the <strong>national security space</u></strong>, <u>where blockchain technology could be enormously useful. <mark>If <strong>mishandled</strong></mark>, however<mark>, it could</mark> also <mark>pose <strong>dangers</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>To maximize the former and mitigate the latter<mark>, it would be wise for the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>to take advantage</mark> of its early technological lead before competitors inevitably catch up</u></strong>. Fortunately, there are myriad ways it could do so.</p><p>First, a brief introduction to the basic technology: <u>The blockchain is a decentralized ledger distributed across a network of computers, or nodes, that records transactions in real time. It adds new and unique “blocks” to a “chain” after the transactions are verified through consensus across the network</u>. In simple terms, <u>if Bob pays Jen, each computer in the network will receive a detailed record of the transaction, with sensitive information encrypted, and will then verify that Bob has sufficient funds and hasn’t already spent them elsewhere</u>. After being confirmed, the transaction is permanently added to a block of other verified transactions and attached to the end of the chain, making it unalterable, easy to trace, and exceedingly difficult to forge.</p><p><u>The blockchain is</u> sometimes <u>described as a “trustless” system. It eliminates the need for banks or other middlemen</u>, because every node verifies and re-enforces each transaction, logging a history that is both public and immutable. It cuts costs for users and, in some cases, increases speed and efficiency. Although many blockchains (such as bitcoin and ethereum<u>) currently can only process a fraction of the number of transactions per second that major credit card companies can, there are efforts underway in the industry to speed up the process. </p><p><mark>Blockchains could</mark> revolutionize sectors including financial services, health care, data storage, and corporate supply chain management. <strong>They also <mark>have important applications for national security</strong></mark>.</p><p><mark>Blockchains</u></mark>, for instance, <u>could <mark>change <strong>supply chain management for defense contracting</u></strong></mark>. <u>One of the Defense Department’s chief concerns regarding new defense systems is that the components are manufactured all over the world, so it is possible that suppliers close to a foreign government could install undetectable backdoors for spying. <mark>Faulty microchips or skulking spyware are <strong>real risks</strong> in today’s <strong>opaque global supply chains</strong></mark>. The blockchain’s accurate and detailed ledger could reduce these risks by tracking what each subcontractor supplies and ensuring that each component is traceable</u>. For example, <u>if a microchip is produced in China for a plane’s onboard computer, a Defense Department auditor could see who made it, when it was installed, and how it was modified. Each action would be added to the blockchain, providing a detailed, unalterable contract history.</p><p><mark>Blockchains could</u></mark> also securely <u><mark>manage</mark> the <mark>identification of contractors and government employees</u></mark>. Anyone who has applied for a security clearance knows how cumbersome and paper-based the process is. With the blockchain, personal information gathered during a security screening could be verified, disaggregated, and encrypted, the inserted into a blockchain, after which the original data could be erased from all individual servers. Individuals would have greater control over who can access what aspects of their personal information by attaching permissions to specific elements of their encrypted digital ID. For example, an individual might allow a potential employer access to specific Social Security information, while providing only a driver’s license number to another. Because comprehensive personal data would no longer be stored in one central server, hacks like the one into the U.S. Office of Personnel Management in 2015 could become a thing of the past, and the blockchain would minimize the risks of identity theft and manipulation.</p><p><u>The government could</u> also <u>use blockchains to secure interagency communications and improve digital record-keeping. Rather than storing key information in a single agency’s archives, the blockchain would provide a decentralized database that many agencies could access. For example, in a multi-agency law enforcement sting, an FBI investigator could add new evidence to a joint blockchain, which is time-stamped, digitally signed, and instantaneously shared across all permissioned entities. Someone like leaker Chelsea Manning could easily have been prevented from gaining access to every State Department cable, because she clearly had no “need to know.” The blockchain eliminates the need to secure permission each time one agency requires access to data and makes transparent who accessed what.</p><p>In cybersecurity, the distributed and immutable nature of the <mark>blockchain would allow for <strong>rapid recognition of hacks and timely responses</u></strong></mark>. <u>Because each block in a chain is encrypted with its own unique identifier (or “hash”) along with that of the previous block, it is impossible to manipulate any one block without changing each subsequent block in the chain. To do this would require massive computing power and would be immediately evident to each node in the system. It is therefore much easier to detect an attack and quickly identify how data is being manipulated.</p><p></u>There are, of course, some obstacles and potential downsides to the use of blockchains in the world of national security. Even more than with other groundbreaking technologies, <u>blockchains are still an internationally ungoverned space</u>. Where academic researchers largely from the United States dominated the early days of the internet, blockchains are truly cross-border, with millions around the world participating. Fraudulent initial coin offerings and other get rich quick schemes have already created confusion and could even hamper further innovation.</p><p>While the blockchain is encrypted, it is vulnerable where it meets the real world, and human error can occur. A blockchain ledger is still only as safe as the hardware security modules protecting its digital access keys. Hacks of cryptocurrency exchanges have become common, and up to one-third of all bitcoins are thought to be missing. A hack on a single node will not compromise a widely distributed system, but if the network is concentrated within a few large mining operations, another ethereum heist could occur. To strengthen network security and be deployable at scale—as in the case of a government agency—industry leaders should coordinate and develop a more comprehensive blockchain security architecture. Adding to the confusion, the largest blockchains can be very slow and insecure, so companies are creating increasing numbers of private blockchains. This leads to a proliferation of isolated networks and incompatible technologies.</p><p><u><mark>The U.S. government</mark> <strong>does not need to wait</strong> for these uncertainties to be resolved to make blockchain a useful tool for national security. Although the government would stifle innovation if it rushed to regulate quality standards for blockchains, but it would be wise to <mark>help the best technologies</mark> win by investing in them and encouraging defense contractors to build on the most stable, secure, and speedy platforms</u>. The government can also discourage contractors from building on inefficient and less secure “proof of work” blockchains that use vast amounts of energy and have negative impacts on the environment.</p><p>The government should also promote active competition and emphasize the public use aspects of blockchain through small investments and grants. DARPA has already begun contracting start-ups to research the applicability of blockchain technology for secure weapons data storage and encrypted communications. DIUx, the Pentagon’s tech incubator, and the CIA-founded In-Q-Tel should follow suit. Promising programs have also begun at the state level. For example, Delaware contracted start-ups to develop a blockchain for contracts and securely storing archival records. These partnerships help distribute the cost of research and development, and they strengthen ties between federal agencies and Silicon Valley’s best and brightest. They also help build the public’s trust in the blockchain.</p><p>In addition, <u><mark>the government can <strong>coax the industry to adopt quality standards and best practices</u></strong></mark>. <u>A federal “regulatory sandbox” would allow companies to test their technologies in a controlled setting while government regulators <strong>ascertain a proper regulatory framework</strong>. Canada launched such a sandbox in 2017, which provided limited-time registrations for blockchain companies while ensuring consumer privacy and other protections.</p><p><mark>If the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>stalls</mark> too long, <mark>rival governments</mark> that invest heavily in blockchain research and development <mark>may <strong>co-opt the industry and set their own standards</strong></mark>.</u> Lichtenstein and Malta are early movers in establishing legal frameworks for blockchain. In July, Malta passed three laws that established internal governance requirements and certification procedures to better protect both consumers and businesses. While no one is concerned about Malta and Lichtenstein, <u><mark>it would be unhelpful if <strong>China</strong></mark>, Russia, or other <mark>governments <strong>antagonistic</strong> to the <strong>U</strong></mark>nited <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>tates <mark>determined the standards</mark> in this critical new technology. That’s why U.S. businesses and lawmakers must work quickly to maintain a leading role in blockchain technology.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Simes 19 [Dimitri K. Simes, President of the Center for the National Interest, “Delusions About Russia,” 8-8, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/delusions-about-russia-72321?page=0%2C3, y2k] fulltext: Russia also happens to be the only country capable of destroying the United States as a modern, prosperous and democratic society, a reality that much of the discourse surrounding Russia seems to ignore. Many Americans now believe that the threat posed by Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal is no longer relevant, and the United States and its allies, with their economic preponderance and superior conventional forces, can deter Russia as long as they can persuade the Kremlin that their determination is proportional to their overwhelming resources. Even when Russian president Vladimir Putin’s defiant speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference warned that Russia would resist an endless incorporation of former Soviet states into the transatlantic alliance structure, the common reaction of the American and European foreign policy establishments was open disdain. Who would be interested in Putin’s appeals for a new multipolar system when his own government was viewed as so self-evidently inadequate and his military and economic power so pathetically out of touch with his pretense? Russia’s subsequent military modernization efforts, combined with its 2008 incursion into Georgia, made the Kremlin far more difficult to ignore. However, the message received by most Western elites was not the need for a new dialogue with Moscow, but, rather, that containment was geopolitically necessary and morally justified, now more than ever. Later, after the United States and the European Union aggressively supported a popular uprising against the corrupt and inept, but legally elected Yanukovych regime in Ukraine, Russia responded with a takeover of Crimea, interference in Donbass and intervention in the Syrian war. Again, the West’s reaction was one of righteous indignation with little analysis of the causes of the crisis or any potential solutions. In hindsight, it is clear that the post-Soviet political order in Eastern Europe was never properly settled by Russia and the West, and that the agreements that emerged after the Cold War were too ambiguous to offer any real clarity. For instance, the 1994 Budapest Agreement, which both Russia and the United States signed, guaranteed the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but also promised the protection of Ukrainian sovereignty, which Russia perceived as a commitment from the West not to interfere in Ukraine’s internal political affairs. Therefore, when America and its European allies supported the ousting of Yanukovych in 2014, Russia viewed this as illegal Western interference, which provided Moscow with both the opportunity and the right to defend its interests in Crimea and Donbass. In recent years, Putin has unveiled his Avangard hypersonic ICBM system and new RS-28 Sarmat heavy ballistic missile (both of which are allegedly capable of overcoming any U.S./NATO missile defenses), and warned that, if push comes to shove, Russia is prepared to stand against a military challenge from the West even if doing so meant escalating to nuclear war. These warnings were coupled with the deployment of new brigades to Ukraine’s borders starting in 2014 and major improvements of Russia’s military capabilities near the Baltic region. Yet again, these moves were treated as something requiring a vigorous response, but ultimately not increasing the risk of a military clash. NATO viewed its commitment to restraint as self-evident, so why would the Kremlin fear Western aggression? And if so, why would anybody seriously fear a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West? UNFORTUNATELY, THE threat of unintentional conflict escalation is not a hypothetical one. Russian and American troops often operate in the same areas of combat in Syria, and U.S. combat aircraft and personnel were involved in a devastating attack on Russian paramilitaries in 2018. In that particular case, Russia gave no advanced warning that Russian fighters were involved, and later downplayed the incident by noting the fundamental difference between the death of Russian private military contractors and an attack against its regular forces. But many experts on both sides privately acknowledge that this incident was a close call that easily could have resulted in rapid escalation. With more and more NATO ships and planes operating in close proximity to Russian territory and their Russian counterparts boldly challenging them to prove their own determination, the potential for a clash in the air or on the seas is becoming more and more real. Yet Congress has had no meaningful discussions about how the sinking of one ship or downing of one plane could result in accidental nuclear war between Russia and the United States. Top Russian commanders are becoming increasingly outspoken about how Russia might respond in the event of a confrontation with the United States or NATO. The Russian news agency TASS reported that Lt. General Viktor Poznikhir, First Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff’s Main Operations Department, “warned the states, which now host or will host element of the U.S. missile shield, that these facilities will become priority targets for destruction.” Even more ominous was the message from former Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov, who claimed that the United States was working to develop a first-strike capability which might force Russia to make a “decision about a preemptive use of force…in a period of heightened tension.” Russia’s new military might, combined with its growing boldness, should be taken seriously. Russia’s posture reflects more than a confidence in its new hardware or a willingness to issue intimidating high-level warnings, but rather speaks to a major change in the Russian mindset. Russia has developed a new mode of nationalism accompanied by a genuine evolution not just in its attitude towards the West and the utility of military force as a policy instrument, but also about what Russia views as its core strategic interests. Indeed, the situation has rarely been more perilous. The Putin administration claims to be unconcerned by the prospect of a nuclear arms-race with the United States, as it argues that the potency of its new weapons, most notably hypersonic ones, renders any potential American numerical advantage in its nuclear arsenal inconsequential and, more fundamentally, gives Russia the capability to overcome any missile defense system. Instead of confronting these issues, the American national security establishment is acting as though it does not have to even consider the possibility of engaging in meaningful diplomacy and as though Russia poses no imminent threat. During perestroika and the early Boris Yeltsin years, Russia enthusiastically celebrated democratization, universal human values and its association with the West. No longer. Russia has once again embraced its traditional self-image: that of a national security state, surrounded by hostile nations, that takes pride in being feared rather than loved. Throughout history, Russia, despite its long-held pretense of being the “Third Rome,” has positioned itself not as a shining city on a hill, but rather a lonely, proud fortress prepared to do whatever is necessary to defend itself and its unique position in the world. Indeed, the Russian state’s recent trend of glorifying the Soviet victory in World War II reveals an increasingly prevalent feeling in Russia that the sacrifice of twenty-six million Soviet soldiers was not only necessary for the preservation of Russian civilization, but also demonstrates a genuine Russian exceptionalism in terms of its willingness to absorb a superhuman level of sacrifice. Something of this mindset was once captured by the great Russian poet and World War II veteran Bulat Okudzhava, who wrote with a combination of pride and sorrow about the attitude of Russian troops during the war: One victory for all, and no price is too high According to Alexander Tsipko, a leading expert on Russian politics who was once considered something of an enlightened nationalist for viewing Moscow’s desire to become part of the West as a delusion, the country has undergone disturbing changes in its national political psyche. This shift was marked by the growing disillusionment with both the West and democracy that became prevalent during the end of the Yeltsin era after the bitter experience of Russia's economic demise and NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia. Tsipko writes, “I agree with those who believe that it is the very national character that is to some extent the cause of the militarization of conscience.” He adds, “It is important to understand that militarization of conscience brings the killing of the instinct of self-preservation. It is not just expecting death, but creating a cult of death, making it sacred.” AS A caveat to this, whatever you feel about Vladimir Putin and his willingness to break the rules of the international order and habitually deny all accusations of Russian misconduct, he has still acted as a cautious and calculating leader. Putin is not blindly militaristic, but always considers the consequences of his actions, even if he has not always managed to anticipate them correctly (as was the case with Russian interference in U.S. elections). While most Russians remain proud of their country’s takeover of Crimea, opinion polls show that these nationalistic sentiments are no longer a major organizing principle in Russian political thinking. Among both the elites and the Russian people, there is a growing sense of fatigue with the mounting costs of great power ambitions. Nonetheless, Tsipko’s observations reveal much about how Russia might respond to a confrontation with America and its allies. If the survival of the country, dignity of the Russian civilization and, yes, legitimacy of the regime are at stake, Russia may be prepared to accept much higher risks and absorb much greater losses than would be acceptable to Western democracies. Russia’s sense of isolation and victimhood are also rooted in an understanding of the collapse of the Soviet Union that differs wildly from the common Western narrative. Many Russians view their country as a modern equivalent of Weimar Germany, dismembered by victorious powers who are responsible for the economic catastrophe, human suffering and great humiliation of the Russian people. Most Russian citizens identify with Putin’s statement that, “the demise of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” and believe that, “for the Russian people, it became a genuine tragedy. Tens of millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen found themselves beyond the fringes of Russian territory.” While neither Putin nor the majority of Russians view the recreation of the USSR as either feasible or desirable, the wounds of the Soviet collapse clearly remain quite fresh and continue to influence attitudes towards the West.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Putin can no longer be <u>deterred</h4><p></u><strong>Simes 19</strong> [Dimitri K. Simes, President of the Center for the National Interest, “Delusions About Russia,” 8-8, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/delusions-about-russia-72321?page=0%2C3, y2k]</p><p>Russia also happens to be the only country capable of destroying the United States as a modern, prosperous and democratic society, a reality that much of the discourse surrounding Russia seems to ignore. <u>Many</u> Americans now <u>believe</u> that the threat posed by Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal is no longer relevant, and the <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>and</u> its <u>allies</u>, <u>with</u> their economic <u>preponderance</u> and superior conventional forces, <u>can <strong>deter Russia</u></strong> <u>as long as they can</u> <u>persuade</u> the Kremlin that their <u>determination is <strong>proportional</u></strong> <u>to</u> their overwhelming <u><strong>resources</u></strong>. Even when Russian president Vladimir Putin’s defiant speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference warned that Russia would resist an endless incorporation of former Soviet states into the transatlantic alliance structure, the common reaction of the American and European foreign policy establishments was open disdain. Who would be interested in Putin’s appeals for a new multipolar system when his own government was viewed as so self-evidently inadequate and his military and economic power so pathetically out of touch with his pretense? Russia’s subsequent military modernization efforts, combined with its 2008 incursion into Georgia, made the Kremlin far more difficult to ignore. However, the message received by most Western elites was not the need for a new dialogue with Moscow, but, rather, that containment was geopolitically necessary and morally justified, now more than ever. Later, after the United States and the European Union aggressively supported a popular uprising against the corrupt and inept, but legally elected Yanukovych regime in Ukraine, Russia responded with a takeover of Crimea, interference in Donbass and intervention in the Syrian war. Again, the West’s reaction was one of righteous indignation with little analysis of the causes of the crisis or any potential solutions. In hindsight, it is clear that the post-Soviet political order in Eastern Europe was never properly settled by Russia and the West, and that the agreements that emerged after the Cold War were too ambiguous to offer any real clarity. For instance, the 1994 Budapest Agreement, which both Russia and the United States signed, guaranteed the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but also promised the protection of Ukrainian sovereignty, which Russia perceived as a commitment from the West not to interfere in Ukraine’s internal political affairs. Therefore, when America and its European allies supported the ousting of Yanukovych in 2014, Russia viewed this as illegal Western interference, which provided Moscow with both the opportunity and the right to defend its interests in Crimea and Donbass. In recent years, Putin has unveiled his Avangard hypersonic ICBM system and new RS-28 Sarmat heavy ballistic missile (both of which are allegedly capable of overcoming any U.S./NATO missile defenses), and warned that, <u>if</u> <u><strong>push comes to shove</u></strong>, <u><mark>Russia is <strong>prepared</u></strong> <u>to stand</mark> against <strong><mark>a military challenge</mark> from the West</u></strong> <u><mark>even if doing so meant</mark> <strong>escalating</u></strong> <u>to <mark>nuclear war</u></mark>. These <u>warnings were coupled with</u> the <u>deployment of <strong>new brigades</u></strong> to Ukraine’s borders starting in 2014 <u>and</u> major <u>improvements of Russia’s <strong>military capabilities</u></strong> <u><mark>near the <strong>Baltic</u></strong></mark> region. <u><strong>Yet</u></strong> again, <u>these moves were treated as</u> something requiring a vigorous response, but ultimately <u><strong>not</u></strong> <u>increasing the risk of a</u> <u>military clash</u>. <u>NATO viewed</u> its <u>commitment to <strong>restraint</u></strong> <u>as</u> self-<u>evident</u>, so <u>why would</u> the <u>Kremlin <strong>fear</u></strong> <u>Western aggression</u>? And if so, why would anybody seriously fear a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West? <u><strong>UNFORTUNATELY</u></strong>, THE threat of <u>unintentional</u> conflict <u>escalation is <strong>not</u></strong> a <u>hypothetical</u> one. Russian and American troops often operate in the same areas of combat in Syria, and U.S. combat aircraft and personnel were involved in a devastating attack on Russian paramilitaries in 2018. In that particular case, Russia gave no advanced warning that Russian fighters were involved, and later downplayed the incident by noting the fundamental difference between the death of Russian private military contractors and an attack against its regular forces. But many <u><strong><mark>experts</u></strong></mark> on both sides privately <u><mark>acknowledge</u></mark> that this <u><mark>incident</u></mark> was a close call that easily <u><mark>could</mark> have <mark>result</mark>ed</u> <u><mark>in</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>rapid</u></strong> <u>escalation</u>. <u>With</mark> more and more <mark>NATO</mark> <strong>ships</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>planes</u></strong> <u><mark>operating in <strong>close proximity</u></strong></mark> <u>to Russian territory</u> <u>and</u> their <u><mark>Russian </mark>counterpart<mark>s</u> <u><strong>boldly challenging</mark> them</u></strong> <u>to prove</u> their own <u>determination</u>, <u>the potential for</u> <u><strong>a clash</u></strong> in the air or on the seas <u>is becoming</u> more and more <u><strong>real</u></strong>. Yet Congress has had no meaningful discussions about how the <u><mark>sinking of</u></mark> one ship or downing of <u><strong><mark>one plane</u></strong> <u>could result in</u> <u><strong>accidental</mark> nuclear <mark>war</u></strong></mark> between Russia and the United States. Top Russian commanders are becoming increasingly outspoken about how Russia might respond in the event of a confrontation with the United States or NATO. The Russian news agency TASS reported that Lt. General Viktor Poznikhir, First Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff’s Main Operations Department, “warned the states, which now host or will host element of the U.S. missile shield, that these facilities will become priority targets for destruction.” Even more ominous was the message from former Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov, who claimed that the United States was working to develop a first-strike capability which might force Russia to make a “decision about a preemptive use of force…in a period of heightened tension.” <u>Russia’s</u> new <u>military might</u>, <u>combined with</u> its <u><strong>growing boldness</u></strong>, <u>should be taken <strong>seriously</u></strong>. <u><mark>Russia’s posture</u> <u>reflects</mark> <strong>more than a confidence</u></strong> <u>in</u> its <u>new hardware</u> <u>or a willingness to issue</u> intimidating <u>high-level warnings</u>, <u><strong>but</u></strong> rather <u>speaks to <strong>a major <mark>change</u></strong> <u>in</mark> the Russian <strong><mark>mindset</u></strong></mark>. <u>Russia</u> has <u>developed <mark>a new </mark>mode of</u> <u><strong><mark>nationalism</u></strong></mark> <u>accompanied by a genuine evolution not just in</u> its <u>attitude towards the West <mark>and</mark> the <mark>utility of</mark> <strong>military <mark>force</strong></mark> as a policy</u> <u>instrument</u>, <u>but also about <strong>what Russia views as its core strategic interests</u></strong>. Indeed, <u>the situation has</u> rarely <u>been more <strong>perilous</u></strong>. The <u><mark>Putin</u></mark> administration <u><mark>claims to be <strong>unconcerned</u></strong></mark> <u>by</u> the prospect of a <u>nuclear arms-race with</u> the <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, as it <u>argues</u> that the <u><mark>potency of</u></mark> its <u>new weapons</u>, most notably <u><strong><mark>hypersonic</u></strong></mark> <u>ones</u>, <u><mark>renders</u></mark> any potential <u><mark>American</mark> <strong>numerical advantage</u></strong> <u>in</u> its <u><strong><mark>nuclear</u></strong> <u>arsenal <strong>inconsequential</u></strong> <u>and</u></mark>, more fundamentally, <u><mark>gives</mark> Russia the <mark>capability to <strong>overcome</u></strong></mark> any <u><strong><mark>missile defense</u></strong></mark> system. Instead of confronting these issues, the American national security establishment is acting as though it does not have to even consider the possibility of engaging in meaningful diplomacy and as though Russia poses no imminent threat. During perestroika and the early Boris Yeltsin years, Russia enthusiastically celebrated democratization, universal human values and its association with the West. No longer. Russia has once again embraced its traditional self-image: that of a national security state, surrounded by hostile nations, that takes pride in being feared rather than loved. Throughout history, Russia, despite its long-held pretense of being the “Third Rome,” has positioned itself not as a shining city on a hill, but rather a lonely, proud fortress prepared to do whatever is necessary to defend itself and its unique position in the world. Indeed, the Russian state’s recent trend of glorifying the Soviet victory in World War II reveals an increasingly prevalent feeling in Russia that the sacrifice of twenty-six million Soviet soldiers was not only necessary for the preservation of Russian civilization, but also demonstrates a genuine Russian exceptionalism in terms of its willingness to absorb a superhuman level of sacrifice. Something of this mindset was once captured by the great Russian poet and World War II veteran Bulat Okudzhava, who wrote with a combination of pride and sorrow about the attitude of Russian troops during the war: One victory for all, and no price is too high According to Alexander Tsipko, a leading expert on Russian politics who was once considered something of an enlightened nationalist for viewing Moscow’s desire to become part of the West as a delusion, the country has undergone disturbing changes in its national political psyche. This shift was marked by the growing disillusionment with both the West and democracy that became prevalent during the end of the Yeltsin era after the bitter experience of Russia's economic demise and NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia. Tsipko writes, “I agree with those who believe that it is the very national character that is to some extent the cause of the militarization of conscience.” He adds, “It is important to understand that militarization of conscience brings the killing of the instinct of self-preservation. It is not just expecting death, but creating a cult of death, making it sacred.” <u>AS A caveat to this</u>, whatever <u>you feel</u> about Vladimir Putin and his willingness to break the rules of the international order and habitually deny all accusations of Russian misconduct, he has still acted as a cautious and calculating leader. <u><mark>Putin</u></mark> is not blindly militaristic, but always <u><mark>considers</mark> the <strong><mark>consequences</u></strong></mark> <u>of</u> his <u>actions</u>, even if he has not always managed to anticipate them correctly (as was the case with Russian interference in U.S. elections). While most Russians remain proud of their country’s takeover of Crimea, opinion polls show that these nationalistic sentiments are no longer a major organizing principle in Russian political thinking. Among both the elites and the Russian people, there is a growing sense of fatigue with the mounting costs of great power ambitions. <u><strong><mark>Nonetheless</u></strong></mark>, Tsipko’s observations reveal much about how Russia might respond to a confrontation with America and its allies. <u>If <mark>the <strong>survival</strong></mark> of the country</u>, <u><strong><mark>dignity</u></strong> <u>of</mark> the <mark>Russian</mark> civilization <mark>and</u></mark>, yes, <u><strong><mark>legitimacy</u></strong></mark> <u>of the regime</u> <u><mark>are <strong>at stake</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>Russia may</mark> be prepared to <strong><mark>accept</u></strong></mark> much <u><strong>higher <mark>risks</u></strong></mark> <u>and absorb</u> much <u><strong>greater losses</u></strong> <u>than would be acceptable to Western democracies</u>. <u>Russia’s sense of <strong>isolation</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>victimhood</u></strong> <u>are</u> also <u>rooted in an understanding of the <strong>collapse</u></strong> <u>of the</u> <u>Soviet Union</u> <u>that differs</u> wildly <u>from the <strong>common Western narrative</u></strong>. Many Russians view their country as a modern equivalent of Weimar Germany, dismembered by victorious powers who are responsible for the economic catastrophe, human suffering and great humiliation of the Russian people. Most Russian citizens identify with Putin’s statement that, “the demise of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” and believe that, “for the Russian people, it became a genuine tragedy. Tens of millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen found themselves beyond the fringes of Russian territory.” While neither Putin nor the majority of Russians view the recreation of the USSR as either feasible or desirable, <u>the <mark>wounds of</mark> the <strong><mark>Soviet collapse</u></strong></mark> clearly <u><mark>remain <strong></mark>quite <mark>fresh</u></strong> <u>and </mark>continue to <mark>influence <strong>attitudes </mark>towards the West</u>.</p></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Koplow 19 [David A. Koplow. Professor of Law at Georgetown University. He specializes in the areas of public international law, national security law, and the intersection between international law and U.S. constitutional law. Koplow served as Special Counsel for Arms Control to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense (2009-2011); Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs at the Department of Defense (1997-1999); and as Attorney-Advisor and Special Assistant to the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1978-1981). A Rhodes scholar, Koplow graduated from Harvard College and Yale Law School. "Exoatmospheric Plowshares: Using a Nuclear Explosive Device for Planetary Defense against an Incoming Asteroid," UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 23, no. 1 (Spring 2019): 76-158] fulltext: Astronomers are fond of observing that the real question is not "whether" Earth will again be struck by a large asteroid, but "when." We can detect around the planet the remnants of scores of impact craters of diverse size and age left by previous NEOs, and the pockmarks are even more obvious on the Moon and other celestial bodies, where erosion has not degraded their silhouettes. As asteroids pinball around the Solar System, it is only a matter of time before the next jarring impact-time that might be measured in months or in millions of years. The potential consequences of such a collision beggar belief Prehistoric experience demonstrates that all of human civilization, as well as most or all other forms of life on Earth, may hang in the balance. Even a more moderately sized asteroid could devastate a community or a country in an instant. As Igor Ashurbeyli assesses the stakes, developing countermeasures to this apocalyptic threat "must become the most important task that humanity must solve in the 2 1st century. "211 But the time frame matters, too. If we knew, hypothetically, that an extinction-level event was not going to occur for thousands or millions of years, why would we devote time, attention, and money to it now? A known risk of extermination, eons into the future, would pose profound philosophical and psychological conundrums, but preemptively responding to it would not be on anyone's active "to-do list" for generations. Still, timing matters in another way, too. With our present state of astronomical intelligence, we cannot be certain about our planet's prolonged safety, and we must exhibit appropriate modesty about our confidence in the completeness of the inventory of known NEOs. Accordingly, the planet may not have much advance notice about the next Chicxulub, and we may be no more able than the dinosaurs to immediately invent our way out of an unanticipated fatal space specter. Frances Lyall and Paul B. Larsen summarize the issue this way: "Time might be too short adequately to deal with the crisis-missile or other technology has to be prepared." 2 12 It is difficult for humans to think rationally about this sort of problem-it is hard to get our collective minds around such enormous consequences and such tiny probabilities simultaneously-especially when people have so little first-hand experience with the causal phenomenon. A 2010 study by the National Academy of Sciences referred to this as a classic "zero times infinity" problem that thwarts human cognitive processing.213 Cass Sunstein and Richard Zeckhauser label the resulting bias in decision-making as "probability neglect"-a propensity to misunderstand the fearsome risks that are so difficult to conceptualize.2 14 Behavioral economics literature abounds with examinations of the collective non-rationality in our species' approach to high-severity/low-probability events, leading to extreme discounting of remote future catastrophes, to the detriment of individuals and society.2 15 The underdeveloped state of international law on trans-border disasters reflects this cognitive deficit. Perhaps this should not be surprising-the tasks of preventing, responding to, and rebuilding after global catastrophes are daunting. These are topics that sovereign states, as well as individual human beings, shy away from addressing-they are uncomfortable to think about; they can involve sharing resources, as well as sympathy, with foreigners; and they seem to call for spending immense sums of money on vanishingly remote contingencies. It will never be easy to marshal political support for developing, improving, and sustaining planetary defense capabilities that in all likelihood will never be exercised during any government official's term in office or even lifetime.216 Nevertheless, planetary defense represents one of the occasions in which these psychological barriers must be overcome. The extended time frame in dealing with asteroids places special burdens on the effort to think rationally about very-low-probability dangers, because the people at risk are (likely) not ourselves but our far-distant progeny, generations so remote that the emotional connection to them is strained. We can appreciate that the good work of IAWN and SMPAG today may help increase the odds of our species' survival, but we must also be aware that the counter-asteroid technology available to earthlings a century or two from now will surely surpass today's puny capabilities in ways we cannot imagine.2 17 Collision with a body of 3-5 km diameter) could kill, say, half the world's population (soon to reach eight billion people) sometime in the next million years. On an actuarial basis, that works out to 4,000 statistical deaths annually. That is surely a significant fatality rate-enough to warrant substantial financial investment-even though the incidents would be extraordinarily "lumpy," in the sense that for almost all of those one million years, there would be no deaths at all due to asteroids, but in one year there would be an unprecedented catastrophe. At this rate, asteroids would rank above many other natural and bizarre phenomena that people fear (and that societies attempt to do something about), such as floods, tornados, airplane crashes, terrorism, or choking. Asteroids, however, would still fall far below other leading causes of death, such as automobile accidents, communicable diseases, and tobacco use. 218 One plausible formula would be to posit that a major NEO impact (a collision with a body of 3-5 km diameter) could kill, say, half the world's population (soon to reach eight billion people) some time in the next million years. On an actuarial basis, that works out to 4,000 statistical deaths annually. That is surely a significant fatality rate-enough to warrant substantial financial investment-even though the incidents would be extraordinarily "lumpy," in the sense that for almost all of those one million years, there would be no deaths at all due to asteroids, but in one year there would be an unprecedented catastrophe. At this rate, asteroids would rank above many other natural and bizarre phenomena that people fear (and that societies attempt to do something about), such as floods, tornados, airplane crashes, terrorism, or choking. Asteroids, however, would still fall far below other leading causes of death, such as automobile accidents, communicable diseases, and tobacco use. 2 18 This weird combination of probabilities and consequences promotes what many call the "giggle factor": humans' seemingly congenital reluctance to discuss planetary defense seriously without retreating to the silliest tropes about alien attacks or sci-fi thrillers. The topic seems to be ripped from kitschy movie trailers, not news headlines. 2 19 An additional fear factor here is the danger of surprise. If a significant asteroid were to arrive without warning-as in the Chelyabinsk incident-the afflicted country might perceive that it had been attacked by a hostile neighbor, rather than by a fickle Mother Nature. If, by further malign luck, the event happened to occur during a period of heightened international tensions, the propensity to misinterpret, and to respond precipitously, would rise. The unforeseen space object could thus catalyze a larger human-caused tragedy.2 20<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Reject <u>conventional risk</u> calculus – the <u>magnitude</u> and <u>inevitability</u> of emerging NEO threats requires a <u>totally different model</u> for risk calculus </h4><p><strong>Koplow 19</strong> [David A. Koplow. Professor of Law at Georgetown University. He specializes in the areas of public international law, national security law, and the intersection between international law and U.S. constitutional law. Koplow served as Special Counsel for Arms Control to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense (2009-2011); Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs at the Department of Defense (1997-1999); and as Attorney-Advisor and Special Assistant to the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1978-1981). A Rhodes scholar, Koplow graduated from Harvard College and Yale Law School. "Exoatmospheric Plowshares: Using a Nuclear Explosive Device for Planetary Defense against an Incoming Asteroid," UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 23, no. 1 (Spring 2019): 76-158]</p><p>Astronomers are fond of observing that the <u>real <mark>question</mark> is <mark>not "whether"</mark> <mark>Earth</mark> will again be <mark>struck by</mark> a large <mark>asteroid</mark>, <mark>but "when</mark>."</u> We can detect around the planet the remnants of scores of impact craters of diverse size and age left by previous NEOs, and the pockmarks are even more obvious on the Moon and other celestial bodies, where erosion has not degraded their silhouettes. <u>As asteroids pinball around the Solar System, it is only a matter of time before the next jarring impact-time</u> that might be measured in months or in millions of years. </p><p><u>The potential <mark>consequences</mark> <mark>of such</mark> a <mark>collision</mark> beggar belief Prehistoric experience <mark>demonstrates</mark> that <strong><mark>all of human civilization</strong></mark>, <mark>as well as</mark> most or <mark>all</mark> other <mark>forms of life</mark> on Earth, may <strong><mark>hang in the balance</strong></mark>.</u> Even <u>a more moderately sized asteroid could devastate a community or a country in an instant.</u> As Igor Ashurbeyli assesses the stakes, <u><mark>developing countermeasures</mark> to this apocalyptic threat "<mark>must</mark> <mark>become</mark> the <strong><mark>most important task</strong></mark> that humanity must solve <strong><mark>in the 2 1st century</strong></mark>. "211 </p><p></u>But <u><mark>the <strong>time frame matters</strong></mark>, too.</u> If we knew, hypothetically, that an extinction-level event was not going to occur for thousands or millions of years, why would we devote time, attention, and money to it now? <u>A known risk of extermination, eons into the future, would pose profound philosophical and psychological conundrums, but preemptively responding to it would not be on anyone's active "to-do list" for generations. </p><p>Still, timing matters in another way, too. <mark>With our present state of</mark> astronomical <mark>intelligence</mark>, <strong><mark>we cannot be certain</mark> </strong><mark>about</mark> our planet's <mark>prolonged safety</mark>, and we must exhibit appropriate modesty about our confidence in the completeness of the inventory of known NEOs.</u> Accordingly, the <u><mark>planet</mark> <mark>may</mark> <strong><mark>not have</mark> much <mark>advance notice</u></strong> </mark>about the next Chicxulub, and we <u>may be <strong><mark>no more able than the</mark> <mark>dinosaurs</strong></mark> <mark>to</mark> <mark>immediately</mark> <mark>invent</mark> <mark>our way out</mark> of an unanticipated fatal space specter</u>. Frances Lyall and Paul B. Larsen summarize the issue this way: "<u>Time might be too short adequately to deal with the crisis-missile or other <strong><mark>technology has to be prepared</u></strong></mark>." 2 12 </p><p>It is <u><strong><mark>difficult for humans to think rationally</mark> about this</strong> sort of problem-it is <mark>hard to get</mark> our <mark>collective</mark> <mark>minds</mark> <mark>around</mark> such <mark>enormous consequences</mark> <mark>and</mark> such <mark>tiny probabilities</mark> simultaneously-especially when people have so little first-hand experience with the causal phenomenon. </u>A <u><strong><mark>2010</mark> <mark>study</strong></mark> by the National Academy of Sciences <mark>referred</mark> <mark>to this as</mark> a <strong><mark>classic "zero times infinity" problem</strong></mark> <mark>that</mark> <strong><mark>thwarts human cognitive processing</strong></mark>.</u>213 Cass Sunstein and Richard Zeckhauser label <u>the <mark>resulting bias</mark> in decision-making <mark>as <strong>"probability neglect"-</strong></mark>a <mark>propensity</mark> <mark>to</mark> <strong><mark>misunderstand</mark> <mark>the fearsome risks</strong></mark> <mark>that</mark> <mark>are</mark> so <mark>difficult to conceptualize</u></mark>.2 14 <u><strong><mark>Behavioral</mark> <mark>economics</strong></mark> literature <mark>abounds</mark> <mark>with</mark> <mark>examinations</mark> <mark>of</mark> the collective <mark>non-rationality</mark> <mark>in</mark> our species' approach to high-severity/low-probability events, leading to <strong><mark>extreme</mark> <mark>discounting of remote future catastrophes</strong></mark>, to the detriment of individuals and society.</u>2 15 </p><p>The <u><strong><mark>underdeveloped</mark> state of <mark>international law</strong></mark> on trans-border disasters <mark>reflects</mark> this <mark>cognitive deficit</mark>. Perhaps this should not be surprising-the tasks of preventing, responding to, and rebuilding after global catastrophes are daunting</u>. These are <u>topics that sovereign <mark>states</mark>, as well as individual human beings, <strong><mark>shy away from</mark> <mark>addressing</mark>-they are <mark>uncomfortable to think about</strong></mark>; they can involve sharing resources, as well as sympathy, with foreigners; and they seem to call for spending immense sums of money on vanishingly remote contingencies.</u> It will never be easy to marshal political support for developing, improving, and sustaining planetary defense capabilities that in all likelihood will never be exercised during any government official's term in office or even lifetime.216 Nevertheless, <u><mark>planetary defense represents</mark> one of the occasions <mark>in which </mark>these <strong><mark>psychological barriers must be overcome</u></strong></mark>. </p><p>The extended time frame in dealing with asteroids places special burdens on the effort to think rationally about very-low-probability dangers, because the people at risk are (likely) not ourselves but our far-distant progeny, generations so remote that the emotional connection to them is strained. We can appreciate that the good work of IAWN and SMPAG today may help increase the odds of our species' survival, but we must also be aware that the counter-asteroid technology available to earthlings a century or two from now will surely surpass today's puny capabilities in ways we cannot imagine.2 17 <u><mark>Collision</mark> with a body of 3-5 km diameter</u>) could <u><strong><mark>kill</strong></mark>, say, <strong><mark>half the world's population</u></strong></mark> (soon to reach eight billion people) sometime in the next million years. On an actuarial basis, that works out to <u>4,000 statistical deaths annually</u>. That is <u>surely a significant fatality rate-enough to warrant substantial financial investment-even though the incidents would be extraordinarily "lumpy,"</u> in the sense that for almost all of those one million years, there would be no deaths at all due to asteroids, but in one year there would be an unprecedented catastrophe. At this rate, <u><mark>asteroids</mark> would <strong><mark>rank</mark> <mark>above</mark> many <mark>other natural and bizarre</mark> <mark>phenomena</strong></mark> that people fear (and that societies attempt to do something about), <mark>such</mark> <mark>as</mark> floods, tornados, airplane crashes, <strong><mark>terrorism</strong></mark>, or choking</u>. Asteroids, however, would still fall far below other leading causes of death, such as automobile accidents, communicable diseases, and tobacco use. 218 </p><p>One plausible formula would be to posit that a major NEO impact (a collision with a body of 3-5 km diameter) could kill, say, half the world's population (soon to reach eight billion people) some time in the next million years. On an actuarial basis, that works out to 4,000 statistical deaths annually. That is surely a significant fatality rate-enough to warrant substantial financial investment-even though the incidents would be extraordinarily "lumpy," in the sense that for almost all of those one million years, there would be no deaths at all due to asteroids, but in one year there would be an unprecedented catastrophe. At this rate, asteroids would rank above many other natural and bizarre phenomena that people fear (and that societies attempt to do something about), such as floods, tornados, airplane crashes, terrorism, or choking. Asteroids, however, would still fall far below other leading causes of death, such as automobile accidents, communicable diseases, and tobacco use. 2 18</p><p>This <u><mark>weird combination</mark> of probabilities and consequences <mark>promotes</mark> what many call <strong><mark>the "giggle</mark> <mark>factor</mark>"</u></strong>:<u> <mark>humans'</mark> seemingly <strong><mark>congenital reluctance to discuss planetary defense</strong></mark> seriously <mark>without</mark> retreating to the silliest <mark>tropes</mark> <mark>about</mark> alien attacks or <mark>sci-fi </mark>thrillers. </u>The topic seems to be ripped from kitschy movie trailers, not news headlines. 2 19 </p><p>An <u><mark>additional</mark> <mark>fear</mark> factor here <mark>is</mark> the <strong><mark>danger of surprise</u></strong></mark>. <u>If a significant asteroid were to arrive without warning-as in the Chelyabinsk incident-the afflicted <strong><mark>country might perceive</strong></mark> that it had been <strong><mark>attacked by a hostile neighbor</strong></mark>, rather than by a fickle Mother Nature</u>.<u> <mark>If</u>,</mark> by further malign luck, <u>the event happened to occur <mark>during</mark> a period of <strong>heightened <mark>international tensions</strong></mark>, the <strong><mark>propensity to</mark> <mark>misinterpret</strong></mark>, <mark>and</mark> to <strong><mark>respond precipitously</strong></mark>, would rise</u>. The unforeseen space <u>object could <mark>thus</mark> <strong><mark>catalyze</mark> a <mark>larger</mark> human-caused <mark>tragedy</u></strong></mark>.2 20 </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Abraham, 17—Johns Hopkins University (Kavi Joseph, “Making Machines: Unlikely Resonances between Realist and Postcolonial Thought,” International Political Sociology (2017) 11, 221–238, dml) fulltext: This passage marks out one of the biggest obstacles to connecting realist and postcolonial thought: race. One would be hard pressed to find in realist theorizations anything resembling a supple understanding of race and racism (Vitalis 2015)— though Carr (2001b, 107) demonstrates a comparatively great deal of reflexivity on postcolonial liberation (see fn. 2 above). Even in Williams’s (2005) “wilful” realist tradition, there is scant discussion of how an embedded ethic of critical self-limitation fared in the context of racial or other forms of radical difference. Absent an engagement with the analytics of postcolonial thinking, or the diverse ways in which white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity inflect past and present liberal imperial formations, willful realism does not address the categories that threaten to push prudential skeptics toward violent responses, that pose limitations to an ethos of limits. As evidenced in Morgenthau, failure to think critically about race opens up the way for Morgenthau’s theoretical practice to be driven toward resentful rather than careful ends. It is at this juncture that those concerned with contemporary imperial formations are confronted with a number of possible responses: one is to deem realism, in all its complex and contradictory manifestations, as a failed, unethical, and fundamentally racist/imperial project. A second response is to politically align against liberalism, while holding this partnership at arm’s length. A third response, derived from Ayoob’s (2002) subaltern realism, is to work on an epistemic register, selectively taking insights from realist traditions that help better explain the neocolonial world. Morgenthau’s racist interjections should be critiqued and confronted—perhaps by outlining the innumerable non-Western contributions to the making of so-called Western modernity (Hobson 2004)—but this failing does not delegitimize other realist insights. What is important for Ayoob’s (2002) accommodationist stance is to combine plausible realist insights with other categories that can grasp the extent of global politics, including the dynamics of the postcolonial experience, better. The final response is the one I advance. To adopt a mode of argumentation concerned with building a counter-imperial machine is to neither dismiss constituencies that become caught up in imperial formations, nor merely to tactically align with them; rather, establishing resonant connections among postcolonial and realist lines of thought, highlighting shared dispositions to difference, is to push the latter toward repositioning itself on new ethical lines that limit contemporary forms of violence. To recover a minor position in realism is not to accept all realist positions, nor is it to synthesize or convert any theoretical line into a coherent framework. It is, however, to amplify the shared spirituality that informs both realist and postcolonial thinking, drawing constituencies toward prudential rather than imperial defenses of difference. It is to furnish current research agendas with an anti-imperial focus, to seek the creative possibilities that may arise when divergent constituencies meet, interfuse, and shift. Thus, our response to Morgenthau, as to other realists, is to cultivate the connections that do exist, not for epistemic reasons but for a political project that strengthens counter-imperial movements. Thinking from the Present By way of conclusion, it is important to reiterate the politics that motivates a theoretical project of linking realist and postcolonial thinking. If the ends of this project were to simply gather critiques of liberalism and its relationship to imperial practices, then certainly a return to classical realist thought adds little epistemic value over and above postcolonial approaches. However, the ends of this argument are to outline and energize a counter-imperial machine, to cultivate a shared spirituality that can gather diverse and divergent constituencies to confront dangerous practices. In my estimation, countering an imperial machine that operates in complex ways and at complex sites requires a political strategy as unwieldy and diffuse, linking constituencies that we may otherwise dismiss. That a tradition of realism regularly circulates through halls of power across the globe should be reason not to reject righteously but rather to leverage its authorized status. We can talk about imperialism, knowledge production, and race here, while they can talk about anarchy, power, and self-interest there—or we can theoretically work on the lines of thought that reverberate among us. To reiterate, building a countermachine is not driven to “pragmatic” reconciliation or consensus and, thus, remains distinct from the “eclecticism” of other plural approaches popular in IR today. While the combinatory logic of paradigmatic synthesis has its place, the connections between realist and postcolonial thought articulated here are made in a far more agonistic manner. Rather than produce something like a “postcolonial-realism,” this argument involves pushing contemporary realist scholarship toward new research agendas and new forms of critique that both capture a spirit internal to its own traditions while confronting the realities of contemporary global politics. It engages with minor positions along the realist canon to orient today’s realism away from the logic of great power politics operating under anarchy toward an understanding of how the logic of liberal order permits forms of imperial intervention. Needless to say, drawing together realist and postcolonial thought, as this essay has done, can be met with analytical skepticism and political hostility. A mode of argumentation that refuses comparisons of theoretical cores or non-truncated readings of select theorists strikes a note of analytical evasion. To this there is no defense—other than that already discussed at length. On the other hand, if the expressly political purpose of this work is accepted, the argument anticipates strong political reservations: why align the project of postcolonial theory with realism, an unethical tradition of militarism and realpolitik? To this I would respond that while a kind of strategic essentialism has its place, reducing “realists” to a coherent body of thought not only obscures the complexity of their thinking (see never-ending interpretations of Machiavelli as an example) but reproduces the narrative of transhistorical unity that some realists use to authorize unethical policy programs in the first place. More critically, however, in embodying an unproductive ahistoricism, it poses conventional realist categories of anarchy, selfinterest, and military power as the political problem to confront whereas the present historical context demands attunement to how some of these drives (militarism, national interest) connect with discrete problems of liberalism and imperial practices. In fact, there are good reasons to think that the dominance of (neo)realism in IR is overstated (Walker and Morton 2005; Maliniak et al. 2011) and that the ascension of liberal IR theory is sociologically tied up with the present hegemony of a US liberal world order (Sterling-Folker 2015). In other words, while realism may have been a productive foil in Cold War bipolarity, we must theorize from the present. In doing so, we may find that countering imperial formations may benefit from resonances established not just among postcolonial, feminist, poststructural, and other “critical” theorists but contemporary realists who identify links between liberalism and imperialism (Walt 2013). Indeed, if realism as a policy program defending the national interest is entangled with current militaristic and imperial interventions, we should push the premise of this statement, that difference should be defended, in anti-imperial and prudential directions. Doing so may allow new openings to emerge in the present sense of closure, new strategies to think and defend alternative politics. In this way, we may more fully embody postcoloniality by not being satisfied with either narrow critique or brash conversion but rather attentive translation.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Their K isn’t a reason to reject realism—you don’t have to affirm its violent legacies to recognize the value of respecting difference that it espouses—blanket rejection makes counter-imperial politics impossible and reproduces liberal violence</h4><p><strong>Abraham, 17</strong>—Johns Hopkins University (Kavi Joseph, “Making Machines: Unlikely Resonances between Realist and Postcolonial Thought,” International Political Sociology (2017) 11, 221–238, dml)</p><p>This passage marks out one of the biggest obstacles to connecting realist and postcolonial thought: race. One would be hard pressed to find in realist theorizations anything resembling a supple understanding of race and racism (Vitalis 2015)— though Carr (2001b, 107) demonstrates a comparatively great deal of reflexivity on postcolonial liberation (see fn. 2 above). Even in Williams’s (2005) “wilful” realist tradition, there is scant discussion of how an embedded ethic of critical self-limitation fared in the context of racial or other forms of radical difference. Absent an engagement with the analytics of postcolonial thinking, or the diverse ways in which white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity inflect past and present liberal imperial formations, willful realism does not address the categories that threaten to push prudential skeptics toward violent responses, that pose limitations to an ethos of limits. As evidenced in Morgenthau, failure to think critically about race opens up the way for Morgenthau’s theoretical practice to be driven toward resentful rather than careful ends. It is at this juncture that <u>those concerned with contemporary imperial formations are confronted with <mark>a number of</mark> possible <mark>responses</mark>: one is to <strong><mark>deem realism</strong>, in all its</mark> <strong>complex</strong> and <strong>contradictory <mark>manifestations</strong>, as a <strong>failed</strong>, <strong>unethical</strong>, and <strong>fundamentally racist/imperial project</u></strong>.</mark> A second response is to politically align against liberalism, while holding this partnership at arm’s length. <u>A third response</u>, derived from Ayoob’s (2002) subaltern realism, <u>is to work on an <strong>epistemic register</strong>, <strong>selectively taking insights</strong> from realist traditions that help better explain the neocolonial world</u>. Morgenthau’s racist interjections should be critiqued and confronted—perhaps by outlining the innumerable non-Western contributions to the making of so-called Western modernity (Hobson 2004)—but this <u><mark>failing <strong>does not delegitimize</mark> other <mark>realist insights</u></strong></mark>. What is important for Ayoob’s (2002) accommodationist stance is to combine plausible realist insights with other categories that can grasp the extent of global politics, including the dynamics of the postcolonial experience, better. </p><p>The final response is the one I advance. To adopt a mode of argumentation concerned with <u>building a counter-imperial machine is to neither <strong>dismiss constituencies</strong> that become caught up in imperial formations, nor merely to <strong>tactically align with them</strong>; rather, <strong>establishing resonant connections</strong> among postcolonial and realist lines of thought, <strong><mark>highlighting shared dispositions</strong></mark> to difference, is to <mark>push</mark> the latter <mark>toward</mark> <strong>repositioning itself on <mark>new ethical lines</strong> that <strong>limit</mark> contemporary forms of <mark>violence</strong></mark>. To recover a minor position in realism is <strong>not to accept all realist positions</strong>, nor is it to synthesize or convert any theoretical line into a coherent framework. It is</u>, however, <u>to <strong>amplify the shared spirituality</strong> that informs both realist and postcolonial thinking, drawing constituencies toward <strong>prudential</strong> rather than <strong>imperial defenses of difference</strong>. It is to <strong>furnish current research agendas</strong> with an <strong>anti-imperial focus</strong>, to seek the <strong>creative possibilities</strong> that may arise when divergent constituencies meet, interfuse, and shift</u>. Thus, our response to Morgenthau, as to other realists, is to cultivate the connections that do exist, not for epistemic reasons but for a political project that strengthens counter-imperial movements. </p><p>Thinking from the Present </p><p>By way of conclusion, it is important to reiterate the politics that motivates a theoretical project of linking realist and postcolonial thinking. If the ends of this project were to simply gather critiques of liberalism and its relationship to imperial practices, then certainly a return to classical realist thought adds little epistemic value over and above postcolonial approaches. However, <u>the ends of this argument are to outline and energize a <strong>counter-imperial machine</u></strong>, to cultivate a shared spirituality <u>that can <strong>gather diverse</strong> and <strong>divergent constituencies</strong> to confront dangerous practices</u>. In my estimation, <u>countering an imperial machine that operates in <strong>complex ways</strong> and at <strong>complex sites</strong> requires a political strategy as <strong>unwieldy</strong> and <strong>diffuse</strong>, linking constituencies that we <strong>may otherwise dismiss</strong>.</u> <u><mark>That</mark> a tradition of <mark>realism</mark> <strong>regularly <mark>circulates through halls of power</strong></mark> across the globe <strong><mark>should be reason not to reject</mark> righteously</strong> <mark>but</mark> rather <mark>to <strong>leverage its authorized status</strong>. </mark>We can talk about <strong>imperialism</strong>, <strong>knowledge production</strong>, and <strong>race</strong> here, while they can talk about <strong>anarchy</strong>, <strong>power</strong>, and <strong>self-interest</strong> there—or we can theoretically work on the lines of thought that <strong>reverberate among us</u></strong>. To reiterate, building a countermachine is not driven to “pragmatic” reconciliation or consensus and, thus, remains distinct from the “eclecticism” of other plural approaches popular in IR today. While the combinatory logic of paradigmatic synthesis has its place, the connections between realist and postcolonial thought articulated here are made in a far more agonistic manner. Rather than produce something like a “postcolonial-realism,” <u>this</u> argument <u>involves pushing contemporary realist scholarship toward <strong>new research agendas</strong> and <strong>new forms of critique</u></strong> that both capture a spirit internal to its own traditions while confronting the realities of contemporary global politics. It engages with minor positions along the realist canon to orient today’s realism away from the logic of great power politics operating under anarchy toward an understanding of how the logic of liberal order permits forms of imperial intervention. </p><p>Needless to say, <u>drawing together realist and postcolonial thought</u>, as this essay has done, <u>can be met with <strong>analytical skepticism</strong> and <strong>political hostility</strong>. <mark>A mode</mark> of argumentation <mark>that <strong>refuses comparisons</strong></mark> of theoretical cores or non-truncated readings of select theorists <mark>strikes a note of <strong>analytical evasion</u></strong></mark>. To this there is no defense—other than that already discussed at length. On the other hand, if the expressly political purpose of this work is accepted, <u>the argument anticipates <strong>strong political reservations</strong>: <mark>why align</mark> the project of postcolonial theory <mark>with realism, an <strong>unethical tradition of militarism</strong></mark> and <strong>realpolitik</strong>?</u> To this I would respond that while a kind of strategic essentialism has its place, <u><strong><mark>reducing</strong> “realists” </mark>to a coherent body of thought <mark>not only <strong>obscures</mark> the <mark>complexity</strong></mark> of their thinking</u> (see never-ending interpretations of Machiavelli as an example) <u><mark>but <strong>reproduces the narrative </mark>of transhistorical unity</strong> <mark>that some</mark> realists <mark>use to <strong>authorize unethical</mark> policy <mark>programs</strong></mark> in the first place</u>. More critically, however, <u>in embodying an <strong>unproductive <mark>ahistoricism</strong></mark>, it <mark>poses</mark> conventional <mark>realist categories of <strong>anarchy</strong>, <strong>selfinterest</strong></mark>, and <strong>military power</strong> <mark>as the</mark> <strong>political <mark>problem</mark> to confront</strong> <mark>whereas the present</mark> historical <mark>context <strong>demands attunement</strong> to how</mark> some of <mark>these drives</u></mark> (militarism, national interest) <u><strong><mark>connect with discrete problems</strong></mark> of liberalism and imperial practices</u>. In fact, there are good reasons to think that the dominance of (neo)realism in IR is overstated (Walker and Morton 2005; Maliniak et al. 2011) and that the ascension of liberal IR theory is sociologically tied up with the present hegemony of a US liberal world order (Sterling-Folker 2015). In other words, while realism may have been a productive foil in Cold War bipolarity, we must theorize from the present. In doing so, we may find that <u><mark>countering imperial formations <strong>may benefit from resonances</mark> established</u></strong> not just <u><strong><mark>among</u></strong></mark> postcolonial, feminist, poststructural, and other “critical” theorists but <u><strong>contemporary <mark>realists</strong></mark> who identify links between liberalism and imperialism</u> (Walt 2013). Indeed, <u><mark>if realism</mark> as a policy program defending the national interest <mark>is <strong>entangled with</mark> current militaristic</strong> and <strong><mark>imperial interventions</strong>, we should <strong>push the premise</strong></mark> of this statement, <mark>that <strong>difference should be defended</strong>, in <strong>anti-imperial</strong></mark> and <strong>prudential <mark>directions</strong></mark>. Doing so may allow <strong>new openings to emerge</strong> in the present sense of closure, <strong>new strategies to think</strong> and <strong>defend alternative politics</u></strong>. In this way, we may more fully embody postcoloniality by not being satisfied with either narrow critique or brash conversion but rather attentive translation.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Bock et al. 15 (Dr. Andreas M. Bock is a professor of political science at the Akkon University of Applied Science Berlin (Germany). Ingo Henneberg is a research associate at the Chair of Multi-Level Governance, Department of Political Science, University of Freiburg (Germany). Friedrich Plank is a lecturer and research fellow at the International Politics Unit, Department of Political Science, University of Mainz (Germany). “"If you compress the spring, it will snap back hard": The Ukrainian crisis and the balance of threat theory.” International journal (Toronto, Ont.) 70(1):101-109 · March 2015. ResearchGate. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273699287_If_you_compress_the_spring_it_will_snap_back_hard_The_Ukrainian_crisis_and_the_balance_of_threat_theory) fulltext: Western news coverage of the Ukrainian crisis has been dominated by an excessively simple explanatory narrative. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which undoubtedly violated international law, has been interpreted in general terms as a neo-imperialist or even neo-Soviet response. Russian foreign policy has been portrayed as aiming to re-establish imperial control of the “near abroad2 (i.e. the newly independent republics that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union)—and in particular of Ukraine. This narrative of aggressive Russian intentions has often been personalized by a focus on Putin himself.2 We suggest that such a critical narrative has been politically motivated and we therefore propose to investigate how the Ukrainian crisis might be managed, and indeed deescalated, so that all parties involved will benefit. We hold that the transformation of the Ukrainian crisis requires a dispassionate analysis of the global and regional context, which must include Moscow’s perception of threats to its interests—a factor that has largely been missing until now. In this brief paper, we argue that Russia’s behaviour can be explained through the lens of Stephen M. Walt’s “balance of threat” theory,3 which complements balance of power theory by not only focusing on power units (e.g. military, or offensive, capabilities) but also on threats. According to balance of threat theory, state behaviour is determined by the threat perceived by other states or alliances. Walt argues that states will not balance against other states that are increasing in power (as balance of power theory predicts) but rather against those that are perceived as a threat. For instance, during the Cold War, US nuclear weapons did not threaten Western European states. The latter states perceived the US as neither aggressive nor hostile. It was therefore not a threat. In his March 2014 speech to the Duma, Putin paraphrased Walt’s core argument in a sentence that deserves greater scholarly and public attention: “If you compress the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard.”4 We interpret this remark as an indicator that Moscow perceives Western political and military expansion (i.e. the admission of East European states into the EU and especially into NATO), as well as defence measures taken by NATO allies (i.e. missile defence), as clear, immediate, and vital threats to Russia’s national security. Our guiding thesis is that balancing exacerbates the dynamic of the security dilemma and makes the perceived threat real, thereby making the balancer an even greater threat than before. The current Ukrainian crisis also shows that, when it comes to security challenges, states tend to resort to balancing against any perceived threat. The Cuban missile crisis and the ongoing Iranian nuclear crisis support Walt’s theory; in both cases the perception of a threat resulted in balancing. The US balanced against the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles into Cuba, which could have reached and destroyed Washington. From Washington’s perspective, the Soviet move was an unprecedented provocation and a threat. The missiles were indeed a provocation, but they were not unprecedented; in 1959, the US had begun to install nuclear missiles in several NATO partner states, including Turkey. The Soviets had perceived Washington’s move as a threat and balanced against it by deploying missiles to Cuba. The US and Israel are currently balancing against a much weaker Iran (measured in terms of military capabilities and economic data to which Walt refers as “aggregate power”) 5 for similar reasons, i.e. both perceive the prospect of a nuclear armed Iran as threatening to regional and world security. These examples indicate that, because the image of a state as aggressive and perceptions of its intentions as aggressive are mutually reinforcing, perception matters; the image influences the perception, and the perception fosters the image. With respect to policy against a perceived threat, whether the state under suspicion really does have aggressive intentions is irrelevant; what matters is how those intentions are perceived and evaluated. As John J. Mearsheimer rightly notes, this also works the other way around. No matter what NATO’s intentions might be, “it is the Russians, not the West, who ultimately get to decide what counts as a threat to them.”6 In this context, Walt’s balance of threat theory appears to be a convincing explanation of state behaviour. It is therefore worth applying such a theoretically driven analytical framework to the Ukrainian crisis. Sources of threat To distinguish threatening from non-threatening states, Walt describes four different sources of threat:  Aggregate power refers to “a state’s total resources”; the greater the aggregate power, the greater the threat a state can pose.  Geographic proximity refers to the distance that lies between the potential competitors; the greater the distance, the more limited “the ability to project power” and the more limited the potential threat.  Offensive power refers to the extent of “offensive capabilities”; the greater the offensive power, the greater the threat a state can pose. Offensive power is closely related to aggregate power and geographic proximity.  Aggressive intentions refer to how states perceive a potential enemy.7 Although Walt regards all four dimensions as equally important, we hold that intentions most strongly influence the image that state A has of state B. From the Russian perspective, Moscow is not only influenced but also dominated by the Western hemisphere (i.e. the US, the EU, and NATO). When considering three of Walt’s material sources of threat, the United States in particular becomes extremely threatening. The combined aggregate and offensive power of the US, the EU, and NATO is unprecedented. However, Russia is only the successor of the former Soviet Union, i.e. a superpower in decline. Western superiority has been reflected in concrete policy decisions toward Russia, which can easily be perceived as threats or even violations of Russian security concerns. Examples include:  The Kosovo intervention: it was executed against the explicit objections of Russia and carried out against Serbia, an ally of Russia;  The Iraq war: the new members of the European Union (i.e. Eastern European states) united with the US to illegally intervene in spite of the objections of France, Russia, and Germany;  The Libya intervention: another example of Western military interventionism using NATO as a tool to extend the UN mandate;  The support of pro-Western actors in Eastern Europe (e.g. the Rose Revolution in Georgia) and criticism of the human rights situation and Caucasus policy of Russia;  The eastward expansion of the EU and primarily of NATO;  The US national missile defence (NMD) project and the NATO missile defence system. From a Western perspective, none of these policy decisions constitutes a threat to Russia. All of them can be interpreted as peaceful, pro-democratic, or defensive, just as they can be understood as aggressive, interventional, or threatening. Indeed, an old statement by the former US secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, resonates half a century later: “Khrushchev,” Dulles wrote with reference to the Soviet leader of the time, “does not need to be convinced of our good intentions. He knows we are not aggressors and do not threaten the security of the Soviet Union.”8 As we now know, Khrushchev saw the US as a severe threat to the Soviet Union, which was one of the reasons he deployed nuclear missiles to Cuba. Fifty years later, although neither offensive nor aggressive motivations might be driving Western expansion toward Russia or Western military interventions and defence investments, Moscow may, and likely does, perceive otherwise.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The 1ac has pluralistically examined Russian behavior through defensive realism, domestic political theorization and the balancing theory – this is a form of self-reflexivity that hedges against Western securitization</h4><p><strong>Bock et al. 15<u> (Dr. Andreas M. Bock is a professor of political science at the Akkon University of Applied Science Berlin (Germany). Ingo Henneberg is a research associate at the Chair of Multi-Level Governance, Department of Political Science, University of Freiburg (Germany). Friedrich Plank is a lecturer and research fellow at the International Politics Unit, Department of Political Science, University of Mainz (Germany). “"If you compress the spring, it will snap back hard": The Ukrainian crisis and the balance of threat theory.” International journal (Toronto, Ont.) 70(1):101-109 · March 2015. ResearchGate. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273699287_If_you_compress_the_spring_it_will_snap_back_hard_The_Ukrainian_crisis_and_the_balance_of_threat_theory)</p><p></strong><mark>Western</mark> news <mark>coverage of the Ukrainian crisis has been dominated by a</mark>n excessively <mark>simple</mark> explanatory <mark>narrative</mark>.</u> Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which undoubtedly violated international law, has been interpreted in general terms as a neo-imperialist or even neo-Soviet response. <u><mark>Russian</mark> foreign <mark>policy has been portrayed as aiming to re-establish imperial control</mark> of the “near abroad</u>2 (i.e. the newly independent republics that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union)—<u>and in particular of Ukraine</u>. This narrative of aggressive Russian intentions has often been personalized by a focus on Putin himself.2 We suggest that <u><strong><mark>such a</mark> critical <mark>narrative has been politically </strong>motivated</mark> and we therefore propose to investigate how the Ukrainian crisis might be</u> managed, and indeed <u>deescalated</u>, so that all parties involved will benefit. We hold that <u>the <mark>transformation of the</mark> Ukrainian <mark>crisis requires</mark> a dispassionate <mark>analysis of</mark> the global and regional <mark>context</mark>, <strong><mark>which must include Moscow’s perception of threats</strong></mark> to its interests</u>—a factor that has largely been missing until now. In this brief paper, we argue that <u>Russia’s <mark>behaviour can be explained</mark> through the lens of </u>Stephen M. Walt’s “<u><mark>balance of threat</mark>” <mark>theory</u></mark>,3 which complements balance of power theory by not only focusing on power units (e.g. military, or offensive, capabilities) but also on threats. According to balance of threat theory, state behaviour is determined by the threat perceived by other states or alliances. Walt argues that states will not balance against other states that are increasing in power (as balance of power theory predicts) but rather against those that are perceived as a threat. For instance, during the Cold War, US nuclear weapons did not threaten Western European states. The latter states perceived the US as neither aggressive nor hostile. It was therefore not a threat. In his March 2014 speech to the Duma, Putin paraphrased Walt’s core argument in a sentence that deserves greater scholarly and public attention: “If you compress the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard.”4 We interpret this remark as an indicator that <u><strong><mark>Moscow perceives Western</mark> political and military <mark>expansion</u></strong></mark> (i.e. the admission of East European states into the EU and especially into NATO), <u><strong><mark>as well as</mark> defence <mark>measures taken by NATO</mark> allies</u></strong> (i.e. missile defence), <u><strong><mark>as clear</mark>, immediate, and vital <mark>threats to Russia’s</mark> national <mark>security</strong></mark>. Our guiding thesis is that <mark>balancing exacerbates</mark> <mark>the</mark> <mark>dynamic of the security dilemma and makes the perceived threat real</mark>, thereby <mark>making</mark> the <mark>balancer</mark> <mark>a</mark>n even <mark>greater threat than before</u></mark>. The current Ukrainian crisis also shows <u>that, when it comes to security challenges, <strong><mark>states</mark> tend to <mark>resort to balancing against</mark> any <mark>perceived threat</mark>. </u></strong>The Cuban missile crisis and the ongoing Iranian nuclear crisis support Walt’s theory; in both cases the perception of a threat resulted in balancing. The US balanced against the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles into Cuba, which could have reached and destroyed Washington. From Washington’s perspective, the Soviet move was an unprecedented provocation and a threat. The missiles were indeed a provocation, but they were not unprecedented; in 1959, the US had begun to install nuclear missiles in several NATO partner states, including Turkey. The Soviets had perceived Washington’s move as a threat and balanced against it by deploying missiles to Cuba. The US and Israel are currently balancing against a much weaker Iran (measured in terms of military capabilities and economic data to which Walt refers as “aggregate power”) 5 for similar reasons, i.e. both perceive the prospect of a nuclear armed Iran as threatening to regional and world security. These examples indicate that, because the image of a state as aggressive and perceptions of its intentions as aggressive are mutually reinforcing, perception matters; the image influences the perception, and the perception fosters the image. <u>With respect to policy against a perceived threat, <mark>whether</mark> the <mark>state under suspicion</mark> really <mark>does have aggressive intentions is irrelevant</mark>; what matters is how those intentions are perceived and evaluated.</u> As John J. Mearsheimer rightly notes, this also works the other way around<u>. No matter what NATO’s intentions might be, “<mark>it is the Russians</mark>, not the West, <mark>who</mark> ultimately <mark>get to decide what counts as a threat to them</mark>.”</u>6 In this context, <u>Walt’s balance of threat theory appears to be a convincing explanation of state behaviour.</u> It is therefore worth applying such a theoretically driven analytical framework to the Ukrainian crisis. Sources of threat To distinguish threatening from non-threatening states, Walt describes four different sources of threat:  Aggregate power refers to “a state’s total resources”; the greater the aggregate power, the greater the threat a state can pose.  Geographic proximity refers to the distance that lies between the potential competitors; the greater the distance, the more limited “the ability to project power” and the more limited the potential threat.  Offensive power refers to the extent of “offensive capabilities”; the greater the offensive power, the greater the threat a state can pose. Offensive power is closely related to aggregate power and geographic proximity.  Aggressive intentions refer to how states perceive a potential enemy.7 Although Walt regards all four dimensions as equally important, we hold that intentions most strongly influence the image that state A has of state B. <u>From the Russian perspective, Moscow is not only influenced but also dominated by the Western hemisphere</u> (i.e. the US, the EU, and NATO). When considering three of Walt’s material sources of threat, <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates in particular <u>becomes extremely threatening. The combined aggregate and offensive power of the US, the EU, and NATO is unprecedented</u>. However, Russia is only the successor of the former Soviet Union, i.e. a superpower in decline. Western superiority has been reflected in concrete <u><mark>policy decisions toward Russia</u></mark>, which <u><strong><mark>can</mark> easily <mark>be perceived as threats</mark> or even violations <mark>of Russian security</mark> <mark>concerns</u></strong></mark>. Examples include:  <u><mark>The Kosovo intervention</u></mark>: <u><strong>it <mark>was executed against</mark> the explicit <mark>objections</mark> of Russia and carried out against Serbia, an ally of Russia</u></strong>;  <u><mark>The Iraq war</u></mark>: <u>the new members of the European Union</u> (i.e. Eastern European states) <u>united with the US to illegally intervene in spite of the objections of</u> France, <u>Russia</u>, and Germany;  <u><mark>The Libya intervention</u></mark>: <u>another example of Western military interventionism using NATO as a tool to extend the UN mandate</u>;  <u>The support of pro-Western actors in Eastern Europe (</u>e.g. the Rose Revolution in Georgia) <u>and criticism of the human rights situation and Caucasus policy of Russia</u>;  <u><mark>The eastward expansion of the EU and</mark> </u>primarily of<u> <mark>NATO</u></mark>;  The <u><mark>US</u></mark> national missile defence (<u><mark>NMD</u></mark>) project <u><mark>and the NATO missile defence system</u></mark>. From a Western perspective, none of these policy decisions constitutes a threat to Russia. All of them can be interpreted as peaceful, pro-democratic, or defensive, just as they can be understood as aggressive, interventional, or threatening. Indeed, an old statement by the former US secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, resonates half a century later: “Khrushchev,” Dulles wrote with reference to the Soviet leader of the time, “does not need to be convinced of our good intentions. He knows we are not aggressors and do not threaten the security of the Soviet Union.”8 As we now know, Khrushchev saw the US as a severe threat to the Soviet Union, which was one of the reasons he deployed nuclear missiles to Cuba. Fifty years later, <u>although neither offensive nor aggressive motivations might be driving Western expansion toward Russia or Western military interventions and defence investments<strong>, Moscow may, and likely does, perceive otherwise.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Henderson and Lenz 15 — Carol Henderson, JD from George Washington Law and BA in Criminal Justice from University of Florida, is director of the National Clearinghouse for Science, Technology, and the Law at Stetson University. Kurt W. Lenz researched at Stetson University and has contributed to in many forensic science publications including; “Legal Issues Concerning Expert Evidence and Testimony”, “Wiley Encyclopedia of Forensic Science”, and “Malpractice Actions Against Experts”. He is also a lawyer in the St. Petersburg area. (“Expert Witness Qualifications and Testimony” Professional Issues in Forensic Science, April 15, 2015, edited by Max M. Huock) fulltext: Qualifications The court must determine whether a proffered witness is qualified to testify as an expert, and that determination will not be overturned except for an abuse of discretion (Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael); but see, for example, Radlein v. Holiday Inns, Inc. (holding that the trial court’s decision will not be reversed unless there is a clear showing of error). Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states that a witness may qualify as an expert on the basis of knowledge, skill, training, experience, or education. An expert witness must possess only one of these traits for the judge to find the expert qualified to give an opinion. In making this evaluation, the judge may consider the expert’s educational background, work experience, publications, awards, teaching, speaking, or other professional engagements, prior expert–witness testimony, and membership in professional associations. Often, the expert may have to educate the attorney proffering the expert regarding the significance of particular experience, achievements, and certifications to ensure that they are appropriately presented to the judge. An expert must be prepared to explain board certification and licensure requirements to the judge in detail. Experience as an Expert Witness Experience and training are often more significant than academic background and are accorded more weight by jurors, according to at least one study evaluating juror perceptions of fingerprint experts. However, experience as an expert witness, standing alone, does not qualify someone as an expert in later cases. One court rejected the opinion of a witness who had testified as an expert 126 times (Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of North America Inc.). Another court noted, “it would be absurd to conclude that one can become an expert by accumulating experience in testifying” (Thomas J. Kline, Inc. v. Lonillard, Inc.). Conversely, a lack of previous experience as an expert witness does not disqualify one from testifying as an expert, because “even the most qualified expert must have his first day in court” (US v. Locascio). Education and Training An expert may be qualified on the basis of academic credentials, including the expert’s undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate work. An expert’s academic credentials should only be issued by accredited educational institutions and programs, because the proliferation of the Internet, while laudable for so many reasons, has also rekindled the oldfashioned diploma mill. One such business, Diplomas 4U, once provided bachelor’s, master’s, MBA, or PhD degrees in its customers’ field of choice; advertisements assured that no one would be turned down and that there would be no bothersome tests, classes, books, or interviews. After studying this issue, the National Academy of Sciences has concluded that it is crucially important to improve undergraduate and graduate forensic science programs with, among other things, attractive scholarship and fellowship offerings, and funding for research programs to attract research universities and students in fields relevant to forensic science. An expert should continuously perform research and publish in the expert’s field, preferably in peer-reviewed publications. Teaching experience is another of the qualifications that judges will evaluate: all forms of teachingd regular, specialty, guest lecturing, visiting professorships, continuing education, and short coursesdweigh in as credentials. An expert should also be up-to-date with developments in his or her field of expertise by reading the current literature, enrolling in continuing education seminars, joining professional societies, and attending professional meetings. Membership in Professional Associations A study published by the U.S. Department of Justice in 1987 found that jurors perceived those fingerprint experts who belonged to professional associations to be more credible than other experts, and presumed experts would belong to such groups (Illsley, supra). It is therefore important for an expert to remain active and participate in professional societies; the expert’s credibility is diminished if the expert has not recently attended a professional meeting. Professional associations that only require annual dues payment to become a member are not as prestigious as associations that are joined by special invitation only, by approval of special referees, or by passing an examination. Thus, an expert should be selective about which professional associations to join. The National Academy Science (NAS) Report calls for standardized accreditation and/or certification, as well as a uniform code of ethics: Although some areas of the forensic science disciplines have made notable efforts to achieve standardization and best practices, most disciplines still lack any consistent structure for the enforcement of ‘better practices,’ operating standards, and certification and accreditation programs. . Accreditation is required in only three states . [and] [i]n other states, accreditation is voluntary, as is individual certification. . NAS Report at 213 Thus, the NAS Report calls for the creation of a federal agency to develop tools to advance reliability in forensic science, to ensure standards that reflect best practices, and serve as accreditation tools for laboratories and as guides for the education, training, and certification of professionals (NAS Report at 214). Increased Scrutiny of Experts Experts have come under increased scrutiny for either fabricating or inflating their qualifications. In Florida, in 1998, a person who had been testifying as an expert in toxicology for 3 years for both the prosecution and defense in criminal cases was prosecuted for perjury for testifying with fraudulent credentials. The expert claimed to possess master’s and doctorate degrees from Florida Atlantic University, but when a prosecutor sought to confirm the claims, he discovered that the registrar’s office had no record of the expert attending or receiving a degree from the university. In another case, a Harvard medical professor was sued for trademark infringement for falsely claiming to be board-certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology (ABPN) in five trials (ABPN v. Johnson-Powell). The board sought to seize the expert’s witness fees and treble damages, but the court denied that relief because it believed the expert was unlikely to infringe in the future. In 2007, a court granted the plaintiff a new trial in her product liability action when it was discovered that the pharmaceutical company’s cardiology expert had misrepresented his credentials by testifying that he was board-certified in internal medicine and cardiovascular disease when in fact those certifications had expired (In re Vioxx Products). In addition to perjury prosecutions for false qualifications, some jurisdictions also prosecute for academic fraud. For example, in Florida, a person who misrepresents association with, or academic standing at, a postsecondary educational institution is guilty of a first-degree misdemeanor (Fla. Stat. x 817.566). Courts have also overturned convictions where the experts testified outside their field of expertise. Instances include a medical examiner testifying to shoe-pattern analysis and an evidence technician with no ballistics expertise giving testimony about bullet trajectory (see Gilliam v. State; Kelvin v. State). There is evidence to suggest that, since the Supreme Court’s decisions in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and Kuhmo Tire Co., courts have been more willing to exclude expert testimony. The Federal Judicial Center compared a 1998 survey of 303 federal judges with a 1991 survey. In 1998, 41% of the judges claimed to have excluded expert testimony, whereas only 25% of the judges did so in 1991. A 2001 RAND study similarly concluded that judges were becoming more vigilant gatekeepers; for example, in the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the exclusion rate in products liability cases rose from 53% to 70%. This contradicts most of the reported case law following Daubert, which seems to indicate that the exclusion of expert testimony remains the exception, not the rule (see Fed. R. Evid. 702).<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>1 — <u>Courts</u> — they’ll <u>exclude</u> digital forensic evidence without a <u>uniform federal standard</u> to verify <u>methods</u> AND investigator <u>expertise</h4><p></u><strong>Henderson and Lenz 15 </strong>— Carol Henderson, JD from George Washington Law and BA in Criminal Justice from University of Florida, is director of the National Clearinghouse for Science, Technology, and the Law at Stetson University. Kurt W. Lenz researched at Stetson University and has contributed to in many forensic science publications including; “Legal Issues Concerning Expert Evidence and Testimony”, “Wiley Encyclopedia of Forensic Science”, and “Malpractice Actions Against Experts”. He is also a lawyer in the St. Petersburg area. (“Expert Witness Qualifications and Testimony” Professional Issues in Forensic Science, April 15, 2015, edited by Max M. Huock)</p><p>Qualifications <u>The <strong><mark>court</strong> must determine whether</mark> a proffered <mark>witness is <strong>qualified </mark>to testify</strong> <mark>as an <strong>expert</u></strong></mark>, and that determination will not be overturned except for an abuse of discretion (Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael); but see, for example, Radlein v. Holiday Inns, Inc. (holding that the trial court’s decision will not be reversed unless there is a clear showing of error). <u><strong>F</u></strong>ederal <u><strong>R</u></strong>ule of <u><strong>E</u></strong>vidence <u><strong>702</u></strong> <u>states that a witness may qualify as an expert on the basis of</u> knowledge, skill, training, experience, or education. An expert witness must possess only one of these traits for the judge to find the expert qualified to give an opinion. In making this evaluation, the judge may consider <u>the expert’s</u> educational <u><strong>background</u></strong>, work experience, publications, awards, teaching, speaking, or other professional engagements, prior expert–witness testimony, and membership in professional associations. Often, the expert may have to educate the attorney proffering the expert regarding the significance of particular experience, achievements, and certifications to ensure that they are appropriately presented to the judge. An expert must be prepared to explain board certification and licensure requirements to the judge in detail. Experience as an Expert Witness Experience and training are often more significant than academic background and are accorded more weight by jurors, according to at least one study evaluating juror perceptions of fingerprint experts. However, experience as an expert witness, standing alone, does not qualify someone as an expert in later cases. One court rejected the opinion of a witness who had testified as an expert 126 times (Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of North America Inc.). Another court noted, “it would be absurd to conclude that one can become an expert by accumulating experience in testifying” (Thomas J. Kline, Inc. v. Lonillard, Inc.). Conversely, a lack of previous experience as an expert witness does not disqualify one from testifying as an expert, because “even the most qualified expert must have his first day in court” (US v. Locascio). Education and Training <u>An expert may be qualified on the basis of</u> academic <u><strong>credentials</u></strong>, including the expert’s undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate work. An expert’s academic credentials should only be <u>issued by</u> <u><strong>accredited</u></strong> educational <u><strong>institutions</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>programs</u></strong>, because the proliferation of the Internet, while laudable for so many reasons, has also rekindled the oldfashioned diploma mill. One such business, Diplomas 4U, once provided bachelor’s, master’s, MBA, or PhD degrees in its customers’ field of choice; advertisements assured that no one would be turned down and that there would be no bothersome tests, classes, books, or interviews. <u>After <strong>studying</u></strong> <u>this</u> issue, <u>the <strong><mark>N</strong></mark>ational <strong><mark>A</strong></mark>cademy of <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>ciences has <mark>concluded</mark> that <mark>it is crucially important to <strong>improve</u></strong></mark> undergraduate and <u><strong><mark>graduate forensic science programs</u></strong></mark> with, among other things, attractive scholarship and fellowship offerings, and funding for research programs to attract research universities and students in fields relevant to forensic science. An expert should continuously perform research and publish in the expert’s field, preferably in peer-reviewed publications. Teaching experience is another of the qualifications that judges will evaluate: all forms of teachingd regular, specialty, guest lecturing, visiting professorships, continuing education, and short coursesdweigh in as credentials. An expert should also be up-to-date with developments in his or her field of expertise by reading the current literature, enrolling in continuing education seminars, joining professional societies, and attending professional meetings. Membership in Professional Associations A study published by the U.S. Department of Justice in 1987 found that jurors perceived those fingerprint experts who belonged to professional associations to be more credible than other experts, and presumed experts would belong to such groups (Illsley, supra). It is therefore important for an expert to remain active and participate in professional societies; the expert’s credibility is diminished if the expert has not recently attended a professional meeting. Professional associations that only require annual dues payment to become a member are not as prestigious as associations that are joined by special invitation only, by approval of special referees, or by passing an examination. Thus, an expert should be selective about which professional associations to join. <u>The</u> National Academy Science (<u><strong><mark>NAS</u></strong></mark>) Report <u><mark>calls for</u> <u><strong>standardized</u></strong></mark> accreditation and/or <u><strong><mark>certification</strong>, as well as a <strong>uniform code of ethics</strong></mark>: </u>Although some areas of the forensic science disciplines have made notable efforts to achieve standardization and best practices, <u>most disciplines still lack any consistent structure for the enforcement of ‘better practices,’ operating standards, and certification and accreditation programs</u>. . Accreditation is required in only three states . [and] <u>[i]n</u> other <u><strong>states</u></strong>, <u><strong>accreditation</u></strong> <u>is</u> <u><strong>voluntary</strong>, as is <strong>individual certification</u></strong>. . NAS Report at 213 <u>Thus, the NAS Report calls for</u> the creation of <u>a</u> <u><strong>federal agency</u></strong> <u>to develop tools to advance <strong>reliability in forensic science</strong>, to <strong>ensure</u></strong> standards that reflect best practices, and serve as accreditation tools for laboratories and as guides for the education, training, and <u><strong>certification</u></strong> <u>of</u> <u><strong>professionals</u></strong> (NAS Report at 214). Increased Scrutiny of Experts <u><mark>Experts have come under <strong></mark>increased<mark> scrutiny</u></strong> <u>for</u></mark> either <u><strong><mark>fabricating</u></strong> <u></mark>or</u> <u><strong>inflating</u></strong> <u>their <mark>qualifications</u></mark>. In Florida, in 1998, a person who had been testifying as an expert in toxicology for 3 years for both the prosecution and defense in criminal cases was prosecuted for perjury for testifying with fraudulent credentials. The expert claimed to possess master’s and doctorate degrees from Florida Atlantic University, but when a prosecutor sought to confirm the claims, he discovered that the registrar’s office had no record of the expert attending or receiving a degree from the university. In another case, a Harvard medical professor was sued for trademark infringement for falsely claiming to be board-certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology (ABPN) in five trials (ABPN v. Johnson-Powell). The board sought to seize the expert’s witness fees and treble damages, but the court denied that relief because it believed the expert was unlikely to infringe in the future. In 2007, a court granted the plaintiff a new trial in her product liability action when it was discovered that the pharmaceutical company’s cardiology expert had misrepresented his credentials by testifying that he was board-certified in internal medicine and cardiovascular disease when in fact those certifications had expired (In re Vioxx Products). <u>In addition to perjury prosecutions for <strong>false</strong> qualifications, some jurisdictions also prosecute for <strong>academic fraud</u></strong>. For example, in Florida, a person who misrepresents association with, or academic standing at, a postsecondary educational institution is guilty of a first-degree misdemeanor (Fla. Stat. x 817.566). <u><mark>Courts </mark>have also <mark>overturn</mark>ed<mark> convictions where the experts testified <strong>outside </mark>their <mark>field of expertise</u></strong></mark>. Instances include a medical examiner testifying to shoe-pattern analysis and an evidence technician with no ballistics expertise giving testimony about bullet trajectory (see Gilliam v. State; Kelvin v. State). <u>There is evidence to suggest that, since the</u> Supreme Court’s <u>decisions in <strong><mark>Daubert</u></strong></mark> v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., <u><mark>and</u> <u><strong>Kuhmo </mark>Tire</u></strong> Co., <u>courts have been <strong>more willing to <mark>exclude expert testimony</u></strong></mark>. The Federal Judicial Center compared a 1998 survey of 303 federal judges with a 1991 survey. <u>In 19<strong>98</strong>, <strong>41%</u></strong> <u>of</u> the <u>judges</u> <u>claimed to have excluded expert testimony, whereas only</u> <u><strong>25%</u></strong> of the judges <u>did so in</u> <u>19<strong>91</u></strong>. A 2001 <u><strong>RAND</u></strong> study similarly <u>concluded that <mark>judges </mark>were <mark>becoming <strong>more vigilant gatekeepers</strong></mark>; for example, in the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the <mark>exclusion rate </mark>in products liability cases <mark>rose</mark> from 53% <mark>to <strong>70%</u></strong>.</mark> This contradicts most of the reported case law following Daubert, which seems to indicate that the exclusion of expert testimony remains the exception, not the rule (see Fed. R. Evid. 702).</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Yoo 17 (April 13th, 2017, John Yoo is the Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, “Trump’s Syria Strike Was Constitutional,” https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/04/trump-syria-strike-constitutional-presidents-have-broad-war-powers) fulltext: Common sense does not support replacing the way our Constitution has worked in wartime with a radically different system that mimics the peacetime balance of powers between president and Congress. If the issue were the environment or Social Security, Congress would enact policy first and the president would faithfully implement it second. But the Constitution does not duplicate this system in war. Instead, our Framers decided that the president would play the leading role in matters of national security. If the issue were the environment or Social Security, Congress would enact policy first and the president would faithfully implement it second. Those in the pro-Congress camp call upon the anti-monarchical origins of the American Revolution for support. If the Framers rebelled against King George III’s dictatorial powers, surely they would not give the president much authority. It is true that the revolutionaries rejected the royal prerogative, and they created weak executives at the state level. Americans have long turned a skeptical eye toward the growth of federal powers. But this may mislead some to resist the fundamental difference in the Constitution’s treatment of domestic and foreign affairs. For when the Framers wrote the Constitution in 1787, they rejected these failed experiments and restored an independent, unified chief executive with its own powers in national security and foreign affairs. The most important of the president’s powers are those of commander in chief and chief executive. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 74: The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength, and the power of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority. Presidents should conduct war, he wrote, because they could act with “decision, activity, secrecy and dispatch.” In perhaps his most famous words, Hamilton wrote: “Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. . . . It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks.” The Framers realized the obvious. Foreign affairs are unpredictable and involve the highest of stakes, making them unsuitable to regulation by preexisting legislation. Instead, they can demand swift, decisive action — sometimes under pressured or even emergency circumstances — that is best carried out by a branch of government that does not suffer from multiple vetoes or that is delayed by disagreements. Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. Our Framers replaced the Articles of Confederation, which had failed in the management of foreign relations because they had no single executive, with the Constitution’s single president for precisely this reason. Even when it has access to the same intelligence as the executive branch, Congress’s loose, decentralized structure would paralyze American policy while foreign threats grew. Congress has no political incentive to mount and see through its own wartime policy. Members of Congress, who are interested in keeping their seats at the next election, do not want to take stands on controversial issues where the future is uncertain. They will avoid like the plague any vote that will anger large segments of the electorate. They prefer that the president take the political risks and be held accountable for failure. Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. Congress’s track record when it has opposed presidential leadership has not been a happy one. Perhaps the most telling example was the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. Congress’s isolationist urge kept the United States out of Europe at a time when democracies fell and Fascism grew in their place. Even as Europe and Asia plunged into war, Congress passed the Neutrality Acts designed to keep the United States out of the conflict. President Franklin Roosevelt violated those laws to help the Allies and draw the nation into war against the Axis. While pro-Congress critics worry about a president’s foreign adventurism, the real threat to our national security could come from inaction and isolationism. Many point to the Vietnam War as an example of the faults of the “imperial presidency.” Vietnam, however, could not have continued without the consistent support of Congress in raising a large military and paying for hostilities. And Vietnam ushered in a period of congressional dominance that witnessed American setbacks in the Cold War and the passage of the ineffectual War Powers Resolution. Congress passed the resolution in 1973 over President Richard Nixon’s veto, and no president has ever accepted the constitutionality of its 60-day limit on the use of troops abroad. No federal court has ever upheld the resolution. Even Congress has never enforced it. Despite the record of practice and the Constitution’s institutional design, critics nevertheless argue that we should radically remake the American way of war. They typically base their claim on Congress’s power to “declare war.” But these observers read the 18th-century constitutional text through a modern lens by interpreting “declare war” to mean “start war.” When the Constitution was written, however, a declaration of war served diplomatic notice about a change in legal relations between nations. It had little to do with launching hostilities. In the century before the Constitution, for example, Great Britain — where the Framers got the idea of declaring war — fought numerous major conflicts but declared war only once beforehand. Our Constitution sets out specific procedures for passing laws, appointing officers, and making treaties. There are none for waging war because the Framers expected the president and Congress to struggle over war through the national political process. In fact, other parts of the Constitution, properly read, support this reading. Article I, Section 10, for example, declares that the states shall not “engage” in war “without the consent of Congress” unless “actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.” This provision creates exactly the limits desired by anti-war critics, complete with an exception for self-defense. If the Framers had wanted to require congressional permission before the president could wage war, they simply could have repeated this provision and applied it to the executive. Presidents, of course, do not have complete freedom to take the nation to war. Congress has ample powers to control presidential policy, if it wants to. Only Congress can raise the military, which gives it the power to block, delay, or modify war plans. Before 1945, the United States had such a small peacetime military that presidents who started a war would have to go hat in hand to Congress to build an army to fight it. Since World War II, Congress has authorized and funded our large standing military, one primarily designed to conduct offensive, not defensive, operations (as we learned all too tragically on 9/11) and to swiftly project power worldwide. If Congress wanted to discourage presidential initiative in war, it could build a smaller, less offense-minded military. A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security. Congress’s check on the presidency lies not just in the long-term raising of the military. It can also block any immediate armed conflict through the power of the purse. If Congress feels it has been misled in authorizing war, or it disagrees with the president’s decisions, all it need do is cut off funds, either all at once or gradually. It can reduce the size of the military, shrink or eliminate units, or freeze supplies. Using the power of the purse does not even require affirmative congressional action. Congress can just sit on its hands and refuse to pass a law funding the latest presidential adventure, and the war will end quickly. Even the Kosovo war, which lasted little more than two months and involved no ground troops, required special funding legislation. The Framers expected Congress’s power of the purse to serve as the primary check on presidential war. During the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention. Patrick Henry attacked the Constitution for failing to limit executive militarism. James Madison responded: “The sword is in the hands of the British king; the purse is in the hands of the Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy can exist.” Congress ended America’s involvement in Vietnam by cutting off all funds for the war. Our Constitution has succeeded because it favors swift presidential action in war, later checked by Congress’s funding power. If a president continues to wage war without congressional authorization, as in Libya, Kosovo, or Korea, it is only because Congress has chosen not to exercise its easy check. We should not confuse a desire to escape political responsibility for a defect in the Constitution. A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security. In order to forestall another 9/11 attack, or take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike terrorists or rogue nations, the executive branch needs flexibility. It is not hard to think of situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act. Time for congressional deliberation, which can lead to passivity and isolation and not smarter decisions, will come at the price of speed and secrecy. The Constitution creates a presidency that can respond forcefully to prevent serious threats to our national security. Presidents can take the initiative, and Congress can use its funding power to check presidents. Instead of demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the Framers left war to politics. As we confront the new challenges of terrorism, rogue nations, and WMD proliferation, now is not the time to introduce sweeping, untested changes in the way we make war.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>War powers solve crisis escalation, WMD prolif, AND nuclear terror </h4><p><strong>Yoo 17</strong> (April 13th, 2017, John Yoo is the Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, “Trump’s Syria Strike Was Constitutional,” https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/04/trump-syria-strike-constitutional-presidents-have-broad-war-powers)</p><p><u><strong>Common sense</strong> does not support replacing the way our Constitution has worked in wartime with a radically different system that mimics the peacetime balance of powers between president and Congress</u>. If the issue were the environment or Social Security, Congress would enact policy first and the president would faithfully implement it second. But the Constitution does not duplicate this system in war. Instead, <u>our Framers decided that the president would play the <strong>leading role in matters of national security</u></strong>. If the issue were the environment or Social Security, Congress would enact policy first and the president would faithfully implement it second. <u>Those in the pro-Congress camp call upon the anti-monarchical origins</u> of the American Revolution for support. If the Framers rebelled against King George III’s dictatorial powers, surely they would not give the president much authority. It is true that the revolutionaries rejected the royal prerogative, and they created weak executives at the state level. Americans have long turned a skeptical eye toward the growth of federal powers. But this may mislead some to resist the fundamental difference in the Constitution’s treatment of domestic and foreign affairs. For when the Framers wrote the Constitution in 1787, they rejected these failed experiments and restored an independent, unified chief executive with its own powers in national security and foreign affairs. <u>The most important of the president’s powers are those of commander in chief and chief executive</u>. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 74: <u>The direction of war implies the <strong>direction of the common strength</strong>, and the power of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority. Presidents should conduct war</u>, he wrote, <u>because they</u> could <u>act with “<strong>decision</strong>, <strong>activity</strong>, <strong>secrecy</strong> and <strong>dispatch</strong>.”</u> In perhaps his most famous words, Hamilton wrote: “<u>Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government</u>. . . . <u>It is essential to the protection</u> of the community <u>against foreign attacks</u>.” <u>The Framers realized the <strong>obvious</u></strong>. <u><mark>Foreign affairs are <strong>unpredictable </mark>and involve the highest of stakes</strong>, <mark>making them <strong>unsuitable to regulation by </mark>preexisting <mark>legislation</u></strong></mark>. Instead, <u><mark>they</u></mark> can <u><mark>demand <strong>swift, decisive action</strong></mark> </u>— <u>sometimes under <strong>pressured</strong> or even <strong>emergency circumstances</u></strong> — <u>that is best carried out by a branch of government that does not <strong>suffer from multiple vetoes</strong> or that is <strong>delayed by disagreements</u></strong>. <u><strong>Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required</u></strong> in wartime. Our Framers replaced the Articles of Confederation, which had failed in the management of foreign relations because they had no single executive, with the Constitution’s single president for precisely this reason. <u><strong>Even when it has access to the same intelligence as the executive branch</strong>, <strong>Congress’s loose, decentralized structure would paralyze American policy while foreign threats grew</u></strong>. Congress has no political incentive to mount and see through its own wartime policy. <u>Members of Congress, who are interested in keeping their seats at the next election, do not want to take stands on controversial issues where the future is uncertain</u>. They will avoid like the plague any vote that will anger large segments of the electorate. They prefer that the president take the political risks and be held accountable for failure. Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. Congress’s track record when it has opposed presidential leadership has not been a happy one. Perhaps the most telling example was the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. Congress’s isolationist urge kept the United States out of Europe at a time when democracies fell and Fascism grew in their place. Even as Europe and Asia plunged into war, Congress passed the Neutrality Acts designed to keep the United States out of the conflict. President Franklin Roosevelt violated those laws to help the Allies and draw the nation into war against the Axis. <u>While pro-Congress critics worry about a president’s foreign adventurism, <mark>the <strong>real threat</strong> to</mark> our <mark>national security </mark>could <mark>come from <strong>inaction</mark> and isolationism</u></strong>. Many point to the Vietnam War as an example of the faults of the “imperial presidency.” Vietnam, however, could not have continued without the consistent support of Congress in raising a large military and paying for hostilities. And Vietnam ushered in a period of congressional dominance that witnessed American setbacks in the Cold War and the passage of the ineffectual War Powers Resolution. Congress passed the resolution in 1973 over President Richard Nixon’s veto, and no president has ever accepted the constitutionality of its 60-day limit on the use of troops abroad. <u><strong>No federal court has ever upheld the resolution</strong>. Even <strong>Congress has never enforced it</u></strong>. Despite the record of practice and the Constitution’s institutional design, critics nevertheless argue that we should radically remake the American way of war. They typically base their claim on Congress’s power to “declare war.” But these observers read the 18th-century constitutional text through a modern lens by interpreting “declare war” to mean “start war.” When the Constitution was written, however, a declaration of war served diplomatic notice about a change in legal relations between nations. It had little to do with launching hostilities. In the century before the Constitution, for example, Great Britain — where the Framers got the idea of declaring war — fought numerous major conflicts but declared war only once beforehand. Our Constitution sets out specific procedures for passing laws, appointing officers, and making treaties. There are none for waging war because the Framers expected the president and Congress to struggle over war through the national political process. In fact, other parts of the Constitution, properly read, support this reading. Article I, Section 10, for example, declares that the states shall not “engage” in war “without the consent of Congress” unless “actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.” This provision creates exactly the limits desired by anti-war critics, complete with an exception for self-defense. If the Framers had wanted to require congressional permission before the president could wage war, they simply could have repeated this provision and applied it to the executive. Presidents, of course, do not have complete freedom to take the nation to war. Congress has ample powers to control presidential policy, if it wants to. Only Congress can raise the military, which gives it the power to block, delay, or modify war plans. Before 1945, the United States had such a small peacetime military that presidents who started a war would have to go hat in hand to Congress to build an army to fight it. Since World War II, Congress has authorized and funded our large standing military, one primarily designed to conduct offensive, not defensive, operations (as we learned all too tragically on 9/11) and to swiftly project power worldwide. If Congress wanted to discourage presidential initiative in war, it could build a smaller, less offense-minded military. A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security. Congress’s check on the presidency lies not just in the long-term raising of the military. It can also block any immediate armed conflict through the power of the purse. If Congress feels it has been misled in authorizing war, or it disagrees with the president’s decisions, all it need do is cut off funds, either all at once or gradually. It can reduce the size of the military, shrink or eliminate units, or freeze supplies. Using the power of the purse does not even require affirmative congressional action. Congress can just sit on its hands and refuse to pass a law funding the latest presidential adventure, and the war will end quickly. Even the Kosovo war, which lasted little more than two months and involved no ground troops, required special funding legislation. The Framers expected Congress’s power of the purse to serve as the primary check on presidential war. During the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention. Patrick Henry attacked the Constitution for failing to limit executive militarism. James Madison responded: “The sword is in the hands of the British king; the purse is in the hands of the Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy can exist.” Congress ended America’s involvement in Vietnam by cutting off all funds for the war. <u>Our <strong>Constitution</strong> has succeeded because it <strong>favors swift presidential action</strong> in war, later checked by Congress’s funding power</u>. If a president continues to wage war without congressional authorization, as in Libya, Kosovo, or Korea, it is only because Congress has chosen not to exercise its easy check. We should not confuse a desire to escape political responsibility for a defect in the Constitution. <u><mark>A <strong>radical change</strong> </mark>in the system</u> for making war <u>might appease critics of presidential power. But it <mark>could</mark> also <strong>seriously <mark>threaten</mark> American <mark>national security</u></strong></mark>. <u>In order to <strong>forestall another 9/11 attack</strong>, or take advantage of a <strong>window of opportunity to strike terrorists or rogue nations</strong>, the <strong>executive branch needs flexibility</u></strong>. It is not hard to think of situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act. <u>Time for congressional deliberation, which can lead to <strong>passivity and isolation and not smarter decisions</strong>, will <strong>come at the price of speed and secrecy</u></strong>. <u><mark>The Constitution creates a <strong>presidency</strong> that can <strong>respond forcefully</strong> to prevent</mark> serious threats to our national security</u>. Presidents can take the initiative, and Congress can use its funding power to check presidents. Instead of demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the Framers left war to politics. <u>As we confront the <strong>new challenges</strong> of <strong><mark>terror</mark>ism</strong>, <strong><mark>rogue nations</strong>, and <strong></mark>WMD <mark>prolif</mark>eration</strong>, now is not the time to introduce sweeping, untested changes</u> in the way we make war.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Arango 12/22 [(Steve, a deputy staff judge advocate at Training and Education Command and currently working toward his LL.M. in national security and cybersecurity from the George Washington University School of Law. He was selected as a Regional Affairs Officer for Latin America. Prior to his time on active duty, Steven worked for the U.S. House of Representatives, the Department of Defense in the Office of General Counsel, International Affairs, and served as a federal law clerk for U.S. District Judge Fernando Rodriguez, who presides on the southern border.) “China Next Door: The CCP's Growing Influence in Latin America,” CIMSEC, 12/22/22. https://cimsec.org/china-next-door-how-the-ccp-is-reshaping-latin-america/] RR fulltext: Americans hear about countries such as China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran on a frequent basis, and for good reason. All have been intertwined in global affairs, politics at home, or both for most of this century so far. But in stark contrast, the United States has treated Latin America with “benign neglect.” Although Russia and Iran have exploited Latin America for their purposes and to the United States’ detriment—China’s inroads into the region are among the most significant threats to U.S. national security. China’s actions in the region reveal short and long-term plans to become the predominant superpower in the region. To do so, China’s influence has sowed its roots in two main areas: military and economic. But most importantly, this influence is not superficial—China’s actions seep through all levels of Latin American governments, even down to city halls. China is not simply a regional challenge; it is a global challenge as demonstrated in Latin America. To ignore Latin America is to ignore the critical inroads being developed by the United States’ chief competitor in its own backyard. Military Influence China’s military influence in Latin America is mainly through soft power, not physical presence. China has fostered significant military relationships through arms sales, exchange programs, and training engagements. China has found a fruitful market for arm’s sales in Latin America; in roughly the last eight years China has sold more than $615 million in weapons to Venezuela. Military sales may have started as simply small arms, but China’s expansion in this market now includes “aircraft, armored vehicles, and radars.” But these sales are not simply about the equipment; the sale is just the beginning of a relationship. Opportunities for training and maintenance follow each transaction—leading to greater interaction between these countries, their militaries, and China. As these deals continue to grow, Chinese personnel and military bases in the region could follow. China has also made major inroads with Latin American militaries through professional military education (PME) programs and exchange officer programs of significant scale. These programs steep Latin American servicemembers in Chinese military and political doctrine and anti-U.S. sentiment, while creating stronger relationships between the respective country and China. To attract military talent to these programs, China has also offered perks to Latin American military personnel. China will pay for business-class travel for exchange students, provide five-star hotels, and pay for other expenses while they live in China. Since 2015, China has “trained more Latin American military officers than the United States, and the difference has grown every year since.” Recent SOUTHCOM commander Adm. Craig Faller noted in Congressional testimony that China was sending five times as many Latin American military officers to its war colleges compared to the United States. According to John Kreul, who was acting deputy secretary of defense for the Western Hemisphere, the feedback on these professional military exchange programs suggested they were “straight up recruitment and propaganda 24/7.” Once these personnel are educated in China and establish professional connections with China’s military, the United States may have to be weary of working with these personnel because of the potential operational security risks. Chinese Influence—Economic Economic influence in Latin America is China’s main focus in the region. In 2000, China’s total trade value with Latin America was $12 billion. Today it is roughly $450 billion, and economists predict it could exceed $700 billion within the next 15 years. China is South America’s top trading partner and second only to the United States for all of Latin America. Underlying this trade is the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s ambitious $1 trillion trade and infrastructure program spanning across the globe. One portion of this program is a proposed transcontinental railway that can link South America’s Atlantic and Pacific coasts from Brazil to Chile. As it does elsewhere, trade naturally builds relationships and influence in the countries China builds in. China can then use its powerful economic leverage in pursuit of political goals, such as persuading regional countries to withhold recognition of Taiwan—which it has. China also engages in debt-trap diplomacy. Through deceptive trade and loan practices, China can manipulate and coerce countries that are unable to repay their loans. For example, China uses contractual language that allows it to cancel and demand repayment on one loan when a country defaults on a separate loan from a “different lender,” which is unusual for government loans. These contracts also allow China to cancel the loan if the “debtor country undertakes policy changes adverse” to China’s preferences. Loans from China have penetrated significant sectors of Latin America, including energy and mineral sectors, port infrastructure, and telecommunications. China is also willing to offer cheaper credit even to countries with poor track records of paying off debt, raising the likelihood that Latin American countries choose Chinese loans over competing loans from other countries. And with the acute economic and domestic pressures in the region, many developing countries may not effectively consider the long-term consequences that may stem from these loans. China has used these practices around the globe. Similar contracts forced Sri Lanka to hand over a major port to Beijing in 2017 when it could not pay off its debts. There is also concern that countries with Chinese debt could be pressured into denying support to U.S. forces, including logistical infrastructure, staging areas, and ports. In fact, China has loans attached to “three [of the] largest projects of port construction by cost” in Latin America. China’s focus and investment in telecommunication technologies in Latin America poses a major issue, too. Chinese companies, such as Huawei and ZTE, have created networks for governments and private sector telecommunications companies, while integrating local government staffs with Chinese personnel who have ties to the Chinese government. These companies are willing to accept lower profits for greater access in Latin America because of the access it provides the Chinese government and vice versa. To be sure, these countries do receive the benefit of modern technology and creating networks that can reach underserved rural citizens. However, China may use this new infrastructure to surveil and undermine Latin American citizens and apply its authoritarian philosophies on personal privacy against populations outside of China. Indeed, one nation has asked the United States “for assistance in disassembling and disinvesting in the Huawei Smart City program because of excessive Chinese monitoring.” But the more Latin American governments adopt this technology, the more difficult it will be for the United States to engage with them on national security issues. Conclusion Latin America is critical to U.S. national security and great power competition. Not only is it the geographic neighbor of the U.S., but the U.S. also has strong economic, political, and cultural ties to the region. According to the White House’s recently released National Security Strategy, the “Western Hemisphere directly impacts the United States more than any other region,” which is predominately Latin America. But China is in Latin America to pursue long-term interests, and to ignore this reality threatens the stability of the region and the United States.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Chinese presence in South America causes great power conflict</h4><p><strong>Arango 12/22</strong> [(Steve, a deputy staff judge advocate at Training and Education Command and currently working toward his LL.M. in national security and cybersecurity from the George Washington University School of Law. He was selected as a Regional Affairs Officer for Latin America. Prior to his time on active duty, Steven worked for the U.S. House of Representatives, the Department of Defense in the Office of General Counsel, International Affairs, and served as a federal law clerk for U.S. District Judge Fernando Rodriguez, who presides on the southern border.) “China Next Door: The CCP's Growing Influence in Latin America,” CIMSEC, 12/22/22. https://cimsec.org/china-next-door-how-the-ccp-is-reshaping-latin-america/<u>] RR</p><p></u>Americans hear about countries such as China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran on a frequent basis, and for good reason. All have been intertwined in global affairs, politics at home, or both for most of this century so far. But in stark contrast, <u><mark>the</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates has <mark>treat</mark>ed <mark>Latin America with</mark> “<strong>benign <mark>neglect</strong></mark>.”</p><p></u>Although Russia and Iran have exploited Latin America for their purposes and to the United States’ detriment—<u><mark>China’s inroads </mark>into the region <mark>are</mark> among the most significant <mark>threats to <strong>U.S. national security</u></strong></mark>. <u>China’s actions in the region reveal short and long-term <mark>plans to become the </mark>predominant <mark>superpower </mark>in the region</u>. To do so, <u>China’s influence has sowed its roots in two main areas: military and economic.</u> But most importantly, this influence is not superficial—China’s actions seep through all levels of Latin American governments, even down to city halls. <u>China is</u> not simply a regional challenge; it is <u>a global challenge as demonstrated in Latin America. To ignore Latin America is to ignore the critical inroads being developed by the United States’ chief competitor in its own backyard.</p><p><strong>Military Influence</p><p></strong><mark>China’s </mark>military influence in Latin America is <strong>mainly <mark>through so</mark>ft<mark> po</mark>wer</strong>, not physical presence</u>. <u>China has fostered significant military relationships through <mark>arms sales, exchange programs</mark>, <mark>and training</mark> engagements.</u> <u>China has found a fruitful market for arm’s sales in Latin America;</u> in roughly the last eight years <u>China has sold more than $615 million in weapons to Venezuela</u>. Military sales may have started as simply small arms, but China’s expansion in this market now includes “aircraft, armored vehicles, and radars.” But these sales are not simply about the equipment; the sale is just the beginning of a relationship. <u>Opportunities for training and maintenance follow each transaction—leading to greater interaction between these countries, their militaries, and China. As these deals continue to grow, <strong>Chinese personnel and military <mark>bases </mark>in the region could <mark>follow</mark>.</p><p></strong>China has</u> also <u>made </u>major <u>inroads with Latin American militaries through</u> professional military education (<u>PME) programs and exchange officer programs of significant scale. These programs</u> steep Latin American servicemembers in Chinese military and political doctrine and anti-U.S. sentiment, while <u>creating</u> <u>stronger relationships between the respective country and China.</u> To attract military talent to these programs<u>, China has also offered perks to Latin American military personnel<strong>. China will pay for business-class travel for exchange students, provide five-star hotels, and pay for other expenses while they live in China. Since 2015, China has “trained more Latin American military officers than the United States, and the difference has grown every year since.”</p><p></u></strong>Recent SOUTHCOM commander Adm. Craig Faller noted in Congressional testimony that China was sending five times as many Latin American military officers to its war colleges compared to the United States. According to John Kreul, who was acting deputy secretary of defense for the Western Hemisphere, the feedback on these professional military exchange programs suggested they were “straight up recruitment and propaganda 24/7.” Once these personnel are educated in China and establish professional connections with China’s military, <u><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates may <mark>have to be weary of </mark>working with these personnel because of the <strong>potential operational <mark>security risks</mark>.</p><p></strong>Chinese Influence—Economic</p><p>Economic influence in Latin America is China’s main focus in the region. </u>In 2000,<u> <mark>China’s </mark>total <mark>trade</mark> value with Latin America was $12 billion. Today it is roughly $450 billion, and economists predict it could <mark>exceed <strong>$700 billion</strong></mark> within the next 15 years. China is <mark>South America’s top trading partner</mark> and second only to the United States for all of Latin America</u>. <u>Underlying this trade is the Belt and Road Initiative</u>, <u>China’s ambitious $1 trillion trade and infrastructure program spanning across the globe</u>. <u>One portion</u> of this program is a proposed transcontinental railway <u>that can link South America’s Atlantic and Pacific coasts from <strong>Brazil to Chile.</p><p></u></strong>As it does elsewhere, trade naturally builds relationships and influence in the countries China builds in. China can then use its powerful economic leverage in pursuit of political goals, such as persuading regional countries to withhold recognition of Taiwan—which it has.</p><p><u>China also engages in <mark>debt-trap diplomacy</mark>.</u> Through deceptive trade and loan practices, <u>China can manipulate and coerce countries that are unable to repay their loans.</u> For example, China uses contractual language that allows it to cancel and demand repayment on one loan when a country defaults on a separate loan from a “different lender,” which is unusual for government loans. These contracts also allow China to cancel the loan if the “debtor country undertakes policy changes adverse” to China’s preferences.</p><p><u><mark>Loans </mark>from China have <mark>penetrate</mark>d significant sectors of Latin America</u>, <u>including <strong><mark>energy and mineral</strong></mark> <mark>sectors, </mark>port infrastructure, and telecommunications.</u> <u>China is also willing to offer cheaper credit even to countries with poor track records of paying off debt, raising the likelihood that Latin American countries choose Chinese loans over competing loans from other countries.</u> And with the acute economic and domestic pressures in the region, many developing countries may not effectively consider the long-term consequences that may stem from these loans.</p><p>China has used these practices around the globe. Similar contracts forced Sri Lanka to hand over a major port to Beijing in 2017 when it could not pay off its debts. There is also concern that countries with Chinese debt could be pressured into denying support to U.S. forces, including logistical infrastructure, staging areas, and ports. In fact, China has loans attached to “three [of the] largest projects of port construction by cost” in Latin America.</p><p>China’s focus and investment in telecommunication technologies in Latin America poses a major issue, too. <u>Chinese companies</u>, such as Huawei and ZTE, <u>have created networks for governments and private sector telecommunications companies, while integrating local government staffs with Chinese personnel who have ties to the Chinese government</u>. These <u>companies are willing to accept lower profits for greater access in Latin America</u> <u>because of the access it provides the Chinese government and vice versa.</p><p></u>To be sure, these countries do receive the benefit of modern technology and creating networks that can reach underserved rural citizens. However, China may use this new infrastructure to surveil and undermine Latin American citizens and apply its authoritarian philosophies on personal privacy against populations outside of China. Indeed, one nation has asked the United States “for assistance in disassembling and disinvesting in the Huawei Smart City program because of excessive Chinese monitoring.” But <u><mark>the more Latin American</mark> <mark>governments</mark> <mark>adopt this</mark> <mark>tech</mark>nology, <mark>the more difficult it will be for the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>to engage </mark>with them <mark>on <strong>national security</mark> issues.</p><p>Conclusion</p><p></strong><mark>Latin America is critical to U.S.</mark> national security and <strong><mark>great power competition</u></strong></mark>. Not only is it the geographic neighbor of the U.S., but <u>the U.S. also has strong economic, political, and cultural ties to the region</u>. According to the White House’s recently released National Security Strategy, <u><mark>the</mark> “<mark>Western Hemisphere</mark> directly <mark>impacts</mark> <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates more than any other region,”</u> <u>which is <mark>predominately Latin America</u></mark>. <u>But<mark> China</mark> is in Latin America to pursue long-term interests, and to ignore this reality <mark>threatens the <strong>stability of the region</mark> <mark>and the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Garvey 14 (Todd Garvey is a legislative attorney, "The Take Care Clause and Executive Discretion in the Enforcement of Law," Congressional Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43708.pdf)//JackH fulltext: The President’s Obligation to Follow and Execute the Law It is beyond dispute that the President plays a significant role in the legislative process. The specific powers enumerated in Article II, §318 and Article I, §719 of the Constitution, along with the general vesting of “the executive power” in Article II, §1,20 provide the President with the authority to recommend legislation to Congress, communicate his opposition or support for legislation under consideration,21 and, ultimately, to either sign legislation that meets his approval, or veto that legislation which “he thinks bad.”22 It is equally well established, however, that once a bill is enacted into law,23 the President’s legislative role comes to an end and is supplanted by his express constitutional obligation under Article II, §3 to “take Care that the Law[] be faithfully executed.”24 Although there was little discussion of the Clause at the Constitutional Convention, most scholars have agreed that, at a minimum, the Clause represents a repudiation of the royal suspending and dispensing power that had been historically exercised by English monarchs.25 James Wilson, delegate to the constitutional convention form Pennsylvania, summarized this view in characterizing the Clause as providing the President with the “authority, not to make, or alter, or dispense with the laws, but to execute and act the laws.”26 The executive branch has agreed with this view, acknowledging that “the Supreme Court and the Attorneys General have long interpreted the Take Care Clause as standing for the proposition that the President has no inherent constitutional authority to suspend the enforcement of the laws, particularly of statutes.”27 The Clause would appear then to prevent the President from simply disregarding or suspending laws enacted by Congress. Today, the Take Care Clause makes a significant contribution to the separation of powers. The constitutionally created distinction between the “faithful” execution of the law under Article II, and the “finely wrought” process for the creation of law under Article I §4, operates as a clear demarcation of the legitimate powers and responsibilities of both the President and Congress in our constitutional system.28 Just as Congress may neither enforce the laws nor improperly intrude into the President’s execution of the same, the President and his subordinates may not create law by unilaterally disregarding, amending, or repealing a validly enacted statute.29 The ultimate power to legislate is a power possessed solely by Congress, and to permit the President the freedom to suspend, amend, or disregard laws of his choosing would be to “clothe” the executive branch with the power of lawmaking.30 A long line of Supreme Court precedent indicates the Court’s consistent view that the Take Care Clause imposes a “duty” or “obligation” upon the President to ensure that executive branch officials obey Congress’s commands, and, additionally, that the Clause does not provide the President with the authority to frustrate legal requirements imposed by law. The notion that the President and executive branch officers must “faithfully” implement and execute the law can be seen as early as the seminal case of Marbury v. Madison in 1803.31 Although Marbury is best known for Chief Justice John Marshall’s discussion of the Supreme Court’s power of “judicial review”—the authority of the Court to invalidate laws it determines to be unconstitutional— the case also contains strong language relating to the obligation of executive branch officials to comply with the law. In the final hours of his Presidency, John Adams had appointed William Marbury to serve as Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia. Marbury’s commission, however, was never delivered, and upon assuming office President Thomas Jefferson instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold the commission, thus denying Marbury the position. Marbury filed suit, asking the Supreme Court to compel Madison to deliver the commission as, Marbury argued, was required by law. Although the Supreme Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case and therefore did not compel Madison to take any action, Chief Justice Marshall nonetheless established that when an executive officer fails to perform a “specific duty [] assigned by law,” the courts may enforce the obligation through a writ of mandamus.32 The Marbury opinion recognized Congress’s authority to impose specific duties upon executive branch officials by law, as well as the official’s corresponding obligation to execute the congressional directive. The general rule established in Marbury had limits, however; the Chief Justice drew a clear distinction between the enforceability of ministerial or mandatory requirements—which were subject to judicial enforcement— and political acts involving either statutory or constitutional discretion—which were not.33 The Supreme Court’s most forceful articulation of the President’s obligation to execute the law came thirty years later in Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes. 34 In Kendall, a federal law directed the Postmaster General to provide back pay to a group of mail carrier contractors in an amount determined by the Solicitor of the Treasury. The Postmaster General, apparently at the express direction of the President, refused to pay the amount that the Solicitor had found owing. The Supreme Court, viewing the Postmaster General’s duty to pay the full amount as ministerial rather than discretionary, held that the President had no authority to direct the Postmaster’s performance of his statutory obligation.35 Where Congress has imposed upon an executive officer a valid duty, the Court declared “the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject to the control of the law, and not to the direction of the President.”36 Any interpretation of the Constitution that characterized the obligation of an executive branch official to execute the law as arising from the direction of the President alone, and not as arising from the law itself, would “cloth[e] the President with a power entirely to control the legislation of Congress, and paralyze the administration of justice.”37 “This is a doctrine,” the majority held “that cannot receive the sanction of this court.”38 Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Kendall opinion was its repudiation of the government’s assertion that the Take Care Clause constituted a source of presidential power. The Court plainly rejected this argument, holding that the Clause could not be relied upon as a basis for noncompliance with the law. “To contend that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed implies a power to forbid their execution,” the Court held, “is a novel construction of the Constitution, and entirely inadmissible.”39 The legal reasoning in Kendall has long been cited as refuting any asserted presidential power to block the execution of validly enacted statutes. The Supreme Court reinforced the Constitution’s clear distinction between Congress’s role in the creation of the law and the President’s role in the execution of the law in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 40 In Youngstown, the Court heard a challenge to an Executive Order issued by President Harry Truman directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize various steel mills in an effort to avert the detrimental effect a potential workers’ strike would have on the prosecution of the Korean conflict. The Court invalidated the President’s directive, holding that neither the Constitution nor any statutory delegation from Congress authorized such an order. The majority opinion was based chiefly on the proposition that the Constitution limits the President’s “functions in the lawmaking process” to recommending laws he supports, vetoing laws he opposes, and executing laws that have been enacted by Congress.41 “In the framework of our Constitution,” wrote Justice Black, “the President’s power to see that the laws be faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”42 Justice Jackson’s influential concurring opinion likewise concluded that “the Executive, except for recommendation and veto, has no legislative power.”43 The legal reasoning espoused in Marbury, Kendall, and Youngstown is buttressed by the judicial response to an illustrative conflict in which President Richard Nixon claimed the authority to disregard congressional enactments. Beginning in 1972, President Nixon asserted the authority to decline to spend or obligate appropriated funds in order to reduce public spending and to negate programs established by congressional legislation.44 Termed an “impoundment,” the legal justification for Nixon’s policy was claimed to have derived from the Take Care Clause. Most of the courts that reviewed the matter rejected the declared authority, holding—generally on statutory grounds—that neither the President nor the agency heads involved had discretion as to whether to spend appropriated funds.45 To permit such an action would be to allow a President to substitute his policy choices on spending for those established by congressional appropriations. The Supreme Court agreed in Train v. City of New York, holding that as a statutory matter the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency had no discretion to withhold funds that had been validly appropriated.46 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, however, offered a more robust rejection of the impoundments and the President’s claimed constitutional authority. In Local 2677 AFGE v. Phillips, the district court held that until Congress terminates a program, “historical precedent, logic, and the text of the Constitution itself obligate the [President] to continue to operate [the program] as was intended by the Congress...”47 The opinion further suggested that were the President’s asserted power to be accepted, “no barrier would remain to the executive ignoring any and all Congressional authorizations if he deemed them, no matter how conscientiously, to be contrary to the needs of the nation.”48<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Non-enforcement gets struck down</h4><p><strong>Garvey 14</strong> (Todd Garvey is a legislative attorney, "The Take Care Clause and Executive Discretion in the Enforcement of Law," Congressional Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43708.pdf)//JackH</p><p>The President’s Obligation to Follow and Execute the Law It is beyond dispute that the President plays a significant role in the legislative process. The specific powers enumerated in Article II, §318 and Article I, §719 of the Constitution, along with the general vesting of “the executive power” in Article II, §1,20 provide the President with the authority to recommend legislation to Congress, communicate his opposition or support for legislation under consideration,21 and, ultimately, to either sign legislation that meets his approval, or veto that legislation which “he thinks bad.”22 It is equally well established, however, that <u>once a bill is enacted into law,23 the President’s legislative role comes to an end and is supplanted by his express constitutional obligation under Article II, §3 to “take Care that the Law[] be faithfully executed.”</u>24 Although there was little discussion of the Clause at the Constitutional Convention, most scholars have agreed that, at a minimum, the Clause represents a repudiation of the royal suspending and dispensing power that had been historically exercised by English monarchs.25 James Wilson, delegate to the constitutional convention form Pennsylvania, summarized this view in characterizing the Clause as providing <u>the President with the “authority, not to make, or alter, or dispense with the laws, but to execute and act the laws.</u>”26 <u>The executive branch</u> has agreed with this view, <u>acknowledging that “<mark>the Supreme Court</mark> and the Attorneys General <mark>have long interpreted the Take Care Clause</mark> as standing for the proposition <mark>that <strong>the President has no</mark> inherent constitutional <mark>authority to suspend the enforcement of</mark> the laws, particularly of <mark>statutes</u></strong></mark>.”27 The Clause would appear then to prevent the President from simply disregarding or suspending laws enacted by Congress. Today, the Take Care Clause makes a significant contribution to the separation of powers. The constitutionally created distinction between the “faithful” execution of the law under Article II, and the “finely wrought” process for the creation of law under Article I §4, operates as a clear demarcation of the legitimate powers and responsibilities of both the President and Congress in our constitutional system.28 Just as Congress may neither enforce the laws nor improperly intrude into the President’s execution of the same, <u><strong>the President and his subordinates may not create law by unilaterally disregarding, amending, or repealing a validly enacted statute.</u></strong>29 <u>The ultimate power to legislate is a power possessed solely by Congress, and to permit the President the freedom to suspend, amend, or disregard laws of his choosing would be to “clothe” the executive branch with the power of lawmaking.</u>30 <u><strong><mark>A long line of Supreme Court precedent indicates the Court’s</mark> consistent <mark>view that the Take Care Clause imposes a “duty”</mark> or “obligation” <mark>upon the President to</mark> ensure that executive branch officials <mark>obey Congress</mark>’s commands</strong>, and, additionally, that the Clause does not provide the President with the authority to frustrate legal requirements imposed by law</u>. The notion that the President and executive branch officers must “faithfully” implement and execute the law can be seen as early as the seminal case of <u>Marbury v. Madison</u> in 1803.31 Although Marbury is best known for Chief Justice John Marshall’s discussion of the Supreme Court’s power of “judicial review”—the authority of the Court to invalidate laws it determines to be unconstitutional— the case <u>also contains strong language relating to the obligation of executive branch officials <strong>to comply with the law. </u></strong>In the final hours of his Presidency, John Adams had appointed William Marbury to serve as Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia. Marbury’s commission, however, was never delivered, and upon assuming office President Thomas Jefferson instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold the commission, thus denying Marbury the position. Marbury filed suit, asking the Supreme Court to compel Madison to deliver the commission as, Marbury argued, was required by law. Although the Supreme Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case and therefore did not compel Madison to take any action, Chief Justice Marshall nonetheless established that when an executive officer fails to perform a “specific duty [] assigned by law,” the courts may enforce the obligation through a writ of mandamus.32 The Marbury opinion recognized Congress’s authority to impose specific duties upon executive branch officials by law, as well as the official’s corresponding obligation to execute the congressional directive. The general rule established in Marbury had limits, however; the Chief Justice drew a clear distinction between the enforceability of ministerial or mandatory requirements—which were subject to judicial enforcement— and political acts involving either statutory or constitutional discretion—which were not.33 <u>The Supreme Court’s <mark>most forceful articulation</mark> of the President’s obligation to execute the law <mark>came</mark> thirty years later <mark>in Kendall</mark> v. United States</u> ex rel. Stokes. 34 In Kendall, a federal law directed the Postmaster General to provide back pay to a group of mail carrier contractors in an amount determined by the Solicitor of the Treasury. The Postmaster General, apparently at the express direction of the President, refused to pay the amount that the Solicitor had found owing. The Supreme Court, viewing the Postmaster General’s duty to pay the full amount as ministerial rather than discretionary, held that the President had no authority to direct the Postmaster’s performance of his statutory obligation.35 Where Congress has imposed upon an executive officer a valid duty, the Court declared “the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject to the control of the law, and not to the direction of the President.”36 Any interpretation of the Constitution that characterized the obligation of an executive branch official to execute the law as arising from the direction of the President alone, and not as arising from the law itself, would “cloth[e] the President with a power entirely to control the legislation of Congress, and paralyze the administration of justice.”37 “This is a doctrine,” the majority held “that cannot receive the sanction of this court.”38 <u>Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Kendall opinion was its repudiation of the government’s assertion that the Take Care Clause constituted a source of presidential power.</u> <u>The Court <strong>plainly rejected</strong> this argument, holding that <mark>the Clause <strong>could not be</mark> relied upon as <mark>a basis for noncompliance with the law.</u></strong></mark> “<u>To contend that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed implies a power to forbid their execution,” the Court held, “is a novel construction of the Constitution, and entirely inadmissible.”</u>39 <u><strong><mark>The legal reasoning</mark> in Kendall <mark>has long been cited as refuting</mark> any asserted presidential <mark>power to block the execution of</mark> validly enacted <mark>statutes</mark>. </u></strong>The Supreme Court reinforced the Constitution’s clear distinction between Congress’s role in the creation of the law and the President’s role in the execution of the law in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 40 In Youngstown, the Court heard a challenge to an Executive Order issued by President Harry Truman directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize various steel mills in an effort to avert the detrimental effect a potential workers’ strike would have on the prosecution of the Korean conflict. The Court invalidated the President’s directive, holding that neither the Constitution nor any statutory delegation from Congress authorized such an order. The majority opinion was based chiefly on the proposition that the Constitution limits the President’s “functions in the lawmaking process” to recommending laws he supports, vetoing laws he opposes, and executing laws that have been enacted by Congress.41 “In the framework of our Constitution,” wrote Justice Black, “the President’s power to see that the laws be faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”42 Justice Jackson’s influential concurring opinion likewise concluded that “the Executive, except for recommendation and veto, has no legislative power.”43 The legal reasoning espoused in Marbury, Kendall, and Youngstown is buttressed by the judicial response to an illustrative conflict in which President Richard Nixon claimed the authority to disregard congressional enactments. Beginning in 1972, President Nixon asserted the authority to decline to spend or obligate appropriated funds in order to reduce public spending and to negate programs established by congressional legislation.44 Termed an “impoundment,” the legal justification for Nixon’s policy was claimed to have derived from the Take Care Clause. Most of the courts that reviewed the matter rejected the declared authority, holding—generally on statutory grounds—that neither the President nor the agency heads involved had discretion as to whether to spend appropriated funds.45 To permit such an action would be to allow a President to substitute his policy choices on spending for those established by congressional appropriations. <u>The Supreme Court agreed in Train v. City of New York, holding that as a statutory matter the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency had no discretion to withhold funds that had been validly appropriated.</u>46 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, however, offered a more robust rejection of the impoundments and the President’s claimed constitutional authority. In Local 2677 AFGE v. Phillips, <u><strong>the district court held that until Congress terminates a program, <mark>“historical precedent</mark>, logic, <mark>and</mark> the text of <mark>the Constitution</mark> itself <mark>obligate the [President] to</mark> continue to <mark>operate [the program]</mark> as was intended by the Congress</u></strong>...”47 The opinion further suggested that were the President’s asserted power to be accepted, “no barrier would remain to the executive ignoring any and all Congressional authorizations if he deemed them, no matter how conscientiously, to be contrary to the needs of the nation.”48</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Baldwin 12 – prof of geography @ Durham University (Andrew, Whiteness and futurity: towards a research agenda, Progress in Human Geography April 2012 vol. 36 no. 2 172-187) fulltext: This paper argues that research on whiteness and geography is oriented almost exclusively around some notion of the past. While this is perhaps to be expected given that whiteness studies builds off two past-oriented bodies of scholarship – US labour studies (Roediger, 1991) and postcolonial theory (Said, 1994) – the argument is that privileging the past when researching geographies of whiteness risks overlooking the ways in which whiteness and hence various forms of racism are configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. In pressing this claim, the argument is not to suggest that history is irrelevant for understanding the politics of whiteness. Analysing the past remains indispensable for understanding the numerous forms whiteness can take. Instead, the argument is that analysing discourses of ‘the future’ can reveal important insights about the ways in which white geographies are configured that might otherwise be foreclosed if the past is privileged as the exclusive time-space through which such geographies are produced and maintained. As such, any politics seeking to challenge whitenesses and their hold on racist social imaginaries may benefit by analysing how the future is invoked in articulations of white identity and how such future-oriented articulations shape geographies of all kinds.¶ Why the future? By future I refer to an imagined time that is yet-to-come. The future can be understood to follow sequentially from a past-present trajectory, or it can be understood as a form of absent presence. From tropes of uncertainty, Utopia, apocalypse, prophesy, hope, fear, possibility and potentiality, the future shapes the present in all manner of ways. For instance, in politics, rights are often suspended to safeguard against future events of insurrection, catastrophe and terror. In religion, moral judgements in the present are shaped by a concern for one’s safe passage into a future afterlife, and, in finance, the pricing of securities necessarily entails some calculation of future risk. Given the ubiquity of the future in the present, it is perhaps no surprise that the future is an important object of inquiry in contemporary thought (see, for example, Adams and Groves, 2007; Anderson, 2010b; Jameson, 2005; Luhmann, 1993).¶ Ben Anderson (2010a) provides a useful sketch of this research in a recent article in this journal. His point is that the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination and performance) and, in turn, intervenes on the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness). So, too, others have made the case that pre-empting the future is now a common feature of contemporary political life (Braun, 2007; Cooper, 2006). Futurity is also an important feature of the affective dimensions of daily life. Take, for instance, fear (Pain, 2009) and hope (Anderson, 2006; Anderson and Holden, 2008). Both are simultaneously embodied experiences and atmospheric qualities animated by imagined futures: one fears the yet-to-come and the other hopes for better things to come. In both, the here-and-now of the psyche or of collective mood is shaped by the yet-to-come. Or, as Brian Massumi (2002) argues, affect occurs precisely in the overlap between the actual and the virtual, which I take to mean an overlap between that which is and a very specific form of the virtual – the yet-to-come. By virtual I refer to things that are real but not actual (Shields, 2003); in this way, the future is exemplary of the virtual. It can be known and hence real, as Anderson suggests, but because it can never be fully actualized as the future, the future remains a permanent virtuality. Thus, analysing atmospheres of fear and hope, for instance, may tell us something about the way politics takes shape through the conjugation of the actual and the virtual, or at the threshold of the future event.¶ But the future as an object or orientation of inquiry is not limited to the affective, and nor is it confined to an actual-virtual binary. Hegel, for instance, paid considerable attention to transactions of the actual and the possible. For Hegel, the dialectic is made possible by the actual-possible relation where the dialectical movement of the actual is the possible.1 So, too, Heidegger argued that the future is indispensable to meaning. For instance, the significance that attaches to certain kinds of information would vanish were it not for the anticipated (i.e. future) consequences that lay dormant in information. Currency exchange rates would matter little, for instance, were it not for the anticipated consequences of exchange rate volatility. Although radically different, the Hegelian and Heideggerian traditions share in common the idea not simply that politics take shape through the collision of social forces that gathered pace in the past, but that political contests are shaped by the future as well.¶ This essay argues for a research agenda that situates the future at the centre of analyses of white geographies. It shows how the geographic literature on whiteness is past-oriented and suggests how this literature might benefit by attending to the ways in which white geographies are infused by notions of futurity. I develop this argument more fully below. For now let me offer a few preliminary thoughts about geographies of whiteness. By whiteness I refer to a racialized subject position that is remarkable for its seeming invisibility (Dwyer and Jones, 2000; Dyer, 1997). In this sense, whiteness is only partially about skin. More important, whiteness plays a foundational role in racist epistemology by serving as the norm against which others come to be viewed as different (Dwyer and Jones, 2000; Kobayashi and Peake, 2000). As such, whiteness does not name a set of stereotypes, so much as a set of ‘narrative structural positions, rhetorical tropes and habits of perception’ (Dyer, 1997: 12) that stand in for the normal. This makes defining whiteness almost impossible but then, as Richard Dyer (1997) argues, the power of whiteness lies in its capacity for almost infinite variability (see also Kobayashi, 2003; Vanderbeck, 2006). For myself, the power of racisms rest in their capacity to normalize their corresponding whitenesses (Kobayashi and Peake, 2000).¶ What, then, are geographies of whiteness? For my purposes here, they refer to geographies – spaces, places, landscapes, natures, mobilities, bodies, etc. – that are assumed to be white or are in some way structured, though often implicitly, by some notion of whiteness (Bonnett, 1997; McCarthy and Hague, 2004; Vanderbeck, 2006). The argument put forward in this paper is that research on geographies of whiteness is almost invariably past-oriented (Bonnett, 1997, 2000; Hoelscher, 2003; Pulido, 2000). By ‘past-oriented’ I mean that whiteness, whether understood as a past or present phenomenon, tends to be explained, accounted for and examined as an expression of social relations that took shape in the past (Satzewich, 2007). In the paper, I aim to show how this work is dominated by an orientation that looks to the past as the temporal horizon through which research and learning about past or present white racial identity occurs. By and large, this work assumes that in order to challenge or reconfigure whitenesses and their corresponding racisms whiteness must be diagnosed using some form of past-oriented analysis (Bonnett, 1997). The racist past is, thus, used to explain the racist present. A brief example makes the point. In an essay that many (Baldwin, 2009a; Dwyer and Jones, 2000; Jackson, 1998; McCarthy and Hague, 2004) suggest is a main point of reference for debate about whiteness in geography, Alastair Bonnett (1997) argues that whiteness ought to be understood as a function of historical geography.2 As such, Bonnett privileges a methodological approach that reaches into the past for answers about contemporary race and racism. Elsewhere, Audrey Kobayashi and Linda Peake (2000) make a similar claim that whiteness is a historically constructed position: to understand whiteness requires understanding its multiple genealogies.¶ I do wonder, though, whether a past-oriented approach to the study of white geographies reproduces the teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. Such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before. Consequently, efforts to understand racism are thought to proceed from, or be enhanced by, some correct historical analysis of whiteness. According to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. It cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. Yet, in so doing, this kind of temporality disregards the ways in which the future is very often already present in the present not as a discrete ontological time-space, but as an absent or virtual presence that constitutes the very meaning of the present (Anderson, 2010a; Massumi, 2007). This is a rather significant oversight when attempting to account for geographies of whiteness because it means that such geographies are not simply a function of the past but of the future as well.¶ So, then, what about the future? To what extent are geographies of whiteness a function not just of the past but of the future? How are white geographies maintained in relation to the future? In what ways is the future already present in various forms of whiteness? It seems that the geographic literature on whiteness is silent on these questions. In pointing this out, I do not mean to indict or discredit the historicist approach that has come to dominate understandings of whiteness. Again, past-oriented analyses of various kinds have been and continue to be critical for understanding whitenesses and the various racisms to which they give rise. I simply wish to acknowledge that by foregrounding the past in the present the geographic study of whiteness risks overlooking how whitenesses are made and maintained in relation to futures both distant and immanent. Here, the task for a future-oriented geographic research on whiteness might be to understand how both contemporary and past forms of whiteness relate to the future (Anderson, 2010a), or how specific geographic expressions of whiteness are contingent on the future. For instance, the task might be to understand how discourses of futurity shape various forms of white supremacy from right-wing xenophobias to left-nationalisms to practices of liberal humanitarianism, and how these shape, for instance, geographies of place, nature, space, mobility, bodies and so on. A worthwhile starting point for this work might be to analyse how discourses of white crisis, such as those found in Great Britain in the early 1900s (Bonnett, 2004) or throughout the West during processes of post-Second World War decolonization (Thobani, 2007), relate to and are shaped by notions of futurity. They do relate to the future. The question is: how and to what effect?¶ Acknowledging how the future is made present in white geographies is important for at least three reasons. First, as many now argue (Grusin, 2010; Massumi, 2007), the future is an important site through which individuals and societies are governed (Anderson, 2010a). A focus on whiteness and futurity provides scope for thinking about the way in which governing through the future might inaugurate new or reconfigure old forms of whiteness. Eugenic science is a useful example here. Eugenics was underwritten by an imagined future eradicated of human imperfections. Thus we might seek to understand how white geographies are reproduced through new future-oriented technologies, like genetic screening and nanotechnology (Rose, 2007). Second, understanding how white geographies articulate with discourses of futurity opens up new terrains for conceptualizing and challenging racism. If white supremacy is, in part, reproduced through shared practices of futurity, what then are these practices? What kinds of futures do such practices seek to expunge or produce, and how can they be resisted? The case of genetic medicine is again illustrative. For instance, individual gene mapping allows ‘genetic citizens’ to witness their ‘future’ health by assessing their genetic predisposition for disease (Rose, 2007). Genetic citizenship is, in turn, shaped by new practices of bodily purification aimed at foreclosing certain ‘unhealthy’ futures. We might ask whether and how these practices are white. Third, a focus on whiteness and futurity points to the idea that affect shapes white racial formation (Hook, 2005). For the future can never exist except as a form of virtual present, and affect can be understood, in part, as a generalized attitude towards the presencing of particular futures. (Important, however, is that affect can also be understood as a generalized attitude towards presencings of the past. Think, for example, affects of nostalgia and loss.) Thus, we might ask: what futures infuse the affective logics of whiteness? How does this future presencing occur? And how, if at all, are these futures constitutive of specific white spatio-temporalities? These reasons together provide a rationale for a research agenda concerned with understanding how the future works as a resource in the geographic expression of whitenesses.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>Whiteness relies on futurity </strong>– the threat of crisis locks in attachment to the structures of whiteness and acts as a mechanism to uphold itself</h4><p><strong>Baldwin 12 – </strong>prof of geography @ Durham University (Andrew, Whiteness and futurity: towards a research agenda, Progress in Human Geography April 2012 vol. 36 no. 2 172-187)</p><p>This paper argues that research on whiteness and geography is oriented almost exclusively around some notion of the past. While this is perhaps to be expected given that whiteness studies builds off two past-oriented bodies of scholarship – US labour studies (Roediger, 1991) and postcolonial theory (Said, 1994) – the argument is that privileging the past when researching geographies of whiteness risks overlooking the ways in which <u><strong>whiteness and</u></strong> hence various forms of <u><strong>racism are configured in relation to</u></strong> a different temporal horizon: <u><strong>the future</u></strong>. In pressing this claim, the argument is not to suggest that history is irrelevant for understanding the politics of whiteness. Analysing the past remains indispensable for understanding the numerous forms whiteness can take. Instead, the argument is that <u><strong>analysing discourses of ‘the future’ can reveal important insights about </u></strong>the ways in which <u><strong>white geographies</u></strong> are configured that might otherwise be foreclosed if the past is privileged as the exclusive time-space through which such geographies are produced and maintained. As such, <u><strong><mark>any politics seeking to challenge whitenesses</mark> and</u></strong> their hold on <u><strong>racist social imaginaries <mark>may benefit by analysing how the future is invoked in articulations of white identity</u></strong></mark> and how such future-oriented articulations shape geographies of all kinds.¶ Why the future? By future I refer to an imagined time that is yet-to-come. The future can be understood to follow sequentially from a past-present trajectory, or it can be understood as a form of absent presence. <u><strong>From <mark>tropes of </mark>uncertainty, Utopia, <mark>apocalypse</mark>, prophesy, <mark>hope, fear</mark>, possibility and potentiality, the future <mark>shape</mark>s <mark>the present</u></strong></mark> in all manner of ways. For instance, <u><strong>in politics, <mark>rights are</mark> often <mark>suspended to safeguard against future events of</u></strong></mark> insurrection, <u><strong><mark>catastrophe</mark> and terror.</u></strong> In religion, moral judgements in the present are shaped by a concern for one’s safe passage into a future afterlife, and, in finance, the pricing of securities necessarily entails some calculation of future risk. Given the ubiquity of the future in the present, it is perhaps no surprise that the future is an important object of inquiry in contemporary thought (see, for example, Adams and Groves, 2007; Anderson, 2010b; Jameson, 2005; Luhmann, 1993).¶ Ben Anderson (2010a) provides a useful sketch of this research in a recent article in this journal. His point is that <u><strong><mark>the future is rendered knowable through</mark> specific practices (i.e. <mark>calculation, imagination and performance</mark>) and, in turn, intervenes on the present through</u></strong> three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness). So, too, others have made the case that <u><strong>pre-empting the future is now a common feature of contemporary political life (Braun, 2007; Cooper, 2006). Futurity is also an important feature of the affective dimensions of daily life. Take, for instance, <mark>fear</u></strong></mark> (Pain, 2009) and hope (Anderson, 2006; Anderson and Holden, 2008). Both <u><strong><mark>are</u></strong></mark> simultaneously <u><strong><mark>embodied experiences and</mark> atmospheric <mark>qualities animated by imagined futures</u></strong></mark>: one fears the yet-to-come and the other hopes for better things to come. In both, <u><strong>the here-and-now of the psyche</u></strong> or of collective mood <u><strong>is <mark>shaped by the yet-to-come</mark>.</u></strong> Or, as Brian Massumi (2002) argues, <u><strong>affect occurs precisely in the overlap between the actual and the virtual</u></strong>, which I take to mean an overlap between that which is and a very specific form of the virtual – the yet-to-come. By virtual I refer to things that are real but not actual (Shields, 2003); in this way, <u><strong>the future is exemplary of the virtual. It can be known and hence real</u></strong>, as Anderson suggests, <u><strong>but because it can never be fully actualized as the future, the future remains a permanent virtuality. Thus, analysing atmospheres of fear </u></strong>and hope, for instance, <u><strong>may tell us something about the way politics takes shape through the conjugation of the actual and the virtual, </strong>or at the threshold of the future event.</u>¶ But the future as an object or orientation of inquiry is not limited to the affective, and nor is it confined to an actual-virtual binary. Hegel, for instance, paid considerable attention to transactions of the actual and the possible. For Hegel, the dialectic is made possible by the actual-possible relation where the dialectical movement of the actual is the possible.1 So, too, Heidegger argued that the future is indispensable to meaning. For instance, the significance that attaches to certain kinds of information would vanish were it not for the anticipated (i.e. future) consequences that lay dormant in information. Currency exchange rates would matter little, for instance, were it not for the anticipated consequences of exchange rate volatility. Although radically different, the Hegelian and Heideggerian traditions share in common the idea not simply that politics take shape through the collision of social forces that gathered pace in the past, but that political contests are shaped by the future as well.¶ <u>This essay</u> argues for a research agenda that <u>situates the future at the centre of analyses of white geographies.</u> It shows how the geographic literature on whiteness is past-oriented and suggests how this literature might benefit by attending to the ways in which white geographies are infused by notions of futurity. I develop this argument more fully below. For now let me offer a few preliminary thoughts about geographies of whiteness. By whiteness I refer to a racialized subject position that is remarkable for its seeming invisibility (Dwyer and Jones, 2000; Dyer, 1997). In this sense, whiteness is only partially about skin. More important, whiteness plays a foundational role in racist epistemology by serving as the norm against which others come to be viewed as different (Dwyer and Jones, 2000; Kobayashi and Peake, 2000). As such, whiteness does not name a set of stereotypes, so much as a set of ‘narrative structural positions, rhetorical tropes and habits of perception’ (Dyer, 1997: 12) that stand in for the normal. This makes defining whiteness almost impossible but then, as Richard Dyer (1997) argues, the power of whiteness lies in its capacity for almost infinite variability (see also Kobayashi, 2003; Vanderbeck, 2006). For myself, the power of racisms rest in their capacity to normalize their corresponding whitenesses (Kobayashi and Peake, 2000).¶ What, then, are geographies of whiteness? For my purposes here, they refer to geographies – spaces, places, landscapes, natures, mobilities, bodies, etc. – that are assumed to be white or are in some way structured, though often implicitly, by some notion of whiteness (Bonnett, 1997; McCarthy and Hague, 2004; Vanderbeck, 2006). The argument put forward in this paper is that research on geographies of whiteness is almost invariably past-oriented (Bonnett, 1997, 2000; Hoelscher, 2003; Pulido, 2000). By ‘past-oriented’ I mean that whiteness, whether understood as a past or present phenomenon, tends to be explained, accounted for and examined as an expression of social relations that took shape in the past (Satzewich, 2007). In the paper, I aim to show how this work is dominated by an orientation that looks to the past as the temporal horizon through which research and learning about past or present white racial identity occurs. By and large, this work assumes that in order to challenge or reconfigure whitenesses and their corresponding racisms whiteness must be diagnosed using some form of past-oriented analysis (Bonnett, 1997). The racist past is, thus, used to explain the racist present. A brief example makes the point. In an essay that many (Baldwin, 2009a; Dwyer and Jones, 2000; Jackson, 1998; McCarthy and Hague, 2004) suggest is a main point of reference for debate about whiteness in geography, Alastair Bonnett (1997) argues that whiteness ought to be understood as a function of historical geography.2 As such, Bonnett privileges a methodological approach that reaches into the past for answers about contemporary race and racism. Elsewhere, Audrey Kobayashi and Linda Peake (2000) make a similar claim that whiteness is a historically constructed position: to understand whiteness requires understanding its multiple genealogies.¶ I do wonder, though, whether a past-oriented approach to the study of white geographies reproduces the teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. Such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before. Consequently, efforts to understand racism are thought to proceed from, or be enhanced by, some correct historical analysis of whiteness. According to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. It cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. Yet, in so doing, this kind of temporality disregards the ways in which <u>the future is very often already present in the present not as a discrete ontological time-space, but as an absent or virtual presence that constitutes the very meaning of the present</u> (Anderson, 2010a; Massumi, 2007). This is a rather significant oversight when attempting to account for geographies of whiteness because it means that such geographies are not simply a function of the past but of the future as well.¶ So, then, what about the future? To what extent are geographies of whiteness a function not just of the past but of the future? How are white geographies maintained in relation to the future? <u>In what ways is the future already present in various forms of whiteness?</u> It seems that the geographic literature on whiteness is silent on these questions. In pointing this out, I do not mean to indict or discredit the historicist approach that has come to dominate understandings of whiteness. Again, past-oriented analyses of various kinds have been and continue to be critical for understanding whitenesses and the various racisms to which they give rise. I simply wish to acknowledge that by foregrounding the past in the present the geographic study of whiteness risks overlooking how whitenesses are made and maintained in relation to futures both distant and immanent. Here, the task for a future-oriented geographic research on whiteness might be to understand how both contemporary and past forms of whiteness relate to the future (Anderson, 2010a), or how specific geographic <u>expressions of whiteness are contingent on the future</u>. For instance, the task might be to understand how <u><strong><mark>discourses of futurity shape</mark> various forms of <mark>white supremacy from</mark> right-wing <mark>xenophobias to</mark> left-<mark>nationalisms to</mark> practices of <mark>liberal humanitarianism</u></strong></mark>, and how these shape, for instance, geographies of place, nature, space, mobility, bodies and so on. A worthwhile starting point for this work might be to analyse how <u><strong>discourses of white crisis, such as</u></strong> those found in Great Britain in the early 1900s (Bonnett, 2004) or throughout the West <u><strong>during</u></strong> processes of post-Second World War <u><strong>decolonization</u></strong> (Thobani, 2007), relate to and <u><strong>are shaped by notions of futurity.</u></strong> They do relate to the future. The question is: how and to what effect?¶ Acknowledging how the future is made present in white geographies is important for at least three reasons. First, as many now argue (Grusin, 2010; Massumi, 2007), <u><strong>the future is an important site through which individuals and societies are governed</u></strong> (Anderson, 2010a). A focus on whiteness and futurity provides scope for thinking about the way in which <u><strong><mark>governing through the future might inaugurate new or reconfigure old forms of whiteness.</u></strong></mark> Eugenic science is a useful example here. Eugenics was underwritten by an imagined future eradicated of human imperfections. Thus we might seek to understand how <u><strong>white geographies are reproduced through new future-oriented technologies, like genetic screening and nanotechnology</u></strong> (Rose, 2007). Second, understanding how white geographies articulate with discourses of futurity opens up new terrains for conceptualizing and challenging racism. If white supremacy is, in part, reproduced through shared practices of futurity, what then are these practices? What kinds of futures do such practices seek to expunge or produce, and how can they be resisted? The case of genetic medicine is again illustrative. For instance, individual gene mapping allows ‘genetic citizens’ to witness their ‘future’ health by assessing their genetic predisposition for disease (Rose, 2007). Genetic citizenship is, in turn, shaped by new practices of bodily purification aimed at foreclosing certain ‘unhealthy’ futures. We might ask whether and how these practices are white. Third, <u><strong>a focus on whiteness and futurity points to the idea that <mark>affect shapes white racial formation</u></strong></mark> (Hook, 2005). For <u><strong><mark>the future can never exist except as a</mark> form of <mark>virtual present</mark>, and affect can be understood</u></strong>, in part,<u><strong> as a generalized attitude towards the presencing of particular futures.</u></strong> (Important, however, is that affect can also be understood as a generalized attitude towards presencings of the past. Think, for example, affects of nostalgia and loss.) <u><strong>Thus, we might ask: what futures infuse the affective logics of whiteness? How does this future presencing occur?</u></strong> And how, if at all, are these futures constitutive of specific white spatio-temporalities? These reasons together provide a rationale for a research agenda concerned with understanding how the future works as a resource in the geographic expression of whitenesses.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Pettyjohn and Wasser 5-20-2022, *senior fellow and director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security, **fellow in the defense program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (Stacie and Becca, “A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-nuclear/)//BB fulltext: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe. A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear. Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict. China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation. China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan. Our recent war game—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—illustrated that a U.S.-Chinese war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict. For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii. A NEW ERA One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning. China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response. The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while still achieving its objectives. AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION The clear lesson from the war game is that the United States needs to strengthen its conventional capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that China never views an invasion of Taiwan as a prudent tactical move. To do so, the United States will need to commit to maintaining its conventional military superiority by expanding its stockpiles of long-range munitions and investing in undersea capabilities. Washington must also be able to conduct offensive operations inside the first and second island chains even while under attack. This will require access to new bases to distribute U.S. forces, enhance their survivability, and ensure that they can effectively defend Taiwan in the face of China’s attacks. Moreover, the United States needs to develop an integrated network of partners willing to contribute to Taiwan’s defense. Allies are an asymmetric advantage: the United States has them, and China does not. The United States should deepen strategic and operational planning with key partners to send a strong signal of resolve to China. As part of these planning efforts, the United States and its allies will need to develop war-winning military strategies that do not cross Chinese red-lines. The game highlighted just how difficult this task may be; what it did not highlight is the complexity of developing military strategies that integrate the strategic objectives and military capacities of multiple nations. Moving forward, military planners in the United States and in Washington’s allies and partners must grapple with the fact that, in a conflict over Taiwan, China would consider all conventional and nuclear options to be on the table. And the United States is running out of time to strengthen deterrence and keep China from believing an invasion of Taiwan could be successful. The biggest risk is that Washington and its friends choose not to seize the moment and act: a year or two from now, it might already be too late.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>China-Taiwan war goes nuclear. Deterrence is key. It’s fast and more probable than European war.</h4><p><strong>Pettyjohn</strong> and Wasser 5-20-20<strong>22</strong>, *senior fellow and director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security, **fellow in the defense program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (Stacie and Becca, “A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-nuclear/)//BB</p><p><u><mark>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war</u></mark>, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” <u>Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. <mark>But if China attempted</mark> to forcibly <mark>invade Taiwan</u></mark> and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, <u><mark>the <strong>threat of escalation could outstrip</strong> </mark>even <mark>the current </mark>nerve-wracking <mark>situation in Europe</u>. </mark>A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that <u><mark>China’s</mark> military modernization and expansion of its <mark>nuclear arsenal</u></mark>—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—<u><mark>mean</mark> that, <mark>in the real world, a fight between China</mark> and the United States <mark>could very well go nuclear</u></mark>. <u>Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. <mark>If</mark> the <mark>C</mark>hinese <mark>C</mark>ommunist <mark>P</mark>arty decides to <mark>invade</mark> the i<mark>s</mark>land, <mark>it</mark>s leaders <mark>may not </mark>be able to <mark>accept failure</u></mark> without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. <u><mark>Thus</mark>, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable</u>. That would mean convincing the United States <u>and</u> its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, <u>from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective</u> means to keep the United States out of the conflict. China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, <u>a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation</u>. China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan. <u>Our recent war game</u>—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—<u>illustrated that <mark>a U.S.-Chinese war</mark> could escalate quickly</u>. For one thing, it showed that <u>both countries <mark>would</mark> face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory</u>. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But <u>such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and <mark>produce</mark>d <mark>a <strong>tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadene</u></strong></mark>d <u><strong><mark>the scope and intensity of the conflict</u></strong></mark>. For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii. A NEW ERA One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. <u><mark>This may push China to</u></mark> preemptively <u><mark>detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning.</u></mark> <u>China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional strike capabilities</u>. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response. The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while still achieving its objectives. AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION <u>The clear lesson from the war game is that the United States needs to <strong>strengthen</u></strong> its <u><strong>conventional capabilities</strong> in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that China <strong>never views an invasion of Taiwan as a prudent tactical move</u></strong>. To do so, the United States will need to commit to maintaining its conventional military superiority by expanding its stockpiles of long-range munitions and investing in undersea capabilities. Washington must also be able to conduct offensive operations inside the first and second island chains even while under attack. This will require access to new bases to distribute U.S. forces, enhance their survivability, and ensure that they can effectively defend Taiwan in the face of China’s attacks. Moreover, <u>the United States needs to </u>develop an integrated network of partners willing to <u><strong>contribute to Taiwan’s defense</u></strong>. Allies are an asymmetric advantage: the United States has them, and China does not. <u>The United States should <strong>deepen strategic and operational planning</strong> with key partners to <strong>send a strong signal of resolve </strong>to China</u>. As part of these planning efforts, the United States and its allies will need to develop war-winning military strategies that do not cross Chinese red-lines. The game highlighted just how difficult this task may be; what it did not highlight is the complexity of developing military strategies that integrate the strategic objectives and military capacities of multiple nations. Moving forward, military planners in the United States and in Washington’s allies and partners must grapple with the fact that, in a conflict over Taiwan, China would consider all conventional and nuclear options to be on the table. And <u>the United States is <strong>running out of time</strong> to strengthen deterrence and keep China from believing an invasion of Taiwan could be successful. <strong>The biggest risk</strong> is that Washington and its friends choose not to seize the moment and act: <strong>a year or two from now</strong>, it might already be too late</u>. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Skran 16 [Dale Skran is Executive Vice President of the National Space Society and a member of the Board of Directors of the Alliance for Space Development. “Settling space is the only sustainable reason for humans to be in space,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2915/1] fulltext: As robotic and artificial intelligence technologies improve and enable increasingly robust exploration without a human presence, eventually there will be only one sustainable reason for humans to be in space: settlement. Research into the recycling technology required for long-term off-Earth settlements will directly benefit terrestrial sustainability. Actively working toward developing and settling space will make available mineral and energy resources for use on Earth on a vast scale. Finally, space settlement offers the hope of long-term species survival that remaining on Earth does not. There are more than seven billion people on the Earth today. No rational space settlement advocate suggests that any significant portion of that population, or even of those who are rich, will be moving to Mars or anywhere else in space. However, a recent essay by Astro Teller, head of Google X Labs, and his wife Danielle, a physician and researcher takes the bold position that “It’s completely ridiculous to think that humans could live on Mars.” This essay, published by Quartz, repeats with little examination some of the hoariest arguments against space settlement. To support this view, the Tellers quote their 12-year-old daughter: “I can’t stand that people think we’re all going to live on Mars after we destroy our own planet.” This quote contains two mischaracterizations that demand refutation: that “we are all” going to live in space and that we are going to live in space after we destroy Earth. Another canard that has long floated about was given form by the recent film Elysium starring Matt Damon: the rich will leave the poor on the Earth and escape to space settlements. Upon examination, all three of these ideas are strawmen. There are more than seven billion people on the Earth today. No rational space settlement advocate suggests that any significant portion of that population, or even of those who are rich, will be moving to Mars or anywhere else in space. Instead, we expect that relatively small numbers of highly qualified individuals, or those who are deeply dedicated to living in space, would form the first settlements. Over a significant period of time, thousands more from the Earth would join those settlements as they become increasingly self-sufficient. Over more time, various possible niches for settlement (Moon, Mars, asteroids, free space, etc.) will be occupied, and eventually the population in space will total many millions, most of whom will have been born in space. So why then do Elon Musk, Stephen Hawking, and many others, including organizations like the National Space Society (NSS) and Alliance for Space Development, believe strongly that space settlement is essential to human survival? Although this may seem surprising, the Earth is not a “safe space.” The destiny of virtually all species on Earth is extinction in a relatively short span of geologic time. The Tellers claim that “we live on a planet that is perfect for us.” This statement is both completely true and total nonsense. We fit well on the Earth because we have evolved over millions of years to become creatures that are both adapted to live here and to like living here. It is truer to say that we are perfect for the Earth than the reverse. In fact, the Earth is not such a commodious place. It is subject to periodic calamities of various sorts, ranging from massive asteroid and comet impacts to titanic volcanic eruptions, and from periodic ice ages to disastrous solar flares. In the short run, the Earth seems balmy and comfortable. Viewed from the perspective of deep time, it starts to look more like a death trap, bedeviled by regular mass extinctions. However, things are actually quite a bit worse. Although there are many potentially bad things that might happen to the human race on the Earth from natural sources, there are many more from unnatural sources. We have been dancing with nuclear disaster for a long time. An apocalyptic atomic war is not inevitable, but it is possible. Add to this scenario the genetically engineered killer virus, “gray goo,” a robot revolt, and other horrors as yet undreamt, and the odds against human survival get longer. Hence, the need to abandon the fiction of Earth as our eternal and unchanging perfect home and to appreciate both the need for, and promise of, space settlement. Not so the rich can escape to an Elysium in the sky, or so we can all leave behind a polluted and overheated Earth, but simply so that the human species and human culture has a chance at surviving and flourishing in the long term. The Tellers believe that sustainability on the Earth has no relationship to what we do in space, but the same technologies that enable deep space settlement will have a profound impact on terrestrial sustainability. The Tellers write, “We haven’t even colonized the Sahara desert, the bottom of the oceans… because it makes no economic sense.” This may be true, but it also makes no sense to settle the Sahara desert, the bottom of the oceans, or Antarctica since these locations are on the Earth, and humans living there will not increase the probability of species survival. Near-Earth free space settlements and lunar bases are just stepping stones to ones much further out that are quarantined from Earth by millions of kilometers of vacuum. Once the motivation of species survival is put front and center, it becomes clear that a settlement in low Earth orbit, on the Moon, at L5, or on the Martian surface is not nearly sufficient. What is needed is a large set of thriving communities distributed throughout the solar system, and even ultimately in the Oort Cloud surrounding the solar system proper. This vision is not a small thing. It will be the work of many generations, just as was the settling of the New World or, even earlier in history, the human diaspora out of Africa along the Asian coast to Australia and beyond. The Tellers believe that sustainability on the Earth has no relationship to what we do in space, but the same technologies that enable deep space settlement will have a profound impact on terrestrial sustainability. Space settlements, of necessity, push the limits of food production per square meter and per liter of water. Space settlement agricultural methods can also be applied to growing food in parched California or in vertical farms in crowded urban areas. Space settlements require humans and technology to co-exist in close proximity. This implies an absolute minimization of pollution and sustained recycling of all waste. Such technologies seem highly applicable to sustainability on Earth as well. We will need to provide the best possible medical care for remote space settlements, which will be far from hospitals on Earth. The technologies that make such medicine effective—“tricorders”, telemedicine, and so on—can also bring medical care to underdeveloped and underserved areas of the Earth. The Tellers raise the specter of “winter-over syndrome” in the Antarctic, writing that “living on Mars would be way, way more miserable than living in Antarctica,” and concluding, “Nobody wants to live there.” Although it is clear that the Tellers will not be going, the large numbers who signed up for Mars One’s sketchy settlement plans suggest that a lot of people do want to live on Mars. There are real challenges to constructing space settlements, but current Antarctic bases are not true settlements. Nobody lives there with their families, with the exception of the coastal Esperanza Base, where about ten families routinely winter over. No real effort is made to create any kind of human environment that is comfortable over a long period of time. Conditions in Antarctica might be better compared to living in a campground than a self-sustaining settlement. Additionally, the current Antarctic Treaty essentially prevents any extraction or use of the natural resources found there, thus making economically independent settlements infeasible. The Tellers think that, from an economic perspective, “Mars has nothing to offer in return.” Here, at least in the short run, they have a point. Let us not shy from the truth. Conditions in the early settlements in the New World were difficult at best, and the casualty rate was high. We should expect the same to hold true for early space settlements. However, Jamestown and Plymouth gave rise to vast cities and a tamed landscape on a scale of hundreds of years. We now bring to the table technological means that would seem magical to the Jamestown settlers. Even as difficult an environment as the Moon can be developed and settled using technology that either exists currently or is an engineering project, as one book suggests. The Tellers think that, from an economic perspective, “Mars has nothing to offer in return.” Here, at least in the short run, they have a point. Although Mars may have more of the natural resources a settlement will need than, say, the Moon, it is at the bottom of a fairly steep gravity well and, for the time being, it is not likely that there will be many Mars-to-Earth exports. However, this is like looking at the resources of the New World via a keyhole, seeing a swamp, and reporting back that there is no point in going there. It is worth keeping in mind the example of “Seward’s Folly.” The purchase of Alaska from Russia was mocked as “Seward’s icebox” and a “polar bear garden.” At the time, the oil and mineral riches of Alaska were undiscovered and undreamt of. Space itself teems with valuable resources, including continuous and abundant solar energy and mineral wealth on a scale beyond imagination just in the near Earth asteroids. Just as the Tellers were dismissing space resources as irrelevant, the US Congress was laying the legal groundwork for asteroid and lunar mining with the passage of the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, signed by President Obama on November 23, 2015. The Tellers also seem unaware that their leadership at Google, Larry Page and Eric Schmidt, are investors in the asteroid mining firm Planetary Resources. The Tellers say that “we won’t survive [on Earth] unless we learn to live in a resource neutral way.” This statement assumes that that Earth is a closed system, which it is not. The Earth is flooded daily with vast amounts of solar energy that, if exploited, could power just about any civilization we wish to maintain. There is no technical limitation to providing continuous, carbon-free power from space solar power satellites beaming power back to the surface of the Earth anywhere it might be needed. The main opposition to this idea derives from an unwillingness to consider centralized power systems on ideological grounds, combined with the unexpected reality of very cheap natural gas today. Even the most conservative consideration of near-Earth asteroid resources suggests that there is no reason to view the Earth as a closed system to which nothing can be added. The time for the settlement of Mars will come, but first we need to build on our success in developing the resources of Earth orbit, in the form of navigation, Earth observation, communication, and weather satellites, by fully developing the economic potential of the Earth-Moon system. Space settlements must flow out of the development of the economic resources of space if they are to be sustainable in the long term. The NSS has developed a complete description of milestones toward the development of space settlements. In view of the above, Astro Teller was probably right to turn down the “space cadet” who wanted Google X to spend money on Mars settlement. But wait—Google is doing exactly that. A key first step toward space settlement is ensuring a gapless transition from the existing International Space Station to commercially owned and operated LEO space stations as described in the NSS position paper “Next Generation Space Stations.” Next will come the development of the resources of the Moon and neaby asteroids leading to the creation of a self-sustaining Earth-Moon economy. Once we have established an asteroid-Earth-Moon economy that makes the resources found in this region fully available for projects ranging from the construction of solar power satellites to fueling future Mars missions, trips to Mars will be far less of a reach than they are today. In view of the above, Astro Teller was probably right to turn down the “space cadet” who wanted Google X to spend money on Mars settlement. Currently Google’s money would be better spent in low Earth orbit, among the asteroids, and on the Moon, joining forces with the growing number of entrepreneurs seeking their fortunes in space. But wait—Google is doing exactly that by sponsoring the Google Lunar X PRIZE to encourage private groups to send landers to the Moon, and investing $900 million in Elon Musk’s SpaceX. Given that corporate Google (now Alphabet) has just made a massive investment in a company founded to settle Mars, the Tellers’ essay sounds a bit like sour grapes. In any case, the Tellers are completely wrong in their disregard of the potential economic benefits of space development and the underlying motivation for space settlement.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Extinction’s <u>inevitable</u>---<u>only</u> growth can <u>sustain</u> space colonization and <u>solve extinction</h4><p></u><strong>Skran 16 </strong>[Dale Skran is Executive Vice President of the National Space Society and a member of the Board of Directors of the Alliance for Space Development. “Settling space is the only sustainable reason for humans to be in space,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2915/1] </p><p><u><mark>As </mark>robotic and artificial intelligence <mark>tech</mark>nologies</u> improve and <u><mark>enable </mark>increasingly robust <mark>exploration</u></mark> without a human presence, eventually <u><mark>there will be only one</mark> sustainable <mark>reason</mark> for humans to be in space</u>: <u><strong><mark>settlement</u></strong>.</mark> <u>Research into the <mark>recycling tech</mark>nology required for long-term off-Earth settlements</u> <u><strong><mark>will</mark> directly <mark>benefit terrestrial sustainability</u></strong></mark>. <u>Actively working toward</u> developing and <u><mark>settling space</u> <u>will make available</mark> mineral and energy <mark>resources</u> <u><strong>for use on Earth</mark> on a vast scale</u></strong>. Finally, <u>space settlement offers the hope of long-term species survival that remaining on Earth does not. </u>There are more than seven billion people on the Earth today. No rational space settlement advocate suggests that any significant portion of that population, or even of those who are rich, will be moving to Mars or anywhere else in space. However, a recent essay by Astro Teller, head of Google X Labs, and his wife Danielle, a physician and researcher takes the bold position that “It’s completely ridiculous to think that humans could live on Mars.” This essay, published by Quartz, repeats with little examination some of the hoariest arguments against space settlement. To support this view, the Tellers quote their 12-year-old daughter: “I can’t stand that people think we’re all going to live on Mars after we destroy our own planet.” This quote contains two mischaracterizations that demand refutation: <u>that “we are all” going to live in space</u> <u>and that we are going to live in space after we destroy Earth</u>. Another canard that has long floated about was given form by the recent film Elysium starring Matt Damon<u>: the rich will leave the poor on the Earth</u> and escape to space settlements. Upon examination, <u><strong>all three of these ideas are strawmen. </u></strong>There are more than seven billion people on the Earth today. No rational space settlement advocate suggests that any significant portion of that population, or even of those who are rich, will be moving to Mars or anywhere else in space. Instead, <u>we expect that relatively <mark>small numbers </mark>of highly qualified individuals</u>, or those <u>who are deeply dedicated to living in space, <mark>would form the first</mark> settlements</u>. Over a significant period of time, <u><mark>thousands more</mark> from the Earth <mark>would join</mark> those settlements as they become increasingly self-sufficient</u>. Over more time, <u>various possible niches</u> for settlement (<u><mark>Moon, Mars, asteroids, free space</u></mark>, etc.) <u>will be occupied</u>, and eventually <u><strong><mark>the population in space will total many millions</u></strong></mark>, most of whom will have been born in space. So why then do Elon Musk, Stephen Hawking, and many others, including organizations like the National Space Society (NSS) and Alliance for Space Development, believe strongly that space settlement is essential to human survival? Although this may seem surprising, <u><strong><mark>the Earth is not</mark> a “<mark>safe</mark> space.”</u></strong> <u><mark>The destiny of</mark> virtually <mark>all species</mark> on Earth <mark>is extinction</u></mark> in a relatively short span of geologic time. The Tellers claim that “we live on a planet that is perfect for us.” This statement is both completely true and total nonsense. <u>We fit well on the Earth because we have evolved over millions of years to become creatures that are both adapted to live here and to like living here</u>. It is truer to say that we are perfect for the Earth than the reverse. In fact, <u>the Earth is not such a commodious place.</u> <u><strong>It is subject to periodic calamities</u></strong> of various sorts, ranging from massive asteroid and comet impacts to titanic volcanic eruptions, and from periodic ice ages to disastrous solar flares. In the short run, the Earth seems balmy and comfortable. <u>Viewed from the perspective of</u> <u>deep time,</u> <u><strong>it starts to look more like a death trap, bedeviled by regular mass extinctions</u></strong>. However, <u><strong>things are actually quite a bit worse</u></strong>. Although <u>there are many potentially bad things that might happen to the human race on the Earth from natural sources</u>, <u>there are many more from unnatural sources</u>. <u><strong>We have been dancing with nuclear disaster for a long time.</u></strong> An apocalyptic atomic war is not inevitable, but it is possible. <u><mark>Add to this</mark> scenario</u> the <u><strong>genetically <mark>engineered killer virus</u></strong></mark>, “<u><strong><mark>gray goo</u></strong></mark>,” a <u><strong><mark>robot revolt</u></strong>, <u><strong>and other horrors</mark> as yet <mark>undreamt</u></strong></mark>, and <u>the odds against human survival get longer</u>. Hence, the need to abandon the fiction of Earth as our eternal and unchanging perfect home and to appreciate both the need for, and promise of, space settlement. <u><mark>Not so the rich can escape</mark> to an Elysium</u> in the sky, or so we can all leave behind a polluted and overheated Earth, <u><mark>but</mark> simply <mark>so that</mark> the <mark>human</mark> specie<mark>s</mark> and human culture has a chance at <mark>surviv</mark>ing</u> and flourishing <u><strong><mark>in the long term</mark>. </u></strong>The Tellers believe that sustainability on the Earth has no relationship to what we do in space, but <u><mark>the same tech</mark>nologies <mark>that enable</mark> deep <mark>space settlement will</mark> have a profound <mark>impact</mark> on <mark>terrestrial sustainability</u></mark>. The Tellers write, “We haven’t even colonized the Sahara desert, the bottom of the oceans… because it makes no economic sense.” This may be true, but<u> it</u> also <u>makes no sense to settle the Sahara </u>desert, the bottom of the <u>oceans, or Antarctica</u> <u>since </u>these locations are on the Earth, and <u><strong>humans living there will not increase the probability of species survival. </u></strong>Near-Earth free space settlements and lunar bases are just stepping stones to ones much further out that are quarantined from Earth by millions of kilometers of vacuum. Once the motivation of species survival is put front and center, it becomes clear that <u>a settlement in low Earth orbit,</u> on the Moon, at L5, or on the Martian surface <u><strong>is not nearly sufficient</u></strong>. <u>What is needed is a large set of thriving communities distributed throughout the solar system, and even ultimately in the Oort Cloud surrounding the solar system </u>proper. This vision is not a small thing. <u>It will be the work of many generations</u>, just as was the settling of the New World or, even earlier in history, the human diaspora out of Africa along the Asian coast to Australia and beyond. The Tellers believe that sustainability on the Earth has no relationship to what we do in space, but the same technologies that enable deep space settlement will have a profound impact on terrestrial sustainability. <u>Space settlements, of necessity, push the limits of food production per square meter and per liter of wate</u>r. Space settlement <u><strong>agricultural methods can also be applied to growing food in parched California or in vertical farms in crowded urban areas</u></strong>. <u>Space <mark>settlements require</mark> humans and technology to co-exist in close proximit</u>y. This implies <u><strong>an absolute <mark>minimization of pollution</u></strong></mark> <u>and sustained recycling of all waste</u>. Such <u>technologies seem <mark>highly applicable to sustainability on Earth</mark> as well</u>. We will need to provide the best possible medical care for remote space settlements, which will be far from hospitals on Earth. The technologies that make such medicine effective—“tricorders”, <u><strong><mark>telemedicine</u></strong>,</mark> and so on—<u><mark>can</mark> also <mark>bring medical care to</mark> underdeveloped and <mark>underserved areas</mark> of the Earth. </u>The Tellers raise the specter of “winter-over syndrome” in the Antarctic, writing that “living on Mars would be way, way more miserable than living in Antarctica,” and concluding, “Nobody wants to live there.” Although it is clear that the Tellers will not be going, the <u>large numbers who signed up for Mars One’s</u> sketchy settlement <u>plans suggest that a lot of people do want to live on Mars</u>. <u>There are real challenges</u> to constructing space settlements, <u>but current Antarctic bases are not true settlements</u>. Nobody lives there with their families, with the exception of the coastal Esperanza Base, where about ten families routinely winter over. <u>No real effort is made to create any kind of human environment that is comfortable </u>over a long period of time. <u>Conditions in Antarctica might be better compared to living in a campground than a self-sustaining settlement.</u> Additionally, <u>the current Antarctic Treaty</u> essentially <u><strong>prevents any extraction or use of the natural resources</u></strong> found there, thus <u>making economically independent settlements infeasible</u>. The Tellers think that, from an economic perspective, “Mars has nothing to offer in return.” Here, at least in the short run, they have a point. Let us not shy from the truth. <u>Conditions in the early settlements</u> in the New <u>World were difficult at best</u>, and the casualty rate was high. <u>We should expect the same to hold true for early space settlements</u>. However, <u><strong>Jamestown and Plymouth gave rise to vast cities and a tamed landscape on a scale of hundreds of years.</u></strong> <u>We now bring to the table technological means that would seem magical to the Jamestown settlers</u>. Even as difficult an environment as the Moon can be developed and settled using technology that either exists currently or is an engineering project, as one book suggests. The Tellers think that, from an economic perspective, “Mars has nothing to offer in return.” Here, at least in the short run, they have a point. Although <u>Mars may have more of the natural resources a settlement will need than</u>, say, <u>the Moon</u>, it is at the bottom of a fairly steep gravity well and, for the time being, it is not likely that there will be many Mars-to-Earth exports. However, this is like looking at the resources of the New World via a keyhole, seeing a swamp, and reporting back that there is no point in going there. It is worth keeping in mind the example of “Seward’s Folly.” <u>The purchase of Alaska from Russia was mocked</u> as “Seward’s icebox” and a “polar bear garden.” <u><strong>At the time, the oil and mineral riches of Alaska were undiscovered</u></strong> and undreamt of. <u><strong>Space itself teems with valuable resources</u></strong>, including continuous and abundant solar energy and mineral wealth on a scale beyond imagination just in the near Earth asteroids. Just as the Tellers were dismissing space resources as irrelevant, the US Congress was laying the legal groundwork for asteroid and lunar mining with the passage of the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, signed by President Obama on November 23, 2015. The Tellers also seem unaware that their leadership at Google, Larry Page and Eric Schmidt, are investors in the asteroid mining firm Planetary Resources. The Tellers say that “we won’t survive [on Earth] unless we learn to live in a resource neutral way.” This statement assumes that that Earth is a closed system, which it is not. <u><mark>The Earth is flooded</mark> daily <mark>with</mark> vast amounts of <mark>solar energy that</mark>, if exploited</u>, <u><mark>could power</mark> just about <mark>any civilization</mark> we wish to maintain</u>. <u><strong><mark>There is no technical limitation to providing continuous, carbon-free power from space</mark> solar power satellites beaming power back to the surface of the Earth anywhere it might be needed</u></strong>. <u>The main opposition to this idea derives from an unwillingness to consider centralized power systems on</u> <u><strong>ideological grounds</u></strong>, combined with the unexpected reality of very cheap natural gas today. <u>Even the most conservative consideration of near-Earth asteroid resources suggests that <strong>there is no reason to view the Earth as a closed system to which nothing can be added. </u></strong>The time for the settlement of Mars will come, but first we need to build on our success in developing the resources of Earth orbit, in the form of navigation, Earth observation, communication, and weather satellites, by fully developing the economic potential of the Earth-Moon system. <u>Space settlements must flow out of the development of the economic resources of space if they are to be sustainable in the long term</u>. The NSS has developed a complete description of milestones toward the development of space settlements. In view of the above, Astro Teller was probably right to turn down the “space cadet” who wanted Google X to spend money on Mars settlement. But wait—Google is doing exactly that. A key first step toward space settlement is ensuring a gapless transition from the existing International Space Station to commercially owned and operated LEO space stations as described in the NSS position paper “Next Generation Space Stations.” Next will come the development of the resources of the Moon and neaby asteroids leading to the creation of a self-sustaining Earth-Moon economy. Once we have established an asteroid-Earth-Moon economy that makes the resources found in this region fully available for projects ranging from the construction of solar power satellites to fueling future Mars missions, trips to Mars will be far less of a reach than they are today. In view of the above, Astro Teller was probably right to turn down the “space cadet” who wanted Google X to spend money on Mars settlement. Currently Google’s money would be better spent in low Earth orbit, among the asteroids, and on the Moon, joining forces with the growing number of entrepreneurs seeking their fortunes in space. But wait—Google is doing exactly that by sponsoring the Google Lunar X PRIZE to encourage private groups to send landers to the Moon, and investing $900 million in Elon Musk’s SpaceX. Given that corporate Google (now Alphabet) has just made a massive investment in a company founded to settle Mars, the Tellers’ essay sounds a bit like sour grapes. In any case, <u>the Tellers are completely wrong</u> in their disregard of the potential economic benefits of space development and the underlying motivation for space settlement.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Stephen Brooks & William Wohlforth 16. William, Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. Stephen Brooks, Ph. D in Political Science from Yale, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. 2016. “6. Assessing the Security Benefits of Deep Engagement.” America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role in the 21st Century. Chapter 6. Page 105-108 fulltext: The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation Matthew Kroenig highlights a number of reasons why US policymakers seek to limit the spread of nuclear weapons: “Fear that nuclear proliferation might deter [US leaders] from using military intervention to pursue their interests, reduce the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy, trigger regional instability, undermine their alliance structures, dissipate their strategic attention, and set off further nuclear proliferation within their sphere of influence.” These are not the only reasons for concern about nuclear proliferation; also notable are the enhanced prospects of nuclear accidents and the greater risk of leakage of nuclear material to terrorists. 9 8 Do deep engagement’s security ties serve to contain the spread of nuclear weapons? The literature on the causes of proliferation is massive and faces challenges as great as any in international relations. With few cases to study, severe challenges in gathering evidence about inevitably secretive nuclear programs, and a large number of factors in play on both the demand and the supply sides, findings are decidedly mixed. Alliance relationships are just one piece of this complex puzzle, one that is hard to isolate from all the other factors in play. And empirical studies face the same selection bias problem just discussed: Nuclear powers are more likely to offer security guarantees to states confronting a serious threat and thus facing above- average incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, alliance guarantees might be offered to states actively considering the nuclear option precisely in order to try to forestall that decision. Like a strong drug given only to very sick patients, alliances thus may have a powerful effect even if they sometimes fail to work as hoped. 10 Bearing these challenges in mind, the most relevant findings that emerge from this literature are: The most recent statistical analysis of the precise question at issue concludes that “security guarantees significantly reduce proliferation proclivity among their recipients.” In addition, states with such guarantees are less likely to export sensitive nuclear material and technology to other nonnuclear states. 12 11 Case study research underscores that the complexity of motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be reduced to security: domestic politics, economic interests, and prestige all matter. 13 Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case studies nonetheless reveal that security alliances help explain numerous allied decisions not to proliferate even when security is not always the main driver of leaders’ interest in a nuclear program. As Nuno Monteiro and Alexandre Debs stress, “States whose security goals are subsumed by their sponsors’ own aims have never acquired the bomb. … This finding highlights the role of U.S. security commitments in stymieing nuclear proliferation: U.S. protégés will only seek the bomb if they doubt U.S. protection of their core security goals.” 15 14 Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case research projects further unpack the conditions that decrease the likelihood of allied proliferation, centering on the credibility of the alliance commitment. In addition, in some cases of prevention failure, the alliances allow the patron to influence the ally’s nuclear program subsequently, decreasing further proliferation risks. 17 Security alliances lower the likelihood of proliferation cascades. To be sure, many predicted cascades did not occur. But security provision, mainly by the United States, is a key reason why. The most comprehensive statistical analysis finds that states are more likely to proliferate in response to neighbors when three conditions are met: (1) there is an intense security rivalry between the two countries; (2) the prospective proliferating state does not have a security guarantee from a nuclear- armed patron; and (3) the potential proliferator has the industrial and technical capacity to launch an indigenous nuclear program. 18 19 16 In sum, as Monteiro and Debs note, “Despite grave concerns that more states would seek a nuclear deterrent to counter U.S. power preponderance,” in fact “the spread of nuclear weapons decelerated with the end of the Cold War in 1989.” Their research, as well as that of scores of scholars using multiple methods and representing many contrasting theoretical perspectives, shows that US security guarantees and the counter- proliferation policy deep engagement allows are a big part of the reason why. 20 The Costs of Nuclear Proliferation General empirical findings thus lend support to the proposition that security alliances impede nuclear proliferation. But is this a net contributor to global security? Most practitioners and policy analysts would probably not even bring this up as a question and would automatically answer yes if it were raised. Yet a small but very prominent group of theorists within the academy reach a different answer: some of the same realist precepts that generate the theoretical prediction that retrenchment would increase demand for nuclear weapons also suggest that proliferation might increase security such that the net effect of retrenchment could be neutral. Most notably, “nuclear optimists” like Kenneth Waltz contend that deterrence essentially solves the security problem for all nuclear- armed states, largely eliminating the direct use of force among them. It follows that US retrenchment might generate an initial decrease in security followed by an increase as insecure states acquire nuclear capabilities, ultimately leaving no net effect on international security. 21 This perspective is countered by “nuclear pessimists” such as Scott Sagan. Reaching outside realism to organization theory and other bodies of social science research, they see major security downsides from new nuclear states. Copious research produced by Sagan and others casts doubt on the expectation that governments can be relied upon to create secure and controlled nuclear forces. The more nuclear states there are, the higher the probability that the organizational, psychological, and civil- military pathologies Sagan identifies will turn an episode like one of the numerous “near misses” he uncovers into actual nuclear use. As Campbell Craig warns, “One day a warning system will fail, or an official will panic, or a terrorist attack will be misconstrued, and the missiles will fly.” 22 23 Looking beyond these kinds of factors, it is notable that powerful reasons to question the assessment of proliferation optimists also emerge even if one assumes, as they do, that states are rational and seek only to maximize their security. First, nuclear deterrence can only work by raising the risk of nuclear war. For deterrence to be credible, there has to be a nonzero chance of nuclear use. If nuclear use is impossible, deterrence cannot be credible. It follows that every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability of 24 nuclear use. The more such relationships there are, the greater the risk of nuclear war. Proliferation therefore increases the chances of nuclear war even in a perfectly rationalist world. Proliferation optimists cannot logically deny that nuclear spread increases the risk of nuclear war. Their argument must be that the security gains of nuclear spread outweigh this enhanced risk. Estimating that risk is not simply a matter of pondering the conditions under which leaders will choose to unleash nuclear war. Rather, as Schelling established, the question is whether states will run the risk of using nuclear weapons. Nuclear crisis bargaining is about a “competition in risk taking.” Kroenig counts some twenty cases in which states—including prominently the United States—ran real risks of nuclear war in order to prevail in crises. As Kroenig notes, “By asking whether states can be deterred or not … proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis?” The more nuclear- armed states there are, the more the opportunities for such risk- taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use. 27 26 25<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Assurance <u>solves</u> prolif. The <u>best</u> studies go <u>Affirmative</u>!</h4><p>Stephen<strong> Brooks & </strong>William<strong> Wohlforth 16</strong>. William, Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. Stephen Brooks, Ph. D in Political Science from Yale, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. 2016. “6. Assessing the Security Benefits of Deep Engagement.” America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role in the 21st Century. Chapter 6. Page 105-108</p><p>The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation </p><p>Matthew Kroenig highlights a number of reasons why US policymakers seek to limit the spread of nuclear weapons: “<u><strong>Fear that nuclear proliferation might deter [US leaders] from using military intervention to pursue their interests, reduce the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy, trigger regional instability, undermine their alliance structures, dissipate their strategic attention, and set off further nuclear proliferation within their sphere of influence</u></strong>.” These are not the only reasons for concern about nuclear proliferation; <u><strong>also notable are the enhanced prospects of</u></strong> <u><strong>nuclear accidents</u></strong> <u><strong>and the greater risk of leakage of</u></strong> <u><strong>nuclear material to terrorists</u></strong>. 9 8</p><p><u><strong>Do</u></strong> deep engagement’s <u><strong>security ties</u></strong> <u><strong>serve to contain t</u></strong>he spread of <u><strong>nuclear weapons</u></strong>? The literature on the causes of proliferation is massive and faces challenges as great as any in international relations. With few cases to study, severe challenges in gathering evidence about inevitably secretive nuclear programs, and a large number of factors in play on both the demand and the supply sides, <u><strong>findings are decidedly mixed. Alliance relationships are just one piece of this complex puzzle</u></strong>, one that is hard to isolate from all the other factors in play. And <u><strong>empirical studies face the same selection bias problem just discussed</u></strong>: Nuclear powers are more likely to offer security guarantees to states confronting a serious threat and thus facing above- average incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, <u><strong>alliance guarantees might be offered to states actively considering the nuclear option precisely in order to try to forestall that decision</u></strong>. Like a strong drug given only to very sick patients, alliances thus may have a powerful effect even if they sometimes fail to work as hoped. 10</p><p>Bearing these challenges in mind, <u><strong>the most relevant findings that emerge from this literature are</u></strong>:</p><p><u><strong>The</u></strong> <u><strong>most recent <mark>statistical analysis</u></strong></mark> of the precise question at issue <u><strong><mark>concludes</mark> that “<mark>security guarantees </mark>significantly <mark>reduce prolif</mark>eration</u></strong> <u><strong>proclivity</u></strong> among their recipients.” In addition, <u><strong><mark>states</mark> <mark>with</mark> such <mark>guarantees are less likely to export</mark> sensitive</u></strong> <u><strong>nuclear <mark>material </mark>and technology</u></strong> to other nonnuclear states. 12 11 </p><p><u><strong>Case study research</u></strong> <u><strong>underscores that the complexity of motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be reduced to security</u></strong>: domestic politics, economic interests, and prestige all matter. 13 </p><p><u><strong>Multiple independently conceived and</u></strong> <u><strong>executed</u></strong> <u><strong>recent case studies nonetheless reveal that security alliances</u></strong> <u><strong>help explain numerous allied decisions not to proliferate even when security is not always the main driver of leaders’ interest</u></strong> in a nuclear program. As Nuno Monteiro and Alexandre Debs stress, “<u><strong>States whose security goals are subsumed by their sponsors’ own aims have never acquired the bomb</u></strong>. … <u><strong>This finding highlights the role of U.S. security commitments in stymieing nuclear proliferation</u></strong>: U<u><strong>.S. <mark>protégés</mark> will <mark>only seek the bomb if they doubt </mark>U.S. <mark>protection</u></strong></mark> of their core security goals.” 15 14 </p><p><u><strong>Multiple independently</u></strong> conceived and executed recent <u><strong>case research</u></strong> <u><strong>projects further unpack the conditions that decrease the likelihood of allied proliferation, centering on the credibility of the alliance commitment. </u></strong>In addition, <u><strong>in</u></strong> some <u><strong>cases of prevention failure, the alliances allow the patron to influence the ally’s nuclear program subsequently, decreasing further proliferation risks</u></strong>. 17 </p><p><u><strong>Security alliances lower the likelihood of proliferation cascades</u></strong>. To be sure, <u><strong>many predicted cascades did not occur.</u></strong> But <u><strong>security provision, mainly by the United States, is a key reason why</u></strong>. <u><strong>The most comprehensive statistical analysis</u></strong> <u><strong>finds that states are more likely to proliferate in response to neighbors when three conditions are met</u></strong>: (1) <u><strong>there is an intense security rivalry between the two countries</u></strong>; (2) <u><strong>the</u></strong> prospective <u><strong>proliferating state does not have a security guarantee from a nuclear- armed patron</u></strong>; <u><strong>and</u></strong> (3) <u><strong>the potential proliferator has the industrial and technical capacity to launch an indigenous</u></strong> nuclear <u><strong>program</u></strong>. 18 19 16</p><p>In sum, as Monteiro and Debs note, “Despite grave concerns that more states would seek a nuclear deterrent to counter U.S. power preponderance,” in fact “<u><strong>the <mark>spread</mark> of nuclear weapons decelerated with the end of the Cold War</u></strong> in 1989.” <u><strong>Their research, as well as that of <mark>scores of scholars</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>using</u></strong> <u><strong>multiple methods</u></strong> <u><strong>and <mark>representing </mark>many <mark>contrasting</mark> theoretical <mark>perspectives</u></strong>, <u><strong>shows</mark> that <mark>US</mark> security <mark>guarantees </mark>and the counter- proliferation policy deep engagement</u></strong> <u><strong>allows <mark>are</mark> a big part of the reason <mark>why</u></strong></mark>. 20</p><p>The Costs of Nuclear Proliferation </p><p>General empirical findings thus lend support to the proposition that security alliances impede nuclear proliferation. But is this a net contributor to global security? Most practitioners and policy analysts would probably not even bring this up as a question and would automatically answer yes if it were raised. Yet a small but very prominent group of theorists within the academy reach a different answer: <u><strong>some of the same realist precepts that generate the theoretical prediction that retrenchment would increase demand for nuclear weapons also suggest that proliferation might increase security</u></strong> such that the net effect of retrenchment could be neutral. Most notably, “<u><strong>nuclear optimists</u></strong>” <u><strong>like</u></strong> Kenneth <u><strong>Waltz</u></strong> <u><strong>contend that deterrence essentially solves the security problem for all nuclear- armed states</u></strong>, <u><strong>largely eliminating the direct use of force </u></strong>among them. It follows that <u><strong>US retrenchment might generate an initial decrease in security followed by an increase as insecure states acquire nuclear capabilities</u></strong>, <u><strong>ultimately leaving no net effect on international security</u></strong>. 21</p><p><u><strong>This perspective is countered by </u></strong>“<u><strong>nuclear <mark>pessimists</u></strong></mark>” such as Scott Sagan. Reaching outside realism to organization theory and other bodies of social science research, <u><strong>they <mark>see major</mark> security <mark>downsides </mark>from new nuclear states. Copious <mark>research</u></strong></mark> produced by Sagan and others <u><strong><mark>casts doubt</mark> on the expectation that <mark>governments can be relied upon</mark> to create secure and controlled nuclear forces. The more nuclear states there are, the higher the probability that the organizational, psychological, and civil- military pathologies Sagan identifies will turn an episode like one of the numerous “near misses” he uncovers</u></strong> into actual nuclear use. As Campbell Craig warns, “<u><strong>One day a <mark>warning system</mark> will <mark>fail</u></strong></mark>, or <u><strong><mark>an</mark> <mark>official will panic</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>or a terrorist <mark>attack will be misconstrued</mark>, and the <mark>missiles will fly</mark>.</u></strong>” 22 23</p><p>Looking beyond these kinds of factors, it is notable that <u><strong>powerful reasons to question the assessment of proliferation optimists also emerge even if one assumes, as they do, that states are rational and seek only to maximize their security</u></strong>. First, <u><strong>nuclear <mark>deterrence </mark>can <mark>only work by raising the risk</mark> of nuclear war. For deterrence to be credible</u></strong>, <u><strong>there has to be a</u></strong> <u><strong>nonzero chance of nuclear use</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>If</mark> nuclear <mark>use is impossible</mark>, <mark>deterrence cannot be credible</u></strong></mark>. It follows that <u><strong>every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability</u></strong> of 24 nuclear use. <u><strong>The more such relationships there are</u></strong>, <u><strong>the greater the risk of nuclear war</u></strong>. Proliferation therefore increases the chances of nuclear war even in a perfectly rationalist world. Proliferation optimists cannot logically deny that nuclear spread increases the risk of nuclear war. Their argument must be that the security gains of nuclear spread outweigh this enhanced risk. </p><p>Estimating that risk is not simply a matter of pondering the conditions under which leaders will choose to unleash nuclear war. Rather, as Schelling established, the question is whether states will run the risk of using nuclear weapons. <u><strong>Nuclear crisis bargaining is about a “competition in risk taking</u></strong>.” <u><strong>Kroenig counts some twenty cases in which states</u></strong>—including prominently the United States—<u><strong>ran real risks of nuclear war in order to prevail in crises</u></strong>. As Kroenig notes<u><strong>, “By asking whether states can be deterred or not … proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question.</u></strong> <u><strong>The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war</u></strong> <u><strong>is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a</u></strong> <u><strong>given crisis</u></strong>?” <u><strong>The more nuclear- armed states there are, the more the opportunities for such risk- taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use</u></strong>. 27 26 25</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Acker 16, Joan, American sociologist, researcher, writer and educator, Race, Class & Gender: An Anthology, “Is Capitalism Gendered and Racialized?”, https://www.cengage.com/c/race-class-gender-an-anthology-9e-andersen/9781305093614/, Accessed 6/28/21 VD fulltext: Industrial capitalism is historically, and in the main continues to be, a white male project, in the sense that white men were and are the innovators, owners, and holders of power. Capitalism developed in Britain and then in Europe and the United States in societies that were already dominated by white men and already contained a gender-based division of labor. The emerging waged labor force was sharply divided by gender, as well as by race and ethnicity with many variations by nation and regions within nations. At the same time, the gendered division of labor in domestic tasks was reconfigured and incorporated in a gendered division between paid market labor and unpaid domestic labor. In the United States, certain white men, unburdened by caring for children and households and already the major wielders of gendered power, buttressed at least indirectly by the profits from slavery and the exploitation of other minorities, were, in the nineteenth century, those who built the U.S. factories and railroads, and owned and managed the developing capitalist enterprise. As far as we know, they were also heterosexual and mostly of Northern European heritage. Their wives and daughters benefited from the wealth they amassed and contributed in symbolic and social ways to the perpetuation of their class, but they were not the architects of the new economy. Recruitment of the labor force for the colonies and then the United States had always been transnational and often coercive. Slavery existed prior to the development of industrialism in the United States: Capitalism was built partly on profits from that source. Michael Omi and Howard Winant (1994, 265) contend that the United States was a racial dictatorship for 258 years, from 1607 to 1865. After the abolition of slavery in 1865, severe exploitation, exclusion, and domination of blacks by whites perpetuated racial divisions cutting across gender and some class divisions, consigning blacks to the most menial, low-paying work in agriculture, mining, and domestic service. Early industrial workers were immigrants. For example, except for the brief tenure (twenty-five years) of young, native-born white women workers in the Lowell, Massachusetts, mills, immigrant women and children were the workers in the first mass production industry in the United States, the textile mills of Massachusetts and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Perrow 2002). This was a gender and racial/ethnic division of labor that still exists, but now on a global basis. Waves of European immigrants continued to come to the United States to work in factories and on farms. Many of these European immigrants, such as impoverished Irish, Poles, and eastern European Jews were seen as non-white or not-quite-white by white Americans and were used in capitalist production as low-wage workers, although some of them were actually skilled workers (Brodkin 1998). The experiences of racial oppression built into industrial capitalism varied by gender within these racial/ethnic groups. Capitalist expansion across the American continent created additional groups of Americans who were segregated by race and gender into racial and ethnic enclaves and into low-paid and highly exploited work. This expansion included the extermination and expropriation of native peoples, the subordination of Mexicans in areas taken in the war with Mexico in 1845, and the recruitment of Chinese and other Asians as low-wage workers, mostly on the west coast (Amott and Matthaei 1996; Glenn 2002). Women from different racial and ethnic groups were incorporated differently than men and differently than each other into developing capitalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. White Euro-American men moved from farms into factories or commercial, business, and administrative jobs. Women aspired to be housewives as the male breadwinner family became the ideal. Married white women, working class and middle class, were housewives unless unemployment, low wages, or death of their husbands made their paid work necessary (Goldin 1990, 133). Young white women with some secondary education moved into the expanding clerical jobs and into elementary school teaching when white men with sufficient education were unavailable (Cohn 1985). African Americans, both women and men, continued to be confined to menial work, although some were becoming factory workers, and even teachers and professionals as black schools and colleges were formed (Collins 2000). Young women from first- and second-generation European immigrant families worked in factories and offices. This is a very sketchy outline of a complex process (Kessler-Harris 1982), but the overall point is that the capitalist labor force in the United States emerged as deeply segregated horizontally by occupation and stratified vertically by positions of power and control on the basis of both gender and race. Unequal pay patterns went along with sex and race segregation, stratification, and exclusion. Differences in the earnings and wealth (Keister 2000) of women and men existed before the development of the capitalist wage (Padavic and Reskin 2002). Slaves, of course, had no wages and earned little after abolition. These patterns continued as capitalist wage labor became the dominant form and wages became the primary avenue of distribution to ordinary people. Unequal wages were justified by beliefs about virtue and entitlement. A living wage or a just wage for white men was higher than a living wage or a just wage for white women or for women and men from minority racial and ethnic groups (Figart, Mutari, and Power 2002). African-American women were at the bottom of the wage hierarchy. The earnings advantage that white men have had throughout the history of modern capitalism was created partly by their organization to increase their wages and improve their working conditions. They also sought to protect their wages against the competition of others, women and men from subordinate groups (for example, Cockburn 1983, 1991). This advantage also suggests a white male coalition across class lines (Connell 2000; Hartmann 1976), based at least partly in beliefs about gender and race differences and beliefs about the superior skills of white men. White masculine identity and self-respect were complexly involved in these divisions of labor and wages. This is another way in which capitalism is a gendered and racialized accumulation process (Connell 2000). Wage differences between white men and all other groups, as well as divisions of labor between these groups, contributed to profit and flexibility, by helping to maintain growing occupational areas, such as clerical work, as segregated and low paid. Where women worked in manufacturing or food processing, gender divisions of labor kept the often larger female work force in low-wage routine jobs, while males worked in other more highly paid, less routine, positions (Acker and Van Houten 1974). While white men might be paid more, capitalist organizations could benefit from this “gender/racial dividend.” Thus, by maintaining divisions, employers could pay less for certain levels of skill, responsibility, and experience when the worker was not a white male. This is not to say that getting a living wage was easy for white men, or that most white men achieved it. Labor-management battles, employers’ violent tactics to prevent unionization, [and] massive unemployment during frequent economic depressions characterized the situation of white industrial workers as wage labor spread in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During the same period, new white-collar jobs were created to manage, plan, and control the expanding industrial economy. This rapidly increasing middle class was also stratified by gender and race. The better-paid, more respected jobs went to white men; white women were secretaries and clerical workers; people of color were absent. Conditions and issues varied across industries and regions of the country. But, wherever you look, those variations contained underlying gendered and racialized divisions. Patterns of stratification and segregation were written into employment contracts in work content, positions in work hierarchies, and wage differences, as well as other forms of distribution. These patterns persisted, although with many alterations, through extraordinary changes in production and social life. After World War II, white women, except for a brief period immediately after the war, went to work for pay in the expanding service sector, professional, and managerial fields. African Americans moved to the North in large numbers, entering industrial and service sector jobs. These processes accelerated after the 1960s, with the civil rights and women’s movements, new civil rights laws, and affirmative action. Hispanics and Asian Americans, as well as other racial/ethnic groups, became larger proportions of the population, on the whole finding work in low-paid, segregated jobs. Employers continued, and still continue, to select and promote workers based on gender and racial identifications, although the processes are more subtle, and possibly less visible, than in the past (for example, Brown et al. 2003; Royster 2003). These processes continually recreate gender and racial inequities, not as cultural or ideological survivals from earlier times, but as essential elements in present capitalisms (Connell 1987, 103–106).<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Capitalism is a project of white domination – racialized bodies are exploited and dominated within the system</h4><p><strong>Acker 16, </strong>Joan, American sociologist, researcher, writer and educator, Race, Class & Gender: An Anthology, “Is Capitalism Gendered and Racialized?”, https://www.cengage.com/c/race-class-gender-an-anthology-9e-andersen/9781305093614/,<strong> <u>Accessed 6/28/21 VD</p><p></strong>Industrial <mark>capitalism is</mark> historically, and in the main continues to be, <mark>a white male project</mark>, in the sense that white men were and are the innovators, owners, and holders of power.</u> Capitalism developed in Britain and then in Europe and the United States in societies that were already dominated by white men and already contained a gender-based division of labor. <u><mark>The</mark> emerging <mark>waged labor force was sharply divided by</mark> gender, as well as by <mark>race</mark> and ethnicity with many variations by nation and regions within nations.</u> At the same time, the gendered division of labor in domestic tasks was reconfigured and incorporated in a gendered division between paid market labor and unpaid domestic labor. <u>In the United States, certain <mark>white men</mark>, unburdened by caring for children and households and already the major wielders of gendered power, <mark>buttressed</mark> at least indirectly <mark>by the profits from slavery and</mark> the exploitation of other <mark>minorities</mark>, were, in the nineteenth century, those <mark>who</mark> built the U.S. factories and railroads, and owned and <mark>managed the developing capitalist enterprise</mark>.</u> As far as we know, they were also heterosexual and mostly of Northern European heritage. Their wives and daughters benefited from the wealth they amassed and contributed in symbolic and social ways to the perpetuation of their class, but they were not the architects of the new economy. Recruitment of the labor force for the colonies and then the United States had always been transnational and often coercive. Slavery existed prior to the development of industrialism in the United States: Capitalism was built partly on profits from that source. Michael Omi and Howard Winant (1994, 265) contend that the United States was a racial dictatorship for 258 years, from 1607 to 1865. <u><mark>After the abolition of slavery</mark> in 1865, <mark>severe exploitation, exclusion, and domination of blacks by whites perpetuated racial divisions</mark> cutting across gender and some class divisions, <mark>consigning blacks to the most menial, low-paying work</mark> in agriculture, mining, and domestic service.</u> Early industrial workers were immigrants. For example, except for the brief tenure (twenty-five years) of young, native-born white women workers in the Lowell, Massachusetts, mills, immigrant women and children were the workers in the first mass production industry in the United States, the textile mills of Massachusetts and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Perrow 2002). This was a gender and racial/ethnic division of labor that still exists, but now on a global basis. Waves of European immigrants continued to come to the United States to work in factories and on farms. Many of these European immigrants, such as impoverished Irish, Poles, and eastern European Jews were seen as non-white or not-quite-white by white Americans and were used in capitalist production as low-wage workers, although some of them were actually skilled workers (Brodkin 1998). The experiences of racial oppression built into industrial capitalism varied by gender within these racial/ethnic groups. Capitalist expansion across the American continent created additional groups of Americans who were segregated by race and gender into racial and ethnic enclaves and into low-paid and highly exploited work. This expansion included the extermination and expropriation of native peoples, the subordination of Mexicans in areas taken in the war with Mexico in 1845, and the recruitment of Chinese and other Asians as low-wage workers, mostly on the west coast (Amott and Matthaei 1996; Glenn 2002). Women from different racial and ethnic groups were incorporated differently than men and differently than each other into developing capitalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. White Euro-American men moved from farms into factories or commercial, business, and administrative jobs. Women aspired to be housewives as the male breadwinner family became the ideal. Married white women, working class and middle class, were housewives unless unemployment, low wages, or death of their husbands made their paid work necessary (Goldin 1990, 133). Young white women with some secondary education moved into the expanding clerical jobs and into elementary school teaching when white men with sufficient education were unavailable (Cohn 1985). African Americans, both women and men, continued to be confined to menial work, although some were becoming factory workers, and even teachers and professionals as black schools and colleges were formed (Collins 2000). Young women from first- and second-generation European immigrant families worked in factories and offices. This is a very sketchy outline of a complex process (Kessler-Harris 1982), but the overall point is that the capitalist labor force in the United States emerged as deeply segregated horizontally by occupation and stratified vertically by positions of power and control on the basis of both gender and race. Unequal pay patterns went along with sex and race segregation, stratification, and exclusion. Differences in the earnings and wealth (Keister 2000) of women and men existed before the development of the capitalist wage (Padavic and Reskin 2002). <u><mark>Slaves</mark>, of course, <mark>had no wages and earned little after abolition. These patterns continued as capitalist wage labor became</mark> the <mark>dominant</mark> form and wages became the primary avenue of distribution to ordinary people.</u> Unequal wages were justified by beliefs about virtue and entitlement. A living wage or a just wage for white men was higher than a living wage or a just wage for white women or for women and men from minority racial and ethnic groups (Figart, Mutari, and Power 2002). African-American women were at the bottom of the wage hierarchy. <u><mark>The earnings advantage that white men have</mark> had throughout the history of modern capitalism was created partly by their organization to increase their wages and improve their working conditions. They also sought to protect their wages against the competition of others, women and men from subordinate groups (for example, Cockburn 1983, 1991). This advantage also suggests a white male coalition across class lines (Connell 2000; Hartmann 1976), <mark>based</mark> at least partly <mark>in beliefs about</mark> gender and race differences and beliefs about the <mark>superior skills of white men</mark>.</u> White masculine identity and self-respect were complexly involved in these divisions of labor and wages. This is another way in which capitalism is a gendered and racialized accumulation process (Connell 2000). Wage differences between white men and all other groups, as well as divisions of labor between these groups, contributed to profit and flexibility, by helping to maintain growing occupational areas, such as clerical work, as segregated and low paid. Where women worked in manufacturing or food processing, gender divisions of labor kept the often larger female work force in low-wage routine jobs, while males worked in other more highly paid, less routine, positions (Acker and Van Houten 1974). While white men might be paid more, capitalist organizations could benefit from this “gender/racial dividend.” Thus, by maintaining divisions, employers could pay less for certain levels of skill, responsibility, and experience when the worker was not a white male. This is not to say that getting a living wage was easy for white men, or that most white men achieved it. Labor-management battles, employers’ violent tactics to prevent unionization, [and] massive unemployment during frequent economic depressions characterized the situation of white industrial workers as wage labor spread in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During the same period, new white-collar jobs were created to manage, plan, and control the expanding industrial economy. This rapidly increasing middle class was also stratified by gender and race. The better-paid, more respected jobs went to white men; white women were secretaries and clerical workers; people of color were absent. Conditions and issues varied across industries and regions of the country. But, wherever you look, those variations contained underlying gendered and racialized divisions. <u><mark>Patterns of stratification and segregation were written into employment contracts</mark> in work content, <mark>positions in work hierarchies, and wage differences</mark>, as well as other forms of distribution.</u> These patterns persisted, although with many alterations, through extraordinary changes in production and social life. After World War II, white women, except for a brief period immediately after the war, went to work for pay in the expanding service sector, professional, and managerial fields. African Americans moved to the North in large numbers, entering industrial and service sector jobs. These processes accelerated after the 1960s, with the civil rights and women’s movements, new civil rights laws, and affirmative action. Hispanics and Asian Americans, as well as other racial/ethnic groups, became larger proportions of the population, on the whole finding work in low-paid, segregated jobs. Employers continued, and still continue, to select and promote workers based on gender and racial identifications, although the processes are more subtle, and possibly less visible, than in the past (for example, Brown et al. 2003; Royster 2003). <u><mark>These processes</mark> continually <mark>recreate</mark> gender and <mark>racial inequities</mark>, not as cultural or ideological survivals from earlier times, but <mark>as essential elements in</mark> present <mark>capitalisms</u></mark> (Connell 1987, 103–106). </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Ferguson: Ferguson, James [Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences, and Professor in the Department of Anthropology @ Stanford] “Teach a man to fish” 2015 AA fulltext: Is it the case that social protection in Africa must wait on the develop ment of the economic, political, and documentary institutions that en- abled it in the West? Does the effective distribution of social payments in fact require the kind of state that knows things like how old every citizen is, who lives in which house, what each household's income is, and which children belong to which parents? It is not possible to say for sure, but the present holds some clues. Promoters of the idea of a basic income grant, for instance, make interesting arguments about the reduced need for documentation entailed by unconditional social transfers and the role that new technologies might play in providing new kinds of bureaucratic recognition. In an ideal system, in some of these accounts, a monthly BIG payment could be obtained by any recipient simply by being biometrically recognized (e.g., through fingerprints and an iris scan) as a unique indi- vidual at any ATM. Instead Of all the paperwork, files, and social workers that conditional schemes require to sort out who qualifies and who does not (what's your name, where were you born, how many children do you have, are they really yours, what is your income level, etc.), the BIG and its biometric recognition scheme would have to answer only one ques- tion: have you already been paid yet this month or not? (Restriction of the benefit to citizens, of course, would require a second—and extremely difficult—question: are you (really) a citizen?) Thus is a radically stripped- down form of recognition envisioned, one that requires far less from the State (in informational and registration terms) than the social of old. There are ample reasons to be skeptical of such proposals, given both the general tendency of our time to seek reductive technological solutions to complex political problems and a more specific South African history of hyped claims for the efficacy of biometrics (Breckenridge 2005). But the idea that biometrics can facilitate the delivery of services to marginal and geographically remote people is not just a fantasy, either. Pensions and other social grants are paid quite effectively in Namibia, for instance, through the use of biometric "smartcards" that, together with fingerprint readers, allow people in even the most remote parts of this vast and lightly populated country to receive payments each month, either at the nearest NamPost (post office) or via mobile pay-points mounted on trucks (ac- companied by armed guard where necessary). India, another state with many rural poor and a checkered history of identity registration systems, has pioneered the use of biometrics (using a combination of iris, face, and fingers) for establishing unique IDs for purposes such as distribut- ing ration cards and is now rolling out a comprehensive scheme for a na- tionwide biometric identification scheme that proponents claim will both improve service delivery to the poorest while reducing opportunities for corruption (Lakshmi 2010; cf. Cohen forthcoming). A recent review of these technologies of recognition concluded that they have already proven their value in creating working systems of cash payment in a range of dif- ficult environments and in making effective distribution of cash payments technically viable even in countries with established records of corruption and "leakage" of public finance (Gelb and Decker 2011, 1). Keith Brecken- ridge's (2010) review of Ghana's current effort to introduce what has been called "the world's first biometric money supply" has highlighted the dan- gers of such schemes and the likelihood of their being deployed in ways that respond principally to the needs of banks and wealthy depositors. But at the same time, Breckenridge acknowledges "that these systems of bio- metric registration can, as has been the case in South Africa, serve as technologies of inclusion, working, very efficiently, to provide the Old, infirm and the young with a measure of social security" (2010, 656). Biometrics are often imagined as scary instruments of control at the disposal of a potentially totalitarian state. Indeed, in a traditional Left perspective, discipline and surveillance are fundamentally capitalist tools used for extracting and controlling labor. Resisting such forms of discipline as enumeration and registration, in such a perspective, can thus easily appear as a way of protecting and defending one's own life and labor, which someone is trying to take from you. But today, under conditions in which labor is in surplus, the poor and cast off may actually aspire to certain forms of surveillance and enumeration (Robins 2008, 77—99), just as they aspire to certain forms of biopolitical care (McKay 2012), seeing in them forms of incorporation, recognition, and support that are otherwise unavailable. Here, inclusion in systems of registration and accounting may appear less as an oppressive system of control than as a valued token of recognized membership. In this context, I suggest that the development of more effective and inclusive techniques for identifying biological individuality should not be thought of as automatically regressive or politically objectionable. Indeed, under the conditions I have described, new technical forms of identity documentation and recognition have some attractive political features that could in fact facilitate more effective and inclusive forms of State support and recognition even while requiring less, rather than more, intrusive surveillance. To appreciate the case for the biometric, it is useful to remember that current regimes of (paper) documentation in Africa have some quite obvious and severe problems. First of all, it is well estab- lished that the burdens ofobtaining and retaining documents fall hardest on the poorest and most marginal members of society (just those who are most in need of social protection), who often fail for this reason to qualify for schemes ostensibly meant to benefit them. In addition, wide- spread fraud (through forged documents, etc.) both wastes resources and (even more important) undermines political support for social trans- fer programs. Reliance on local officials to issue or certify documents creates vast opportunities for corruption, while linking benefits to the holding of specific cards Or identifying documents allows social stigma to be attached to the receipt of payments. In contrast, the mechanics of bio-recognition appear to fit well with the universality of unconditional cash transfers, where everyone with a unique iris scan is entitled to get a transfer once a month. In this scenario, many of the identity-related documents the "social" state has always needed can be dispensed with, and resources that would otherwise be spent tracking down who really qualifies for the income cut-off or who really lives at what address could be used instead to provide benefits. Critical skepticism toward such ideas is of course important, but I am increasingly convinced that it is equally important to allow ourselves to be open to the political possibilities that such new "techniques of the social" might enable. It would be easy to say that what the "lumpen" masses ofAfrica's cities really need is "proper jobs" and the whole range of "social" rights, state protections, and documentary entailments that (at least in European wel- fare states) have long been understood to come with them. But such a demand seems increasingly irrelevant in places where state capacities are extremely limited, where a formal-sector job is a distant rumor, and informal hustling the dominant livelihood. To find forms of social assistance and state services—and perhaps also forms of political mobilization— that can be effective in such circumstances, we may require both a historically informed sense of the future and its possibilities and a willingness to envision new forms of legibility that might correspond to new forms of social and political recognition.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>[Ferguson] The counterplan re-appropriates biopolitical surveillance technologies for life-saving social services---willingness to be open to benefits of surveillance is vital for new futures that remedy inequality</h4><p><u><strong>Ferguson: </u></strong>Ferguson, James [Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences, and Professor in the Department of Anthropology @ Stanford] “Teach a man to fish” 2015 AA</p><p>Is it the case that social protection in Africa must wait on the develop ment of the economic, political, and documentary institutions that en- abled it in the West? Does the effective distribution of social payments in fact require the kind of state that knows things like how old every citizen is, who lives in which house, what each household's income is, and which children belong to which parents? It is not possible to say for sure, but the present holds some clues. Promoters of the idea of a basic income grant, for instance, make interesting arguments about the reduced need for documentation entailed by unconditional social transfers and the role that new technologies might play in providing new kinds of bureaucratic recognition. In an ideal system, in some of these accounts, a monthly BIG payment could be obtained by any recipient simply by being biometrically recognized (e.g., through fingerprints and an iris scan) as a unique indi- vidual at any ATM. Instead Of all the paperwork, files, and social workers that conditional schemes require to sort out who qualifies and who does not (what's your name, where were you born, how many children do you have, are they really yours, what is your income level, etc.), the BIG and its biometric recognition scheme would have to answer only one ques- tion: have you already been paid yet this month or not? (Restriction of the benefit to citizens, of course, would require a second—and extremely difficult—question: are you (really) a citizen?) Thus is a radically stripped- down form of recognition envisioned, one that requires far less from the State (in informational and registration terms) than the social of old. There are ample reasons to be skeptical of such proposals, given both the general tendency of our time to seek reductive technological solutions to complex political problems and a more specific South African history of hyped claims for the efficacy of biometrics (Breckenridge 2005). But <u><strong>the idea that <mark>biometrics can facilitate</mark> the delivery of <mark>services to marginal and geographically remote people</mark> is not just a fantasy</u></strong>, either. <u><strong><mark>Pensions</mark> and</u></strong> other social <u><strong>grants <mark>are paid</mark> quite <mark>effectively</u></strong></mark> in Namibia, for instance, <u><strong>through the use of biometric "smartcards" that</u></strong>, together with fingerprint readers, <u><strong><mark>allow people</u></strong></mark> in even the most remote parts of this vast and lightly populated country <u><strong><mark>to receive payments</mark> each month</u></strong>, either at the nearest NamPost (post office) or <u><strong>via mobile pay-points</u></strong> mounted on trucks (ac- companied by armed guard where necessary). <u><strong>India</u></strong>, another state with many rural poor and a checkered history of identity registration systems, <u><strong>has pioneered the use of biometrics</u></strong> (using a combination of iris, face, and fingers) <u><strong>for</u></strong> establishing unique IDs for purposes such as <u><strong>distribut- ing ration cards and is now rolling out a comprehensive scheme for a na- tionwide biometric identification scheme that proponents claim will both improve service delivery to the poorest</u></strong> while <u><strong>reducing</u></strong> opportunities for <u><strong>corruption</u></strong> (Lakshmi 2010; cf. Cohen forthcoming). A recent review of these technologies of recognition concluded that they have already proven their value in creating working systems of cash payment in a range of dif- ficult environments and in making effective distribution of cash payments technically viable even in countries with established records of corruption and "leakage" of public finance (Gelb and Decker 2011, 1). Keith Brecken- ridge's (2010) review of Ghana's current effort to introduce what has been called "the world's first biometric money supply" has highlighted the dan- gers of such schemes and the likelihood of their being deployed in ways that respond principally to the needs of banks and wealthy depositors. But at the same time, Breckenridge acknowledges "that these <u><strong>systems of <mark>bio- metric registration can</u></strong></mark>, as has been the case in South Africa, <u><strong><mark>serve as technologies of inclusion</mark>, working, very efficiently, to provide</u></strong> the Old, infirm and the young with <u><strong>a measure of social</u></strong> <u><strong>security</u></strong>" (2010, 656). <u><strong><mark>Biometrics are often imagined as scary instruments of control</mark> at the disposal of a potentially totalitarian state. </u></strong>Indeed, <u><strong>in a traditional Left perspective, discipline and surveillance are fundamentally capitalist tools used for extracting</u></strong> and controlling <u><strong>labor. Resisting such forms of discipline</u></strong> as enumeration and registration, in such a perspective, <u><strong>can thus easily appear as a way of protecting and defending one's own life</u></strong> and labor, which someone is trying to take from you. <u><strong>But today, under conditions in which labor is in surplus, <mark>the poor and cast off may actually aspire to certain forms of surveillance</u></strong></mark> and enumeration (Robins 2008, 77—99), <u><strong>just as they aspire to certain forms of biopolitical care</u></strong> (McKay 2012), <u><strong>seeing in them forms of incorporation, recognition, and support that are otherwise unavailable. Here, inclusion in systems of registration and accounting may appear less as an oppressive system of control than as a valued token of recognized membership.</u></strong> In this context, I suggest that the development of more effective and inclusive techniques for <u><strong>identifying biological individuality should not be thought of as automatically regressive or politically objectionable</u></strong>. Indeed, under the conditions I have described, <u><strong><mark>new technical forms of identity documentation</u></strong></mark> and recognition <u><strong><mark>have</u></strong></mark> some <u><strong><mark>attractive political features that could</u></strong></mark> in fact <u><strong><mark>facilitate more effective and inclusive forms of State support and recognition</mark> even while requiring less, rather than more, intrusive surveillance</u></strong>. To appreciate the case for the biometric, it is useful to remember that current regimes of (paper) documentation in Africa have some quite obvious and severe problems. First of all, it is well estab- lished that the burdens ofobtaining and retaining documents fall hardest on the poorest and most marginal members of society (just those who are most in need of social protection), who often fail for this reason to qualify for schemes ostensibly meant to benefit them. In addition, wide- spread fraud (through forged documents, etc.) both wastes resources and (even more important) undermines political support for social trans- fer programs. Reliance on local officials to issue or certify documents creates vast opportunities for corruption, while linking benefits to the holding of specific cards Or identifying documents allows social stigma to be attached to the receipt of payments. In contrast, <u><strong><mark>the mechanics of bio-recognition appear to fit well with the universality of unconditional cash transfers</u></strong></mark>, where everyone with a unique iris scan is entitled to get a transfer once a month. In this scenario, many of the identity-related documents the "social" state has always needed can be dispensed with, and resources that would otherwise be spent tracking down who really qualifies for the income cut-off or who really lives at what address could be used instead to provide benefits. Critical skepticism toward such ideas is of course important, but I am increasingly convinced that <u><strong>it is</u></strong> equally <u><strong>important to allow ourselves to be open to the political possibilities that such new "techniques of the social" might enable</u></strong>. It would be easy to say that what the "lumpen" masses ofAfrica's cities really need is "proper jobs" and the whole range of "social" rights, state protections, and documentary entailments that (at least in European wel- fare states) have long been understood to come with them. But such a demand seems increasingly irrelevant in places where state capacities are extremely limited, where a formal-sector job is a distant rumor, and informal hustling the dominant livelihood. <u><strong><mark>To find forms of social assistance</mark> and state services—and perhaps also forms of political mobilization— <mark>that can be effective in such circumstances</mark>, <mark>we</mark> may <mark>require</mark> both a historically informed sense of the future and its possibilities and <mark>a willingness to envision new forms of legibility that might correspond to new forms of social and political recognition.</strong></mark> </p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Bryant 12 — Levi R. Bryant, Professor of Philosophy at Collin College, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Loyola University in Chicago, 2012 (“Underpants Gnomes: A Critique of the Academic Left,” Larval Subjects—Levi R. Bryant’s philosophy blog, November 11th, Available Online at http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/, Accessed 02-21-2014) **brackets in original article – except for [video omitted] fulltext: I must be in a mood today–half irritated, half amused–because I find myself ranting. Of course, that’s not entirely unusual. So this afternoon I came across a post by a friend quoting something discussing the environmental movement that pushed all the right button. As the post read, For mainstream environmentalism– conservationism, green consumerism, and resource management –humans are conceptually separated out of nature and mythically placed in privileged positions of authority and control over ecological communities and their nonhuman constituents. What emerges is the fiction of a marketplace of ‘raw materials’ and ‘resources’ through which human-centered wants, constructed as needs, might be satisfied. The mainstream narratives are replete with such metaphors [carbon trading!]. Natural complexity,, mutuality, and diversity are rendered virtually meaningless given discursive parameters that reduce nature to discrete units of exchange measuring extractive capacities. Jeff Shantz, “Green Syndicalism” While finding elements this description perplexing– I can’t say that I see many environmentalists treating nature and culture as distinct or suggesting that we’re sovereigns of nature –I do agree that we conceive much of our relationship to the natural world in economic terms (not a surprise that capitalism is today a universal). This, however, is not what bothers me about this passage. What I wonder is just what we’re supposed to do even if all of this is true? What, given existing conditions, are we to do if all of this is right? At least green consumerism, conservation, resource management, and things like carbon trading are engaging in activities that are making real differences. From this passage–and maybe the entire text would disabuse me of this conclusion–it sounds like we are to reject all of these interventions because they remain tied to a capitalist model of production that the author (and myself) find abhorrent. The idea seems to be that if we endorse these things we are tainting our hands and would therefore do well to reject them altogether. The problem as I see it is that this is the worst sort of abstraction (in the Marxist sense) and wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities. Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park: [YouTube video omitted] The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this: Phase 1: Collect Underpants Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Profit! They even have a catchy song to go with their work: [YouTube video omitted] Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows: Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique Phase 2: ? (Question Mark) Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation! Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing? But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done! But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc. What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle. I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation. “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary–it is–but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Empty critiques and radical upheavals devoid of concrete proposals are incomprehensible, doomed to failure, and drive people towards reigning ideology</h4><p><strong>Bryant 12</strong> — Levi R. Bryant, Professor of Philosophy at Collin College, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Loyola University in Chicago, 2012 (“Underpants Gnomes: A Critique of the Academic Left,” Larval Subjects—Levi R. Bryant’s philosophy blog, November 11th, Available Online at http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/, Accessed 02-21-2014) **brackets in original article – except for [video omitted]</p><p>I must be in a mood today–half irritated, half amused–because I find myself ranting. Of course, that’s not entirely unusual. So this afternoon I came across a post by a friend quoting something discussing the environmental movement that pushed all the right button. As the post read, For mainstream environmentalism– conservationism, green consumerism, and resource management –humans are conceptually separated out of nature and mythically placed in privileged positions of authority and control over ecological communities and their nonhuman constituents. What emerges is the fiction of a marketplace of ‘raw materials’ and ‘resources’ through which human-centered wants, constructed as needs, might be satisfied. The mainstream narratives are replete with such metaphors [carbon trading!]. Natural complexity,, mutuality, and diversity are rendered virtually meaningless given discursive parameters that reduce nature to discrete units of exchange measuring extractive capacities. Jeff Shantz, “Green Syndicalism” While finding elements this description perplexing– I can’t say that I see many environmentalists treating nature and culture as distinct or suggesting that we’re sovereigns of nature –I do agree that we conceive much of our relationship to the natural world in economic terms (not a surprise that capitalism is today a universal). This, however, is not what bothers me about this passage. <u>What I wonder is just what we’re supposed to do even if all of this is true? What, given existing conditions, are we to do if all of this is right?</u> At least green consumerism, conservation, resource management, and things like carbon trading are engaging in activities that are making real differences. From this passage–and maybe the entire text would disabuse me of this conclusion–it sounds like we are to reject all of these interventions because they remain tied to a capitalist model of production that the author (and myself) find abhorrent. The idea seems to be that if we endorse these things we are tainting our hands and would therefore do well to reject them altogether. The problem as I see it is that this is the worst sort of abstraction (in the Marxist sense) and wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities. Unfortunately, <u><mark>the academic left falls prey to</mark> its own</u> form of <u><mark>abstraction. It’s good at</mark> carrying out <mark>critiques that denounce</mark> various <mark>social formations, yet <strong>very poor at proposing</strong></mark> any sort of <strong><mark>realistic constructions of alternatives</u></strong></mark>. This because <u>it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative</u>. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park: [YouTube video omitted] The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this: Phase 1: Collect Underpants Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Profit! They even have a catchy song to go with their work: [YouTube video omitted] Well this is sadly how it often is with <u>the academic left</u>. Our <u>plan seems to be as follows: Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique Phase 2: ? (Question Mark) Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation! Our problem is that we seem <strong>perpetually stuck at phase 1</strong> without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless <strong>all sorts of problems</strong> with those critiques</u> nonetheless. <u>In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that <strong>only an academic with a PhD</strong> in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand</u>. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. <u>To make matters worse, we publish our work in <strong>expensive academic journals</strong> that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at <strong>expensive hotels</strong> at academic conferences attended only by other academics</u>. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? <u>If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, <strong>it doesn’t make a sound!</u></strong> Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing? But finally, and worst of all, us <u>Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as <strong>the fundamentalist minister</strong> or <strong>the priest of the inquisition</u></strong> (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). <u><strong>This </strong>type of <strong>“revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist</strong> because they do more to drive people into the embrace of <strong>reigning ideology</strong> than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that <strong>keep Rush Limbaugh in business</strong>. Well done! </u>But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. <u><strong>Our most serious shortcomings</strong> are to be found at phase 2. We almost <strong>never make concrete proposals </strong>for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. <mark>How</u></mark>, I wonder, <u><mark>are we to do <strong>anything </mark>at all</strong> <mark>when we have no <strong>concrete proposals</strong></mark>? We live on a planet of <strong>6 billion people</strong>. These <mark>6 billion people are dependent on</mark> a certain <mark>network of production</mark> and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc.</u>, etc., etc. <u>What are your <strong>proposals</strong>? How will you <strong>meet these problems</strong>? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure?</u> Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? <u>Today we are so <strong>intellectually bankrupt</strong> on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring <strong>the horror they generated</strong>, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the <strong>repetition of these horrors</strong> in a new system of organization</u>. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle. I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. <u>Why should anyone <strong>even bother listening to you</strong> if you aren’t proposing real plans?</u> But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead <u>we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the <strong>infrastructural questions</strong> of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would <strong>concretely</strong> go about building those alternatives</u>. Masturbation. <u>“Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need <strong>less critique</strong> not because critique isn’t important or necessary</u>–it is–<u>but because <strong><mark>we know</mark> the critiques, we know <mark>the problems</strong></mark>. <mark>We’re <strong>intoxicated with critique</strong> because it’s <strong>easy and safe</strong>.</mark> We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? <mark>What we need</mark> <strong>today</strong>, <strong>more than ever</strong><mark>, is</mark> <strong>composition or <mark>carpentry</strong>. </mark>Everyone knows something is wrong. <mark>Everyone knows this system is destructive</mark> and stacked against them. <strong>Even the Tea Party</strong> knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. <mark>None of us,</mark> however<mark>, are <strong>proposing alternatives</strong></mark>. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that</u>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Sajjad Shaukat 19 - writes on international affairs and is author of the book: US vs Islamic Militants, Invisible Balance of Power: Dangerous Shift in International Relations. (“India's Appetite for New Weaponry and War Hysteria: Risk of Nuclear War,” Kashmir Watch, 03/17/2019, https://kashmirwatch.com/indias-appetite-new-weaponry-war-hysteria-risk-nuclear-war/ ) PJW fulltext: TAKING COGNIZANCE of the war-like situation between India and Pakistan, which started in the aftermath of the false flag Pulwama terror attack in the Indian Occupied Kashmir, the US played a key role in de-escalation of tension between the two neighboring nuclear countries. But, tension which involves the risk of nuclear war still exists, as the extremist government of the BharatiyaJanata Party (BJP) led by the Indian fundamentalist Prime Minister NarendraModihas refused the mediatory role of any country, while continuing war hysteria against Pakistan in wake of acceleration of shelling across the Line of Control (LoC), which has resulted into many casualties in the Pakistani side of Kashmir. On the other side, Pakistan's armed forces are on high alert to give a matching response to any Indian prospective aggression or war.Apart from other Western media, The New York Times wrote on March 7, 2019: 'Tensions have cooled between India and Pakistan after a terrorist attack, but their nuclear arsenals mean unthinkable consequences are always possible. The current focus on North Korea's growing arsenal obscures the fact that the most likely trigger for a nuclear exchange could be the conflict between India and Pakistan [in wake of the unresolved dispute of Kashmir]…Adding to the volatility, India's prime minister, NarendraModiis waging a tough re-election campaign in which he has used anti-Pakistan talk to fuel Hindu nationalism.' In a public testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on January 30, this year, US Director of National Intelligence Daniel presented a threat assessment report outlining significant global security threats facing the US. Coats said: 'We remain concerned about Pakistan's continued development control of nuclear weapons, but did not express any concern about India's nuclear programme…India had, in 2018, conducted its first deployment of a nuclear-powered submarine armed with nuclear missiles. Pakistan continues to develop new types of nuclear weapons, including short-range tactical weapons, sea-based cruise missiles, airlaunched cruise missiles, and longer range ballistic missiles...the overall threat from weapons of mass destruction is expected to continue growing in 2019…Pakistan and India's growing nuclear arsenals increase the risk of a nuclear security incident in South Asia'.The report speculates that strained relations between Pakistan and India will persist 'at least through May 2019, the deadline for the Indian election, and probably beyond'. However, there is co-relationship of India's appetite for new weaponry, the use of Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMDs),war hysteria and risk of nuclear war, which needs urgent attention of the international community.It is notable that in its annual report, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) disclosed on March 12, this year,'India was the world's second largest importer of major arms in 2014-18 and accounted for 9.5 per cent of the global total.' On June 18, 2018, SIPRI pointed out: 'Estimated 110-130 Indian nuclear bombs are stored in six or so government-run sites across India. Within the next five years to one decade, as many as 60 reactors will also be functional in India with the active cooperation of the US-led Western and far eastern allies'. According to the 'Military Balance 2018' report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 'India's defence budget broke into the world's top five…beating the UK for the first time…India overtook the UK as the fifth-largest defence spender in the world in 2017 at $52.5 billion, up from $51.1 billion in 2016.' New Delhi's military is acquiring a slew of new equipments from combat aircraft to submarines and artillery. It is currently finalising a deal with France's Dassault Aviation to buy 126 Rafale fighter jets in a contract worth an estimated $12 billion.On November 2, 2010, the US also agreed to sell India the most expensive the new F35 fighter jets including US F-16 and F-18 fighters, C-17 and C-130 aircraft, radar systems, Harpoon weapons etc. Besides acquisition of arms and weapons from other western countries especially Israel, America is a potential military supplier to India.Last year, New Delhi also inked agreement with Russia for buying anti-missile system S-400 as well. By pursuing the double standards of America and some Westerncountries in its worst form, President Trump also favoured India, while opposing the nuclear weapons of Pakistan. Because, being the only nuclear country in the Islamic World, Pakistan annoys America, Israel and some Western countries. As a matter of fact, it is Zionist agenda to 'denculearise' Pakistan. However, like Obama, Trump has brushed aside the ground realities that Indian Prime Minister Modi led by the ruling fundamentalist party BJP has been implementing anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan agenda.As part of their double game, these US-led countries have ignored Indian poor record of nuclear security, non-proliferation, lack of safety of workers, working at Indian nuclear facilities and lack of any appropriate regulatory authority.Contrarily, during his first visit to New Delhi, on November 6, 2010, PresidentObama announced the measures, America would take regarding removal of Indian space and defence companies from a restricted 'entities list', and supported Indian demand for membership of four key global nuclear nonproliferation regimes. Latest reports suggest that India is also desperate in her endeavour to get a berth in NSG. In the wake of suspension of 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between USA and Russia, New Delhi may resort to further her nuclear ambitions.Besides obtaining atomic weapons from the US and other Western countries, New Delhi is, clandestinely, importing nuclear arms, components and submarines from Israel. In this connection, Zionist-led IndoIsraeli secret diplomacy could be assessed from the interview of Israel's ambassador to India, Mark Sofer, published in the Indian weekly Outlook on February 18, 2008. Regarding India's defense arrangements with Tel Aviv, Sofer had surprisingly revealed: 'We do have a defense relationship with India, and 'with all due respect, the secret part will remain a secret.' Although Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMDs) which also include atomic weapons seem to be mysterious, yet still could be within the reach of some Hindu terrorists with the help of IndianRAW which might have also got these destructive arms from the IsraeliMossad. Such atomic weapons or radiological materials could have also been smuggled inside India by the Hindu fanatics with the covert assistance of RAW.Frustrated in isolating Pakistan, RAW in connivance with MOSSAD might have prepared a most dangerous plan to use WMDs or nuclear weapons or dirty nuclear bombs inside the US homeland or any major European country to implicate Pakistan for having allegedly used these weapons through some Taliban militants.Particularly, RAW and Mossad may also employ these fatal weapons against NATO forces in Afghanistan, as New Delhi and Tel Aviv want to prolong the stay of the US-led NATO troops in Afghanistan which have become the center of their secret activities against Pakistan, Russia, China and Iran. Terrorists of the Afghanistan-based Tehreeke-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) andISIS, which are strategic assets of the CIA, MOSSAD and RAW may be used for employment of these unconventional weapons. While, India, Israel and America are also playing double game against one another, hence, by utilizing the vicious circle of terrorism, New Delhi can alone use these weapons through TTP and ISIS which have claimed responsibility for many terror assaults inside Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the recent ones. So, RAW's sole aim will be to provoke Americans and its allies against Islamabad which is challenging Indian dominance in South Asia. Thus, RAW could create a dangerous misunderstanding in which US could use small nuclear weapons against Pakistan or could ask the latter to rollback its atomic programme. In such an environment, considering India to be qualified for acquiring of nuclear technology through global powers' led NSG and IAEAand obstructing Islamabad's safe nuclear energy programme is discriminatory as well as an effort to hinder peace and economic progress of Pakistan. And unsafe materials in nuclear facilities patrolled by low morale CISF troops across India are also liable to be stolen by insiders having grievances against employers and typical Hindu mindset of Indian leadership. Unfortunately, Washington and its other allies, instead of pressing India for quick nuclear reforms are encouraging India to expand its nuclear stockpiles. The US-led West needs to take cognizance of such ventures rather than criticizing Pak-China civil nuclear cooperation. While, international community has been making strenuous efforts for world peace in wake of global financial crisis and war against terrorism, especially against ISIL, but, emboldened by America, New Delhi has particularly initiated deadly nuclear arms race in South Asia where people are already facing multiple problems of grave nature. Majority of South Asian people are living below the poverty level, lacking basic facilities like fresh food and clean water. Yielding to acute poverty, every day, some persons commit suicide. Even, Indian civil society organizations, while complaining of excessive defense spending, recently, pointed out that the government spends very little amount for the betterment of people. Indian defense analyst Ravinder Pal Singh, while indicating New Delhi's unending defense expenditures at the cost of poverty-alleviation, calls it guns-versus-butter question.And by ignoring regional problems and settlement of Indo-Pak issues, especially the Kashmir dispute which remains a nuclear flashpoint, Indian rulers state that they do not have any belligerent policy. But, it becomes a big joke of the 21st century, reminding a maxim, 'armed to the teeth, but no enemy', if we take cognizance of India's increasing defense purchases and her aggressive designs. We can conclude that although peace and brinksmanship cannot co-exist in the modern era, yet India's appetite for new weaponry and war hysteria against Pakistan have increased the risk of nuclear war by endangering the regional security as well as that of the entire world, as the terrorist outfit like the ISIS can also use WMDs in any volatile country or Western country, particularly the US.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Terrorism goes nuclear – global war</h4><p>Sajjad <strong>Shaukat 19</strong> - writes on international affairs and is author of the book: US vs Islamic Militants, Invisible Balance of Power: Dangerous Shift in International Relations. (“India's Appetite for New Weaponry and War Hysteria: Risk of Nuclear War,” Kashmir Watch, 03/17/2019, https://kashmirwatch.com/indias-appetite-new-weaponry-war-hysteria-risk-nuclear-war/ ) PJW</p><p>TAKING COGNIZANCE of the war-like situation between India and Pakistan, which started in the aftermath of the false flag Pulwama terror attack in the Indian Occupied Kashmir, <u>the <strong><mark>US play</mark>ed a <mark>key role in de-escalation</strong></mark> of tension between</u> the two neighboring <u>nuclear countries. But,</u> tension which involves <u>the <mark>risk of nuc</mark>lear <mark>war still exists</u></mark>, as the extremist government of the BharatiyaJanata Party (BJP) led by the Indian fundamentalist Prime Minister NarendraModihas refused the mediatory role of any country, while continuing war hysteria against Pakistan in wake of acceleration of shelling across the Line of Control (LoC), which has resulted into many casualties in the Pakistani side of Kashmir. On the other side, Pakistan's armed forces are on high alert to give a matching response to any Indian prospective aggression or war.Apart from other Western media, The New York Times wrote on March 7, 2019: 'Tensions have cooled between India and Pakistan after a terrorist attack, but their <u>nuclear arsenals mean <strong><mark>unthinkable consequences </mark>are always possible</strong>.</u> The current focus on North Korea's growing arsenal obscures the fact that the most likely trigger for a nuclear exchange could be the conflict between India and Pakistan [in wake of the unresolved dispute of Kashmir]…Adding to the volatility, India's prime minister, NarendraModiis waging a tough re-election campaign in which he has used anti-Pakistan talk to fuel Hindu nationalism.'</p><p>In a public testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on January 30, this year, US Director of National Intelligence Daniel presented a threat assessment report outlining significant global security threats facing the US. Coats said: 'We remain concerned about Pakistan's continued development control of nuclear weapons, but did not express any concern about India's nuclear programme…India had, in 2018, conducted its first deployment of a nuclear-powered submarine armed with nuclear missiles. Pakistan continues to develop new types of nuclear weapons, including short-range tactical weapons, sea-based cruise missiles, airlaunched cruise missiles, and longer range ballistic missiles...the overall <u>threat from <strong><mark>w</strong></mark>eapons of <strong><mark>m</strong></mark>ass <strong><mark>d</strong></mark>estruction is expected to continue <mark>growing</u></mark> in 2019…Pakistan and India's growing nuclear arsenals <u>increase the risk of a <strong>nuclear security incident</u></strong> in South Asia'.The report speculates that strained relations between Pakistan and India will persist 'at least through May 2019, the deadline for the Indian election, and probably beyond'. However, there is co-relationship of India's appetite for new weaponry, the use of Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMDs),war hysteria and risk of nuclear war, which needs urgent attention of the international community.It is notable that in its annual report, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) disclosed on March 12, this year,'India was the world's second largest importer of major arms in 2014-18 and accounted for 9.5 per cent of the global total.' On June 18, 2018, SIPRI pointed out: 'Estimated 110-130 Indian nuclear bombs are stored in six or so government-run sites across India. Within the next five years to one decade, as many as 60 reactors will also be functional in India with the active cooperation of the US-led Western and far eastern allies'.</p><p>According to the 'Military Balance 2018' report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 'India's defence budget broke into the world's top five…beating the UK for the first time…India overtook the UK as the fifth-largest defence spender in the world in 2017 at $52.5 billion, up from $51.1 billion in 2016.' New Delhi's military is acquiring a slew of new equipments from combat aircraft to submarines and artillery. It is currently finalising a deal with France's Dassault Aviation to buy 126 Rafale fighter jets in a contract worth an estimated $12 billion.On November 2, 2010, the US also agreed to sell India the most expensive the new F35 fighter jets including US F-16 and F-18 fighters, C-17 and C-130 aircraft, radar systems, Harpoon weapons etc. Besides acquisition of arms and weapons from other western countries especially Israel, America is a potential military supplier to India.Last year, New Delhi also inked agreement with Russia for buying anti-missile system S-400 as well. By pursuing the double standards of America and some Westerncountries in its worst form, President Trump also favoured India, while opposing the nuclear weapons of Pakistan. Because, being the only nuclear country in the Islamic World, Pakistan annoys America, Israel and some Western countries. As a matter of fact, it is Zionist agenda to 'denculearise' Pakistan. However, like Obama, Trump has brushed aside the ground realities that Indian Prime Minister Modi led by the ruling fundamentalist party BJP has been implementing anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan agenda.As part of their double game, these US-led countries have ignored Indian poor record of nuclear security, non-proliferation, lack of safety of workers, working at Indian nuclear facilities and lack of any appropriate regulatory authority.Contrarily, during his first visit to New Delhi, on November 6, 2010, PresidentObama announced the measures, America would take regarding removal of Indian space and defence companies from a restricted 'entities list', and supported Indian demand for membership of four key global nuclear nonproliferation regimes.</p><p>Latest reports suggest that India is also desperate in her endeavour to get a berth in NSG. In the wake of suspension of 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between USA and Russia, New Delhi may resort to further her nuclear ambitions.Besides obtaining atomic weapons from the US and other Western countries, New Delhi is, clandestinely, importing nuclear arms, components and submarines from Israel. In this connection, Zionist-led IndoIsraeli secret diplomacy could be assessed from the interview of Israel's ambassador to India, Mark Sofer, published in the Indian weekly Outlook on February 18, 2008. Regarding India's defense arrangements with Tel Aviv, Sofer had surprisingly revealed: 'We do have a defense relationship with India, and 'with all due respect, the secret part will remain a secret.' Although Weapons of Mass Destructions (<u>WMDs</u>) which also include atomic weapons seem to be mysterious, yet still <u>could be <mark>within</mark> the <mark>reach of</mark> some</u> Hindu <u><mark>terrorists</u></mark> with the help of IndianRAW which might have also got these destructive arms from the IsraeliMossad. Such atomic weapons or radiological materials could have also been smuggled inside India by the Hindu fanatics with the covert assistance of RAW.Frustrated in isolating Pakistan, RAW in connivance with MOSSAD might have <u>prepared a</u> most dangerous <u>plan <mark>to use</mark> WMDs or nuclear weapons or dirty nuclear bombs <mark>in</mark>side the <mark>US</mark> homeland</u> or any major European country to implicate Pakistan for having allegedly used these weapons through some Taliban militants.Particularly, RAW and Mossad may also employ these fatal weapons against NATO forces in Afghanistan, as New Delhi and Tel Aviv want to prolong the stay of the US-led NATO troops in Afghanistan which have become the center of their secret activities against Pakistan, Russia, China and Iran. Terrorists of the Afghanistan-based Tehreeke-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) andISIS, which are strategic assets of the CIA, MOSSAD and RAW may be used for employment of these unconventional weapons. While, India, Israel and America are also playing double game against one another, hence, by utilizing the <u><strong>vicious circle of terrorism</u></strong>, New Delhi can alone use these weapons through TTP and ISIS which have claimed responsibility for many terror assaults inside Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the recent ones. So, RAW's sole <u><strong>aim</u></strong> will be <u><strong>to <mark>provoke Americans</strong> and</mark> its allies</u> against Islamabad which is challenging Indian dominance in South Asia. Thus, RAW could <u><strong><mark>create a dangerous misunderstanding</strong> </mark>in which <mark>US </mark>could <mark>use</u></mark> small <u><mark>nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s</u></mark> against Pakistan or could ask the latter to rollback its atomic programme. In such an environment, considering India to be qualified for acquiring of nuclear technology through global powers' led NSG and IAEAand obstructing Islamabad's safe nuclear energy programme is discriminatory as well as an effort to hinder peace and economic progress of Pakistan. And <u>unsafe <mark>materials</mark> in nuclear facilities</u> patrolled by low morale CISF troops across India <u>are</u> also <u>liable to be <mark>stolen</u></mark> by insiders having grievances against employers and typical Hindu mindset of Indian leadership. Unfortunately, Washington and its other allies, instead of pressing India for quick nuclear reforms are encouraging India to expand its nuclear stockpiles. The US-led West needs to take cognizance of such ventures rather than criticizing Pak-China civil nuclear cooperation.</p><p>While, international community has been making strenuous efforts for world peace in wake of global financial crisis and war against terrorism, especially against ISIL, but, emboldened by America, New Delhi has particularly initiated deadly nuclear arms race in South Asia where people are already facing multiple problems of grave nature. Majority of South Asian people are living below the poverty level, lacking basic facilities like fresh food and clean water. Yielding to acute poverty, every day, some persons commit suicide. Even, Indian civil society organizations, while complaining of excessive defense spending, recently, pointed out that the government spends very little amount for the betterment of people. Indian defense analyst Ravinder Pal Singh, while indicating New Delhi's unending defense expenditures at the cost of poverty-alleviation, calls it guns-versus-butter question.And by ignoring regional problems and settlement of Indo-Pak issues, especially the Kashmir dispute which remains a nuclear flashpoint, Indian rulers state that they do not have any belligerent policy. But, it becomes a big joke of the 21st century, reminding a maxim, 'armed to the teeth, but no enemy', if we take cognizance of India's increasing defense purchases and her aggressive designs. We can conclude that although peace and brinksmanship cannot co-exist in the modern era, yet India's appetite for new weaponry and war hysteria against Pakistan have <u>increased the risk of nuclear war by <mark>endangering</mark> the regional security as well as that of <strong>the entire <mark>world</strong></mark>,</u> as the terrorist outfit like the <u>ISIS can</u> also <u>use <strong>WMDs</strong> in any volatile country or Western country, <strong>particularly the US.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Hines and Williams ‘19 – ([1] Jaymes Hines Deputy Legislative Assistant @ OCJCS & [2] Mark Williams Asst Professor of Aerospace Studies @ USAF, 2019, “Lifting the Interagency Fog of Information: Blockchain Information-Sharing and Radical Inclusion”, Arthur D. Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation, https://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/IAJ-10-1-2019-pg60-74.pdf) NT-ML fulltext: Technical System For the first time in human history, people anywhere can trust each other and transact within large peer-to-peer networks without centralized management.17 Trust is established not by centralized institutions but by protocols, cryptography, and computer code.18 The application of these modalities of digital information-sharing greatly strengthens the capacity for cooperation and collaboration between organizations and individuals within peer networks. The implication being that global networks of collaboration without centralized formal institutions will increase the instantaneous and assured access to trusted digital information. This unprecedented, yet increasingly relevant mass collaboration data-exchange is a singular characteristic within the age of globalization, as a response to twenty-first century challenges. Blockchain is a complex technological, economic, and social phenomenon calling into question commonly-accepted parameters of value, trust, and exchange. The technology creates a trust machine that enables transparency and collaboration, two stalwarts of the rapid transformation of the culture within the information-sharing community. As mentioned, the structure is neither centralized nor decentralized but a distributed network. The strength of the blockchain information system is the distributed user interface. Such a system allows for a community approach to ensuring trust, reliability, and validity of information flow. This way no one partner could “cheat the system” by editing records because everyone using the system would be watching. Systems like this are on the horizon, and the software that powers them is called a blockchain. Blockchains store information across a network of designated computers. Making them not just decentralized but distributed. This means no central nation or user owns the system, yet everyone can use it or help run it. This is important because it means it is difficult for any one person to take down the network or corrupt it. The blockchain uses a form of math called cryptography to ensure that records cannot be counterfeited or changed by anyone else. Blockchains that manage and verify online data could enable us to launch networks that are entirely run by algorithms helping us protect online identities. In this manner, information and intelligence is factual, accurate, and secure, verified by anyone within the system. The setup process is critical to effectively implement the technological advances of blockchain. First, identify the stakeholders of an event, operation, crisis, and pandemic. These stakeholders may include AFRICOM, the European Union, the UN, the US, and any one or all nation-states within the African Region. It may include two or more stakeholders for cooperation, collaboration, and the sharing or exchanging of information. Second, identify the event the stakeholders will be participating in. Blockchain allows the actors in an armed conflict or any scenario to have the situation broken down into a network of separate conflicts and/or bilateral relationships among the parties. Each of these relations can then be qualified. These events may include counterterrorism; a military operation; natural disaster response, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, volcanoes etc.; and pandemics, such as the Ebola response case study discussed in this article. Because blockchain technology is so robust and advanced, there can be several events within the forum, and several different stakeholders will have access capability to the events deemed necessary. Third, there must be a trust protocol criterion established that allows the different stakeholders to access the technology and share information. Creating an application criterion to gain access ensures that the correct stakeholders have access to the correct forums, scenarios, or information. The trust protocol also ensures protection of the established network, and that only interested parties have access. Stakeholders will then have access to the system through an encrypted gate that also prevents unwanted cyberattacks or attempts to attack the architecture; however, due to the technology, this is virtually impossible. Finally, inside of the architecture, stakeholders will have access to streams of information based on the event accessed. These streams have input capabilities to both read and compose information. What makes blockchain successful is the validation process for a transaction. The technology incorporates a validation process, similar to the already existing transaction confirmation process, which allows all users to validate shared information or pieces of information based on their own information gathering efforts. The information statement once validated, continues to gain or show strength based on the number of confirmations it receives from the interested parties. Since a financial transaction must be validated in several (sometimes up to seven) different locations in order to cement the transaction in the ledger, sharing information can be done similarly. Except, the validation happens when the different users validate that piece of information giving it strength. A shared portion of information with seven validations may appear stronger than a shared portion of information with only two validations. This will address trust and make the users feel at ease with the use of this intelligence/ information because it has essentially been confirmed by several entities. It is common knowledge that information suffers from an inconsistency; it is only valuable when shared with those who need or can benefit from it. However, the more it is shared, the more it risks being compromised. On this platform, these information-sharing relationships are embedded in a larger bilateral relationship, which might involve alliances, military cooperation, and economic cooperation. This platform could mitigate some of the consequences in the event of a crisis and presents the partners the opportunity and ability to share relevant information quickly and safely. If you cannot trust your partners to treat the information you share in some secure fashion, then there is a major cost for the sharing or the sending state. Information is a commodity, and states share out of mutual interest or to extract things such as foreign aid and security assurances. The providers of information cannot be sure that the receivers will adequately protect what they receive, and the receivers cannot be sure of the veracity of the information provided. This process should not seem like spontaneous sharing, which could be very troubling to other countries because that it is so unpredictable. Institutional System The success of a multinational operation hinges on timely and accurate information- sharing. The development of a culture of trust, rooted in an effective information-sharing environment, ensures that all parties within the information-sharing environment can weigh the best available intelligence when developing a course of action. Agencies and stakeholders should begin developing information products with a multinational focus from the beginning of an operation. Using guidance from appropriate regulatory and reference documents and coordinating with a foreign disclosure officer can empower multinational partners to utilize the information and drive operations. The advocacy of this line of effort acknowledges the existence of and necessary reform to information-sharing barriers such as policy and status. For example, the use of classification, whether U.S. classifications or alliance, such as NATO, classifications impose restrictions on information-sharing, dissemination, and fusion of information products. Too often, however, partners fail to share information because they lack an understanding of classification requirements, caveats, and/or over-classification. As a way forward, blockchain technologies may foster the development of new information- sharing standards, break-down the asymmetric relationships, and, ultimately, create an international regime of information-sharing and a global forum for collaboration between trusted partners. In either case, the adjudication of and reform of existing legacy policies must be a first step, as suggested in the U.S. Forum of Blockchain Technology. However, the implications of blockchain technology are not simply focused on interagency applications, considerations for multilateral information- sharing is also considered. Human System The human system line of effort centers around a central construct: “How do we create an inclusive approach toward employing blockchain information-sharing that frames information-truth in terms of context and narrative?” Unequivocally, the center of gravity for this line of effort is people. Therefore, this line of effort seeks to establish common principles, imbedded in interagency leadership competencies that establish a framework of enhanced mutual trust among the people who are the information stakeholders. These stakeholders are organized into the leaders and followers who are involved in information-sharing processes. Collectively, the people involved in the interagency information-sharing process will require dynamic leadership that promotes unfettered and inclusive collaboration and cooperation. In the book, Radical Inclusion, General (retired) Martin Dempsey and Ori Brafman describe the contemporary operating environment as a digital echo. The era of the digital echo results from the speed and ubiquitous dissemination of and access to information. It is a neutral force that informs, misinforms, educates, entertains, and inspires. In this manner, it is a leadership challenge and a leadership opportunity.21 Furthermore, the combination of these aspects of information- sharing creates vulnerabilities toward the sharing of factual information and may erode the trust between leaders and followers, as well as the information stakeholders.22 To mitigate the challenges and exploit the opportunities within the era of the digital echo, information-sharing must incorporate the concept of radical inclusion. Radical inclusion is a prescription to conquer the fear of losing control in the fast-paced, complex, and highly- scrutinized environment that is pushing agencies and governments to rely on philosophies of exclusion. The information-sharing approach advocated for in this article will require a foundation of instinctual inclusion, whereby information and data sources are openly accepted and equally scrutinized. The human system will, in the intermediate, rely on the adage of “trust but verify.” Humans will need to remain in the loop in the information-sharing systems. However, as the benefits of artificial intelligence continue to permeate information-sharing systems, the principles of trust, verification, and reliability may shorten the information-sharing timeline and further amplify the benefits of interagency blockchain information-sharing modalities. As the U.S. incorporates blockchain technology, the assured access to and analysis of information will illuminate new challenges and opportunities. Interagency collaboration and cooperation will require more attention, more learning, more effort, and more inclusion.23 Ultimately, blockchain technology provides for assured access to the diversity of real- time or near real-time information. In this manner, leaders and stakeholders may become increasingly exposed to raw data that competes to expose truth. The primacy of competing narratives will dominate the decisionmaker. A strength of block-chain technology is its inherent ability to control verified information. Regardless, the decisionmaker must understand that a philosophy of inclusion—assessing multiple sources, as fringe as they may seem, will leverage a diversity of sources to build a picture of reality (sense-making) through factual information to create a common operating picture and permit organizations and governments to create a “winning narrative.”24 The human system should be grounded within the leadership theories presented in Radical Inclusion. This article combines the concepts of the digital echo and radical inclusion as a human element. Their symbiotic relationship leverages blockchain technologies as the interagency information-sharing standard of the future. The human system will rely on the technical and institutional systems and vice versa. The transformative change to interagency information-sharing demands this inclusive approach. Inclusion, in this manner, not only supports the integrated lines of effort toward information-sharing, it also unlocks understanding and opportunity for leaders and information stake holders.25<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Allied blockchain cooperation is key to resolve trust and classification barriers hindering info-sharing within NATO</h4><p><strong>Hines and Williams ‘19 </strong>– ([1] Jaymes Hines Deputy Legislative Assistant @ OCJCS & [2] Mark Williams Asst Professor of Aerospace Studies @ USAF, 2019, “Lifting the Interagency Fog of Information: Blockchain Information-Sharing and Radical Inclusion”, Arthur D. Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation, https://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/IAJ-10-1-2019-pg60-74.pdf) NT-ML</p><p>Technical System</p><p>For the first time in human history, people anywhere can trust each other and transact within large peer-to-peer networks without centralized management.17 Trust is established not by centralized institutions but by protocols, cryptography, and computer code.18</p><p><u>The application of these modalities of digital information-sharing greatly strengthens the capacity for <strong>cooperation</strong> and collaboration between organizations and individuals within peer networks.</u> The <u>implication being that global networks of collaboration without centralized formal institutions will increase the instantaneous and assured access to trusted digital information</u>. This unprecedented, yet increasingly relevant <u>mass collaboration data-exchange</u> is a singular <u>characteristic within</u> the age of <u>globalization</u>, as a response to twenty-first century challenges.</p><p><u>Blockchain</u> is a <u>complex technological, economic, and social phenomenon calling into question commonly</u>-accepted parameters of <u>value, trust, and exchange</u>. The <u>tech</u>nology <u><strong>creates </u></strong>a <u><strong>trust machine</strong> that <strong>enables transparency and collaboration</u></strong>, <u>two <strong>stalwarts o</strong>f</u> the rapid transformation of the culture within the <u><strong>info</strong>rmation-<strong>sharing</u></strong> community. As mentioned, the structure is neither centralized nor decentralized but a distributed network.</p><p>The <u>strength of the blockchain information system is the distributed u</u>ser <u>i</u>nterface. Such a <u>system allows</u> for a community approach to ensuring <u>trust, reliability, and validity of information flow</u>. This way no one partner could “cheat the system” by editing records because everyone using the system would be watching. Systems like this are on the horizon, and the software that powers them is called a blockchain. Blockchains store information across a network of designated computers. Making them not just decentralized but distributed. This means no central nation or user owns the system, yet everyone can use it or help run it. This is important because it means it is <u>difficult for any one person to take down the network or corrupt it.</u> The blockchain uses a form of math called <u>cryptography </u>to <u>ensure</u> that <u>records cannot be counterfeited or changed</u> by anyone else. Blockchains that manage and verify online data could enable us to launch networks that are entirely run by algorithms helping us protect online identities. In this manner, information and intelligence is factual, accurate, and secure, verified by anyone within the system.</p><p>The <u>setup process is critical to effectively implement the technological advances of blockchain</u>. <u>First, identify </u>the <u>stakeholders</u> of an event, operation, crisis, and pandemic. These stakeholders may include AFRICOM, the European Union, the UN, the US, and any one or all nation-states within the African Region. It may include two or more stakeholders for <u>cooperation, collaboration, and the sharing or exchanging of information</u>.</p><p>Second, identify the event the stakeholders will be participating in. Blockchain allows the actors in an armed conflict or any scenario to have the situation broken down into a network of separate conflicts and/or bilateral relationships among the parties. Each of these relations can then be qualified. These events may include counterterrorism; a military operation; natural disaster response, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, volcanoes etc.; and pandemics, such as the Ebola response case study discussed in this article. Because blockchain technology is so robust and advanced, there can be several events within the forum, and several different stakeholders will have access capability to the events deemed necessary.</p><p>Third, there must be <u>a trust protocol criterion established</u> that <u>allows the different stakeholders to access the technology and share information</u>. Creating an application criterion to gain access ensures that the correct stakeholders have access to the correct forums, scenarios, or information. The <u>trust protocol</u> also <u>ensures protection</u> of the established network, and that only interested parties have access. Stakeholders will then have access to the system through an encrypted gate that also <u>prevents unwanted cyberattacks or attempts to attack</u> the <u>architecture</u>; however, due to the technology, this is virtually impossible.</p><p>Finally, inside of the architecture, stakeholders will have access to streams of information based on the event accessed. These streams have input capabilities to both read and compose information. What makes <u>blockchain successful</u> is the <u>validation process for</u> a <u>transaction.</u> The technology incorporates a <u>validation process</u>, similar to the already existing transaction confirmation process, which <u>allows all users to validate shared information or pieces of information based on</u> their <u>own information gathering efforts</u>. The information statement once validated, continues to gain or show strength based on the number of confirmations it receives from the interested parties. Since a financial transaction must be validated in several (sometimes up to seven) different locations in order to cement the transaction in the ledger, sharing information can be done similarly. Except, <u>the validation happens when</u> the <u>different users validate</u> that <u>piece of info</u>rmation <u>giving it strength</u>. A shared portion of information with seven validations may appear stronger than a shared portion of information with only two validations. This will <u>address trust and make</u> the <u>users feel at ease with</u> the <u>use of</u> this <u>intelligence/ information because it has</u> essentially <u>been confirmed by several entities</u>.</p><p>It is common knowledge that <u>information suffers from an inconsistency</u>; it is <u>only valuable when shared with those who need or can benefit from it</u>. However, <u>the more it is shared, the more it risks being compromised</u>. On this platform, these <u>info</u>rmation-<u>sharing relationships</u> are <u><strong>embedded in</strong> a larger </u>bilateral<u> relationship</u>, which might <u>involve <strong>alliances, military cooperation</u></strong>, and economic cooperation. This platform could mitigate some of the consequences in the event of a crisis and presents the partners the opportunity and ability to share relevant information quickly and safely.</p><p><u>If you cannot trust your partners to treat</u> the <u>info</u>rmation <u>you share in some secure fashion</u>, then <u>there is a major cost for the sharing or the sending state</u>. Information is a commodity, and <u>states share out of mutual interest or to extract</u> things such as foreign aid <u>and</u> <u><strong>security assurances</u></strong>. The providers of information cannot be sure that the receivers will adequately protect what they receive, and the receivers cannot be sure of the veracity of the information provided. This process should not seem like spontaneous sharing, which could be very troubling to other countries because that it is so unpredictable.</p><p>Institutional System</p><p>The <u>success of a multinational operation hinges on timely and accurate information- sharing</u>. The <u>development of a culture of trust</u>, <u>rooted in an effective information-sharing environment, <strong>ensures </u></strong>that all parties within the information-sharing environment can weigh the <u><strong>best available intelligence</u></strong> when developing a course of action. Agencies and stakeholders should begin developing information products with a multinational focus from the beginning of an operation. <u>Using guidance from appropriate regulatory and reference documents and coordinating with a foreign disclosure</u> officer <u>can empower multinational partners to utilize the information and drive operations.</p><p></u>The advocacy of this line of effort acknowledges the existence of and <u>necessary reform to <strong>information-sharing barriers</strong> such as policy and status</u>. For example, the <u>use of classification, whether <strong>U.S.</strong> classifications or alliance</u>, such as <u><strong>NATO, classifications impose restrictions on info</strong>rmation-<strong>sharing</strong>, dissemination, and fusion of information products</u>. Too often, however, <u>partners fail to share information because they <strong>lack</u></strong> an <u><strong>understanding of classification requirements</u></strong>, caveats, and/or <u>over-classification.</u> As a way forward, <u><strong>blockchain</strong> technologies may <strong>foster </strong>the development of <strong>new info</strong>rmation- <strong>sharing standards</u></strong>, <u>break-down the asymmetric relationships</u>, and, <u>ultimately, create an international regime of information-sharing and a global forum for collaboration between trusted partners</u>. In either case, the <u>adjudication of and reform of existing legacy policies must be a first step</u>, as suggested in the U.S. Forum of Blockchain Technology. However, the <u>implications of blockchain technology are not simply focused on interagency applications</u>, considerations for <u>multilateral information- sharing is also considered.</p><p>Human System</p><p></u>The human system line of effort centers around a central construct: “How do we create an inclusive approach toward employing blockchain information-sharing that frames information-truth in terms of context and narrative?” Unequivocally, the center of gravity for this line of effort is people. Therefore, this line of effort seeks <u>to establish common principles, imbedded in interagency leadership</u> competencies that <u>establish a framework of enhanced mutual trust among</u> the people who are the <u>information stakeholders</u>. These stakeholders are organized into the leaders and followers who are involved in information-sharing processes. Collectively, the people involved in the interagency information-sharing process <u>will require</u> dynamic <u>leadership that promotes unfettered and</u> <u><strong>inclusive</strong> </u>collaboration and <u>cooperation.</p><p></u>In the book, Radical Inclusion, General (retired) Martin Dempsey and Ori Brafman describe the contemporary operating environment as a digital echo. The era of the digital echo results from the speed and ubiquitous dissemination of and access to information. It is a neutral force that informs, misinforms, educates, entertains, and inspires.</p><p>In this manner, it is a leadership challenge and a leadership opportunity.21 Furthermore, the combination of these aspects of information- sharing creates vulnerabilities toward the sharing of factual information and may erode the trust between leaders and followers, as well as the information stakeholders.22</p><p>To mitigate the challenges and exploit the opportunities within the era of the digital echo, information-sharing must incorporate the concept of radical inclusion. Radical inclusion is a prescription to conquer the fear of losing control in the fast-paced, complex, and highly- scrutinized environment that is pushing agencies and governments to rely on philosophies of exclusion. The information-sharing approach advocated for in this article will require a foundation of instinctual inclusion, whereby information and data sources are openly accepted and equally scrutinized. The human system will, in the intermediate, rely on the adage of “trust but verify.” Humans will need to remain in the loop in the information-sharing systems. However, <u>as</u> the benefits of <u>a</u>rtificial <u>i</u>ntelligence <u>continue to permeate info</u>rmation-<u>sharing systems</u>, the principles of trust, verification, and <u>reliability may shorten</u> the <u>info</u>rmation-<u>sharing timeline and further amplify</u> the <u>benefits of interagency blockchain information-sharing</u> modalities.</p><p><u>As the <strong>U.S. incorporates blockchain</strong> technology</u>, <u>the assured <strong>access to and analysis of info</u></strong>rmation <u>will illuminate new challenges and opportunities</u>. <u>Interagency collaboration and cooperation will <strong>require</strong> more attention</u>, more <u>learning, more effort, and</u> more <u><strong>inclusion</strong>.</u>23 Ultimately, blockchain technology provides for assured access to the diversity of real- time or near real-time information. In this manner, leaders and stakeholders may become increasingly exposed to raw data that competes to expose truth. The primacy of competing narratives will dominate the decisionmaker. A strength of block-chain technology is its inherent ability to control verified information.</p><p>Regardless, the decisionmaker must understand that a philosophy of inclusion—assessing multiple sources, as fringe as they may seem, will leverage a diversity of sources to build a picture of reality (sense-making) through factual information to create a common operating picture and permit organizations and governments to create a “winning narrative.”24</p><p>The human system should be grounded within the leadership theories presented in Radical Inclusion. This article combines the concepts of the digital echo and radical inclusion as a human element. Their <u>symbiotic relationship leverages blockchain technologies as </u>the <u>interagency info</u>rmation-<u>sharing standard of the future</u>. The human system will rely on the technical and institutional systems and vice versa. The <u>transformative change to interagency info</u>rmation<u>-sharing <strong>demands</u></strong> this <u><strong>inclusive approach</u></strong>. Inclusion, in this manner, <u>not only supports</u> the <u>integrated lines of effort toward info</u>rmation-<u>sharing,</u> it <u>also unlocks</u> understanding and <u>opportunity for leaders and info</u>rmation <u>stake holders.</u>25</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Julian Cribb 17, Fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, 2017, “The Poisoner,” in Surviving the 21st Century, p. 113-117 fulltext: There are two essential points about the Earthwide chemical flood. First it is quite new. It began with the industrial revolution of the late nineteenth century, but expanded dramatically in the wake of the two world wars—where chemicals were extensively used in munitions—and has exploded in deadly earnest in the past 50 years, attaining a new crescendo in the early twenty-first century. It is something our ancestors never faced—and to which we, in consequence, lack any protective adaptations which might otherwise have evolved due to constant exposure to poisons. Second, the toxic flood is, for the most part, preventable. It is not compulsory—but is an unwanted by-product of economic growth. Though driven by powerful industries and interests, it still lies within the powers and rights of citizens, consumers and their governments to demand it be curtailed or ended and to encourage industry to safer, healthier products and production systems. The issue is whether, or not, a wise humanity would choose to continue poisoning our children, ourselves and our world. Regulatory Failure Despite the fact that around 2000 new chemicals are released onto world markets annually, most have not received proper health, safety or environmental screening—especially in terms of their impact on babies and small children. Regulation has so far failed to make any serious curtailment of this flood: only 21 out of 144,000 known chemicals have been banned internationally, and this has not eliminated their use. At such a rate of progress it will take us more than 50,000 years to identify and prohibit or restrict all the chemicals which do us harm. Even then, bans will only apply in a handful of well-regulated countries, and will not protect the Earth system nor humanity at large. Clearly, national regulation holds few answers to what is now an out-of-control global problem. Furthermore, the chemical industry is relocating from the developed world (where it is quite well regulated and observes its own ethical standards) and into developing countries, mainly in Asia, where it is largely beyond the reach of either ethics or the law. However, its toxic emissions return to citizens in well-regulated countries via wind, water, food, wildlife, consumer goods, industrial products and people. The bottom line is that it doesn’t matter how good your country’s regulations are: you and your family are still exposed to a growing global flood of toxins from which even a careful diet and sensible consumer choices cannot fully protect you. The wake-up call to the world about the risks of chemical contamination was issued by American biologist Rachel Carson when she published Silent Spring in 1962, in which she warned specifically about the impact of certain persistent pesticides used in agriculture. Since her book came out, the volume of pesticide use worldwide has increased 30-fold, to around four million tonnes a year in the mid-2010s. Since the modern chemical age began there has been a string of high-profile chemical disasters: Minamata, the Love Canal, Seveso, Bhopal, Flixborough, Oppau, Toulouse, Hinkley, Texas City, Jilin, Tianjin. Most of these display a familiar pattern of unproductive confrontation between angry citizens, industry and regulators, involving drawn-out legal battles that deliver justice to nobody. By their spectacular and local nature, such events serve to distract from the far larger, more insidious and ubiquitous, universal toxic flood. Chemists and chemical makers often claim that their products are ‘safe’ because individual exposure (e.g. in a given product, like a serve of food) is too low to result in a toxic dose, a theory first put forward by the mediaeval scholar Paracelsus in the sixteenth century. This ‘dose related’ argument is disingenuous, if not dishonest—as modern chemists well know—for the following reasons: Most chemicals target a receptor or receptors on certain of your body cells, to cause harm. There may be not one, but hundreds or even thousands of different chemicals all targeting the same receptor, so a particular substance may contribute an unknowable fraction to an overall toxic dose. That does not make it ‘safe’. Chemicals not known to be poisonous in small doses on their own can combine with other substances in water, air, food or your body to create a toxin. No manufacturer can truthfully assert this will not happen to their products. Chemical toxicity is a function of both dose and the length of time you are exposed to it. In the case of persistent chemicals and heavy metals, this exposure may occur over days, months, years, even a lifetime in some cases. Tiny doses may thus accumulate into toxic ones. Most chemical toxicity is still measured on the basis of an exposed adult male. Babies and children being smaller and using much more water, food and air for their bodyweight, are therefore more at risk of receiving a poisonous dose than are adults. Chemicals and minerals are valuable and extremely useful. They do great good, save many lives and much money. No-one is suggesting they should all be banned. But their value may be for nothing if the current uncontrolled, unmonitored, unregulated and unconscionable mass release and planetary saturation continues. Chemical Extinction Two billion years ago, excessive production of one particular poisonous chemical by the inhabitants of Earth caused a colossal die-off and threatened the extermination of all life. That chemical was oxygen and it was excreted by the blue-green algae which then dominated the planet, as part of their photosynthetic processes. After several hundred million of years, the planet’s physical ability to soak up the surplus O2 in iron formations, oceans and sediments had reached saturation and the gas began to poison the existing life. This event was known as the ‘oxygen holocaust’, and is probably the nearest life on Earth has ever come to complete disaster before the present (Margulis and Sagan 1986). Since it developed slowly, over tens of millions of years, the poisonous atmosphere permitted some of these primitive organisms to evolve a tolerance to O2—and this in time led to the rise of oxygen-dependent species such as fish, mammals and eventually, us. The takehome learning from this brush with total annihilation is that it is possible for living creatures to pollute themselves into oblivion, if they don’t take care to avoid it or rapidly adapt to the new, toxic environment. It’s a message that humans, with our colossal planetary chemical impact, would do well to ponder. While it is unlikely that human chemical emissions alone could reach such a volume and toxic state as to directly threaten our entire species with extinction (other than through carbon emissions in a runaway global warming event) or even the collapse of civilization, it is likely they will emerge as a serious contributing factor during the twenty-first century in combination with other factors such as war, climate change, pandemic disease and ecosystem breakdown. Credible ways in which man-made chemicals might imperil the human future include: Undermining the immune systems, physical and mental health of the population through growing exposure to toxins Reducing the intelligence of current and future generations through the action of nerve poisons on the developing brains and central nervous systems of children, rendering humanity less able to solve its problems and adapt to major changes; and by increasing the level of violent crime and conflict in society, which is closely linked to lower IQ. Bringing down the economy through the massive healthcare costs of having to nurse, treat and maintain a growing proportion of the population disabled by lifelong chronic chemical exposure. By poisoning the ecosystem services—clean air, water, soil, plants, insects and wildlife—on which humanity depends for its own survival and thereby contributing to potential global ecosystem breakdown By augmenting the global arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and hence the risk of their use by nations or uncontrollable fanatics.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>2---Chemicals---AND flips innovation.</h4><p>Julian <strong>Cribb 17</strong>, Fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, 2017, “The Poisoner,” in Surviving the 21st Century, p. 113-117</p><p>There are two essential points about <u><mark>the</mark> Earthwide <strong><mark>chemical flood</u></strong></mark>. First it <u>is quite <strong>new</u></strong>. <u>It began with the industrial revolution</u> of the late nineteenth century, <u>but expanded dramatically in the wake of the two world wars</u>—where chemicals were extensively used in munitions—and has exploded in deadly earnest in the past 50 years, attaining a new crescendo in the early twenty-first century. <u>It is something our ancestors never faced</u>—<u>and to which we</u>, in consequence, <u>lack any protective adaptations which might otherwise have evolved due to constant exposure to poisons</u>. Second, the toxic flood is, for the most part, preventable. It is not compulsory—but <u><strong><mark>is a</mark>n unwanted by-<mark>product of </mark>economic <mark>growth</u></strong></mark>. Though driven by powerful industries and interests, it still lies within the powers and rights of citizens, consumers and their governments to demand it be curtailed or ended and to encourage industry to safer, healthier products and production systems. The issue is whether, or not, a wise humanity would choose to continue poisoning our children, ourselves and our world. Regulatory Failure <u>Despite the fact that around 2000 new chemicals are released onto world markets annually, most have not received proper health, safety or environmental screening</u>—especially in terms of their impact on babies and small children. <u><mark>Regulation has</mark> so far <mark>failed</mark> to make any serious curtailment of this flood:</u> only 21 out of 144,000 known chemicals have been banned internationally, and this has not eliminated their use. At such a rate of progress <u>it will take us more than 50,000 years to identify and prohibit or restrict all the chemicals which do us harm</u>. Even then, bans will only apply in a handful of well-regulated countries, and will not protect the Earth system nor humanity at large. Clearly, national regulation holds few answers to what is now an out-of-control global problem. Furthermore, <u>the chemical industry is relocating from the developed world</u> (where it is quite well regulated and observes its own ethical standards) <u>and into developing countries</u>, mainly in Asia, where it is largely beyond the reach of either ethics or the law. However, <u>its <mark>toxic emissions return</mark> to citizens in well-regulated countries <mark>via wind, water, food, wildlife,</mark> consumer <mark>goods</mark>, industrial products <mark>and people</u>.</mark> The bottom line is that it doesn’t matter how good your country’s regulations are: you and your family are still exposed to a growing global flood of toxins from which even a careful diet and sensible consumer choices cannot fully protect you. The wake-up call to the world about the risks of chemical contamination was issued by American biologist Rachel Carson when she published Silent Spring in 1962, in which she warned specifically about the impact of certain persistent pesticides used in agriculture. Since her book came out, the volume of pesticide use worldwide has increased 30-fold, to around four million tonnes a year in the mid-2010s. Since the modern chemical age began there has been a string of high-profile chemical disasters: Minamata, the Love Canal, Seveso, Bhopal, Flixborough, Oppau, Toulouse, Hinkley, Texas City, Jilin, Tianjin. Most of these display a familiar pattern of unproductive confrontation between angry citizens, industry and regulators, involving drawn-out legal battles that deliver justice to nobody. By their spectacular and local nature, such events serve to distract from the far larger, more insidious and ubiquitous, universal toxic flood. Chemists and chemical makers often claim that their products are ‘safe’ because individual exposure (e.g. in a given product, like a serve of food) is too low to result in a toxic dose, a theory first put forward by the mediaeval scholar Paracelsus in the sixteenth century. This ‘dose related’ argument is disingenuous, if not dishonest—as modern chemists well know—for the following reasons: Most chemicals target a receptor or receptors on certain of your body cells, to cause harm. There may be not one, but hundreds or even thousands of different chemicals all targeting the same receptor, so a particular substance may contribute an unknowable fraction to an overall toxic dose. That does not make it ‘safe’. Chemicals not known to be poisonous in small doses on their own can combine with other substances in water, air, food or your body to create a toxin. No manufacturer can truthfully assert this will not happen to their products. Chemical toxicity is a function of both dose and the length of time you are exposed to it. In the case of persistent chemicals and heavy metals, this exposure may occur over days, months, years, even a lifetime in some cases. Tiny doses may thus accumulate into toxic ones. Most chemical toxicity is still measured on the basis of an exposed adult male. Babies and children being smaller and using much more water, food and air for their bodyweight, are therefore more at risk of receiving a poisonous dose than are adults. Chemicals and minerals are valuable and extremely useful. They do great good, save many lives and much money. No-one is suggesting they should all be banned. But their value may be for nothing if the current uncontrolled, unmonitored, unregulated and unconscionable mass release and planetary saturation continues. Chemical Extinction Two billion years ago, <u>excessive production of one particular poisonous chemical by the inhabitants of Earth caused a colossal die-off and threatened the <strong>extermination of all life</u></strong>. That chemical was oxygen and it was excreted by the blue-green algae which then dominated the planet, as part of their photosynthetic processes. After several hundred million of years, the planet’s physical ability to soak up the surplus O2 in iron formations, oceans and sediments had reached saturation and the gas began to poison the existing life. <u>This event was known as the ‘oxygen holocaust’, and is probably the nearest life on Earth has ever come to complete disaster before the present</u> (Margulis and Sagan 1986). Since it developed slowly, over tens of millions of years, the poisonous atmosphere permitted some of these primitive organisms to evolve a tolerance to O2—and this in time led to the rise of oxygen-dependent species such as fish, mammals and eventually, us. The takehome learning from this brush with total annihilation is that <u><mark>it is possible</mark> for living creatures <mark>to <strong>pollute </mark>themselves <mark>into oblivion</u></strong></mark>, if they don’t take care to avoid it or rapidly adapt to the new, toxic environment. <u>It’s a message that humans, with our colossal planetary chemical impact, would do well to ponder</u>. While it is unlikely that human <u>chemical emissions</u> alone could reach such a volume and toxic state as to directly threaten our entire species with extinction (other than through carbon emissions in a runaway global warming event) or even the collapse of civilization, it is likely they <u>will emerge as a serious contributing factor during the twenty-first century in combination with other factors such as war, climate change, pandemic disease and ecosystem breakdown.</u> <u>Credible <mark>ways</mark> in which man-made <mark>chemicals</mark> might <mark>imperil the</mark> human <mark>future include:</u> <u><strong>Undermining</mark> the <mark>immune systems</u></strong></mark>, <u>physical and mental health</u> of the population through growing exposure to toxins Reducing the intelligence of current and future generations through the action of nerve poisons on the developing brains and central nervous systems of children, <u><mark>rendering humanity less able to solve</mark> its <mark>problems</mark> and adapt to major changes;</u> <u>and by increasing the level of violent crime and conflict in society,</u> which is closely linked to lower IQ. Bringing down the economy through the massive healthcare costs of having to nurse, treat and maintain a growing proportion of the population disabled by lifelong chronic chemical exposure. <u>By <mark>poisoning</mark> the <mark>ecosystem services</u></mark>—<u>clean air, water, soil, plants, insects and wildlife—<mark>on which <strong>humanity depends</mark> for its own survival</u></strong> <u>and thereby <mark>contributing to</mark> potential <mark>global ecosystem breakdown</u></mark> By augmenting the global arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and hence the risk of their use by nations or uncontrollable fanatics. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Mary Crossley 16, Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Fall 2016, “ARTICLE: BLACK HEALTH MATTERS: DISPARITIES, COMMUNITY HEALTH, AND INTEREST CONVERGENCE,” Michigan Journal of Race & Law, 22 Mich. J. Race & L. 53 fulltext: Thus far, this Article has described how the ACA's new CHNA requirement for tax-exempt hospitals could, in theory, serve as a mechanism for hospitals to identify racial health disparities in their communities. In addition, the Article has considered how steps to remedy those disparities might advance a hospital's financial self-interest in some instances. But, it also has recognized that early evidence of how hospitals have implemented the CHNA requirement indicates that this potential for interest convergence has not yet caused hospitals to pursue those steps. Based on this evidence, a convergence of interests leading to hospital actions that "move the needle" on disparities in their communities is not a sure thing. Part V identifies three avenues for action that could help, in Professor Bell's words, "forge fortuity" in bringing about interest convergence. Specifically, it will identify steps that health justice advocates, federal regulators, and researchers should take to increase the likelihood that a convergence of interests will prompt hospitals to focus on disparities in their community health efforts. It concludes by acknowledging and responding to several potential objections to the Article's reliance on interest convergence to address racial health disparities. A. Health Justice Activism One step that could foster interest convergence is for community health justice advocates to seek a seat at the table and a voice in the health needs assessment process. As discussed above, the Regulations detailing the CHNA requirement require hospitals to solicit input from minority and underserved communities and to take into account any input received as they assess and prioritize community health needs, n205 thus providing a platform for advocates to press for the inclusion of health disparities as high-priority community health needs. These Regulations, however, do not specify any particular process that hospitals must use in soliciting or [*93] incorporating community input, and they implicitly recognize that a hospital unable to secure input from these groups may still proceed with the needs assessment process. n206 As a result, some responsibility remains with community members to respond to (or even seek) invitations to give input and to share their knowledge about their community's greatest health needs. In addition, even an individual or group that is not invited by a hospital to give input can have a voice. For each CHNA after the first, the Regulations require a hospital to consider written comments received (presumably from its community) regarding its most recently adopted CHNA report and implementation strategy. n207 Community health justice advocates are permitted to present concerns about disparities and propose solutions, even if the hospital has not reached out to them to participate in the assessment process. The Regulations clearly intend that community members should have a voice in the CHNA process, but leave them some responsibility to speak up and raise community concerns. The Regulations also permit significant discretion for hospitals in choosing which health needs to prioritize and how to address them. n208 However, robust participation by racial justice advocates in the CHNA process can help surface the existence of disparities. Moreover, well-informed advocates may be able to highlight how disparities-reducing measures could advance the hospital's interests, thus sharpening the alignment of interests between the hospital and the community. n209 B. Regulatory Action to Foster Convergence Regulatory action provides a second front to help accelerate the convergence of interests so more hospitals will treat health disparities as health needs that they should remedy. The existing Regulations implementing the ACA's requirement that hospitals assess community health needs already direct hospitals to solicit and consider input from populations likely to experience disparities, but early evidence suggests that relatively few hospitals have paid serious attention to disparities or engaged minority communities in a meaningful and sustained fashion. n210 The IRS should more strongly encourage hospitals performing CHNAs to attend to disparities, a step it could take even without undertaking another round of notice-and-comment [*94] rule making. For example, ongoing guidance could emphasize the importance of health equity as a community health concern and provide hospitals with tools for identifying and responding to disparities. n211 The IRS could announce an expectation that CHNA reports will describe more fully and precisely how hospitals engaged community participants and the substance of their input. n212 Or, along the same lines, the IRS could revise Schedule H to direct hospitals to provide more specific information about community engagement and to identify strategies actually pursued that target health disparities. By taking these steps, the IRS could amplify the community's voice and draw hospitals' attention to the disparities existing in their communities, thereby fostering interest convergence. According to interest convergence theory, the federal government should be keen to take these steps, regardless of any policy maker's or bureaucrat's particular commitment to racial health justice. The high cost of racial disparities borne by the federal government in its role as payer under the Medicare program confirms its strong interests in addressing disparities and, presumably, in enlisting hospitals' participation in disparities-reduction efforts. n213 More broadly, the industry-wide push toward value-based reimbursement methods, led by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS"), n214 may help hospitals recognize an alignment between providing high quality, equitable care and their financial well-being. Financial penalties for hospitals with excessive readmissions n215 provide a specific example of how federal payment policies can forge fortuity. Penalizing hospitals for excessive readmissions - a marker of poor quality care experienced disproportionately by minority populations - effectively [*95] gives them a financial incentive to address some factors producing disparities. Many of the conditions targeted by value-based payment models are preventable conditions that racial and ethnic minorities suffer from disproportionately. n216 In continuing its initiatives to craft and implement reimbursement measures to promote care of high quality and value, CMS can and should incorporate factors directly targeting disparities. n217 It should act more directly to create financial and non-financial incentives that align providers' interests with achieving health equity. n218 For example, CMS's redesign of payment systems to incorporate clinical performance measures could explicitly include measurements of reductions in disparities. n219 These steps would help crystallize hospitals' financial interest in addressing disparities. C. Research Identifying Potential Convergence A third way to assist the convergence of interests is to continue research into the types of interventions that are effective in reducing disparities and their potential return on investment for hospitals. n220 A body of knowledge regarding effective interventions is emerging, providing hospitals with evidence for investing in disparities-reduction strategies, but a more fully developed knowledge base could facilitate and accelerate the convergence of interests. n221 Many experts in this area assert that the most effective interventions involve coordinated efforts by a range of actors, including health care providers, public health servants, community-based organizations, and business and education leaders. n222 Thus, research into how hospitals most effectively contribute to successful initiatives would be particularly valuable.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Our argument theorizes that moments of interest convergence can further racial justice <u>regardless of any policymaker’s</u> <u>actual</u> commitment to racial justice. The 1AC <u>depends</u> on the idea that the federal government will never truly eliminate its racism. The 1AC <u>takes as a given</u> that actors throughout the health system are racially biased and will not simply <u>decide</u> to address disparities. <u>At the same time</u>, the 1AC holds that the conditions that affect black lives can be changed <u>even in the face</u> of ongoing institutional racism, through moments of interest convergence. Federal payment policy is a key lever for those interests. </h4><p>Mary <strong>Crossley 16</strong>, Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Fall 2016, “ARTICLE: BLACK HEALTH MATTERS: DISPARITIES, COMMUNITY HEALTH, AND INTEREST CONVERGENCE,” Michigan Journal of Race & Law, 22 Mich. J. Race & L. 53</p><p>Thus far, this Article has described how <u>the</u> ACA's new <u>CHNA requirement</u> for tax-exempt hospitals <u>could, <strong>in theory</strong>, serve as a mechanism for hospitals to identify racial health disparities in their communities</u>. In addition, the Article has considered how steps to remedy those disparities might advance a hospital's financial self-interest in some instances. <u>But, it also has recognized that early evidence of how hospitals have implemented the CHNA requirement indicates that <strong>this potential for interest convergence has not yet caused hospitals to pursue those steps</strong>. Based on this evidence, a <mark>convergence of interests leading to</mark> hospital <mark>actions</mark> that "move the needle" <mark>on disparities</u></mark> in their communities <u><strong><mark>is not a sure thing</u></strong></mark>. Part V identifies three <u>avenues for action</u> that <u>could help</u>, in Professor Bell's words, <u>"forge fortuity" in bringing about interest convergence</u>. Specifically, <u>it will identify <strong><mark>steps</mark> that <mark>health justice advocates, federal regulators</u></strong></mark>, and researchers <u><mark>should take to increase</mark> the <mark>likelihood</mark> that a <mark>convergence of interests will prompt hospitals to focus on disparities</mark> in their community health efforts</u>. It concludes by acknowledging and responding to several potential objections to the Article's reliance on interest convergence to address racial health disparities. </p><p>A. Health Justice Activism </p><p><u><mark>One</mark> step that could foster interest convergence <mark>is for</mark> <strong>community <mark>health justice advocates to seek a seat at the table and a voice</strong></mark> in the health needs assessment process</u>. As discussed above, the <u>Regulations</u> detailing the CHNA requirement <u>require hospitals to <strong>solicit input from minority and underserved communities</u></strong> and to take into account any input received as they assess and prioritize community health needs, n205 <u>thus providing a platform for advocates to press for the inclusion of health disparities as high-priority community health needs</u>. These Regulations, however, do not specify any particular process that hospitals must use in soliciting or [*93] incorporating community input, and they implicitly recognize that a hospital unable to secure input from these groups may still proceed with the needs assessment process. n206 As a result, <u><strong>some responsibility remains with community members to respond to (or even seek) invitations to give input and to share their knowledge</u></strong> about their community's greatest health needs. </p><p>In addition, <u>even an individual or group that is not invited by a hospital to give input can have a voice</u>. For each CHNA after the first, the Regulations require a hospital to consider written comments received (presumably from its community) regarding its most recently adopted CHNA report and implementation strategy. n207 Community health justice advocates are permitted to present concerns about disparities and propose solutions, even if the hospital has not reached out to them to participate in the assessment process. <u>The Regulations clearly intend that community members should have a voice in the CHNA process, but leave them some responsibility to speak up and raise community concerns</u>. The Regulations also permit significant discretion for hospitals in choosing which health needs to prioritize and how to address them. n208 However, robust participation by racial justice advocates in the CHNA process can help surface the existence of disparities. Moreover, <u><strong><mark>well-informed advocates may</mark> be able to <mark>highlight how disparities-reducing measures</mark> could <mark>advance the hospital's interests</u></strong></mark>, thus <u><strong>sharpening the alignment of interests between the hospital and the community</u></strong>. n209</p><p>B. Regulatory Action to Foster Convergence </p><p><u>Regulatory action provides a second front to</u> help <u>accelerate</u> the <u>convergence of interests so more hospitals will treat health disparities as health needs that they should remedy</u>. The existing Regulations implementing the ACA's requirement that hospitals assess community health needs already direct hospitals to solicit and consider input from populations likely to experience disparities, but early evidence suggests that relatively few hospitals have paid serious attention to disparities or engaged minority communities in a meaningful and sustained fashion. n210 The IRS should more strongly encourage hospitals performing CHNAs to attend to disparities, a step it could take even without undertaking another round of notice-and-comment [*94] rule making. For example, ongoing guidance could emphasize the importance of health equity as a community health concern and provide hospitals with tools for identifying and responding to disparities. n211 The IRS could announce an expectation that CHNA reports will describe more fully and precisely how hospitals engaged community participants and the substance of their input. n212 Or, along the same lines, the IRS could revise Schedule H to direct hospitals to provide more specific information about community engagement and to identify strategies actually pursued that target health disparities.</p><p>By taking these steps, the IRS could amplify the community's voice and draw hospitals' attention to the disparities existing in their communities, thereby fostering interest convergence. <u><mark>According to interest convergence</mark> theory, <strong><mark>the federal government should</mark> be keen to <mark>take these steps, regardless of any policy maker's</mark> or bureaucrat's <mark>particular commitment to racial health justice</strong></mark>. The <mark>high cost of racial disparities borne by the federal government in its role as payer under</mark> the <mark>Medicare</mark> program <mark>confirms its</mark> strong <mark>interests in addressing disparities</mark> and</u>, presumably, in <u>enlisting hospitals' participation</u> in disparities-reduction efforts. n213</p><p>More broadly, the industry-wide push toward value-based reimbursement methods, led by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS"), n214 may help hospitals recognize an alignment between providing high quality, equitable care and their financial well-being. <u>Financial penalties for hospitals with excessive readmissions</u> n215 <u>provide a specific example of how federal payment policies can forge fortuity</u>. Penalizing hospitals for excessive readmissions - a marker of poor quality care experienced disproportionately by minority populations - effectively [*95] gives them a financial incentive to address some factors producing disparities. Many of the conditions targeted by value-based payment models are preventable conditions that racial and ethnic minorities suffer from disproportionately. n216 In continuing its initiatives to craft and implement reimbursement measures to promote care of high quality and value, <u>CMS can and should incorporate factors directly targeting disparities</u>. n217 It should act more directly to create financial and non-financial incentives that align providers' interests with achieving health equity. n218 For example, CMS's redesign of payment systems to incorporate clinical performance measures could explicitly include measurements of reductions in disparities. n219 These steps would help crystallize hospitals' financial interest in addressing disparities.</p><p>C. Research Identifying Potential Convergence</p><p><u><mark>A</mark> third <mark>way to assist</u></mark> the <u><mark>convergence</mark> of interests <mark>is to <strong>continue research into</mark> the types of <mark>interventions</mark> that are <mark>effective in reducing disparities</strong></mark> and their potential return on investment for hospitals</u>. n220 A body of knowledge regarding effective interventions is emerging, providing hospitals with evidence for investing in disparities-reduction strategies, but <u><strong><mark>a more fully developed knowledge base could</mark> facilitate and <mark>accelerate</mark> the <mark>convergence of interests</u></strong></mark>. n221 Many experts in this area assert that <u><mark>the <strong>most effective interventions</strong> involve coordinated efforts by a <strong>range of actors</strong>, including</u></mark> health care providers, public health servants, <u><strong><mark>community-based organizations</u></strong>,</mark> and business <u><mark>and education leaders</u></mark>. n222 Thus, <u>research into how hospitals most effectively contribute to successful initiatives would be <strong>particularly valuable</u></strong>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Cayton 20 [Samuel, Adjunct Prof at Seattle Univ School of Law, legal intern at the Media Law Group, “The ‘Green Patent Paradox’ and Fair Use: The Intellectual Property Solution to Fight Climate Change,” Seattle Journal of Technology, Environmental & Innovation Law 11.1, p.218-22, JCR] fulltext: The justification for a patent holder’s right to exclude rests on the principle that it promotes innovation by giving the inventor an incentive to use their invention and benefit the public.30 However, while patent law assumes patent holders will efficiently license their technologies to make the best use of its potential, this notion is not always true.31 Even with the U.S. antitrust system geared toward preventing an entity’s full market control over products, patent grants give the rightsholder the power to exclude others from unauthorized secondary use of that technology.32 Furthermore, the refusal to license is not a defense against patent infringement in a lawsuit.33 If this principle is carried out to its fullest extent, there could be a prohibitive effect on initiatives to combat climate change. Globally, companies have filed numerous green patents at varying rates among specific subsectors.34 While trends show that green patent applications are declining in part because of delays in research and development (R&D) and investment,35 certain technologies such as renewable energy are becoming “more profitable” and “less reliant on government subsidies.”36 Moreover, although the U.S. remains dependent on oil and thus resistant to transforming its energy system,37 these statistics demonstrate significant innovation within green technology. Although the U.S. is now very likely to rejoin the global efforts to combat climate change, the consensus remains that private sector innovation is needed to effectuate the challenges ahead.38 This tension between the rights of the patent holder and the need to use their green technology can be described as the Green Patent Paradox, whereby patented technologies geared toward mitigating the effects of climate change or substituting environmentally hazardous industries may not reach their full potential in part because patentees refrain from licensing their products. Whether a major crisis within the patent regime concerning green technology exists is still too early to determine.39 However, recent suits in federal court foreshadow the prospect of this issue developing in the years to come. With regard to patent reform specifically, progress has been made around the world to actively combat the effects of climate change.40 At the same time, many lawsuits have been filed and argued in federal court concerning secondary and more expansive uses of patented green technology. A patent holder is entitled to relief when a secondary user “makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells” the patented invention regardless of whether the secondary user possesses41 However, the degree to which patentees can gain relief was limited by the Supreme Court in eBay v. MercExchange whereby permanent injunctive relief in patent infringement suits must meet four basic requirements for an injunction.42 A heightened standard for plaintiffs means that secondary uses of patented technologies have a better chance of surviving infringement suits. For commentators as well as secondary users, this decision is seen as a partial victory because the patent infringement gravitated from the old standard which automatically gave injunctive relief to the plaintiff.43 Since eBay, many subsequent green patent infringement cases have come before federal courts, providing mixed signals for future developments of green technology.44 In 1992, Paice LLC, a startup company in the business of hybrid gas-electric vehicles, filed a patent for its developed hybrid technology.45 Paice’s patent application covered the utilization of an electric motor in conjunction with the standard internal combustion engine (ICE) that supplies additional power and transfers torque to the drive wheels of conventional automobiles.46 In 1994, the USPTO granted Patent No. 5,343,970 (“the ‘970 patent”) to Paice.47 One year later, Toyota started developing hybrid gas-electric vehicles in Japan and later launched the Prius in 1997, which was subsequently released to the U.S. in 2000.48 Paice founder, Dr. Alex Severinsky, met with representatives of Toyota USA to demonstrate Paice’s hybrid technology and offer a license agreement; however, Toyota refused because it had “no intention of developing [Paice’s] technology.”49 At subsequent meetings between the parties, Toyota acknowledging Paice’s strong contributions but still refusing its offer to license the patent.50 Thereafter, Paice filed suit against Toyota in the Eastern District of Texas for infringement of the ‘970 patent.51 Pursuant to eBay, the District Court denied permanent injunctive relief for Paice; however, the Court went on to hold that Toyota infringed on the patent rights of Paice and awarded ongoing royalties of $25 per infringing hybrid Toyota vehicle to Paice.52 On appeal, the Federal Circuit Court affirmed the denial of the injunction but remanded on the issue of royalties, holding that the District Court could not allow further use by Toyota without clarifying how to calculate the ongoing royalty.53 On remand, after providing the parties an opportunity to settle on a rate themselves, the District Court raised the ongoing royalties to $98 per hybrid vehicle.54 Paice demonstrates the sheer benefit that eBay has toward resolving the Green Patent Paradox. If Dr. Severinsky had his way, Toyota would not have been able to sell the Prius, Highlander, Lexus RH400h, or other hybrid models in the U.S.55 Given Toyota’s success and leadership in the fuel efficiency market, such a result could have imposed a severe impact on the climate.56 However, given Dr. Severinsky’s zealousness to hold dominion over the hybrid motor, this case also reveals the potential threat of a patent holder not fully utilizing their rights on the rights of valuable green patents. Infringement suits on green patents have also covered alternative energy. In 2002, General Electric (GE) obtained U.S. Patent No. 5,083,039 (the ‘039 patent),57 which covered a “wind turbine mechanism operating at variable speed under different wind condition[s].”58 This advancement was beneficial because U.S. electric companies previously had to adjust wind turbines based on “a standard fixed frequency [of 60Hz].”59 A few years later, GE and Mitsubishi, a Japanese wind turbine manufacturer, engaged in a patent dispute over the ‘039 patent. GE brought an infringement action against Mitsubishi.60 Mitsubishi countered by filing61 a complaint in the Western District of Arkansas, accusing GE of violating antitrust law by dominating the market of variable speed wind turbines.62 These suits illustrate what is considered “the beginning of an arms race for IP in the clean energy industry.”63 While these companies are advocating for what they believe are their rights to use this technology, the need to expand this technology in the pursuit of mitigating the effects of climate change is sidelined. The ‘039 patent is a quality patent that effectively blocked use by other companies wishing to achieve an energy quality standard without proper licensing.64 If a patent of this nature gets into the hands of an entity that sits on their intellectual property rights,65 then the benefits of the green technologies covered will not be imputed on society. While Paice and GE are two major lawsuits in the area of green technology, other forms of patent infringement actions have reached federal court involving a wide variety of green patents.66 For example, one technology that has gained success in the realm of alternative energy is energy-efficient lighting such as light-emitting diodes (LEDs). LEDs are an effective substitute for standard incandescent lightbulbs and are more environmentally friendly; producing more light per watt, emitting particular colors of light without utilizing other color filters, and radiating very little heat.67 Additionally, LEDs are eco-friendly substitutes for technologies such as traffic lights and cell phones.68 Given the potential widespread use of LEDs, patent infringement disputes are inevitable. In 2019 alone, Technical LED Intellectual Property and Lighting Science Group collectively filed nineteen patent infringement lawsuits against other companies, alleging that certain products infringe on their LED patents.69 Additionally, numerous infringement lawsuits have arisen in other green technology sectors such as solar power, batteries, and even eco-friendly pet products.70<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Plan key to solve climate change – ‘refusal to license’ is the roadblock to all solutions</h4><p><strong>Cayton 20 </strong>[Samuel, Adjunct Prof at Seattle Univ School of Law, legal intern at the Media Law Group, “The ‘Green Patent Paradox’ and Fair Use: The Intellectual Property Solution to Fight Climate Change,” Seattle Journal of Technology, Environmental & Innovation Law 11.1, p.218-22, JCR]</p><p>The justification for a patent holder’s right to exclude rests on the principle that it promotes innovation by giving the inventor an incentive to use their invention and benefit the public.30 However, while patent law assumes patent holders will efficiently license their technologies to make the best use of its potential, this notion is not always true.31 Even with the U.S. antitrust system geared toward preventing an entity’s full market control over products, <u>patent grants give the rightsholder the power to exclude others from unauthorized secondary use of that technology.</u>32 Furthermore, <u>the <strong><mark>refusal to license</strong></mark> is not a defense against patent infringement in a lawsuit.</u>33 If <u>this principle</u> is carried out to its fullest extent, there <u><mark>could be a prohibitive effect on initiatives to combat climate change.</u></mark> Globally, companies have filed numerous green patents at varying rates among specific subsectors.34 While trends show that <u><mark>green patent applications are declining</mark> in part <mark>because of delays in</u></mark> research and development <u><mark>(R&D) and investment</u></mark>,35 certain technologies such as renewable energy are becoming “more profitable” and “less reliant on government subsidies.”36 Moreover, although the U.S. remains dependent on oil and thus resistant to transforming its energy system,37 these statistics demonstrate significant innovation within green technology. Although the U.S. is now very likely to rejoin the global efforts to combat climate change, the consensus remains that <u><mark>private sector innovation is needed</mark> to effectuate the challenges ahead.</u>38 This tension between the rights of the patent holder and the need to use their green technology can be described as the Green Patent Paradox, whereby <u>patented <mark>tech</mark>nologies geared toward <mark>mitigating</mark> the effects of <mark>climate change</mark> or substituting environmentally hazardous industries <mark>may not reach their</mark> full <mark>potential</mark> in part <mark>because patentees refrain from licensing</mark> their products. </u>Whether a major crisis within the patent regime concerning green technology exists is still too early to determine.39 However, recent suits in federal court foreshadow the prospect of this issue developing in the years to come. With regard to patent reform specifically, progress has been made around the world to actively combat the effects of climate change.40 At the same time, <u><mark>many lawsuits</mark> have been filed and argued in federal court <mark>concerning secondary</mark> and more expansive <mark>uses of patented green technology</mark>. </u>A patent holder is entitled to relief when a secondary user “makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells” the patented invention regardless of whether the secondary user possesses41 However, the degree to which patentees can gain relief was limited by the Supreme Court in eBay v. MercExchange whereby permanent injunctive relief in patent infringement suits must meet four basic requirements for an injunction.42 A heightened standard for plaintiffs means that secondary uses of patented technologies have a better chance of surviving infringement suits. For commentators as well as secondary users, this decision is seen as a partial victory because the patent infringement gravitated from the old standard which automatically gave injunctive relief to the plaintiff.43 Since eBay, many subsequent green patent infringement cases have come before federal courts, providing mixed signals for future developments of green technology.44 In 1992, Paice LLC, a startup company in the business of hybrid gas-electric vehicles, filed a patent for its developed hybrid technology.45 Paice’s patent application covered the utilization of an electric motor in conjunction with the standard internal combustion engine (ICE) that supplies additional power and transfers torque to the drive wheels of conventional automobiles.46 In 1994, the USPTO granted Patent No. 5,343,970 (“the ‘970 patent”) to Paice.47 One year later, Toyota started developing hybrid gas-electric vehicles in Japan and later launched the Prius in 1997, which was subsequently released to the U.S. in 2000.48 Paice founder, Dr. Alex Severinsky, met with representatives of Toyota USA to demonstrate Paice’s hybrid technology and offer a license agreement; however, Toyota refused because it had “no intention of developing [Paice’s] technology.”49 At subsequent meetings between the parties, Toyota acknowledging Paice’s strong contributions but still refusing its offer to license the patent.50 Thereafter, Paice filed suit against Toyota in the Eastern District of Texas for infringement of the ‘970 patent.51 Pursuant to eBay, the District Court denied permanent injunctive relief for Paice; however, the Court went on to hold that Toyota infringed on the patent rights of Paice and awarded ongoing royalties of $25 per infringing hybrid Toyota vehicle to Paice.52 On appeal, the Federal Circuit Court affirmed the denial of the injunction but remanded on the issue of royalties, holding that the District Court could not allow further use by Toyota without clarifying how to calculate the ongoing royalty.53 On remand, after providing the parties an opportunity to settle on a rate themselves, the District Court raised the ongoing royalties to $98 per hybrid vehicle.54 Paice demonstrates the sheer benefit that eBay has toward resolving the Green Patent Paradox. If Dr. Severinsky had his way, Toyota would not have been able to sell the Prius, Highlander, Lexus RH400h, or other hybrid models in the U.S.55 Given Toyota’s success and leadership in the fuel efficiency market, such a result could have imposed a severe impact on the climate.56 However, given Dr. Severinsky’s zealousness to hold dominion over the hybrid motor, this case also reveals the potential threat of a patent holder not fully utilizing their rights on the rights of valuable green patents. Infringement suits on green patents have also covered alternative energy. In 2002, General Electric (GE) obtained U.S. Patent No. 5,083,039 (the ‘039 patent),57 which covered a “wind turbine mechanism operating at variable speed under different wind condition[s].”58 This advancement was beneficial because U.S. electric companies previously had to adjust wind turbines based on “a standard fixed frequency [of 60Hz].”59 A few years later, GE and Mitsubishi, a Japanese wind turbine manufacturer, engaged in a patent dispute over the ‘039 patent. GE brought an infringement action against Mitsubishi.60 Mitsubishi countered by filing61 a complaint in the Western District of Arkansas, accusing GE of violating antitrust law by dominating the market of variable speed wind turbines.62 <u>These suits <mark>illustrate</mark> what is considered <mark>“the beginning of an arms race for IP in the clean energy industry.”</u></mark>63 <u><mark>While</mark> these <mark>companies are advocating for</mark> what they believe are <mark>their rights</mark> to use this technology, the need to expand this technology in the pursuit of mitigating the effects of<mark> climate change is sidelined.</u></mark> The ‘039 patent is a quality patent that effectively blocked use by other companies wishing to achieve an energy quality standard without proper licensing.64 If a patent of this nature gets into the hands of an entity that sits on their intellectual property rights,65 then <u><mark>the benefits of the green tech</mark>nologies covered <mark>will not be imputed on society.</mark> </u>While Paice and GE are two major lawsuits in the area of green technology, other forms of <u>patent infringement actions have reached federal court involving a wide variety of green patents.</u>66 For example, one technology that has gained success in the realm of alternative energy is energy-efficient lighting such as light-emitting diodes (LEDs). LEDs are an effective substitute for standard incandescent lightbulbs and are more environmentally friendly; producing more light per watt, emitting particular colors of light without utilizing other color filters, and radiating very little heat.67 Additionally, LEDs are eco-friendly substitutes for technologies such as traffic lights and cell phones.68 Given the potential widespread use of LEDs, patent infringement disputes are inevitable. In 2019 alone, Technical LED Intellectual Property and Lighting Science Group collectively filed nineteen patent infringement lawsuits against other companies, alleging that certain products infringe on their LED patents.69 Additionally, <u>numerous infringement lawsuits have arisen in other green technology sectors such as solar power, batteries, and even eco-friendly pet products.</u>70</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Baum ’19 - executive director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, Ph.D in Geography Seth Baum, “Risk-Risk Tradeoff Analysis of Nuclear Explosives for Asteroid Deflection,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, May 31, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3397559. fulltext: The most severe asteroid collisions and nuclear wars can cause global environmental effects. The core mechanism is the transport of particulate matter into the stratosphere, where it can spread worldwide and remain aloft for years or decades. Large asteroid collisions create large quantities of dust and large fireballs; the fire heats the dust so that some portion of it rises into the stratosphere. The largest collisions, such as the 10km Chicxulub impactor, can also eject debris from the collision site into space; upon reentry into the atmosphere, the debris heats up enough to spark global fires (Toon, Zahnle, Morrison, Turco, & Covey, 1997). The fires are a major impact in their own right and can send additional smoke into the stratosphere. For nuclear explosions, there is also a fireball and smoke, in this case from the burning of cities or other military targets. While in the stratosphere, the particulate matter blocks sunlight and destroys ozone (Toon et al., 2007). The ozone loss increases the amount of ultraviolet radiation reaching the surface, causing skin cancer and other harms (Mills, Toon, Turco, Kinnison, & Garcia, 2008). The blocked sunlight causes abrupt cooling of Earth’s surface and in turn reduced precipitation due to a weakened hydrological cycle. The cool, dry, and dark conditions reduce plant growth. Recent studies use modern climate and crop models to examine the effects for a hypothetical IndiaPakistan nuclear war scenario with 100 weapons (50 per side) each of 15KT yield. The studies find agriculture declines in the range of approximately 2% to 50% depending on the crop and location.11 Another study compares the crop data to existing poverty and malnourishment and estimates that the crop declines could threaten starvation for two billion people (Helfand, 2013). However, the aforementioned studies do not account for new nuclear explosion fire simulations that find approximately five times less particulate matter reaching the stratosphere, and correspondingly weaker global environmental effects (Reisner et al., 2018). Note also that the 100 weapon scenario used in these studies is not the largest potential scenario. Larger nuclear wars and large asteroid collisions could cause greater harm. The largest asteroid collisions could even reduce sunlight below the minimum needed for vision (Toon et al., 1997). Asteroid risk analyses have proposed that the global environmental disruption from large collisions could cause one billion deaths (NRC, 2010) or the death of 25% of all humans (Chapman, 2004; Chapman & Morrison, 1994; Morrison, 1992), though these figures have not been rigorously justified (Baum, 2018a). The harms from asteroid collisions and nuclear wars can also include important secondary effects. The food shortages from severe global environmental disruption could lead to infectious disease outbreaks as public health conditions deteriorate (Helfand, 2013). Law and order could be lost in at least some locations as people struggle for survival (Maher & Baum, 2013). Today’s complex global political-economic system already shows fragility to shocks such as the 2007- 2008 financial crisis (Centeno, Nag, Patterson, Shaver, & Windawi, 2015); an asteroid collision or nuclear war could be an extremely large shock. The systemic consequences of a nuclear war would be further worsened by the likely loss of major world cities that serve as important hubs in the global economy. Even a single detonation in nuclear terrorism would have ripple effects across the global political-economic system (similar to, but likely larger than, the response prompted by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001). It is possible for asteroid collisions to cause nuclear war. An asteroid explosion could be misinterpreted as a nuclear attack, prompting nuclear attack that is believed to be retaliation. For example, the 2013 Chelyabinsk event occurred near an important Russian military installation, prompting concerns about the event’s interpretation (Harris et al., 2015). The ultimate severity of an asteroid collision or violent nuclear conflict use would depend on how human society reacts. Would the reaction be disciplined and constructive: bury the dead, heal the sick, feed the hungry, and rebuild all that has fallen? Or would the reaction be disorderly and destructive: leave the rubble in place, fight for scarce resources, and descend into minimalist tribalism or worse? Prior studies have identified some key issues, including the viability of trade (Cantor, Henry, & Rayner, 1989) and the self-sufficiency of local communities (Maher & Baum, 2013). However, the issue has received little research attention and remains poorly understood. This leaves considerable uncertainty in the total human harm from an asteroid collision or nuclear weapons use. Previously published point estimates of the human consequences of asteroid collisions12 and nuclear wars (Helfand, 2013) do not account for this uncertainty and are likely to be inaccurate. Of particular importance are the consequences for future generations, which could vastly outnumber the present generation. If an asteroid collision or nuclear war would cause human extinction, then there would be no future generations. Alternatively, if survivors fail to recover a large population and advanced technological civilization, then future generations would be permanently diminished. The largest long-term factor is whether future generations would colonize space and benefit from its astronomically large amount of resources (Tonn, 1999). However, it is not presently known which asteroid collisions or nuclear wars (if any) would cause the permanent collapse of human civilization and thus the loss of the large future benefits (Baum et al., 2019). Given the enormous stakes, prudent risk management would aim for very low probabilities of permanent collapse (Tonn, 2009). It should be noted that the severity of violent nuclear conflict could depend on more than just the effects of nuclear explosions, because the overall conflict scenario could include non-nuclear violence. Indeed, it is possible for the nuclear explosions to constitute a relatively small portion of the total severity, as was the case in World War II. 4.4 Risk of Violent Non-Nuclear Conflict Finally, it is necessary to discuss the risk of violent non-nuclear conflict. Only a small portion of violent non-nuclear conflicts are applicable, specifically the portion affected by nuclear weapons. More precisely, this section discusses non-nuclear conflicts involving one or more countries that possess nuclear weapons at some point during the lifetime of a nuclear deflection program. Nuclear deterrence theory predicts that nuclear-armed adversaries will not initiate major wars against each other because both sides could be destroyed in a nuclear war. However, the theory does permit limited, small-scale violent conflicts between nuclear-armed countries. These conflicts likely would not involve nuclear weapons. Indeed, nuclear deterrence may even make small violent conflicts more likely, because the countries know that neither side wants to escalate the conflict into major war. This idea is known as the stability-instability paradox: nuclear deterrence brings stability with respect to major wars but instability with respect to minor conflicts. Empirical support for the stability-instability paradox has been found by some research (Rauchhaus, 2009),while other research has found no significant effect of the possession of nuclear weapons on the probability of conflicts of any scale (Bell & Miller, 2015; Gartzke & Jo, 2009). If countries fully disarm their nuclear arsenals, such that they would never have nuclear weapons again, then there would be no nuclear deterrence to prevent the onset of major wars. A simple risk analysis could assume that the risk of major wars would be comparable to the risk prior to the development of nuclear weapons. The two twentieth century World Wars combined for around 100 million deaths in 50 years,13 suggesting an annualized risk of two million deaths. However, two World Wars do not make for a robust dataset. Indeed, the robustness of these two data points is called into question by historical analysis finding that both world wars might not have occurred in the reasonably plausible event that the 1914 assassination of Archduke Ferdinand had failed (Lebow, 2014). Similarly, another historical analysis finds that the U.S. and Soviet Union would probably not have waged major war against each other even in the absence of nuclear deterrence (Mueller, 1988). Furthermore, these past events are not necessarily applicable to the future conditions of a post-nuclear-disarmament world. To the best of the present author’s knowledge, no studies have analyzed the risk of major wars in a post-nucleardisarmament world.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Major collisions cause extinction</h4><p><strong>Baum ’19 </strong>- executive director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, Ph.D in Geography</p><p>Seth Baum, “Risk-Risk Tradeoff Analysis of Nuclear Explosives for Asteroid Deflection,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, May 31, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3397559.</p><p><u>The most severe <mark>asteroid collisions </mark>and nuclear wars can <mark>cause <strong>global environmental effects</u></strong></mark>. <u>The core mechanism is the transport of particulate matter into the stratosphere</u>, <u>where it can spread worldwide and</u> <u>remain aloft for</u> years or <u>decades</u>. <u>Large asteroid <mark>collisions create</u></mark> large quantities of <u>dust and <strong><mark>large fireballs</u></strong></mark>; <u>the fire heats the dust so that some portion of it rises into the stratosphere</u>. <u>The largest <mark>collisions</u></mark>, such as the 10km Chicxulub impactor, can also <u><mark>eject debris</u></mark> from the collision site <u><mark>into space</u></mark>; upon <u><mark>reentry</u></mark> into the atmosphere, the debris <u>heats up enough to <mark>spark <strong>global fires</u></strong></mark> (Toon, Zahnle, Morrison, Turco, & Covey, 1997). The fires <u>are <mark>a <strong>major impact in their own right</strong></mark> and can send additional smoke into the stratosphere</u>. For nuclear explosions, there is also a fireball and smoke, in this case from the burning of cities or other military targets. While in the stratosphere, <u>the particulate matter blocks sunlight and destroys ozone</u> (Toon et al., 2007). <u>The <mark>ozone loss</mark> <mark>increases</mark> the amount of <mark>u</mark>ltra<mark>v</mark>iolet <mark>radiation</u></mark> reaching the surface, <u>causing skin cancer and other harms</u> (Mills, Toon, Turco, Kinnison, & Garcia, 2008). T<u>he <mark>blocked sunlight causes abrupt cooling</mark> of Earth’s surface <mark>and</mark> in turn <mark>reduced precipitation</u></mark> due to a weakened hydrological cycle. The <u>cool, dry, and dark <mark>conditions</mark> <mark>reduce plant growth</u></mark>. Recent studies use modern climate and crop models to examine the effects for <u>a hypothetical IndiaPakistan nuclear war scenario with 100 weapons</u> (50 per side) each of 15KT yield. The studies <u>find agriculture declines</u> in the range of <u>approximately</u> 2% to <u>50%</u> depending on the crop and location.11 Another study compares the crop data to existing poverty and malnourishment and estimates that the <u><mark>crop declines</mark> could <mark>threaten <strong>starvation for two billion people</u></strong></mark> (Helfand, 2013). However, the aforementioned studies do not account for new nuclear explosion fire simulations that find approximately five times less particulate matter reaching the stratosphere, and correspondingly weaker global environmental effects (Reisner et al., 2018). Note also that <u>the 100 weapon scenario</u> used in these studies <u><strong>is not the largest potential scenario</u></strong>. Larger nuclear wars and large asteroid collisions could cause greater harm. <u>The <mark>largest</mark> asteroid <mark>collisions could</mark> even <mark>reduce <strong>sunlight below the minimum needed for vision</u></strong></mark> (Toon et al., 1997). Asteroid risk analyses have proposed that <u>the global environmental disruption from <strong>large collisions could cause one billion deaths</u></strong> (NRC, 2010) <u><strong>or</u></strong> the death of <u><strong>25% of all humans</u></strong> (Chapman, 2004; Chapman & Morrison, 1994; Morrison, 1992), though these figures have not been rigorously justified (Baum, 2018a). The harms from asteroid collisions and nuclear wars can also include important secondary effects. The <u><strong><mark>food shortages</strong></mark> from severe global environmental disruption could <strong><mark>lead to infectious disease outbreaks</strong></mark> as public health conditions deteriorate</u> (Helfand, 2013). Law and order could be lost in at least some locations as people struggle for survival (Maher & Baum, 2013). <u>Today’s complex global political-economic system already shows fragility to shocks</u> such as the 2007- 2008 financial crisis (Centeno, Nag, Patterson, Shaver, & Windawi, 2015); <u><strong>an asteroid collision</u></strong> or nuclear war <u><strong>could be an extremely large shock</u></strong>. <u>The systemic consequences of a nuclear war would be further worsened by the likely loss of major world cities</u> that serve as important hubs in the global economy. Even a single detonation in nuclear terrorism would have ripple effects across the global political-economic system (similar to, but likely larger than, the response prompted by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001). <u><strong>It is possible for asteroid collisions to cause nuclear war</u></strong>. <u><mark>An</mark> <mark>asteroid</mark> explosion <mark>could be <strong>misinterpreted as a nuclear attack</mark>, <mark>prompting</mark> nuclear attack that is believed to be <mark>retaliation</mark>.</u></strong> For example, the 2013 <u>Chelyabinsk</u> event <u>occurred near an important Russian military installation</u>, prompting concerns about the event’s interpretation (Harris et al., 2015). The ultimate severity of an asteroid collision or violent nuclear conflict use would depend on how human society reacts. <u>Would the reaction be disciplined</u> and constructive: bury the dead, heal the sick, feed the hungry, and rebuild all that has fallen<u>?</u> <u>Or would the reaction be disorderly and destructive</u>: leave the rubble in place, fight for scarce resources, and descend into minimalist tribalism or worse<u>?</u> Prior studies have identified some key issues, including the viability of trade (Cantor, Henry, & Rayner, 1989) and the self-sufficiency of local communities (Maher & Baum, 2013). However, the issue has received little research attention and remains poorly understood. <u>This leaves considerable uncertainty in the total human harm from an asteroid collision</u> or nuclear weapons use. Previously <u><strong><mark>published</u></strong></mark> point <u><strong><mark>estimates</strong></mark> of the human consequences</u> of asteroid collisions12 and nuclear wars (Helfand, 2013) <u>do not account for this uncertainty and <strong><mark>are likely to be inaccurate</strong></mark>.</u> <u>Of particular importance</u> are the consequences for future generations, <u>which could vastly outnumber the present generation</u>. <u><strong>If an asteroid collision or nuclear war would cause human extinction, then <mark>there would be no future generations</u></strong></mark>. Alternatively, if survivors fail to recover a large population and advanced technological civilization, then <u>future generations would be permanently diminished.</u> The largest long-term factor is whether future generations would colonize space and benefit from its astronomically large amount of resources (Tonn, 1999). However, it is not presently known which asteroid collisions or nuclear wars (if any) would cause the permanent collapse of human civilization and thus the loss of the large future benefits (Baum et al., 2019). Given the enormous stakes, <u><strong>prudent risk management would aim for very low probabilities of permanent collapse </u></strong>(Tonn, 2009). It should be noted that <u>the severity of violent nuclear conflict could depend on more than just the effects of nuclear explosions, because the overall conflict scenario could <strong>include non-nuclear violence</strong>. </u>Indeed, <u><strong>it is possible for the <mark>nuclear explosions</mark> to <mark>constitute a relatively small portion of </mark>the <mark>total severity</u></strong></mark>, as was the case in World War II. 4.4 Risk of Violent Non-Nuclear Conflict Finally, <u>it is necessary to discuss the risk of violent non-nuclear conflict</u>. Only a small portion of violent non-nuclear conflicts are applicable, specifically the portion affected by nuclear weapons. More precisely, this section discusses non-nuclear conflicts involving one or more countries that possess nuclear weapons at some point during the lifetime of a nuclear deflection program. <u>Nuclear deterrence</u> theory predicts that nuclear-armed adversaries will not initiate major wars against each other because both sides could be destroyed in a nuclear war. However, the <u>theory <strong>does permit limited, small-scale violent conflicts</strong> between nuclear-armed countries</u>. These <u>conflicts</u> likely <u>would not involve nuclear weapons.</u> Indeed, <u>nuclear deterrence may</u> even <u>make</u> <u>small</u> violent <u>conflicts <strong>more likely</u></strong>, because the countries know that neither side wants to escalate the conflict into major war. This idea is <u>known as the stability-instability paradox</u>: nuclear deterrence <u>brings</u> stability with respect to major wars but <u>instability with respect to minor conflicts. Empirical support</u> for the stability-instability paradox <u>has been found by some research</u> (Rauchhaus, 2009),while other research has found no significant effect of the possession of nuclear weapons on the probability of conflicts of any scale (Bell & Miller, 2015; Gartzke & Jo, 2009). If countries fully disarm their nuclear arsenals, such that they would never have nuclear weapons again, then there would be no nuclear deterrence to prevent the onset of major wars. A simple risk analysis could assume that the risk of major wars would be comparable to the risk prior to the development of nuclear weapons. The two twentieth century World Wars combined for around 100 million deaths in 50 years,13 suggesting an annualized risk of two million deaths. However, two World Wars do not make for a robust dataset. Indeed, the robustness of these two data points is called into question by historical analysis finding that both world wars might not have occurred in the reasonably plausible event that the 1914 assassination of Archduke Ferdinand had failed (Lebow, 2014). Similarly, another historical analysis finds that the U.S. and Soviet Union would probably not have waged major war against each other even in the absence of nuclear deterrence (Mueller, 1988). Furthermore, these past events are not necessarily applicable to the future conditions of a post-nuclear-disarmament world. To the best of the present author’s knowledge, no studies have analyzed the risk of major wars in a post-nucleardisarmament world.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Dr. Nick Hughes 18, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at University College Dublin, PhD in Philosophy from University of St Andrews & University of Olso, and Dr. Guy Kahane, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford, D. Phil. in Philosophy from Oxford University, “Our Cosmic Insignificance”, 7-6, http://www.unariunwisdom.com/our-cosmic-insignificance/ fulltext: Humanity occupies a very small place in an unfathomably vast Universe. Travelling at the speed of light – 671 million miles per hour – it would take us 100,000 years to cross the Milky Way. But we still wouldn’t have gone very far. Our modest Milky Way galaxy contains 100–400 billion stars. This isn’t very much: according to the latest calculations, the observable universe contains around 300 sextillion stars. By recent estimates, our Milky Way galaxy is just one of 2 trillion galaxies in the observable Universe, and the region of space that they occupy spans at least 90 billion light-years. If you imagine Earth shrunk down to the size of a single grain of sand, and you imagine the size of that grain of sand relative to the entirety of the Sahara Desert, you are still nowhere near to comprehending how infinitesimally small a position we occupy in space. The American astronomer Carl Sagan put the point vividly in 1994 when discussing the famous ‘Pale Blue Dot’ photograph taken by Voyager 1. Our planet, he said, is nothing more than ‘a mote of dust suspended in a sunbeam’. Stephen Hawking delivers the news more bluntly. We are, he says, “just a chemical scum on a moderate-sized planet, orbiting round a very average star in the outer suburb of one among a hundred billion galaxies.” And that’s just the spatial dimension. The observable Universe has existed for around 13.8 billion years. If we shrink that span of time down to a single year, with the Big Bang occurring at midnight on 1 January, the first Homo sapiens made an appearance at 22:24 on 31 December. It’s now 23:59:59, as it has been for the past 438 years, and at the rate we’re going it’s entirely possible that we’ll be gone before midnight strikes again. The Universe, on the other hand, might well continue existing forever, for all we know. Sagan could have added, then, that our time on this mote of dust will amount to nothing more than a blip. In the grand scheme of things we are very, very small. For Sagan, the Pale Blue Dot underscores our responsibility to treat one another with kindness and compassion. But reflection on the vastness of the Universe and our physical and temporal smallness within it often takes on an altogether darker hue. If the Universe is so large, and we are so small and so fleeting, doesn’t it follow that we are utterly insignificant and inconsequential? This thought can be a spur to nihilism. If we are so insignificant, if our existence is so trivial, how could anything we do or are – our successes and failures, our anxiety and sadness and joy, all our busy ambition and toil and endeavour, all that makes up the material of our lives – how could any of that possibly matter? To think of one’s place in the cosmos, as the American philosopher Susan Wolf puts it in ‘The Meanings of Lives’ (2007), is ‘to recognise the possibility of a perspective … from which one’s life is merely gratuitous’. The sense that we are somehow insignificant seems to be widely felt. The American author John Updike expressed it in 1985 when he wrote of modern science that: We shrink from what it has to tell us of our perilous and insignificant place in the cosmos … our century’s revelations of unthinkable largeness and unimaginable smallness, of abysmal stretches of geological time when we were nothing, of supernumerary galaxies … of a kind of mad mathematical violence at the heart of the matter have scorched us deeper than we know. In a similar vein, the French philosopher Blaise Pascal wrote in Pensées (1669): When I consider the short duration of my life, swallowed up in an eternity before and after, the little space I fill engulfed in the infinite immensity of spaces whereof I know nothing, and which know nothing of me, I am terrified. The eternal silence of these infinite spaces frightens me. Commenting on this passage in Between Man and Man (1947), the Austrian-Israeli philosopher Martin Buber said that Pascal had experienced the ‘uncanniness of the heavens’, and thereby came to know ‘man’s limitation, his inadequacy, the casualness of his existence’. In the film Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life (1983), John Cleese and Eric Idle conspire to persuade a character, played by Terry Gilliam, to give up her liver for donation. Understandably reluctant, she is eventually won over by a song that sharply details just how comically inconsequential she is in the cosmic frame. Even the relatively upbeat Sagan wasn’t, in fact, immune to the pessimistic point of view. As well as viewing it as a lesson in the need for collective goodwill, he also argued that the Pale Blue Dot challenges ‘our posturings, our imagined self-importance, and the delusion that we have some privileged position in the Universe’. When we reflect on the vastness of the universe, our humdrum cosmic location, and the inevitable future demise of humanity, our lives can seem utterly insignificant. As we complacently go about our little Earthly affairs, we barely notice the black backdrop of the night sky. Even when we do, we usually see the starry skies as no more than a pleasant twinkling decoration. This sense of cosmic insignificance is not uncommon; one of Joseph Conrad’s characters describes one of those dewy, clear, starry nights, oppressing our spirit, crushing our pride, by the brilliant evidence of the awful loneliness, of the hopeless obscure insignificance of our globe lost in the splendid revelation of a glittering, soulless universe. I hate such skies. The young Bertrand Russell, a close friend of Conrad, bitterly referred to the Earth as “the petty planet on which our bodies impotently craw.” Russell wrote that: Brief and powerless is Man’s life; on him and all his race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way…This is why Russell thought that, in the absence of God, we must build our lives on “a foundation of unyielding despair.” When we consider ourselves as a mere dot in a vast universe, when we consider ourselves in light of everything there is, nothing human seems to matter. Even the worst human tragedy may seem to deserve no cosmic concern. After all, we are fighting for attention with an incredibly vast totality. How could this tiny speck of dust deserve even a fraction of attention, from that universal point of view? This is the image that is evoked when, for example, Simon Blackburn writes that “to a witness with the whole of space and time in its view, nothing on the human scale will have meaning”. Such quotations could be easily multiplied—we find similar remarks, for example, in John Donne, Voltaire, Schopenhauer, Byron, Tolstoy, Chesterton, Camus, and, in recent philosophy, in Thomas Nagel, Harry Frankfurt, and Ronald Dworkin. The bigger the picture we survey, the smaller the part of any point within it, and the less attention it can get… When we try to imagine a viewpoint encompassing the entire universe, humanity and its concerns seem to get completely swallowed up in the void. Over the centuries, many have thought it absurd to think that we are the only ones. For example, Anaxagoras, Epicurus, Lucretius, and, later, Giordano Bruno, Huygens and Kepler were all confident that the universe is teeming with life. Kant was willing to bet everything he had on the existence of intelligent life on other planets. And we now know that there is a vast multitude of Earth-like planets even in our own little galaxy. The experience of cosmic insignificance is often blamed on the rise of modern science, and the decline of religious belief. Many think that things started to take a turn for the worse with Copernicus. Nietzsche, for example, laments ‘the nihilistic consequences of contemporary science’, and adds that Since Copernicus it seems that man has found himself on a descending slope—he always rolls further and further away from his point of departure toward… —where is that? Towards nothingness? Freud later wrote about a series of harsh blows to our self-esteem delivered by science. The first blow was delivered by Copernicus, when we learned, as Freud puts it, that “our earth was not the centre of the universe but only a tiny fragment of a cosmic system of scarcely imaginable vastness…” It is still common to refer, in a disappointed tone, to the discovery that we aren’t at the centre of God’s creation, as we had long thought, but located, as Carl Sagan puts it, “in some forgotten corner”. We live, Sagan writes, “on a mote of dust circling a humdrum star in the remotest corner of an obscure galaxy.”<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Even a <u>small chance</u> of Universe destruction outweighs <u>certain</u> human extinction. Earth is <u>cosmically insignificant</u>.</h4><p>Dr. Nick <strong>Hughes 18</strong>, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at University College Dublin, PhD in Philosophy from University of St Andrews & University of Olso, and Dr. Guy Kahane, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford, D. Phil. in Philosophy from Oxford University, “Our Cosmic Insignificance”, 7-6, <u>http://www.unariunwisdom.com/our-cosmic-insignificance/</p><p>Humanity occupies a very small place in an unfathomably vast Universe</u>. Travelling at the speed of light – 671 million miles per hour – it would take us 100,000 years to cross the Milky Way. But we still wouldn’t have gone very far. <u>Our modest Milky Way galaxy contains 100–400 billion stars.</u> This isn’t very much: <u>according to the latest calculations, <mark>the</mark> observable <mark>universe contains</mark> around <mark>300 sextillion stars</mark>.</u> By recent estimates, <u>our <mark>Milky Way</mark> galaxy <mark>is </mark>just <mark>one of 2 trillion galaxies</mark> in the observable Universe, and the region of space that they occupy spans at least 90 billion light-years. <mark>If</mark> you imagine <mark>Earth shrunk</mark> down <mark>to</mark> the size of <mark>a</mark> single <mark>grain of sand, and you imagine</mark> the size of that grain of sand relative to the entirety of <mark>the Sahara</mark> Desert, <mark>you are still nowhere near</mark> to <mark>comprehending how infinitesimally small</mark> a position we occupy in space</u>. The American astronomer Carl Sagan put the point vividly in 1994 when discussing the famous ‘Pale Blue Dot’ photograph taken by Voyager 1. <u>Our planet,</u> he said, <u>is nothing more than ‘a mote of dust suspended in a sunbeam’</u>. Stephen Hawking delivers the news more bluntly. We are, he says, “just a chemical scum on a moderate-sized planet, orbiting round a very average star in the outer suburb of one among a hundred billion galaxies.” <u>And that’s just the spatial dimension. The</u> observable <u>Universe has existed for around 13.8 billion years.</u> <u>If we shrink that span of time down to a single year, with the Big Bang occurring at midnight on 1 January, the first Homo sapiens made an appearance at 22:24 on 31 December. It’s now 23:59:59</u>, as it has been for the past 438 years, and at the rate we’re going <u>it’s entirely possible that we’ll be gone before midnight strikes again</u>. <u>The Universe</u>, on the other hand, <u>might well continue existing forever</u>, for all we know. Sagan could have added, then, that <u>our time</u> on this mote of dust <u>will amount to nothing more than a blip</u>. In the grand scheme of things <u>we are very, very small. </u>For Sagan, the Pale Blue Dot underscores our responsibility to treat one another with kindness and compassion. But reflection on the vastness of the Universe and our physical and temporal smallness within it often takes on an altogether darker hue. <u>If the Universe is so large</u>, and we are so small and so fleeting, doesn’t it follow that <u>we are utterly insignificant and inconsequential</u>? This thought can be a spur to nihilism. If we are so insignificant, if <u>our existence is so trivial</u>, how could anything we do or are – our successes and failures, our anxiety and sadness and joy, all our busy ambition and toil and endeavour, all that makes up the material of our lives – how could any of that possibly matter? <u><mark>To think of</mark> one’s <mark>place in the cosmos</u></mark>, as the American philosopher Susan Wolf puts it in ‘The Meanings of Lives’ (2007), <u><mark>is ‘to recognise</mark> the possibility of a <mark>perspective</mark> … from which <mark>one’s life is merely gratuitous’</u></mark>.<u> </u>The sense that we are somehow insignificant seems to be widely felt. The American author John Updike expressed it in 1985 when he wrote of modern science that:<u> We shrink from what it has to tell us of our perilous and insignificant place in the cosmos</u> … <u>our century’s <mark>revelations of</mark> unthinkable largeness and <mark>unimaginable smallness</u></mark>, of abysmal stretches of geological time when we were nothing, of supernumerary galaxies … of a kind of mad mathematical violence at the heart of the matter have scorched us deeper than we know.<u> </u>In a similar vein, the French philosopher Blaise Pascal wrote in Pensées (1669):<u> </u>When I consider the short duration of my life, swallowed up in an eternity before and after, the little space I fill engulfed in the infinite immensity of spaces whereof I know nothing, and which know nothing of me, I am terrified. The eternal silence of these infinite spaces frightens me.<u> </u>Commenting on this passage in Between Man and Man (1947), the Austrian-Israeli philosopher Martin Buber said that Pascal had experienced the ‘uncanniness of the heavens’, and thereby came to know ‘man’s limitation, his inadequacy, the casualness of his existence’. In the film Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life (1983), John Cleese and Eric Idle conspire to persuade a character, played by Terry Gilliam, to give up her liver for donation. Understandably reluctant, she is eventually won over by a song that sharply details just how comically inconsequential she is in the cosmic frame.<u> </u>Even the relatively upbeat Sagan wasn’t, in fact, immune to the pessimistic point of view. As well as viewing it as a lesson in the need for collective goodwill, he also argued that <u>the Pale Blue Dot <mark>challenges</u></mark> ‘our posturings, <u>our <mark>imagined self-importance, and the delusion</mark> that <mark>we have some privileged position in the Universe</u>’</mark>.<u> </u>When we reflect on the vastness of the universe, our humdrum cosmic location, and the inevitable future demise of humanity, our lives can seem utterly insignificant. As we complacently go about our little Earthly affairs, we barely notice the black backdrop of the night sky. Even when we do, we usually see the starry skies as no more than a pleasant twinkling decoration.<u> </u>This sense of cosmic insignificance is not uncommon; one of Joseph Conrad’s characters describes<u> </u>one of those dewy, clear, starry nights, oppressing our spirit, crushing our pride, by the brilliant evidence of the awful loneliness, of the hopeless obscure insignificance of our globe lost in the splendid revelation of a glittering, soulless universe. I hate such skies.<u> </u>The young Bertrand Russell, a close friend of Conrad, bitterly referred to the Earth as “the petty planet on which our bodies impotently craw.” Russell wrote that:<u> </u>Brief and powerless is Man’s life; on him and all his race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way…This is why Russell thought that, in the absence of God, we must build our lives on “a foundation of unyielding despair.”<u> </u>When we consider ourselves as a mere dot in a vast universe, when we consider ourselves in light of everything there is, nothing human seems to matter. <u><strong><mark>Even the worst human tragedy</mark> may seem to <mark>deserve no cosmic concern</strong></mark>. After all, we are fighting for attention <mark>with an incredibly vast totality</mark>. How could this tiny speck of dust deserve even a fraction of attention, from that universal point of view? </u>This is the image that is evoked when, for example, Simon Blackburn writes that “to a witness with the whole of space and time in its view, nothing on the human scale will have meaning”.<u> </u>Such quotations could be easily multiplied—we find similar remarks, for example, in John Donne, Voltaire, Schopenhauer, Byron, Tolstoy, Chesterton, Camus, and, in recent philosophy, in Thomas Nagel, Harry Frankfurt, and Ronald Dworkin.<u> </u>The bigger the picture we survey, the smaller the part of any point within it, and the less attention it can get… When we try to imagine a viewpoint encompassing the entire universe, humanity and its concerns seem to get completely swallowed up in the void.<u> Over the centuries, many have thought it <mark>absurd to think</mark> that <mark>we are the only ones</u></mark>. For example, Anaxagoras, Epicurus, Lucretius, and, later, Giordano Bruno, Huygens and Kepler were all confident that <u><mark>the universe is teeming with life</mark>.</u> Kant was willing to bet everything he had on the existence of intelligent life on other planets. And <u>we now know that there is a vast multitude of Earth-like planets even in our own little galaxy.</u> The experience of cosmic insignificance is often blamed on the rise of modern science, and the decline of religious belief. Many think that things started to take a turn for the worse with Copernicus. Nietzsche, for example, laments ‘the nihilistic consequences of contemporary science’, and adds that Since Copernicus it seems that man has found himself on a descending slope—he always rolls further and further away from his point of departure toward… —where is that? Towards nothingness? Freud later wrote about a series of harsh blows to our self-esteem delivered by science. The first blow was delivered by Copernicus, when we learned, as Freud puts it, that “<u>our earth was not the centre of the universe but only a tiny fragment of a cosmic system of scarcely imaginable vastness</u>…” It is still common to refer, in a disappointed tone, to the discovery that <u>we aren’t at the centre</u> of God’s creation, as we had long thought, <u>but</u> located, as Carl Sagan puts it, “<u>in some forgotten corner</u>”. We live, Sagan writes, “<u>on a mote of dust circling a humdrum star in the remotest corner of an obscure galaxy</u>.”</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Fitzsimmons 2007 – Ph.D. in international security policy from the University of Maryland, Adjunct Professor of Public Policy, analyst in the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses (Michael, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, Survival, Winter 06/07 fulltext: In defence of prediction Uncertainty is not a new phenomenon for strategists. Clausewitz knew that ‘many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain’. In coping with uncertainty, he believed that ‘what one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he should possess a standard of judgment, which he can gain only from knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense. He should be guided by the laws of probability.’34 Granted, one can certainly allow for epistemological debates about the best ways of gaining ‘a standard of judgment’ from ‘knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense’. Scientific inquiry into the ‘laws of probability’ for any given strate- gic question may not always be possible or appropriate. Certainly, analysis cannot and should not be presumed to trump the intuition of decision-makers. Nevertheless, Clausewitz’s implication seems to be that the burden of proof in any debates about planning should belong to the decision-maker who rejects formal analysis, standards of evidence and probabilistic reasoning. Ultimately, though, the value of prediction in strategic planning does not rest primarily in getting the correct answer, or even in the more feasible objective of bounding the range of correct answers. Rather, prediction requires decision-makers to expose, not only to others but to themselves, the beliefs they hold regarding why a given event is likely or unlikely and why it would be important or unimportant. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May highlight this useful property of probabilistic reasoning in their renowned study of the use of history in decision-making, Thinking in Time. In discussing the importance of probing presumptions, they contend: The need is for tests prompting questions, for sharp, straightforward mechanisms the decision makers and their aides might readily recall and use to dig into their own and each others’ presumptions. And they need tests that get at basics somewhat by indirection, not by frontal inquiry: not ‘what is your inferred causation, General?’ Above all, not, ‘what are your values, Mr. Secretary?’ ... If someone says ‘a fair chance’ ... ask, ‘if you were a betting man or woman, what odds would you put on that?’ If others are present, ask the same of each, and of yourself, too. Then probe the differences: why? This is tantamount to seeking and then arguing assumptions underlying different numbers placed on a subjective probability assessment. We know of no better way to force clarification of meanings while exposing hidden differences ... Once differing odds have been quoted, the question ‘why?’ can follow any number of tracks. Argument may pit common sense against common sense or analogy against analogy. What is important is that the expert’s basis for linking ‘if’ with ‘then’ gets exposed to the hearing of other experts before the lay official has to say yes or no.’35 There are at least three critical and related benefits of prediction in strate- gic planning. The first reflects Neustadt and May’s point – prediction enforces a certain level of discipline in making explicit the assumptions, key variables and implied causal relationships that constitute decision-makers’ beliefs and that might otherwise remain implicit. Imagine, for example, if Shinseki and Wolfowitz had been made to assign probabilities to their opposing expectations regarding post-war Iraq. Not only would they have had to work harder to justify their views, they might have seen more clearly the substantial chance that they were wrong and had to make greater efforts in their planning to prepare for that contingency. Secondly, the very process of making the relevant factors of a decision explicit provides a firm, or at least transparent, basis for making choices. Alternative courses of action can be compared and assessed in like terms. Third, the transparency and discipline of the process of arriving at the initial strategy should heighten the decision-maker’s sensitivity toward changes in the environment that would suggest the need for adjustments to that strategy. In this way, prediction enhances rather than under-mines strategic flexibility. This defence of prediction does not imply that great stakes should be gambled on narrow, singular predictions of the future. On the contrary, the central problem of uncertainty in plan- ning remains that any given prediction may simply be wrong. Preparations for those eventualities must be made. Indeed, in many cases, relatively unlikely outcomes could be enormously consequential, and therefore merit extensive preparation and investment. In order to navigate this complexity, strategists must return to the dis- tinction between uncertainty and risk. While the complexity of the international security environment may make it somewhat resistant to the type of probabilistic thinking associated with risk, a risk-oriented approach seems to be the only viable model for national-security strategic planning. The alternative approach, which categorically denies prediction, precludes strategy. As Betts argues, Any assumption that some knowledge, whether intuitive or explicitly formalized, provides guidance about what should be done is a presumption that there is reason to believe the choice will produce a satisfactory outcome – that is, it is a prediction, however rough it may be. If there is no hope of discerning and manipulating causes to produce intended effects, analysts as well as politicians and generals should all quit and go fishing.36 Unless they are willing to quit and go fishing, then, strategists must sharpen their tools of risk assessment. Risk assessment comes in many varieties, but identification of two key parameters is common to all of them: the consequences of a harmful event or condition; and the likelihood of that harmful event or condition occurring. With no perspective on likelihood, a strategist can have no firm perspective on risk. With no firm perspective on risk, strategists cannot purposefully discriminate among alternative choices. Without purposeful choice, there is no strategy. One of the most widely read books in recent years on the complicated relation- ship between strategy and uncertainty is Peter Schwartz’s work on scenario-based planning, The Art of the Long View. Schwartz warns against the hazards faced by leaders who have deterministic habits of mind, or who deny the difficult implications of uncertainty for strategic planning. To overcome such tenden- cies, he advocates the use of alternative future scenarios for the purposes of examining alternative strategies. His view of scenarios is that their goal is not to predict the future, but to sensitise leaders to the highly contingent nature of their decision-making.37 This philosophy has taken root in the strategic-planning processes in the Pentagon and other parts of the US government, and properly so. Examination of alternative futures and the potential effects of surprise on current plans is essential. Appreciation of uncertainty also has a number of organisational impli- cations, many of which the national-security establishment is trying to take to heart, such as encouraging multidisciplinary study and training, enhancing information sharing, rewarding innovation, and placing a premium on speed and versatility. The arguments advanced here seek to take nothing away from these imperatives of planning and operating in an uncertain environment. But appreciation of uncertainty carries hazards of its own. Questioning assumptions is critical, but assumptions must be made in the end. Clausewitz’s ‘standard of judgment’ for discriminating among alternatives must be applied. Creative, unbounded speculation must resolve to choice or else there will be no strategy. Recent history suggests that unchecked scepticism regarding the validity of prediction can marginalise analysis, trade significant cost for ambig- uous benefit, empower parochial interests in decision-making, and undermine flexibility. Accordingly, having fully recognised the need to broaden their strategic-planning aperture, national-security policymakers would do well now to reinvigorate their efforts in the messy but indispensable business of predicting the future.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Even if it’s true that our predictions are bad, it’s their burden to provide an alternative methodology for planning—probabilistic decisionmaking is best because it’s flexible and transparent—alternative frameworks make predictions worse</h4><p><strong><mark>Fitzsimmons 2007</strong></mark> – Ph.D. in international security policy from the University of Maryland, Adjunct Professor of Public Policy, analyst in the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses (Michael, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, Survival, Winter 06/07</p><p>In defence of prediction Uncertainty is not a new phenomenon for strategists. Clausewitz knew that ‘many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain’. In coping with uncertainty, he believed that ‘what one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he should possess a standard of judgment, which he can gain only from knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense. He should be guided by the laws of probability.’34 Granted, one can certainly allow for epistemological debates about the best ways of gaining ‘a standard of judgment’ from ‘knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense’. Scientific inquiry into the ‘laws of probability’ for any given strate- gic question may not always be possible or appropriate. Certainly, analysis cannot and should not be presumed to trump the intuition of decision-makers. Nevertheless, Clausewitz’s implication seems to be that <u><strong><mark>the burden of proof</u></strong></mark> in any debates about planning <u><strong><mark>should belong to the decision-maker who rejects</u></strong></mark> formal analysis, standards of evidence and <u><strong><mark>probabilistic reasoning</u></strong></mark>. Ultimately, though, the value of prediction in strategic planning does not rest primarily in getting the correct answer, or even in the more feasible objective of bounding the range of correct answers. Rather, <u><strong><mark>prediction requires decision-makers to expose</u></strong></mark>, not only to others but to themselves, the beliefs they hold regarding <u><strong><mark>why a given event is likely or unlikely</u></strong></mark> and why it would be important or unimportant. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May highlight this useful property of probabilistic reasoning in their renowned study of the use of history in decision-making, Thinking in Time. In discussing the importance of probing presumptions, they contend: The need is for tests prompting questions, for sharp, straightforward mechanisms the decision makers and their aides might readily recall and use to dig into their own and each others’ presumptions. And they need tests that get at basics somewhat by indirection, not by frontal inquiry: not ‘what is your inferred causation, General?’ Above all, not, ‘what are your values, Mr. Secretary?’ ... If someone says ‘a fair chance’ ... ask, ‘if you were a betting man or woman, what odds would you put on that?’ If others are present, ask the same of each, and of yourself, too. Then probe the differences: why? This is tantamount to seeking and then arguing assumptions underlying different numbers placed on a subjective probability assessment. We know of no better way to force clarification of meanings while exposing hidden differences ... Once differing odds have been quoted, the question ‘why?’ can follow any number of tracks. Argument may pit common sense against common sense or analogy against analogy. What is important is that the expert’s basis for linking ‘if’ with ‘then’ gets exposed to the hearing of other experts before the lay official has to say yes or no.’35 There are at least three critical and related benefits of prediction in strate- gic planning. The first reflects Neustadt and May’s point – <u><strong><mark>prediction enforces</u></strong></mark> a certain level of <u><strong><mark>discipline in making explicit the assumptions</u></strong></mark>, key variables <u><strong><mark>and implied causal relationships that constitute decision-makers’ beliefs</u></strong></mark> and that might otherwise remain implicit. Imagine, for example, if Shinseki and Wolfowitz had been made to assign probabilities to their opposing expectations regarding post-war Iraq. Not only would they have had to work harder to justify their views, they might have seen more clearly the substantial chance that they were wrong and had to make greater efforts in their planning to prepare for that contingency. Secondly, the very process of making the relevant factors of a decision explicit provides a firm, or at least transparent, basis for making choices. Alternative courses of action can be compared and assessed in like terms. Third, <u><strong><mark>the transparency and discipline of the process</u></strong></mark> of arriving at the initial strategy <u><strong><mark>should heighten the decision-maker’s sensitivity toward changes in the environment that would suggest the need for adjustments</u></strong></mark> to that strategy. In this way, <u><strong><mark>prediction enhances rather than under-mines strategic flexibility</u></strong></mark>. This defence of prediction does not imply that great stakes should be gambled on narrow, singular predictions of the future. On the contrary, the central problem of uncertainty in plan- ning remains that any given prediction may simply be wrong. Preparations for those eventualities must be made. Indeed, in many cases, relatively unlikely outcomes could be enormously consequential, and therefore merit extensive preparation and investment. In order to navigate this complexity, strategists must return to the dis- tinction between uncertainty and risk. <u><strong><mark>While the complexity of the</u></strong></mark> international <u><strong><mark>security environment may make it</u></strong></mark> somewhat <u><strong><mark>resistant to</u></strong></mark> the type of <u><strong><mark>probabilistic thinking associated with risk, a risk-oriented approach seems to be the only viable model for national-security strategic planning. The alternative</u></strong></mark> approach, which categorically denies prediction, <u><strong><mark>precludes strategy</u></strong>.</mark> As Betts argues, Any assumption that some knowledge, whether intuitive or explicitly formalized, provides guidance about what should be done is a presumption that there is reason to believe the choice will produce a satisfactory outcome – that is, it is a prediction, however rough it may be. If there is no hope of discerning and manipulating causes to produce intended effects, analysts as well as politicians and generals should all quit and go fishing.36 Unless they are willing to quit and go fishing, then, strategists must sharpen their tools of risk assessment. Risk assessment comes in many varieties, but identification of two key parameters is common to all of them: the consequences of a harmful event or condition; and the likelihood of that harmful event or condition occurring. With no perspective on likelihood, a strategist can have no firm perspective on risk. With no firm perspective on risk, strategists cannot purposefully discriminate among alternative choices. Without purposeful choice, there is no strategy. One of the most widely read books in recent years on the complicated relation- ship between strategy and uncertainty is Peter Schwartz’s work on scenario-based planning, The Art of the Long View. Schwartz warns against the hazards faced by leaders who have deterministic habits of mind, or who deny the difficult implications of uncertainty for strategic planning. To overcome such tenden- cies, he advocates the use of alternative future scenarios for the purposes of examining alternative strategies. His view of scenarios is that their goal is not to predict the future, but to sensitise leaders to the highly contingent nature of their decision-making.37 This philosophy has taken root in the strategic-planning processes in the Pentagon and other parts of the US government, and properly so. Examination of alternative futures and the potential effects of surprise on current plans is essential. Appreciation of uncertainty also has a number of organisational impli- cations, many of which the national-security establishment is trying to take to heart, such as encouraging multidisciplinary study and training, enhancing information sharing, rewarding innovation, and placing a premium on speed and versatility. The arguments advanced here seek to take nothing away from these imperatives of planning and operating in an uncertain environment. But appreciation of uncertainty carries hazards of its own. <u><strong><mark>Questioning assumptions is critical, but assumptions must be made in the end</u></strong></mark>. Clausewitz’s ‘standard of judgment’ for discriminating among alternatives must be applied. Creative, unbounded speculation must resolve to choice or else there will be no strategy. Recent history suggests that <u><strong><mark>unchecked scepticism regarding the validity of prediction can marginalise analysis</u></strong></mark>, trade significant cost for ambig- uous benefit, empower parochial interests in decision-making, <u><strong><mark>and undermine flexibility</u></strong></mark>. Accordingly, having fully recognised the need to broaden their strategic-planning aperture, national-security policymakers would do well now to reinvigorate their efforts in the messy but indispensable business of predicting the future. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Rendleman 20 [Doug Rendleman. Huntley Professor, Washington and Lee University Law School. 2020. “Preserving the Nationwide National Government Injunction to Stop Illegal Executive Branch Activity.” University of Colorado Law Review. https://www.colorado.edu/law/sites/default/files/attached-files/preserving_the_nationwide_national_government_injunctiton_to_stop_illegal_executive_branch_activity_rendleman.pdf] azi fulltext: III. TRUMP CHALLENGES JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SEPARATION OF POWERS The national government injunction is one important tool among several to reduce the damage the Trump Administration has inflicted and is likely to continue to inflict. “Experience over the last two years,” Professor Steve Burbank write, “has reminded us that, in times of aspiring authoritarianism in the executive branch and serial subservience in the legislative branch, independent and accountable courts are the bulwark of our freedoms.”74 “This nation,” the Supreme Court wrote in Ex parte Milligan, “has no right to expect that it will always have wise and humane rulers, sincerely attached to the principles of the Constitution. Wicked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may fill the place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln.”75 Trump challenges the basic principles of separation of powers and judicial review: Trump once remarked, “I have an Article II, where I have the right to do whatever I want as president.”76 The desiccation of Congress at the expense of the President set the stage for President Trump’s executive activity. Trump is taking advantage of past Congresses’ excessive delegations of power to the executive branch to implement his autocratic and authoritarian views. His measures threaten democratic institutions. The Republican party has been unwilling to challenge Trump’s measures. History provides no guidance.77 Trump’s executive orders challenge the rule of law: the principle that “every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals” and is responsible for “every act done without legal justification.”78 Professor Driesen examined the executive orders and concluded that Trump’s “collection of decrees poses an unprecedented challenge to our constitutional democracy as a system.”79 Judge Gertner wrote, “[A]ll of this may look different with new Trump appointees emboldened . . . on an explicit mission to transform the decisional law. Their goal may be to change the prevailing assumptions of the past thirty years—about civil rights, the rights of criminal defendants, checks and balances, etc.”80 For example, the Trump Administration’s immigration policy of “zero-tolerance,” its separation of children from their parents, and its begrudging obedience to court orders to reunite the families are unique in their overreach and long-term harm to the children.81 The Trump Administration’s contempt for and disregard of separation of powers and the rule of law differs in kind from the preceding administration’s approach. The Obama and Trump Administrations should not be equated.82 Federal judges have ruled against the Trump administration at least 63 times over the past two years, an extraordinary record of legal defeat that has stymied large parts of the president’s agenda on the environment, immigration and other matters. . . . . . . . . . .[T]he rulings so far paint a remarkable portrait of a government rushing to implement far-reaching changes in policy without regard for long-standing rules against arbitrary and capricious behavior.83 Trump is the President our forefathers warned us against.84 Madison and Hamilton feared concentrated power. As the Seventh Circuit noted in City of Chicago v. Sessions: The founders of our country well understood that the concentration of power threatens individual liberty and established a bulwark against such tyranny by creating a separation of powers among the branches of government. If the Executive Branch can determine policy, and then use the power of the purse to mandate compliance with that policy by the state and local governments, all without the authorization or even acquiescence of elected legislators, the check against tyranny is forsaken.85 Former federal District Judge Nancy Gertner concluded that the “challenges to checks and balances, to the separation of powers, even to elementary notions of federalism, are not abstract but concrete; not aberrant but systemic.”86 Trump’s excesses are not the reason for the national government injunction, but they illustrate why courts need the national government injunction as an available judicial remedy. Trump’s disregard for the integrity of democratic institutions, norms, processes, and rules threatens our constitutional order and the rule of law. His authoritarian, unilateralist approach to government threatens government by decree. His impulsive disrespect for the traditional limits on his office has opened a new frontier in executive overreach.87 Will the constitutional system of separation of powers, an independent judiciary, federalism, and freedom of speech provide accountability?88 In 2019, Trump’s complete opposition to congressional oversight subpoenas opened a new chapter in the question of continuing obedience to court orders.89 Trump’s refusal to cooperate with the House of Representatives’ inquiry seeking testimony and documents as part of the impeachment process raised questions about the executive branch’s willingness to obey court orders and injunctions. In response to one refusal, Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote: [B]latant defiance of Congress’ centuries-old power to compel the performance of witnesses is not an abstract injury, nor is it a mere banal insult to our democracy. It is an affront to the mechanism for curbing abuses of power that the Framers carefully crafted for our protection, and, thereby, recalcitrant witnesses actually undermine the broader interests of the People of the United States.90 If it occurs, disobedience will undermine the integrity of the law and the public’s respect for it.91 Does the executive branch accept a powerful and independent judiciary? The Trump Administration has thus far complied with every national government injunction against it.92 Professor Parrillo is less optimistic about obedience. Parrillo wrote that contempt’s shaming power depends on how deeply and exclusively the defendant official is committed to the group(s) that hold dear the norm. . . . . . . . Rising partisan polarization could, ultimately, diminish the shaming power of contempt findings if people affiliated with a political party come to dismiss any contempt finding that goes against officials of their party.93 Whether that prediction describes the present state of the Trump Administration’s recalcitrance and polarization remains to be seen. Then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions did not realize he was supporting this Article’s concern about Trump’s improper activity when he said of national government injunctions that “[t]his kind of judicial activism did not happen a single time in our first 175 years as a nation, but it has become common in recent years. It has happened to the Trump administration 25 times in less than two years.”94 This Article was written in 2018 and 2019 in the hope that, after the 2020 election, much of it will have become obsolete because the United States will have returned to a “normal” level of executive lawbreaking, with the federal court’s injunction remedy intact.95 This Article’s central idea is that Trump’s threat to the Constitution and basic liberties needs to be curbed. The nationwide national government injunction is one part of that effort. As King Henry cried in Shakespeare’s Henry V: “Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more.”96<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><u>Unrestrained</u> executive threatens <u>democratic</u> <u>institutions</u> and NGI reverse casually <u>solves</u> BUT Trump is a symptom <u>not</u> the disease. </h4><p><strong>Rendleman 20</strong> [Doug Rendleman. Huntley Professor, Washington and Lee University Law School. 2020. “Preserving the Nationwide National Government Injunction to Stop Illegal Executive Branch Activity.” University of Colorado Law Review. https://www.colorado.edu/law/sites/default/files/attached-files/preserving_the_nationwide_national_government_injunctiton_to_stop_illegal_executive_branch_activity_rendleman.pdf] azi</p><p>III. TRUMP CHALLENGES JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SEPARATION OF POWERS</p><p><u>The <strong><mark>n</mark>ational <mark>g</mark>overnment <mark>i</mark>njunction is one <mark>important tool</strong> </mark>among several to reduce the damage the Trump Administration has inflicted</u> and is likely to continue to inflict. “<u>Experience over the last two years</u>,” Professor Steve Burbank write, “<u>has reminded us that, in times of aspiring authoritarianism in the executive branch and serial subservience in the legislative branch,<strong> independent and <mark>accountable courts </mark>are the <mark>bulwark of </mark>our <mark>freedoms</u></strong></mark>.”74 “This nation,” the Supreme Court wrote in Ex parte Milligan, “has no right to expect that it will always have wise and humane rulers, sincerely attached to the principles of the Constitution. Wicked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may fill the place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln.”75</p><p><u>Trump <mark>challenges </mark>the <strong>basic principles of <mark>s</mark>eparation <mark>o</mark>f <mark>p</mark>owers and judicial review</strong>:</u> Trump once remarked, “I have an Article II, where I have the right to do whatever I want as president.”76</p><p><u>The <strong><mark>desiccation of Congress at</mark> the <mark>expense of </mark>the <mark>President set the stage</strong> </mark>for </u>President <u>Trump’s executive activity. </u>Trump is <u>taking advantage of <strong>past Congresses’ excessive delegations of power to the executive branch</strong> to implement his autocratic and authoritarian views. His <mark>measures <strong>threaten democratic institutions</strong></mark>. </u>The Republican party has been unwilling to challenge Trump’s measures. History provides no guidance.77</p><p><u>Trump’s <strong>executive orders challenge the rule of law</u></strong>: the principle <u>that “every man</u>, whatever be his rank or condition, <u>is subject to the ordinary law</u> of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals” and is responsible for “every act done without legal justification.”78 Professor <u>Driesen examined the executive orders and concluded that Trump’s “<strong><mark>collection of decrees poses </mark>an <mark>unprecedented challenge to </mark>our constitutional <mark>democracy</strong> </mark>as a system.”</u>79 Judge Gertner wrote, “[A]ll of this may look different with new Trump appointees emboldened . . . on an explicit mission to transform the decisional law. Their goal may be to change the prevailing assumptions of the past thirty years—about civil rights, the rights of criminal defendants, checks and balances, etc.”80</p><p><u>For example, the Trump Administration’s immigration policy of “zero-tolerance,”</u> its separation of children from their parents, and its begrudging obedience to court orders to reunite the families <u>are unique in their overreach and long-term harm to the children.</u>81 The <u>Trump Administration’s contempt for and disregard of separation of powers and the rule of law differs in kind from the preceding administration</u>’s approach. The Obama and Trump Administrations should not be equated.82</p><p><u>Federal judges have ruled against the Trump administration at least 63 times</u> over the past two years, an extraordinary record of legal defeat that has stymied large parts of the president’s agenda on the environment, immigration and other matters. . . . . . . .</p><p>. . <u>.[T]he rulings so far paint a remarkable portrait of a government rushing to implement far-reaching changes in policy <strong>without regard for long-standing rules against arbitrary and capricious behavior</strong>.83</p><p></u>Trump is the President our forefathers warned us against.84 <u>Madison and Hamilton feared concentrated power. As the Seventh</u> <u>Circuit</u> <u>noted in City of Chicago v. Sessions: </p><p>The <mark>founders </mark>of our country</u> <u>well <mark>understood </mark>that <strong>the <mark>concentration of power threatens </mark>individual <mark>liberty</strong> </mark>and established a bulwark against such tyranny by creating a separation of powers</u> among the branches of government. <u><mark>If </mark>the <mark>Executive </mark>Branch <mark>can determine policy</mark>, and then use the power of the purse to mandate compliance</u> with that policy by the state and local governments, <u>all <mark>without </mark>the <mark>authorization </mark>or even acquiescence of elected legislators, <mark>the check </mark>against tyranny <mark>is forsaken</mark>.</u>85</p><p><u>Former federal District Judge</u> Nancy <u>Gertner concluded that the “<strong><mark>challenges to checks and balances</mark>, to the separation of powers, <mark>even </mark>to <mark>elementary </mark>notions of federalism, <mark>are </mark>not abstract but <mark>concrete</mark>; not aberrant but <mark>systemic</strong></mark>.”</u>86</p><p><u><mark>Trump</mark>’s excesses</u> are not the reason for the national government injunction, but they <u><strong><mark>illustrate why courts need </mark>the <mark>n</mark>ational <mark>g</mark>overnment <mark>i</mark>njunction</strong> as an available judicial remedy.</u> <u>Trump’s <mark>disregard for </mark>the integrity of democratic institutions, <mark>norms</mark>, processes, and rules <strong><mark>threatens </mark>our <mark>constitutional order and </mark>the <mark>r</mark>ule <mark>o</mark>f <mark>l</mark>aw.</u></strong> <u>His</u> <u>authoritarian, unilateralist approach to government threatens government by decree</u>. <u>His impulsive disrespect</u> for the traditional limits on his office has <u><strong><mark>opened </mark>a <mark>new frontier in </mark>executive <mark>overreach</strong></mark>.</u>87 Will the constitutional system of separation of powers, an independent judiciary, federalism, and freedom of speech provide accountability?88</p><p>In 2019, Trump’s complete opposition to congressional oversight subpoenas opened a new chapter in the question of continuing obedience to court orders.89 Trump’s refusal to cooperate with the House of Representatives’ inquiry seeking testimony and documents as part of the impeachment process raised questions about the executive branch’s willingness to obey court orders and injunctions. In response to one refusal, Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote:</p><p><u>[B]latant defiance of Congress’ centuries-old power to compel the performance of witnesses <strong>is <mark>not </mark>an abstract injury, nor is it a <mark>mere </mark>banal <mark>insult to </mark>our <mark>democracy</strong></mark>. It is an <strong><mark>affront to </mark>the <mark>mechanism for curbing abuses </mark>of power</strong> that the Framers carefully crafted for our protection</u>, and, thereby, recalcitrant witnesses actually undermine the broader interests of the People of the United States.90</p><p>If it occurs, disobedience will undermine the integrity of the law and the public’s respect for it.91</p><p><u>Does the executive branch accept a powerful and independent judiciary? The <strong><mark>Trump </mark>Administration has thus far <mark>complied with every n</mark>ational <mark>g</mark>overnment <mark>i</mark>njunction</strong> against it.</u>92 Professor Parrillo is less optimistic about obedience. Parrillo wrote that contempt’s shaming power</p><p>depends on how deeply and exclusively the defendant official is committed to the group(s) that hold dear the norm.</p><p>. . . .</p><p>. . . Rising partisan polarization could, ultimately, diminish the shaming power of contempt findings if people affiliated with a political party come to dismiss any contempt finding that goes against officials of their party.93</p><p>Whether that prediction describes the present state of the Trump Administration’s recalcitrance and polarization remains to be seen.</p><p>Then-Attorney General <u>Jeff Sessions did not realize he was supporting this Article’s concern about Trump’s improper activity when he said of national government injunctions that <strong>“[t]his kind of judicial activism did not happen a single time in our first 175 years</strong> as a nation, but it has become common in recent years.</u> </p><p>It has happened to the Trump administration 25 times in less than two years.”94 This Article was written in 2018 and 2019 in the hope that, after the 2020 election, much of it will have become obsolete because the United States will have returned to a “normal” level of executive lawbreaking, with the federal court’s injunction remedy intact.95</p><p>This Article’s central idea is that Trump’s threat to the Constitution and basic liberties needs to be curbed. The nationwide national government injunction is one part of that effort. As King Henry cried in Shakespeare’s Henry V: “Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more.”96</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Dornis ’21 [Tim; January 29; PhD, Professor of Law at Leuphana Law School and Global Professor of Law at NYU School of Law; European Intellectual Property Review, “Of ‘Authorless Works’ and ‘Inventions without Inventor’ – The Muddy Waters of ‘AI Autonomy’ in Intellectual Property Doctrine,” forthcoming 2021] fulltext: To start, the patentability requirement of non-obviousness of the invention – or that the invention must involve a so-called inventive step – implies a minimum of technical creativity.114 This minimum has sometimes been prosaically described as a ‘scintilla of invention’.115 Determining the de minimis threshold depends not on the inventor’s ingenious accomplishment, her hard work and diligence, or her showing of actual cost, effort, and investment,116 but rather on her contribution to the finding of a solution. In other words, the analytical focus is on the process of inventing, in which the inventor must be actively involved and in which she shapes the outcome.117 Most essentially, to determine the quality of the de minimis contribution to the invention, a distinction must be made between the ‘problem’ and the ‘solution’ of the invention.118 The former designates the specific technical problem and, at the same time, the effects and success of the invention as a solution to this problem.119 Once the problem has been determined, consideration is given to the solution, namely whether it is obvious.120 The solution refers to the technical and instrumental means employed to accomplish the in- vention’s success.121 It is the search for and the finding of a solution that is decisive for the inventive step. In principle, there can also exist a ‘problem invention’, particularly when the solution to a problem is trivial and obvious but the problem as such is not obvious in light of the state of the art.122 However, exclusively looking at the problem is usually not sufficient for finding an inventive step. This is due to the fact that finding and explaining a problem as such will usually have to be considered to be within the routine of a person skilled in the art. It thus cannot be inventive.123 Accordingly, the inventive step cannot lie in the problem but must be found in the solution alone.124 In essence, such a functional perspective on the solution of a technical problem also prevails in US patent law, where the so-called conception of the invention is the touchstone of inventorship.125 The con- ception as an essential element of an invention refers to ‘the formation in the mind of the inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention as it is thereafter to be applied in practice’.126 A closer look at scenarios of inventive collaboration between two or more human actors helps explain the structure of the solution and conception requirement: In order to be found an inventor or co-inventor, a person must have significantly con- tributed to the development of the invention and its concept.127 Merely providing mone- tary, manual, or technical support does not qualify an actor as an inventor or a co-inven- tor.128 Furthermore, providing information that describes the state of the art, explaining the technical problem, formulating the task, or defining the expected results of an in- ventive endeavour does not make one a co-inventor.129 Rather, participation must be substantial, meaning that the person must actually contribute to searching for and finding a solution – hence, a contribution to the concept of the invention.130 Against this backdrop, we can see that AI-generated solutions to technical problems cannot be attributed to a human programmer, data trainer, or user of the AI application: To start with programming and data training, some have suggested that a sufficient contribution to the invention should be seen in programming, data training, or design and adaptation of the AI application and its processes to an inventive setting.131 Yet this approach overlooks the importance of a de minimis contribution to the search process and to the finding of a solution. Of course, the programmer and data trainer may conceive of the technical settings and feed in the seed information, but their preparatory activity does no more than provide the AI application with access to the state of the art.132 After all, their initial ‘creation’ of the application is just the starting point for the algorithmic pro- cesses searching for a solution. Accordingly, neither programming nor data training will directly effectuate or shape the outcome of the search.133 This task is handed over to the non-deterministic evolution of the algorithm. Modern AI applications are intentionally designed to develop beyond the framework of their initial program code and database. They inevitably exceed and break free of the human-made enclosure.134 Since such AI- driven search processes are not controlled by human actors, the results and outcomes are not predictable. Thus, as with creative AI production, even if the AI application is only autonomous in an incomplete, weak, and technical sense,135 the nexus between the human contribution to the search process and the ultimate finding of a solution is severed during the AI’s evolution and transformation. In this context, it is evident that simply pushing the on/off button does not substantially contribute to the AI application’s search for an inventive solution. Additionally, if the human contribution is limited to mere recognition of the results of an AI application’s search processes, there will be no human contribution prior to or during the search pro- cess. What’s more, in such a scenario, the specific human contribution is not even causally related to the outcome of the AI application’s search for a solution. A practical illustration can be seen in the Oral-B CrossAction toothbrush that was de- signed by the ‘Creativity Machine’. It was the AI’s developer, Stephen Thaler, who de- scribed the problem and set the task of searching for a brush design with specifically de- termined properties. He also provided a dataset of information on solutions that had al- ready been implemented in practice (hence, he delivered the dataset). Yet he left the search for a solution – and, thus, the inventive activity – to the AI application and its ar- tificial neural network. It was Thaler’s machine that came up with the result.136 Since it developed the solution from within its evolutionary process, neither the development nor the preparation and adaption of the AI application to the task can be regarded as a sufficient contribution under the doctrine of patent law.137 Additional examples of such ‘emancipated’ AI search processes can be found in the field of pharmaceutical and medical research and development.138 In patent law, finally, similar to copyrights,139 a glance at the consequences of implementing the misguided inventing-through-recognizing approach can further illustrate the doctrinal distortion looming: First, as in copyright cases, an approach basing inventorship or co-inventorship on the mere conception of an invention – e.g., by deeming programming or data training suffi- cient – would run into a post-mortem invention paradox. Here as well, one should consider the possibility that an inventive AI application might continue inventing after the death of its programmer or data trainer. Obviously, such a solution would require the fiction of a programmer’s or developer’s complete and perfect ‘conception’ of all thinkable future inventions that the application will ever make. This conception would have to be fictionalized as having existed at the time of the AI application’s completion or first use, even if transformation and evolution of the application might still take place afterwards. Moreover, in patent law as in copyright doctrine, both the conception-of-the-search and the recognition-of-the-solution approach severely distort settled doctrine in scenarios in- volving two or more human actors working on an invention. If a contribution in the run-up to the inventive process, like the conception of an AI application’s program and design, suffices to grant a patent to the programmer, there is no reason not to apply this approach in cases with two or more human actors. Then, however, one would have to grant co-inventor status to actors who contributed to the finding of the problem or to the formulation of the task or of the search concept. But as we have seen, none of these activities is considered a sufficient contribution to the solution and, hence, an inventive step.140 Allowing mere recognition of a solution to suffice would be even more distortive: After all, any subsequent ‘recognizer’ of a human-found solution would have to be considered a co-inventor alongside the ‘normal inventor’.141 Under all these approaches, in the end, the assignment of patent rights would be left to happenstance and manipulation.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>AI inventions <u>distort</u> the <u>touchstone</u> of patent doctrine---solutions based on finding the ‘<u>nearest person</u>’ pervert the law. </h4><p><strong>Dornis ’21</strong> [Tim; January 29; PhD, Professor of Law at Leuphana Law School and Global Professor of Law at NYU School of Law; European Intellectual Property Review, “Of ‘Authorless Works’ and ‘Inventions without Inventor’ – The Muddy Waters of ‘AI Autonomy’ in Intellectual Property Doctrine,” forthcoming 2021] </p><p>To start, the <u>patentability requirement of <strong>non-obviousness</u></strong> of the invention – or that the invention must involve a so-called inventive step – <u>implies</u> a <u><strong>minimum</u></strong> of technical <u><strong>creativity</u></strong>.114 This <u>minimum</u> has sometimes <u>been</u> prosaically <u>described as</u> a ‘<u><strong>scintilla</strong> of invention</u>’.115 <u>Determining</u> the <u><strong><mark>de minimis</u></strong></mark> threshold <u><mark>depends</mark> not <mark>on</mark> the inventor’s ingenious accomplishment</u>, her hard work and diligence, or her showing of actual cost, effort, and investment,116 <u>but</u> rather on her <u><strong><mark>contribution</strong> to</u></mark> the finding of a <u><mark>solution</u></mark>. In other words, the analytical focus is on the process of inventing, in which the inventor must be actively involved and in which she shapes the outcome.117 Most essentially, to determine the quality of the de minimis contribution to the invention, a <u>distinction must be made between</u> the ‘<u><strong>problem</u></strong>’ <u>and</u> the ‘<u><strong>solution</u></strong>’ <u>of</u> the <u>invention</u>.118 The former designates the specific technical problem and, at the same time, the effects and success of the invention as a solution to this problem.119 Once the problem has been determined, consideration is given to the solution, namely whether it is obvious.120 The solution refers to the technical and instrumental means employed to accomplish the in- vention’s success.121 It is the search for and the finding of a solution that is decisive for the inventive step. In principle, there can also exist a ‘problem invention’, particularly when the solution to a problem is trivial and obvious but the problem as such is not obvious in light of the state of the art.122 However, <u><strong><mark>exclusively</strong> looking at</mark> the <mark>problem is</u></mark> usually <u><strong><mark>not sufficient</strong> for</mark> finding</u> an <u><strong><mark>inventive step</u></strong></mark>. This is due to the fact that <u><strong><mark>finding</u></strong></mark> and explaining a <u>problem as such will</u> usually <u>have to be considered to be within</u> the <u><strong>routine</strong> of</u> a <u><strong>p</strong>ers<strong>o</strong>n <strong>s</strong>killed <strong>i</strong>n <strong>t</strong>he <strong>a</strong>rt. It thus <strong><mark>cannot</strong> be inventive</u></mark>.123 Accordingly, the <u>inventive step</u> cannot lie in the problem but <u><strong>must</strong> be found in the solution <strong>alone</u></strong>.124 In essence, <u>such a functional perspective</u> on the solution of a technical problem also <u><strong>prevails</strong> in US <strong>patent law</strong>, where</u> the so-called <u><strong><mark>conception</u></strong></mark> of the invention <u><mark>is</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>touchstone</strong></mark> of inventorship</u>.125 The con- ception as an essential element of an invention refers to ‘the formation in the mind of the inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention as it is thereafter to be applied in practice’.126 A closer look at scenarios of inventive collaboration between two or more human actors helps explain the structure of the solution and conception requirement: In order to be found an inventor or co-inventor, a person must have significantly con- tributed to the development of the invention and its concept.127 Merely providing mone- tary, manual, or technical support does not qualify an actor as an inventor or a co-inven- tor.128 Furthermore, providing information that describes the state of the art, explaining the technical problem, formulating the task, or defining the expected results of an in- ventive endeavour does not make one a co-inventor.129 Rather, participation must be substantial, meaning that the person must actually contribute to searching for and finding a solution – hence, a contribution to the concept of the invention.130 Against this backdrop, we can see that <u><mark>AI</mark>-generated <strong><mark>solutions</u></strong></mark> to technical problems <u><mark>cannot be</mark> attributed to</u> a <u><strong><mark>human</u></strong></mark> programmer, data trainer, or user of the AI application: To start with programming and data training, <u><mark>some</u></mark> have <u><mark>suggested</u></mark> that a <u><strong>sufficient</strong> contribution to the invention should be seen in <strong><mark>programming</u></strong></mark>, data <u><strong>training</strong>, or <strong>design</u></strong> and adaptation <u>of</u> the <u>AI</u> application and its processes to an inventive setting.131 <u><strong><mark>Yet</strong> this</mark> approach <strong><mark>overlooks</u></strong></mark> the <u>importance of a <strong><mark>de minimis</strong> contribution</mark> to</u> the search process and to the finding of a <u><strong>solution</strong>. Of course</u>, the <u>programmer and</u> data <u>trainer may conceive of the technical <strong>settings</strong> and feed</u> in the <u><strong>seed info</u></strong>rmation, <u>but their preparatory activity does no more than provide the AI</u> application <u>with access to</u> the state of the <u>art</u>.132 After all, their initial ‘creation’ of the application is just the starting point for the algorithmic pro- cesses searching for a solution. Accordingly, <u><mark>neither <strong>programming</u></strong> <u>nor</u></mark> data <u><strong><mark>training</strong></mark> will directly effectuate or <mark>shape</mark> the <strong><mark>outcome</u></strong></mark> of the search.133 This <u>task is handed over to the non-deterministic <strong>evolution</strong> of the algorithm</u>. Modern <u><mark>AI</u></mark> applications <u>are <strong>intentionally</strong> designed to <mark>develop <strong>beyond</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong>framework</strong> of</u> their <u>initial</u> program <u><strong><mark>code</u></strong></mark> and database. <u>They inevitably <strong>exceed</u></strong> and break free <u>of the human-made enclosure</u>.134 <u>Since such AI</u>- driven search <u>processes are not controlled by <strong>human</u></strong> actor<u><strong>s</u></strong>, the results and <u><mark>outcomes</mark> are <strong><mark>not predictable</u></strong></mark>. Thus, as with creative AI production, even if the AI application is only autonomous in an incomplete, weak, and technical sense,135 the <u><strong><mark>nexus</strong> between</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>human</mark> contribution</u></strong> to the search process <u><mark>and</u></mark> the ultimate <u>finding of</u> a <u><mark>solution is <strong>severed</strong></mark> during the AI’s evolution</u> and transformation. In this context, it is evident that <u>simply pushing the <strong>on/off button</strong> does not</u> substantially <u>contribute to the AI</u> application<u>’s search for</u> an <u><strong>inventive solution</u></strong>. Additionally, <u>if the human contribution is limited to mere <strong>recognition</strong> of the results of</u> an <u>AI</u> application’s search processes, <u>there will be <strong>no</strong> human contribution prior to or during</u> the <u>search</u> pro- cess. What’s more, in such a scenario, the specific <u><mark>human</mark> contribution is <strong><mark>not</strong> even</mark> <strong>causally <mark>related</u></strong> <u>to</mark> the <mark>outcome</u></mark> of the AI application’s search for a solution. A practical illustration can be seen in the Oral-B CrossAction toothbrush that was de- signed by the ‘Creativity Machine’. It was the AI’s developer, Stephen <u>Thaler</u>, who de- scribed the problem and set the task of searching for a brush design with specifically de- termined properties. He also provided a dataset of information on solutions that had al- ready been implemented in practice (hence, he delivered the dataset). Yet he <u>left the search for a <strong>solution</u></strong> – and, thus, the inventive activity – <u>to</u> the <u><strong>AI</u></strong> application and its ar- tificial neural network. It was <u>Thaler’s machine</u> that <u>came up with the result</u>.136 Since it developed the solution from within its evolutionary process, neither the development nor the preparation and adaption of the AI application to the task can be regarded as a sufficient contribution under the doctrine of patent law.137 <u><strong>Additional</strong> <mark>examples of</u></mark> such ‘<u><strong>emancipated</u></strong>’ <u>AI search processes can be <mark>found in</u></mark> the field of <u><strong><mark>pharma</u></strong></mark>ceutical <u><mark>and</u> <u><strong>medical</mark> research</u></strong> and development.138 <u>In <strong>patent law</u></strong>, finally, similar to copyrights,139 <u>a glance at the <strong>consequences</strong> of <mark>implementing</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>misguided</strong></mark> inventing-through-recognizing <mark>approach</mark> can</u> further <u><mark>illustrate</u></mark> the <u><strong>doctrinal <mark>distortion</strong></mark> looming: </u>First, as in copyright cases, an approach basing inventorship or co-inventorship on the mere conception of an invention – e.g., by deeming programming or data training suffi- cient – would run into a post-mortem invention paradox. Here as well, one should consider the possibility that an <u>inventive <mark>AI</u></mark> application <u><mark>might</u> <u><strong>continue</strong> inventing after</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>death</strong> of</mark> its <mark>programmer</u></mark> or data trainer. Obviously, <u>such a solution would <strong><mark>require</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>fiction</strong> of</mark> a programmer’s or <mark>developer’s</mark> <strong>complete</u></strong> and perfect ‘<u><strong><mark>conception</u></strong></mark>’ <u><mark>of <strong>all</strong></mark> thinkable future <mark>inventions</u></mark> that the <u>application will ever make</u>. This <u>conception would</u> have to <u>be</u> <u><strong>fictionalized</u></strong> as having existed at the time of the AI application’s completion or first use, <u>even if</u> transformation and <u><strong>evolution</strong> of the application might</u> still <u>take place <strong>afterwards</u></strong>. Moreover, <u>in <strong>patent law</u></strong> as in copyright doctrine, <u><mark>both</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>conception</strong>-of</mark>-the-<strong><mark>search</strong> and</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>recognition</strong>-of-</mark>the-<strong><mark>solution</strong></mark> approach <mark>severely distort</mark> <strong>settled <mark>doctrine</u></strong></mark> in scenarios in- volving two or more human actors working on an invention. <u>If</u> a <u>contribution in</u> the <u><strong>run-up</strong> to the inventive process, like</u> the <u>conception of an AI</u> application’s <u><strong>program</u></strong> and design, <u><strong>suffices</strong> to grant a patent to the programmer, there is <strong>no reason</strong> not to apply this</u> approach <u>in cases with</u> two or <u>more <strong>human</strong> actor<strong>s</strong>. Then</u>, however, <u>one would have to grant <strong>co-inventor</strong> status to actors who <strong>contributed</strong> to the finding of</u> the <u><strong>problem</strong> or to</u> the <u><strong>formulation</strong> of the task</u> or of the search concept. <u><mark>But</u></mark> as we have seen, <u><strong><mark>none</strong></mark> of these activities <mark>is</mark> considered a <strong><mark>sufficient</u></strong></mark> contribution to the solution and, hence, an <u>inventive step</u>.140 <u><mark>Allowing</mark> mere <strong><mark>recognition</u></strong></mark> of a solution <u>to suffice <mark>would be</mark> even <strong>more <mark>distortive</u></strong></mark>: After all, <u><strong>any</strong> subsequent ‘recognizer’ of a <strong>human</strong>-found <strong>solution</strong> would have to be considered a <strong>co-inventor</u></strong> alongside the ‘normal inventor’.141 Under all these approaches, in the end, the assignment of <u><mark>patent</mark> right<mark>s</mark> would be <mark>left to</mark> <strong>happenstance</strong> and <strong><mark>manipulation</u></strong></mark>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Korowicz 20. David Korowicz, Director of Risk and Response @ the Geneva Global Initiative, (3-4-2020, "We Need to Talk About Catastrophic Global Risk," Resilience, https://www.resilience.org/stories/2020-03-04/we-need-to-talk-about-catastrophic-global-risk/)//pacc fulltext: Because society depends upon multiple interacting networks, within cities and across the globe, there are many routes to cascading disruption. This is an example of non-linearity- a relatively small number of directly impacted people or functions can still cause the failure of a whole system. The speed of our societal processes, from Just-in-Time logistics to financial transactions means that shocks can rapidly cascade. We can think of society as an ecosystem, with keystone species providing the structural anchors through which society functions. Such keystones include critical infrastructure (the grid, telecommunications, water and sanitation etc.); the financial system; societal cohesion; supply-chains, and environmental inputs (food, oil, water etc.). These are also interdependent with each other, if you remove any one of them, the others will topple. This allows us to see other paths toward systemic failure. A severe solar storm, natural disaster, or a major physical-cyber-attack on the grid provides one avenue to large-scale critical infrastructure failure. The President’s National Infrastructure Advisory Council 2018 report[v] examined the United States preparedness for a prolonged wide-area catastrophic power outage. Again, it would undermine societal integration and lifeline operations. Depending upon the centrality of the impacted region/ networks to global systems integration, it could drive global process contagion and systemic failure. Growing international tensions are therefore adding to this risk. A massive cyber-attack or war between parties with high global centrality becomes everybody’s problem- even the toe is in trouble if the heart goes to war with the liver. The global financial system is also an increasing source of catastrophic risk, it’s the operating system for the flow of goods and services. It is massively overindebted (there are far more claims on future economic growth than can ever be delivered) and it is losing resilience as monetary policy becomes less effective, and polarization within countries and discord between them intensifies. Indeed, this is what is increasing general vulnerability to supply-chain contagion from a pandemic or other catastrophic shock. It now faces the convergence of growing climate change and environment related impacts, multi-dimensional threats to food security, potential critical resource constraints, and the feedback of those stressors on socio-political stability and conflict. A global financial system collapse would be similar to a catastrophic pandemic collapse, just an inversion of the initiating shock- a financial-system supply-chain cross-contagion. Pandemic risk is also growing. It may not be COVID-19 but someday, somewhere, a virus with high infectivity and virulence will emerge with potentially catastrophic consequences for our species. Urbanization, a large-scale animal food industry, intensive transportation networks, advances in widely accessible biotechnology, our increasing incursion into animal habitats, the expanding impacts of climate and environmental change, and the growing likelihood of socio-political instability are increasing the likelihood of such an emergence. The Age of Destabilization The recovery from the COVID-19 shock will be slow. In addition, there is potential for further pandemic waves. It may also contribute to the generation of new stresses and shocks later in the year. For example, the disruptions to agricultural production in China and elsewhere (due to COVID-19), Australia[vi] (drought influenced by climate change), East Africa (locust plague influenced by climate change) is more likely to be further compounded by other climate impacts as yet unrealised[vii]. A rise in the cost of staples on global food markets is more likely to drive social unrest and even state failure in poorer countries[viii], generating new stresses through global systems. This would increase stress even in rich countries, with more of the population struggling to get by, and feeling the effects of a slowing global economy in addition to the economic impacts of COVID-19. It could be expected to squeeze discretionary income, putting further pressure on economies and the financial system, and increase social tensions. This is but one speculative path, there are innumerable potential interactions and a myriad of potential tail risks. Whatever path the global economy takes in the next year, it will bequeath an even more fragile economic and financial system that is already facing mounting risks from climate change related impacts[ix]. There are increasing risks to global food production with many drivers in addition to climate change[x]. The multi-dimensional impacts of declining biodiversity to socio-economic stability are accelerating[xi]. The security impacts of climate change are growing[xii], while societal polarization and loss of trust continues[xiii]. Though receiving little attention and much misunderstood, there are major reasons to be concerned about the ability to sustain affordable oil production[xiv]. Food, oil, water, a functioning financial system, a stable environment for societal infrastructures (relative to the conditions in which they evolved), and large-scale societal cooperation are individually critical for the stability of global systems integration. We are seeing intensifying stresses on all fronts. Further, stresses in each will tend to further increase pressures on the others. These stressors are intensifying their interactions through increasingly vulnerable civilizational networks. Society, locked into systems of dependency adaptive to system stability with correspondingly low resilience, is vulnerable to Liebig’s Law. In such an environment, economic growth is persistently undermined, there is increased socio-economic stress, while the intensity and frequency of shocks increases. This creates the conditions for rapid and diverse local and globalised contagion, compounding, simultaneous crises, and the generation of new stresses and shocks. General systemic instability, volatility and uncertainty accelerates, and future expectations become more pessimistic. The impacts are likely to become more non-linear, with associated tipping points. Losing a thousand euros means different things depending on whether it’s your first, or last. Even more so if your rent is late and eviction beckons, a family member is sick and needs medicine, and those who once might have supported you, be it friends or state, are themselves overwhelmed. Similar scenarios could be drawn for any scale of societal systems. As the need to build resilience into existing systems becomes more apparent, our capacity to invest -in inventories, flood defenses, and critical infrastructure redundancy is more difficult, as incomes fall, affordable financing becomes scarce or non-existent, and the ability to produce and access constituent inputs becomes uncertain. Further, in an increasingly stressed and volatile environment, the necessity of maintaining existing systems and expectations is more likely to take precedence over investments in future resilience. For example, our food systems are very vulnerable, but making them more resilient at scale would raise food prices. Yet if food prices are already high due to production/ distribution constraints, and/or if incomes are falling and governments’ intervention capacity is already strained, adding further to food prices risks potentially intensifying present crisis (food prices having highly non-linear societal impacts), to marginally ameliorate a future crisis. In such contexts, people tend to become even more present focused. This is a feature of civilizational lock-in, we become trapped within increasingly dangerous systems of complex dependency as our adaptive capacity becomes further undermined. Prolonged low and declining growth, rising socio-economic stress and volatility, growing asymmetric downside uncertainty, declining resilience and adaptive capacity and intensifying stressors create the conditions for catastrophic financial system failure. This means we may have a declining window of opportunity, both in terms of time, and capacity to deploy resources, to prepare ourselves to avoid the very worst of consequences. Preparing for What? Societies’ capacities to deal with stress, shocks, and catastrophes are primarily shaped by their historical experiences. This includes the type, likelihood, and impacts that might be anticipated; the resilience of society and infrastructures; the scale and role of contingency and preparedness within the wider government and society; and the range of scenarios that have been planned for and exercised. Governments, societies, and expert communities are often slow to recognize a changing paradigm, especially when it comes into conflict with established expectations, worldviews, sunk costs, analytic traditions, and institutional lock-in. Our experience of and habituation to broad societal stability, the relative invisibility of the structural and dynamical foundations of societal operations, dysfunctional economic risk models, and our siloed approach to individual stressors means society may be seriously underestimating global and catastrophic risk. We need to consider our transforming risk environment from an integrated perspective: the interactions of a growing range and intensity of stressors, environmental and socio-economic, through increasingly brittle societal systems[xv].<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>COVID’s getting worse---<u>timeframe</u> is fast. </h4><p><strong>Korowicz 20.</strong> David Korowicz, Director of Risk and Response @ the Geneva Global Initiative, (3-4-2020, "We Need to Talk About Catastrophic Global Risk," Resilience, https://www.resilience.org/stories/2020-03-04/we-need-to-talk-about-catastrophic-global-risk/)//pacc</p><p><u>Because society depends upon multiple interacting networks</u>, within cities and across the globe, <u>there are</u> many routes to <u><strong>cascading disruption</u></strong>. <u>This is</u> an example of <u><strong>non-linear</u></strong>ity- <u>a relatively small number of directly impacted people or functions can still cause the failure of a <strong>whole system</u></strong>. <u><mark>The <strong>speed</strong> of</mark> our societal processes, from Just-in-Time logistics to <strong>financial <mark>transactions</strong> means</mark> that <mark>shocks</mark> can <strong><mark>rapidly cascade</u></strong></mark>. We can think of society as an ecosystem, with keystone species providing the structural anchors through which society functions. Such keystones include critical infrastructure (the grid, telecommunications, water and sanitation etc.); the financial system; societal cohesion; supply-chains, and environmental inputs (food, oil, water etc.). These are also interdependent with each other, if you remove any one of them, the others will topple. This allows us to see other paths toward systemic failure. A severe solar storm, natural disaster, or a major physical-cyber-attack on the grid provides one avenue to large-scale critical infrastructure failure. The President’s National Infrastructure Advisory Council 2018 report[v] examined the United States preparedness for a prolonged wide-area catastrophic power outage. Again, it would undermine societal integration and lifeline operations. Depending upon the centrality of the impacted region/ networks to global systems integration, it could drive global process contagion and systemic failure. Growing international tensions are therefore adding to this risk. A massive cyber-attack or war between parties with high global centrality becomes everybody’s problem- even the toe is in trouble if the heart goes to war with the liver. The global financial system is also an increasing source of catastrophic risk, it’s the operating system for the flow of goods and services. It is massively overindebted (there are far more claims on future economic growth than can ever be delivered) and it is losing resilience as monetary policy becomes less effective, and polarization within countries and discord between them intensifies. Indeed, this is what is increasing general vulnerability to supply-chain contagion from a pandemic or other catastrophic shock. It now faces the convergence of growing climate change and environment related impacts, multi-dimensional threats to food security, potential critical resource constraints, and the feedback of those stressors on socio-political stability and conflict. A global financial system collapse would be similar to a catastrophic pandemic collapse, just an inversion of the initiating shock- a financial-system supply-chain cross-contagion. Pandemic risk is also growing. It may not be COVID-19 but someday, somewhere, a virus with high infectivity and virulence will emerge with potentially catastrophic consequences for our species. Urbanization, a large-scale animal food industry, intensive transportation networks, advances in widely accessible biotechnology, our increasing incursion into animal habitats, the expanding impacts of climate and environmental change, and the growing likelihood of socio-political instability are increasing the likelihood of such an emergence. The Age of Destabilization The <u><mark>recovery from</u></mark> the <u><mark>COVID</u></mark>-19 <u>shock <mark>will be <strong>slow</u></strong></mark>. In addition, there is potential for <u><strong><mark>further </mark>pandemic<mark> waves</u></strong></mark>. It may also <u><mark>contribute</mark> to the generation of <mark>new</mark> stresses and <strong><mark>shocks later in the year</u></strong></mark>. For example, the disruptions to agricultural production in China and elsewhere (due to COVID-19), Australia[vi] (drought influenced by climate change), East Africa (locust plague influenced by climate change) is more likely to be further compounded by other climate impacts as yet unrealised[vii]. A rise in the cost of staples on global food markets is more likely to drive social unrest and even state failure in poorer countries[viii], generating new stresses through global systems. This would increase stress even in rich countries, with more of the population struggling to get by, and feeling the effects of a slowing global economy in addition to the economic impacts of COVID-19. It could be expected to squeeze discretionary income, putting further pressure on economies and the financial system, and increase social tensions. This is but one speculative path, there are innumerable potential interactions and a myriad of potential tail risks. Whatever path the global economy takes in the next year, it will bequeath an even more fragile economic and financial system that is already facing mounting risks from climate change related impacts[ix]. There are increasing risks to global food production with many drivers in addition to climate change[x]. The multi-dimensional impacts of declining biodiversity to socio-economic stability are accelerating[xi]. The security impacts of climate change are growing[xii], while societal polarization and loss of trust continues[xiii]. Though receiving little attention and much misunderstood, there are major reasons to be concerned about the ability to sustain affordable oil production[xiv]. Food, oil, water, a functioning financial system, a stable environment for societal infrastructures (relative to the conditions in which they evolved), and large-scale societal cooperation are individually critical for the stability of global systems integration. We are seeing intensifying stresses on all fronts. Further, stresses in each will tend to further increase pressures on the others. These stressors are intensifying their interactions through increasingly vulnerable civilizational networks. Society, locked into systems of dependency adaptive to system stability with correspondingly low resilience, is vulnerable to Liebig’s Law. In such an environment, economic growth is persistently undermined, there is increased socio-economic stress, while the intensity and frequency of shocks increases. This creates the conditions for rapid and diverse local and globalised contagion, compounding, simultaneous crises, and the generation of new stresses and shocks. General systemic instability, volatility and uncertainty accelerates, and future expectations become more pessimistic. The <u><mark>impacts are</mark> likely to become more <strong><mark>non-linear</strong>, with</mark> associated <strong><mark>tipping points</u></strong></mark>. Losing a thousand euros means different things depending on whether it’s your first, or last. Even more so if your rent is late and eviction beckons, a family member is sick and needs medicine, and those who once might have supported you, be it friends or state, are themselves overwhelmed. Similar scenarios could be drawn for any scale of societal systems. As <u>the <strong><mark>need </mark>to build<mark> resilience</strong></mark> into existing systems <mark>becomes</mark> more <mark>apparent</mark>, our <strong><mark>capacity to invest</u></strong></mark> -in inventories, flood defenses, and critical infrastructure redundancy <u><mark>is</mark> more <mark>difficult</mark>, as incomes fall, <strong>affordable<mark> financing becomes scarce</strong></mark> or non-existent, and the ability to produce and access constituent inputs becomes uncertain</u>. Further, <u>in an increasingly stressed and volatile environment, the necessity of maintaining existing systems and expectations is more likely to take precedence over investments in future resilience</u>. For example, our food systems are very vulnerable, but making them more resilient at scale would raise food prices. Yet if food prices are already high due to production/ distribution constraints, and/or if incomes are falling and governments’ intervention capacity is already strained, adding further to food prices risks potentially intensifying present crisis (food prices having highly non-linear societal impacts), to marginally ameliorate a future crisis. In such contexts, people tend to become even more present focused. This is a feature of civilizational lock-in, we become trapped within increasingly dangerous systems of complex dependency as our adaptive capacity becomes further undermined. <u><mark>Prolonged</u></mark> low and <u><mark>declining growth</mark>, rising <mark>socio-economic stress</mark> and volatility, growing</u> asymmetric downside <u><mark>uncertainty</mark>, declining resilience and adaptive capacity and intensifying stressors <mark>create</mark> the conditions for <strong><mark>catastrophic financial system failure</u></strong></mark>. This means <u><mark>we</u></mark> may <u><mark>have</mark> a <strong><mark>declining window </mark>of opportunity</u></strong>, both <u>in terms of time, and capacity <mark>to deploy resources</mark>, to prepare</u> ourselves <u><mark>to avoid</mark> the very <strong>worst of consequences</u></strong>. Preparing for What? Societies’ capacities to deal with stress, shocks, and catastrophes are primarily shaped by their historical experiences. This includes the type, likelihood, and impacts that might be anticipated; the resilience of society and infrastructures; the scale and role of contingency and preparedness within the wider government and society; and the range of scenarios that have been planned for and exercised. <u>Governments</u>, societies, and expert communities <u>are <strong>often slow</strong> to recognize a changing paradigm, especially when it comes into conflict with established expectations, worldviews, sunk costs, analytic traditions, and institutional lock-in</u>. Our experience of and habituation to broad societal stability, the relative invisibility of the structural and dynamical foundations of societal operations, dysfunctional economic risk models, and <u>our siloed approach to individual stressors means society may be seriously underestimating <strong><mark>global and catastrophic risk</u></strong></mark>. We need to consider our transforming risk environment from an integrated perspective: the interactions of a growing range and intensity of stressors, environmental and socio-economic, through increasingly brittle societal systems[xv].</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Warikoo, 16 – (Natasha K., associate professor of education at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, The Diversity Bargain: And Other Dilemmas of Race, Admission, and Meritocracy at Elite Universities, Chapter One, UChicago Press, Chicago and London, 2016, USC Libraries)//usc-br/ fulltext: While optimists have placed their faith in merit to promote democratic inclusion, critics—and there have been many—claim that merit serves as an ideological tool that allows elites to maintain their position in society and to pass down privileges to their children. 6 Scholars in the tradition of social reproduction have long argued that educational institutions simply reproduce class status. They demonstrate h ow schools and universities reward upper- cl ass characteristics, such as how one speaks and responds to authority, and label those cultural characteristics as meritorious. 7 Jerome Karabel, in his expansive study of admissions to Harvard, Princeton, and Yale, argues that “the definition of ‘merit’ is fluid and tends to reflect the values and interests of those in power to impose their particular cultural ideals.” 8 For example, he describes how the universities shifted the definition of merit to include “character” during the 1920s, when they wanted to reduce the number of Jewish students admitted. The loosely defined “character” and an espoused desire for “well- rounded” students empowered the universities to ask for letters of recommendation, pictures, and on- cam pus interviews as part of the application, all designed to promote Protestant applicants over Jews, who were acing the admissions exams. Also, the universities opened admissions to women only when they began to worry that without women on campus elite men would not enroll. 9 More recently, some have argued in both the United States and Britain that elitism under the guise of meritocracy has increased in the recent past. 10 They point out, for example, that as admission has gotten more competitive at the most selective colleges, 11 upper- class families have poured ever more resources into test preparation, extracurricular activities, and more, increasing overall inequality in opportunities. 12 In Britain, the grammar school system rested on the notion that some individuals are innately intelligent and that those top students should study in schools that prepare them to attend university, regardless of class background. However, in Britain too attempts at e xpanding opportunity through meritocracy did not turn out to be bias- f ree. In the early years of grammar schools, just 1 percent of children with working- cl ass fathers attended grammar schools, compared with 37 percent of children with professional parents; as late as the 1940s, children from professional families were more than six times as likely to attend grammar schools as their working- cl ass peers. 13 The very term meritocracy, in fact, was not coined as an articulation of beliefs in systems of reward for achievement. Rather, British sociologist Michael Young invented it in 1958 as a criticism. He wrote a satirical account of a dystopia, labeled a meritocracy, in which notions of m erit were used to reproduce and legitimate class status: “The top of today are breeding the top of tomorrow to a greater extent than at any time in the past. The elite is on the way to becoming hereditary; the principles of heredity and merit are coming together.” Young’s account warned of the dangers of a system in which elites craft definitions of merit to enable them to perpetuate class privilege across generations, with consent from the lower classes based on the perceived l egitimacy of the meritocracy. Active in the Labour Party, Young preferred the party to focus on improving life conditions for working- cl ass Britons rather than paying lip service to the potential of class mobility via meritocracy, which he viewed as a false promise. Young’s perspective, shared by others in the Labour Party, may explain why little discussion of expanding access to higher education developed in Britain, even during the 1960s expansion of higher education, despite a more generous welfare state and stronger working- cl ass identities than in the United States. Rather than emphasizing mobility through meritocracy, Labour Party members recognized that some proportion of the population will always be working- cl ass; thus, working- cl ass life should have a minimum decent standard of living. 14 Race, Merit, and College Admissions The history of intelligence testing in both the United States and Britain is intertwined with the eugenics movement, spearheaded by Francis Galton, which sought to categorize races by levels of intelligence in order to “breed” a better society. 15 Although eugenics was abandoned long ago, the impetus to use testing to sort individuals for social roles and positions, including various types of schooling, the military, and jobs, endures, and the notion that differences in intelligence by race may exist continues to flourish, if as a minority view. 16 As a result, race has been a central part of conversations about merit. From the early 1960s, some selective colleges in the United States, including Brown and Harvard, began recruiting African American students, both from a desire to promote racial justice and as a strategy to avoid accusations of racism and the consequent campus unrest that could unfold. 17 This was also an attempt to maintain the legitimacy of the admissions contest in the face of loud public criticism. 18 Because elite American universities had previously added “character” to their definitions of merit, a holistic approach to admissions to allow for affirmative action was rather easily implemented. 19 Since then race, merit, and college admissions have been inexorably linked. In 1978 the US Supreme Court ruled that considering race in admissions is permissible only when it serves the goal of providing a diverse environment to enhance the learning of all students on campus. 20 Since then, multiple decisions have upheld this justification for affirmative action, and no others. 21 In The Enigma of Diversity, Ellen Berrey traces the shift in university justifications for affirmative action from a moral imperative that expands opportunities during the 1960s and 1970s to this “diversity rationale.” 22 Diversity—especially racial diversity—has become a currency for respectable leadership in the United States and a value espoused by institutions of many types. 23 In fact, today racial diversity is one of the many criteria determining college rankings in the United States.24 Despite the emphasis on the diversity rationale in court, many public intellectuals, including many legal scholars, have advocated alternative justifications for affirmative action in higher education admissions. For example, some argue that compensation for past discrimination that continues to have adverse effects on minorities, especially African Americans, is an important rationale for affirmative action. 25 Others advocate class- based affirmative action, sometimes as determined by zip code. 26 Lani Guinier goes further, criticizing notions of meritocracy altogether. 27 She argues that universities should consider students’ potential contributions to civic life rather than measuring merit through test scores. These voices join more conservative critics who argue against affirmative action, 28 leading to an overall loud chorus of public debate about admission to selective colleges. Ordinary Americans, too, are very interested in how selective colleges decide admissions. Affirmative action appears on many opinion polls, and in eight states it has faced referenda leading to bans. A recent spate of books written for mainstream audiences has also criticized other aspects of admission to selective colleges, suggesting they privilege already privileged applicants. 29 Nicholas Lemann, in his history of the SAT, demonstrates how the exam reproduced privilege rather than expanding opportunity. 30 Others have called for the end of legacy admission, which privileges whites over all minority groups, and for attenuating or ending athletic recruiting, which mostly privileges whites, given the wide range of sports, such as lacrosse and crew, th at most disadvantaged youth never encounter in high school.31 There is even more interest in how our most elite universities do admissions, and in the affirmative action that happens on those campuses. Elite universities are the very places we uphold as bastions of excellence and meritocracy in the United States. Notions of merit and worthiness at Harvard are watched not only by lower-tier colleges setting their own admissions criteria, but also by ordinary Americans viewing Harvard as the symbol of excellence, opportunity, and meritocracy. Beyond symbolic meaning, considerable evidence suggests that attending an elite college rather than a nonelite one means that a student is more likely to graduate, to earn more, and to hold a position of power. 32 Of course, the 2.8 million full- t ime students attending private four- y ear colleges are just 17 percent of college students in the United States; a small subset of those students attend selective colleges. 33 Still, what happens at selective universities, especially the most selective ones, has symbolic value in the broader society.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Merit is a fluid concept created by elites for the purpose of cultural dominence – the aff is just the newest neoliberal move to change the terms of exclusion, legitimizing racialized meritocracy.</h4><p>Warikoo, 16 – (Natasha K., associate professor of education at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, The Diversity Bargain: And Other Dilemmas of Race, Admission, and Meritocracy at Elite Universities, Chapter One, UChicago Press, Chicago and London, 2016, USC Libraries)//usc-br/</p><p>While <u>optimists</u> <u>have placed their faith in merit to promote democratic inclusion</u>, <u>critics</u>—and there have been many—<u>claim that <strong><mark>merit serves as an ideological tool</strong> that allows <strong>elites to maintain their position</strong></mark> in society and to pass down privileges to their children</u>. 6 <u>Scholars</u> in the tradition of social reproduction have <u>long argued that educational institutions simply reproduce class status</u>. They demonstrate h ow schools and universities reward upper- cl ass characteristics, such as how one speaks and responds to authority, and label those cultural characteristics as meritorious. 7 Jerome <u>Karabel</u>, <u>in his expansive study of admissions to Harvard, Princeton, and Yale, argues that “the <strong>definition of <mark>‘merit’ is fluid and tends to reflect the values</mark> and interests <mark>of those in power</u></strong> <u></mark>to impose their particular cultural ideals.”</u> 8 For example, <u>he describes how the <mark>universities shifted </mark>the definition of merit <mark>to include “character”</mark> during the 1920s, <mark>when they wanted to <strong>reduce the number of Jewish students</mark> admitted. </strong>The loosely defined “character” and an espoused desire for “well- rounded” students</u> <u>empowered the universities to ask for letters of recommendation, pictures, and on- cam pus interviews as part of the application, all designed to <strong>promote Protestant applicants over Jews</u></strong>, <u><mark>who were <strong>acing the admissions exams</mark>.</u></strong> Also, <u>the <strong>universities <mark>opened admissions to women</mark> only <mark>when they began to worry </mark>that <mark>without women</mark> on campus <mark>elite men would not enroll</mark>.</u></strong> 9 More recently, <u>some have argued in both the United States and Britain that <strong><mark>elitism under the guise of meritocracy has increased</mark> in the recent past</u></strong>. 10 They point out, for example, that as <u>admission has gotten more competitive at the most selective colleges</u>, 11 <u>upper- class families have poured ever more resources into test preparation, extracurricular activities, and more, <strong>increasing <mark>overall inequality</mark> in opportunitie</strong>s. </u>12 In Britain, the grammar school system rested on the notion that some individuals are innately intelligent and that those top students should study in schools that prepare them to attend university, regardless of class background. However, in Britain too attempts at e xpanding opportunity through meritocracy did not turn out to be bias- f ree. In the early years of grammar schools, just 1 percent of children with working- cl ass fathers attended grammar schools, compared with 37 percent of children with professional parents; as late as the 1940s, children from professional families were more than six times as likely to attend grammar schools as their working- cl ass peers. 13 The very term <u>meritocracy</u>, in fact, <u>was not coined as an articulation of beliefs in systems of reward for achievement. Rather</u>, British sociologist <u>Michael Young invented it in 1958 as a criticism</u>. He wrote a <u>satirical account of a dystopia, labeled a meritocracy, in which notions of m erit were used to reproduce and legitimate class status:</u> “The top of today are breeding the top of tomorrow to a greater extent than at any time in the past. <u>The elite is on the way to becoming <strong>hereditary</u></strong>; the principles of heredity and merit are coming together.” Young’s account warned of the dangers of a system in which elites craft definitions of merit to enable them to perpetuate class privilege across generations, with consent from the lower classes based on the perceived l egitimacy of the meritocracy. Active in the Labour Party, Young preferred the party to focus on improving life conditions for working- cl ass Britons rather than paying lip service to the potential of class mobility via meritocracy, which he viewed as a false promise. Young’s perspective, shared by others in the Labour Party, may explain why little discussion of expanding access to higher education developed in Britain, even during the 1960s expansion of higher education, despite a more generous welfare state and stronger working- cl ass identities than in the United States. Rather than emphasizing mobility through meritocracy, Labour Party members recognized that some proportion of the population will always be working- cl ass; thus, working- cl ass life should have a minimum decent standard of living. 14 Race, Merit, and College Admissions <u><mark>The history of intelligence testing</mark> in both the United States and Britain <mark>is <strong>intertwined with</mark> the <mark>eugenics</mark> movement,</strong> </u>spearheaded by Francis Galton, <u>which sought to categorize races by levels of intelligence in order to <strong>“breed” a better society</strong>. </u>15 Although eugenics was abandoned long ago, <u>the impetus to use <mark>testing to sort individuals for social roles</mark> and positions</u>, including various types of schooling, the military, and jobs, endures, <u><mark>and the notion that differences in intelligence by race</mark> may <mark>exist <strong>continues to flourish</u></strong></mark>, if as a minority view. 16 As a result, race has been a central part of conversations about merit. From the early 1960s, some <u><mark>selective colleges</mark> in the United States, including Brown and Harvard,</u> <u><mark>began recruiting African American students</mark>, both <mark>from a desire to</mark> promote racial justice and as a strategy to <mark>avoid accusations of racism</mark> and the consequent campus unrest that could unfold.</u> 17 <u><mark>This was</mark> also <mark>an attempt to <strong>maintain</mark> the <mark>legitimacy</mark> of the admissions contest in the face of loud public criticism.</u></strong> 18 Because elite American universities had previously added “character” to their definitions of merit, a holistic approach to admissions to allow for affirmative action was rather easily implemented. 19 <u>Since then race, merit, and college admissions have been inexorably linked.</u> In 1978 the US Supreme Court ruled that considering race in admissions is permissible only when it serves the goal of providing a diverse environment to enhance the learning of all students on campus. 20 Since then, multiple decisions have upheld this justification for affirmative action, and no others. 21 In The Enigma of Diversity, Ellen Berrey traces the shift in university justifications for affirmative action from a moral imperative that expands opportunities during the 1960s and 1970s to this “diversity rationale.” 22 Diversity—especially racial diversity—has become a currency for respectable leadership in the United States and a value espoused by institutions of many types. 23 In fact, today racial diversity is one of the many criteria determining college rankings in the United States.24 Despite the emphasis on the diversity rationale in court, many public intellectuals, including many legal scholars, have advocated alternative justifications for affirmative action in higher education admissions. For example, <u>some argue that compensation for past discrimination that continues to have adverse effects on minorities, especially African Americans, is an important rationale for affirmative action.</u> 25 Others advocate class- based affirmative action, sometimes as determined by zip code. 26 Lani Guinier goes further, criticizing notions of meritocracy altogether. 27 She argues that <u><mark>universities should consider students’ </mark>potential <mark>contributions to civic life <strong>rather than </mark>measuring merit <mark>through test scores</strong></mark>.</u> These voices join more conservative critics who argue against affirmative action, 28 leading to an overall loud chorus of public debate about admission to selective colleges. Ordinary Americans, too, are very interested in how selective colleges decide admissions. Affirmative action appears on many opinion polls, and in eight states it has faced referenda leading to bans. A recent spate of books written for mainstream audiences has also criticized other aspects of admission to selective colleges, suggesting they privilege already privileged applicants. 29 <u>Nicholas Lemann, in his history of <strong><mark>the SAT</strong></mark>, demonstrates how the exam<mark> <strong>reproduced privilege rather than expanding opportunity</u></strong></mark>. 30 <u>Others have called for the end of legacy admission, which privileges whites over all minority groups, and for attenuating or ending athletic recruiting, which mostly privileges whites, given the wide range of sports, such as lacrosse and crew, th at most disadvantaged youth never encounter in high school</u>.31 There is even more interest in how our most elite universities do admissions, and in the affirmative action that happens on those campuses. <u>Elite universities are the very places we uphold as bastions of excellence and meritocracy in the United States. <mark>Notions of merit and worthiness at Harvard are watched not only by lower-tier colleges setting their own admissions criteria, but also by ordinary Americans viewing </mark>Harvard <mark>as the symbol of excellence</mark>, opportunity, and meritocracy. </u>Beyond symbolic meaning, <u>considerable evidence suggests that attending an elite college rather than a nonelite one means that a student is more likely to graduate, to earn more, and to hold a position of power</u>. 32 Of course, the 2.8 million full- t ime students attending private four- y ear colleges are just 17 percent of college students in the United States; a small subset of those students attend selective colleges. 33 Still, what happens at selective universities, especially the most selective ones, has symbolic value in the broader society. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Kirk, 18 [Martin, co-founder and Director of Strategy for The Rules, former Head of Campaigns at Oxfam UK and Head of Global Advocacy for Save the Children, citing a study by Rodolfo Dirzo and Paul Ehrlich from the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment and Gerardo Ceballos of the National Autonomous University of Mexico, “What if economic growth isn’t as positive as you think?,” https://www.fastcompany.com/90202203/what-if-economic-growth-isnt-as-positive-as-you-think] fulltext: But there are some new strains of thought that take a more nuanced and sophisticated view of growth. That say, yes, all other things being equal, economic growth is a positive thing. But all other things are not equal. There’s no such thing as a free lunch, and, for all its positives, economic growth has a dark side; its ecological impact. The impacts of our ever-growing economy have become so stark and so widespread that they are by any sane measure portents to catastrophe. Whether it’s the fact that Antarctic ice is now melting three times faster than we thought, or the unfolding “biological annihilation” that has already wiped out 50% of all animals and up to 75% of all insects, or the fact that, in spite of all this, we are pumping out CO2 at record levels, it takes willful ignorance or a blinding ideology to deny the severity of the crisis. This creates a terrible paradox: Economic growth keeps economies stable today, but threatens not just future growth but medium-term social and civilizational cohesion, and ultimately the very capacity of this biosphere to sustain life. A paper published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences last year suggested that “the window for effective action is very short, probably two or three decades at most.” And that even this dire prediction is considered “conservative” by the authors, “given the increasing trajectories of the drivers of extinction.” In terms of practical politics, that means acting immediately, preferably yesterday. Most politicians deal with this paradox by ignoring it. It’s by far the easiest option; one afforded every incentive and reward by this political economy and the beliefs that underpin it. This belief system has been dominant for a long time now. We are, as a society, deeply comfortable with it, which means many of its core assumptions are considered unassailable–too obvious to question. The most profound being this idea that growth is always good. Questioning this amounts to political suicide for any politician. Or, at least, it used to. We are starting to see some movement in interesting corners of the global political landscape that suggest that some leaders are showing the sort of political courage needed to shift established norms. It may well be starting to become something of a bonafide political movement. It’s young and small, still, but so were all movements at one time. A little thought experiment shows how growth can be a problem: Insert the word “a” before it. “A growth.” That feels very different from just “growth,” right? Growth is a big part of what we all understand happens in a healthy life. Children grow, knowledge grows, love grows. But “a growth” is what happens when life gets corrupted. “A growth” is when the growth is unchecked, and thus a symptom not of health but disease; when it takes on the character of an invader, attacking its host. The word for growth that gets out of control in this way, such that it becomes “a growth,” is, of course, cancer. But wait, I hear you cry, technological progress will save us! We can just grow meat in test tubes rather than needing so much land and clean air space for cows and their methane-laden farts, or we can all switch to renewable energy, or recycle more and better, and then we can get back to the promise of infinite growth. Unfortunately, the evidence is clear that this is simply not possible. Yes, we can make dents in our impact with such measures, and we should with all possible speed, but the way the global economy is currently programmed means such things are important–but also entirely insufficient. So, once we discard the vain hope of being able to grow the economy infinitely and indefinitely, what are we looking at? This is where the innovation and bravery come in. A new alliance was formed in 2017, called the Wellbeing Economy Alliance. What they are shooting for is one–or many different–economic model(s) that have, “the fundamental goal of achieving sustainable well-being with dignity and fairness for humans and the rest of Nature.” Which means they cannot just reach for socialism or any other historical model–socialism, like capitalism, relies on growth, as does communism. They have recognized that we can’t rely on past thinking; we must genuinely put our best brains forward and innovate. We’re not talking about a bunch of random, dreamy utopians here, but real politicians who have won real elections and are exercising real power. So far, the roster of governments signing up to the Alliance includes Scotland, Costa Rica, Slovenia, and New Zealand. Other governments that are actively looking at the issue include Italy, and there are political parties emerging, like the Alternative Party in Denmark, which is also embracing the innovation challenge. These are not what are often referred to as Tier 1 countries in the international order, but neither are they so small they are irrelevant. Scotland, for example, provides a direct line into both the U.K. and (at least for the time being) the EU. Costa Rica has long been a pioneer of innovative economic and social thinking, with impressive results: It is routinely in the top three countries in the world when measured for the well-being and happiness of their people. New Zealand is, perhaps, the most newly bold. Its prime minster has not only called growth-at-all-costs capitalism “a “blatant failure” but also has said her government would no longer accept GDP as the sole, supreme measure of progress. “The measures for us have to change,” she said in October last year. “We need to make sure we are looking at people’s ability to actually have a meaningful life, an enjoyable life, where their work is enough to survive and support their families.” And this is where social and economic forces start to align in very interesting and potentially powerful ways. And open the door for seeing electoral strategies in an agenda based on innovations to take us beyond traditional growth-at-all-costs economics. Consider a few facts: More than 50% of millennials say they would take a pay cut to find work that matches their values, while 90% want to use their skills for good. And these trends are on the up. Deloitte’s 7th Annual Millennial Survey of 12,000 young people, for example–both millennials and gen Z–reports record low opinions of businesses. Fewer than half now believe that businesses behave ethically, and this directly affects how loyal they feel to their employers; 43% of millennials and a whopping 61% of gen-Zers expect to stay in a job no more than two years. And all this against a backdrop of general public opinion that is also looking increasingly unkindly on the economic paradigm we have. These are conditions that can be worked with. They show that there is a large and growing instinct out there that thinks that we need fundamental change to the way we do economics. Not tweaking around the edges, but fundamental change at the very roots of the global economy. There is no neat or reliable evidence to suggest that challenging infinite growth is at the top of peoples’ minds, or likely to be a particularly easy sell. But there is significant doubt in growth-at-all-costs capitalism, and that is an opportunity for innovation. Combine that with the new thinking coming out of places like the Wellbeing Alliance, and you can start to sense the causes and conditions may well be aligning in favor of the emergence of wholly new, post-growth economies. It cannot come soon enough.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The aff prevents a quick short-term crisis that causes a transition away from growth, which is unsustainable and otherwise causes extinction </h4><p><strong>Kirk, 18 </strong>[Martin, co-founder and Director of Strategy for The Rules, former Head of Campaigns at Oxfam UK and Head of Global Advocacy for Save the Children, citing a study by Rodolfo Dirzo and Paul Ehrlich from the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment and Gerardo Ceballos of the National Autonomous University of Mexico, “What if economic growth isn’t as positive as you think?,” https://www.fastcompany.com/90202203/what-if-economic-growth-isnt-as-positive-as-you-think]</p><p>But there are some new strains of thought that take a more nuanced and sophisticated view of growth. That say, yes, all other things being equal, economic growth is a positive thing. But all other things are not equal. There’s no such thing as a free lunch, and, <u>for all its positives, <mark>economic growth</mark> has a <strong>dark side</strong>; its <strong><mark>ecological impact</strong></mark>. The impacts of our ever-growing economy</u> have become so stark and so widespread that they <u>are</u> by any sane measure <u><strong>portents to <mark>catastrophe</strong></mark>. Whether it’s the fact that <strong><mark>Antarctic ice</strong> is</mark> now <mark>melting <strong>three times</mark> faster</strong> than we thought, or the unfolding “<strong><mark>biological annihilation</strong></mark>” that <mark>has</mark> already <mark>wiped out <strong>50% of all animals</strong></mark> and up to <strong>75% of all insects</strong>, or the fact that</u>, in spite of all this, <u><mark>we are <strong>pumping out CO2 at record levels</strong></mark>, it takes willful ignorance</u> or a blinding ideology <u>to deny the severity of the crisis</u>.</p><p>This creates a terrible paradox: <u>Economic growth</u> keeps economies stable today, but <u><strong>threatens</u></strong> not just future growth but medium-term <u><strong>social</strong> and <strong>civilizational cohesion</strong>, and ultimately the <strong>very capacity of this biosphere to sustain life</u></strong>. A paper published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences last year suggested that “<u><strong><mark>the window for</mark> effective <mark>action is very short</u></strong></mark>, probably <u>two or three decades</u> at most.” And that even this dire prediction <u>is</u> considered “<u><strong>conservative</u></strong>” by the authors, “<u>given the <strong>increasing trajectories</strong> of the drivers of extinction</u>.” In terms of practical politics, <u>that means <strong>acting immediately</u></strong>, preferably yesterday.</p><p><u>Most</u> politicians <u>deal with this</u> paradox <u>by <strong>ignoring it</u></strong>. It’s by far the easiest option; one afforded every incentive and reward by this political economy and the beliefs that underpin it. <u>This belief system has been dominant for a long time now</u>. We are, as a society, deeply comfortable with it, which means <u>many of its core assumptions are <strong>considered unassailable</u></strong>–too obvious to question. The most profound being this idea that growth is always good. Questioning this amounts to political suicide for any politician.</p><p><u>Or, at least, it <strong>used to</strong>. <mark>We are <strong>starting to see</mark> some <mark>movement</u></strong></mark> in interesting corners of the global political landscape <u><mark>that suggest</mark> that some <mark>leaders are <strong>showing</mark> the sort of political <mark>courage</strong> needed to <strong>shift</mark> established <mark>norms</strong></mark>. It may well be starting to become</u> something of <u>a <strong>bonafide political movement</u></strong>. It’s young and small, still, but so were all movements at one time.</p><p>A little thought experiment shows how growth can be a problem: Insert the word “a” before it. “A growth.” That feels very different from just “growth,” right? Growth is a big part of what we all understand happens in a healthy life. Children grow, knowledge grows, love grows. But “a growth” is what happens when life gets corrupted. “A growth” is when the growth is unchecked, and thus a symptom not of health but disease; when it takes on the character of an invader, attacking its host. The word for growth that gets out of control in this way, such that it becomes “a growth,” is, of course, cancer.</p><p><u>But wait</u>, I hear you cry, <u><strong>technological progress will save us</strong>! We can just <strong>grow meat in test tubes</strong> rather than needing so much land and clean air space for cows and their methane-laden farts, or we can all <strong>switch to renewable energy</strong>, or <strong>recycle more</strong> and <strong>better</u></strong>, and then we can get back to the promise of infinite growth. Unfortunately, <u>the <strong>evidence is clear</strong> that this is <strong>simply not possible</strong>. Yes, we can <strong>make dents</strong> in our impact with such measures</u>, and we should with all possible speed, <u>but the way the global economy is currently programmed means such things are</u> important–but also <u><strong>entirely insufficient</u></strong>.</p><p>So, once we discard the vain hope of being able to grow the economy infinitely and indefinitely, what are we looking at? This is where the innovation and bravery come in.</p><p><u>A new alliance was formed in 2017, called the <strong>Wellbeing Economy Alliance</u></strong>. What <u>they are shooting for is</u> one–or many <u><strong>different</u></strong>–<u><strong>economic model(s)</u></strong> that have, “the fundamental goal of achieving sustainable well-being with dignity and fairness for humans and the rest of Nature.” Which means they cannot just reach for socialism or any other historical model–socialism, like capitalism, relies on growth, as does communism. <u>They have recognized that we can’t rely on past thinking</u>; we must genuinely put our best brains forward and innovate.</p><p><u>We’re <strong><mark>not</mark> talking about <mark>a bunch of random</strong></mark>, <strong>dreamy <mark>utopians</strong></mark> here, <mark>but <strong>real politicians</strong></mark> who have won <strong>real elections</strong> and are exercising <strong>real power</u></strong>. So far, <u>the roster of governments signing up</u> to the Alliance <u><mark>includes <strong>Scotland</strong>, <strong>Costa Rica</strong>, <strong>Slovenia</strong>, and <strong>New Zealand</strong></mark>. Other governments that are actively looking at the issue include <strong>Italy</strong>, and there are political parties emerging, like the <strong>Alternative Party in Denmark</strong>, which is also embracing the innovation challenge. These are not</u> what are often referred to as <u>Tier 1 countries</u> in the international order, <u>but neither are they so small they are irrelevant</u>.</p><p><u>Scotland</u>, for example, <u>provides a <strong>direct line</strong> into both the <strong>U.K.</strong> and</u> (at least for the time being) <u>the <strong>EU</strong>. Costa Rica has <strong>long been a pioneer</strong> of innovative economic and social thinking, with impressive results</u>: It is routinely in the top three countries in the world when measured for the well-being and happiness of their people. <u>New Zealand</u> is, perhaps, the most newly bold. Its prime minster has not only called growth-at-all-costs capitalism “a “blatant failure” but also <u>has said her government <strong>would no longer accept GDP</strong> as the sole, supreme measure of progress</u>. “The measures for us have to change,” she said in October last year. “We need to make sure we are looking at people’s ability to actually have a meaningful life, an enjoyable life, where their work is enough to survive and support their families.”</p><p>And <u>this is where <mark>social and economic forces</mark> <strong>start to <mark>align</strong> in</mark> very interesting and <strong>potentially <mark>powerful ways</strong>. And</mark> <strong>open the door</strong> for seeing electoral strategies in an agenda based on innovations to<mark> <strong>take us beyond</mark> traditional <mark>growth-at-all-costs</mark> economics</strong>.</p><p></u>Consider a few facts: <u><strong>More than 50%</strong> of millennials say they would take a pay cut to find work that matches their values, while <strong>90%</strong> want to use their skills for good. And these trends are <strong>on the up</u></strong>. <u>Deloitte’s</u> 7th Annual Millennial <u>Survey of</u> 12,000 young people, for example–both <u>millennials and gen Z</u>–<u>reports <strong>record low opinions of businesses</strong>. <strong>Fewer than half</strong> now believe that businesses behave ethically, and this <strong>directly affects</strong> how loyal they feel to their employers</u>; 43% of millennials and a whopping 61% of gen-Zers expect to stay in a job no more than two years. <u>And all this against a backdrop of <strong>general public opinion</strong> that is also <strong>looking increasingly unkindly</strong> on the economic paradigm we have.</p><p>These</u> are <u>conditions</u> that can be worked with. They <u>show that <mark>there is a <strong>large</strong></mark> and <strong><mark>growing instinct</strong></mark> out there <mark>that thinks that we need <strong>fundamental change</strong></mark> to the way we do economics. <mark>Not <strong>tweaking</mark> around the edges</strong>, but <strong>fundamental change</strong> at the <strong>very roots of the global economy</u></strong>. There is no neat or reliable evidence to suggest that challenging infinite growth is at the top of peoples’ minds, or likely to be a particularly easy sell. But <u>there is <strong>significant doubt</strong> in growth-at-all-costs capitalism, and that is an <strong>opportunity for innovation</strong>. Combine that with the new thinking coming out of places like the Wellbeing Alliance, and you can start to sense the causes and conditions <strong>may well be aligning in favor</strong> of the emergence of <strong>wholly new</strong>, <strong>post-growth economies</strong>. It <strong>cannot come soon enough.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Amanda ANDERSON 6, Andrew W. Mellon Professor for the Humanities at Brown University [The Way We Argue Now, Princeton University Press, p. 25-28] Recut Justin fulltext: Whether such a procedural approach actually helps to yield any substantive normative guidance is an issue of debate. Habermas has sought to justify communicative ethics through appeal to the principles of respect and reciprocity that he claims are inherent in linguistic practices geared toward reaching understanding. Attempting to redress the overwhelmingly negative forms of critique characteristic of both the Frankfurt School and poststructuralist traditions, he argues that the logocentrism of Western thought and the powerful instrumentality of reason are not absolute but rather constitute “a systematic foreshortening and distortion of a potential always already operative in the communicative practice of everyday life.” The potential he refers to is the potential for mutual understanding “inscribed into communication in ordinary language.” 7 Habermas acknowledges the dominance and reach of instrumental reason—his project is largely devoted to a systematic analysis of the historical conditions and social effects of that dominance—yet at the same time he wishes to retrieve an emancipatory model of communicative [END PAGE 25] reason derived from a linguistic understanding of intersubjective relations. As Benhabib argues, this form of communicative action, embodied in the highly controversial and pervasively misunderstood concept of the “ideal speech situation,” entails strong ethical assumptions, namely the principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity (SS, 29). Habermas has famously argued that he does not believe any metaphysical grounding of such norms is possible; he insists instead that we view the normative constraints of the ideal speech community as “universal pragmatic presuppositions” of competent moral actors who have reached the postconventional stage of moral reasoning. Habermas’s theory combines a “weak transcendental argument” concerning the four types of validity claims operative in speech acts with an empirical reconstruction of psychosocial development derived from Lawrence Kohlberg. Benhabib, though she, too, appeals to socialization processes, distinguishes her position from Habermas’s “weak transcendental argument” by promoting a “historically self-conscious universalism” that locates the ethical principles of respect and reciprocity as “constituents of the moral point of view from within the normative hermeneutic horizon of modernity” (SS, 30). Benhabib’s work thus constitutes, like Habermas’s, a strong defense of specific potentialities of modernity. She differs from him in two key respects, besides the emphasis already outlined. First, she believes that Habermas’s emphasis on consensus seriously distorts his account of communicative ethics. Like others who have argued against the conflation of understanding and consensus, Benhabib champions instead a discourse model of ethics that is geared toward keeping the conversation going: When we shift the burden of the moral test in communicative ethics from consensus to the idea of an ongoing moral conversation, we begin to ask not what all would or could agree to as a result of practical discourses to be morally permissible or impermissible, but what would be allowed and perhaps even necessary from the standpoint of continuing and sustaining the practice of the moral conversation among us. The emphasis now is less on rational agreement, but more on sustaining those normative practices and moral relationships within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish and continue. (SS, 38)8 [END PAGE 26] The second significant difference between Habermas and Benhabib is that Benhabib rejects Habermas’s rigid opposition between justice and the good life, an opposition that effectively relegates identity-based politics to a lower plane of moral practice, and that for Benhabib undercuts our ability to apprehend the radical particularity of the other. While she believes in the importance of self-reflexive interrogations of conventional identities and roles, she strongly opposes any ethics or politics that privileges the unencumbered or detached self over the concrete, embodied, situated self. She argues in particular against those liberal models that imagine that conversations of moral justification should take place between individuals who have bracketed their strongest cultural or social identifications and attachments. Instead she promotes what she calls an “interactive universalism”: Interactive universalism acknowledges the plurality of modes of being human, and differences among humans, without endorsing all these pluralities and differences as morally and politically valid. While agreeing that normative disputes can be settled rationally, and that fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are constituents, that is, necessary conditions of the moral standpoint, interactive universalism regards difference as a starting point for reflection and action. In this sense, “universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied and embedded identity, but aims at developing moral attitudes and encouraging political transformations that can yield a point of view acceptable to all. Universality is not the ideal consensus of fictitiously defined selves, but the concrete process in politics and morals of the struggle of concrete, embodied selves, striving for autonomy. (SS, 153) This passage encapsulates the core of Benhabib’s position, which attempts to mediate between universalism and particularism as traditionally understood. On the one hand, universalism’s informing principles of rational argumentation, fairness, and reciprocity adjudicate between different positions in the ethicopolitical realm, enabling crucial distinctions between those notions of the good life that promote interactive universalism and those that threaten its key principles. It insists, in other words, that there is a specifiable moral standpoint from which—to take a few prominent examples—Serbian aggression, neo-Nazism, and gay bashing can be definitively condemned. On the other hand, universalism “regards difference as a starting point.” It understands identity as “embodied and embedded” and promotes encounters with otherness so as to nurture the development of a moral attitude that will “yield a point of view acceptable to all.” Of course it must simultaneously be recognized that the “all” here cannot coherently include those who have, according to universalism’s own principles, forfeited their place as equal participants in the ethicopolitical [END PAGE 27] community. Ironically, then, Benhabib’s redefinition of universalism insists on inevitable exclusion, but not in the sense that many poststructuralist and postmodernist cultural critics do, as the hardwired effect of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness, and as victimizing those disempowered by race, class, gender, or sexuality. Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness and plurality, which ultimately prove self-undermining in their toleration of communities, individuals, and practices that exclude others arbitrarily, interactive universalism claims that certain exclusions are not only justified, but indeed required by the principles of recognition and respect that underpin democratic institutions and practices.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>No impact turns—debate inevitably involves exclusions—making sure that those exclusions occur along reciprocal lines is necessary and outweighs.</h4><p>Amanda <strong>ANDERSON 6</strong>, Andrew W. Mellon Professor for the Humanities at Brown University [The Way We Argue Now, Princeton University Press, p. 25-28] Recut Justin</p><p>Whether such a procedural approach actually helps to yield any <u>substantive normative guidance</u> is an issue of debate. Habermas has sought to justify communicative ethics <u>through appeal to the principles of respect and <mark>reciprocity</u></mark> that he claims <u>are <mark>inherent in </mark>linguistic <mark>practices</mark> geared toward reaching understanding</u>. Attempting to redress the overwhelmingly negative forms of critique characteristic of both the Frankfurt School and poststructuralist traditions, he argues that the logocentrism of Western thought and the powerful instrumentality of reason are not absolute but rather constitute “a systematic foreshortening and distortion of a potential always already operative in the communicative practice of everyday life.” The potential he refers to is the potential for mutual understanding “inscribed into communication in ordinary language.” 7 <u>Habermas acknowledges the dominance and reach of instrumental reason</u>—his project is largely devoted to a systematic analysis of the historical conditions and social effects of that dominance—<u>yet at the same time he wishes to retrieve an <mark>emancipatory</mark> model of <mark>communicative</u></mark> [END PAGE 25] <u><mark>reason derived from</mark> a linguistic understanding of <strong><mark>intersubjective relations</u></strong></mark>. As Benhabib argues, this form of communicative action, embodied in the highly controversial and pervasively misunderstood concept of the “ideal speech situation,” entails strong ethical assumptions, namely the principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity (SS, 29).</p><p>Habermas has famously argued that <u>he does not believe any metaphysical grounding of such norms is possible; he insists</u> instead <u>that we view the normative constraints of</u> the ideal <u>speech community as “universal <strong>pragmatic presuppositions</strong>” of competent moral actors who have reached the postconventional stage of moral reasoning</u>. Habermas’s theory combines a “weak transcendental argument” concerning the four types of validity claims operative in speech acts with an empirical reconstruction of psychosocial development derived from Lawrence Kohlberg. <u>Benhabib</u>, though she, too, appeals to socialization processes, <u>distinguishes her position from Habermas’s “weak transcendental argument” by promoting a “historically self-conscious universalism” that locates the ethical principles of respect and reciprocity as “constituents of the moral point of view from within the normative hermeneutic horizon of modernity”</u> (SS, 30). <u>Benhabib’s work</u> thus constitutes, <u>like Habermas’s</u>, a strong <u>defense of specific potentialities of modernity</u>. She <u>differs</u> from him <u>in two</u> key <u>respects</u>, besides the emphasis already outlined. <u>First, she believes</u> that <u>Habermas’s emphasis on consensus</u> seriously <u>distorts his account of communicative ethics</u>. Like others who have argued against the conflation of understanding and consensus, <u>Benhabib champions</u> instead <u>a <strong>discourse model of ethics that is geared toward keeping the conversation going</u></strong>:</p><p><u><mark>When we <strong>shift </mark>the burden</strong> of the moral test in communicative ethics <strong><mark>from consensus to</u></strong></mark> the idea of <u><strong>an ongoing moral <mark>conversation</strong>, we </mark>begin to <mark>ask </mark>not what all would or could agree to as a result of practical discourses to be morally permissible or impermissible, but what would be allowed and</u> perhaps even <u>necessary <mark>from the standpoint of</mark> continuing and <strong><mark>sustaining</strong></mark> the practice of the</u> moral <u><strong><mark>conversation</strong></mark> among us. The <mark>emphasis</u></mark> now <u><mark>is <strong>less on</mark> rational <mark>agreement</strong>, but</mark> more on <strong><mark>sustaining</mark> those normative <mark>practices</mark> and moral relationships</strong> <mark>within which</mark> reasoned <mark>agreement</mark> as a way of life <mark>can</mark> flourish and <mark>continue</u></mark>. (SS, 38)8 [END PAGE 26]</p><p>The second significant difference between Habermas and Benhabib is that Benhabib rejects Habermas’s rigid opposition between justice and the good life, an opposition that effectively relegates identity-based politics to a lower plane of moral practice, and that for <u>Benhabib</u> undercuts our ability to apprehend the radical particularity of the other. While she believes in the importance of self-reflexive interrogations of conventional identities and roles, she strongly <u>opposes any ethics or politics that privileges the</u> unencumbered or <u>detached self over the concrete, embodied, situated self</u>. She argues in particular against those liberal models that imagine that conversations of moral justification should take place between individuals who have bracketed their strongest cultural or social identifications and attachments. Instead <u>she promotes</u> what she calls an <u>“interactive universalism”</u>:</p><p><u>Interactive universalism acknowledges the plurality of modes of being human, and differences</u> among humans, <u>without endorsing all these pluralities and differences as</u> morally and politically <u>valid. While agreeing</u> that <u>normative disputes can be settled</u> rationally, <u>and that <strong><mark>fairness, reciprocity and</mark> some <mark>procedure</mark> of universalizability <mark>are </mark>constituents</strong>, that is, <strong><mark>necessary </mark>conditions</strong> of the moral standpoint, interactive universalism regards difference as a starting point <mark>for reflection</u></mark> and action. In this sense, <u><strong>“universality” is a regulative ideal that <mark>does not deny</mark> our embodied and embedded <mark>identity</strong>, but aims at</mark> developing</u> moral <u>attitudes and <strong>encouraging political <mark>transformations </mark>that can <mark>yield a</mark> point of <mark>view acceptable to all</strong></mark>. Universality is not the ideal consensus</u> of fictitiously defined selves, <u>but the concrete process in politics</u> and morals <u>of the struggle of concrete, embodied selves, striving for autonomy</u>. (SS, 153)</p><p>This passage encapsulates the core of <u>Benhabib’s position</u>, which <u>attempts to mediate between universalism and particularism</u> as traditionally understood. On the one hand, <u>universalism’s informing principles of rational argumentation, fairness, and reciprocity adjudicate between different positions in the ethicopolitical realm, enabling crucial distinctions between those notions of the good life that promote interactive universalism and those that threaten its key principles</u>. It insists, in other words, that there is a specifiable moral standpoint from which—to take a few prominent examples—Serbian aggression, neo-Nazism, and gay bashing can be definitively condemned. <u>On the other hand, universalism “regards difference as a starting point.” It understands identity as “embodied and embedded” and promotes encounters with otherness so as to nurture the development of</u> a moral <u>attitude that will “yield a point of view acceptable to all.”</p><p>Of course</u> it must simultaneously be recognized that <u><strong><mark>the “all”</mark> here <mark>cannot</mark> coherently <mark>include those who</mark> have</u></strong>, according to universalism’s own principles, <u><strong><mark>forfeited their place as equal participants</strong></mark> in the ethicopolitical</u> [END PAGE 27] <u>community</u>. Ironically, then, Benhabib’s <u>redefinition of <mark>universalism insists on <strong>inevitable exclusion</strong></mark>, but <strong>not</strong> in the sense that</u> many <u>poststructuralist and</u> postmodernist <u>cultural critics do, as the hardwired effect of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness, and as victimizing those disempowered by race, class, gender, or sexuality. Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness</u> and plurality, <u>which</u> ultimately <u>prove <strong>self-undermining in their toleration</strong> of</u> communities, individuals, and <u>practices that exclude others arbitrarily, interactive universalism claims that <strong><mark>certain exclusions are</mark> not only justified, but</u></strong> indeed <u><strong><mark>required</strong> by</mark> the principles of <mark>recognition</mark> and respect that underpin democratic institutions and practices</u>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: - It’s highly unlikely and exaggerated by media fulltext: - Strong political constituency against ANY prolif EVER - No tech basis for claim it would only take 6 months - Won’t go nuclear based on US actions – too tied to the alliance Lewis 14 [Jeffrey Lewis is director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies 6-26-2014 http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/26/if-japan-wanted-to-build-a-nuclear-bomb-itd-be-awesome-at-it/] I am a critic of Japan’s policy of separating and reusing the plutonium inevitably created in the country’s nuclear power plants. Japan’s stockpile of plutonium sets a terrible example for other states like, say, Iran. Still, we should not lose sight of the fact that Japan is not going to build nuclear weapons. Much of the concern expressed by Japan’s neighbors is simply a convenient opportunity to give Prime Minister Abe a kick in the shins. And, frankly, he probably deserves more than a few kicks in areas north of the shins for stunts like visiting the Yasukuni shrine and throwing shade at the women raped by the Imperial Japanese Army. Yet the notion of Japanese nuclear weapons keeps turning up. The idea has gotten some attention in light of the general combativeness of the most recent International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Shangri-La Dialogue (I am trademarking "The Brou-ha-ha in Shang-ri-la"), where Chinese participants acted boorishly, as well as an interesting debate between my friends David Santoro and Elbridge Colby about whether the United States should ditch Asian allies that leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in search of the bomb. These are important discussions, but they give the wrong impression. Focusing on the unlikely possibility of a nuclear-armed Japan distracts from more important policy challenges that threaten the shared interests of the United States and Japan in arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. Don’t get me wrong, there will always be a certain constituency within Japan for extremist views. Shintaro Ishihara, the former governor of Tokyo, has made a career out of saying impolitic things, including his infamous book, The Japan That Can Say No — say "no" to the United States, that is. Ishihara says "yes" to nuclear weapons and a bunch of other terrible ideas, from purchasing the islands at the center of the maritime dispute with China to suggesting that sexual enslavement was "a very good way of making a living" for a young woman in wartime. There have always been extremists in Japan who aren’t one bit sorry about the war. Take Ishihara’s buddy, the late Yukio Mishima. Three times nominated for the Nobel Prize in literature, Mishima was also an actor who later in life got into extremist right-wing causes, body-building, and so on. In 1970, he and some of his young acolytes in a student militia called the Tatenokai entered the military base in Ichigaya and exhorted the soldiers to launch a coup to restore the emperor. The soldiers looked on, sort of baffled — some accounts say they even heckled him — and then Mishima retired to an office to commit seppuku, or ritual suicide. The plan was that Mishima would stab himself in the stomach and then one of the students, alleged to be his lover, would behead the well-known author. The lop job didn’t go exactly as anticipated: The poor fool botched it a couple of times, leaving another student to finish off Misihima. Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, who knew Mishima socially, said, "I can only think he went out of his mind." So, yes, there are weirdos in Japan. (And elsewhere: Someone pinned Mishima’s severed head on Pinterest.) As an American, I can tell you that it’s not fair to judge a country by its nut-jobs. As an American, I can tell you that it’s not fair to judge a country by its nut-jobs. A far larger and more important constituency in Japan are the people who categorize the devastation of World War II as a catastrophe, the post-war reconstruction as a miracle, and the existence of nuclear weapons as abhorrent. This is the Japan of Yellow Magic Orchestra and Hello Kitty. (Oops.) It’s easy to talk about Japan building nuclear weapons, but the real policy debates reflect Japan’s nuclear allergy, not enthusiasm. In late 1969, a few months before Mishima killed himself, the United States agreed to return Okinawa to Japanese control. The sticking point between Tokyo and Washington was whether U.S. bases would continue to host American nuclear weapons or not. Ultimately, the United States relented to Japan’s demand for an Okinawa without nuclear weapons, although Prime Minister Sato agreed to consult with the United States in the event of a crisis. (Sato is Abe’s maternal great-uncle, by the way.) Even that agreement, however, had to be signed in secret. After signing the official memorandum to return Okinawa to Japan, then-National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and his Japanese counterpart actually contrived for U.S. President Richard Nixon to invite Sato into the president’s study to look at some objets d’art so they could sign the secret agreement without anyone present. This is hardly ancient history. In 2010, when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) finally took sole control of the government for the first time in post-war Japan, it ordered an inquiry into secret agreements like the one Sato signed. (The Japanese copy was found by Sato’s son, who would be Abe’s first cousin once-removed, if you are keeping score.) The DPJ calculated, correctly, that secret agreements to allow U.S. nuclear weapons to enter Japan would outrage a good portion of the public. The result was an ugly spat between the Obama administration and the DPJ government. The Japanese public, by and large, thinks what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a terrible thing. I am a member (that’s my head!) of the Governor of Hiroshima’s roundtable on disarmament. Let me tell you, nuclear weapons are not a vote winner in Japan. Nor, I hasten to add, is Japan "six months away" from a bomb, even if you hear that all the time. Recently some senior U.S. officials repeated the "six month" claim to NBC reporter Robert Windrem. There is no technical basis for such a statement. I once actually tried to trace the heritage of that irksome claim. As far as I could tell, it dates to a conversation with a "Japanese strategic thinker" in 1976 that is cited in Richard Halloran’s 1991 book, Chrysanthemum and Sword Revisited: Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent? The claim is made in passing, not as a formal assessment of Japan’s technological capability or plans. "Six months" in context is like the biblical "40" — that is to say, it means "fairly soon" just like "40 days and 40 nights" means it rained a long, long time. Other than one bit of yellow journalism in the Sunday Times, no one has attempted to document a technical basis for the "six-month" claim. There have been several Japanese and American assessments, from academic studies to declassified intelligence reports, on the possibility that Japan might build nuclear weapons. All of them conclude that a nuclear deterrent would cost Japan a few billion dollars and would take several years to build. That’s because the Japanese would not jury-rig a tiny arsenal out of civil plutonium. They could do it, sure, but why? Why completely alter the structure of Japanese security policy for a handful of makeshift bombs that might not work? If Japan goes nuclear, it will do so only as part of a fundamental change in how the Japanese look at their security environment. In that case, Japan would build nuclear weapons like they do everything else, down to the beer machine at Narita — with meticulous care. Japan would construct dedicated plutonium production reactors and facilities to separate weapons-grade plutonium, probably conduct nuclear tests, and deploy modern delivery systems, such as missiles. This is, I would argue, the most important point to understanding U.S.-Japan relations, and extended deterrence. We often talk about nuclear weapons in Japan like a thermostat — if U.S. credibility declines in Tokyo, Japan will build a nuclear arsenal to compensate. It’s almost as if we cut 10 bombs, the Japanese will want 10 of their own to make up the difference. That’s not right at all. For Japan, becoming a nuclear weapons power would require a dramatic break in a foreign and security policy that has historically centered on the U.S. alliance. So would unarmed neutrality. It is Japan’s lack of such strategic options that account for the most interesting Japanese behaviors in foreign and security policy. As one Japanese observer pointed out to me, neither alternative — nuclear-armed independence nor unarmed neutrality — has a mainstream constituency in Japan. That means the only practical approach for Japanese policymakers is an alliance with the United States. Tokyo has little choice but to accept whatever level of security Washington can provide at the moment. Another colleague compared it to riding on the back of a motorcycle — you can see the bumps and twists in the road, but you can’t do anything about it. That’s scary. The result, of course, is a lot of whining from Japan about the credibility of the U.S. guarantee. What else can they do? And it accounts for the tendency of the country’s politicos to fixate on symbols of Washington’s commitment, just as Max Weber observed that Protestants tended to obsess about material success as a sign of predestination.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>No Japan prolif</h4><p>- It’s highly unlikely and exaggerated by media</p><p>- Strong political constituency against ANY prolif EVER</p><p>- No tech basis for claim it would only take 6 months</p><p>- Won’t go nuclear based on US actions – too tied to the alliance</p><p><strong>Lewis 14</strong> [Jeffrey Lewis is director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies 6-26-2014 http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/26/if-japan-wanted-to-build-a-nuclear-bomb-itd-be-awesome-at-it/]</p><p>I am a critic of Japan’s policy of separating and reusing the plutonium inevitably created in the country’s nuclear power plants. Japan’s stockpile of plutonium sets a terrible example for other states like, say, Iran. Still, <u><strong>we should not lose sight of the fact that Japan is not going to build nuclear weapons</u></strong>. Much of the <u><strong>concern</u></strong> expressed by Japan’s neighbors <u><strong>is simply a convenient opportunity to give</u></strong> Prime Minister <u><strong>Abe a kick in the shins</u></strong>. And, frankly, he probably deserves more than a few kicks in areas north of the shins for stunts like visiting the Yasukuni shrine and throwing shade at the women raped by the Imperial Japanese Army. Yet <u><strong>the notion of Japanese nuclear weapons keeps turning up.</u></strong> The idea has gotten some attention in light of the general combativeness of the most recent International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Shangri-La Dialogue (I am trademarking "The Brou-ha-ha in Shang-ri-la"), where Chinese participants acted boorishly, as well as an interesting debate between my friends David Santoro and Elbridge Colby about whether the United States should ditch Asian allies that leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in search of the bomb. <u><strong>These are important discussions, but they give the wrong impression</u></strong>. <u><strong>Focusing on the</u></strong> <u><strong>unlikely possibility</u></strong> of a nuclear-armed Japan <u><strong>distracts from more important policy challenges</u></strong> that threaten the shared interests of the United States and Japan in arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. Don’t get me wrong, <u><strong><mark>there will always be a certain</mark> <mark>constituency</mark> within Japan <mark>for extremist views</u></strong></mark>. Shintaro Ishihara, the former governor of Tokyo, has made a career out of saying impolitic things, including his infamous book, The Japan That Can Say No — say "no" to the United States, that is. Ishihara says "yes" to nuclear weapons and a bunch of other terrible ideas, from purchasing the islands at the center of the maritime dispute with China to suggesting that sexual enslavement was "a very good way of making a living" for a young woman in wartime. There have always been extremists in Japan who aren’t one bit sorry about the war. Take Ishihara’s buddy, the late Yukio Mishima. Three times nominated for the Nobel Prize in literature, Mishima was also an actor who later in life got into extremist right-wing causes, body-building, and so on. In 1970, he and some of his young acolytes in a student militia called the Tatenokai entered the military base in Ichigaya and exhorted the soldiers to launch a coup to restore the emperor. The soldiers looked on, sort of baffled — some accounts say they even heckled him — and then Mishima retired to an office to commit seppuku, or ritual suicide. The plan was that Mishima would stab himself in the stomach and then one of the students, alleged to be his lover, would behead the well-known author. The lop job didn’t go exactly as anticipated: The poor fool botched it a couple of times, leaving another student to finish off Misihima. Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, who knew Mishima socially, said, "I can only think he went out of his mind." So, yes, there are weirdos in Japan. (And elsewhere: Someone pinned Mishima’s severed head on Pinterest.) As an American, I can tell you that it’s not fair to judge a country by its nut-jobs. As an American, I can tell you that it’s not fair to judge a country by its nut-jobs. <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong> <u><strong>far larger</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>more important</u></strong> <u><strong>constituency</u></strong></mark> in Japan are the people who <u><strong><mark>categorize</u></strong></mark> the devastation of World War II as a catastrophe, the post-war reconstruction as a miracle, and the <u><strong>existence of <mark>nu</mark>clear weapon<mark>s</mark> <mark>as abhorrent</u></strong></mark>. This is the Japan of Yellow Magic Orchestra and Hello Kitty. (Oops.) It’s easy to talk about Japan building nuclear weapons, but <u><strong>the real policy debates reflect Japan’s nuclear allergy, not enthusiasm</u></strong>. In late 1969, a few months before Mishima killed himself, the United States agreed to return Okinawa to Japanese control. The sticking point between Tokyo and Washington was whether U.S. bases would continue to host American nuclear weapons or not. Ultimately, the United States relented to Japan’s demand for an Okinawa without nuclear weapons, although Prime Minister Sato agreed to consult with the United States in the event of a crisis. (Sato is Abe’s maternal great-uncle, by the way.) Even that agreement, however, had to be signed in secret. After signing the official memorandum to return Okinawa to Japan, then-National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and his Japanese counterpart actually contrived for U.S. President Richard Nixon to invite Sato into the president’s study to look at some objets d’art so they could sign the secret agreement without anyone present. This is hardly ancient history. In 2010, when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) finally took sole control of the government for the first time in post-war Japan, it ordered an inquiry into secret agreements like the one Sato signed. (The Japanese copy was found by Sato’s son, who would be Abe’s first cousin once-removed, if you are keeping score.) The DPJ calculated, correctly, that secret agreements to allow U.S. nuclear weapons to enter Japan would outrage a good portion of the public. The result was an ugly spat between the Obama administration and the DPJ government. The Japanese public, by and large, thinks what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a terrible thing. I am a member (that’s my head!) of the Governor of Hiroshima’s roundtable on disarmament. Let me tell you, nuclear weapons are not a vote winner in Japan. <u><strong><mark>Nor</u></strong></mark>, I hasten to add, <u><strong><mark>is Japan "six months away</mark>" from a bomb</u></strong>, <u><strong>even if you hear that all the time</u></strong>. Recently some senior U.S. officials repeated the "six month" claim to NBC reporter Robert Windrem. <u><strong><mark>There is no tech</mark>nical <mark>basis</mark> for such a statement</u></strong>. I once actually tried to trace the heritage of that irksome claim. As far as I could tell, it dates to a conversation with a "Japanese strategic thinker" in 1976 that is cited in Richard Halloran’s 1991 book, Chrysanthemum and Sword Revisited: Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent? <u><strong>The claim is made in passing, not as a formal assessment of Japan’s technological capability or plans</u></strong>. "<u><strong>Six months" in context is like the biblical "40" — that is to say, it means "fairly soon" just like "40 days and 40 nights" means it rained a long, long time. </u></strong>Other than one bit of yellow journalism in the Sunday Times, <u><strong>no one has attempted to document a technical basis for the "six-month" claim.</u></strong> There have been <u><strong><mark>several</mark> Japanese and American <mark>assessments</u></strong></mark>, from academic studies to declassified intelligence reports, on the possibility that Japan might build nuclear weapons. All of them <u><strong><mark>conclude</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong>a nuclear deterrent would cost Japan <mark>a few billion dollars and</mark> would take <mark>several years</mark> to build. </u></strong>That’s because the Japanese would not jury-rig a tiny arsenal out of civil plutonium. They could do it, sure, but why? Why completely alter the structure of Japanese security policy for a handful of makeshift bombs that might not work? If Japan goes nuclear, it will do so only as part of a fundamental change in how the Japanese look at their security environment. In that case, <u><strong>Japan would build nuclear weapons like they do everything else,</u></strong> down to the beer machine at Narita — <u><strong>with meticulous care.</u></strong> Japan would construct dedicated plutonium production reactors and facilities to separate weapons-grade plutonium, probably conduct nuclear tests, and deploy modern delivery systems, such as missiles. This is, I would argue, the most important point to understanding U.S.-Japan relations, and extended deterrence. <u><strong><mark>We</mark> often <mark>talk about nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s</mark> <mark>in Japan like a thermostat</mark> — <mark>if U.S. credibility declines</u></strong></mark> in Tokyo, <u><strong><mark>Japan will build</mark> a nuclear arsenal to compensate</u></strong>. It’s almost as if we cut 10 bombs, the Japanese will want 10 of their own to make up the difference. <u><strong><mark>That’s not right</u></strong></mark> at all. <u><strong>For Japan, <mark>becoming a nuclear weapons power would require a dramatic break in a foreign and security policy</mark> that has historically centered on the U.S. alliance</u></strong>. So would unarmed neutrality. It is Japan’s lack of such strategic options that account for the most interesting Japanese behaviors in foreign and security policy. As one Japanese observer pointed out to me, neither alternative — nuclear-armed independence nor unarmed neutrality — has a mainstream constituency in Japan. That means <u><strong><mark>the only practical approach</mark> for Japanese policymakers <mark>is</mark> an <mark>alliance with the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Tokyo has little choice</mark> <mark>but to accept whatever</mark> level of <mark>security Washington can provide at the moment</u></strong></mark>. Another colleague compared it to riding on the back of a motorcycle — you can see the bumps and twists in the road, but you can’t do anything about it. That’s scary. <u><strong><mark>The result</mark>, of course, is <mark>a lot of whining</mark> from Japan about the credibility of the U.S. guarantee. <mark>What else can they do</mark>?</u></strong> <u><strong>And it accounts for the tendency of the country’s politicos to fixate on symbols of Washington’s commitment</u></strong>, just as Max Weber observed that Protestants tended to obsess about material success as a sign of predestination.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Robert GREENE 17 II, PhD student at the University of South Carolina [“The Left After Charlottesville,” Jacobin, September 7, 2017, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/09/charlottesville-antifa-trump-medicare-for-all] fulltext: In short, the lessons post-Charlottesville are the lessons we should have learned earlier this year. We cannot simply react to Trump or the “alt-right.” Being proactive, advancing a clear program that can mobilize and galvanize a huge swath of the public — this must be the hallmark of the American left. Otherwise, the genuine anger directed at Trump and the GOP will be wasted. And we’ll squander our chance to build the kind of broad-based left that, in the end, is the best bulwark against the far right. The Politics We Need Most of the planks of the left platform we need are already out there, waiting to be used to spur genuine debate and action across American society. Two in particular should top any left agenda The first is universal health care: Medicare for All. The Republicans’ haphazard bid to scrap the Affordable Care Act showed that even an extremely flawed version of “universal” coverage was still popular enough to scuttle repeal attempts. Now, according to recent polling, public support for single-payer is on the rise. Even centrist Democrats like Kamala Harris are getting on board. After decades of struggle, universal health care is, if not right around the corner, at least on the near horizon. Crucially, the demand for Medicare for All also offers a means to build the bonds of solidarity. As Atlantic writer Vann R. Newkirk recently pointed out, Martin Luther King Jr and other civil rights activists saw universal health care as a critical component of their struggle for a just and equitable society. The same is true today. Across movements — whether for black lives or a fifteen-dollar minimum wage or immigrant rights — universal health care is a demand that unifies. There’s another reason to prioritize the push for universal health care. Far-right organizations like the Traditionalist Workers Party have begun making overtures to poor whites in places like Appalachia by talking about jobs and access to quality health care. We can’t allow a pitch for decent health care, or an argument for good jobs, to be used as a gateway to fascism. Universal voting rights should be the second demand of any immediate left platform. Our political and economic system can’t be changed, radically and in the long-term, through voting. But countless people are being hurt by the system as it exists today, and substantially boosting voter turnout is a prerequisite for winning the reforms that will improve their lives in the short term. Conservatives understand the importance of voting rights. In recent years, numerous GOP-controlled states have passed laws restricting the franchise, whether through ID requirements or shorter windows for voter registration. They know a smaller, demoralized voting base makes it harder to get left candidates into office. In the past, the Populist era of the 1890s came to a crashing halt in part because of Jim Crow laws and new state constitutions across the South that severely limited voting rights for African Americans (and many poor whites as well). On the flip side, the rise of a strong voting base in the urbanized North, which included union members and African Americans, propelled the New Deal forward and gave social democracy in America some of its earliest and most important victories — despite opposition from both conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats. More recently, results at the local level have testified to the enduring power of a mobilized electorate. Victories by Chokwe Lumumba in Jackson, Mississippi’s mayoral race and khalid kamau in South Fulton, Georgia’s city council election were made possible by left-wing political activism on the ground. That these victories occurred in the Deep South and with heavy political participation from African Americans also belies common perceptions about what the Left looks like and where it can compete. Both Lumumba and kamau met people where they were at, while also sketching out an expansive vision. Which brings me to another important part of the Left’s post-Charlottesville toolbox: political education. The debate over monuments and Confederate flags is a perfect opportunity to get Americans thinking not just about the world we live in, but the kind of world we could live in if the Left was given the opportunity to lead. Beyond considering what statues to tear down, we should discuss what statues should replace them. Why not more monuments, across the country, to the United States Colored Troops or Harriet Tubman? But we should not stop with statues and public history, as important as they are to shaping future debates about the country’s fate. Political education should reach out to a wide range of Americans, both expanding their conception of what’s possible and learning how they see the world. Left education, after all, should be a two-way street. It can take a variety of forms — from setting up a booth at a community event or organizing a teach-in at a union hall to simply making sure socialist organizations are as open to the public as possible. Examples of political education, as I describe it, already exist. In my adopted home state of South Carolina, the SC Progressive Network offers a yearly “Modjeska Simkins School” to budding activists. Named after one of the state’s greatest human rights advocates, the seminar teaches history as well as protest and activist tactics. It, and other education efforts like it across the nation, are the spiritual grandchildren of the Highlander Folk School in the 1930s, ’40s, and ’50s. Finally, mass protest against white supremacy will continue to be a crucial tactic going forward. The rally in Boston last month, where a handful of neo-Nazis were met with over thirty thousand counter-protesters, was an enormous victory for progressives and the Left. It demonstrated the power of solidarity, viscerally and publicly. But such actions must also be tied to the sorts of political programs and tactics pitched above — using them as opportunities to not only bring together everyone opposed to white supremacy, but talking to people about the ways in which class warfare from above, gender and racial discrimination, and a revanchist politics hurts virtually everyone every day. We can’t let facile narratives about “poor whites” drive the discourse on racism in American society. The white supremacists that marched in defense of the Robert E. Lee statue included many well-off, college-educated whites that would have no qualms throwing away the lives of poor white Americans. They would also destroy the lives and aspirations of African Americans, Jews, Latinos, immigrants, and the LGBTQ community. By challenging these narratives and linking them to concrete demands for a better future, we can reach out to people who were galvanized by Charlottesville but might not know what can be done next. Breaking White Supremacy's Back These recommendations aren’t politically sexy. They don’t seem the stuff of revolution. But they’re the necessary materials for improving political conditions in the near future — which has to be done before we can work for more transformative change. Political education, for example, will be crucial for resuscitating the labor movement, to avoid more defeats like those suffered in union drives at Boeing’s plant in Charleston, South Carolina or Nissan’s plant in Canton, Mississippi. A strong left expands the public sphere, offering a broader conception of what’s politically attainable. It offers people a politics not of scapegoating or austerity but universal health care and democratic agency. Historically, it’s been the most potent antidote to the far right. But we must also remember that victory in street battles does not equal a durable political victory. Nor, on the other hand, is seeing a Democratic House in 2018 or a Democrat in the White House in 2020 the final measure of victory. The problems of Trump’s America are, not surprisingly, much like the problems of Obama’s America. And Bush’s America. And Clinton’s America. An effective left post-Charlottesville will have to concern itself, as always, with long-term planning and patient organizing. That’s the only way we’ll finally break the back of white identity politics — the only identity politics to ever wield real political power in America.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>If we abandon the issue of <u>universal health care</u>, the right wing will <u>coopt</u> working class politics to <u>cement fascism</u>. Concretely demanding single-payer provides focus and unity to broader movements against white supremacy. </h4><p>Robert <strong>GREENE 17</strong> II, PhD student at the University of South Carolina [“The Left After Charlottesville,” Jacobin, September 7, 2017, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/09/charlottesville-antifa-trump-medicare-for-all]</p><p>In short, the lessons post-Charlottesville are the lessons we should have learned earlier this year. <u><strong><mark>We cannot simply react to Trump</u></strong></mark> or the “alt-right.” <u><strong>Being proactive, advancing <mark>a clear program that can mobilize</u></strong></mark> and galvanize <u><strong>a huge swath of <mark>the public</u></strong></mark> — this <u><strong><mark>must be the hallmark of the American left.</mark> Otherwise</u></strong>, the genuine <u><strong>anger</u></strong> directed at Trump and the GOP <u><strong>will be wasted. And we’ll squander our chance to build the kind of broad-based left that</u></strong>, in the end, <u><strong>is the best bulwark against the far right</u></strong>.</p><p>The Politics We Need</p><p><u><strong>Most</u></strong> of the <u><strong><mark>planks of the left platform</u></strong></mark> we need <u><strong><mark>are</u></strong></mark> already out there, <u><strong>waiting <mark>to be used</mark> to spur genuine debate and action across American society</u></strong>. Two in particular should top any left agenda</p><p><u><strong>The <mark>first is universal health care</u></strong></mark>: Medicare for All. The Republicans’ haphazard bid to scrap the Affordable Care Act showed that even an extremely flawed version of “universal” coverage was still popular enough to scuttle repeal attempts. Now, <u><strong>according to recent polling, public <mark>support for single-payer is on the rise</mark>. Even centrist Democrats</u></strong> like Kamala Harris <u><strong>are getting on board. After decades of struggle, universal health care is</u></strong>, if not right around the corner, at least <u><strong>on the</u></strong> near <u><strong>horizon</u></strong>.</p><p>Crucially, <u><strong>the demand for Medicare for All</u></strong> also <u><strong><mark>offers a means to build the bonds of solidarity.</mark> As</u></strong> Atlantic writer Vann R. <u><strong>Newkirk</u></strong> recently <u><strong>pointed out, M</u></strong>artin <u><strong>L</u></strong>uther <u><strong>K</u></strong>ing Jr <u><strong>and other civil rights activists saw universal <mark>health care as a critical component of their struggle for a</mark> just and <mark>equitable society</u></strong></mark>. The same is true today. <u><strong><mark>Across movements</mark> — <mark>whether for black lives or a</mark> fifteen-dollar minimum <mark>wage</mark> or immigrant rights — <mark>universal health care is a demand that unifies</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong></mark>There’s another reason to prioritize</u></strong> the push for <u><strong>universal health care. <mark>Far-right organizations</u></strong></mark> like the Traditionalist Workers Party <u><strong><mark>have begun making overtures to poor whites</u></strong></mark> in places like Appalachia <u><strong><mark>by talking about</mark> jobs and access to quality <mark>health care. We can’t allow a pitch</mark> for decent health care</u></strong>, or an argument for good jobs, <u><strong><mark>to be used as a gateway to fascism</u></strong>.</p><p></mark>Universal voting rights should be the second demand of any immediate left platform. Our political and economic system can’t be changed, radically and in the long-term, through voting. But countless people are being hurt by the system as it exists today, and substantially boosting voter turnout is a prerequisite for winning the reforms that will improve their lives in the short term.</p><p>Conservatives understand the importance of voting rights. In recent years, numerous GOP-controlled states have passed laws restricting the franchise, whether through ID requirements or shorter windows for voter registration. They know a smaller, demoralized voting base makes it harder to get left candidates into office.</p><p>In the past, the Populist era of the 1890s came to a crashing halt in part because of Jim Crow laws and new state constitutions across the South that severely limited voting rights for African Americans (and many poor whites as well). On the flip side, the rise of a strong voting base in the urbanized North, which included union members and African Americans, propelled the New Deal forward and gave social democracy in America some of its earliest and most important victories — despite opposition from both conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats.</p><p>More recently, results at the local level have testified to the enduring power of a mobilized electorate. Victories by Chokwe Lumumba in Jackson, Mississippi’s mayoral race and khalid kamau in South Fulton, Georgia’s city council election were made possible by left-wing political activism on the ground. That these victories occurred in the Deep South and with heavy political participation from African Americans also belies common perceptions about what the Left looks like and where it can compete.</p><p>Both Lumumba and kamau met people where they were at, while also sketching out an expansive vision. Which brings me to another important part of the Left’s post-Charlottesville toolbox: political education.</p><p><u><strong>The debate over monuments and Confederate flags is a perfect opportunity to get Americans thinking not just about the world we live in, but the kind of world we could live in if the Left was given the opportunity to lead.</u></strong> Beyond considering what statues to tear down, we should discuss what statues should replace them. Why not more monuments, across the country, to the United States Colored Troops or Harriet Tubman? But we should not stop with statues and public history, as important as they are to shaping future debates about the country’s fate.</p><p>Political education should reach out to a wide range of Americans, both expanding their conception of what’s possible and learning how they see the world. Left education, after all, should be a two-way street. It can take a variety of forms — from setting up a booth at a community event or organizing a teach-in at a union hall to simply making sure socialist organizations are as open to the public as possible.</p><p>Examples of political education, as I describe it, already exist. In my adopted home state of South Carolina, the SC Progressive Network offers a yearly “Modjeska Simkins School” to budding activists. Named after one of the state’s greatest human rights advocates, the seminar teaches history as well as protest and activist tactics. It, and other education efforts like it across the nation, are the spiritual grandchildren of the Highlander Folk School in the 1930s, ’40s, and ’50s.</p><p>Finally, <u><strong><mark>mass protest against white supremacy</mark> will continue to be a crucial tactic going forward. The rally in Boston last month, where a handful of neo-Nazis were met with over thirty thousand counter-protesters, was an enormous victory for progressives and the Left</u></strong>. It demonstrated the power of solidarity, viscerally and publicly.</p><p>But <u><strong>such actions <mark>must</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>be tied to</u></strong></mark> the sorts of <u><strong><mark>political programs</u></strong></mark> and tactics pitched above — <u><strong><mark>using them as opportunities to not only bring together</mark> <mark>everyone</mark> opposed to white supremacy, <mark>but talking to people about</mark> the ways in which <mark>class warfare</mark> from above, gender and racial discrimination, and a revanchist politics hurts virtually everyone every day</u></strong>.</p><p>We can’t let facile narratives about “poor whites” drive the discourse on racism in American society. The white supremacists that marched in defense of the Robert E. Lee statue included many well-off, college-educated whites that would have no qualms throwing away the lives of poor white Americans. They would also destroy the lives and aspirations of African Americans, Jews, Latinos, immigrants, and the LGBTQ community.</p><p><u><strong>By <mark>challenging</u></strong></mark> these <u><strong><mark>narratives and linking them to concrete demands</u></strong></mark> for a better future, <u><strong>we can reach out to people who were galvanized by Charlottesville but might not know what can be done next</u></strong>.</p><p>Breaking White Supremacy's Back</p><p><u><strong>These recommendations</u></strong> aren’t politically sexy. They <u><strong><mark>don’t seem the stuff of revolution. But they’re the necessary materials for improving political</mark> <mark>conditions</mark> in the near future — <mark>which has to be done before</mark> we can work for more <mark>transformative change</u></strong></mark>. Political education, for example, will be crucial for resuscitating the labor movement, to avoid more defeats like those suffered in union drives at Boeing’s plant in Charleston, South Carolina or Nissan’s plant in Canton, Mississippi.</p><p><u><strong>A strong left expands the public sphere, offering a broader conception of what’s politically attainable. It offers</u></strong> people a politics not of scapegoating or austerity but <u><strong>universal health care and democratic agency. Historically, it’s been the most potent antidote to the far right</u></strong>.</p><p>But we must also remember that victory in street battles does not equal a durable political victory. Nor, on the other hand, is seeing a Democratic House in 2018 or a Democrat in the White House in 2020 the final measure of victory. The problems of Trump’s America are, not surprisingly, much like the problems of Obama’s America. And Bush’s America. And Clinton’s America.</p><p><u><strong>An effective left post-Charlottesville will have to concern itself, as always, with long-term planning and patient organizing</u></strong>. That’s the only way we’ll finally break the back of white identity politics — the only identity politics to ever wield real political power in America.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Peter Kareiva 18, Ph.D. in ecology and applied mathematics from Cornell University, director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA, et al., September 2018, “Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back,” Futures, Vol. 102, p. 39-50 fulltext: In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (climate change, global freshwater cycle, and ocean acidification) do pose existential risks. This is because of intrinsic positive feedback loops, substantial lag times between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield surprises. In addition, climate, freshwater, and ocean acidification are all directly connected to the provision of food and water, and shortages of food and water can create conflict and social unrest. Climate change has a long history of disrupting civilizations and sometimes precipitating the collapse of cultures or mass emigrations (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields). Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to exacerbate drought and water scarcity, as well as flooding. Climate change can even impair water quality because it is associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. Ample clean water is not a luxury—it is essential for human survival. Consequently, cities, regions and nations that lack clean freshwater are vulnerable to social disruption and disease. Finally, ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of the world’s protein coming from oceans (FAO, 2016), the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. Acidification is known to interfere with oyster reef building and coral reefs. Climate change also increases storm frequency and severity. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy (Spalding et al., 2014). If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises, coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge—and may be ravaged by recurrent storms. A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). Society will have a hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three extreme events. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al., 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people. 4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes Humans are remarkably ingenious, and have adapted to crises throughout their history. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). However, the many stories of human ingenuity successfully addressing existential risks such as global famine or extreme air pollution represent environmental challenges that are largely linear, have immediate consequences, and operate without positive feedbacks. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm. In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans. The consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, unlike past environmental challenges, the Earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback loops. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that very warming can cause more CO2 release which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri, Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios. Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002). Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that forest fires will become more frequent and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). This catastrophic fire embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that could catch humanity off-guard and produce a true apocalyptic event. Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming. Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967). Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, & Norris, 2009). The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that runaway climate change, and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered positive feedbacks portends even greater existential risks. The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Warming causes widespread societal disruption that cumulatively poses an existential risk</h4><p>Peter <strong>Kareiva 18<u></strong>, Ph.D. in ecology and applied mathematics from Cornell University, director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA, et al., September 2018, “Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back,” Futures, Vol. 102, p. 39-50</p><p></u>In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (<u><mark>climate change</mark>, global freshwater cycle, and ocean acidification</u>) do <u><mark>pose <strong>existential risks</u></strong></mark>. <u>This is <mark>because of</mark> intrinsic <strong><mark>positive feedback loops</strong>,</mark> substantial <strong>lag times</u></strong> <u>between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield <strong>surprises</u></strong>. In addition, <u>climate, freshwater, and ocean acidification are all <mark>directly connected to</mark> the provision of <strong><mark>food</strong> and <strong>water</strong>,</mark> and <mark>shortages</u></mark> of food and water can <u><mark>create <strong>conflict</strong></mark> and social unrest</u>. <u><mark>Climate change</mark> has a long history of <strong><mark>disrupting civilizations</u></strong> <u>and</mark> sometimes <mark>precipitating the <strong>collapse of cultures</u></strong></mark> <u>or mass emigrations</u> (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields). <u>Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is <mark>expected to <strong>exacerbate drought</strong> and</u> <u><strong>water scarcity</strong>, as well as <strong>flooding</u></strong></mark>. <u>Climate change can even <mark>impair water quality</mark> because it is associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants</u> in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. <u>Ample <mark>clean water</u></mark> is not a luxury—it <u><mark>is essential for human survival</mark>.</u> Consequently, <u>cities, regions and nations that lack clean freshwater are <mark>vulnerable to social disruption and <strong>disease</u></strong></mark>. Finally, <u>ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of</u> the world’s <u>protein coming from oceans</u> (FAO, 2016), <u>the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious</u>. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. <u>Acidification is known to interfere with oyster reef building and <strong>coral reefs</u></strong>. <u>Climate change <mark>also increases <strong>storm frequency</strong> and severity</mark>. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy</u> (Spalding et al., 2014). <u>If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises</u>, <u><strong><mark>coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge</u></strong></mark>—<u>and may be ravaged by recurrent storms</u>. A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). <u>Society will have a hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of an individual human, <mark>a</mark> <mark>person might experience as few as two or three <strong>extreme events</u></strong></mark>. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al., 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people. 4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes Humans are remarkably ingenious, and have adapted to crises throughout their history. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). However, the many stories of human ingenuity successfully addressing existential risks such as global famine or extreme air pollution represent environmental challenges that are largely linear, have immediate consequences, and operate without positive feedbacks. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm. In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans. The consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, unlike past environmental challenges, the Earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback loops. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that very warming can cause more CO2 release which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri, Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios. Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002). Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that forest fires will become more frequent and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). This catastrophic fire embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that could catch humanity off-guard and produce a true apocalyptic event. Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming. Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967). Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, & Norris, 2009). The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that runaway climate change, and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered positive feedbacks portends even greater existential risks. The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: DePetris 15 (Daniel R. DePetris is an analyst at Wikistrat, Inc., a geostrategic consulting firm, and a freelance researcher. He has also written for CNN.com, Small Wars Journal and The Diplomat. “Iran's Master Plan to Retaliate If Israel Strikes aug 3rd 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/irans-master-plan-retaliate-if-israel-attacks-13476?page=2 ) fulltext: And what about the prospects of a unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities? That would be a mistake of unimaginable proportions, according to Secretary Kerry. Asked exactly this question by NBC’s Matt Lauer recently on the Today Show, Kerry was blunt in his warnings. An Israeli military operation on Tehran’s program “would be an enormous mistake,” Kerry said, “a huge mistake with grave consequences for Israel and for the region.” But how much of a mistake would the military option be? How would Iran respond in the event of Israeli airstrikes on Tehran’s nuclear enrichment and research facilities? Would Iranian retaliation really be that devastating to the United States and its allies? 1. Use Diplomatic Channels at the United Nations For understandable reasons, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu genuinely believes that the Islamic Republic of Iran is run by a collection of unreasonable, unconstrained, irrational men who are too deceptive and/or crazy to deal with. Yet if past history is any guide, the first response from the Iranian Government is likely to be a full-court press at the United Nations against Israel and a formal complaint to the United Nations Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Human Rights Council that Israel’s aggression is a violation of their national sovereignty and a direct infringement of Article 2 in the United Nations Charter. Using diplomatic channels would be an especially appealing option for President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif—both of whom have devoted their tenure to improving Tehran’s image in the eyes of the world. A formal Iranian complaint would be dead-on-arrival once it hits the desk of the Security Council, but it would nonetheless serve its intended purpose: demonstrate to the developing world (Russia and China in particular) that the Iranian Government is a responsible power whose sovereignty was targeted by the aggressive actions of another state without sufficient cause. The objective, therefore, is not to actually pass a resolution in favor of Iran, but rather to embarrass Israel and depict it as a belligerent to a wide swath of the global community. 2. Redoubling support to its proxies According to a 2013 profile in The New Yorker on Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp-Quds Force, Iran contributed $100 million to Lebanese Hezbollah every year from 2000-2006. Hundreds of millions of additional dollars have been given to the organization since that time — a consistent pool of resources that has permitted Hezbollah to stockpile a conservative estimate of 50,000 missiles in southern Lebanon in preparation for another war with Israel. Tens of millions more have been transferred to Hamas’ Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades since the two began a reconciliation after a falling out over support for the Assad regime. “Apart from using Iranian aid to rebuild the [Hamas] tunnel network,” writes Con Coughlin of the Telegraph, “the Palestinian brigades are also replenishing their depleted stocks of medium-range missiles…” Because Iran doesn’t share a land border with Israel, you can expect Tehran to extend its material and arms support to both of these organizations after an Israeli air campaign against its nuclear program (Iran would have more resources to do so, given the sanctions relief that it is receiving for implementing the JCPOA). Through improved technology and successful defense research with the United States, Israel has been able to render many of Hamas’ rockets ineffective. Yet even with Israel’s sophisticated anti-missile defense system, it would be difficult to counteract a coordinated attack from Hezbollah in the north and Hamas in the west simultaneously. Iran, meanwhile, would still be afforded some small degree of plausible deniability. 3. You’re welcome, Al-Qaeda It may seem like an incredibly odd thing for Iran to do given its Shia composition, but the country has tacitly worked with Al-Qaeda in the past—a Sunni jihadist group that has killed thousands of people just because they happened to be worshipping in the wrong way. The U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned numerous Al-Qaeda commanders for using Iran as a staging ground to transfer fighters and money to and from South Asia and the Middle East. And the ayatollahs in Tehran have largely looked the other way when Al-Qaeda is working to target the United States or American interests. An October 2012 notice from the Treasury Department summarizes the Al-Qaeda-Iran relationship quite well. “This [Al-Qaeda] network uses Iran as a critical transit point and operates under an agreement between al-Qa’ida and the Iranian government,” former U.S. Undersecretary of the Treasury (and now Deputy CIA Director) David Cohen writes. “Under the terms of the agreement between al-Qa’ida and Iran, al-Qa’ida must refrain from conducting any operations within Iranian territory and recruiting operatives inside Iran while keeping Iranian authorities informed of their activities. In return, the Government of Iran gave the Iran-based al-Qa’ida network freedom of operation and uninhibited ability to travel for extremists and their families.” Al-Qaeda’s own operatives have confirmed through internal correspondence that Iran was once thought of as a perfect base to re-establish itself after its expulsion from Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001 attacks. While those plans were shelved due to expense, it is not inconceivable that the group would be offered expanded freedom of movement inside Iran if Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the IRGC believed such a partnership would serve their interests. 4. Kidnap more Americans Iran has a habit of sweeping up American citizens who reside in or travel to the country, charging them with espionage, locking them up in Evin prison, putting them on trial, and convicting them for being members of the CIA. Sarah Shourd, Shane Bauer, Joshua Fattel, Robert Levinson, Amir Hekmati, Saeed Abedini, and Jason Razaian have all been picked up by Iranian authorities (or, in the case of Levinson, disappeared) and accused of being U.S. government agents. In each of these cases, the detention of an American was an international headline that made the United States look feckless and unable to guarantee the safety of its citizens. Even if Israel chose to act alone during a military operation against Tehran’s nuclear program, Iran would likely assume that Washington was involved in some fashion — either through intelligence channels or military enablers. This is why Iranian authorities would likely view the arrest and prosecution of more Americans as justified under the circumstances. The imprisonment of even one additional American in an Iranian detention facility for a lengthy sentence would be a black eye to the United States and would elicit an uproar among members of Congress. 5. Make Afghanistan a living hell If you think Afghanistan is chaotic today, it can get a lot bloodier if the IRGC-Quds Force increases its covert support to insurgent groups fighting the Afghan national security forces. Whereas Iran and the Taliban were once bitter enemies in the late 1990s (Iran was all but ready to launch military action against the Taliban in 1998 after nine Iranian diplomats were slaughtered by the movement), the two have turned into allies of convenience—if only because both consider the United States to be a major irritant in the region. Thanks to Chelsea Manning’s disclosure of hundreds of thousands of “war logs” to the anti-secrecy group Wikileaks, we know how extensive that cooperation has been in the past: Taliban fighters training across the border in eastern Iran; Iranian agents providing money and weapons to anti-government insurgent groups; millions of dollars in bribes given to senior Afghan government officials, among other cases. Defense Secretary Robert Gates lambasted Iran in 2010 for “playing a double game” in Afghanistan—supporting the Afghan government with cash, while at the very same time building contacts among the various Afghan insurgent factions. At a time when the United States is closing out its fourteen-year engagement in Afghanistan, the last thing that Washington wants is an Iraq-style disintegration of that country’s security situation. Yet this is exactly what Tehran could foment in order to retaliate against an Israeli attack. Such a decision would also have the effect of jeopardizing another multi-year U.S. military engagement in a country where Americans have fought and died. Conclusion However Iran chooses to respond to an Israeli attack on its nuclear program, Khamenei will instruct the IRGC-QF to do its work as discreetly as possible. Any overt missile attack on an American ally in the Arab world — let alone a conventional missile attack on Israel — would prompt the U.S. armed forces to scramble the fighter jets and deploy the aircraft carriers. This is not something Iran wants and a full U.S. military operation is certainly not something that they can afford to confront. The name of the game for Iran is to maximize the damage on Israeli and U.S. interests without provoking a conventional military assault from both nations that will degrade its military capability and potentially destroy the regime<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>No Iran War</h4><p><strong>DePetris 15</strong> (Daniel R. DePetris is an analyst at Wikistrat, Inc., a geostrategic consulting firm, and a freelance researcher. He has also written for CNN.com, Small Wars Journal and The Diplomat. “Iran's Master Plan to Retaliate If Israel Strikes aug 3rd 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/irans-master-plan-retaliate-if-israel-attacks-13476?page=2 ) </p><p>And <u>what about the prospects of a unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities</u>? That would be a mistake of unimaginable proportions, according to Secretary Kerry. Asked exactly this question by NBC’s Matt Lauer recently on the Today Show, Kerry was blunt in his warnings<u>. An Israeli military operation on Tehran’s program “would be an enormous mistake,” Kerry said, “a huge mistake with grave consequences for Israel and for the region.” </u>But how much of a mistake would the military option be? How would Iran respond in the event of Israeli airstrikes on Tehran’s nuclear enrichment and research facilities? <u><strong><mark>Would Iranian retaliation really be that devastatin</mark>g to the United States and its allies? </strong>1. <mark>Use Diplomatic Channels</mark> at the United Nations </u>For understandable reasons, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu genuinely believes that the Islamic Republic of Iran is run by a collection of unreasonable, unconstrained, irrational men who are too deceptive and/or crazy to deal with. Yet if past history is any guide, the first response from the Iranian Government is likely to be a full-court press at the United Nations against Israel and a formal complaint to the United Nations Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Human Rights Council that Israel’s aggression is a violation of their national sovereignty and a direct infringement of Article 2 in the United Nations Charter. Using diplomatic channels would be an especially appealing option for President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif—both of whom have devoted their tenure to improving Tehran’s image in the eyes of the world. A formal Iranian complaint would be dead-on-arrival once it hits the desk of the Security Council, but it would nonetheless serve its intended purpose: demonstrate to the developing world (Russia and China in particular) that the Iranian Government is a responsible power whose sovereignty was targeted by the aggressive actions of another state without sufficient cause. The objective, therefore, is not to actually pass a resolution in favor of Iran, but rather to embarrass Israel and depict it as a belligerent to a wide swath of the global community. <u>2. <mark>Redoubling</mark> <mark>support to its proxies</mark> </u>According to a 2013 profile in The New Yorker on Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp-Quds Force, Iran contributed $100 million to Lebanese Hezbollah every year from 2000-2006. Hundreds of millions of additional dollars have been given to the organization since that time — a consistent pool of resources that has permitted Hezbollah to stockpile a conservative estimate of 50,000 missiles in southern Lebanon in preparation for another war with Israel. Tens of millions more have been transferred to Hamas’ Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades since the two began a reconciliation after a falling out over support for the Assad regime. “Apart from using Iranian aid to rebuild the [Hamas] tunnel network,” writes Con Coughlin of the Telegraph, “the Palestinian brigades are also replenishing their depleted stocks of medium-range missiles…” Because Iran doesn’t share a land border with Israel, you can expect Tehran to extend its material and arms support to both of these organizations after an Israeli air campaign against its nuclear program (Iran would have more resources to do so, given the sanctions relief that it is receiving for implementing the JCPOA). Through improved technology and successful defense research with the United States, Israel has been able to render many of Hamas’ rockets ineffective. Yet even with Israel’s sophisticated anti-missile defense system, it would be difficult to counteract a coordinated attack from Hezbollah in the north and Hamas in the west simultaneously. Iran, meanwhile, would still be afforded some small degree of plausible deniability. 3. You’re welcome, Al-Qaeda It may seem like an incredibly odd thing for Iran to do given its Shia composition, but <u>the country has tacitly worked with Al-Qaeda in the past</u>—a Sunni jihadist group that has killed thousands of people just because they happened to be worshipping in the wrong way. The U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned numerous Al-Qaeda commanders for using Iran as a staging ground to transfer fighters and money to and from South Asia and the Middle East. And the ayatollahs in Tehran have largely looked the other way when Al-Qaeda is working to target the United States or American interests. An October 2012 notice from the Treasury Department summarizes the Al-Qaeda-Iran relationship quite well. “This [Al-Qaeda] network uses Iran as a critical transit point and operates under an agreement between al-Qa’ida and the Iranian government,” former U.S. Undersecretary of the Treasury (and now Deputy CIA Director) David Cohen writes. “Under the terms of the agreement between al-Qa’ida and Iran, al-Qa’ida must refrain from conducting any operations within Iranian territory and recruiting operatives inside Iran while keeping Iranian authorities informed of their activities. In return, the Government of Iran gave the Iran-based al-Qa’ida network freedom of operation and uninhibited ability to travel for extremists and their families.” Al-Qaeda’s own operatives have confirmed through internal correspondence that Iran was once thought of as a perfect base to re-establish itself after its expulsion from Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001 attacks. While those plans were shelved due to expense, it is not inconceivable that the group would be offered expanded freedom of movement inside Iran if Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the IRGC believed such a partnership would serve their interests. <u>4. <mark>Kidnap more Americans</mark> </u>Iran has a habit of sweeping up American citizens who reside in or travel to the country, charging them with espionage, locking them up in Evin prison, putting them on trial, and convicting them for being members of the CIA. Sarah Shourd, Shane Bauer, Joshua Fattel, Robert Levinson, Amir Hekmati, Saeed Abedini, and Jason Razaian have all been picked up by Iranian authorities (or, in the case of Levinson, disappeared) and accused of being U.S. government agents. In each of these cases, the detention of an American was an international headline that made the United States look feckless and unable to guarantee the safety of its citizens. Even if Israel chose to act alone during a military operation against Tehran’s nuclear program, Iran would likely assume that Washington was involved in some fashion — either through intelligence channels or military enablers. This is why Iranian authorities would likely view the arrest and prosecution of more Americans as justified under the circumstances. The imprisonment of even one additional American in an Iranian detention facility for a lengthy sentence would be a black eye to the United States and would elicit an uproar among members of Congress. <u>5. <mark>Make Afghanistan a living hell</mark> </u>If you think Afghanistan is chaotic today, it can get a lot bloodier if the IRGC-Quds Force increases its covert support to insurgent groups fighting the Afghan national security forces. Whereas Iran and the Taliban were once bitter enemies in the late 1990s (Iran was all but ready to launch military action against the Taliban in 1998 after nine Iranian diplomats were slaughtered by the movement), the two have turned into allies of convenience—if only because both consider the United States to be a major irritant in the region. Thanks to Chelsea Manning’s disclosure of hundreds of thousands of “war logs” to the anti-secrecy group Wikileaks, we know how extensive that cooperation has been in the past: Taliban fighters training across the border in eastern Iran; Iranian agents providing money and weapons to anti-government insurgent groups; millions of dollars in bribes given to senior Afghan government officials, among other cases. Defense Secretary Robert Gates lambasted Iran in 2010 for “playing a double game” in Afghanistan—supporting the Afghan government with cash, while at the very same time building contacts among the various Afghan insurgent factions. At a time when the United States is closing out its fourteen-year engagement in Afghanistan, the last thing that Washington wants is an Iraq-style disintegration of that country’s security situation. Yet this is exactly what Tehran could foment in order to retaliate against an Israeli attack. Such a decision would also have the effect of jeopardizing another multi-year U.S. military engagement in a country where Americans have fought and died. Conclusion <u><mark>However Iran chooses to respond</mark> to an Israeli attack on its nuclear program, <mark>Khamenei will instruct the IRGC</mark>-QF <mark>to</mark> do its <mark>work as discreetly as possible<strong>. Any overt missile attack on an American</mark> ally in the Arab world — let alone a conventional missile attack on Israel — <mark>would prompt the U.S. armed forces to scramble</mark> the fighter jets and deploy the aircraft carriers. <mark>This is not something Iran wants and a full U.S. military</mark> operation <mark>is</mark> certainly <mark>not something that they can afford</mark> to confront. </u></strong>The <u><mark>name of the game for Iran is to maximize the damage on Israeli and U.S. interests without provoking a conventional military assault f</u></mark>rom both nations that will degrade its military capability and potentially destroy the regime</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Sanger 18 (David, national security correspondent at NYT, “Pentagon Puts Cyberwarriors on the Offensive, Increasing the Risk of Conflict,” 6-17-18, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/17/us/politics/cyber-command-trump.html) fulltext: WASHINGTON — The Pentagon has quietly empowered the United States Cyber Command to take a far more aggressive approach to defending the nation against cyberattacks, a shift in strategy that could increase the risk of conflict with the foreign states that sponsor malicious hacking groups. Until now, the Cyber Command has assumed a largely defensive posture, trying to counter attackers as they enter American networks. In the relatively few instances when it has gone on the offensive, particularly in trying to disrupt the online activities of the Islamic State and its recruiters in the past several years, the results have been mixed at best. But in the spring, as the Pentagon elevated the command’s status, it opened the door to nearly daily raids on foreign networks, seeking to disable cyberweapons before they can be unleashed, according to strategy documents and military and intelligence officials. The change in approach was not formally debated inside the White House before it was issued, according to current and former administration officials. But it reflects the greater authority given to military commanders by President Trump, as well as a widespread view that the United States has mounted an inadequate defense against the rising number of attacks aimed at America. It is unclear how carefully the administration has weighed the various risks involved if the plan is acted on in classified operations. Adversaries like Russia, China and North Korea, all nuclear-armed states, have been behind major cyberattacks, and the United States has struggled with the question of how to avoid an unforeseen escalation as it wields its growing cyberarsenal. Another complicating factor is that taking action against an adversary often requires surreptitiously operating in the networks of an ally, like Germany — a problem that often gave the Obama administration pause. The new strategy envisions constant, disruptive “short of war” activities in foreign computer networks. It is born, officials said, of more than a decade of counterterrorism operations, where the United States learned that the best way to take on Al Qaeda or the Islamic State was by destroying the militants inside their bases or their living rooms. The objective, according to the new “vision statement” quietly issued by the command, is to “contest dangerous adversary activity before it impairs our national power.” Pushing American defenses “as close as possible to the origin of adversary activity extends our reach to expose adversaries’ weaknesses, learn their intentions and capabilities, and counter attacks close to their origins,” the document says. “Continuous engagement imposes tactical friction and strategic costs on our adversaries, compelling them to shift resources to defense and reduce attacks.” Another Pentagon document, dated May 2017, provides a legal basis for attacking nuclear missiles on the launchpad using “nonkinetic options” — meaning a cyberattack or some other means that does not involve bombing a missile on the pad or otherwise blowing it up. The policy was issued two months after The New York Times revealed that the Obama administration had developed an extensive “left of launch” capability to attack North Korea’s missiles using cyber and electronic warfare, though it was unclear how well the strategy was working. The new Pentagon legal strategy was first reported by The Daily Beast. As the Defense Department elevated the Cyber Command to a status equal to the Indo-Pacific Command, the European Command, the Space Command and the Joint Special Operations Command, among others, it declared that most of its 133 “cyber mission teams” were combat-ready after years of development. But most of those teams protect Defense Department networks. Offensive cyberaction by the United States has been relatively rare, a reflection of the time it takes to mount operations and the fact that only the president can approve any use of a cyberweapon that is likely to have significant effects. Those operations have included disabling another nation’s nuclear facilities or its missiles, as the United States has attempted in Iran and North Korea, or disrupting the communications of groups like the Islamic State. The president’s sole authority to authorize the use of those weapons is similar to his authority to launch nuclear weapons, a recognition that cyberweapons, even if less powerful than nuclear arms, can have broad, unintended effects. Under the Trump administration, the traditional structure of White House oversight of American offensive and defensive cyberactivities is being dismantled. Days after taking office in April, the new national security adviser, John R. Bolton, forced out the homeland security adviser, Thomas P. Bossert, in part because of his discomfort that Mr. Bossert had direct access to the president. Mr. Bolton then eliminated the position of White House cybercoordinator, who had overseen the complex mix of cyberactivities run by the American government. The last person who held the job, Rob Joyce, had previously run the Tailored Access Operations unit of the National Security Agency — the covert “special forces” of America’s cyberoperations, which has mounted attacks on critical foreign targets, from Iran’s nuclear facilities to North Korean missile testing sites. Mr. Joyce returned to the N.S.A. American intelligence agencies have identified cyberthreats as the No. 1 risk facing the United States — it has ranked ahead of terrorism for years now in the annual assessment provided to Congress, even before the Russian intrusion into the election. But the White House declared that it did not need a separate cybercoordinator because the issues are included in many other programs. A young National Security Council staff member, with scant experience in the topic, now oversees offensive cyberissues. The United States Cyber Command was created partly in response to a Russian hacking attack that long predated the 2016 election. In the fall of 2008, Russian intelligence agencies penetrated SIPRNet, the Pentagon’s secret internal network; that led to a rush to consolidate several cyberprograms into a command. The Chinese, meanwhile, were stealing weapons designs, including blueprints for the F-35, America’s most expensive fighter jet. Cyber Command was placed at Fort Meade, Md., home of the National Security Agency, but it has been criticized for being far too dependent on the N.S.A.’s hacking skills. A decade later, it is under new command, led by Gen. Paul Nakasone. He was a junior officer in the command’s early days and was deeply involved in one of its first big classified projects, “Nitro Zeus”: the plan to use cybertools, among other things, to take down Iran’s air defenses, its communications systems and its power grid if a conflict broke out. To prepare for that day, if it ever happened, the United States tunneled deep inside Iran’s grids, and even Revolutionary Guards Corps command-and-control systems. It was a huge mission, involving hundreds of troops and civilians. The program was never activated; the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement avoided conflict. But now that Mr. Trump has announced that he is abandoning the accord, many of those plans are being dusted off, according to several officials. General Nakasone, in his confirmation hearings in March, made clear that a more aggressive approach to opponents in cyberspace would be needed, though he gave few details. “By conducting operations to frustrate and counter adversary cyberactivities to decrease will, increase cost and deny benefits,” he said, the United States could begin to deliver more decisive blows with its attacks. The same month, Gen. John E. Hyten, the head of Strategic Command, said in testimony that if the United States was going to defend itself in cyberspace, it needed clear rules of day-to-day engagement. “Cyberspace needs to be looked at as a warfighting domain,” he said, “and if somebody threatens us in cyberspace, we need to have the authorities to respond.” His statement seemed to reflect a view that the current legal authority is too slow. There is little debate inside the government’s sprawling community of cyberwarriors and defenders that the United States needs to step up its game: It did not see the Russian hack of the 2016 election coming, or North Korea’s “WannaCry” attack last year, which crippled the National Health Service in Britain and rippled around the world, partly driven by stolen American cyberweapons. But the risks of escalation — of United States action in foreign networks leading to retaliatory strikes against American banks, dams, financial markets or communications networks — are considerable, according to current and former officials. Mr. Trump has shown only a cursory interest in the subject, former aides say, not surprising for a man who does not use a computer and came of age as a business executive in a predigital era. Efforts to rewrite the main document governing the presidential authorities in the cyberarena — Presidential Policy Directive 20, signed by Barack Obama — have faltered in the chaos of Mr. Bolton’s decision to oust the key players. “It is essentially a ‘forward defense’ approach,” Jason Healey, who runs the cyber initiative at Columbia University, said recently. “Clearly, what we have been doing so far isn’t working. But you want to think through the consequences carefully.” The chief risk is that the internet becomes a battleground of all-against-all, as nations not only place “implants” in the networks of their adversaries — something the United States, China, Russia, Iran and North Korea have done with varying levels of sophistication — but also begin to engage in daily attack and counterattack.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Delegation <u>Increases risk of conflict</u> – if spillover from nukes is true, the <u>plan solves escalation</u> from <u>botched operations</h4><p></u><strong>Sanger 18</strong> (David, national security correspondent at NYT, “Pentagon Puts Cyberwarriors on the Offensive, Increasing the Risk of Conflict,” 6-17-18, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/17/us/politics/cyber-command-trump.html)</p><p>WASHINGTON — <u><strong>The <mark>Pentagon</mark> has quietly <mark>empowered</mark> the United States <mark>Cyber</mark> Command<mark> to take a</mark> far <mark>more aggressive approach</mark> to defending the nation against cyberattacks</u></strong>, a shift in strategy <u><strong>that <mark>could increase the risk of conflict</mark> with the foreign states</u></strong> that sponsor malicious hacking groups. <u><strong>Until now, the Cyber Command has assumed a largely defensive posture</u></strong>, trying to counter attackers as they enter American networks. In the relatively few instances when it has gone on the offensive, particularly in trying to disrupt the online activities of the Islamic State and its recruiters in the past several years, the results have been mixed at best. But in the spring, as <u><strong>the Pentagon elevated the command’s status</u></strong>, <u><strong>it <mark>opened the door to</mark> nearly <mark>daily raids</mark> on foreign networks</u></strong>, <u><strong>seeking to disable cyberweapons before they can be unleashed</u></strong>, according to strategy documents and military and intelligence officials. <u><strong>The <mark>change</mark> in approach <mark>was not formally debated</mark> inside the White House before it was issued</u></strong>, according to current and former administration officials. But <u><strong><mark>it reflects</mark> the <mark>greater authority</mark> given <mark>to military commanders</u></strong></mark> by President Trump, as well as a widespread view that the United States has mounted an inadequate defense against the rising number of attacks aimed at America. <u><strong>It is unclear how carefully the administration has weighed the various risks involved if the plan is acted on in classified operations</u></strong>. <u><strong>Adversaries like Russia, China and North Korea</u></strong>, <u><strong>all nuclear-armed states</u></strong>, <u><strong>have been behind major cyberattacks</u></strong>, <u><strong>and the United States has struggled with</u></strong> the question of <u><strong>how to avoid an unforeseen escalation</u></strong> <u><strong>as it wields its growing cyberarsenal</u></strong>. Another complicating factor is that <u><strong><mark>taking action against an adversary</mark> often <mark>requires</mark> surreptitiously <mark>operating in the networks of an ally</u></strong></mark>, like Germany — a problem that often gave the Obama administration pause. <u><strong>The new strategy envisions constant, disruptive “short of war” activities in foreign computer networks</u></strong>. It is born, officials said, of more than a decade of counterterrorism operations, where the United States learned that the best way to take on Al Qaeda or the Islamic State was by destroying the militants inside their bases or their living rooms. The objective, according to the new “vision statement” quietly issued by the command, is to “contest dangerous adversary activity before it impairs our national power.” Pushing American defenses “as close as possible to the origin of adversary activity extends our reach to expose adversaries’ weaknesses, learn their intentions and capabilities, and counter attacks close to their origins,” the document says. “Continuous engagement imposes tactical friction and strategic costs on our adversaries, compelling them to shift resources to defense and reduce attacks.” Another Pentagon document, dated May 2017, provides a legal basis for attacking nuclear missiles on the launchpad using “nonkinetic options” — meaning a cyberattack or some other means that does not involve bombing a missile on the pad or otherwise blowing it up. The policy was issued two months after The New York Times revealed that the Obama administration had developed an extensive “left of launch” capability to attack North Korea’s missiles using cyber and electronic warfare, though it was unclear how well the strategy was working. The new Pentagon legal strategy was first reported by The Daily Beast. As the Defense Department elevated the Cyber Command to a status equal to the Indo-Pacific Command, the European Command, the Space Command and the Joint Special Operations Command, among others, it declared that most of its 133 “cyber mission teams” were combat-ready after years of development. But most of those teams protect Defense Department networks. <u><strong>Offensive cyberaction by the United States has been relatively rare</u></strong>, a reflection of the time it takes to mount operations and the fact that only the president can approve any use of a cyberweapon that is likely to have significant effects. Those operations have included disabling another nation’s nuclear facilities or its missiles, as the United States has attempted in Iran and North Korea, or disrupting the communications of groups like the Islamic State. <u><strong>The <mark>president’s sole authority</mark> to authorize the use of those weapons <mark>is similar</mark> to his <mark>authority to launch nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>a recognition that cyberweapons</u></strong>, <u><strong>even if less powerful than nuclear arms</u></strong>, <u><strong>can have broad,</u></strong> <u><strong>unintended effects. </u></strong>Under the Trump administration, <u><strong><mark>the traditional structure of</mark> White House <mark>oversight</mark> of American offensive and defensive cyberactivities is being dismantled</u></strong>. Days after taking office in April<u><strong>, the new national security adviser, John R. Bolton, forced out the homeland security adviser</u></strong>, Thomas P. Bossert<u><strong>, in part because of his discomfort that Mr. Bossert had direct access to the president. </u></strong>Mr. <u><strong><mark>Bolton</mark> then <mark>eliminated the</mark> position of White House <mark>cybercoordinator</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>who had overseen the complex mix of cyberactivities run by the American government</u></strong>. The last person who held the job, Rob Joyce, had previously run the Tailored Access Operations unit of the National Security Agency — the covert “special forces” of America’s cyberoperations, which has mounted attacks on critical foreign targets, from Iran’s nuclear facilities to North Korean missile testing sites. Mr. Joyce returned to the N.S.A. American intelligence agencies have identified cyberthreats as the No. 1 risk facing the United States — it has ranked ahead of terrorism for years now in the annual assessment provided to Congress, even before the Russian intrusion into the election. But the White House declared that it did not need a separate cybercoordinator because the issues are included in many other programs. <u><strong><mark>A young N</mark>ational <mark>S</mark>ecurity <mark>C</mark>ouncil <mark>staff member, with scant experience</mark> in the topic, <mark>now oversees</mark> offensive <mark>cyberissues</mark>. </u></strong>The United States Cyber Command was created partly in response to a Russian hacking attack that long predated the 2016 election. In the fall of 2008, Russian intelligence agencies penetrated SIPRNet, the Pentagon’s secret internal network; that led to a rush to consolidate several cyberprograms into a command. The Chinese, meanwhile, were stealing weapons designs, including blueprints for the F-35, America’s most expensive fighter jet. Cyber Command was placed at Fort Meade, Md., home of the National Security Agency, but it has been criticized for being far too dependent on the N.S.A.’s hacking skills. A decade later, it is under new command, led by Gen. Paul Nakasone. He was a junior officer in the command’s early days and was deeply involved in one of its first big classified projects, “Nitro Zeus”: the plan to use cybertools, among other things, to take down Iran’s air defenses, its communications systems and its power grid if a conflict broke out. To prepare for that day, if it ever happened, the United States tunneled deep inside Iran’s grids, and even Revolutionary Guards Corps command-and-control systems. It was a huge mission, involving hundreds of troops and civilians. The program was never activated; the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement avoided conflict. But now that Mr. Trump has announced that he is abandoning the accord, many of those plans are being dusted off, according to several officials. General Nakasone, in his confirmation hearings in March, made clear that a more aggressive approach to opponents in cyberspace would be needed, though he gave few details. “By conducting operations to frustrate and counter adversary cyberactivities to decrease will, increase cost and deny benefits,” he said, the United States could begin to deliver more decisive blows with its attacks. The same month, Gen. John E. Hyten, the head of Strategic Command, said in testimony that if the United States was going to defend itself in cyberspace, it needed clear rules of day-to-day engagement. “Cyberspace needs to be looked at as a warfighting domain,” he said, “and if somebody threatens us in cyberspace, we need to have the authorities to respond.” His statement seemed to reflect a view that the current legal authority is too slow. There is little debate inside the government’s sprawling community of cyberwarriors and defenders that the United States needs to step up its game: It did not see the Russian hack of the 2016 election coming, or North Korea’s “WannaCry” attack last year, which crippled the National Health Service in Britain and rippled around the world, partly driven by stolen American cyberweapons. But <u><strong><mark>the risks of escalation</mark> </u></strong>— <u><strong>of United States action in foreign networks leading to retaliatory strikes against American banks, dams, financial markets or communications networks</u></strong> — <u><strong><mark>are considerable</u></strong></mark>, according to current and former officials. <u><strong>Mr. Trump has shown only a cursory interest in the subject</u></strong>, former aides say, <u><strong>not surprising for a man who does not use a computer and came of age as a business executive in a predigital era. <mark>Efforts to rewrite the</mark> main <mark>document governing</mark> the <mark>presidential authorities</mark> in the cyberarena</u></strong> — Presidential Policy Directive 20, signed by Barack Obama — <u><strong><mark>have faltered in the chaos of</mark> Mr. <mark>Bolton</mark>’s decision to oust the key players</u></strong>. “It is essentially a ‘forward defense’ approach,” Jason Healey, who runs the cyber initiative at Columbia University, said recently. “Clearly, what we have been doing so far isn’t working. But you want to think through the consequences carefully.” The chief risk is that <u><strong>the internet becomes a battleground of all-against-all, as nations not only place “implants” in the networks of their adversaries</u></strong> — something the United States, China, Russia, Iran and North Korea have done with varying levels of sophistication — but also begin to engage in daily attack and counterattack.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Gregory Fernando Pappas 16 [Texas A&M University] “The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016, BE fulltext: In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the “denotative method” (LW 1:371).18 What Dewey means by “denotation” is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are con- cerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an empirical inquiry about an injustice must begin with a rough and tentative designation of where the injustices from within the broader context of our everyday life and activities are. Once we designate the subject matter, we then engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry “as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience” (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revi- sion of our theories.¶ Injustices are events suffered by concrete people at a particular time and in a situation. We need to start by pointing out and describing these prob- lematic experiences instead of starting with a theoretical account or diagnosis of them. Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start of inquiry, they can blind us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses. We must attempt to pretheoretically designate the subject matter, that is, to “point” in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. One must be careful to designate the subject matter in such a way as not to slant the question in favor of one’s theory or theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because a concrete social problem (e.g., injustice) is independent and neutral with respect to the different possible competing diagnoses or theories about its causes. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his Logic, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical prac- tice, one that they both use to make their points.19 The doctor’s startingpoint is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or prob- lematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”20 The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solu- tions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to sug- gest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”21¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their con- ceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doc- tor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something in- dividualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contex- tualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”22 Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her in- quiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s character- ization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the ill- ness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis. To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem; as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶ Making problematic situations of injustice our explicit methodological commitment as a starting point rather than a diagnosis of the problem is an important and useful imperative for nonideal theories. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its ame- lioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, our cures should try to address as much as possible the unique circumstances of each injustice. The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to prac- tice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Morality is based on response to problems in the world, which justifies focus on resolving material conditions of violence.</h4><p>Gregory Fernando <u><strong>Pappas 16</u></strong> [Texas A&M University] “The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016, BE</p><p>In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the “denotative method” (LW 1:371).18 What Dewey means by “denotation” is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are con- cerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an <u><strong><mark>empirical inquiry about</mark> an <mark>injustice must begin with</mark> a rough and tentative <mark>designation of where the injustices</mark> from within the broader context of our everyday life and activities <mark>are</u></strong></mark>. Once we designate the subject matter, we then engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry “as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience” (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revi- sion of our theories.¶ <u><strong><mark>Injustices are events suffered by concrete people</mark> at a particular time and in a situation. <mark>We need to start by pointing out and describing</mark> these <mark>prob- lematic experiences instead of</mark> starting with a <mark>theoretical account</mark> or diagnosis of them</u></strong>. Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start of inquiry, they can blind us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses. <u><strong><mark>We must</mark> attempt to <mark>pretheoretically designate the subject matter</mark>, that is, to “point” in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem</u></strong>. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. <u><strong><mark>One must be careful to designate the subject matter in</mark> such <mark>a way as not</mark> to slant the question <mark>in favor of one’s theory</mark> or theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because <mark>a concrete social problem</u></strong></mark> (e.g., injustice) <u><strong><mark>is independent and neutral with respect to</mark> the different possible <mark>competing diagnoses</mark> or theories about its causes</u></strong>. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his Logic, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical prac- tice, one that they both use to make their points.19 The doctor’s startingpoint is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or prob- lematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”20 The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solu- tions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to sug- gest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”21¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their con- ceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doc- tor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something in- dividualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contex- tualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”22 Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her in- quiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s character- ization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the ill- ness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis. <u><strong><mark>To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem</u></strong></mark>; as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶ <u><strong><mark>Making problematic situations</mark> of injustice <mark>our</mark> explicit <mark>methodological</mark> commitment as a <mark>starting point</mark> rather than a diagnosis of the problem <mark>is</mark> an <mark>important</mark> and useful imperative</u></strong> for nonideal theories. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its ame- lioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, <u><strong>our <mark>cures should</mark> try to <mark>address</mark> as much as possible the <mark>unique circumstances</mark> of each injustice</u></strong>. The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to prac- tice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Máximo Langer 20. Professor of Law, Director of the Transnational Program on Criminal Justice, and Faculty Director of the Criminal Justice Program at the University of California Los Angeles School of Law, former Professor of Law at University Torcuato DiTella School of Law (Argentina), Harvard Law School, New York University School of Law, and the School of Law at Aix-Marseille University (France), holds an S.J.D. from Harvard Law School and an LL.B. from the University of Buenos Aires Law School. 8-14-2020. “Penal Abolitionism and Criminal Law Minimalism: Here and There, Now and Then.” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3674183. DOA: 9-9-2020. p. 19-23. Recut by kyujin fulltext: The final response by penal abolitionists to the challenge of what to do with harmful behavior is postponing until a new society is created. I refer here to a set of responses by penal abolitionists that argue that not punishing social harm and abolishing prisons and other institutions are unthinkable or can be only partially implemented today because we need a radically different society. Once this new society is established, the argument goes, harmful conduct would be radically reduced and it would be possible to address it without police, prisons or punishment.121 I will discuss this argument in the following subsection. B. There Is No Way to Abolish Every Power Regime Thirty years ago, my co-author and I raised a second, rarely discussed, challenge to penal abolitionism: even if prisons could be abolished, power regimes cannot.122 Foucault challenged the notion that the shift from corporal punishment to prisons was a humanizing process because he argued that a society with prisons was a disciplinary society with its own power and knowledge regimes.123 Similarly, if there were a transition from a society with prisons to a society without prisons, one could then question whether this would necessarily be a humanizing process and ask what the possible power and knowledge regimes of this society without prisons would be.124 This does not mean that all power relations are alike since some power relations may be fairer—e.g., more equal, freer, more humane—than others. But it does mean that the “society without prisons” that penal abolitionists call for would have power relations too. The plausibility and appeal of penal abolitionism as a program would thus depend on how fair this “society without prisons”, “without punishment” or “without police” would be. I have to admit that even if I share many specific proposals and the broader goal to create fairer societies, I am skeptical about various penal abolitionist proposals in this regard for multiple reasons. First, a number of penal abolitionists concentrate on penal policy and do not articulate a vision that covers other realms of social life or articulate their vision in such general terms that it is hard to know what to make out of it.125 Second, when they articulate such a vision or one can infer it through a close reading of their discourse, the vision has aspects that, at least for me, often sound unrealistic or [end page 20] unattractive. For instance, some abolitionists seem to suggest a return to small communities where everyone knows each other, has extra time, and is committed to spending time and energy to deal with conflicts with other people without intervention by the penal system.126 But it is unclear in these accounts how we would transition from our mass, socially complex and specialized societies to these small communities. In addition, even if they may rely on the penal system less than larger societies, small communities can be very oppressive and exclusive in their own ways.127 Other penal abolitionists have argued for “cop-free” zones. One of the ideas behind is to have zones without surveillance—an understandable reaction given the justified frustration and anger against oversurveillance and overpolicing of vulnerable neighborhoods in the United States.128 But even if there were restorative and transformative justice processes in these zones, it is not clear to me that these processes would always be better ways to deal with harm, including serious harm, than resorting at times to armed public law enforcement, arresting someone who has killed or seriously injured other human beings, prosecuting them and punishing them. Another example is the strand of penal abolitionism that is articulated or combined with communist ideals. For instance, in The Politics of Abolition, published in the early 1970s, Mathiesen considered (then communist) Albania and China as possible model societies.129 Mathiesen, who believes that abolition never ends, found them attractive models because, according to him, they had the potential to host radical revolutions that could maintain their radical character over time.130 But these were authoritarian states that did not respect basic human rights and rule of law standards, did not have high levels of economic development or social justice, and had prisons. For similar reasons, the banner of communism that has been embraced by several prison abolitionists in the United States is not reassuring,131 even if I readily recognize that many critiques to American capitalism can be fully compatible with a democracy and others forms of capitalism.132 I do not mean to dismiss all abolitionist visions of a future society. For instance, the Black Lives Matter Platform—that includes reparations, divestment from the police and investment in Black communities, economic justice, community control, and political [end page 21] power, and is currently being updated—provides an attractive agenda of discussion and change that is often articulated with penal abolition.133 But even if attractive versions of this platform were fully implemented, such a society would still have interpersonal harm and would require some sort of armed public law enforcement and punishment—as I will discuss in more detail in the next section. In addition, given the variety of visions about how a “society without police and without prisons” would look like, another risk for penal abolitionist coalitions is finishing like popular fronts did in the 1930s where leftists and liberals within the same coalitions ended up attacking each other, and authoritarian extreme left and extreme right actors took advantage of these struggles to take over or increase their power. Another danger is that penal abolitionists may succeed in abolishing institutions, but not being able to replace them with more appealing alternatives. For instance, some advocates of defunding the police will often say: “when we talk about defunding the police, we aren't calling just for the police to go away, we are calling for policing to be replaced with something different, like mobile response by unarmed mental health professionals.” One danger here is that we can wind up with just the first half of this, the cutting programs part. It can be like what happened with the deinstitutionalization of mental health. The idea wasn't just to empty out mental hospitals; it was to replace them with community mental health services. But we just got the first part.134 As will be clearer later, I am making a plea here neither for superficial criminal justice reform, nor for the economic, political and social status quo.135 The United States is a country where individual and structural racism are very much alive, of great inequalities and where large sectors of the population do not have access or adequate access to food, health care, education, housing, jobs, economic security, a healthy environment, etc., partly because of how the capitalist system has worked in this country.136 I am also not “trashing” penal abolitionism. A criminal law minimalist position has to learn from and work with American prison abolitionism by articulating or integrating its agenda about the penal system within a broader economic, political, social and environmental agenda, and it has to think about how to implement its ideas through political action. My point is rather that proposing or aspiring to “abolish the police” or create “a society without prisons” would require substantial rearrangement of not only the penal system, but other realms of social life like the political system, the economy and civil society. Penal abolitionists have not articulated such a vision or a clear vision for these realms, or when they have, their vision has, at times if not often, not been particularly realistic or attractive, at least for me. There are also risks in pursuing penal abolitionist agendas that, if they [end page 22] realized, could make us end up with a worse, rather than a better state of affairs than the current one.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>7. Lack of a concrete alternative recreates <u>power structures</u> that turn alt solvency.</h4><p>Máximo <strong>Langer 20</strong>. Professor of Law, Director of the Transnational Program on Criminal Justice, and Faculty Director of the Criminal Justice Program at the University of California Los Angeles School of Law, former Professor of Law at University Torcuato DiTella School of Law (Argentina), Harvard Law School, New York University School of Law, and the School of Law at Aix-Marseille University (France), holds an S.J.D. from Harvard Law School and an LL.B. from the University of Buenos Aires Law School. 8-14-2020. “Penal Abolitionism and Criminal Law Minimalism: Here and There, Now and Then.” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3674183. DOA: 9-9-2020. p. 19-23. Recut by kyujin</p><p>The final response by penal abolitionists to the challenge of what to do with harmful behavior is postponing until a new society is created. I refer here to a set of responses by penal abolitionists that argue that not punishing social harm and abolishing prisons and other institutions are unthinkable or can be only partially implemented today because we need a radically different society. Once this new society is established, the argument goes, harmful conduct would be radically reduced and it would be possible to address it without police, prisons or punishment.121 I will discuss this argument in the following subsection. </p><p>B. <u>There Is <strong>No Way</u></strong> <u>to <strong>Abolish</strong> Every</u> <u><strong>Power Regime</p><p></u></strong>Thirty years ago, my co-author and I raised a second, rarely discussed, challenge to penal abolitionism: <u><mark>even if <strong>prisons</u></strong> <u>could be abolished</u></mark>, power regimes cannot.122 Foucault challenged the notion that the shift from corporal punishment to prisons was a humanizing process because he argued that a society with prisons was a disciplinary society with its own power and knowledge regimes.123 Similarly, <u>if there were <mark>a <strong>transition</u></strong></mark> from a society with prisons to a society without prisons, <u>one could</u> then <u>question whether this would</u> necessarily <u>be</u> a <u><strong>humanizing</u></strong> process <u>and ask what the</u> possible <u><strong>power</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>knowledge regimes</u></strong> of this society without prisons <u>would be</u>.124</p><p>This does not mean that all power relations are alike since some power relations may be fairer—e.g., more equal, freer, more humane—than others. But it does mean that <u>the “society without prisons</u>” that penal abolitionists call for <u><mark>would <strong>have power relations</u></strong></mark> <u>too</u>. <u>The <strong>plausibility</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong><mark>appeal</u></strong></mark> <u>of</u> <u>penal abolitionism</u> as a program <u><mark>would</u></mark> thus <u><mark>depend on <strong>how fair</u></strong> <u>this</mark> “<mark>society</mark> without prisons</u>”, “<u>without punishment” or “without police” <mark>would be</u></mark>. I have to admit that even if I share many specific proposals and the broader goal to create fairer societies, <u><mark>I am <strong>skeptical</u></strong> <u>about</u></mark> various penal <u>abolitionist <strong><mark>proposals</u></strong></mark> <u>in this regard</u> for multiple reasons.</p><p>First, a number of penal <u>abolitionists concentrate on <strong>penal policy</u></strong> <u>and do <strong>not</u></strong> <u>articulate a vision that covers</u> <u><strong>other realms</u></strong> <u>of social life or <strong>articulate their vision</u></strong> <u>in</u> <u>such</u> <u>general terms that it is <strong>hard to know</u></strong> <u>what to <strong>make out</u></strong> of it.125</p><p>Second, <u>when they <strong>articulate</strong> such a vision</u> <u>or</u> <u>one can <strong>infer</u></strong> it <u>through a close reading</u> of their discourse, <u>the vision has <strong>aspects</u></strong> <u>that</u>, at least for me, often <u>sound <strong>unrealistic</u></strong> <u>or</u> [end page 20] <u><strong>unattractive</u></strong>. For instance, some <u>abolitionists seem to suggest a return</u> <u>to <strong><mark>small communities</u></strong></mark> where everyone knows each other, has extra time, and is committed to spending time and energy to deal with conflicts with other people without intervention by the penal system.126 <u>But it is <strong>unclear</u></strong> in these accounts <u>how we would transition from our <strong>mass</u></strong>, socially <u><strong>complex</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>specialized societies</u></strong> to these small communities. In addition, even if they may rely on the penal system less than larger societies, <u>small communities <mark>can be <strong>very oppressive</u></strong></mark> <u>and</u> <u><strong>exclusive</u></strong> in their own ways.127</p><p>Other penal <u>abolitionists</u> have <u>argued for “<strong>cop-free” zones</u></strong>. One of the ideas behind is to have zones without surveillance—an understandable reaction given the justified frustration and anger against oversurveillance and overpolicing of vulnerable neighborhoods in the United States.128 But even if there were restorative and transformative justice processes in these zones, <u><mark>it is <strong>not clear</u></strong></mark> to me <u>that</u> these <u><mark>processes would</u></mark> always <u><mark>be</u> <u><strong>better</u></strong></mark> ways <u>to deal with</u> harm, including <u><strong>serious harm</u></strong>, <u><mark>than</mark> resorting</u> at times <u>to</u> <u><strong>armed</u></strong> public <u><strong><mark>law enforcement</u></strong></mark>, arresting someone who has killed or seriously injured other human beings, prosecuting them and punishing them.</p><p>Another example is the strand of penal <u><mark>abolitionism</u></mark> that is <u>articulated or <mark>combined with</mark> <strong><mark>communist ideals</u></strong></mark>. For instance, in The Politics of Abolition, published in the early 1970s, Mathiesen considered (then communist) Albania and China as possible model societies.129 Mathiesen, who believes that abolition never ends, found them attractive models because, according to him, they had the potential to host radical revolutions that could maintain their radical character over time.130 But these <u><mark>were <strong>authoritarian</u></strong></mark> <u>states</u> <u>that <strong>did not</u></strong> <u>respect</u> basic <u><strong>human rights</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>rule of law</u></strong> standards, <u>did not have high levels of</u> economic <u><strong>development</u></strong> <u>or</u> <u><strong>social justice</u></strong>, <u>and had <strong>prisons</u></strong>. For similar reasons, the banner of communism that has been embraced by several prison abolitionists in the United States is not reassuring,131 even if I readily recognize that many critiques to American capitalism can be fully compatible with a democracy and others forms of capitalism.132</p><p>I do not mean to dismiss all abolitionist visions of a future society. For instance, the Black Lives Matter Platform—that includes reparations, divestment from the police and investment in Black communities, economic justice, community control, and political [end page 21] power, and is currently being updated—provides an attractive agenda of discussion and change that is often articulated with penal abolition.133 But even if attractive versions of this platform were fully implemented, such a society would still have interpersonal harm and would require some sort of armed public law enforcement and punishment—as I will discuss in more detail in the next section.</p><p>In addition, given the variety of visions about how a “society without police and without prisons” would look like, <u><mark>another risk</u></mark> for penal abolitionist coalitions <u><mark>is</u> <u><strong>finishing</u></strong> <u>like</u> <u><strong>popular fronts</u></strong></mark> did in the 1930s <u>where leftists and liberals</u> within the same coalitions <u>ended up <strong>attacking each other</u></strong>, <u>and</u> authoritarian <u><strong>extreme left</u></strong> <u>and</u> extreme <u><strong>right</u></strong> <u>actors <strong>took advantage</u></strong> <u>of these struggles to <strong>take over</u></strong> <u>or</u> <u><strong>increase</u></strong> their <u><strong>power</u></strong>.</p><p>Another danger is that penal <u><mark>abolitionists <strong>may succeed</u></strong></mark> in abolishing institutions, <u><mark>but <strong>not</u></strong></mark> being <u><strong>able</u></strong> <u>to <mark>replace</mark> them <mark>with</mark> more <strong><mark>appealing alternatives</u></strong></mark>. For instance, some advocates of defunding the police will often say: “when we talk about defunding the police, we aren't calling just for the police to go away, we are calling for policing to be replaced with something different, like mobile response by unarmed mental health professionals.” One danger here is that we can wind up with just the first half of this, the cutting programs part. It can be like what happened with the deinstitutionalization of mental health. The idea wasn't just to empty out mental hospitals; it was to replace them with community mental health services. But we just got the first part.134</p><p>As will be clearer later, I am making a plea here neither for superficial criminal justice reform, nor for the economic, political and social status quo.135 The United States is a country where individual and structural racism are very much alive, of great inequalities and where large sectors of the population do not have access or adequate access to food, health care, education, housing, jobs, economic security, a healthy environment, etc., partly because of how the capitalist system has worked in this country.136 I am also not “trashing” penal abolitionism. A criminal law minimalist position has to learn from and work with American prison abolitionism by articulating or integrating its agenda about the penal system within a broader economic, political, social and environmental agenda, and it has to think about how to implement its ideas through political action.</p><p>My point is <u>rather that <strong>proposing</u></strong> <u>or</u> <u><strong>aspiring</u></strong> <u>to “<strong>abolish the police</u></strong>” <u>or create “a <strong>society without prisons</u></strong>” <u>would require substantial <strong>rearrangement</u></strong> <u>of not only the <strong>penal system</u></strong>, <u>but other realms of <strong>social life</u></strong> like the political system, the economy and civil society. Penal <u><mark>abolitionists</u> <u><strong>have not</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>articulated</mark> such a vision or <mark>a <strong>clear vision</u></strong></mark> for these realms, <u>or when they have, their vision</u> <u>has</u>, at times if not often, <u><strong>not been</u></strong> particularly <u><strong>realistic or attractive</u></strong>, at least for me. <u>There are</u> also <u>risks in pursuing</u> penal <u>abolitionist agendas that</u>, if they [end page 22] realized, <u>could</u> make us <u>end up with a <strong>worse</u></strong>, rather than a better <u><strong>state of affairs</u></strong> than the current one. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: --norms are constantly in flux – being constructed out of violence=/=those norms are necessarily violent or that their violence is the same fulltext: Butler 2016 (Judith, UC Berkeley Maxine Elliot Professor in the Department of Comparative Literature and the Program of Critical Theory, also the Hannah Arendt Chair at the European Graduate School, professional writer of dense text; “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable,” Verso, Radical Thinkers, 2/2/2016, p. 155-158, IC) **page numbers are from the e-book In a recent exchange in differences, I was asked by the philosopher Catherine Mills to consider an apparent paradox.1 Mills points out that there is a violence through which the subject is formed, and that the norms that found the subject are by definition violent. She asks how, then, if this is the case, I can make a call for non-violence. We might pause right away and ask whether it is only norms that form the subject, and whether the norms that do take part in that formation are necessarily violent. But let’s accept the thesis for the moment, and see where it leads. We are at least partially formed through violence. We are given genders or social categories, against our will, and these categories confer intelligibility or recognizability, which means that they also communicate what the social risks of unintelligibility or partial intelligibility might be. But even if this is true, and I think it is, it should still be possible to claim that a certain crucial breakage can take place between the violence by which we are formed and the violence with which, once formed, we conduct ourselves. Indeed, it may be that precisely because one is formed through violence, the responsibility not to repeat the violence of one’s formation is all the more pressing and important. We may well be formed within a matrix of power, but that does not mean we need loyally or automatically reconstitute that matrix throughout the course of our lives. To understand this, we have to think for a moment about what it is to be formed and, in particular, to be formed by norms, and whether that forming happens once, in the past, or in a way that is unilinear and effective. Such norms act productively to establish (or disestablish) certain kinds of subjects, not only in the past but also in a way that is reiterated through time. Norms do not act only once. Indeed, it is not possible to narrate the beginning of the action of such norms, although we can, fictionally, posit such a beginning, often with great interest—and we can also, I suppose, try to locate the place and time when a certain formation was said to be accomplished (though I would wager that such a chronology is invariably constructed in bad faith). If gender, for instance, acts on us “in the beginning,” it does not then cease to act upon us, and the primary impressions are not ones that begin and end in time. Rather, they are ones that establish the temporality of our lives as bound up with the continuing action of norms, the continuing action of the past in the present, and so the impossibility of marking the origin and end of a gender formation as such. We do not need to refer to two distinct temporal events, that is, to claim that at a given point in time there are normative conditions by which subjects are produced and then afterwards, at another point in time, there are “breaks” with such conditions. The normative production of the subject is an iterable process—the norm is repeated, and in this sense is constantly “breaking” with the contexts delimited as the “conditions of production.” The idea of iterability is crucial for understanding why norms do not act in deterministic ways. And it may also be the reason why performativity is finally a more useful term than “construction.”2 Even if we were able to describe the “origin” of norms and to offer a description outside of a fictional rendition, what use would it be? If the aims of a norm cannot be derived from its origins (as Nietzsche clearly tells us, for instance, with regard to legal conventions), then even if norms originated in violence it would not follow that their fate is only and always to reiterate the violence at their origin. And it would also still be possible that, if norms do continue to exercise violence, they do not always do so in the same way. Moreover, it would have to be shown that the violence at the origin is the same as the violence exercised in the iterations that produce the norm through time. Does the origin of the norm constrain all future operations of the norm? It may well function to establish a certain control over temporality, but does another temporality—or do several—emerge in the course of its iterations? Is this at least a possibility, something that one might try to orchestrate or call for? What one is pressing for, calling for, is not a sudden break with the entirety of a past in the name of a radically new future. The “break” is nothing other than a series of significant shifts that follow from the iterable structure of the norm. To say that the norm is iterable is precisely not to accept a structuralist account of the norm, but to affirm something about the continuing life of poststructuralism, a preoccupation with notions such as living on, carrying on, carrying over, continuing, that form the temporal tasks of the body. All that said, I would caution against a generalization of the thesis that all normativity is founded in violence. This kind of claim can function as a transcendental argument and so fail to distinguish those social instances when norms operate for other reasons, or when the term “violence” does not quite describe the power or force by which they operate. There are, to be sure, regimes of power that produce and constrain certain ways of being. But I am not at all sure about affirming or denying a transcendental thesis that would dismiss power from the equation and make violence essential to any and all subject formation.3 An ethical proscription against the waging of violence does not disavow or refuse that violence that may be at work in the production of the subject. In fact, to understand a call to non-violence, it is probably necessary to reverse the formulation altogether: when one is formed in violence (and here the “one” may be formed through national structures of bellicosity that take various tributary forms in civil and private life), and that formative action continues throughout one’s life, an ethical quandary arises about how to live the violence of one’s formative history, how to effect shifts and reversals in its iteration. Precisely because iterability evades every determinism, we are left with questions such as: How do I live the violence of my formation? How does it live on in me? How does it carry me, in spite of me, even as I carry it? And in the name of what new value can I reverse and contest it? In what sense can such violence be redirected, if it can? Precisely because iterability evades every voluntarism, I am not free to dispense with the history of my formation. I can only live on in the wake of this unwilled region of history, or, indeed, as its wake. Can one work with such formative violence against certain violent outcomes and thus undergo a shift in the iteration of violence? Perhaps the better word here is “aggression” or, less clinically, “rage,” since my view is that non-violence, when and where it exists, involves an aggressive vigilance over aggression’s tendency to emerge as violence. As such, non-violence is a struggle, forming one of the ethical tasks of clinical psychoanalysis and of the psychoanalytic critique of culture. Indeed, non-violence as an ethical “call” could not be understood if it were not for the violence involved in the making and sustaining of the subject. There would be no struggle, no obligation, and no difficulty. The point is not to eradicate the conditions of one’s own production, but only to assume responsibility for living a life that contests the determining power of that production; in other words, that makes good use of the iterability of the productive norms and, hence, of their fragility and transformability. The social conditions of my existence are never fully willed by me, and there is no agency apart from such conditions and their unwilled effects. Necessary and interdependent relations to those I never chose, and even to those I never knew, form the condition of whatever agency might be mine. And though not all unwilled effects are “violent,” some of them are impingements that are injurious, acting forcibly on the body in ways that provoke rage. This is what constitutes the dynamic bind or “struggle” that is non-violence. It has, I would submit, nothing to do with cleansing or expiating violence from the domain of normativity, nor does it involve finding and cultivating an ostensibly non-violent region of the soul and learning how to live according to its dictates.4 It is precisely because one is mired in violence that the struggle exists and that the possibility of non-violence emerges. Being mired in violence means that even as the struggle is thick, difficult, impeding, fitful, and necessary, it is not the same as a determinism—being mired is the condition of possibility for the struggle for non-violence, and that is also why the struggle so often fails. If this were not the case, there would be no struggle at all, but only repression and the quest for a false transcendence.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Norms exist that uphold certain power regimes, but those norms function through their <u>iterability</u>—their analysis of ontological death is fatalist and turns their offense</h4><p>--norms are constantly in flux – being constructed out of violence=/=those norms are necessarily violent or that their violence is the same</p><p><strong><mark>Butler 2016<u></mark> (Judith, UC Berkeley Maxine Elliot Professor in the Department of Comparative Literature and the Program of Critical Theory, also the Hannah Arendt Chair at the European Graduate School, professional writer of dense text; “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable,” Verso, Radical Thinkers, 2/2/2016, p. 155-158, IC) **page numbers are from the e-book</p><p></u></strong>In a recent exchange in differences, I was asked by the philosopher Catherine Mills to consider an apparent paradox.1 <u><strong>Mills points out that there is a violence through which the subject is formed, and that the norms that found the subject are by definition violent. She asks how</u></strong>, then, if this is the case, <u><strong>I can make a call for non-violence.</u></strong> We might pause right away and ask whether it is only norms that form the subject, and whether the norms that do take part in that formation are necessarily violent. But let’s accept the thesis for the moment, and see where it leads. <u><strong>We are</u></strong> at least <u><strong>partially formed through violence. We are given genders or social categories</u></strong>, against our will, <u><strong>and these categories confer intelligibility</u></strong> or recognizability, <u><strong>which means that they also communicate what the social risks of unintelligibility</u></strong> or partial intelligibility might be. But even if this is true, and I think it is, <u><strong><mark>it should</mark> still <mark>be possible to claim that a</mark> certain <mark>crucial breakage can take place between the violence by which we are formed and the violence with which</mark>, once formed, <mark>we conduct ourselves</mark>.</u></strong> Indeed, it may be that <u><strong>precisely because one is formed through violence, the responsibility not to repeat the violence of one’s formation is all the more pressing</u></strong> and important. We may well be formed within a matrix of power, but that does not mean we need loyally or automatically reconstitute that matrix throughout the course of our lives. To understand this, we have to think for a moment about what it is to be formed and, in particular, to be formed by norms, and whether that forming happens once, in the past, or in a way that is unilinear and effective. Such <u><strong><mark>norms act productively to establish</u></strong></mark> (or disestablish) <u><strong>certain kinds of <mark>subjects</u></strong></mark>, not only in the past but also <u><strong><mark>in a way that is reiterated through time. Norms do not act only once</mark>.</u></strong> Indeed, <u><strong>it is not possible to narrate the beginning of the action of such norms</u></strong>, although we can, fictionally, posit such a beginning, often with great interest—and we can also, I suppose, try to locate the place and time when a certain formation was said to be accomplished (though I would wager that such a chronology is invariably constructed in bad faith). If gender, for instance, acts on us “in the beginning,” it does not then cease to act upon us, and the primary impressions are not ones that begin and end in time. Rather, they are ones that establish the temporality of our lives as bound up with the continuing action of norms, the continuing action of the past in the present, and so the impossibility of marking the origin and end of a gender formation as such. <u><strong>We do not need to refer to two distinct temporal events, that is, to claim that at a given point in time there are normative conditions by which subjects are produced and then afterwards</u></strong>, at another point in time, <u><strong>there are “breaks” with such conditions. The normative production of the subject is an iterable process—<mark>the norm is repeated, and</u></strong></mark> in this sense is <u><strong><mark>constantly “breaking” with the contexts delimited as the “conditions of production</u></strong></mark>.” The idea of iterability is crucial for understanding why norms do not act in deterministic ways. And it may also be the reason why performativity is finally a more useful term than “construction.”2 Even if we were able to describe the “origin” of norms and to offer a description outside of a fictional rendition, what use would it be? If the aims of a norm cannot be derived from its origins (as Nietzsche clearly tells us, for instance, with regard to legal conventions), then <u><strong><mark>even if norms originated in violence it would not follow that their fate is only and always to reiterate the violence at their origin</u></strong></mark>. And it would also still be possible that, <u><strong><mark>if norms do</mark> continue to <mark>exercise violence, they do not always do so in the same way</u></strong></mark>. Moreover, <u><strong><mark>it would have to be shown that</mark> the <mark>violence at the origin is the same as</mark> the <mark>violence exercised in</mark> the <mark>iterations</mark> that produce the norm through time</u></strong>. Does the origin of the norm constrain all future operations of the norm? It may well function to establish a certain control over temporality, but does another temporality—or do several—emerge in the course of its iterations? Is this at least a possibility, something that one might try to orchestrate or call for? What one is pressing for, calling for, is not a sudden break with the entirety of a past in the name of a radically new future. The “break” is nothing other than a series of significant shifts that follow from the iterable structure of the norm. <u><strong>To say that the norm is iterable is precisely not to accept a structuralist account of the norm, but to affirm something about the continuing life of poststructuralism, a preoccupation with notions such as living on,</u></strong> carrying on, carrying over, continuing, <u><strong>that form the temporal tasks of the body</u></strong>. All that said, I would caution against a generalization of the thesis that all normativity is founded in violence. This kind of claim can function as a transcendental argument and so fail to distinguish those social instances when norms operate for other reasons, or when the term “violence” does not quite describe the power or force by which they operate. There are, to be sure, regimes of power that produce and constrain certain ways of being. But I am not at all sure about affirming or denying a transcendental thesis that would dismiss power from the equation and make violence essential to any and all subject formation.3 An ethical proscription against the waging of violence does not disavow or refuse that violence that may be at work in the production of the subject. In fact, to understand a call to non-violence, it is probably necessary to reverse the formulation altogether: <u><strong>when one is formed in violence</u></strong> (and here the “one” may be formed through national structures of bellicosity that take various tributary forms in civil and private life), <u><strong>and that formative action continues throughout one’s life, an ethical quandary arises about how to live the violence of one’s formative history</u></strong>, how to effect shifts and reversals in its iteration. Precisely <u><strong>because <mark>iterability evades every determinism</mark>, we are left with questions such as: How do I live the violence of my formation?</u></strong> How does it live on in me? How does it carry me, in spite of me, even as I carry it? And in the name of what new value can I reverse and contest it? In what sense can such violence be redirected, if it can? Precisely because iterability evades every voluntarism, I am not free to dispense with the history of my formation. I can only live on in the wake of this unwilled region of history, or, indeed, as its wake. Can one work with such formative violence against certain violent outcomes and thus undergo a shift in the iteration of violence? Perhaps the better word here is “aggression” or, less clinically, “rage,” since my view is that <u><strong>non-violence</u></strong>, when and where it exists, <u><strong>involves an aggressive vigilance over aggression’s tendency to emerge as violence</u></strong>. As such, non-violence is a struggle, forming one of the ethical tasks of clinical psychoanalysis and of the psychoanalytic critique of culture. Indeed, <u><strong>non-violence as an ethical “call” could not be understood if it were not for the violence involved in the making and sustaining of the subject</u></strong>. There would be no struggle, no obligation, and no difficulty. <u><strong><mark>The point is</mark> not to eradicate the conditions of one’s own production, but</u></strong> only <u><strong><mark>to assume responsibility for living a life that contests the determining power of that production</u></strong></mark>; in other words, <u><strong><mark>that makes good use of the iterability of </mark>the productive <mark>norms and, hence, of their fragility and transformability</mark>. The social conditions of my existence are never fully willed by me, and there is no agency apart from such conditions and their unwilled effects</u></strong>. Necessary and interdependent relations to those I never chose, and even to those I never knew, form the condition of whatever agency might be mine. And though not all unwilled effects are “violent,” some of them are impingements that are injurious, acting forcibly on the body in ways that provoke rage. This is what constitutes the dynamic bind or “struggle” that is non-violence. It has, I would submit, nothing to do with cleansing or expiating violence from the domain of normativity, nor does it involve finding and cultivating an ostensibly non-violent region of the soul and learning how to live according to its dictates.4 It is precisely because one is mired in violence that the struggle exists and that the possibility of non-violence emerges. <u><strong><mark>Being mired in violence means that</mark> even as <mark>the struggle is</mark> thick</u></strong>, difficult, impeding, fitful, and necessary, <u><strong>it is <mark>not</mark> the same as a <mark>determinism</mark>—being mired is the condition of possibility for the struggle for non-violence, and that is also why the struggle so often fails. If this were not the case, there would be no struggle at all, but only repression and the quest for a false transcendence.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Robinson 14 (William I., Prof. of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies, @ UC-Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism: Crisis of Humanity and the Specter of 21st Century Fascism” pg. 15-16 DOA 2/3/2016 The World Financial Review) fulltext: Cyclical, Structural, and Systemic Crises Most commentators on the contemporary crisis refer to the “Great Recession” of 2008 and its aftermath. Yet the causal origins of global crisis are to be found in over-accumulation and also in contradictions of state power, or in what Marxists call the internal contradictions of the capitalist system. Moreover, because the system is now global, crisis in any one place tends to represent crisis for the system as a whole. The system cannot expand because the marginalisation of a significant portion of humanity from direct productive participation, the downward pressure on wages and popular consumption worldwide, and the polarisation of income, has reduced the ability of the world market to absorb world output. At the same time, given the particular configuration of social and class forces and the correlation of these forces worldwide, national states are hard-pressed to regulate transnational circuits of accumulation and offset the explosive contradictions built into the system. Is this crisis cyclical, structural, or systemic? Cyclical crises are recurrent to capitalism about once every 10 years and involve recessions that act as self-correcting mechanisms without any major restructuring of the system. The recessions of the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and of 2001 were cyclical crises. In contrast, the 2008 crisis signaled the slide into a structural crisis. Structural crises reflect deeper contra- dictions that can only be resolved by a major restructuring of the system. The structural crisis of the 1970s was resolved through capitalist globalisation. Prior to that, the structural crisis of the 1930s was resolved through the creation of a new model of redistributive capitalism, and prior to that the struc- tural crisis of the 1870s resulted in the development of corpo- rate capitalism. A systemic crisis involves the replacement of a system by an entirely new system or by an outright collapse. A structural crisis opens up the possibility for a systemic crisis. But if it actually snowballs into a systemic crisis – in this case, if it gives way either to capitalism being superseded or to a breakdown of global civilisation – is not predetermined and depends entirely on the response of social and political forces to the crisis and on historical contingencies that are not easy to forecast. This is an historic moment of extreme uncertainty, in which collective responses from distinct social and class forces to the crisis are in great flux. Hence my concept of global crisis is broader than financial. There are multiple and mutually constitutive dimensions – economic, social, political, cultural, ideological and ecological, not to mention the existential crisis of our consciousness, values and very being. There is a crisis of social polarisation, that is, of social reproduction. The system cannot meet the needs or assure the survival of millions of people, perhaps a majority of humanity. There are crises of state legitimacy and political authority, or of hegemony and domination. National states face spiraling crises of legitimacy as they fail to meet the social grievances of local working and popular classes experiencing downward mobility, unemployment, heightened insecurity and greater hardships. The legitimacy of the system has increasingly been called into question by millions, perhaps even billions, of people around the world, and is facing expanded counter-hegemonic challenges. Global elites have been unable counter this erosion of the system’s authority in the face of worldwide pressures for a global moral economy. And a canopy that envelops all these dimensions is a crisis of sustainability rooted in an ecological holocaust that has already begun, expressed in climate change and the impending collapse of centralised agricultural systems in several regions of the world, among other indicators. By a crisis of humanity I mean a crisis that is approaching systemic proportions, threatening the ability of billions of people to survive, and raising the specter of a collapse of world civilisation and degeneration into a new “Dark Ages.”2 This crisis of humanity shares a number of aspects with earlier structural crises but there are also several features unique to the present: 1. The system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. Global capitalism now couples human and natural history in such a way as to threaten to bring about what would be the sixth mass extinction in the known history of life on earth.3 This mass extinction would be caused not by a natural catastrophe such as a meteor impact or by evolutionary changes such as the end of an ice age but by purposive human activity. According to leading environmental scientists there are nine “planetary boundaries” crucial to maintaining an earth system environment in which humans can exist, four of which are experiencing at this time the onset of irreversible environmental degradation and three of which (climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss) are at “tipping points,” meaning that these processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries. 2. The magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as is the concentration of the means of global communication and symbolic production and circulation in the hands of a very few powerful groups. Computerised wars, drones, bunker-buster bombs, star wars, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare. Warfare has become normalised and sanitised for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. At the same time we have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication, images and symbolic production. The world of Edward Snowden is the world of George Orwell; 1984 has arrived; 3. Capitalism is reaching apparent limits to its extensive expansion. There are no longer any new territories of significance that can be integrated into world capitalism, de-ruralisation is now well advanced, and the commodification of the countryside and of pre- and non-capitalist spaces has intensified, that is, converted in hot-house fashion into spaces of capital, so that intensive expansion is reaching depths never before seen. Capitalism must continually expand or collapse. How or where will it now expand? 4. There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a “planet of slums,”4 alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and subject to sophisticated systems of social control and to destruction - to a mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion. This includes prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes, omnipresent policing, militarised gentrification, and so on; 5. There is a disjuncture between a globalising economy and a nation-state based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and have not been able to play the role of what social scientists refer to as a “hegemon,” or a leading nation-state that has enough power and authority to organise and stabilise the system. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the unprecedented militarisation of social life and conflict across the globe makes it hard to imagine that the system can come under any stable political authority that assures its reproduction. Global Police State How have social and political forces worldwide responded to crisis? The crisis has resulted in a rapid political polarisation in global society. Both right and left-wing forces are ascendant. Three responses seem to be in dispute. One is what we could call “reformism from above.” This elite reformism is aimed at stabilising the system, at saving the system from itself and from more radical re- sponses from below. Nonetheless, in the years following the 2008 collapse of the global financial system it seems these reformers are unable (or unwilling) to prevail over the power of transnational financial capital. A second response is popular, grassroots and leftist resistance from below. As social and political conflict escalates around the world there appears to be a mounting global revolt. While such resistance appears insurgent in the wake of 2008 it is spread very unevenly across countries and regions and facing many problems and challenges. Yet another response is that I term 21st century fascism.5 The ultra-right is an insurgent force in many countries. In broad strokes, this project seeks to fuse reactionary political power with transnational capital and to organise a mass base among historically privileged sectors of the global working class – such as white workers in the North and middle layers in the South – that are now experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility. It involves militarism, extreme masculinisation, homophobia, racism and racist mobilisations, including the search for scapegoats, such as immigrant workers and, in the West, Muslims. Twenty-first century fascism evokes mystifying ideologies, often involving race/culture supremacy and xenophobia, embracing an idealised and mythical past. Neo-fascist culture normalises and glamorises warfare and social violence, indeed, generates a fascination with domination that is portrayed even as heroic.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Resource competition and wealth extraction under Racial Capitalism produces fascism, endless war and environmental destruction which requires the cultivation of a mass base.</h4><p><strong>Robinson 14 <u></strong>(William I., Prof. of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies, @ UC-Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism: Crisis of Humanity and the Specter of 21st Century Fascism” pg. 15-16 DOA 2/3/2016 The World Financial Review)</p><p></u>Cyclical, Structural, and Systemic Crises Most commentators on the contemporary crisis refer to the “Great Recession” of 2008 and its aftermath. Yet <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> <u>causal <strong><mark>origins of global crisis are</strong></mark> to be <strong><mark>found in over-accumulation and</u></strong></mark> also <u>in <strong><mark>contradictions of state power</u></strong></mark>, or in what Marxists call the internal contradictions of the capitalist system. Moreover, <u>because the system is now global, <strong><mark>crisis in</strong></mark> any <strong><mark>one place</strong></mark> tends to <strong><mark>represent crisis for the system</strong></mark> as a whole.</u> The system cannot expand because the marginalisation of a significant portion of humanity from direct productive participation, the downward pressure on wages and popular consumption worldwide, and the polarisation of income, has reduced the ability of the world market to absorb world output. At the same time, <u>given the particular configuration of social and class forces and the correlation of these forces worldwide, national states are hard-pressed to regulate transnational circuits of accumulation and offset</u> the <u>explosive contradictions</u> built into the system. Is this crisis cyclical, structural, or systemic? <u>Cyclical crises are recurrent to capitalism about once every 10 years and involve recessions that act as self-correcting mechanisms</u> without any major restructuring of the system. The recessions of the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and of 2001 were cyclical crises. In contrast, the 2008 crisis signaled the slide into a structural crisis. Structural crises reflect deeper contra- dictions that can only be resolved by a major restructuring of the system. The structural crisis of the 1970s was resolved through capitalist globalisation. Prior to that, the structural crisis of the 1930s was resolved through the creation of a new model of redistributive capitalism, and prior to that the struc- tural crisis of the 1870s resulted in the development of corpo- rate capitalism. <u>A systemic crisis involves the replacement of a system by an entirely new system or by an outright collapse. A structural crisis opens up the possibility for a systemic crisis.</u> But if it actually snowballs into a systemic crisis – in this case, if it gives way either to capitalism being superseded or to a breakdown of global civilisation – is not predetermined and depends entirely on the response of social and political forces to the crisis and on historical contingencies that are not easy to forecast. <u>This is an historic moment of extreme uncertainty, in which collective responses from distinct social and class forces to the crisis are in great flux. </u>Hence my concept of global crisis is broader than financial. <u>There are multiple and mutually constitutive dimensions – economic, social, political, cultural, ideological and ecological, not to mention the existential crisis of our consciousness</u>, values and very being. There is a crisis of social polarisation, that is, of social reproduction. <u>The system cannot meet the needs</u> or assure the survival <u>of millions of people</u>, perhaps a majority of humanity. There are crises of state legitimacy and political authority, or of hegemony and domination. National states face spiraling crises of legitimacy as they fail to meet the social grievances of local working and popular classes experiencing downward mobility, unemployment, heightened insecurity and greater hardships. <u>The legitimacy of the system has increasingly been called into question by millions</u>, <u>perhaps</u> even <u>billions</u>, of people around the world, <u>and is facing expanded counter-hegemonic challenges.</u> Global elites have been unable counter this erosion of the system’s authority in the face of worldwide pressures for a global moral economy. <u>And <strong><mark>a canopy that envelops all these dimensions is</strong></mark> a crisis of sustainability rooted in</u> an ecological holocaust that has already begun, expressed in <u><strong><mark>climate change and the impending collapse of centralised agricultural</strong></mark> systems</u> in several regions of the world, among other indicators. By <u>a crisis of humanity</u> I mean a crisis that is approaching systemic proportions, <u><strong><mark>threatening the ability of billions of people to survive</strong></mark>, and raising the specter of a collapse of world civilisation</u> and degeneration into a new “Dark Ages.”2 This crisis of humanity shares a number of aspects with earlier structural crises but there are also several features unique to the present: 1. <u><strong><mark>The system is fast reaching</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>ecological limits of its reproduction</strong></mark>. Global capitalism now couples human and natural history in such a way as to threaten to bring about what would be the sixth mass extinction</u> in the known history of life on earth.3 This mass extinction would be caused not by a natural catastrophe such as a meteor impact or by evolutionary changes such as the end of an ice age but by purposive human activity. According to leading environmental scientists <u>there are nine “planetary boundaries” crucial to maintaining an earth system environment in which humans can exist, four of which are experiencing</u> at this time <u>the onset of irreversible environmental degradation and three of which</u> (climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss) <u>are at “tipping points</u>,” meaning that these processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries. 2. <u>The magnitude of the means of <strong><mark>violence</strong></mark> and</u> social <u>control <strong><mark>is unprecedented</strong></mark>, as is the concentration of the means of global communication and symbolic production and circulation in the hands of a very few powerful groups. <strong><mark>Computerised wars, drones, bunker-buster bombs</strong></mark>, star wars</u>, and so forth, <u>have changed the face of warfare. Warfare has become normalised and sanitised for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. At the same time we have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication, images and symbolic production. The world of Edward Snowden is the world of George Orwell; 1984 has arrived; 3. Capitalism is reaching apparent limits to its extensive expansion. There are no longer any new territories of significance that can be integrated into world capitalism, de-ruralisation is now well advanced, and the commodification of the countryside and of pre- and non-capitalist spaces has intensified, that is, converted in hot-house fashion into spaces of capital, so that intensive expansion is reaching depths never before seen. Capitalism must continually expand or collapse. How or where will it now expand? 4. There is the rise of <strong><mark>a</strong></mark> vast <strong><mark>surplus population</strong></mark> inhabiting a “planet of slums,”4 alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and <strong><mark>subject to</strong></mark> sophisticated systems of social <strong><mark>control and</mark> to <mark>destruction</strong></mark> - to a mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion. This includes <strong><mark>prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes, omnipresent policing, militarised gentrification</u></strong></mark>, and so on; 5. <u>There is a disjuncture between a globalising economy and a nation-state based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and have not been able to play the role of what social scientists refer to as a “hegemon,” or a leading nation-state that has enough power and authority to organise and stabilise the system. <strong><mark>The spread of w</strong></mark>eapons of <strong><mark>m</strong></mark>ass <strong><mark>d</strong></mark>estruction <strong><mark>and</strong></mark> the unprecedented <strong><mark>militarisation</strong></mark> of social life and conflict across the globe <strong><mark>makes it hard to imagine</strong></mark> that <strong><mark>the system can come under</strong></mark> any <strong><mark>stable political authority</strong></mark> that assures its reproduction. </u> Global Police State How have social and political forces worldwide responded to crisis? The crisis has resulted in a rapid political polarisation in global society. Both right and left-wing forces are ascendant. Three responses seem to be in dispute. One is what we could call “reformism from above.” This elite reformism is aimed at stabilising the system, at saving the system from itself and from more radical re- sponses from below. Nonetheless, in the years following the 2008 collapse of the global financial system it seems these reformers are unable (or unwilling) to prevail over the power of transnational financial capital. A second response is popular, grassroots and leftist resistance from below. As social and political conflict escalates around the world there appears to be a mounting global revolt. While such resistance appears insurgent in the wake of 2008 it is spread very unevenly across countries and regions and facing many problems and challenges. Yet another response is that I term 21st century fascism.5 <u><strong><mark>The ultra-right is</strong></mark> an <strong><mark>insurgent</strong></mark> force in many countries.</u> In broad strokes, <u>this project seeks to fuse reactionary political power with transnational capital and to organise a mass base among historically privileged sectors of the global working class</u> – <u>such as white workers</u> in the North and middle layers in the South – <u>that are now experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility. <strong><mark>It involves militarism,</mark> </strong>extreme<strong> <mark>masculinisation, homophobia, racism and racist mobilisations</strong></mark>, including the search for scapegoats, such as immigrant workers and</u>, in the West, <u>Muslims. <strong><mark>Twenty-first century fascism</strong></mark> evokes mystifying ideologies, often involving race/culture supremacy and xenophobia, embracing an idealised and mythical past. Neo-fascist culture <strong><mark>normalises and glamorises warfare</strong></mark> and social violence, indeed, generates a fascination with domination that is portrayed even as heroic.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: The Red Nation ’19 [International coalition of Native and non-Native activists, educators, students, and community organizers advocating Native liberation. 09/6/2019. “Revolutionary Socialism is the Primary Political Ideology of The Red Nation”. https://therednation.org/2019/09/07/revolutionary-socialism-is-the-primary-political-ideology-of-the-red-nation-2/] pat fulltext: Marxism is a tool for making revolution, first and foremost. But it is a useless tool unless wielded properly by the oppressed. Our traditions of Indigenous resistance wield Marxism, not to uphold European traditions, but to emancipate ourselves from the colonizers by destroying that which destroys us, and building and rebuilding our nations according to our traditions and cultures so that our human and nonhuman relations and thus all people may live. And we cannot merely destroy capitalism, without the foresight and knowledge of replacing it with a more humane and just system without rulers and without colonizers. That system is called socialism, which seeks to destroy the class system and the ruling classes, redistribute land and wealth to its proper owners, and restore dignity to the humble people of the earth. Put simply, socialism is people power. Socialism puts people before profits. Socialism aligns with Indigenous traditions of relationality as we seek to be good relatives to other humans and other-than-humans. Socialism is the natural state of humanity, to live and work towards peace and justice. Communism is the greatest expression of love for the people and our nonhuman relatives. And it is the only solution for a planet on the brink of destruction at the hands of the ruling bourgeoisie and their backwards ideologies and institutions. 1. US imperialism is the number one enemy of the planet. Our socialism is rooted in Indigenous resistance, African slave rebellions, and European labor history. It is also rooted in the nations of the Tri-Continental—of Asia, Africa, and the Americas—that aligned themselves against the primary enemy of the planet: US imperialism. Indigenous peoples were the first victims of European imperialism and invasion. The US inherited that mantle and has exported the settler colonial project to the rest of the globe by plundering and killing other darker nations. We are internationalists. As Indigenous nations, who are in the United States but not entirely of it, we align ourselves with the Third World. We seek to end the oppressive relations between European nations and the Third World. This means opposing US imperialism at all turns, denouncing all US imperialist wars, and aligning ourselves with the poorer nations of the world in the defense of their sovereignty and self-determination. The US must get out of everywhere, including Turtle Island! Global climate change is also not a Third World problem—it’s a first world problem. Nations like the United States consume and produce the most carbon. This concentration of wealth and consumption derives from the histories of African slavery, Indigenous genocide, and European settler colonialism. Thus, the struggle against the multinational oil and gas corporations is an anti-imperialist struggle in which Indigenous nations are leading the fight. But we also recognize that our socialism, our freedom and emancipation, can never come at the expense of our Third World comrades and relatives. Marx and Engels developed their theories of change and history from the vantage point of the laboring European proletariat. Industrial capitalism, however, didn’t begin solely in the English factory. The hands that picked the cotton that was weaved in English textile mills were African — stolen from their homelands and enslaved by European masters. The land where the cotton grew had to be cleared of Indigenous people and Indigenous title to make way for the plantation economy, the main driving force behind the expansion of modern capitalism. Thus, the expansion of African slavery fueled the dispossession of Indigenous peoples. US settler colonialism was thoroughly a racial project of genocide and Indigenous elimination, which is an enduring structure that changes over time. After all, even the so-called Five Civilized Tribes who had adopted the plantation economy and African slave system from their European counterparts were themselves dispossessed and extirpated from their lands. And both freed Africans and Indigenous people fought as soldiers and scouts for the US settler wars of extermination against western Indigenous nations and overseas campaigns of conquest. Despite their military service in the US imperialist army, their stations within settler society have always been subordinate to white Europeans. They faced Jim Crow segregation, police violence, mass incarceration, and the continued settler occupation of Indigenous lands. We reject settler colonialism and US imperialism as the means of emancipation for the working class and for colonized people. Our communist and anti-imperialist principles to which we ascribe are as follows: 1. End the unequal relations between European and colonized nations. 2. End the violent competition between the nations of exploiters and colonizers. 3. End the plunder of the earth for profit. 2. Marxism is not European. Socialism is Indigenous. Marxism is founded on the expropriated knowledges of non-capitalist Indigenous societies. Although Marx himself was wrong about many things, Marxism, as a science, has a built-in self-correcting mechanism that has helped revolutionaries throughout the world build off the political theory Marx first formulated. If this were untrue, there would be no Russian Revolution, no African Revolution and decolonization movement, no Vietnamese liberation, no Bolivarian Revolution, no Cuban Revolution, no Chinese Revolution, etc. Each adopted Marxism and applied it to its specific and unique circumstances by building off the long struggles against exploitation and European imperialism. Even for Indigenous peoples in the Americas, the concepts and theories of decolonization explicitly derive from Marxist revolutionary movements. It’s dishonest for us to not recognize this history. It’s not because of Marx or European thinkers that these revolutions were successful. It’s because Marxism is the science of revolution for the poor masses, the colonized, and the wretched of the earth. Fundamentally, Marxism is the science of how to get free. It is the study of class struggle. If capitalism upholds the systems of racism, settler colonialism, heteropatriarchy, and imperialism, then we cannot use capitalism to undo these systems. It’s not enough to just be anti-capitalist. Like our ancestors we must be forward-thinking by drawing from and amplifying our non-capitalist social relations as Indigenous peoples, not to make Indigenous traditions relevant to Marxism or socialism but to make socialism and Marxism relevant to our struggle as Indigenous peoples. You cannot fight fire with fire. You cannot fight capitalism with Indigenous capitalism. You cannot fight nationalism with hyper-nationalism. You can only fight fire with water. And the solution to all these ills—and it is what capitalists and colonists hate the most—is socialism. If capitalism is burning the planet, then socialism is the water to douse the flame. Water is life. We all need water to live, but we don’t need capitalism. And for us to fight colonialism, we must ensure that our nations can live. But our nationalism cannot mirror the bourgeois settler nationalism of colonial states, which is premised on exclusion and white supremacy. We adopt a revolutionary Indigenous nationalism that aligns with the most oppressed and marginalized first, within and outside our own communities. And we recognize that by organizing production—for our food, medicines, resources, etc.—according to need and not profit is the only possible path forward according to our traditions. The philosophy of communism neatly lines up with the philosophy of our Indigenous ancestors. Friedrich Engels admitted as much when in the 1888 English edition of the Communist Manifesto he added a footnote to the famous line: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle.” He clarified, “That is, all written history,” making note specifically of Lewis Henry Morgan’s study of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, which was a communistic, classless, and democratic society before European invasion. Moreover, it was the relative gender equality of Indigenous societies that inspired the suffragettes — white women seeking parity with white men. The study of Indigenous societies, the inherent equality and freedom they engendered among producers and the common ownership of property and social institutions, also inspired European workers to demand eight-hour workdays and the abolition of child labor. And, in the final analysis, despite their own limited understandings, Marx and Engels, the founders of the modern communist movement, had developed theories of emancipation largely from the expropriated knowledges of Indigenous and communal people, whose examples they relied on to prove that capitalism is neither inevitable nor natural. But, in fact, communism is both natural and inevitable. This is not to suggest Indigenous societies were utopias — no society is perfect. It is, however, important to understand that Indigenous peoples have been knocked off the path of their natural social development to live in balance and correct relations. We are not trying to recreate the past so much as steer Indigenous nations back on their communal developmental path that has been destroyed or seriously distorted by capitalist social relations. 3. The United States is not a “nation of immigrants” but a nation of colonizers. Whereas contemporary racial identity politics attempts to mask or obscure class antagonisms, a class struggle that doesn’t overturn white supremacy and settler colonialism frees no one. We are not seeking parity with colonizers or further integration into a colonial system. We’re seeking to end settler and white supremacy entirely over Black, Indigenous, and colonized people. We aim to end the colonial system entirely. Why? The United States, as a nation of European colonizers, had no feudal or communal past. Unlike other nations in history who transitioned from feudalism to capitalism, the United States was the first nation born entirely as a capitalist state. It was constructed from the ground up according to the nightmare vision of European slave owners and Indian killers — the nation’s founding bourgeois ideologies. The United States began as an oppressor nation, as a colonizer of oppressed people, and its function remains so. It not only has a capitalist ruling class, but all strata and classes of white Europeans among its ranks are encouraged to become preoccupied with the aims of the ruling class through petty racial privileges and private property ownership, the guiding stars of white settler nationalism. We reject those national and settler aspirations and ask our comrades in struggle to reject them as well. The current US colonial state is not only an instrument of racial and class rule, it is also an instrument of imperialist plunder and the oppressor of nations. It thus obscures its own internal divisions of colonizer and colonized. The United States fabricates national myths by calling itself a “nation of immigrants” to hide its unnaturalness and crimes. Immigrants come to a land to integrate within the existing legal, social, and political orders. The first European settlers came to colonize, to destroy and replace existing Indigenous legal, social, and political orders. The United States is, therefore, more accurately described as a “nation of colonizers.” Immigrants don’t come in chains; you can’t immigrate to a land you already belong to; and refugees fleeing imperialist violence are not immigrants. We recognize that the colonial state keeps in place irreconcilable class antagonisms, between rich and poor, between settler and Native. The state is first and foremost police and military violence. Its legitimacy is maintained by force. It’s primary function is enforcing capitalist social relations. The veneer of “representative democracy” is only possible because the ruling classes have crushed and will continue to crush any alternative to capitalism by mobilizing the police and military. In this sense, Indigenous people are the first “Red Scare.” Because we held land in common and represented an alternative to the settler state (whether it be by taking in escaped slaves or mounting armed resistance), we had to be annihilated. Today, because we adopt revolutionary socialism as our struggle and vision for a free society, we are the second coming of the “Red Scare.” But we are not exclusive in our struggles for freedom. We align ourselves with all colonized and oppressed people of the world. Only imperial borders and nation-states that are not of our own making divide our common humanity. Therefore, our struggle transcends the state, but we are not naive enough to turn away from the state as a site of struggle. We understand that state power is nearly impossible to achieve, since Indigenous peoples are a minority. Yet, in alliance with other colonized and oppressed peoples, we can take state power, not to become the new rulers of a capitalist society, but to use the mechanisms of the state to wage our rightful struggle against our class enemies—the rich. A socialist state uses the power and democracy of the masses to undo the privileges and wealth of the ruling classes and the colonial elite, even among our own people. A socialist state seeks to destroy itself because it is built in the shell of the old. But it has to be wielded by the oppressed in the service of the oppressed to achieve freedom and the abolition of the state itself, because, whether we like it or not, the state is the primary organizer of society. And through a decolonized socialist state, we will reorganize society to redistribute wealth and land by taking it back from those who stole it from us in the first place.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Marxism provides the <u>best framework</u> for Indigenous emancipation – it’s <u>self-correcting</u>, which means offense against the perm <u>solves itself</u>.</h4><p><strong>The Red Nation ’19 </strong>[International coalition of Native and non-Native activists, educators, students, and community organizers advocating Native liberation. 09/6/2019. “Revolutionary Socialism is the Primary Political Ideology of The Red Nation”. <u>https://therednation.org/2019/09/07/revolutionary-socialism-is-the-primary-political-ideology-of-the-red-nation-2/</u>] pat</p><p>Marxism is a tool for making revolution, first and foremost. But it is a useless tool unless wielded properly by the oppressed. <u>Our traditions of <mark>Indigenous resistance wield Marxism</u></mark>, not to uphold European traditions, <u>but <mark>to emancipate</mark> ourselves <mark>from</mark> the <mark>colonizers</mark> by destroying that which destroys us</u>, and building and rebuilding our nations according to our traditions and cultures so that our human and nonhuman relations and thus all people may live. <u>And <mark>we cannot</mark> merely <mark>destroy capitalism</u></mark>, <u><mark>without</mark> the foresight and <mark>knowledge of</mark> replacing it with <mark>a more</mark> humane and <mark>just system</mark> without rulers and without colonizers</u>. <u><strong>That system is called <mark>socialism</mark>, which <mark>seeks to destroy</mark> the <mark>class</mark> system and the ruling classes, <mark>redistribute land</mark> and wealth to its proper owners, <mark>and restore dignity to</mark> the humble <mark>people of the earth</u></strong></mark>. Put simply, socialism is people power. Socialism puts people before profits. Socialism aligns with Indigenous traditions of relationality as we seek to be good relatives to other humans and other-than-humans. Socialism is the natural state of humanity, to live and work towards peace and justice.</p><p>Communism is the greatest expression of love for the people and our nonhuman relatives. And it is the only solution for a planet on the brink of destruction at the hands of the ruling bourgeoisie and their backwards ideologies and institutions.</p><p>1. US imperialism is the number one enemy of the planet.</p><p>Our socialism is rooted in Indigenous resistance, African slave rebellions, and European labor history. It is also rooted in the nations of the Tri-Continental—of Asia, Africa, and the Americas—that aligned themselves against the primary enemy of the planet: US imperialism. Indigenous peoples were the first victims of European imperialism and invasion. The US inherited that mantle and has exported the settler colonial project to the rest of the globe by plundering and killing other darker nations. <u><mark>We are internationalists</u></mark>.</p><p>As Indigenous nations, who are in the United States but not entirely of it, we align ourselves with the Third World. We seek to end the oppressive relations between European nations and the Third World. This means opposing US imperialism at all turns, denouncing all US imperialist wars, and aligning ourselves with the poorer nations of the world in the defense of their sovereignty and self-determination. The US must get out of everywhere, including Turtle Island!</p><p>Global climate change is also not a Third World problem—it’s a first world problem. Nations like the United States consume and produce the most carbon. This concentration of wealth and consumption derives from the histories of African slavery, Indigenous genocide, and European settler colonialism. Thus, the struggle against the multinational oil and gas corporations is an anti-imperialist struggle in which Indigenous nations are leading the fight. But we also recognize that our socialism, our freedom and emancipation, can never come at the expense of our Third World comrades and relatives.</p><p>Marx and Engels developed their theories of change and history from the vantage point of the laboring European proletariat. Industrial capitalism, however, didn’t begin solely in the English factory. The hands that picked the cotton that was weaved in English textile mills were African — stolen from their homelands and enslaved by European masters. The land where the cotton grew had to be cleared of Indigenous people and Indigenous title to make way for the plantation economy, the main driving force behind the expansion of modern capitalism. Thus, the expansion of African slavery fueled the dispossession of Indigenous peoples.</p><p>US settler colonialism was thoroughly a racial project of genocide and Indigenous elimination, which is an enduring structure that changes over time. After all, even the so-called Five Civilized Tribes who had adopted the plantation economy and African slave system from their European counterparts were themselves dispossessed and extirpated from their lands. And both freed Africans and Indigenous people fought as soldiers and scouts for the US settler wars of extermination against western Indigenous nations and overseas campaigns of conquest. Despite their military service in the US imperialist army, their stations within settler society have always been subordinate to white Europeans. They faced Jim Crow segregation, police violence, mass incarceration, and the continued settler occupation of Indigenous lands. We reject settler colonialism and US imperialism as the means of emancipation for the working class and for colonized people.</p><p>Our communist and anti-imperialist principles to which we ascribe are as follows:</p><p>1. End the unequal relations between European and colonized nations.</p><p>2. End the violent competition between the nations of exploiters and colonizers.</p><p>3. End the plunder of the earth for profit.</p><p>2. Marxism is not European. Socialism is Indigenous.</p><p>Marxism is founded on the expropriated knowledges of non-capitalist Indigenous societies. Although Marx himself was wrong about many things, <u><mark>Marxism</u></mark>, as a science, <u><mark>has a</mark> built-in <mark>self-correcting mechanism that</mark> has <mark>helped revolutionaries throughout the world</mark> build off the political theory Marx first formulated</u>. If this were untrue, there would be no Russian Revolution, no African Revolution and decolonization movement, no Vietnamese liberation, no Bolivarian Revolution, no Cuban Revolution, no Chinese Revolution, etc. Each adopted Marxism and applied it to its specific and unique circumstances by building off the long struggles against exploitation and European imperialism.</p><p><u>Even <mark>for Indigenous peoples</mark> in the Americas</u>, <u><strong>the concepts and <mark>theories of decolonization explicitly derive from Marxist</mark> revolutionary <mark>movements</u></strong></mark>. It’s dishonest for us to not recognize this history. It’s not because of Marx or European thinkers that these revolutions were successful. <u>It’s because <mark>Marxism is the science</mark> of revolution <mark>for the poor masses</u></mark>, <u>the <mark>colonized</u></mark>, <u><mark>and</mark> the <mark>wretched of the earth</u></mark>. Fundamentally, Marxism is the science of how to get free. It is the study of class struggle.</p><p>If capitalism upholds the systems of racism, settler colonialism, heteropatriarchy, and imperialism, then we cannot use capitalism to undo these systems. It’s not enough to just be anti-capitalist. <u>Like our ancestors <mark>we must be forward-thinking by</mark> drawing from and <mark>amplifying</mark> our <mark>non-capitalist social relations as Indigenous peoples</u></mark>, <u>not to make Indigenous traditions relevant to Marxism or socialism but <mark>to make</mark> socialism and <mark>Marxism relevant to our struggle</mark> as Indigenous peoples</u>.</p><p>You cannot fight fire with fire. You cannot fight capitalism with Indigenous capitalism. You cannot fight nationalism with hyper-nationalism. You can only fight fire with water. And the solution to all these ills—and it is what capitalists and colonists hate the most—is socialism. If capitalism is burning the planet, then socialism is the water to douse the flame. Water is life. We all need water to live, but we don’t need capitalism.</p><p><u>And for us <mark>to fight colonialism</u></mark>, <u><mark>we must ensure</mark> that <mark>our nations can live</u></mark>. But our nationalism cannot mirror the bourgeois settler nationalism of colonial states, which is premised on exclusion and white supremacy. We adopt a revolutionary Indigenous nationalism that aligns with the most oppressed and marginalized first, within and outside our own communities. <u>And we recognize that by <mark>organizing production</u></mark>—for our food, medicines, resources, etc.—<u><mark>according to need</mark> and not profit <mark>is the only</mark> possible <mark>path forward</mark> according to our traditions</u>.</p><p><u><strong>The philosophy of <mark>communism</mark> neatly <mark>lines up with</mark> the philosophy of <mark>our Indigenous ancestors</u></strong></mark>. Friedrich Engels admitted as much when in the 1888 English edition of the Communist Manifesto he added a footnote to the famous line: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle.” He clarified, “That is, all written history,” making note specifically of Lewis Henry Morgan’s study of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, which was a communistic, classless, and democratic society before European invasion. Moreover, it was the relative gender equality of Indigenous societies that inspired the suffragettes — white women seeking parity with white men. <u>The study of Indigenous societies</u>, <u><mark>the</mark> inherent <mark>equality</mark> and freedom <mark>they engendered</mark> among producers <mark>and</mark> the <mark>common ownership</mark> of property and social institutions</u>, <u>also <mark>inspired European workers to demand eight-hour workdays and</mark> the <mark>abolition of child labor</u></mark>. And, in the final analysis, despite their own limited understandings, Marx and Engels, the founders of the modern communist movement, had developed theories of emancipation largely from the expropriated knowledges of Indigenous and communal people, whose examples they relied on to prove that capitalism is neither inevitable nor natural. But, in fact, communism is both natural and inevitable.</p><p>This is not to suggest Indigenous societies were utopias — no society is perfect. It is, however, important to understand that Indigenous peoples have been knocked off the path of their natural social development to live in balance and correct relations. We are not trying to recreate the past so much as steer Indigenous nations back on their communal developmental path that has been destroyed or seriously distorted by capitalist social relations.</p><p>3. The United States is not a “nation of immigrants” but a nation of colonizers.</p><p>Whereas contemporary racial identity politics attempts to mask or obscure class antagonisms, a class struggle that doesn’t overturn white supremacy and settler colonialism frees no one. We are not seeking parity with colonizers or further integration into a colonial system. We’re seeking to end settler and white supremacy entirely over Black, Indigenous, and colonized people. We aim to end the colonial system entirely.</p><p>Why? The United States, as a nation of European colonizers, had no feudal or communal past. Unlike other nations in history who transitioned from feudalism to capitalism, the United States was the first nation born entirely as a capitalist state. It was constructed from the ground up according to the nightmare vision of European slave owners and Indian killers — the nation’s founding bourgeois ideologies. The United States began as an oppressor nation, as a colonizer of oppressed people, and its function remains so. It not only has a capitalist ruling class, but all strata and classes of white Europeans among its ranks are encouraged to become preoccupied with the aims of the ruling class through petty racial privileges and private property ownership, the guiding stars of white settler nationalism. We reject those national and settler aspirations and ask our comrades in struggle to reject them as well.</p><p>The current US colonial state is not only an instrument of racial and class rule, it is also an instrument of imperialist plunder and the oppressor of nations. It thus obscures its own internal divisions of colonizer and colonized. The United States fabricates national myths by calling itself a “nation of immigrants” to hide its unnaturalness and crimes. Immigrants come to a land to integrate within the existing legal, social, and political orders. The first European settlers came to colonize, to destroy and replace existing Indigenous legal, social, and political orders. The United States is, therefore, more accurately described as a “nation of colonizers.” Immigrants don’t come in chains; you can’t immigrate to a land you already belong to; and refugees fleeing imperialist violence are not immigrants.</p><p>We recognize that the colonial state keeps in place irreconcilable class antagonisms, between rich and poor, between settler and Native. The state is first and foremost police and military violence. Its legitimacy is maintained by force. It’s primary function is enforcing capitalist social relations. The veneer of “representative democracy” is only possible because the ruling classes have crushed and will continue to crush any alternative to capitalism by mobilizing the police and military.</p><p>In this sense, Indigenous people are the first “Red Scare.” Because we held land in common and represented an alternative to the settler state (whether it be by taking in escaped slaves or mounting armed resistance), we had to be annihilated. Today, because we adopt revolutionary socialism as our struggle and vision for a free society, we are the second coming of the “Red Scare.” But we are not exclusive in our struggles for freedom. <u><mark>We align ourselves with all colonized and oppressed people</mark> of the world</u>. Only imperial borders and nation-states that are not of our own making divide our common humanity. Therefore, our struggle transcends the state, but we are not naive enough to turn away from the state as a site of struggle.</p><p>We understand that state power is nearly impossible to achieve, since Indigenous peoples are a minority. Yet, <u>in alliance with other colonized and oppressed peoples</u>, <u><strong><mark>we can take state power</u></strong></mark>, not to become the new rulers of a capitalist society, but to use the mechanisms of the state to wage our rightful struggle against our class enemies—the rich. <u><mark>A socialist state uses</mark> the power and <mark>democracy of the masses to undo</mark> the privileges and <mark>wealth of</mark> the <mark>ruling classes and</mark> the <mark>colonial elite</u></mark>, even among our own people. A socialist state seeks to destroy itself because it is built in the shell of the old. But it has to be wielded by the oppressed in the service of the oppressed to achieve freedom and the abolition of the state itself, because, whether we like it or not, the state is the primary organizer of society. <u>And <mark>through a decolonized socialist state</u></mark>, <u><mark>we</mark> will <mark>reorganize society to redistribute wealth and land by taking it back</mark> from those who stole it from us in the first place</u>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Rojas Álvarez & Mahoney 12/1/16 (Carlos Rojas Álvarez, the student field director for Save Our Public Schools Massachusetts, organized with the Boston Student Advisory Council (BSAC) and Youth on Board (YOB), served as campaign director for the Student Immigrant Movement; and is a founding member of United We Dream – interviewed by Ella Mahoney, “Public Education Can Win,” Jacobin, December 1, 2016, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/12/charter-schools-massachusetts-question-2-public-reform) fulltext: [Mahoney] Responding to your point about this being rooted in people’s fear for the future of their schools and feeling like they’re being underserved, in Boston of course there’s a vivid history of racist allocation of school resources. Were parents of color a base for the corporate charter movement, and do you feel you were able to win over those parents? [Rojas Álvarez] Yes we were. I have to say our victory has been one of the only bright lights in this dark time, not just locally but nationally. And one of our greatest successes was actually demonstrating, resoundingly, that white families and students and families and students of color are overwhelmingly in support of local public schools. The charter school advocates deployed a campaign message directed at the racial and class prejudices of white suburban voters, who by and large turn out to vote more than urban voters of color, because of socioeconomic privileges. They tried really hard to tug at those strings. Our Republican governor Charlie Baker, who has been spearheading privatization efforts in transportation, tried to appeal to white voters with messages like “Wouldn’t you want your child to have more choices if their public school was failing, my children have the privilege of going to a good school, but what about those urban students who don’t have those opportunities?” What they underestimated was our ground game, our ability to talk to a whole lot of voters about the reality not only of charter schools but of public schools. One, that charter schools exist at the expense of our public schools especially if they expand in number without taking into consideration the severe impact they would have on public funding. Two, we were able to address this misconception that parents of color in the city aren’t happy with their schools. We had lots of parents of color on the campaign, knocking on doors, as spokespeople at forums, at hundreds of debates across the state, saying “Actually, I love my school and I know my school needs more resources, not less, to keep succeeding or to improve.” I mean, Boston is one of the best urban school districts in the country and has demonstrated their ability to improve and turn around schools. Third, we shed light on the extremely irresponsible funding fiasco behind charter school expansion. But beyond all that, some of our winning messaging tapped into the anti–Wall Street, anti-corporate sentiments that are boiling across the country, in large part ignited by Bernie Sanders’s primary campaign. We tapped into this through the exposure of who was funding Yes on 2. The Yes on 2 cover group was Families for Excellent Schools Massachusetts — it appears like a group of parents of color and liberal white parents who care a lot about the community, but behind that is an extraordinary amount of money coming from Wall Street and hedge-funders across New York and Connecticut; we even saw the Walton family donating to this organization all the way from Arkansas. We also saw really disgraceful collusion between state officials at the department of education like Paul Sagan and the charter school campaign. Sagan donated $100,000 to this campaign. He’s the chair of the board of development of secondary education in Massachusetts; in other words the person responsible for approving charter schools, responsible for holding them accountable, was caught donating $100,000 to this ballot initiative. So we successfully put the integrity of that campaign in question. We shifted the consciousness, asking, “Are these funders’ interests really on the side of families and students or on the side of investors and corporations like Walmart, who not incidentally are the ones paying parents of color low wages?” So we were able to simplify the message and open the opportunity, in the state, in community forums, for deeper analysis over what interests were driving the Yes and No campaigns. [Mahoney] It’s interesting you mention Bernie Sanders because the Democratic primary results in Massachusetts showed Sanders dominating the rural areas, and then in Boston and the suburban areas it was very pro-Clinton. But I’m looking at a map right now of the Question 2 results and that rural/urban political divide is just not there at all. The few places that voted Yes on 2 were small areas in Cape Cod, Nantucket . . . [Rojas Álvarez] Yes, Republican strongholds voted Yes on 2. I have a couple thoughts about that. One, if you look at the map, you can see that every community that the pro-charter advocates said were going to vote “yes” on two voted “no” on two. Any part of the state that’s poor and predominantly of color you can see we won those communities. Conversely our prediction that Republican, conservative, and well-off communities would most likely vote “yes” on 2 was also borne out. Bernie Sander’s message was a huge boost to our campaign. But many Clinton voters also went with No on 2, I think because on such a local issue like public education, most left-of-center voters are increasingly on the same page about the need to protect the common good, to protect public education. And while in previous years corporate education efforts have been firmly rooted in the Democratic Party, we’re growing a movement to reject that. I think we’re successfully pushing back and holding Democratic leaders accountable against these privatization efforts. This is why, with the exception of a handful of legislators, the majority of Democratic legislators in Massachusetts came out against Question 2. Overall, there was a recognition that public services like education need to stay public and need to serve all people. People are not interested in creating special, more elite, more selective, isolated systems of education as a way to address the issue. [Mahoney] What was the role of the Massachusetts Teachers Association, particularly with respect to Barbara Madeloni’s leadership? She was first elected MTA president in 2014, and has steered the union in a much more confrontational direction since then. [Rojas Álvarez] Barbara Madeloni is an incredibly fierce and powerful leader that really has her eyes set on the prize and is able to talk to people and bring them to victory. The teachers’ union played a huge role in this campaign. Teachers are one of the most impacted constituencies of this question, and are deeply invested in doing what’s best for students and families. Barbara’s leadership, particularly around addressing racial disparities in public schools and prejudices within the teaching core, did an excellent job at rallying thousands of teachers across the state to act to save public schools not just wherever the teacher lives but in all parts of the state. There’s a lot of work left to do; as Trump has demonstrated our racial and class divides are still easily exploitable, and lead people to policies that are bad for the working and middle class. If we can continue uniting working people around issues of economic justice while openly addressing racial class divides — if we aren’t afraid to do that, to debate, to come together again and again, and come to an understanding — we have a good shot at building a strong backlash to Trump and the Republican takeover of Congress. This was also probably the most coalition-based ballot initiative campaign we’ve ever seen in Massachusetts. I’ve spoken to educators and community organizers, they are in agreement that this is the campaign that most worked in broad coalition, not just with the teachers’ union but a huge array of labor unions who came together to protect public education. That’s one reason why we defeated this ballot question.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>The alternative is feasible and builds support for state protection of public good – linking privatization and school choice to critique of neoliberalism catalyzes movements and creates public consciousness shift</h4><p>Rojas Álvarez & Mahoney 12/1/16</p><p></strong>(Carlos Rojas Álvarez, the student field director for Save Our Public Schools Massachusetts, organized with the Boston Student Advisory Council (BSAC) and Youth on Board (YOB), served as campaign director for the Student Immigrant Movement; and is a founding member of United We Dream – interviewed by Ella Mahoney, “Public Education Can Win,” Jacobin, December 1, 2016, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/12/charter-schools-massachusetts-question-2-public-reform)</p><p>[Mahoney] Responding to your point about this being rooted in people’s fear for the future of their schools and feeling like they’re being underserved, in Boston of course there’s a vivid history of racist allocation of school resources. <u><strong>Were parents of color a base for the corporate charter movement</u></strong>, and do you feel you were able to win over those parents?</p><p>[Rojas Álvarez] Yes we were. I have to say our victory has been one of the only bright lights in this dark time, not just locally but nationally. And <u><strong>one of our greatest successes was</u></strong> actually <u><strong>demonstrating</u></strong>, resoundingly, that <u><strong>white families and</u></strong> students and <u><strong>families</u></strong> and students <u><strong>of color are overwhelmingly in support of local public schools</u></strong>.</p><p>The <u><strong>charter school advocates</u></strong> deployed a campaign message directed at the racial and class prejudices of white suburban voters, who by and large turn out to vote more than urban voters of color, because of socioeconomic privileges. They tried really hard to tug at those strings. Our Republican governor Charlie Baker, who has been spearheading privatization efforts in transportation, tried to appeal to white voters with messages like “Wouldn’t you want your child to have more choices if their public school was failing, my children have the privilege of going to a good school, but what about those urban students who don’t have those opportunities?”</p><p>What they <u><strong>underestimated</u></strong> was <u><strong>our ground game</u></strong>, <u><strong>our ability to talk to a whole lot of voters about the reality not only of charter schools but of public schools</u></strong>. <u><strong>One</u></strong>, that <u><strong>charter schools exist at the expense of our public schools</u></strong> especially if they expand in number without taking into consideration the severe impact they would have on public funding. <u><strong>Two, we were able to address this misconception that parents of color in the city aren’t happy with their schools</u></strong>. We had lots of parents of color on the campaign, knocking on doors, as spokespeople at forums, at hundreds of debates across the state, saying “Actually, I love my school and I know my school needs more resources, not less, to keep succeeding or to improve.” I mean, Boston is one of the best urban school districts in the country and has demonstrated their ability to improve and turn around schools. <u><strong>Third, we shed light on the</u></strong> extremely irresponsible <u><strong>funding fiasco</u></strong> <u><strong>behind charter school expansion</u></strong>.</p><p>But beyond all that, some of <u><strong>our winning messaging tapped into the anti–Wall Street, anti-corporate sentiments</u></strong> that are <u><strong>boiling across the country</u></strong>, in large part ignited by Bernie Sanders’s primary campaign.</p><p>We tapped into this through the exposure of who was funding Yes on 2. The Yes on 2 cover group was Families for Excellent Schools Massachusetts — it appears like a group of parents of color and liberal white parents who care a lot about the community, but behind that is an extraordinary amount of money coming from Wall Street and hedge-funders across New York and Connecticut; we even saw the Walton family donating to this organization all the way from Arkansas.</p><p><u><strong>We</u></strong> also <u><strong>saw</u></strong> really <u><strong>disgraceful collusion between state officials at the department of education</u></strong> like Paul Sagan <u><strong>and the charter school campaign</u></strong>. Sagan donated $100,000 to this campaign. He’s the chair of the board of development of secondary education in Massachusetts; in other words the person responsible for approving charter schools, responsible for holding them accountable, was caught donating $100,000 to this ballot initiative. So <u><strong>we successfully put the integrity of that campaign in question</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong>We shifted</u></strong> the <u><strong>consciousness</u></strong>, asking, “Are these funders’ interests really on the side of families and students or on the side of investors and corporations like Walmart, who not incidentally are the ones paying parents of color low wages?” So <u><strong>we were able to simplify the message and open the opportunity</u></strong>, in the state, in community forums, <u><strong>for deeper analysis over what interests were driving the</u></strong> Yes and No <u><strong>campaigns</u></strong>.</p><p>[Mahoney] It’s interesting you mention Bernie Sanders because the Democratic primary results in Massachusetts showed Sanders dominating the rural areas, and then in Boston and the suburban areas it was very pro-Clinton.</p><p>But I’m looking at a map right now of the Question 2 results and that rural/urban political divide is just not there at all. The few places that voted Yes on 2 were small areas in Cape Cod, Nantucket . . .</p><p>[Rojas Álvarez] Yes, Republican strongholds voted Yes on 2. I have a couple thoughts about that. One, if you look at the map, you can see that every community that the pro-charter advocates said were going to vote “yes” on two voted “no” on two. <u><strong>Any part of the state that’s poor and predominantly of color you</u></strong> can see <u><strong>we won those communities</u></strong>. Conversely our prediction that Republican, conservative, and well-off communities would most likely vote “yes” on 2 was also borne out.</p><p>Bernie Sander’s message was a huge boost to our campaign. But many Clinton voters also went with No on 2, I think because <u><strong>on</u></strong> such <u><strong>a local issue like public education, most left-of-center voters are increasingly on the same page about the need to protect the common good</u></strong>, to protect public education.</p><p>And <u><strong>while in previous years corporate education efforts have been firmly rooted in the Democratic Party</u></strong>, <u><strong>we’re growing a movement to reject that</u></strong>. I think <u><strong>we’re successfully pushing back and holding Democratic leaders accountable against</u></strong> these <u><strong>privatization efforts</u></strong>. This is why, with the exception of a handful of legislators, the majority of Democratic legislators in Massachusetts came out against Question 2.</p><p>Overall, <u><strong>there was a recognition</u></strong> that <u><strong>public services like education need to stay public and need to serve all people</u></strong>. <u><strong>People are not interested in creating special</u></strong>, more <u><strong>elite</u></strong>, more <u><strong>selective, isolated systems of education as a way to address the issue</u></strong>.</p><p>[Mahoney] What was the role of the Massachusetts Teachers Association, particularly with respect to Barbara Madeloni’s leadership? She was first elected MTA president in 2014, and has steered the union in a much more confrontational direction since then.</p><p>[Rojas Álvarez] Barbara Madeloni is an incredibly fierce and powerful leader that really has her eyes set on the prize and is able to talk to people and bring them to victory. <u><strong>The teachers’ union played a huge role</u></strong> in this campaign. <u><strong>Teachers are one of the most impacted constituencies</u></strong> of this question, <u><strong>and are deeply invested</u></strong> in doing what’s best for students and families. Barbara’s leadership, particularly around addressing racial disparities in public schools and prejudices within the teaching core, did an excellent job at rallying thousands of teachers across the state to act to save public schools not just wherever the teacher lives but in all parts of the state.</p><p><u><strong>There’s</u></strong> a lot of <u><strong>work left to do</u></strong>; as <u><strong>Trump has demonstrated</u></strong> our <u><strong>racial and class divides are still easily exploitable</u></strong>, <u><strong>and lead people to policies that are bad for the working and middle class</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong>If we can continue uniting working people</u></strong> <u><strong>around issues of economic justice while openly addressing racial class divides</u></strong> — <u><strong>if we aren’t afraid to</u></strong> do that, to <u><strong>debate, to come together again and again, and come to an understanding</u></strong> — <u><strong>we have a good shot at building a strong backlash to Trump</u></strong> and the Republican takeover of Congress.</p><p>This was also probably the most coalition-based ballot initiative campaign we’ve ever seen in Massachusetts. I’ve spoken to <u><strong>educators and community organizers</u></strong>, they <u><strong>are in agreement that this is the campaign that most worked in broad coalition</u></strong>, not just <u><strong>with</u></strong> the teachers’ union but <u><strong>a huge array of labor unions</u></strong> <u><strong>who came together to protect public education</u></strong>. That’s one reason why we defeated this ballot question.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Zembylas 19 [Michalinos Zembylas (2019): The affective dimension of everyday resistance: implications for critical pedagogy in engaging with neoliberalism’s educational impact, Critical Studies in Education, DOI: 10.1080/17508487.2019.1617180]//jz fulltext: My analysis has shown that whatever form neoliberalism is taken to be in schools and universities, the neoliberal present has important affective implications. The affective economies of neoliberalism that are produced in schools and universities create particular ‘capacities to affect and be affected’ for teachers and students alike. It is thus extremely important to develop methodological and theoretical tools that critically trace the capacities of teachers and students for affecting and being affected in their engagements and negotiations with neoliberal education, and specifically how these capacities are normalized, embodied or enable alternative counter-practices (Zembylas, 2018b). Hence, what is required is a continued critical engagement with neoliberalism’s educational impact in ways that take into consideration the affective potentialities of resistance. Considering the affective potentialities of resistance in critical pedagogy can be the starting point for alternatives visions of educational policies and practices that challenge forms of neoliberal education. I would argue, then, that what is needed in the study of resistance in critical pedagogy is what Thrift (2008) calls a micro-biopolitical approach (Thrift, 2008) which understands the complexities and ambivalences of neoliberal affects and norms that operate at the mundane, ordinary, and everyday level in schools and universities and the consequences that are produced (Zembylas, 2018b). This micro-biopolitical approach on conceptualizing resistance in critical pedagogy is valuable not only because it pays attention to the affective consequences of mechanisms and techniques of neoliberal education in schools and universities, but also because it invokes what Braidotti (2013) terms ‘affirmative critique’ (see also Staunæs, 2016). An affirmative critique in critical pedagogy, for example, is the sort of critical engagement with ideas 10 M. ZEMBYLAS and things that creates affective spaces for alternative counter-conduct practices against neoliberal education. In other words, recognizing the affective dimension of resistance in critical pedagogy creates openings for an affirmative critique that has the potential to transform teachers’ and students’ capacities to affect and be affected. In considering the approach I am suggesting here to affect and resistance in critical pedagogy, one can indeed raise several questions and concerns such as: How may critical pedagogy itself function as an ‘apparatus of power’ (Anderson, 2014) which uses affect to mobilize resistance towards certain ideologies or structures such as neoliberalism? How are these mobilizations of resistance connected to broader collective conditions and processes of resisting certain ideologies or structures at the macro-political level? How do teachers’ and students’ practices and bodily capacities reproduce or enrich certain mobilizations of resistance through their encounters? How can those practices and bodily capacities be reproductive, adaptive or resistant, whether intentionally or not? (e.g. see McKenzie, 2017). There are no definitive answers to these questions, but they must be posed to show the complexities and ambivalences emerging from attempts to link affect and resistance in critical pedagogy. Hence, I would argue that any viable theorization of resistance in critical pedagogy must not be limited to ‘conventional’ understandings of resistance but must emphasize how affects condition the ways neoliberalism emerges, circulate and are transformed by forms of resistance waged by teachers and students. Greater acknowledgment of the ways in which schools and universities play a fundamental role in the affective conduct of individuals, encouraging and directing the self-perceptions, economic behavior and socio-political actions of students, citizens, and workers (Odysseos & Pal, 2018) will renew theorization of resistance in critical pedagogy in two ways. First, by gesturing toward the particular ways in which affects come to have force and socio-political significance, critical pedagogy disconnects resistance from a psychologized perspective or a perspective that defines resistance in dualistic terms as a matter of either human agency or social structure. This would mean, for instance, recognizing that resistance is not a set of individualized actions but rather it is very much embedded in the affective infrastructures of neoliberal education. To create renewed affective relations and assemblages as counter-conduct in schools and universities, then, would essentially mean to invent new affective practices that instigate empowerment and resistance against the various manifestations of neoliberal education. As Alldred and Fox (2017) conclude: It is therefore more accurate to see power and resistance as dual fluxes that permeate all assemblages, a shifting balance that is never finally settled. Defining a certain affect as an assertion of power or an effort at resistance is less important than assessing the capacities that these affects produce. (p. 1171) For example, it is argued that ‘affective solidarity’ is necessary for a sustainable politics of transformation (Hemmings, 2012). Hemmings proposes an approach that moves away from rooting transformation in politics of identity and towards modes of engagement that start from the affective dissonance experience can produce. Although affective dissonance with the experience of neoliberalism’s educational impact, for instance, cannot guarantee a resistant mode, ‘that sense of dissonance might become a sense of injustice and then a desire to rectify that’ (Hemmings, 2012, CRITICAL STUDIES IN EDUCATION 11 p. 157). The recognition of affective dissonance as the point of departure for a possible affective solidarity among teachers and student highlights that affective dissonance with neoliberalism’s educational impact may be a productive basis from which to seek solidarity with others – not based on a shared identity or ideology, but on feeling the desire for transforming the injustices inflicted by neoliberal policies and practices. Second, the recognition of the affective dimension of resistance in critical pedagogy helps us understand the affective present in and beyond schools and universities as a series of processes and practices in ‘the everyday’ in which the focus is on the actions that are mobilized to produce something rather than on their representations or what they supposedly mean. By examining the consequences of affects at the micropolitical level, resistance can be understood in terms of the ways actions produce capacities to affect and be affected, that is, ‘in terms of the forces circulating in assemblage and the consequent capacities that are produced in assembled relations, including human bodies and subjectivities’ (Alldred & Fox, 2017, p. 1171). Calling upon theoretical insights in critical pedagogy that recognize and examine the affective dimension of everyday resistance is likely to challenge the ‘invisible’ infrastructures of neoliberal education in schools and universities. All in all, the call for a critical pedagogy to acknowledge the affective dimension of resistance marks an important and necessary moment that allows critical pedagogy to be further enriched in attempts to address the challenges faced by teachers and students in neoliberal education. Schools and universities are at a critical juncture whether and how they will be able to develop pedagogies and ideas that neither return to an idealized, pre-neoliberal past, nor expect a sudden revolution but instead resist against the self-formations involved by neoliberalism (Odysseos & Pal, 2018). What I have offered here is an attempt to illuminate the affective dimension of resistance and its implications for critical pedagogy through theoretical insights that enhance individual and collective capacity for counter-conduct in neoliberal contexts. Being attentive to the complexities and potential ambivalences in teachers’ and students’ forms of resistance enhances our analysis of how critical pedagogy more broadly, and schools and universities more specifically, are themselves implicated in transformations of neoliberal education (Odysseos & Pal, 2018).<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><u><mark>In (neo)liberal political discourses, the ideal subject</mark> is an independent homo oeconomicus, that <mark>is, a masculine, disembodied being, who is self-sufficient and self-caring, while knowingly making rational, utilitarian, and abstracted ethical choices for the common good</mark> </u>of all. The liberal subject is an invulnerable individual, or at least well secured against any risks in life. He is never ill; he does not leak of bodily fluids (because he seems not to have a body); and he never ages. Or, in case he does age, he does so actively and “successfully”, in ways that his body’s care needs would never gain control of his life: the life of a subjective, rational Self. Feminist social and political theory argues that these conceptions of political subjectivity are non-realistic: <u><mark>Such disembodied subjects simply do not exist</u></mark> (cf. Bacchi and Beasley 2002; Beattie and Schick 2013; Cohn 2014; Fineman 2008; Grosz 1994; Hoppania and Vaittinen 2015; Robinson 1999; 2011; Ruddick 1990; Shildrick 2002; 2012; Tronto 1993; Vaittinen 2015; forthcoming) <u><mark>While vulnerable embodiment is discursively associated merely with women, children, and the weak, the truth is that as human beings we all are bodies, and as such vulnerable, relational and dependent</u></mark>. As political subjects we are perhaps meant to “own” our bodies, to be in control of them and our lives. Yet, the bodies that our subjectivity inhabits may in fact both pre-exist and outlive the subjective “I”. <u>We are intercorporeal: conceived, born, raised, and sustained by other bodies. </u>We live _and die _in concrete relations with others<u>. Thus, <mark>as opposed to being the self-caring ideal subjects of (neo)liberal politics, as bodies we are dependent, fleshy, and irrational. We are vulnerable, sometimes sick and dis/abled</u></mark>, every day in contact with our own bodily fluids  _and frequently also with those of others. We are made of and sometimes governed by the fluids, bacteria and hormones that move within, without, and between our bodies (cf. Fishel 2015; Irni 2013; Preciado 2013). <u><mark>Our lives are inherently frail. We start ageing and decaying the moment we are born</mark>.</u> In other words<mark>, <u>the fact of embodiment makes the liberal understanding of subjectivity ultimately an illusion</mark>. Nevertheless, global politics and its <mark>security policies</mark> and practices <mark>continue to build on the liberal conceptions of life</mark>. In other words, the contemporary security policies and practices tend <mark>to build on an illusion</u></mark>. In this chapter, I challenge these illusionary yet prevailing understandings of security through different accounts of embodied in/security. I begin the chapter with a discussion of feminist analysis of vulnerability. Here, I rely on accounts that emerge from the feminist ethics of care tradition (e.g. Robinson 1999; 2011), as well as Carol Cohn’s (2014) recent interrogation of vulnerability in international security discourses. <u>Feminist conceptions of <mark>vulnerability and care challenge conventional security practice</mark>s, and reveal them as unrealistic, <mark>by foregrounding the human beings’ existential dependency on each other for surviva</mark>l</u> (e.g. Robinson 2011; Beattie and Schick 2013; Butler 2004). Yet, as I have argued elsewhere (Vaittinen 2015), they also rarely explicitly engage with the body organism and its materiality, which need be recognised if embodied in/security is to be taken seriously. In this chapter, I interrogate the body in more concrete terms. Here, I first show how embodied realities of human life have always been central in feminist security studies, albeit usually in contexts of direct violence and hence in/securities external to the body. I then introduce the concept of the lowest common denominator of embodiment, which emphasises the body’s need of care from other bodies and, while defying essentialism, is applicable to all living bodies at all times (Vaittinen, forthcoming). Unlike in the usual security frames that begin with direct violence, in this conception, embodied in/security becomes defined through to the body’s most basic needs, which necessitate care relations with other bodies at times when we are corporeally incapable of being the liberal individual subjects that we are meant to be. In the concluding section<u>, <mark>I juxtapose my conception of embodied in/security with the</mark> conceptions that seem to predominate <mark>security discourses</mark> more generally. I argue <mark>that</mark>, sometimes also in feminist security studies, the empirical contexts of direct violence, war, and militarism easily (<mark>re)produce perceptions of embodied in/security that begin with the threats that bodies pose to other bodies. Here, in/secure bodies are primarily present as subjects and objects of violence, rather than as caring and in need of care</mark>. Consequently, the threats that the body, as an organism, poses to itself remain unaddressed. I argue that ultimately at stake here are two contending gendered ontologies of human relatedness through which security policies can be shaped: feminised dependency on other bodies’ care against masculine perceptions of the bodies of others as primarily threatening. Both the conceptions of embodied in/vulnerability are profoundly relational, yet the security practices that they (re)produce are fundamentally different. </u>Existential vulnerability and the ethics of care <u><mark>Feminist literature</u></mark> (e.g. Fineman 2008; Beattie and Schick 2013) <u><mark>has emphasised the necessity to put vulnerability instead of liberal individualism at the centre of political discourses and practices</mark>, since vulnerability describes the condition of human life much more realistically than individual, rational autonomy does. This way of thinking is particularly present in <mark>the feminist ethics of care tradition,</mark> which <mark>provides a powerful alternative to liberal individualistic thinking about ethics, morality, and politics</mark>. Foregrounding the existential dependency of every human being on each other’s care for survival, feminist accounts of care can also forcefully challenge the conventional security thinking, by presenting the lack of care as a threat to human security</u> (Robinson 2011).<u> Feminist ethics of care argues that practices of care give rise to an alternative moral thinking, which is capable of realistically accounting for the situatedness of the moral subject </u>(see, for example, Tronto 1993; Robinson 1999; 2011; Ruddick 1990). Feminist care ethicists show how moral decisions are never made in a political void or behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, as in the Kantian tradition, but in concrete relations with particular others. Importantly, emphasising practices of care as a source of moral and political relatedness, <u>feminist ethics of care demonstrates how human existential vulnerability - that is, our dependency on care as well as our capacity to respond caringly - is a powerful site and source of politics rather than a realm external to it </u>(Tronto 1993; Robinson 1999; 2011; Vaittinen 2015).Educational norms can be reoriented towards critical pedagogy from within and has the potential to ground intersectional movements but requires critical engagement through counter-conduct performances</h4><p><strong>Zembylas 19</strong> [Michalinos Zembylas (2019): The affective dimension of everyday resistance: implications for critical pedagogy in engaging with neoliberalism’s educational impact, Critical Studies in Education, DOI: 10.1080/17508487.2019.1617180]//jz</p><p>My analysis has shown that whatever form neoliberalism is taken to be in schools and universities, the neoliberal present has important affective implications. <u>The <mark>affective economies of neoliberalism</mark> that <mark>are produced in schools</mark> and universities create particular ‘capacities to affect and be affected’ for teachers and students alike. <mark>It is thus extremely important to develop methodological and theoretical tools that</mark> <mark>critically trace</mark> the capacities of teachers and students for affecting and being affected in their engagements and negotiations with <mark>neoliberal education, and</mark> specifically how <mark>these capacities are normalized, embodied or enable alternative counter-practices</mark> (Zembylas, 2018b).</u> Hence, what is required is a continued critical engagement with neoliberalism’s educational impact in ways that take into consideration the affective potentialities of resistance. Considering the affective potentialities of resistance in critical pedagogy can be the starting point for alternatives visions of educational policies and practices that challenge forms of neoliberal education. <u>I would argue, then, that what is needed in the study of resistance in <mark>critical pedagogy</mark> is what Thrift (2008) calls a micro-biopolitical approach (Thrift, 2008) which understands the complexities and ambivalences of neoliberal affects and <mark>norms</mark> that <mark>operate at the mundane</mark>, ordinary, and <mark>everyday level in schools</mark> and universities and the consequences that are produced (Zembylas, 2018b). This micro-biopolitical approach on conceptualizing resistance in critical pedagogy is valuable not only because <mark>it</mark> pays attention to the affective consequences of mechanisms and techniques of neoliberal education in schools and universities, but also because it <mark>invokes</mark> what Braidotti (2013) terms ‘<mark>affirmative critique’</mark> (see also Staunæs, 2016). An affirmative critique in critical pedagogy, for example, is the sort <mark>of critical engagement</mark> with ideas 10 M. ZEMBYLAS and things <mark>that creates affective spaces for alternative counter-conduct practices</mark> against neoliberal education.</u> In other words, recognizing the affective dimension of resistance in critical pedagogy creates openings for an affirmative critique that has the potential to transform teachers’ and students’ capacities to affect and be affected. In considering the approach I am suggesting here to affect and resistance in critical pedagogy, one can indeed raise several questions and concerns such as: How may critical pedagogy itself function as an ‘apparatus of power’ (Anderson, 2014) which uses affect to mobilize resistance towards certain ideologies or structures such as neoliberalism? How are these mobilizations of resistance connected to broader collective conditions and processes of resisting certain ideologies or structures at the macro-political level? How do teachers’ and students’ practices and bodily capacities reproduce or enrich certain mobilizations of resistance through their encounters? How can those practices and bodily capacities be reproductive, adaptive or resistant, whether intentionally or not? (e.g. see McKenzie, 2017). There are no definitive answers to these questions, but they must be posed to show the complexities and ambivalences emerging from attempts to link affect and resistance in critical pedagogy. <u>Hence, I would argue that <mark>any viable theorization of resistance in critical pedagogy must not be limited to ‘conventional’ understandings of resistance</mark> but must emphasize how affects condition the ways neoliberalism emerges, circulate and are transformed by forms of resistance waged by teachers and students.</u> Greater acknowledgment of the ways in which schools and universities play a fundamental role in the affective conduct of individuals, encouraging and directing the self-perceptions, economic behavior and socio-political actions of students, citizens, and workers (Odysseos & Pal, 2018) will renew theorization of resistance in critical pedagogy in two ways. First, by gesturing toward the particular ways in which affects come to have force and socio-political significance, critical pedagogy disconnects resistance from a psychologized perspective or a perspective that defines resistance in dualistic terms as a matter of either human agency or social structure. This would mean, for instance, recognizing that resistance is not a set of individualized actions but rather it is very much embedded in the affective infrastructures of neoliberal education. To create renewed affective relations and assemblages as counter-conduct in schools and universities, then, would essentially mean to invent new affective practices that instigate empowerment and resistance against the various manifestations of neoliberal education. As Alldred and Fox (2017) conclude: It is therefore more accurate to see power and resistance as dual fluxes that permeate all assemblages, a shifting balance that is never finally settled. Defining a certain affect as an assertion of power or an effort at resistance is less important than assessing the capacities that these affects produce. (p. 1171) For example, it is argued that ‘affective solidarity’ is necessary for a sustainable politics of transformation (Hemmings, 2012). Hemmings proposes an approach that moves away from rooting transformation in politics of identity and towards modes of engagement that start from the affective dissonance experience can produce. Although affective dissonance with the experience of neoliberalism’s educational impact, for instance, cannot guarantee a resistant mode, ‘that sense of dissonance might become a sense of injustice and then a desire to rectify that’ (Hemmings, 2012, CRITICAL STUDIES IN EDUCATION 11 p. 157). <u>The recognition of affective dissonance as the point of departure for a possible affective solidarity among teachers and student highlights that <mark>affective dissonance with neoliberalism’s educational impact may be a productive basis from which to seek solidarity with others – not based on a shared identity or ideology, but on feeling the desire for transforming the injustices inflicted by neoliberal policies and practices</mark>.</u> Second, the recognition of the affective dimension of resistance in critical pedagogy helps us understand the affective present in and beyond schools and universities as a series of processes and practices in ‘the everyday’ in which the focus is on the actions that are mobilized to produce something rather than on their representations or what they supposedly mean. By examining the consequences of affects at the micropolitical level, resistance can be understood in terms of the ways actions produce capacities to affect and be affected, that is, ‘in terms of the forces circulating in assemblage and the consequent capacities that are produced in assembled relations, including human bodies and subjectivities’ (Alldred & Fox, 2017, p. 1171). Calling upon theoretical insights in critical pedagogy that recognize and examine the affective dimension of everyday resistance is likely to challenge the ‘invisible’ infrastructures of neoliberal education in schools and universities. All in all, the call for a critical pedagogy to acknowledge the affective dimension of resistance marks an important and necessary moment that allows critical pedagogy to be further enriched in attempts to address the challenges faced by teachers and students in neoliberal education. Schools and universities are at a critical juncture whether and how they will be able to develop pedagogies and ideas that neither return to an idealized, pre-neoliberal past, nor expect a sudden revolution but instead resist against the self-formations involved by neoliberalism (Odysseos & Pal, 2018). What I have offered here is an attempt to illuminate the affective dimension of resistance and its implications for critical pedagogy through theoretical insights that enhance individual and collective capacity for counter-conduct in neoliberal contexts. Being attentive to the complexities and potential ambivalences in teachers’ and students’ forms of resistance enhances our analysis of how critical pedagogy more broadly, and schools and universities more specifically, are themselves implicated in transformations of neoliberal education (Odysseos & Pal, 2018).</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Pampinella 19, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the State University of New York (SUNY) at New Paltz. He is on leave from SUNY New Paltz during Spring 2019 and is conducting research on the practice of diplomacy in the Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry in Quito, Ecuador. (Stephen, 1-23-2019, "The Internationalist Disposition and US Grand Strategy", Disorder of Things, https://thedisorderofthings.com/2019/01/23/the-internationalist-disposition-and-us-grand-strategy/) fulltext: I think there is a strategy consistent with the international disposition: great power concert. A concert strategy requires that all great powers pursue mutual accommodation and recognize each other’s interests as part of a larger commitment to maintain international stability. Patrick Porter and Amitav Acharya argue that a great power concert strategy is the best suited to adapt to the transfer of wealth and power to Asia along with the “multiplex” nature of world politics (not to mention a global perspective on international relations). The emergence of a diverse range of state and non-state actors bound together by extreme interdependence makes it impossible for any one actor, such as the United States, to establish rules for global governance which can mobilize all others. On this basis, a concert strategy would lead the United States to collaborate with others on the basis of mutual co-existence and embrace joint decision-making at the global level for coping with macrostructural processes that threaten all peoples around the world. In this way, a concert strategy is firmly grounded the international disposition and can serve as the realization of progressive internationalism. Security and The Balance of Power A concert strategy can do what establishment foreign policy cannot, namely de-escalate great power competition by giving up US hegemony. If adopted, the United States would treat other great powers, like Russia, China, and Iran, as equal partners in the maintenance of global stability and incorporate their interests into regional security agreements. The United States would give up its self-assumed role as an unrivaled global hegemon and seek a balance of power based on mutual respect with other great powers as partners rather than enemies. This kind of international posture would result in a more horizontal great power system, one that Stacie Goddard as identified as being productive of status quo rather than revisionist intentions. It would be compatible with recognition of the great power identities of other states and provide them with ontological security. Transitioning from a hegemonic security strategy to a balance of power one will require that the United States engage in some degree of retrenchment from its already expansive commitments. But supporters of hegemony are wrong when they claim that retrenchment will encourage great power aggression and lead to the abandonment of our allies. The United States can engage in moderate forms of retrenchment consistent with great power recognition while still maintaining commitments to allies that strive to uphold human dignity. For example, were the United States to support a moratorium on NATO expansion, as Michael O’Hanlon suggests, it would signal that the United States is no longer interested in moving the frontiers of its influence to the gates of Moscow and remove the sense of threat experienced by Russian leaders. By recognizing the validity of Russian security interests as well as its great power identity, the equal relationship made possible by a concert strategy will better deal with the threat of interstate conflict compared to US hegemony. Reviving Global Governance A concert strategy informed by the internationalist disposition can further enable more robust forms of global governance. Rather than attempt international cooperation based on a priori liberal normative templates, the United States would accept the validity of all claims made by collective actors in world politics in an open-ended and inclusive process of deliberation. The result would be less of a hegemonic order and more of a constitutionalist one, in which the United States binds itself to a truly democratic process of decision-making at the global level. The emergence of global governance norms would be a function less of hegemonic socialization and more of a right held by all actors to contest the validity of standards of expected behavior. In other words, a concert strategy would enable the United States to accept processes of norm contestation as the motor of transnational cooperation and generate more legitimate rules for regulating global governance. It would expand the US order building project initially identified by Ikenberry on the basis of restraint and institutional self-binding, but without retaining its own hierarchical position in world politics or engaging in hypocritical forms of dominance. The implications for economic governance are profound: the United States would no longer exclude from consideration the notion of social democratic regulation of global capitalism and instead promote non-capitalist perspectives on the economy. Todd Tucker provides one great example of this approach when he argues that ISDS arbitration should include labor leaders and social justice advocates rather than international lawyers chosen by multinational firms which initiate legal action against sovereign states. It would also enable the United States to seriously consider Piketty’s call for a global wealth tax, Palley and Chow’s call for minimum wage floors, and a binding multilateral treaty that regulates global business activities on the basis of human rights. And finally, it would enable the drastic shift away from fossil fuels necessary to avoid climate apocalypse. In Search of a Global Public Naysayers might argue that all this degree of international cooperation sounds idealist, but all are possible in a context of declining great power competition. Once the United States recognizes the equal membership of all others in world politics on the basis of our extreme interdependencies, it can make possible what Mitzen has referred to as collective intentionality, or the emergence of a plural subject composed of several individuals who make and uphold joint commitments to each other and demand adherence as members of a global public. This kind of action is what the internationalist disposition can help us conceptualize, and even realize, through a concert strategy. If progressive internationalists want to realize their objectives, they should be willing to turn away from the US establishment and embrace a concert strategy. By prioritizing cooperation on non-state issues and resolving great power competition through equal recognition, they can realize security for their own citizens as well as others. However, IR constructivists remind us that no foreign policy can be enacted by policymakers without a legitimating national security narrative. Progressive internationalists must continue to develop a new story about the United States that rationalizes a concert strategy and renders US national identity compatible with the pluralism we find in both world politics and US domestic politics. To develop this narrative, progressive internationalists should engage radical critiques of democracy, like those offered by Chantal Mouffe, which seek maximal inclusion of others and accept difference and conflict as irreducible elements of political life. A pluralist strategic narrative can thereby serve as the basis for mutual respect of others and enable the democratization of world politics.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>U.S. hegemony provokes <u>blowback aggression</u> due to <u>status insecurity</u> and <u>dooms international cooperation</u>---decline spurs a <u>great power concert</u> that solves <u>war</u> and <u>existential threats</u>.</h4><p><strong>Pampinella 19</strong>, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the State University of New York (SUNY) at New Paltz. He is on leave from SUNY New Paltz during Spring 2019 and is conducting research on the practice of diplomacy in the Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry in Quito, Ecuador. (Stephen, 1-23-2019, "The Internationalist Disposition and US Grand Strategy", Disorder of Things, https://thedisorderofthings.com/2019/01/23/the-internationalist-disposition-and-us-grand-strategy/)</p><p><u>I think there is a strategy <strong>consistent</strong> with the <strong>international disposition</strong>: <strong>great power concert.</u></strong> <u><mark>A <strong>concert strategy</strong> requires</mark> that all <strong><mark>great powers pursue mutual</mark> <mark>accommodation</mark> and recognize each other’s interests as part of a larger commitment <mark>to maintain</mark> international <mark>stability</u></strong>.</mark> Patrick Porter and Amitav Acharya argue that a great power concert strategy is the best suited to adapt to the transfer of wealth and power to Asia along with the “multiplex” nature of world politics (not to mention a global perspective on international relations). <u>The emergence of a diverse range of state and non-state actors bound together by extreme interdependence makes it impossible for any <strong>one actor</strong>, such as the <strong>United States</strong>, to establish <strong>rules for global governance</strong> which can <strong>mobilize all others</u></strong>. <u>On this basis, <mark>a concert strategy would lead the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>to <strong>collaborate with others</u></strong></mark> on the basis of mutual co-existence <u><mark>and embrace <strong>joint decision-making</u></strong></mark> at the global level for coping with macrostructural processes that threaten all peoples around the world. In this way, a concert strategy is firmly grounded the international disposition and can serve as the realization of progressive internationalism.</p><p>Security and The Balance of Power</p><p><u><mark>A concert strategy can</mark> </u>do what establishment foreign policy cannot, namely <u><strong><mark>de-escalate great power competition</strong> by <strong>giving up US heg</mark>emony</strong>. <strong>If adopted</strong>, the United States would treat <strong>other great powers,</strong> like Russia, China, and Iran, as <strong>equal partners</strong> in the <strong>maintenance of global stability</strong> and incorporate their interests into <strong>regional security agreements</strong>. The United States would <strong>give up its self-assumed role</strong> as an <strong>unrivaled global hegemon</strong> and seek a balance of power based on <strong>mutual respect</u></strong> with other great powers as partners rather than enemies. <u>This kind of international posture would result in a more <strong>horizontal great power system</strong>, one that Stacie Goddard as identified as being productive of status quo rather than revisionist intentions. It would be compatible with recognition of the great power identities of other states and provide them with ontological security.</p><p>Transitioning from a <strong>hegemonic security strategy</strong> to a <strong>balance of power </strong>one will require that the United States engage in</u> some degree of <u><strong>retrenchment</u></strong> <u>from its </u>already<u> <strong>expansive commitments</u></strong>. But <u><strong>supporters of hegemony are wrong</strong> when they claim that retrenchment will <strong>encourage great power aggression</strong> and lead to the <strong>abandonment</strong> of our allies.</u> <u>The United States can engage in <strong>moderate forms of retrenchment</strong> consistent with <strong>great power recognition</strong> while still <strong>maintaining commitments to allies</u></strong> that strive to uphold human dignity. For example, were the United States to support a moratorium on NATO expansion, as Michael O’Hanlon suggests, it would signal that the United States is no longer interested in moving the frontiers of its influence to the gates of Moscow and remove the sense of threat experienced by Russian leaders. By recognizing the validity of Russian security interests as well as its great power identity, <u>the equal relationship made possible by a concert strategy will <strong>better deal</strong> with the <strong>threat of interstate conflict</strong> compared to US hegemony.</p><p></u>Reviving Global Governance</p><p><u>A <strong>concert strategy</u></strong> informed by the internationalist disposition <u>can further enable more <strong>robust forms of global governance</u></strong>. Rather than attempt international cooperation based on a priori liberal normative templates, the United States would accept the validity of all claims made by collective actors in world politics in an open-ended and inclusive process of deliberation. <u>The result would be <strong>less of a hegemonic order</strong> and more of a <strong>constitutionalist one,</strong> in which the United States <strong>binds itself</strong> to a truly <strong>democratic process of decision-making</u></strong> at the global level. The emergence of <u><strong>global governance norms</u></strong> <u>would be</u> a function less of hegemonic socialization and more of a right <u><strong>held by all actors</strong> to contest the validity of standards of expected behavior. In other words, <mark>a <strong>concert strategy</strong> would enable the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>to accept <strong></mark>processes of <mark>norm contestation</strong></mark> as the <strong>motor</strong> of <strong>transnational cooperation</strong> <mark>and generate</mark> more <strong>legitimate <mark>rules</strong> for</mark> <strong>regulating global <mark>governance</u></strong></mark>. It would expand the US order building project initially identified by Ikenberry on the basis of<u><strong> restraint and institutional self-binding, but without retaining its own hierarchical position in world politics or engaging in hypocritical forms of dominance.</p><p></u></strong>The implications for economic governance are profound: the United States would no longer exclude from consideration the notion of social democratic regulation of global capitalism and instead promote non-capitalist perspectives on the economy. Todd Tucker provides one great example of this approach when he argues that ISDS arbitration should include labor leaders and social justice advocates rather than international lawyers chosen by multinational firms which initiate legal action against sovereign states. It would also enable the United States to seriously consider Piketty’s call for a global wealth tax, Palley and Chow’s call for minimum wage floors, and a binding multilateral treaty that regulates global business activities on the basis of human rights. And finally, <u><mark>it would enable</mark> <mark>the <strong>drastic shift away</mark> <mark>from fossil fuels</strong></mark> <mark>necessary to <strong>avoid climate apocalypse</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>In Search of a Global Public</p><p>Naysayers might argue that all <u>this degree of <strong>international cooperation</strong> sounds <strong>idealist</u></strong>, but <u><strong>all are possible</strong> in a context of <strong>declining great power competition</u></strong>. Once the United States recognizes the equal membership of all others in world politics on the basis of our extreme interdependencies, it can make possible what Mitzen has referred to as collective intentionality, or the emergence of a plural subject composed of several individuals who make and uphold joint commitments to each other and demand adherence as members of a global public. This kind of action is what the internationalist disposition can help us conceptualize, and even realize, through a concert strategy.</p><p>If progressive internationalists want to realize their objectives, they should be willing to turn away from the US establishment and embrace a concert strategy. <u>By prioritizing <strong>cooperation on non-state issues</strong> and resolving <strong>great power competition</strong> through <strong>equal recognition</u></strong>, <u>they can <strong>realize security</u></strong> for their own citizens as well as others. However, IR constructivists remind us that no foreign policy can be enacted by policymakers without a legitimating national security narrative. Progressive internationalists must continue to develop a new story about the United States that rationalizes a concert strategy and renders US national identity compatible with the pluralism we find in both world politics and US domestic politics. To develop this narrative, progressive internationalists should engage radical critiques of democracy, like those offered by Chantal Mouffe, which seek maximal inclusion of others and accept difference and conflict as irreducible elements of political life. A pluralist strategic narrative can thereby serve as the basis for mutual respect of others and enable the democratization of world politics.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Kevin Bankston 17, Director of New America’s Open Technology Institute, JD from USC, nonresidential fellow at Stanford Law School’s Center for Internet & Society, Justice Brennan First Amendment Fellow at the ACLU, 6-14-2017, “Ending The Endless Crypto Debate: Three Things We Should Be Arguing About Instead of Encryption Backdoors,” https://www.lawfareblog.com/ending-endless-crypto-debate-three-things-we-should-be-arguing-about-instead-encryption-backdoors/ //SIR fulltext: First, to very briefly summarize a long-running debate: until he was dismissed in May, FBI Director Comey had been arguing since 2014 that the growing prevalence of encryption—in particular, default encryption on some smartphones, and end-to-end encrypted messages that neither messaging service providers nor the government can decode—is depriving government investigators of needed evidence. This is what the FBI calls the “Going Dark” problem. For the past several years, and most recently in two speeches in March and in testimony to Congress in early May, Comey called for a solution to that problem. Privacy and security advocates fear that the FBI’s preferred solution may end up being a wrong-headed legislative mandate requiring providers to ensure some sort of exceptional technical access to encrypted data for government—what opponents (like me) would call a “backdoor”—or otherwise ensure that they do not deploy any encryption that they themselves cannot decrypt. I won’t bother repeating here the many arguments why such a mandate would be bad for America’s cybersecurity and economic security, as well as the civil and human rights of people around the world, nor why it would be mostly useless at preventing bad guys from using encryption if they want to; see here for arguments that I and my organization Open Technology Institute have previously made. Recently in Slate I responded to Comey’s repeated calls for an “adult conversation” on this seemingly endless debate. I replied that an “adult conversation” means moving past any discussion of discouraging or undermining the deployment of unbreakable encryption, in light of the broad consensus outside of the FBI that such a move would be dangerously bad policy. Rather than continuing to argue about whether or how we might force encryption technology to adapt to law enforcement’s needs, our time would be better spent focusing on how we can help law enforcement adapt to the technology. This was essentially the same conclusion of the House of Representatives working group that examined the encryption issue last year. In its report at the end of 2016, members of that working group—including the chair and ranking members of both the House Judiciary and Commerce committees—concluded that undermining encryption was bad policy, and that we should instead focus on other pathways by which the government can get the information it needs for its investigations. I wholeheartedly agree. There is no single answer to law enforcement’s Going Dark concerns, but here I outline three potential courses of action that should form the focus of the debate. I expect that a broad selection of privacy advocates, internet companies, security experts, and a range of other pro-encryption stakeholders inside and outside of government are willing to discuss and debate in good faith these three ideas about how law enforcement can adapt to the spread of encryption, if we can stop wasting time arguing about the wisdom of having unbreakable encryption at all. Of course, there are aspects of these three conversations that will be difficult or unpleasant for all of these stakeholders, as well as the government. But I take that as a sign that I’m on the right track, as per the old saying: a good compromise leaves all parties equally dissatisfied. 1. Establish Rules of the Road for Government Hacking and Vulnerability Disclosure When the government can’t unlock an encrypted phone or intercept an encrypted text message, hacking into the phone is one way to get around the encryption problem (as the San Bernardino iPhone case demonstrated). However, there are still no clear rules for the government to follow when it wants to use a zero-day vulnerability to hack into a phone it has seized, or when it wants to secretly hack into a phone remotely to read messages in the phone’s storage that it couldn’t read in transit due to end-to-end encryption. Congress can and should change that. As the House report indicated, Congress should consider creating a legal framework to answer those questions. In particular, as suggested by privacy-minded groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Congress could craft a statute that governs legal hacking much like the federal wiretapping statute or “Title III” regulates electronic eavesdropping. Congress could also consider whether and how to codify the current White House-led “Vulnerabilities Equities Process” that dictates when the government can hold on to previously unknown software vulnerabilities for its own use versus disclosing those vulnerabilities so they can be fixed. The Open Technology Institute has held events and written papers that discuss both of these options but there’s only so far we can take those ideas when we know so little about the government’s actual activities. Congress should hold hearings to collect basic knowledge about what the government’s current practices and capabilities look like before making any decisions. As the House Report pointed out and FBI Director Comey repeated in his May testimony, law enforcement doesn’t consider lawful hacking alone to be an adequate solution to the encryption challenge, since it can be a time- and resource-intensive tactic that won’t always scale to meet investigative needs, especially for state and local law enforcement. This is certainly true to some extent—lawful hacking will always be more difficult and resource-intensive for law enforcement than bluntly demanding backdoors for all messaging systems. That’s actually one of the reasons why some privacy advocates have argued expressly in favor of lawful hacking, as a targeted alternative to such broad capability mandates. But the objection that hacking will never give law enforcement as much access as would a backdoor into or a ban on user-controlled encryption misunderstands the problem we’re trying to solve. The societal goal here is not to ensure that law enforcement can access every piece of data it might ever seek, but that it can get enough information to do its job, and hacking is certainly a part of the solution. How big a part it might play is not a question that we should just take the FBI’s word on. Rather, focused dialogue in Congress—through public hearings—is the best way to obtain the information necessary to evaluate how well hacking can address the Going Dark concern. Law enforcement is not likely to welcome with open arms any brand-new legislative constraints on its ability to secretly hack into suspects’ computers or stockpile vulnerabilities for such hacking, when it has been conducting these activities with little guidance or restriction from Congress for nearly twenty years. However, clear statutory rules guided by the same Fourth Amendment principles that informed the wiretap statute would provide the police officer and the prosecutor with something they lack right now, which is some level of legal certainty—and clear endorsement of the practice, when paired with appropriate checks and balances—directly from Congress. The idea of such an endorsement makes some privacy advocates nervous, both because this kind of hacking relies at least sometimes on zero-day (previously unknown) software vulnerabilities that they would prefer to see disclosed and patched, and because it raises a wide variety of novel privacy and security risks. But again, the government has already been conducting remote computer intrusions at least since the turn of the century and Congress has so far shown no inclination to prohibit it; indeed, Congress recently helped clear the path for more hacking by allowing a procedural rule change that lets police remotely hack computers without knowing their location. That said, if anyone seriously expects that Congress might consider banning government hacking outright, they should also share the initial goal of getting Congress to hold hearings so as to better understand how the government is using hacking now. In the meantime, as unbreakable encryption proliferates, so too will government hacking necessarily increase, whether advocates like it or not. Therefore there’s little to lose and much to gain if Congress affirmatively regulates when and how the government gets to hack, along with when and how it gets to keep software vulnerabilities secret instead of disclosing them. Such a statute would help constrain and minimize the privacy and security harms that stem from the government’s hacking activities without foreclosing constitutional arguments that litigators might raise against the practice. Indeed, it may be even easier to raise such challenges once the government’s practices have been exposed to greater scrutiny and codified.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The plan solves.</h4><p>Kevin<strong> Bankston 17</strong>, Director of New America’s Open Technology Institute, JD from USC, nonresidential fellow at Stanford Law School’s Center for Internet & Society, Justice Brennan First Amendment Fellow at the ACLU, 6-14-2017, “Ending The Endless Crypto Debate: Three Things We Should Be Arguing About Instead of Encryption Backdoors,” https://www.lawfareblog.com/ending-endless-crypto-debate-three-things-we-should-be-arguing-about-instead-encryption-backdoors/ //SIR </p><p>First, to very briefly summarize a long-running debate: until he was dismissed in May, FBI Director <u>Comey had been <strong>arguing</u></strong> <u>since 2014 that the growing <strong>prevalence</u></strong> <u>of <strong>encryption</u></strong>—in particular, default encryption on some smartphones, and end-to-end encrypted messages that neither messaging service providers nor the government can decode—<u>is <strong>depriving</u></strong> government <u>investigators of needed <strong>evidence</u></strong>. <u>This is what the FBI calls the “<strong>Going Dark</u></strong>” <u>problem</u>. <u>For</u> the past <u><strong>several years</u></strong>, and most recently in two speeches in March and in testimony to Congress in early May, <u>Comey called for a <strong>solution</u></strong> <u>to that</u> problem. Privacy and security <u>advocates fear that <mark>the</mark> FBI’s <strong><mark>preferred solution</u></strong> <u>may</mark> end up <mark>be</mark>ing a <strong>wrong-headed</u></strong> legislative <u><strong>mandate</u></strong> <u>requiring providers to <strong>ensure</u></strong> some sort of <u><strong><mark>exceptional</u></strong></mark> technical <u><strong><mark>access</u></strong></mark> <u>to encrypted data for government</u>—what opponents (like me) would call <u>a “<strong>backdoor</u></strong>”—<u>or otherwise <strong>ensure</u></strong> <u>that they <strong>do not deploy</strong> any encryption that they themselves</u> <u><strong>cannot decrypt</u></strong>. I won’t bother repeating here the many arguments why such a mandate would be bad for America’s cybersecurity and economic security, as well as the civil and human rights of people around the world, nor why it would be mostly useless at preventing bad guys from using encryption if they want to; see here for arguments that I and my organization Open Technology Institute have previously made.</p><p>Recently in Slate I responded to Comey’s repeated calls for an “adult conversation” on this seemingly endless debate. I replied that an “adult conversation” means moving past any discussion of discouraging or undermining the deployment of unbreakable encryption, in light of the broad consensus outside of the FBI that such a move would be dangerously bad policy. Rather than continuing to argue about whether or how we might force encryption technology to adapt to law enforcement’s needs, <u>our time would be <strong>better spent</strong> focusing on how we can <strong>help</u></strong> <u><strong>law enforcement</u></strong> <u><strong>adapt</u></strong> to the technology. <u>This was</u> essentially <u>the <strong>same conclusion</u></strong> <u>of the House</u> of Representatives <u>working group</u> that examined the encryption issue last year. In its report at the end of 2016, members of that working group—including the chair and ranking members of both the House Judiciary and Commerce committees—concluded that undermining encryption was bad policy, and that we should instead focus on other pathways by which the government can get the information it needs for its investigations.</p><p><u>I wholeheartedly agree. There is no single answer to law enforcement’s Going Dark concerns, but here I outline three potential courses of action that should form the focus of the debate. I expect that a broad selection of privacy advocates, internet companies, security experts, and a range of other pro-encryption stakeholders inside and outside of government are willing to discuss and debate in good faith these three ideas about how law enforcement can adapt to the spread of encryption, if we can stop wasting time arguing about the wisdom of having unbreakable encryption at all. Of course, there are aspects of these three conversations that will be difficult or unpleasant for all of these stakeholders, as well as the government. But I take that as a sign that I’m on the right track, as per the old saying: a good compromise leaves all parties equally dissatisfied.</p><p></u>1. <u><mark>Establish</mark> <strong><mark>Rules</mark> of the Road</u></strong> <u><mark>for</u></mark> <u><strong>Government <mark>Hacking</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>and <strong>Vulnerability Disclosure</p><p></u></strong></mark>When the government can’t unlock an encrypted phone or intercept an encrypted text message, hacking into the phone is one way to get around the encryption problem (as the San Bernardino iPhone case demonstrated). However, <u><mark>there are</u></mark> still <u><strong><mark>no clear rules</u></strong></mark> <u>for the government to follow</u> <u>when it wants to use a</u> zero-day <u><strong>vulnerability</u></strong> <u>to <strong>hack</u></strong> into a phone it has seized, or when it wants to secretly hack into a phone remotely to read messages in the phone’s storage that it couldn’t read in transit due to end-to-end encryption. <u><mark>Congress</mark> <strong>can</strong> and <strong><mark>should change that</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>As the House report indicated, <u>Congress should</u> consider <u>creating a <strong>legal framework</u></strong> to answer those questions. In particular, as suggested by privacy-minded groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, <u>Congress could <mark>craft a statute that</mark> <strong><mark>governs</u></strong></mark> legal <u><strong><mark>hacking</u></strong></mark> much <u><mark>like</mark> the federal <strong>wiretapping statute</u></strong> <u>or</u> “<u><strong><mark>Title III</u></strong></mark>” regulates electronic eavesdropping. Congress could also consider whether and how to codify the current White House-led “Vulnerabilities Equities Process” that dictates when the government can hold on to previously unknown software vulnerabilities for its own use versus disclosing those vulnerabilities so they can be fixed. The Open Technology Institute has held events and written papers that discuss both of these options but there’s only so far we can take those ideas when we know so little about the government’s actual activities. Congress should hold hearings to collect basic knowledge about what the government’s current practices and capabilities look like before making any decisions.</p><p>As the House Report pointed out and FBI Director Comey repeated in his May testimony, law enforcement doesn’t consider lawful hacking alone to be an adequate solution to the encryption challenge, since it can be a time- and resource-intensive tactic that won’t always scale to meet investigative needs, especially for state and local law enforcement. This is certainly true to some extent—lawful hacking will always be more difficult and resource-intensive for law enforcement than bluntly demanding backdoors for all messaging systems. That’s actually one of the reasons why some privacy advocates have argued expressly in favor of lawful hacking, as a targeted alternative to such broad capability mandates.</p><p>But the objection that hacking will never give law enforcement as much access as would a backdoor into or a ban on user-controlled encryption misunderstands the problem we’re trying to solve. <u>The societal goal</u> here <u>is</u> not <u><mark>to</mark> <mark>ensure</u></mark> that <u><mark>law enforcement</u></mark> can access every piece of data it might ever seek, but that <u>it <mark>can get</mark> <strong>enough <mark>info</strong></mark>rmation</u> <u><mark>to <strong>do its job</u></strong></mark>, <u>and <mark>hacking</mark> <mark>is</u></mark> <u><strong>certainly</u></strong> a part of <u><strong><mark>the solution</u></strong></mark>. How big a part it might play is not a question that we should just take the FBI’s word on. Rather, focused dialogue in Congress—through public hearings—is the best way to obtain the information necessary to evaluate how well hacking can address the Going Dark concern.</p><p>Law enforcement is not likely to welcome with open arms any brand-new legislative constraints on its ability to secretly hack into suspects’ computers or stockpile vulnerabilities for such hacking, when it has been conducting these activities with little guidance or restriction from Congress for nearly twenty years. However, <u><mark>clear statutory rules</mark> guided by</u> the same <u><strong>Fourth Amendment</u></strong> principles that informed the wiretap statute <u><mark>would provide</mark> the <strong><mark>police</u></strong></mark> officer <u>and</u> the <u><strong>prosecutor</u></strong> <u><mark>with</mark> something they <strong>lack</u></strong> right now, <u>which is</u> some level of <u><strong>legal <mark>certainty</u></strong></mark>—<u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>clear endorsement</u></strong></mark> <u>of the practice, when <mark>paired with</mark> appropriate <strong>checks and <mark>balances</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>directly <mark>from Congress</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>The idea of such an endorsement makes some privacy advocates nervous, both because this kind of hacking relies at least sometimes on zero-day (previously unknown) software vulnerabilities that they would prefer to see disclosed and patched, and because it raises a wide variety of novel privacy and security risks. But again, <u>the government has <strong>already</u></strong> <u>been conducting <strong>remote</u></strong> computer <u><strong>intrusions</u></strong> at least <u>since <strong>the turn of the century</u></strong> <u>and Congress has</u> so far <u>shown <strong>no inclination</u></strong> <u>to prohibit it</u>; indeed, Congress recently helped clear the path for more hacking by allowing a procedural rule change that lets police remotely hack computers without knowing their location. That said, if anyone seriously expects that Congress might consider banning government hacking outright, they should also share the initial goal of getting Congress to hold hearings so as to better understand how the government is using hacking now.</p><p>In the meantime, as unbreakable encryption proliferates, so too will government hacking necessarily increase, whether advocates like it or not. Therefore <u><mark>there’s</mark> <strong>little to lose</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong><mark>much to gain</u></strong> <u>if Congress</mark> <mark>affirmatively</u> <u><strong>regulates</u></strong></mark> <u>when and how the government</u> <u><strong>gets to hack</u></strong>, along with when and how it gets to keep software vulnerabilities secret instead of disclosing them. <u>Such a statute would help <strong>constrain</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>minimize</u></strong> <u>the</u> privacy and security <u>harms that <strong>stem</u></strong> <u>from</u> the government’s <u>hacking</u> activities without foreclosing constitutional arguments that litigators might raise against the practice. Indeed, <u>it may be</u> even <u><strong>easier</u></strong> <u>to raise</u> such <u>challenges once the government’s practices</u> <u>have been <strong>exposed</u></strong> <u>to</u> greater <u><strong>scrutiny and codified</u></strong>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Deer 16, [Professor Sarah Deer, Department of Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, University of K], (01-01-2016, "The Beginning and End of Rape", https://muse.jhu.edu/book/42560, accessed 3-30-2020)//Snitty fulltext: Engaging with federal legislative reform efforts can be an inherently risky endeavor from a tribal perspective. On a practical level, members of Congress often fail to accurately remedy identified problems, or, worse, enact new anti-sovereignty legislation, which further limits the recognition of tribal authority. This dynamic became a cogent reality in 2006, when Congress passed the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). Commonly known as the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, the legislation unfortunately ended up pitting tribal sovereignty against mainstream political efforts to require all convicted sex offenders to be tracked in a national database. While sex offender registration and notification laws seem, at first glance, to be benevolent, serious due process concerns have arisen in response to such legislation—and there is no clear evidence that such laws effectively prevent sex crimes. But the tribal connection to SORNA became even more complicated. The 2006 SORNA legislation raised fundamental concerns about sovereignty because it unilaterally authorized states to exercise civil regulatory authority (to register and track offenders) in Indian country, extending state authority into an unprecedented realm. Tribal leaders were not consulted about the SORNA, and the ignorance of the politicians who championed the law did not recognize the grave long-term implications of this intrusion. Tribal nations affected by PL 280 were particularly affected, as lawyers Virginia Davis and Kevin Washburn explain: Congress created state regulatory authority that had not previously existed on some Public Law 280 reservations and arguably created state criminal authority where it did not previously exist in non-PL 280 jurisdictions. For tribes in the latter category, SORNA constitutes the only delegation of authority to states on reservations, dramatically undermining 3 longstanding federal legal principles providing that Indians on reservations are subject to tribal or federal, but never state authority. SORNA imposed requirements on all tribes, not just those in PL 280 states. Tribal nations were forced to operate pursuant to an arbitrary time frame during which they could “assert” their sovereignty to undertake registration (with no guaranteed access to funding to make it happen). The law thus abruptly started the clock before most tribal leaders knew it existed. Tribal leaders had to scramble to preserve their nations’ sovereignty. This means that tribes had to develop fully compliant sex offender laws and accompanying infrastructure to implement them—and some of these tribal governments had never even prosecuted rape in their contemporary systems. Objection to the law put tribal leaders and advocates in the uncomfortable position of challenging a law that was, on the surface, intended to protect innocent children from sexual predators (and had a great deal of bipartisan political support). When tribal leaders resisted state regulatory authority based on the precedent it could establish in other realms, some journalists unfairly characterized tribes as providing jurisdictional “shields” for sex offenders. Moreover, tribal governments that had not actively been prosecuting rape were suddenly tasked with creating a sophisticated computerized registration system or surrender such authority (presumably forever) to state governments. Registries and civil commitment (in which sex offenders who have served their punitive sentences in prison are remanded by the state, sometimes indefinitely, because the state believes they are still a threat) have fallen out of favor with many victim advocates and social change organizations. Registration and civil commitment laws actually run counter to most feminist theories, because they are inspired by the stereotypical “real rape” scenario that feminists have fought so hard to challenge. In truth, sex offender registration and notification laws were developed as a conservative political response to sexual abuse as experienced by white children who were assaulted by strangers—harking back to a day when the legal definition of rape required victims to be innocent and chaste to be worthy of protection. There is little evidence that registration and commitment laws are effective. Most rapists are never caught and prosecuted and so do not appear on these lists. The legacy of SORNA should give pause to those who expect that engaging with the federal government will lead to tribal-centric solutions. And it leads me to ask a difficult question. Do tribal nations compromise or weaken their own sovereignty by the mere process of seeking federal legislative reform? I recognize a fundamental problem with federal law reform, because it requires a tribe to petition the colonizing government to ask for help for a problem that the colonizer created, to ask for a solution that will be on the colonizer’s terms. The federal government is the source of the problem, so why would we expect it to be the source of the solution? Depending on a foreign government, especially a government established and created by colonizers, is not the solution to violent crimes committed upon Native women. Yet tribes find themselves in a catch-22. As the AWA/SORNA fiasco demonstrates, failing to engage with the federal system can be dangerous because Congress may pass laws that infringe on tribal sovereignty without consulting or even considering the sovereignty of tribal nations. One school of thought to undoing this catch-22 argues that the federal government can never hold the answers. That it is simply a waste of time to fight for sovereignty in the halls of Congress. One could argue that energy might be better spent in building strong communities and tribal nations, revitalizing traditions and languages and focusing on elders, children, and those with disabilities and other special needs. In addition, engaging with the federal government may signal a form of surrender to federal dominion over tribal nations. Is it the same as consenting to jurisdiction in a courtroom? We show up; therefore we agree with the framework? The legislative process itself can be patronizing and paternalistic. A case in point: the tribal provisions of the 2013 VAWA were initially introduced by Senator Daniel Akaka (D–Hawai’i] as the “SAVE Native Women Act” (the Stand Against Violence and Empower Native Women Act). I have no doubt that Senator Akaka was well intentioned, but the presentation of the legislation left much to be desired. Native women do not need to be “saved” by Senator Akaka, or any federal government official for that matter. We are saving ourselves. Another fundamental challenge with federal reform is the risk of increasing federal presence and punishment on tribal lands. Both laws that I discuss in this chapter provide for more punitive measures in federal and tribal court, which may continue to feed into the cycle of high incarceration rates. The activism and scholarship of feminists of color have been particularly instructive with regards to critiquing the direction federal reform has on social justice issues generally. Any federal legislation, by definition, institutionalizes and endorses the United States as a protector of women—and this is a cession that some are not willing to make. Contemporary Realities: The Argument for Engagement Despite the potential downsides to federal reform, the damage done to sovereignty today is done largely through rape. Any legitimate efforts to address this systemic crisis and provide justice and support for victims is worth considering, including partnerships with neighboring jurisdictions to ensure that rape victims have access to justice. I realize that this is a provocative claim, because there are many threats to tribal existence. But use of rape is widespread and is intended to terrorize and destroy the psyche of communities. Rape is more of a fundamental threat to self-determination of tribal nations than the drawbacks federal reform could ever be. Rape and child sexual abuse are directly related to most of the social challenges tribal nations face, and when people are hurting, they cannot effectively govern themselves or provide guidance and support for the children in the community. Legal scholar and Grand Traverse citizen Matthew L. M. Fletcher reminds us that “tribal sovereignty is not a claim to power and authority for their own sake, but a tool to preserve the culture and traditions of Indian people.” The damage being done to sovereignty through sexual violence is so deep and significant that other tribal sovereignty efforts will continue to fail because people are hurting. Western medicine has finally confirmed what many Native people have known for centuries—that psychological trauma is directly linked to long7 term physical health problems. A long-range multifaceted study commonly referred to as ACEs (Adverse Childhood Experience) has provided the evidence that Native spiritual healers and medicine people have known for millennia—namely, that there is no formal separation between mind and body; trauma affects not just psychological but physical well-being. The ACEs study has helped Western medicine understand that experiencing abuse is correlated with long-term chronic health problems that Western medicine has long dismissed as biologically unrelated. The long-term health problems ACEs has linked to childhood trauma are all elevated in tribal communities, including heart disease, diabetes, obesity, and liver disease. The study shows that such health consequences are elevated for trauma victims—even controlling for external factors such as cigarette smoking. The authors also note that many of our most intractable public health problems are the result of attempted personal solutions to problems caused by traumatic childhood experiences, which are lost in time and concealed by shame, secrecy, and social taboo against the exploration of certain topics. Social harms, such as suicide and addiction, also have a direct connection to trauma. Chronic health conditions such as diabetes and obesity can be triggered or aggravated by unresolved psychological trauma. Many survivors of child sexual abuse have described a phenomenon of wanting to be sexually unattractive to avoid attention from predators—leading to eating disorders and agoraphobia. This philosophy is illustrated by training materials from several Native organizations—sustaining strong nations is simply not possible when most of the women in your community have been denied justice. Challenges with the Scope of Federal Reform Once a decision has been made to engage with federal reform, the next question invariably becomes “what can we politically accomplish” as opposed to “what is truly needed?” Are incremental changes enough? It is a fantasy, for example, to think that Congress will completely decolonize Indian law overnight. Politically, it is not possible to impose such a radical departureand recognize tribal nations as sovereign entities with no restrictions in one fell swoop. The incremental changes may seem frustrating, but also offer hope that Native voices have been heard. I do not believe those of us who advocate for federal reform are under the impression that the Violence Against Women Act and the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 are the ultimate solutions to ending rape in tribal nations. Federal legal reform is only a small aspect in legal reform for tribal nations. So TLOA and VAWA, and laws to come, are and should be the subject of rigorous debate and intensive critique. The American government nearly destroyed tribal legal systems and replaced them with substandard systems that were designed to control Native people; not respect them. Little wonder that many tribal leaders are skeptical of federal efforts to improve the lives of Native people. Organizations like the National Congress of American Indians and several tribal embassies in Washington, D.C., have established a physical presence in the nation’s capital. It is becoming more and more difficult for Congress to move on legislation without hearing from at least one tribal organization about concerns. This was not the case until very recently, so perhaps the successes of TLOA and VAWA are a window into the future.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Only policy change solves the Native rape crisis and takes out the <u>largest threat</u> to self-determination—critiques of incrementalism <u>cement</u> the status quo. </h4><p><strong>Deer 16,<u></strong> [Professor Sarah Deer, Department of Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, University of K], (01-01-2016, "The Beginning and End of Rape", https://muse.jhu.edu/book/42560, accessed 3-30-2020)//Snitty</p><p><mark>Engaging with</mark> federal legislative <mark>reform</mark> efforts <mark>can be</mark> an inherently <mark>risky</mark> endeavor from a tribal perspective.</u> On a practical level, members of <u>Congress often fail to accurately remedy identified problems, or, worse, enact new anti-sovereignty legislation, which further limits the recognition of tribal authority.</u> This dynamic became a cogent reality in 2006, when Congress passed the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). Commonly known as the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act<u>, the legislation unfortunately ended up pitting tribal sovereignty against mainstream political efforts to require all convicted sex offenders to be tracked in a national database. </u>While sex offender registration and notification laws seem, at first glance, to be benevolent, serious due process concerns have arisen in response to such legislation—and there is no clear evidence that such laws effectively prevent sex crimes. But the tribal connection to SORNA became even more complicated. <u>The 2006 SORNA legislation raised fundamental concerns about sovereignty because it unilaterally authorized states to exercise civil regulatory authority (to register and track offenders) in Indian country, extending state authority into an unprecedented realm.</u> Tribal leaders were not consulted about the SORNA, and the ignorance of the politicians who championed the law did not recognize the grave long-term implications of this intrusion. Tribal nations affected by PL 280 were particularly affected, as lawyers Virginia Davis and Kevin Washburn explain: Congress created state regulatory authority that had not previously existed on some Public Law 280 reservations and arguably created state criminal authority where it did not previously exist in non-PL 280 jurisdictions. For tribes in the latter category, <u>SORNA constitutes the only delegation of authority to states on reservations, dramatically undermining 3 longstanding federal legal principles providing that Indians on reservations are subject to tribal or federal, but never state authority.</u> SORNA imposed requirements on all tribes, not just those in PL 280 states. Tribal nations were forced to operate pursuant to an arbitrary time frame during which they could “assert” their sovereignty to undertake registration (with no guaranteed access to funding to make it happen). <u>The law thus abruptly started the clock before most tribal leaders knew it existed. Tribal leaders had to scramble to preserve their nations’ sovereignty. This means that tribes had to develop fully compliant sex offender laws and accompanying infrastructure to implement them—and some of these tribal governments had never even prosecuted rape in their contemporary systems.</u> <u><strong>Objection to the law put tribal leaders</strong> and advocates <strong>in the uncomfortable position</strong> of challenging a law that was, on the surface, intended to protect innocent children from sexual predators (and had a great deal of bipartisan political support).</u> <u>When tribal leaders resisted state regulatory authority based on the precedent it could establish in other realms, some journalists unfairly characterized tribes as providing jurisdictional “shields” for sex offenders.</u> Moreover, tribal governments that had not actively been prosecuting rape were suddenly tasked with creating a sophisticated computerized registration system or surrender such authority (presumably forever) to state governments. Registries and civil commitment (in which sex offenders who have served their punitive sentences in prison are remanded by the state, sometimes indefinitely, because the state believes they are still a threat) have fallen out of favor with many victim advocates and social change organizations. Registration and civil commitment laws actually run counter to most feminist theories, because they are inspired by the stereotypical “real rape” scenario that feminists have fought so hard to challenge. In truth, sex offender registration and notification laws were developed as a conservative political response to sexual abuse as experienced by white children who were assaulted by strangers—harking back to a day when the legal definition of rape required victims to be innocent and chaste to be worthy of protection. There is little evidence that registration and commitment laws are effective. Most rapists are never caught and prosecuted and so do not appear on these lists. <u>The legacy of SORNA should give pause to those who expect that engaging with the federal government will lead to tribal-centric solutions. And it leads me to ask a difficult question. Do tribal nations compromise or weaken their own sovereignty by the mere process of seeking federal legislative reform? I recognize a fundamental problem with federal law reform</u>, because it requires a tribe to petition the colonizing government to ask for help for a problem that the colonizer created, to ask for a solution that will be on the colonizer’s terms. The federal government is the source of the problem, so why would we expect it to be the source of the solution? <u>Depending on a foreign government, especially a government established and created by colonizers, is not the solution to violent crimes committed upon Native women.</u> <u><strong>Yet tribes find themselves in a catch-22.</u></strong> <u>As the AWA/SORNA fiasco demonstrates<mark>, <strong>failing to engage </mark>with the federal system <mark>can be dangerous</u></strong></mark> <u>because <mark>Congress may</u> <u><strong>pass laws that infringe on tribal sovereignty</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>without consulting</mark> or even considering the sovereignty of tribal <mark>nations</mark>.</u> One school of thought to undoing this catch-22 argues that the federal government can never hold the answers. That it is simply a waste of time to fight for sovereignty in the halls of Congress. One could argue that energy might be better spent in building strong communities and tribal nations, revitalizing traditions and languages and focusing on elders, children, and those with disabilities and other special needs. In addition, engaging with the federal government may signal a form of surrender to federal dominion over tribal nations. Is it the same as consenting to jurisdiction in a courtroom? We show up; therefore we agree with the framework? The legislative process itself can be patronizing and paternalistic. A case in point: the tribal provisions of the 2013 VAWA were initially introduced by Senator Daniel Akaka (D–Hawai’i] as the “SAVE Native Women Act” (the Stand Against Violence and Empower Native Women Act). I have no doubt that Senator Akaka was well intentioned, but the presentation of the legislation left much to be desired. Native women do not need to be “saved” by Senator Akaka, or any federal government official for that matter. We are saving ourselves. Another fundamental challenge with federal reform is the risk of increasing federal presence and punishment on tribal lands. Both laws that I discuss in this chapter provide for more punitive measures in federal and tribal court, which may continue to feed into the cycle of high incarceration rates. The activism and scholarship of feminists of color have been particularly instructive with regards to critiquing the direction federal reform has on social justice issues generally. Any federal legislation, by definition, institutionalizes and endorses the United States as a protector of women—and this is a cession that some are not willing to make. <u>Contemporary Realities: The Argument for Engagement Despite the potential downsides to federal reform, the <mark>damage done to sovereignty </mark>today <mark>is done </mark>largely <mark>through rape</mark>. <strong><mark>Any</mark> <mark>legitimate efforts to address this</mark> systemic <mark>crisis</u></strong></mark> <u>and provide justice and support for victims</u> <u><strong><mark>is worth considering</mark>,</u></strong> <u>including partnerships with neighboring jurisdictions to ensure that rape victims have access to justice. I realize that this is a provocative claim, because there are many threats to tribal existence</u>. <u>But use of</u> <u><strong><mark>rape</strong> is</mark> widespread and <strong>is <mark>intended to </mark>terrorize and <mark>destroy the psyche of communities</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Rape is more of a </mark>fundamental <mark>threat to self-determination</mark> of tribal nations <mark>than </mark>the drawbacks federal <mark>reform could ever be</mark>. Rape and child sexual abuse are directly related to most of the social challenges tribal nations face, and when people are hurting, they cannot effectively govern themselves or provide guidance and support for the children in the community.</u> Legal scholar and Grand Traverse citizen Matthew L. M. Fletcher reminds us that “<u>tribal <mark>sovereignty is </mark>not a claim to power and authority for their own sake, but <mark>a tool to preserve </mark>the <mark>culture </mark>and traditions of Indian people.” <mark>The damage being done </mark>to sovereignty <mark>through sexual violence is so deep</mark> and significant <mark>that other </mark>tribal sovereignty <mark>efforts will</mark> continue to <mark>fail </mark>because people are hurting.</u> Western medicine has finally confirmed what many Native people have known for centuries—that psychological trauma is directly linked to long7 term physical health problems. A long-range multifaceted study commonly referred to as ACEs (Adverse Childhood Experience) has provided the evidence that Native spiritual healers and medicine people have known for millennia—namely, that there is no formal separation between mind and body; trauma affects not just psychological but physical well-being. The ACEs study has helped Western medicine understand that experiencing abuse is correlated with long-term chronic health problems that Western medicine has long dismissed as biologically unrelated. <u>The long-term health problems ACEs has linked to childhood trauma are all elevated in tribal communities, including heart disease, diabetes, obesity, and liver disease. The study shows that such health consequences are elevated for trauma victims—even controlling for external factors such as cigarette smoking. The authors also note that many of our most intractable public health problems are the result of attempted personal solutions to problems caused by traumatic childhood experiences, which are lost in time and concealed by shame, secrecy, and social taboo against the exploration of certain topics. Social harms, such as suicide and addiction, also have a direct connection to trauma. Chronic health conditions such as diabetes and obesity can be triggered or aggravated by unresolved psychological trauma. Many survivors of child sexual abuse have described a phenomenon of wanting to be sexually unattractive to avoid attention from predators—leading to eating disorders and agoraphobia.</u> This philosophy is illustrated by training materials from several Native organizations—sustaining strong nations is simply not possible when most of the women in your community have been denied justice. <u>Challenges with the Scope of Federal Reform Once a decision has been made to engage with federal reform, the next question invariably becomes “what can we politically accomplish” as opposed to “what is truly needed?” Are incremental changes enough?</u> <u><strong><mark>It is a fantasy</u></strong></mark>, <u>for example,</u> <u><strong><mark>to think that Congress will</mark> completely <mark>decolonize Indian law overnight</u></strong></mark>. <u>Politically, it is not possible to impose such a radical departureand recognize tribal nations as sovereign entities with no restrictions in one fell swoop.</u> <u>The <mark>incremental changes</mark> may seem frustrating, but also <mark>offer hope</mark> that Native voices have been heard</u>. I do not believe those of us who advocate for federal reform are under the impression that the Violence Against Women Act and the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 are the ultimate solutions to ending rape in tribal nations. <u>Federal legal reform is only a small aspect in legal reform for tribal nations. <mark>So TLOA and VAWA</mark>, and laws to come, are and <mark>should be</mark> the <mark>subject of</mark> rigorous debate and <mark>intensive critique</mark>.</u> The American government nearly destroyed tribal legal systems and replaced them with substandard systems that were designed to control Native people; not respect them. Little wonder that many tribal leaders are skeptical of federal efforts to improve the lives of Native people. Organizations like the National Congress of American Indians and several tribal embassies in Washington, D.C., have established a physical presence in the nation’s capital. <u>It is becoming more and more difficult for Congress to move on legislation without hearing from at least one tribal organization about concerns. This was not the case until very recently, so perhaps the successes of TLOA and VAWA are a window into the future.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Robert Ayson, 6-21-2010, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism vol. 33(7), pg. 571-593, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2010.483756?journalCode=uter20. ZKMSU fulltext: A Catalytic Response: Dragging in the Major Nuclear Powers A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important ... some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ ... long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure?<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Russia presumes the worst – extinction</h4><p>Robert <strong>Ayson</strong>, 6-21-<strong>2010</strong>, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism vol. 33(7), pg. 571-593, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2010.483756?journalCode=uter20. ZKMSU</p><p>A Catalytic Response: Dragging in the Major Nuclear Powers A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, <u>there are reasons to wonder whether <mark>nuc</mark>lear <mark>terror</mark>ism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of <mark>truly existential</mark> threats</u>. <u><strong>A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange</u></strong> between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. <u>Even the worst terrorism</u> that the twenty-first century might bring <u>would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war</u> would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. <u><strong>But <mark>these two nuclear worlds</u></strong></mark>—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—<u><strong><mark>are not</u></strong></mark> necessarily <u><strong><mark>separable</u></strong></mark>. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of <u><strong>nuclear terrorism</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>could </mark>precipitate a chain of events <mark>lead</mark>ing<mark> to </mark>a massive <mark>exchange of nuclear weapons</mark> between two or more of the states that possess them</u></strong>. In this context, today’s and <u>tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war</u> between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important ... some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, <u>if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension</u> in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, <u><strong>would officials and political <mark>leaders</mark> not be tempted to <mark>assume the worst</mark>?</u></strong> Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur <u><mark>in Russia</u></mark> or China <u><mark>during</mark> a period of <mark>heightened tension</mark> or even limited conflict</u> with the United States, <u><strong>could<mark> Moscow</u></strong></mark> and Beijing <u><strong>resist the pressures that might rise domestically<mark> to consider the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates as <mark>a</mark> possible <mark>perpetrator</mark> or encourager of the attack?</u></strong> Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China <u><mark>might</mark> mistakenly <mark>read</mark> this <mark>as</mark> a sign of U.S. <mark>intent</mark>ions<mark> to use</mark> force</u> (and possibly <u><mark>nuclear force</u></mark>) <u>against them</u>. In that situation, <u><strong>the <mark>temptations to preempt </mark>such actions might <mark>grow</u></strong></mark>, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that <u>some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with</u> what Allison claims is the “<u><strong><mark>Chechen insurgents’</u></strong> ... <u><strong>long-standing interest in</mark> all things <mark>nuclear</mark>.”</u></strong>42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. <u>Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo</u>, <u><strong>is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism</u></strong>. <u>In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert</u> and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure?</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Vitalis ’15 [Robert Vitalis received his Ph.D. in political science from MIT in 1989. His graduate work included a three-year residence in Cairo where he studied Arabic and researched the political strategies of Egyptian business firms. His first book, When Capitalists Collide: Business Conflict and the End of Empire in Egypt, was published in 1995.  The Organization of American Historians awarded him the Bernath Prize in 1996 for his work on Egypt's political economy. He has continued to develop and expand the scope of his interests in historical comparative analysis in his second book, America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier, which was published in October 2006 by Stanford University Press, and named a book of the year in the London Guardian.  Recent honors include fellowships from the Woodrow Wilson International Center (2009), the Rockefeller Foundation (2003), the International Center for Advanced Study, NYU (2002), and the American Council of Learned Societies (2002). He was a MacArthur Award nominee in 1998. His new book project, White World Order, Black Power Politics: the Birth of American International Relations (Cornell University Press, 2015), moves away from the Middle East to explore the unwritten history of disciplinary international relations and to recover the African-American internationalist tradition. White World Order, Black Power Politics: the Birth of American International Relations. Cornell University Press, 2015. pp. 5-8.] fulltext: International Relations 101: The problem, we now know in large part thanks to historians and sociologists of science, is that scholars reliably produce unreliable accounts of the past of their own fields.14 International relations is no exception.15 American schoolchildren learn the story of the midnight ride of Paul Revere together with any number of other myths about “the nation’s origins, achievements, and destiny.”16 Such myths function to produce a common consciousness and obscure the existence of hierarchy. The practitioner histories of international relations in the United States do roughly the same thing to the same end through the socialization of graduate students in the rituals of PhD programs and through lecture courses that pass on the discipline’s invented traditions and escape from knowledge to generations of undergraduates who will be- come public intellectuals, politicians, and policymakers.  Every year thousands of undergraduates across the United States sign up for a class titled “Introduction to International Relations.” In the first week  or two they learn that three broad rival theoretical traditions vie for explana- tory primacy among specialists. The first (and it is always first) among un- equals is “realism.” The second is “liberalism” or “liberal internationalism.”  The third is “constructivism” (thirty years ago it was “neo-Marxism”), a kind of residual category that consists of various persuasions of critics on the discipline’s margins, the serious consideration of which is honored more in the breach than in the observance. For self-identified “realists,” the struggle for power among states is a law operating across space and time, one that statesmen in antiquity or their later chroniclers discovered and that their descendants discount at their (and our)  peril. Instructors might drive the lesson home for undergraduates by assigning a fragment of the History of the Peloponnesian War by Athenian general and historian Thucydides (ca. 460–395 BCE) that is known as the Melian dialogue to demonstrate the timelessness of realism’s truth about power politics: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”17 Who teaches these introductory classes? The professors at the podiums in the large lecture halls are more often than not freshly minted PhDs and new assistant professors, while those who run the small discussion sections—if the undergraduates are lucky enough to have them—are first- and second-year graduate students. An even more reliable generalization is that all those young professors and graduate students in the intro courses will be white. The key point, however, is that these professors and would-be professors have committed vast amounts of their time and energy in an intensive period of immersion in the discipline and its literature. It is any academic profession’s primary method for passing on its origin story in the guise of a canon of theories and theorists. That is, the chains of transmission of the classical beliefs from Thucydides and their transubstantiation into theories by his putative intellectual heirs come to comprise the organizing framework and content of all those intro courses, the undergraduate version a stripped-down version of what is taught to the graduate students. The new professors will design their first  stand-alone classes based on the ones for which they served as teaching as- sistants, which are based on the ones their own professors served as teaching assistants for slightly longer ago at one of the twenty to thirty research uni- versities that reproduce the professoriate (and, increasingly, produce faculty outside the tenure system) across the country. Little wonder, then, that the syllabi all tend to look the same.18 Identification of and with a tradition helps to make the discipline something more than a collection of professors and graduate students, blogs, journals, annual conventions, PhD qualifying exam reading lists, and anxieties of the moment. Just as inevitably, however, disciplining of this kind shifts one’s critical gaze away from the complicated history of the development and transmission of what more often than not are fables of origin.19  Consider a heretofore-unrecognized puzzle that emerges from the ar- chive of model syllabi, textbooks, and surveys of teaching and research in  international relations that was beginning to be compiled and published in the mid-1920s, which reflected the accumulation of knowledge under the then-new rubric for the previous ten to fifteen years.20 None of those  long-forgotten authors and advocates for recognition of a new interdisciplin- ary specialization described anything remotely like a continuous tradition traceable to the ancients. To do so would hardly have aided the legitimacy of a claim of autonomy for their new enterprise and its specialized object of knowledge. The pattern is in fact common to academic specializations of all  kinds that emerged later in the twentieth century, from art history and literary criticism to cultural anthropology and area studies.21 In the case of international relations, conditions changed after World War II. Although international relations professors continued to express anxieties in the 1950s and 1960s about the identity of field as a “real”  discipline—presidents of the 50-year-old American Political Science Asso- ciation (APSA) were still having trouble specifying precisely how their work differed from that of sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, economists, and even historians—international relations was no longer in need of defense within the postwar university. The Cold War was all the justification the discipline required. It is during this new moment of relative disciplinary security that a new cohort, in the course of seeking to establish its own hegemony,  began a process by which they elided “the historical boundary between the era of the research university and the pre-professional era.”22 The professors have not looked back since—at least not without blinders on.  Today, unaware of the history of its early decades, a new generation of specialists in international relations in the United States since the 1950s practice their craft under the sway of two entwined myths of empire. The first is the idea that the United States is not and never was (much of) an imperial power. The second is that the discipline itself has never showed much interest in the study of imperialism. The first idea is, to my thinking, an example of willful ignorance in the face of much devastating argument (and violence) to the contrary across the globe in the last half century. It is basically the academics’ version of the flag pin that all politicians now routinely attach to their lapels.23 We might agree to disagree on this point, although it would take some work to explain the seeming delusion under which an earlier generation labored. There is no disputing the mythical status of the second idea.  The authoritative version can be found in the opening pages of Columbia University political scientist Michael Doyle’s Empires (1986), where he baldly states that “mainstream” international relations showed no scholarly interest in imperialism, a point no reviewer of the book ever challenged him on.24 Like all myths, its value is not in the facts that it purports to offer but in what it tells us about experts on world affairs such as Doyle who believe it to be a valid argument about the world. Doyle’s disciplinary ancestors knew the opposite to be true about the United States and about imperialism. By “ancestors” I don’t mean the fictive ones conjured in today’s textbooks and undergraduate lectures. By ancestors I mean (and I use this identifier intentionally) the men at Princeton, Columbia, and elsewhere who founded the first international relations departments, funding committees, memorials, journals, summer institutes, research centers, conferences, and professional associations. I include those who gained the early support of the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation. The term “ancestor” includes the textbooks and model syllabi that identified and tried to draw boundaries around the new field for the first time in the years before and after World War I and those who went on the radio and wrote in the mass circulation magazines and newspapers to disseminate its scientific findings.25 By “ancestor” I mean the whole system of intellectual,  professional, and institutional production that has made international relations what it is today, including how international relations is taught in those introductory courses that pass the rudiments of the discipline on to the next generation of scholars, opinion makers, and policy professionals.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>The foundational myths of IR are flawed and reproduce dangerous narratives about empire – you should be skeptical of any epistemology that starts with the idea that the world order is fundamentally chaotic – it is instead ordered by imperial power</h4><p>Vitalis ’15 </strong>[Robert Vitalis received his Ph.D. in political science from MIT in 1989. His graduate work included a three-year residence in Cairo where he studied Arabic and researched the political strategies of Egyptian business firms. His first book, When Capitalists Collide: Business Conflict and the End of Empire in Egypt, was published in 1995.  The Organization of American Historians awarded him the Bernath Prize in 1996 for his work on Egypt's political economy. He has continued to develop and expand the scope of his interests in historical comparative analysis in his second book, America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier, which was published in October 2006 by Stanford University Press, and named a book of the year in the London Guardian.  Recent honors include fellowships from the Woodrow Wilson International Center (2009), the Rockefeller Foundation (2003), the International Center for Advanced Study, NYU (2002), and the American Council of Learned Societies (2002). He was a MacArthur Award nominee in 1998. His new book project, White World Order, Black Power Politics: the Birth of American International Relations (Cornell University Press, 2015), moves away from the Middle East to explore the unwritten history of disciplinary international relations and to recover the African-American internationalist tradition. White World Order, Black Power Politics: the Birth of American International Relations. Cornell University Press, 2015. pp. 5-8.]</p><p>International Relations 101: <u><strong>The <mark>problem</u></strong></mark>, we now know in large part thanks to historians and sociologists of science<mark>, <u><strong>is that scholars reliably produce unreliable accounts of the past of their own fields.</u></strong></mark>14 <u><strong><mark>International relations is no exception</mark>.</u></strong>15 <u><strong>American schoolchildren learn the story of</u></strong> the midnight ride of <u><strong>Paul Revere together with any number of other myths about “the nation’s origins, achievements, and destiny.”</u></strong>16 <u><strong>Such <mark>myths function to produce a common consciousness and obscure </mark>the existence of <mark>hierarchy. The practitioner histories of international relations </mark>in the United States <mark>do </mark>roughly <mark>the same thing</u></strong></mark> to the same end through the socialization of graduate students in the rituals of PhD programs and <u><strong><mark>through</mark> lecture <mark>courses that pass on the discipline’s invented traditions</mark> and escape from knowledge to generations</u></strong> of undergraduates <u><strong>who will be- come public intellectuals, politicians, and policymakers.</u></strong>  Every year thousands of undergraduates across the United States sign up for a class titled “Introduction to International Relations.” In the first week  or two they learn that three broad rival theoretical traditions vie for explana- tory primacy among specialists. <u>The first (and it is always first) among un- equals is “<mark>realism</mark>.” The second is “liberalism” or “<mark>liberal internationalism</mark>.”  The third is “<mark>constructivism</mark>” (thirty years ago it was “neo-Marxism”</u>), a kind of residual category that consists of various persuasions of critics on the discipline’s margins, the serious consideration of which is honored more in the breach than in the observance. <u>For self-identified “realists,” <mark>the struggle for power among states is a law</mark> operating across space and time, one that statesmen in antiquity or their later chroniclers discovered and that their descendants discount at their (and our)  peril</u>. Instructors might drive the lesson home for undergraduates by assigning <u><mark>a fragment of the History of the Peloponnesian War by</mark> Athenian general and historian <mark>Thucydides</mark> (ca. 460–395 BCE) that <mark>is known</mark> as the Melian dialogue <mark>to demonstrate</mark> the timelessness of <mark>realism’s truth about power politics</mark>: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must</u>.”17 Who teaches these introductory classes? The professors at the podiums in the large lecture halls are more often than not freshly minted PhDs and new assistant professors, while those who run the small discussion sections—if the undergraduates are lucky enough to have them—are first- and second-year graduate students. An even more reliable generalization is that <u><strong>all those young professors and graduate students in the intro courses will be white. The key point</u></strong>, however,<u><strong> is that these professors and would-be professors have committed vast amounts of their time and energy in an intensive period of immersion in the discipline and its literature.</u></strong> It is any academic profession’s primary method for passing on its origin story in the guise of a canon of theories and theorists. That is<u>, <mark>the chains of transmission of the classical beliefs from Thucydides and their transubstantiation into theories by hi</mark>s putative <mark>intellectual heirs</mark> come to <mark>comprise the organizing framework</mark> and content of all those intro courses, the undergraduate version a stripped-down version of what is taught to the graduate students</u>. The new professors will design their first  stand-alone classes based on the ones for which they served as teaching as- sistants, which are based on the ones their own professors served as teaching assistants for slightly longer ago at one of the twenty to thirty research uni- versities that reproduce the professoriate (and, increasingly, produce faculty outside the tenure system) across the country. Little wonder, then, that the syllabi all tend to look the same.18 <u><strong>Identification of and with a tradition helps to make the discipline something more than a collection of professors and graduate students, blogs, journals, annual conventions, PhD qualifying exam reading lists, and anxieties of the moment. Just as inevitably, however, <mark>disciplining </mark>of this kind <mark>shifts one’s critical gaze away from the complicated history of the development </mark>and transmission <mark>of </mark>what more often than not are <mark>fables of origin</mark>.</u></strong>19  <u><strong>Consider a heretofore-unrecognized puzzle that emerges from the ar- chive of model syllabi, textbooks, and surveys of teaching and research in  international relations that was beginning to be compiled and published in the mid-1920s, which reflected the accumulation of knowledge under the then-new rubric for the previous ten to fifteen years.20 None of those  long-forgotten authors and advocates for recognition of a new interdisciplin- ary specialization described anything remotely like a continuous tradition traceable to the ancients. </u></strong>To do so would hardly have aided the legitimacy of a claim of autonomy for their new enterprise and its specialized object of knowledge. The pattern is in fact common to academic specializations of all  kinds that emerged later in the twentieth century, from art history and literary criticism to cultural anthropology and area studies.21 In the case of international relations, conditions changed after World War II. Although international relations professors continued to express anxieties in the 1950s and 1960s about the identity of field as a “real”  discipline—presidents of the 50-year-old American Political Science Asso- ciation (APSA) were still having trouble specifying precisely how their work differed from that of sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, economists, and even historians—international relations was no longer in need of defense within the postwar university. <u><strong>The Cold War was all the justification the discipline required. It is during this new moment of relative disciplinary security that a new cohort, in the course of seeking to establish its own hegemony,  began a process by which they elided “the historical boundary between the era of the research university and the pre-professional era.”</u></strong>22 The professors have not looked back since—at least not without blinders on.  <u><mark>Today, unaware of </mark>the <mark>history</mark> of its early decades, <mark>a new generation of specialists in i</mark>nternational <mark>r</mark>elations in the United States since the 1950s <mark>practice their craft under the sway of two entwined myths of empire. The first is the idea that the United States is not</mark> and never was (much of) an <mark>imperial</mark> power. <mark>The second is that the discipline</mark> itself has <mark>never showed much interest in</mark> the study of <mark>imperialism</u></mark>. The first idea is, to my thinking, an example of willful ignorance in the face of much devastating argument (and violence) to the contrary across the globe in the last half century. It is basically the academics’ version of the flag pin that all politicians now routinely attach to their lapels.23 We might agree to disagree on this point, although it would take some work to explain the seeming delusion under which an earlier generation labored. There is no disputing the mythical status of the second idea.  The authoritative version can be found in the opening pages of Columbia University political scientist Michael Doyle’s Empires (1986), where he baldly states that “mainstream” international relations showed no scholarly interest in imperialism, a point no reviewer of the book ever challenged him on.24 Like all myths, its value is not in the facts that it purports to offer but in what it tells us about experts on world affairs such as Doyle who believe it to be a valid argument about the world. Doyle’s disciplinary ancestors knew the opposite to be true about the United States and about imperialism. By “ancestors” I don’t mean the fictive ones conjured in today’s textbooks and undergraduate lectures. By ancestors I mean (and I use this identifier intentionally) the men at Princeton, Columbia, and elsewhere who founded the first international relations departments, funding committees, memorials, journals, summer institutes, research centers, conferences, and professional associations. I include those who gained the early support of the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation. The term “ancestor” includes the textbooks and model syllabi that identified and tried to draw boundaries around the new field for the first time in the years before and after World War I and those who went on the radio and wrote in the mass circulation magazines and newspapers to disseminate its scientific findings.25 By “ancestor” I mean the whole system of intellectual,  professional, and institutional production that has made international relations what it is today, including how international relations is taught in those introductory courses that pass the rudiments of the discipline on to the next generation of scholars, opinion makers, and policy professionals.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Nevitt 14 – Mark Nevitt has served as the Sharswood Fellow at Penn Law and Professor of Leadership & Law at the U.S. Naval Academy. He is currently Associate Professor at Syracuse University College of Law. His research focuses on climate change’s legal and national security implications, 9-30-2020, "Climate change, Arctic security and why the U.S. should join the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea," Center For Ethics and the Rule of Law, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/news/10524-climate-change-arctic-security-and-why-the-us/news/cerl-news fulltext: In addition, climate change is both opening maritime trade routes and offering the possibility of natural resource extraction on the Arctic’s continental shelf. It is also creating a whole new operational domain for the world’s militaries. Unlike Antarctica—which is also being dramatically impacted by climate change—the Arctic lacks a comprehensive, Arctic-specific treaty. The Arctic region is largely governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the increasingly important work of the Arctic Council, and a hodgepodge of laws and bilateral agreements. But climate change is increasingly stressing this legal and policy framework. UNCLOS, aptly described as “A Constitution of the Oceans,” remains one of the most comprehensive and complex international law treaties ever negotiated. It will take on increased importance as the Arctic adjusts to its 21st century climate reality. The United States, however, remains the only Arctic Council member that is not party to UNCLOS. This is short-sighted and contrary to U.S. national security, environmental, and economic interests. Despite continued U.S. intransigence on law of the sea ratification, a remarkably diverse coalition of American national security experts, environmentalists, and business interests support the United States becoming a party to UNCLOS. To be sure, the United States accepts UNCLOS’s key navigational provisions as binding as a matter of customary international law. But as a non-party to UNCLOS, the United States increasingly lacks a “seat at the table” on core law of the sea matters and cannot avail itself of its adjudicatory bodies. It also cannot take advantage of key UNCLOS provisions, such as submitting information to establish the outer limits of Alaska’s continental shelf. Climate change’s opening of maritime trade routes and the possibility for natural resource extraction reinforces the need for the U.S. Senate to provide its advice and consent on this critical treaty. In what follows, I will argue the U.S. should join UNCLOS and I will highlight three UNCLOS provisions that take on increasing importance in a changing Arctic. Article 38: The Right of Transit Passage Through the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route The right of transit passage will take on increased importance as climate change opens two Arctic maritime routes: the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route. These two seasonal waterways—the Northwest Passage that runs through Canada and the Northern Sea Route (sometimes referred to as the Northeast Passage) that hugs the Russian coastline—are both found in the Arctic. The Northwest Passage contains several possible routes running through the Canadian Arctic Islands, linking trade from northeast Asia via North America to the northern Atlantic. The Northern Sea Route provides the shortest maritime link between eastern and western Russia while offering another global maritime shortcut for the world’s shipping. The right of transit passage applies to straits that are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or exclusive economic zone. All ships and aircraft enjoy this right, and UNCLOS makes clear that this right “shall not be impeded” provided that ships and aircraft proceed without delay through (or over) the strait. But does the right of transit passage fully apply to these two Arctic waterways? It remains unclear. As the Arctic sea ice extent decreases, shipping from all nations—to include nations outside the Arctic such as China—will also increase as nations seek faster and cheaper routes. Yet the international right of transit passage is running headfirst into Russian and Canadian claims over these waters. Canada, for example, asserts that much of the Northwest Passage traverses through an Arctic Archipelago that are historic Canadian internal waters. In addition, Russia asserts a similar internal waters claim over three straits that makeup the Northern Sea Route. Both Russian and Canadian claims challenge the right of transit passage through these waters. While these claims have been protested as excessive by both the United States and European Union, their precise legal status remains unclear. While the United States and Canada signed a 1988 Agreement on Arctic Cooperation that has defused tensions between these two allies, consider how much the Arctic (and world) has changed since 1988. How much longer can the “agree to disagree” approach hold? Article 76: Defining the Continental Shelf The five Arctic coastal states (Denmark (via Greenland), Russia, United States, Norway, and Canada) all have continental shelves in the Arctic Ocean. Converging at the North Pole, each nation’s extended continental shelf comes together the way orange wedges meet at the stem. Approximately half of the Arctic’s ocean floor is composed of the continental shelf, the largest percentage of any of the world’s oceans. Why is the Arctic continental shelf so important? A coastal state’s continental shelf comprises the seabed and subsoil that extend far beyond the territorial sea. The United States has an enormous continental shelf off the coast of Alaska, and the seabed and subsoil provide access to valuable oil, natural gas, and minerals. Unlike other maritime zone delineations, the continental shelf lacks an express outer limitation. Under UNCLOS, for example, each coastal state’s exclusive economic zone extends out to 200 nautical miles. But a coastal state’s continental shelf is not limited to 200 nautical miles, and it is far more difficult to determine its outer limit with precision. Under UNCLOS, each coastal state’s continental shelf extends beyond its territorial sea “throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin.” What, exactly, constitutes a natural prolongation is a complex scientific and technical question that is made even more difficult by the costs to procure this information in the harsh Arctic environment. As climate change renews the possibility for Arctic oil, mineral, and gas extraction determining the precise breadth of each nation’s continental shelf will take on increased importance. Indeed, the U.S. Geological Survey estimates that 30% of the world’s undiscovered gas and 13% of undiscovered oil lies north of the Arctic Circle. UNCLOS can aid in resolving competing continental shelf claims with the procedures outlined in Article 76 that establishes the Commission for the Limits on the Continental Shelf (CLCS). With Canada’s Arctic submission to the CLCS in May 2019, each Arctic coastal state—but not the United States—has submitted information in support of its continental shelf claim. Not surprisingly, each Arctic coastal state seeks a fairly broad interpretation of “natural prolongation” and the outer breadth of their continental shelf. Russia, for example, asserts a continental shelf that extends to the Lomonosov Ridge, an area that extends to the North Pole several hundred miles from its Arctic coastline. As a non-party to UNCLOS, the United States is likely prohibited from making a submission to the CLCS in support of its Arctic continental shelf claim off the Alaskan coast. While the CLCS can only make recommendations on the breadth of each nation’s continental shelf, “the limits of the continental shelf established by a coastal state on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding.” Regardless of the finality of CLCS decisions, the United States should ratify UNCLOS and immediately make an Alaskan continental shelf submission to the CLCS. Article 234: Ice Covered Areas As highlighted above, climate change is dramatically altering the Arctic icepack’s size, opening up shipping lines and navigational waterways for the first time in human history. Beyond the disputed claims by Russia and Canada over the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route, climate change is forcing us to look with fresh eyes at each Arctic coastal state’s authority over Arctic “ice-covered areas.” Article 234 (“Ice-covered areas”) of the law of the sea treaty states: Coastal states have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation …[s]uch laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and protection of the marine environment. This provision is taking on increasing importance in the Arctic, which has large swaths of ice-covered areas that are melting due to climate change. Article 234 bestows special regulatory authority for Arctic coastal states over ice-covered areas up to 200 nautical miles, the limits of the exclusive economic zone. Yet climate change raises several key questions about the outer scope of this authority. What, for, example, does “for most of the year” and “severe climatic conditions” mean? And won’t climate change gradually diminish any regulatory authority over ice-covered areas as the Arctic ice pack melts? Further, how should we apply Article 234 to the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route? And how can this provision be reconciled with the right of transit and innocent passage discussed earlier? Despite these questions, both Canada and Russia have taken a forward-leaning view of their authority under Article 234. Russia has asserted an expansive view of this authority, requiring notification of foreign ships prior to transiting the Northeast Passage. While this runs counter to other UNCLOS provisions concerning the right of innocent passage through another nation’s territorial sea, it, too, remains unresolved. The U.S. Should Ratify and Sign the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea The United States is an Arctic nation. And the Arctic Council’s 2008 Ilulissat Declaration reaffirmed the Arctic Council’s commitment to the law of the sea framework. While the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, the United States has actually been a good law of the sea partner in upholding navigational freedoms throughout the world. And the U.S. Navy has complemented and enforced many key UNCLOS provisions through freedom of navigation operations. The United States has also worked hard to resolve disputes peacefully, a core law of the sea principle. But the United States lacks a seat at the law of the sea table, and its credibility and commitment to the law of the sea are questioned by other nations—a point made painfully clear in both the Arctic and in ongoing disputes in the South China Sea. As these three provisions highlight, the law of the sea will be central to resolving current and future disputes in the Arctic. President Bill Clinton sent UNCLOS and the 1994 Amendment to the Senate for its advice and consent in 1994. And both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama urged Senate law of the sea treaty ratification. While the Senate held hearings in 2004 and 2012, a vote on UNCLOS ratification died on the vine. Whoever wins the 2020 U.S. presidential election should renew calls for Senate ratification. And the Senate should provide its advice and consent to UNCLOS without delay.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>It’s reverse casual---only the plan makes UNCLOS <u>effective</u> at <u>protecting</u> the Arctic broadly</h4><p><strong>Nevitt 14</strong> – Mark Nevitt has served as the Sharswood Fellow at Penn Law and Professor of Leadership & Law at the U.S. Naval Academy. He is currently Associate Professor at Syracuse University College of Law. His research focuses on climate change’s legal and national security implications, 9-30-2020, "Climate change, Arctic security and why the U.S. should join the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea," Center For<u> Ethics and the Rule of Law, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/news/10524-climate-change-arctic-security-and-why-the-us/news/cerl-news</p><p>In addition, <mark>climate change is</mark> both <mark>opening</mark> maritime trade <mark>routes and offering </mark>the possibility of natural <mark>resource extraction</mark> on the Arctic’s continental shelf. It is also creating a whole new operational domain for the world’s militaries.</p><p>Unlike Antarctica—which is also being dramatically impacted by climate change—<strong>the Arctic lacks a comprehensive, Arctic-specific treaty</strong>. The Arctic region is largely governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the increasingly important work of the Arctic Council, and a hodgepodge of laws and bilateral agreements. But <mark>climate change <strong>is </mark>increasingly <mark>stressing this</mark> legal and policy </strong>framework.</p><p><mark>UNCLOS,</mark> aptly described as “A Constitution of the Oceans,” <mark>remains </mark>one of <mark>the most comprehensive </mark>and complex <mark>international </mark>law <mark>treati</mark>es ever negotiated. It will take on increased importance as the Arctic adjusts to its 21st century climate reality. <strong><mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates, however, <mark>remains the only Arctic Council member </mark>that is <mark>not party to UNCLOS</strong></mark>. This is short-sighted and contrary to U.S. national security, environmental, and economic interests. Despite continued U.S. intransigence on law of the sea ratification, a remarkably diverse coalition of American national security experts, environmentalists, and business interests support the United States becoming a party to UNCLOS. To be sure, the United States accepts UNCLOS’s key navigational provisions as binding as a matter of customary international law. But as a non-party to UNCLOS, the United States increasingly lacks a “seat at the table” on core law of the sea matters and cannot avail itself of its adjudicatory bodies. It also cannot take advantage of key UNCLOS provisions, such as submitting information to establish the outer limits of Alaska’s continental shelf. Climate change’s opening of maritime trade routes and the possibility for natural resource extraction reinforces the need for the U.S. Senate to provide its advice and consent on this critical treaty.</p><p></u>In what follows, I will argue <u><strong><mark>the U.S. should join UNCLOS</u></strong></mark> and I will highlight three UNCLOS provisions that take on increasing importance in a changing Arctic.</p><p><u>Article 38: The Right of Transit Passage Through the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route</p><p>The right of transit <mark>passage will take on </mark>increased <mark>importance as climate change opens</mark> two Arctic maritime <mark>routes</mark>: the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route.</p><p></u>These two seasonal waterways—the Northwest Passage that runs through Canada and the Northern Sea Route (sometimes referred to as the Northeast Passage) that hugs the Russian coastline—are both found in the Arctic. The Northwest Passage contains several possible routes running through the Canadian Arctic Islands, linking trade from northeast Asia via North America to the northern Atlantic. The Northern Sea Route provides the shortest maritime link between eastern and western Russia while offering another global maritime shortcut for the world’s shipping.</p><p>The right of transit passage applies to straits that are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or exclusive economic zone. All ships and aircraft enjoy this right, and UNCLOS makes clear that this right “shall not be impeded” provided that ships and aircraft proceed without delay through (or over) the strait. But does the right of transit passage fully apply to these two Arctic waterways? It remains unclear.</p><p><u>As the Arctic sea ice extent decreases, shipping from all nations—to include nations outside the Arctic such as China—will also increase as nations seek faster and cheaper routes. Yet the international right of transit passage is running headfirst into Russian and Canadian claims over these waters. Canada, for example, asserts that much of the Northwest Passage traverses through an Arctic Archipelago that are historic Canadian internal waters. In addition, Russia asserts a similar internal waters claim over three straits that makeup the Northern Sea Route. Both Russian and Canadian claims challenge the right of transit passage through these waters</u>. While these claims have been protested as excessive by both the United States and European Union, their precise legal status remains unclear.</p><p>While the United States and Canada signed a 1988 Agreement on Arctic Cooperation that has defused tensions between these two allies, consider how much the Arctic (and world) has changed since 1988. How much longer can the “agree to disagree” approach hold?</p><p><u>Article 76: Defining the Continental Shelf</p><p>The five Arctic coastal states (Denmark (via Greenland), Russia, United States, Norway, and Canada) all have continental shelves in the Arctic Ocean. Converging at the North Pole, each nation’s extended continental shelf comes together the way orange wedges meet at the stem. Approximately <mark>half of the Arctic’</mark>s ocean floor <mark>is composed of the continental shelf,</mark> the largest percentage of any of the world’s oceans.</p><p></u>Why is the Arctic continental shelf so important? A coastal state’s continental shelf comprises the seabed and subsoil that extend far beyond the territorial sea. <u><mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates has an enormous <mark>continental shelf</mark> off the coast of Alaska, and the seabed and subsoil <mark>provide access to </mark>valuable <mark>oil, natural gas, and minerals</mark>. Unlike other maritime zone delineations, the continental shelf lacks an express outer limitation. Under UNCLOS, for example, each coastal state’s <mark>e</mark>xclusive <mark>e</mark>conomic <mark>z</mark>one <mark>extends</mark> out to <mark>200 nautical miles</mark>. But a coastal state’s continental shelf is not limited to 200 nautical miles, and it is far more difficult to determine its outer limit with precision. Under UNCLOS, each coastal state’s continental shelf extends beyond its territorial sea “throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin.” What, exactly, constitutes a natural prolongation is a complex scientific and technical question that is made even more difficult by the costs to procure this information in the harsh Arctic environment.</p><p>As <mark>climate change renews the possibility for</mark> Arctic oil, mineral, and gas <mark>extraction determining the </mark>precise <mark>breadth of each nation’s continental shelf will </mark>take on <mark>increase</mark>d <mark>importance</mark>. Indeed, the U.S. Geological Survey estimates that 30% of the world’s undiscovered gas and 13% of undiscovered oil lies north of the Arctic Circle. UNCLOS can aid in resolving competing continental shelf claims with the procedures outlined in Article 76 that establishes the Commission for the Limits on the Continental Shelf (CLCS).</p><p>With Canada’s Arctic submission to the CLCS in May 2019, each Arctic coastal state—but not the United States—has submitted information in support of its continental shelf claim. Not surprisingly, each Arctic coastal state seeks a fairly broad interpretation of “natural prolongation” and the outer breadth of their continental shelf. Russia, for example, asserts a continental shelf that extends to the Lomonosov Ridge, an area that extends to the North Pole several hundred miles from its Arctic coastline.</p><p>As a non-party to UNCLOS, <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>is</mark> likely <mark>prohibited from making a submission</mark> to the CLCS in support of its Arctic continental shelf claim off the Alaskan coast. While the CLCS can only make recommendations on the breadth of each nation’s continental shelf, “the limits of the continental shelf established by a coastal state on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding.” Regardless of the finality of CLCS decisions, the United States should ratify UNCLOS and immediately make an Alaskan continental shelf submission to the CLCS.</p><p>Article 234: Ice Covered Areas</p><p>As highlighted above, climate change is dramatically altering the Arctic icepack’s size, opening up shipping lines and navigational waterways for the first time in human history. Beyond the disputed claims by Russia and Canada over the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route, climate change is forcing us to look with fresh eyes at each Arctic coastal state’s authority over Arctic “ice-covered areas.”</p><p></u>Article 234 (“Ice-covered areas”) of the law of the sea treaty states:</p><p><u><mark>Coastal states have the right to adopt and enforce</mark> non-discriminatory laws and <mark>regulations for the prevention</mark>, reduction and control <mark>of marine pollution </mark>from vessels in ice-covered areas <strong>within the limits of the exclusive economic zone,</strong> where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation …[s]uch laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and protection of the marine environment.</p><p>This provision is taking on increasing importance in the Arctic, which has large swaths of ice-covered areas that are melting due to climate change. <mark>Article 234 bestows </mark>special regulatory <mark>authority </mark>for Arctic coastal states over ice-covered areas up to 200 nautical miles, the limits of the exclusive economic zone. Yet <mark>climate change raises</mark> several key <mark>questions about </mark>the outer <mark>scope</mark> of this authority. What, for, example, does “for most of the year” and “severe climatic conditions” mean? And won’t climate change gradually diminish any regulatory authority over ice-covered areas as the Arctic ice pack melts? Further, how should we apply Article 234 to the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route? And how can this provision be reconciled with the right of transit and innocent passage discussed earlier?</p><p><strong>Despite these questions, both Canada and Russia have taken a forward-leaning view of their authority under Article 234. Russia has asserted an expansive view of this authority, requiring notification of foreign ships prior to transiting the Northeast Passage. While this runs counter to other UNCLOS provisions concerning the right of innocent passage through another nation’s territorial sea, it, too, remains unresolved.</p><p></strong>The U.S. Should Ratify and Sign the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea</p><p>The United States is an Arctic nation. And the Arctic Council’s 2008 Ilulissat Declaration reaffirmed the Arctic Council’s commitment to the law of the sea framework. While the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>has</mark> actually <mark>been a good </mark>law of the sea <mark>partner</mark> in <mark>upholding navigational freedoms </mark>throughout the world. And the U.S. Navy has complemented and enforced many key UNCLOS provisions through freedom of navigation operations. The United States has also worked hard to resolve disputes peacefully, a core law of the sea principle. <mark>But </mark>the United States <strong><mark>lacks</strong></mark> a seat at the law of the sea table, and its <strong><mark>credibility and commitment</strong></mark> to the law of the sea are questioned by other nations—<mark>a point made </mark>painfully <mark>clear in</mark> both <mark>the Arctic</mark> and in ongoing disputes in the South China Sea. As these three provisions highlight, the law of the sea will be central to resolving current and future disputes in the Arctic. President Bill Clinton sent UNCLOS and the 1994 Amendment to the Senate for its advice and consent in 1994. And both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama urged Senate law of the sea treaty ratification. While the Senate held hearings in 2004 and 2012, a vote on UNCLOS ratification died on the vine. Whoever wins the 2020 U.S. presidential election should renew calls for Senate ratification. And the Senate should provide its advice and consent to UNCLOS without delay.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: 1AC Carpenter, 19 Ted Galen Carpenter is a senior fellow in security studies at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at The American Conservative, is the author of 13 books, including his latest, Gullible Superpower: U.S. Support for Bogus Foreign Democratic Movements, and more than 800 articles on international affairs. “Time Bomb: How the Growing Hong Kong-Taiwan Axis is Riling Beijing.” https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/time-bomb-how-the-growing-hong-kong-taiwan-axis-is-riling-beijing, 09-23-19, acc. 10-09-19, Ingraham-Vincent fulltext: Hong Kong’s pro-democracy demonstrations appear to be having a major impact on Taiwan’s presidential campaign in advance of its January 2020 election. Protest leaders urge the Taiwanese to express emphatic vocal support for Hong Kong’s democratic aspirations. To a large extent, that is already happening. Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, frequently speaks out in favor of the Hong Kong demonstrators and their demands, infuriating Beijing. Protests in Hong Kong have made the Taiwanese “increasingly treasure” their democracy and “deeply feel” what it would be like if China treated them the way it’s handling Hong Kong, Tsai said in June. The emergence of a de facto Hong Kong-Taiwan democratic political axis has heightened Beijing’s nervousness and paranoia. Not only do Communist Party leaders have to deal with the rising popular defiance in Hong Kong to Beijing’s authority, but the prospect of any negotiations for Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland now looks utterly remote. Xi Jinping’s government is not likely to tolerate high-profile policy defeats on two fronts, yet that outcome is a growing possibility. The situation has become a ticking time bomb. Joshua Wong, a prominent figure in Hong Kong’s street protests, is stepping up his efforts to enlist the Taiwanese. “We hope that before Communist China’s National Day on Oct. 1, our friends in Taiwan can express their support for Hong Kong through street protests,” Wong said at a news conference on September 3. “A lot of people in the past have said ‘today Hong Kong and tomorrow Taiwan.’ But I think the most ideal thing we’d say is ‘Taiwan today, tomorrow Hong Kong.’ Hong Kong can be like Taiwan, a place for freedom and democracy.” Such sentiments by themselves are enough to enrage Beijing. But Wong also urged Taiwan’s government to let Hong Kong protesters seek political asylum. Worse from Beijing’s standpoint, he made those statements not in Hong Kong or some neutral location, but in Taipei following meetings with Taiwan’s governing, pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Communist Chinese leaders are likely to interpret such a venue as further evidence of a Hong Kong-Taiwanese political alliance against the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Beijing’s persistent attempts to undermine Hong Kong’s political autonomy under its “one county, two systems” arrangement has caused Taiwanese attitudes to turn emphatically against such a formula for their island. Most Taiwanese were never enthusiastic about that proposal, but the proposed Hong Kong extradition law (just now withdrawn) that would have enabled Chinese authorities to try Hong Kong-based political dissidents in mainland courts has soured Taiwanese public opinion even more. A poll that Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council published in late July found that 88.7 percent of respondents rejected one country, two systems, up from 75.4 per cent in a January survey. The Hong Kong democracy campaign is strengthening hardline, anti-PRC factions in Taiwan. Incumbent President Tsai appeared to be in deep political trouble earlier this year. Taiwan’s continuing economic malaise had undermined her presidency, and the DPP suffered huge losses in November 2018 local elections. Indeed, the losses were so severe that Tsai had to quit her post as party chair. She also faced a strong primary challenge for the DPP’s presidential nomination from her onetime prime minister, James Lai. But Tsai has shrewdly exploited public anger at Beijing’s crude attempts to undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy to rebuild her domestic political support. “As long as I am here, I will stand firm to defend Taiwan’s sovereignty,” Tsai pledged in July. “As long as I am here, you would not have to fear, because we will not become another Hong Kong.” That message resonated with voters, and not only did she defeat Lai, but her fortunes against the opposition Kuomintang Party in the upcoming general election appear far more favorable than they did a few months ago. The Hong Kong developments have created a political nightmare for the Kuomintang. The party’s nominee, Han Kuo-yu, the maverick populist mayor of Kaohsiung, had long advocated closer relations with the mainland. To that end, he sought to resume the policy that the last Kuomintang president, Ma Jing-jeou, pursued from 2008 to 2016. Earlier this year, Han visited China and had cordial meetings with Communist Party officials. He has always seemed highly favorable to the PRC’s one country, two systems arrangement for Taiwan as well as Hong Kong. Both the Chinese government and pro-Beijing media outlets in Taiwan (the so-called red media) were decidedly enthusiastic about Han’s candidacy against more moderate opponents in the Kuomintang Party’s primary election this summer. But the popularity of the Hong Kong pro-democracy demonstrations among Taiwanese voters has thrown Han on the defensive, and he is beating a very fast retreat from his previous position. In a desperate attempt to rebut allegations that he would embrace an appeasement policy toward Beijing, Han even asserted that, if he is elected president, Taiwan would only accept China’s one country, two systems proposal “over my dead body.” It is not clear how credible his eleventh-hour political transformation is with Taiwanese voters. A Tsai victory is now a serious possibility, even though such an outcome would infuriate the Chinese government and lead to a spike in Taiwan Strait tensions. Her re-election might well lead China to conclude that achieving Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland by peaceful means is no longer feasible. The DPP’s landslide victory in 2016 came as a shock to Beijing. PRC leaders had counted on growing cross-strait economic ties to gradually erode the Taiwanese public’s resistance to political reunification. It seemed a logical approach under Tsai’s accommodating Kuomintang predecessor, but the DPP’s electoral triumph underscored its defects. Beijing reacted harshly, with a surge of provocative military exercises in and around the Taiwan Strait, strident denunciations of Taipei’s leaders and their policies, and a revived campaign to poach Taiwan’s handful of remaining diplomatic partners. That campaign has accelerated dramatically in recent weeks. Beijing has enticed both the Solomon Islands and Kiribati to sever diplomatic relations with Taipei. The United States already is entangled in the dispute over Taiwan’s political status. Under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, Washington made a commitment to provide Taipei with “defensive” weaponry and to regard any coercive moves by Beijing as a threat to the peace of East Asia. Under the Trump administration, U.S. policy has become even more supportive of Taiwan’s de facto independence. American officials complained about the decision of the Solomon Islands to recognize Beijing instead of Taipei and threatened to reconsider aid to that country. Even more significant, for the first time since Washington severed formal diplomatic ties with Taipei and switched them to Beijing in 1979, high-level U.S. security officials, including former national security adviser John Bolton, have met with their Taiwanese counterparts. The Trump administration has also approved an $8 billion arms sale that includes F-16 fighters. Beijing protests all U.S. weapons sales to Taipei, but the reaction this time seems especially angry. Chinese leaders also suspect that the United States is fomenting much of the trouble in Hong Kong. It is tempting to dismiss such accusations as nothing more than typical propaganda and scapegoating on the part of a beleaguered communist regime. But the sight of more and more demonstrators waving American flags understandably makes Beijing suspicious and nervous. Moreover, as the New York Times points out, there have been “statements of support for the protests from congressional leaders and Democratic presidential candidates, and meetings between Hong Kong opposition figures and administration officials. One such meeting with a diplomat in the United States Consulate in Hong Kong has been seized on by China, as was another in Washington with Vice President Mike Pence and President Trump’s national security adviser, John Bolton.” Chinese leaders now face the prospect of twin humiliating political defeats, and they are not likely to accept such an outcome passively. One only hopes that they do not adopt reckless policies towards either Hong Kong or Taiwan. A Tiananmen Square-style crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators would poison Beijing’s relations with the United States and China’s other trading partners, and (at a minimum) force them to impose economic sanctions. Any Chinese military move against Taiwan would be even worse, creating an immediate, potentially lethal, crisis between Beijing and Washington. As much as Americans are understandably pleased with the democratic factions in Hong Kong and Taiwan, Washington must temper its enthusiasm—and especially avoid any manifestations of meddling. We must not give PRC leaders reason to believe that the United States is waging a campaign to force China into a corner and inflict major geopolitical defeats. Caution in both capitals is imperative. The next few months, perhaps even the next few weeks, may determine whether East Asia remains at peace.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><mark>Their carpenter 19 ev states reelection spikes tensions – this should have already triggered their links</h4><p><strong></mark>1AC Carpenter, 19 <u></strong>Ted Galen Carpenter is a senior fellow in security studies at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at The American Conservative, is the author of 13 books, including his latest, Gullible Superpower: U.S. Support for Bogus Foreign Democratic Movements, and more than 800 articles on international affairs. “Time Bomb: How the Growing Hong Kong-Taiwan Axis is Riling Beijing.” https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/time-bomb-how-the-growing-hong-kong-taiwan-axis-is-riling-beijing, 09-23-19, acc. 10-09-19, Ingraham-Vincent</p><p></u>Hong Kong’s pro-democracy demonstrations appear to be having a major impact on Taiwan’s presidential campaign in advance of its January 2020 election. Protest leaders urge the Taiwanese to express emphatic vocal support for Hong Kong’s democratic aspirations. To a large extent, that is already happening. <u><strong>Taiwan’s president, <mark>Tsai</mark> Ing-wen, <mark>frequently speaks</mark> out <mark>in favor of</mark> the <mark>Hong Kong demonstrators</strong></mark> and their demands, <mark>infuriating Beijing</mark>. Protests in Hong Kong have made the Taiwanese “increasingly treasure” their democracy and “deeply feel” what it would be like if China treated them the way it’s handling Hong Kong, Tsai said in June. <strong>The emergence of a de facto Hong Kong-Taiwan democratic political axis has heightened Beijing’s nervousness and paranoia</strong>. Not only do Communist <mark>Party leaders have to deal with</mark> the rising popular defiance in <mark>Hong Kong</mark> to Beijing’s authority, but <strong><mark>the prospect of</mark> any negotiations for Taiwan’s <mark>reunification</mark> with the mainland now <mark>looks</mark> utterly <mark>remote. Xi</mark> Jinping’s government <mark>is not likely to tolerate</mark> high-profile <mark>policy defeats on two fronts</strong></mark>, yet that outcome is a growing possibility. The situation has become a ticking time bomb</u>. Joshua Wong, a prominent figure in Hong Kong’s street protests, is stepping up his efforts to enlist the Taiwanese. “We hope that before Communist China’s National Day on Oct. 1, our friends in Taiwan can express their support for Hong Kong through street protests,” Wong said at a news conference on September 3. “<u>A lot of people in the past have said ‘today Hong Kong and tomorrow Taiwan.’ But I think the most ideal thing we’d say is ‘Taiwan today, tomorrow Hong Kong.’ Hong Kong can be like Taiwan, a place for freedom and democracy.” Such sentiments by themselves are enough to enrage Beijing.</u> But Wong also urged Taiwan’s government to let Hong Kong protesters seek political asylum. Worse from Beijing’s standpoint, he made those statements not in Hong Kong or some neutral location, but in Taipei following meetings with Taiwan’s governing, pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Communist Chinese leaders are likely to interpret such a venue as further evidence of a Hong Kong-Taiwanese political alliance against the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Beijing’s persistent attempts to undermine Hong Kong’s political autonomy under its “one county, two systems” arrangement has caused Taiwanese attitudes to turn emphatically against such a formula for their island. Most Taiwanese were never enthusiastic about that proposal, but the proposed Hong Kong extradition law (just now withdrawn) that would have enabled Chinese authorities to try Hong Kong-based political dissidents in mainland courts has soured Taiwanese public opinion even more. A poll that Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council published in late July found that 88.7 percent of respondents rejected one country, two systems, up from 75.4 per cent in a January survey. <u>The Hong Kong democracy campaign is strengthening hardline, anti-PRC factions in Taiwan. Incumbent President Tsai appeared to be in deep political trouble earlier this year</u>. Taiwan’s continuing economic malaise had undermined her presidency, and the DPP suffered huge losses in November 2018 local elections. Indeed, the losses were so severe that Tsai had to quit her post as party chair. She also faced a strong primary challenge for the DPP’s presidential nomination from her onetime prime minister, James Lai. <u>But Tsai has shrewdly exploited public anger at Beijing’s crude attempts to undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy to rebuild her domestic political support. “As long as I am here, I will stand firm to defend Taiwan’s sovereignty,” </u>Tsai pledged in July. “As long as I am here, you would not have to fear, because we will not become another Hong Kong.” That message resonated with voters, and not only did she defeat Lai, but her fortunes against the opposition Kuomintang Party in the upcoming general election appear far more favorable than they did a few months ago. The Hong Kong developments have created a political nightmare for the Kuomintang. The party’s nominee, Han Kuo-yu, the maverick populist mayor of Kaohsiung, had long advocated closer relations with the mainland. To that end, he sought to resume the policy that the last Kuomintang president, Ma Jing-jeou, pursued from 2008 to 2016. Earlier this year, Han visited China and had cordial meetings with Communist Party officials. He has always seemed highly favorable to the PRC’s one country, two systems arrangement for Taiwan as well as Hong Kong. Both the Chinese government and pro-Beijing media outlets in Taiwan (the so-called red media) were decidedly enthusiastic about Han’s candidacy against more moderate opponents in the Kuomintang Party’s primary election this summer. But the popularity of the Hong Kong pro-democracy demonstrations among Taiwanese voters has thrown Han on the defensive, and he is beating a very fast retreat from his previous position. In a desperate attempt to rebut allegations that he would embrace an appeasement policy toward Beijing, Han even asserted that, if he is elected president, Taiwan would only accept China’s one country, two systems proposal “over my dead body.” <u>It is not clear how credible his eleventh-hour political transformation is with Taiwanese voters. A <mark>Tsai victory</mark> is now a serious possibility, even though <strong>such an outcome <mark>would</mark> infuriate the Chinese government and <mark>lead to a spike in Taiwan Strait tensions</mark>. Her re-election might well <mark>lead China to conclude</mark> that achieving <mark>Taiwan’s reunification</mark> with the mainland <mark>by peaceful means is no longer feasible</strong></mark>.</u> The DPP’s landslide victory in 2016 came as a shock to Beijing. PRC leaders had counted on growing cross-strait economic ties to gradually erode the Taiwanese public’s resistance to political reunification. It seemed a logical approach under Tsai’s accommodating Kuomintang predecessor, but the DPP’s electoral triumph underscored its defects. Beijing reacted harshly, with a surge of provocative military exercises in and around the Taiwan Strait, strident denunciations of Taipei’s leaders and their policies, and a revived campaign to poach Taiwan’s handful of remaining diplomatic partners. That campaign has accelerated dramatically in recent weeks. Beijing has enticed both the Solomon Islands and Kiribati to sever diplomatic relations with Taipei. <u>The United States already is entangled in the dispute over Taiwan’s political status</u>. Under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, Washington made a commitment to provide Taipei with “defensive” weaponry and to regard any coercive moves by Beijing as a threat to the peace of East Asia. <u><mark>Under</mark> the <mark>Trump</mark> administration, <mark>U.S. policy has become</mark> even more <mark>supportive of</mark> Taiwan’s de facto <mark>independence</u></mark>. American officials complained about the decision of the Solomon Islands to recognize Beijing instead of Taipei and threatened to reconsider aid to that country. Even more significant, for the first time since Washington severed formal diplomatic ties with Taipei and switched them to Beijing in 1979, high-level U.S. security officials, including former national security adviser John Bolton, have met with their Taiwanese counterparts. <u><strong>The <mark>Trump</mark> administration has also <mark>approved a</mark>n $8 billion arms sale that includes <mark>F-16</mark> fighters.</strong> Beijing protests all U.S. weapons <mark>sale</mark>s to Taipei, but <strong><mark>the reaction this time seems especially angry</strong></mark>.</u> Chinese leaders also suspect that the United States is fomenting much of the trouble in Hong Kong. It is tempting to dismiss such accusations as nothing more than typical propaganda and scapegoating on the part of a beleaguered communist regime. But the sight of more and more demonstrators waving American flags understandably makes Beijing suspicious and nervous. Moreover, as the New York Times points out, there have been “statements of support for the protests from congressional leaders and Democratic presidential candidates, and meetings between Hong Kong opposition figures and administration officials. One such meeting with a diplomat in the United States Consulate in Hong Kong has been seized on by China, as was another in Washington with Vice President Mike Pence and President Trump’s national security adviser, John Bolton.” <u><strong><mark>Chinese leaders</mark> now <mark>face</mark> the prospect of <mark>twin</mark> humiliating political <mark>defeats</mark>, and <mark>they are not likely to accept such an outcome</mark> passively. One only hopes that they do not adopt <mark>reckless policies towards</mark> either Hong Kong or <mark>Taiwan</strong></mark>. A Tiananmen Square-style crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators would poison Beijing’s relations with the United States and China’s other trading partners, and (at a minimum) force them to impose economic sanctions. Any Chinese military move against Taiwan <mark>would</mark> be even worse, <mark>creat</mark>ing <mark>an immediate</mark>, potentially <mark>lethal, crisis between Beijing and Washington</u></mark>. As much as Americans are understandably pleased with the democratic factions in Hong Kong and Taiwan, Washington must temper its enthusiasm—and especially avoid any manifestations of meddling. <u>We must not give PRC leaders reason to believe that the United States is waging a campaign to force China into a corner and inflict major geopolitical defeats. Caution in both capitals is imperative. The next few months, perhaps even the next few weeks, may determine whether East Asia remains at peace.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Harry Kazianis 9/15/2014 (Harry J. Kazianis serves as Managing Editor of the Washington, DC based international affairs journal The National Interest. Mr. Kazianis is also a Senior Fellow (Non-Resident) at the China Policy Institute. “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands: The Spark for Great Power War?” https://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2014/10/15/the-senkakudiaoyu-islands-the-spark-for-great-power-war/) fulltext: While China has multiple overlapping territorial claims with many of its neighbors in various parts of the East and South China Seas, none has more potential for great power conflict as claims concerning the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In fact, considering this hotly disputed area of the Asia-Pacific is contested by two of the world’s premier economic and military powers, China and also Japan, it is safe to say the area around the islands is one of only a few places on planet Earth that could spark a truly catastrophic conflict with possible nuclear ramification that could draw in the United States.¶ Called Diaoyu by China, Senkaku by Japan (the islands are also claimed by Taiwan) these small islands have been a constant flashpoint leading to at least one incident that came close to military confrontation. While today most media is focused on the various crises in the Middle East, the trend lines in the East China Sea point to a slowly escalating situation, that if not properly managed, could spiral into a tragic conflict.¶ In order to understand the deep-rooted tensions surrounding what are actually very small but geostrategically important islands with possible large deposits of natural resources, historical context is needed.[i]¶ Understanding the claims of both sides present and the evident they present is important. Japan and China lay claim to the islands under different aspects of international law. Tokyo’s case rests on the idea of “occupation of terra nullius”—or land without an owner. Japan stresses that when it formally took over the area (in an 1895 cabinet decision), it had established the islands were uninhabited—and more importantly—showed no trace of having been under the control of Beijing.¶ For its part China asserts its case though what can be called an historical claim. Beijing claims to have evidence that it exercised sovereignty through various parts of its historical experience—not dissimilar to claims in the South China Sea. These include the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing Dynasties (1644-1912). China also points out the islands were ceded to Japan as part of the unjust 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the First Sino-Japanese War. Since the treaty came about presumably by force of arms—so this line of argument goes—they should be returned to China. Beijing also bases some of its claims under the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations (1943 and 1945) that Japan must return all territories seized through war.¶ America also plays a role in the various claims and counter claims. At the conclusion of World War II, the islands were occupied, along with Ryukyu Islands, by the U.S. under the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco. Control then reverted back to Japanese administration in 1972. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers the territory since Tokyo is the defacto administrator of the islands. While U.S. officials have made it now quite clear they wish to see both sides work towards some sort of compromise, multiple American officials—including the President Obama himself—have made it clear the islands would be defended, along with any other part of Japanese territory, from any sort of outside aggression.¶ While tensions today over the islands run high, the possibility of armed conflict is a relatively new phenomenon. During the 1970’s, Japan and China had different goals—the normalization of relations. Both sides understood the challenge the dispute over the islands could pose to such a goal. Creating an even larger stumbling block was a 1969 UN-led geologic survey that claimed possible vast natural resources in the surrounding area around the islands. Negotiators came up with an interesting compromise: to relegate the issue to future generations and/or downplay the dispute. Both nations were more concerned about cementing ties in light of rising Soviet power in the Pacific than competing island claims. Here the work of MIT professor M. Taylor Fravel, who is largely credited to bringing these discussions to light, is important:¶ In 1972, Zhou Enlai and Takeiri Yoshikazu (leader of the Komeito party) appeared to agree orally not to discuss the Senkakus in talks that would be held to normalize relations between the two countries. In a recent book, Seton Hall scholar Yinan He cites a collection of documents on Chinese-Japanese relations: in July 1972, Zhou told Takeiri, “There is no need to mention the Diaoyu Islands. It does not count a problem of any sort compared to recovering normal relations [between the two countries].” A Japanese magazine article earlier this month contains a similar account. Thus, from China’s point of view, the decision not to discuss the dispute at the time was a recognition that a dispute did exist.¶ Fravel also notes a similar discussion several years later that are also telling:¶ Similarly, in 1978, Deng Xiaoping and the Japanese Foreign Minister also appeared to agree orally not to discuss the Senkakus at a later time. A chronology or nianpu of Deng’s activities published by a party research office summarizes a meeting between Deng and Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda. According to the book, Deng stated: “It’s not that China and Japan do not have any problems. For example [there are] the Diaoyu Island and continental shelf issues. Don’t drag them in now, they can be set aside to be calmly discussed later and we can slowly reach a way that both sides can accept. If our generation cannot find a way, the next generation or the one after that will find a way.”¶ While neither side dropped its claims, tension over the area remained frozen until 2010. With the threat of the Soviet Union gone and the rise of nationalism in both countries, old claims resurfaced. Thanks to a 2010 incident involving the seizure by Japan of a Chinese fisherman near the islands the issue sparked a major diplomatic row. Matters grew more complicated in April 2012 when Tokyo’s then governor, Shintaro Ishihara, announced a plan during a lecture at the Washington DC-based Heritage Foundation to purchase 3 of the 5 islands from private Japanese owners, inflaming tensions. The government of then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda felt compelled to act. The government was concerned that if Ishihara purchased the disputed territory tensions would grow to unacceptable levels. Looking over its options, it was decided an effort must be made to head off the possible Ishihara purchase, having Japan buy the islands themselves—effectively nationalizing them. Tokyo, which expected a negative reaction from Beijing, felt it was important to control the situation and hedge against what was felt at the time would be an even less desirable outcome. Japan saw the issue as a “transfer of property from a private owner to the central government and would not change the status quo.” China considered the action illegal which has led to strained ties to this day.¶ China’s reaction to brewing tensions over the contested islands in the East China Sea has grown ever more aggressive. China has utilized a strategy—as one scholar has dubbed it —of “small-stick diplomacy.” Beijing has sent varying amounts of non-naval maritime vessels, from fishing vessels to unarmed coast guard craft to press its claims. As China claims these islands as part of its “core interests,” Beijing feels it has the right to patrol them and fish them acting as if they are undisputed, sovereign waters. China has also sent air assets—namely reconnaissance aircraft and at times fighter aircraft in clear attempts to demonstrate sovereignty. An early 2013 incident involving a Chinese destroyer locking its firing-radar onto a Japanese destroyer and helicopter clearly demonstrated the dangerous escalatory nature of these competing claims. Beijing has also declared as of November 23, 2013, an ADIZ across a large swath of the East China Sea that covers the disputed islands. Less than twenty-four hours after China’s declaration, Washington was quick to reiterate its treaty commitments to Tokyo. In a statement by the U.S. Department of Defense, “We remain steadfast in our commitments to our allies and partners. The U.S. reaffirms its longstanding policy that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands.”¶ China’s reaction has created an equally concerning Japanese reaction. Tokyo has sought to increase its defense budget after over a decade of small decreases. Japan is also re-orientating its forces towards the area of dispute with China, developing amphibious-landing capabilities and training with U.S. forces as well as increasing the procurement of ever-advanced conventionally powered submarines and highly advanced helicopter carriers that can deploy, in theory, American V-22 Osprey’s that could carry small groups of combat troops to the Senkakus.¶ So what happens if either side starts shooting over these small but hotly disputed islands?¶ When considering China’s and Japan’s escalating tensions over the Senkakus, Beijing’s A2/AD strategy is an extremely important aspect of such a discussion. China would essentially deploy the same strategy it would use against the U.S. Considering that Japan’s Navy, excluding the U.S., is the most advanced in Asia; China would have no choice but to use an asymmetric strategy in a wartime scenario. Most experts expect Washington would come to Tokyo’s aid. While U.S. officials—for obvious reasons—have not spelled out what assistance they would provide, it seems reasonable to suggest such efforts would be largely compromised of naval assets. Washington has forward deployed a Carrier Battle Group (or CBG) in Japan that would likely be utilized in such a scenario.¶ If a crisis broke out, China would gain considerable advantage in striking its opponents early with massive conventional force. One option would be a considerable kinetic strike utilizing its sizeable arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles. Beijing could launch a massive conventional missile strike at allied planes sitting unprotected at airfields across the Asia-Pacific. As Roger Cliff explained in a May 2012 interview :¶ The problem is, there are hardly any shelters at all at most bases in the Asia-Pacific. Kadena Air Base, for example, has a grand total of 15 shelters, enough for at most 30 fighter aircraft if you squeeze two into each. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, also on Okinawa, has no aircraft shelters. There are also no shelters at MCAS Iwakuni and Yokota Air Base on Honshu, or Andersen Air Force Base.¶ In the event of war U.S. and Japanese forces would face tremendous challenges—including advanced anti-ship ballistic missiles—which could overwhelm, at least on paper, most allied ballistic missile defense systems by sheer numbers. Even assuming a hit to kill ratio of 1:1, Chinese rocketeers would have many more missiles than allied interceptors—essentially, simple math would be the biggest enemy of allied forces. Not even factoring in other domains of warfare, allied forces in a Senkakus conflict—while certainly formidable—would be highly susceptible to a Chinese preemptive or early missile offensive. With very little literature detailing Chinese views on escalation beyond academic works and retired military officials, it is hard to predict Chinese escalation strategies once conflict has begun.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><mark>Senkaku conflict draws in the US—</mark>causes <mark>global nuclear war</h4><p></mark>Harry <strong>Kazianis</strong> 9/15/20<strong>14 </strong>(Harry J. Kazianis serves as Managing Editor of the Washington, DC based international affairs journal The National Interest. Mr. Kazianis is also a Senior Fellow (Non-Resident) at the China Policy Institute. “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands: The Spark for Great Power War?” https://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2014/10/15/the-senkakudiaoyu-islands-the-spark-for-great-power-war/)</p><p>While <u><strong><mark>China has </mark>multiple <mark>overlapping territorial claims with</mark> many of <mark>its neighbors</mark> in</u></strong> various parts of the East and <u><strong>South China Seas, none has more potential for great power conflict as claims concerning <mark>the Senkaku</mark>/Diaoyu <mark>Islands</u></strong></mark>. In fact, considering <u><strong>this hotly disputed area</u></strong> of the Asia-Pacific <u><strong><mark>is contested by two</mark> of the world’s premier economic and <mark>military powers</u></strong></mark>, China and also Japan, it is safe to say the area around <u><strong>the islands is <mark>one of</mark> only <mark>a few places</mark> on planet Earth <mark>that could spark a truly catastrophic conflict with possible nuclear ramification that could draw in the Un</mark>ited<mark> S</mark>tates.</strong>¶</u> Called Diaoyu by China, Senkaku by Japan (the islands are also claimed by Taiwan) these small islands have been a constant flashpoint leading to at least one incident that came close to military confrontation. While today most media is focused on the various crises in the Middle East, the trend lines in the East China Sea point to a slowly escalating situation, that if not properly managed, could spiral into a tragic conflict.¶ In order to understand the deep-rooted tensions surrounding what are actually very small but geostrategically important islands with possible large deposits of natural resources, historical context is needed.[i]¶ Understanding the claims of both sides present and the evident they present is important<u><strong>. <mark>Japan and China lay claim </mark>to the islands<mark> under different aspects of international law</u></strong></mark>. Tokyo’s case rests on the idea of “occupation of terra nullius”—or land without an owner. Japan stresses that when it formally took over the area (in an 1895 cabinet decision), it had established the islands were uninhabited—and more importantly—showed no trace of having been under the control of Beijing.¶ For its part China asserts its case though what can be called an historical claim. Beijing claims to have evidence that it exercised sovereignty through various parts of its historical experience—not dissimilar to claims in the South China Sea. These include the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing Dynasties (1644-1912). China also points out the islands were ceded to Japan as part of the unjust 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the First Sino-Japanese War. Since the treaty came about presumably by force of arms—so this line of argument goes—they should be returned to China. Beijing also bases some of its claims under the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations (1943 and 1945) that Japan must return all territories seized through war.¶ America also plays a role in the various claims and counter claims. At the conclusion of World War II, the islands were occupied, along with Ryukyu Islands, by the U.S. under the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco. Control then reverted back to Japanese administration in 1972. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers the territory since Tokyo is the defacto administrator of the islands. While U.S. officials have made it now quite clear they wish to see both sides work towards some sort of compromise, multiple American officials—including the President Obama himself—have made it clear the islands would be defended, along with any other part of Japanese territory, from any sort of outside aggression.¶ <u><strong>While tensions today over the islands run high, <mark>the possibility of armed conflict is a</mark> relatively <mark>new phenomenon</u></strong></mark>. During the 1970’s, Japan and China had different goals—the normalization of relations. Both sides understood the challenge the dispute over the islands could pose to such a goal. Creating an even larger stumbling block was a 1969 UN-led geologic survey that claimed possible vast natural resources in the surrounding area around the islands. Negotiators came up with an interesting compromise: to relegate the issue to future generations and/or downplay the dispute. Both nations were more concerned about cementing ties in light of rising Soviet power in the Pacific than competing island claims. Here the work of MIT professor M. Taylor Fravel, who is largely credited to bringing these discussions to light, is important:¶ In 1972, Zhou Enlai and Takeiri Yoshikazu (leader of the Komeito party) appeared to agree orally not to discuss the Senkakus in talks that would be held to normalize relations between the two countries. In a recent book, Seton Hall scholar Yinan He cites a collection of documents on Chinese-Japanese relations: in July 1972, Zhou told Takeiri, “There is no need to mention the Diaoyu Islands. It does not count a problem of any sort compared to recovering normal relations [between the two countries].” A Japanese magazine article earlier this month contains a similar account. Thus, from China’s point of view, the decision not to discuss the dispute at the time was a recognition that a dispute did exist.¶ Fravel also notes a similar discussion several years later that are also telling:¶ Similarly, in 1978, Deng Xiaoping and the Japanese Foreign Minister also appeared to agree orally not to discuss the Senkakus at a later time. A chronology or nianpu of Deng’s activities published by a party research office summarizes a meeting between Deng and Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda. According to the book, Deng stated: “It’s not that China and Japan do not have any problems. For example [there are] the Diaoyu Island and continental shelf issues. Don’t drag them in now, they can be set aside to be calmly discussed later and we can slowly reach a way that both sides can accept. If our generation cannot find a way, the next generation or the one after that will find a way.”¶ While neither side dropped its claims, tension over the area remained frozen until 2010. With the threat of the Soviet Union gone and the rise of nationalism in both countries, old claims resurfaced. Thanks to a 2010 incident involving the seizure by Japan of a Chinese fisherman near the islands the issue sparked a major diplomatic row. Matters grew more complicated in April 2012 when Tokyo’s then governor, Shintaro Ishihara, announced a plan during a lecture at the Washington DC-based Heritage Foundation to purchase 3 of the 5 islands from private Japanese owners, inflaming tensions. The government of then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda felt compelled to act. The government was concerned that if Ishihara purchased the disputed territory tensions would grow to unacceptable levels. Looking over its options, it was decided an effort must be made to head off the possible Ishihara purchase, having Japan buy the islands themselves—effectively nationalizing them. Tokyo, which expected a negative reaction from Beijing, felt it was important to control the situation and hedge against what was felt at the time would be an even less desirable outcome. Japan saw the issue as a “transfer of property from a private owner to the central government and would not change the status quo.” China considered the action illegal which has led to strained ties to this day.¶ <u><strong><mark>China’s reaction</mark> to brewing tensions over the contested islands in the East China Sea <mark>has grown ever more aggressive. </mark>China has utilized a strategy</u></strong>—as one scholar has dubbed it —<u><strong>of “small-stick diplomacy.” <mark>Beijing has sent</mark> varying amounts of non-naval <mark>maritime vessels</u></strong></mark>, from fishing vessels to unarmed coast guard craft <u><strong>to press its claims</u></strong>. As China claims these islands as part of its “core interests,” <u><strong><mark>Beijing feels it has the right to patrol them</mark> and fish them acting <mark>as if they are</mark> undisputed, <mark>sovereign waters</u></strong></mark>. China has also sent air assets—namely reconnaissance aircraft and at times fighter aircraft in clear attempts to demonstrate sovereignty. An early 2013 incident involving a Chinese destroyer locking its firing-radar onto a Japanese destroyer and helicopter clearly demonstrated the dangerous escalatory nature of these competing claims. Beijing has also declared as of November 23, 2013, an ADIZ across a large swath of the East China Sea that covers the disputed islands. Less than twenty-four hours after China’s declaration, Washington was quick to reiterate its treaty commitments to Tokyo. In a statement by the U.S. Department of Defense, “We remain steadfast in our commitments to our allies and partners. The U.S. reaffirms its longstanding policy that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands.”¶ <u><strong>China’s reaction has created an equally concerning Japanese reaction. <mark>Tokyo has sought to increase its defense budget</mark> after over a decade of small decreases</u></strong>. <u><strong>Japan is also re-orientating its forces towards the area of dispute with China, developing amphibious-landing capabilities and training with U.S. forces as well as increasing the procurement of ever-advanced conventionally powered submarines and highly advanced helicopter carriers that can deploy</u></strong>, in theory, <u><strong>American V-22 Osprey’s that could carry small groups of combat troops to the Senkakus</u></strong>.¶ So what happens if either side starts shooting over these small but hotly disputed islands?¶ When considering China’s and Japan’s escalating tensions over the Senkakus, Beijing’s A2/AD strategy is an extremely important aspect of such a discussion. <u><strong>China would essentially deploy the same strategy it would use against the U.S. </u></strong>Considering that Japan’s Navy, excluding the U.S., is the most advanced in Asia; China would have no choice but to use an asymmetric strategy in a wartime scenario. Most experts expect Washington would come to Tokyo’s aid. While U.S. officials—for obvious reasons—have not spelled out what assistance they would provide, it seems reasonable to suggest such efforts would be largely compromised of naval assets. <u><strong>Washington has forward deployed a Carrier Battle Group (or CBG) in Japan that would likely be utilized in such a scenario.</strong>¶</u> <u><strong>If a crisis broke out, China would gain considerable advantage in striking its opponents early with massive conventional force.</u></strong> One option would be a considerable kinetic strike utilizing its sizeable arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles. <u><strong><mark>Beijing could launch a massive conventional missile strike</mark> at allied planes sitting unprotected at airfields across the Asia-Pacific. As Roger Cliff explained in a May 2012 interview :</strong>¶</u> The problem is, there are hardly any shelters at all at most bases in the Asia-Pacific. Kadena Air Base, for example, has a grand total of 15 shelters, enough for at most 30 fighter aircraft if you squeeze two into each. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, also on Okinawa, has no aircraft shelters. There are also no shelters at MCAS Iwakuni and Yokota Air Base on Honshu, or Andersen Air Force Base.¶ <u><strong>In the event of war <mark>U.S. and Japanese forces would face </mark>tremendous challenges—including <mark>advanced</mark> anti-ship <mark>ballistic missiles</mark>—which could overwhelm, at least on paper, most allied ballistic missile defense systems by sheer numbers</u></strong>. Even assuming a hit to kill ratio of 1:1, Chinese rocketeers would have many more missiles than allied interceptors—essentially, simple math would be the biggest enemy of allied forces. <u><strong>Not even factoring in other domains of warfare, allied forces in a <mark>Senkakus conflict</mark>—while certainly formidable—<mark>would be highly susceptible to a Chinese preemptive</mark> or early missile <mark>offensive.</u></strong></mark> With very little literature detailing Chinese views on escalation beyond academic works and retired military officials, it is hard to predict Chinese escalation strategies once conflict has begun.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Pummer 15 fulltext: (Theron, Philosophy @St. Andrews http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/) There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>4. Reducing existential risks is the top priority in any coherent moral theory </h4><p>Pummer 15</p><p></strong>(Theron, Philosophy @St. Andrews http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/)</p><p>There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe <u>there is</u> at least <u>one thing</u> <u>it is reasonable to agree on</u> right now, <u><strong>whatever</u></strong> general <u><strong>moral view we adopt</u></strong>: that <u>it is</u> very <u>important to reduce</u> <u>the risk that</u> all intelligent <u>beings</u> on this planet <u>are eliminated by</u> an enormous <u><strong>catastrophe</u></strong>, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that <u><mark>we </u></mark>– <u>whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists</u> – <u><mark>should all agree that we should try <strong>to save the world</mark>.</u></strong> According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. <u><mark>There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is </mark>arguably the <mark>most important </mark>thing in the world</u>, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. <u>Even on a wholly person-affecting view</u> – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – <u>the case for reducing existential risk is very strong</u>. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. <u>You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only.</u> <u><mark>There is a tendency to assume </mark>that, <mark>if an argument appeals to consequentialist </mark>considerations</u> (the goodness of outcomes), <u><strong><mark>it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>But that is a huge mistake</u></strong>. <u>Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness</u> <u>than</u> the goodness of <u>consequences </u>or outcomes; <u><strong>it is not the view that the latter don’t matter</u></strong>. <u>Even </u>John <u><strong>Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account</u></strong> in judging rightness. <u>One which did not would simply be irrational</u>, crazy.” <u><strong>Minimally plausible versions of <mark>deontology </mark>and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view</u></strong>. <u>They’d thus <mark>imply <strong>very strong reasons</strong> to reduce existential risk</u></mark>, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. <u>Even egoism</u>, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, <u>might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. </u>It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that <u><strong><mark>most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future</mark> generations</u></strong> of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. <u>So obviously</u> if Scheffler were right <u>I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk</u>. <u><strong>We should also take into account moral <mark>uncertainty.</u></strong></mark> W<u>hat is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain</u> not (only<u>) about</u> the empirical facts, but also about the <u>moral facts?</u> I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even <u>those </u>(hedonistic egoists) <u><strong>who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken,</u></strong> and that one of the above views is correct. <u><mark>Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one</u> </mark>(and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), <u><strong><mark>they would have pretty strong reason,</mark> from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, <mark>to reduce existential risk</u></strong></mark>. Perhaps most disturbingly still, <u><mark>even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people </mark>matters</u>, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, <u><strong>reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world</u></strong>. Again, this is largely <u>for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future –</u> there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation<u>). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives</u>. It’s possible they’ll be miserable<u>. It is enough</u> for my claim <u>that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world</u>. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And <u>even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to</u>. I suspect that <u>most of us alive today</u> – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – <u>have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve</u>. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Paul Meyer 18, Ph.D., adjunct professor of international studies at Simon Fraser; Tom Sauer, Ph.D., Associate Professor in International Politics at the Universiteit Antwerpen, 03-20-18, “The nuclear ban treaty: a sign of global impatience,” Global Politics and Survival, vol. 60, no. 2, pp.61-72, http://www.ceasefire.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/The-Nuclear-Ban-Treaty-A-Sign-of-Global-Impatience.pdf fulltext: Future of the treaty The ultimate goal of the Humanitarian Initiative was to demonstrate that any use of nuclear weapons would be unacceptably destructive, immoral and illegitimate, and therefore that these weapons should be made illegal, just as chemical and biological weapons, and even landmines and cluster munitions, have been. It determined that an international treaty prohibiting the possession and use of nuclear weapons would be one way of doing so. The negotiation of such a treaty was regarded as an achievable short-term goal that would constitute the first step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Humanitarian Initiative organised three international conferences in 2013–14 (in Norway, Mexico and Austria) that brought together increasing numbers of NGOs and government representatives, and which generated support for UN resolutions and statements at NPT meetings. In 2016, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution authorising the convening of multilateral negotiations in 2017 to develop a legally binding agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons.16 Importantly, the resolution specified that General Assembly rules of procedure would apply, meaning that decisions would be taken by majority vote instead of by consensus. Too often, the need to achieve consensus on previous disarmament-related initiatives had allowed the nuclear-armed states to stymie these efforts. This time, the nonnuclear-weapons states would be able to prevent such obstruction. Having been denied their usual method of blocking progress on disarmament, the nuclear-weapons states and their allies (with the notable exception of the Netherlands) opted to boycott the proceedings. The fact that, in the end, the Netherlands decided to cast the sole negative vote against adoption of the treaty demonstrated the wisdom of circumventing the consensus trap. The ban treaty, like any treaty, is not without its flaws, not least because it was negotiated in a very short time span. One of its flaws is that it represents a mixture of both a prohibition and an elimination treaty. While many had expected that it would be limited to a simple prohibition statement that would later be supplemented by a more extensive Nuclear Weapon Convention detailing the process of elimination, the actual treaty contains both elements, and is therefore best regarded as a framework agreement that will require subsequent supplementary arrangements to specify verification and other procedures. Far from being a major weakness of the treaty as some have suggested,17 however, this pragmatic approach recognises that eventual adherence by nuclear-weapon-possessing states will require their input into how ‘irreversible’ elimination (admittedly a high standard, but one which all parties to the NPT have affirmed) would take place. The interests of non-nuclear-weapons states will be assured through the involvement of a ‘competent international authority’ and agreement on terms by a meeting of treaty signatories. This may be challenging, but is not infeasible. Although the treaty’s adoption at the close of negotiations by 122 states certainly represents a major diplomatic achievement, it is fair to ask what its impact on global nuclear affairs will ultimately be. Sceptics point out that the treaty is of mainly symbolic importance, and that the nuclear-weapons states and their allies, the treaty’s main targets, will not change their policies as they continue to assert that nuclear deterrence is essential for their security. Nevertheless, the treaty’s advocates, while harbouring no delusion that the nuclear-weapons states will radically change course in the short term, believe that it sets in motion two forces that may eventually serve to alter the behaviour of these states and their allies. The first of these is the way the treaty may encourage enhanced restraint by private-sector firms (especially banks and investment funds) with respect to their exposure to the nuclear-weapons industry.18 In an age of ethical investing, banks and investment funds care about their reputation. Once nuclear weapons are declared illegal, many financial institutions will think twice before funding or investing in firms that are doing business in the nuclear-weapons sector. Indeed, a large Norwegian pension fund changed its policy even before the treaty was agreed, and a Dutch pension fund followed suit shortly afterwards.19 It is possible that many more banks will come under pressure to do likewise, which would in turn cause problems for nuclear-weapons-related businesses. This could have implications for state policy. Secondly and more fundamentally, the treaty will demonstrably strengthen the global norm against nuclear weapons, thereby increasing the stigma for states that continue to possess them.20 It is possible that as support for the treaty grows, new societal and political debates about the future of nuclear weapons will emerge within the nuclear-weapons and allied states themselves, especially the five basing states for NATO’s nuclear forces in Europe.21 Indeed, official policy in the Netherlands has already been influenced by civil-society activism. Pax, the main peace movement in that country, successfully collected 40,000 signatures on a 2016 petition against nuclear weapons. That achievement led automatically to a debate on the subject being held in the Dutch parliament on 28 April 2016. The four-hour debate was attended by the Dutch minister of foreign affairs, Bert Koenders, and resulted in motions calling upon the Dutch government to at least attend the ban-treaty negotiations. (These motions received the approval of both opposition and governmental parties.) Despite enormous pressure from the US, the UK and France, as well as other allies, Dutch diplomats did attend, and contribute to, the negotiations – though, as noted, the Netherlands was the only delegation to vote against the treaty. Meanwhile, eminent members of society in many non-nuclear NATO member states have spoken in favour of their governments adopting a positive stance towards the treaty. Once it enters into force, pressure will grow on at least some of these governments (to possibly include Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway) to sign the treaty or align their security policies with its goals. At least one nuclear-weapons state may also feel the near-term effects of the ban treaty. In the UK, the costly renewal of the Trident nuclear deterrent has already triggered a societal debate. Most Scottish politicians are against the retention of nuclear weapons, reflecting in part the fact that the only British nuclear base is less than 65 kilometres from Glasgow. Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn is a lifelong member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and even attended the 2014 Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. Many of his young followers are fervent critics of nuclear weapons. As party leader, he has declared that if he becomes prime minister he will never push the ‘nuclear button’. Although the official party line (reflecting the influence of labour unions and members of parliament) is still in favour of Trident renewal, the consequences of Brexit and economic stagnation may work to overturn that earlier decision given the high opportunity costs that renewal will entail. The Greens are against, and Liberal Democrats are also lukewarm about maintaining nuclear weapons and have suggested a recessed nuclear deterrent instead. This leaves only the Conservative Party fully in favour of renewing Trident. The entry into force of the ban treaty may help the many advocates of nuclear disarmament in the UK to make their point even more vehemently. If Labour wins the next election, a variety of factors (not least cost) may result in Trident renewal being dropped, opening the way for the UK to become a state without nuclear weapons and thus the first NPT nuclear-weapons state to fully realise its Article VI commitment. If the UK signs the ban treaty, a positive domino effect may follow. At a minimum, it will put pressure on the remaining nuclear-weapons states to explain exactly how they intend to achieve the world without nuclear weapons that they have espoused, at least rhetorically, as a goal. Advocates hope that the ban treaty will be a wake-up call for the nuclear weapons states and their allies. If they were previously unaware that nuclear disarmament is viewed as a priority by the rest of the world, they should have received the message now. The ban treaty is nothing less than a heart-felt cry for nuclear abolition. Ignoring it could be a recipe for disaster down the road. If the nuclear-weapons states and their allies do not take substantial steps towards elimination (in the form of deep cuts to arsenals, no-first-use policies, the de-alerting of deployed forces, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons stationed abroad and the halting of modernisation) before the next NPT Review Conference in 2020, the probability of that conference failing will be extremely high. The failure of two such conferences in a row would further erode the authority of what will then be a 50-year-old NPT, and could well lead some of its non-nuclear signatories to abandon it in favour of the more comprehensive provisions of the ban treaty. The prospect of defections from the NPT is certainly not foreseen in the ban treaty itself, which, in a preambular paragraph, reaffirms ‘the full and effective implementation’ of the NPT. Nevertheless, if nuclear-weapons states that are party to the NPT are judged not to be implementing their treaty obligations, non-nuclear-weapons states may begin to lessen their engagement with that treaty regime, especially if they are party to a treaty with higher disarmament standards. The weakening of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime that might result from this process would not be in the interest of the nuclear-weapons states, even if their conduct over the decades would have contributed to bringing it about. In this sense, the ban treaty is the most recent manifestation of decades of frustration over the failure of nuclear-weapons states to realise their NPT obligations, and of the determination of the majority of NPT parties to rebel against the status quo and champion another route for nuclear disarmament. The best way to prevent this scenario is for the nuclear-weapons states to take substantial steps in the direction of nuclear-weapons elimination in the near term.23 The ban treaty serves as a stark reminder of the unfinished business of the NPT.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Establishing an NFU solves---it’s a signal of goodwill that shores up support of the NPT and de-legitimizes the ban treaty</h4><p>Paul <strong>Meyer 18</strong>, Ph.D., adjunct professor of international studies at Simon Fraser; Tom Sauer, Ph.D., Associate Professor in International Politics at the Universiteit Antwerpen, 03-20-18, “The nuclear ban treaty: a sign of global impatience,” Global Politics and Survival, vol. 60, no. 2, pp.61-72, http://www.ceasefire.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/The-Nuclear-Ban-Treaty-A-Sign-of-Global-Impatience.pdf</p><p>Future of the treaty</p><p><u>The ultimate goal of the Humanitarian Initiative was to demonstrate that any use of nuclear weapons would be unacceptably destructive, immoral and illegitimate, and therefore that these weapons should be made illegal,</u> just as chemical and biological weapons, and even landmines and cluster munitions, have been. It determined that <u>an international treaty prohibiting the possession and use of nuclear weapons would be one way of doing so. </u>The <u>negotiation of such a treaty was regarded as an achievable short-term goal that would constitute the first step</u> towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.</p><p>The Humanitarian Initiative organised three international conferences in 2013–14 (in Norway, Mexico and Austria) that brought together increasing numbers of NGOs and government representatives, and which generated support for UN resolutions and statements at NPT meetings. In 2016, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution authorising the convening of multilateral negotiations in 2017 to develop a legally binding agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons.16 Importantly, the resolution specified that General Assembly rules of procedure would apply, meaning that decisions would be taken by majority vote instead of by consensus. <u>Too often, the need to achieve consensus on previous disarmament-related initiatives had allowed the nuclear-armed states to stymie these efforts. This time,</u> the <u>nonnuclear-weapons states would be able to prevent such obstruction. Having been denied their usual method of blocking progress</u> on disarmament, the <u>nuclear-weapons states and their allies</u> (with the notable exception of the Netherlands) <u>opted to boycott the proceedings. The fact that, in the end, the Netherlands decided to cast the sole negative vote against adoption of the treaty demonstrated the wisdom of circumventing the consensus trap.</p><p><mark>The ban treaty</u>,</mark> like any treaty, <u>is not without its flaws, not least because it was negotiated in a very short time span. One of its flaws is that it<mark> represents a mixture of</mark> both a <mark>prohibition and</mark> an <mark>elimination</mark> treaty. </u>While many had expected that it would be limited to a simple prohibition statement that would later be supplemented by a more extensive Nuclear Weapon Convention detailing the process of elimination, <u>the actual treaty contains both elements, and is therefore best regarded as a framework agreement that will require subsequent supplementary arrangements</u> to specify verification and other procedures. <u>Far from being a</u> major <u>weakness</u> of the treaty as some have suggested,17 <u>however, this pragmatic approach recognises that eventual adherence by nuclear-weapon-possessing states will require their input into how ‘irreversible’ elimination</u> (admittedly a high standard, but one which all parties to the NPT have affirmed) <u>would take place. The interests of non-nuclear-weapons states will be assured</u> through the involvement of a ‘competent international authority’ and agreement on terms by a meeting of treaty signatories. <u>This may be challenging, but is not infeasible.</p><p>Although the treaty’s adoption</u> at the close of negotiations by 122 states <u>certainly represents a major diplomatic achievement, it is fair to ask what its impact on global nuclear affairs will ultimately be</u>. Sceptics point out that the treaty is of mainly symbolic importance, and that the nuclear-weapons states and their allies, the treaty’s main targets, will not change their policies as they continue to assert that nuclear deterrence is essential for their security. Nevertheless, the treaty’s advocates, while harbouring no delusion that the nuclear-weapons states will radically change course in the short term, believe that <u>it sets in motion two forces that may eventually serve to alter the behaviour of these states and their allies. </u>The first of these is the way <u>the treaty may encourage enhanced restraint by private-sector firms</u> (especially banks and investment funds) <u>with respect to their exposure to the nuclear-weapons industry.</u>18 In an age of ethical investing, banks and investment funds care about their reputation. <u>Once nuclear weapons are declared illegal, many financial institutions will think twice before funding or investing in firms that are doing business in the nuclear-weapons sector.</p><p>Indeed, a large Norwegian pension fund changed its policy even before the treaty was agreed, and a Dutch pension fund followed suit shortly afterwards.</u>19 <u>It is possible that many more banks will come under pressure to do likewise, which would in turn cause problems for nuclear-weapons-related businesses. This could have implications for state policy.</p><p></u>Secondly and <u>more fundamentally, the treaty will demonstrably strengthen the global norm against nuclear weapons</u>, thereby <u>increasing the stigma for states that continue to possess them.</u>20 It is possible that <u>as support for the treaty grows, new societal and political debates about the future of nuclear weapons will emerge within</u> the nuclear-weapons and <u>allied states </u>themselves, especially the five basing states for NATO’s nuclear forces in Europe.21 Indeed, official policy in the Netherlands has already been influenced by civil-society activism. Pax, the main peace movement in that country, successfully collected 40,000 signatures on a 2016 petition against nuclear weapons. That achievement led automatically to a debate on the subject being held in the Dutch parliament on 28 April 2016. The four-hour debate was attended by the Dutch minister of foreign affairs, Bert Koenders, and resulted in motions calling upon the Dutch government to at least attend the ban-treaty negotiations. (These motions received the approval of both opposition and governmental parties.) <u><mark>Despite</mark> enormous <mark>pressure from the US</mark>, the UK and France, <mark>as well as other allies</mark>,</u> Dutch <u>diplomats did attend, and contribute to, the negotiations </u>– though, as noted, the Netherlands was the only delegation to vote against the treaty. <u>Meanwhile, eminent members of society in many <mark>non-nuclear NATO</mark> member <mark>states have spoken in favour of</mark> their governments <mark>adopting</mark> a positive stance towards <mark>the treaty. </mark>Once it enters into force, <mark>pressure will grow</u></mark> on at least some of these governments (to possibly include Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway) to sign the treaty or align their security policies with its goals.</p><p><u>At least one nuclear-weapons state may also feel the near-term effects of the ban treaty</u>. <u>In the UK, the costly renewal of the Trident nuclear deterrent has already triggered a societal debate</u>. Most Scottish politicians are against the retention of nuclear weapons, reflecting in part the fact that the only British nuclear base is less than 65 kilometres from Glasgow. Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn is a lifelong member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and even attended the 2014 Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. Many of his young followers are fervent critics of nuclear weapons. As party leader, he has declared that if he becomes prime minister he will never push the ‘nuclear button’. Although the official party line (reflecting the influence of labour unions and members of parliament) is still in favour of Trident renewal, the consequences of Brexit and economic stagnation may work to overturn that earlier decision given the high opportunity costs that renewal will entail. The Greens are against, and Liberal Democrats are also lukewarm about maintaining nuclear weapons and have suggested a recessed nuclear deterrent instead. This leaves only the Conservative Party fully in favour of renewing Trident. <u>The entry into force of the ban treaty may help the many advocates of nuclear disarmament in the UK to make their point even more vehemently. If Labour wins the next election, a variety of factors</u> (not least cost) <u>may result in Trident renewal being dropped, opening the way for the UK to become a state without nuclear weapons and thus the first NPT nuclear-weapons state to fully realise its Article VI commitment</u>.</p><p><u><mark>If the UK signs the</mark> ban <mark>treaty</u></mark>, <u><mark>a</mark> positive <mark>domino effect may follow</mark>. At a minimum, it will put pressure on the remaining nuclear-weapons states to explain exactly how they intend to achieve the world without nuclear weapons that they have espoused, at least rhetorically, as a goal.</p><p></u>Advocates hope that the ban treaty will be a wake-up call for the nuclear weapons states and their allies. If they were previously unaware that nuclear disarmament is viewed as a priority by the rest of the world, they should have received the message now. <u>The ban treaty is</u> nothing less than <u>a heart-felt cry for nuclear abolition</u>. <u><mark>Ignoring it could be a recipe for disaster</u></mark> down the road. <u><mark>If</u></mark> the<u> <mark>nuclear-weapons states</u></mark> and their allies <u><mark>do not take</mark> substantial <mark>steps towards elimination (in the form of</u></mark> deep cuts to arsenals<u>, <mark>no-first-use policies</mark>, the de-alerting of deployed forces</u>, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons stationed abroad and the halting of modernisation) <u><mark>before the next NPT Review</mark> Conference <mark>in 2020, the probability of that conference failing will be</mark> extremely <mark>high</mark>. The <mark>failure</mark> of two such conferences in a row <mark>would</mark> further <mark>erode the</mark> authority of what will then be a 50-year-old <mark>NPT, and could</mark> well <mark>lead</mark> some of its non-nuclear <mark>signatories to abandon it</mark> in favour of the more comprehensive provisions of the ban treaty.</p><p></u>The prospect of defections from the NPT is certainly not foreseen in the ban treaty itself, which, in a preambular paragraph, reaffirms ‘the full and effective implementation’ of the NPT. Nevertheless, <u><mark>if nuclear-weapons states</mark> that are party to the NPT <mark>are judged not to be implementing their</mark> treaty <mark>obligations, non-nuclear</mark>-weapons <mark>states may</mark> begin to <mark>lessen</mark> their <mark>engagement</u></mark> with that treaty regime, especially if they are party to a treaty with higher disarmament standards. <u>The weakening of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime that might result from this process would not be in the interest of the nuclear-weapons states</u>, even if their conduct over the decades would have contributed to bringing it about. In this sense, the <u>ban treaty is the most recent manifestation of decades of frustration over the failure of nuclear-weapons states to realise their NPT obligations</u>, and of the determination of the majority of NPT parties to rebel against the status quo and champion another route for nuclear disarmament.</p><p><u>The best way to prevent this scenario is for the nuclear-weapons states to take substantial steps in the direction of nuclear-weapons elimination in the near term</u>.23 The ban treaty serves as a stark reminder of the unfinished business of the NPT.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Barry Pavel 21, senior vice president and director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council; and Vikram Venkatram, Young Global Professional in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, B.A. in Foreign Service from Georgetown University, 9/7/2021, "Facing the future of bioterrorism," https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/article/facing-the-future-of-bioterrorism/, RMax fulltext: Biotechnology has developed at an astounding rate over the first twenty years of the twenty-first century. Emerging biotechnological tools have become cheaper and more accessible than ever before, and less expertise is necessary to use those tools effectively. Amateur biologists can now accomplish feats that would have been impossible until recently for even the foremost experts in top-of-the-line laboratories. The iGEM competition is a great example of this phenomenon in practice: a synthetic biology competition in which amateur scientists compete with one another to build biological systems and operate them within living cells. Similarly, CRISPR, a scientific technique that enables the manipulation of DNA and genetic engineering, can be used in the high-school classroom as an illustrative practical example of biology. There exists a new and growing community of “biohackers” who use novel biotechnology tools to modify their own bodies in a variety of ways. As biotechnologist Drew Endy at Stanford University put it, many years ago hackers would hack computer code, but now they are hacking the code for life.1 Thus, biotechnology capabilities are becoming democratized.In general, this evolution of biotechnology will bring with it an amazing array of changes to our societies, our economies, and our security. The growing biotech revolution will have as great an impact on our way of life as the communications and information revolution. Chronic diseases will be mitigated, human life spans will be extended, and the global economy will be increasingly driven by biological inventions and processes. A new understanding of epigenetics could usher in an era of highly personalized medicine, and gene drives could wipe mosquito-borne diseases like malaria from the planet. One day, engineered living materials, built through synthetic biology, might grow to suit specific architectural needs and heal when faced with wear and tear. Neuroenhancement technology could optimize human performance: increasing learning speed, combatting neurological diseases, or even assisting soldiers by boosting their awareness and decision-making on the battleground. A new generation of scientists will build a suite of as-yet-undiscovered technologies, transforming the world in radical ways.However, greater access to cheap but powerful biotechnology tools—and a reduced need for expertise in operating those tools—also is making it easier for malicious actors to utilize that technology for ill. Terrorist groups could use synthetic biology to craft bioweapons, using data to manufacture dangerous pathogens or modifying easily accessible pathogens to make them more virulent. At present, there are still some barriers to entry that prevent such actors from operating with free reign, as widespread access to certain pathogens, tools, and data is still limited. But these barriers will only continue to recede over the next decade. In evaluating the future of terrorism and counterterrorism, one must consider: How should the United States and its allies prepare to face the growing threat of bioterrorism? Bioterrorism is not a new phenomenon, though past cases have been limited in scope. In the 1990s, a Japanese cult known as Aum Shinrikyo attempted to engineer an aerosolized strain of anthrax or, in other words, a strain of anthrax capable of infecting people through inhalation. The cult’s members were ultimately unsuccessful in their attempts to do so and resorted to releasing sarin gas (a chemical weapon, rather than a biological one) in Tokyo’s subway system on March 20, 1995, which killed thirteen people and sickened thousands of others. Their goal was to release an infectious pathogen in the hopes of causing an epidemic and stimulating a world war that would have allowed them to seize power. They were stymied by a lack of expertise—though cult members included former biologists and some with medical credentials. A decade before, in Oregon, a cult known as the Rajneeshees spread salmonella in the hopes of incapacitating opposing candidates in local government elections. Cult members ultimately caused food poisoning in more than seven hundred and fifty people, marking the largest bioterrorism incident in US history. In 1998, al-Qaeda publicly declared its intent to pursue weapons of mass destruction, including bioweapons. The organization later conducted training courses on the use of such weapons and recruited biologists to help develop a bioweapons program. In the wake of the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, anthrax-laced letters were sent by mail, killing five people. As these cases illustrate, terrorists have already demonstrated a willingness to use biological weapons, without regard for the indiscriminate danger those weapons pose to the entire globe. As COVID-19 has shown, diseases can cross borders, particularly in the globalized world we live in today. A bioweapon released in Tokyo could spread across the world in short order, even if the initial attack is limited in scope (i.e., targeted at a specific group or starting with a relatively small volume of pathogen). These potential large-scale effects of attempted bioterrorism have been mitigated in the past by terrorists’ lack of expertise, and the inherent challenge of using biotechnology to make and release dangerous pathogens. Now, as people gain greater access to this technology and it becomes easier to use, the challenge is easing. Further, COVID-19 has shown that pandemics can have an extraordinary political impact, preying upon and worsening existing fractures in society and among nations. To terrorists, who conduct violence to achieve political aims, this reinforces the fact that a bioweapon could serve their purposes. Thus, incidents of bioterrorism soon will become more prevalent.Given the broad scope and scale of this growing threat, the United States should take a series of actions to mitigate the risks, without unduly stunting the growth of the biotechnology field. To date, bioterrorist attacks have been low-risk, high-impact events. While they have been extremely rare, their frequency will only increase as will their ramifications. However, overregulating the spread of biotechnological tools could stunt innovation and the profound potential of this increasingly important sector. Furthermore, existing methods of preventing bioterrorism may no longer be effective. The government could previously monitor the purchase of expensive and dangerous biotechnology tools and the laboratories that owned them in large quantities. This is no longer possible to the same degree when such tools are increasingly cheap, widespread, and usable in a garage. The FBI is currently attempting to address this risk by building relationships with the iGEM community and with life scientists so that they can report suspicious behavior. These efforts should continue, but are wildly insufficient, since some bioterrorists may have minimal contact with the larger community of biologists and biology hobbyists.The release of a bioweapon by a terrorist, if left unchecked, could spread throughout the globe, just as a naturally occurring pandemic would. Thus, one major step that the United States should take is to establish improved responses to disease outbreaks, particularly learning from COVID-19. This should include building a larger stockpile of PPE and establishing a set of clear step-by-step actions to be taken in the event of an attack. Building resilience in this fashion will not prevent bioterrorism, but it will mitigate its effects, and may slightly disincentivize utilizing bioweapons to cause terror. Beyond this, the United States should secure its laboratories and the data within, as terrorists could leverage that knowledge to build bioweapons. For example, new technology allows pathogens to be synthesized from the data describing their genetic sequences. In a recent controversial study, scientists published a methodology that would allow horsepox virus, a virus very similar to one that causes smallpox, to be synthesized. This research was conducted with a noble goal: understanding how the horsepox virus could be used as a potential treatment for cancer. However, it had significant dual-use implications. Research like this should not be banned outright, but the United States should establish norms to evaluate whether it is worth the risk before such research is conducted, and then ensure that it is conducted and the results published in the most secure ways. Replicability is an important part of science, but the general public should not be able to replicate the most dangerous experiments. Where building resilience would reduce the impact of a bioterror incident, restricting access to dual-use methodologies will reduce the likelihood of one occurring in the first place.Finally, enforcing domestic standards is not enough. Pathogens spread across borders, and the spillover effects of even a targeted bioterrorist attack could kill many unintended victims. Thus, the United States must work with other countries to protect against the bioterrorist threat, monitor the emergence of new viruses and bacteria that could be leveraged for a bioweapon, limit access to the most dangerous pathogens (and data associated with those), and build global response networks in the event of an attack. Importantly, this collaboration should emphasize working with allies, but should also include adversaries: if China or Russia remain unregulated, an attack within their borders would still affect the United States and its allies. Emerging biotechnology will result in new medicines and medical techniques, a greater understanding of how pathogens function and spread (and thus a better understanding of how to combat them), a healthier populace, innovative new capabilities that could transform daily life, and greater engagement with the biological sciences. While ensuring that these benefits are maintained, the United States and its allies and partners must take logical steps to protect themselves from the worst-case scenarios. The risk of bioterrorism is growing, and the United States must be prepared to face the future.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Recent biotech developments have significantly increased the ease of engineered pathogens---allied response building is crucial. </h4><p>Barry <strong>Pavel 21</strong>, senior vice president and director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council; and Vikram Venkatram, Young Global Professional in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, B.A. in Foreign Service from Georgetown University, 9/7/2021, "Facing the future of bioterrorism," https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/article/facing-the-future-of-bioterrorism/, RMax</p><p><u><strong>Biotechnology</strong> has developed at an <strong>astounding rate</u></strong> over the first twenty years of the twenty-first century. Emerging biotechnological <u><strong>tools</strong> have become <strong>cheaper</strong> and <strong>more accessible</u></strong> than ever before, and <u><strong>less expertise</strong> is necessary</u> to use those tools effectively. <u><strong>Amateur</strong> biologists can</u> now <u>accomplish feats</u> that would have been impossible until recently for even the foremost experts in top-of-the-line laboratories. The iGEM competition is a great example of this phenomenon in practice: a synthetic biology competition in which amateur scientists compete with one another to build biological systems and operate them within living cells. Similarly, <u><strong>CRISPR</u></strong>, a scientific technique that enables the manipulation of DNA and genetic engineering, <u>can be used in</u> the <u><strong>high-school classroom</u></strong> as an illustrative practical example of biology. There exists a new and growing community of <u>“<strong>biohackers</strong>”</u> who <u>use novel biotechnology</u> tools <u>to modify their own bodies</u> in a variety of ways. As biotechnologist Drew Endy at Stanford University put it, many years ago hackers would hack computer code, but now <u>they are hacking the <strong>code for life</u></strong>.1 Thus, biotechnology capabilities are becoming democratized.In general, this evolution of biotechnology will bring with it an amazing array of changes to our societies, our economies, and our security. The growing <u><strong>biotech revolution</strong> will have</u> as <u>great</u> an <u>impact on our way of life</u> as the communications and information revolution. Chronic <u><strong>diseases</strong> will be <strong>mitigated</u></strong>, human <u>life spans will be <strong>extended</u></strong>, and the global economy will be increasingly driven by biological inventions and processes. A new understanding of <u><strong>epigenetics</strong> could usher in</u> an era of highly <u><strong>personalized medicine</u></strong>, and <u>gene drives could wipe</u> mosquito-borne <u>diseases</u> like malaria <u>from the planet</u>. One day, engineered living materials, built through synthetic biology, might grow to suit specific architectural needs and heal when faced with wear and tear. <u><strong>Neuroenhancement</u></strong> technology <u>could optimize</u> human performance: increasing learning speed, <u>combatting neurological <strong>diseases</u></strong>, or even assisting soldiers by boosting their awareness and decision-making on the battleground. A new generation of scientists will build a suite of as-yet-undiscovered technologies, transforming the world in radical ways.However, <u>greater access to <strong>cheap</strong> but <strong>powerful biotech</strong>nology <strong>tools</u></strong>—<u>and</u> a <u><strong>reduced need</strong> for <strong>expertise</u></strong> in operating those tools—also <u>is making it <strong>easier</strong> for <strong>malicious actors</strong> to utilize that technology</u> for ill. Terrorist <u>groups could</u> use synthetic biology to <u>craft <strong>bioweapons</strong>, using data to manufacture dangerous pathogens or</u> modifying easily accessible pathogens to <u>make them <strong>more virulent</u></strong>. At present, there are still some barriers to entry that prevent such actors from operating with free reign, as widespread access to certain pathogens, tools, and data is still limited. But these <u>barriers will <strong>only continue to recede</u></strong> over the next decade. In evaluating the future of terrorism and counterterrorism, one must consider: How should the United States and its allies prepare to face the growing threat of bioterrorism?</p><p><u>Bioterrorism is <strong>not</u></strong> a <u>new</u> phenomenon, though <u><strong>past cases</strong> have been <strong>limited</u></strong> in scope. In the 1990s, a Japanese cult known as Aum Shinrikyo attempted to engineer an aerosolized strain of anthrax or, in other words, a strain of anthrax capable of infecting people through inhalation. The cult’s members were ultimately unsuccessful in their attempts to do so and resorted to releasing sarin gas (a chemical weapon, rather than a biological one) in Tokyo’s subway system on March 20, 1995, which killed thirteen people and sickened thousands of others. Their goal was to release an infectious pathogen in the hopes of causing an epidemic and stimulating a world war that would have allowed them to seize power. They were <u><strong>stymied</strong> by a lack of <strong>expertise</u></strong>—though cult members included former biologists and some with medical credentials.</p><p>A decade before, in Oregon, a cult known as the Rajneeshees spread salmonella in the hopes of incapacitating opposing candidates in local government elections. Cult members ultimately caused food poisoning in more than seven hundred and fifty people, marking the largest bioterrorism incident in US history. In 1998, al-Qaeda publicly declared its intent to pursue weapons of mass destruction, including bioweapons. The organization later conducted training courses on the use of such weapons and recruited biologists to help develop a bioweapons program. In the wake of the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, anthrax-laced letters were sent by mail, killing five people.</p><p>As these cases illustrate, <u><strong>terrorists</strong> have</u> already <u>demonstrated a <strong>willingness</strong> to use <strong>bio</strong>logical <strong>weapons</u></strong>, without regard for the indiscriminate danger those weapons pose to the entire globe. As <u>COVID</u>-19 has <u>shown, diseases can <strong>cross borders</u></strong>, particularly <u>in the <strong>globalized world</u></strong> we live in today. A <u><strong>bioweapon</u></strong> released <u>in Tokyo could spread across the world in <strong>short order</strong>, even if the <strong>initial</strong> attack is <strong>limited</u></strong> in scope (i.e., targeted at a specific group or starting with a relatively small volume of pathogen). These potential <u><strong>large-scale effects</strong> of</u> attempted <u>bioterrorism have been mitigated <strong>in the past</strong> by</u> terrorists’ <u>lack of <strong>expertise</u></strong>, and the inherent challenge of using biotechnology to make and release dangerous pathogens. <u><strong>Now</u></strong>, as people gain <u><strong>greater access</strong> to this <strong>tech</strong>nology</u> and it becomes easier to use, the <u>challenge is <strong>easing</u></strong>. Further, COVID-19 has shown that <u><strong>pandemics</u></strong> can have an extraordinary political impact, <u><strong>prey</u></strong>ing <u>upon</u> and worsening existing <u><strong>fractures</strong> in society and among nations</u>. To terrorists, who conduct violence to achieve political aims, this reinforces the fact that a bioweapon could serve their purposes. Thus, <u>incidents of <strong>bioterror</strong>ism <strong>soon</strong> will become <strong>more prevalent</u></strong>.Given the broad scope and scale of this growing threat, the United States should take a series of actions to mitigate the risks, without unduly stunting the growth of the biotechnology field. To date, bioterrorist attacks have been low-risk, high-impact events. While they have been extremely rare, their <u>frequency will <strong>only increase</u></strong> <u>as will their <strong>ramifications</u></strong>. However, overregulating the spread of biotechnological tools could stunt innovation and the profound potential of this increasingly important sector. Furthermore, existing methods of preventing bioterrorism may no longer be effective. The <u>government could previously <strong>monitor</u></strong> the <u>purchase of</u> expensive and <u><strong>dangerous biotech</strong>nology</u> tools and the laboratories that owned them in large quantities. <u><strong>This is no longer possible</u></strong> to the same degree when such tools are increasingly cheap, widespread, and usable in a garage. The FBI is currently attempting to address this risk by building relationships with the iGEM community and with life scientists so that they can report suspicious behavior. These efforts should continue, but are wildly insufficient, since some bioterrorists may have minimal contact with the larger community of biologists and biology hobbyists.The release of <u>a <strong>bioweapon</u></strong> by a terrorist, if left unchecked, <u>could <strong>spread throughout the globe</u></strong>, just as a naturally occurring pandemic would. Thus, one major step that the <u>United States should</u> take is to <u>establish <strong>improved responses</strong> to disease outbreaks</u>, particularly learning from COVID-19. This should include building a larger stockpile of PPE and establishing a set of clear step-by-step actions to be taken in the event of an attack. Building resilience in this fashion will not prevent bioterrorism, but it will mitigate its effects, and may slightly disincentivize utilizing bioweapons to cause terror. Beyond this, the United States should secure its laboratories and the data within, as terrorists could leverage that knowledge to build bioweapons. For example, new technology allows pathogens to be synthesized from the data describing their genetic sequences. In a recent controversial study, scientists published a methodology that would allow horsepox virus, a virus very similar to one that causes smallpox, to be synthesized. This research was conducted with a noble goal: understanding how the horsepox virus could be used as a potential treatment for cancer. However, it had significant dual-use implications. Research like this should not be banned outright, but the United States should establish norms to evaluate whether it is worth the risk before such research is conducted, and then ensure that it is conducted and the results published in the most secure ways. Replicability is an important part of science, but the general public should not be able to replicate the most dangerous experiments. Where building resilience would reduce the impact of a bioterror incident, restricting access to dual-use methodologies will reduce the likelihood of one occurring in the first place.Finally, enforcing <u><strong>domestic standards</strong> is <strong>not enough</strong>. Pathogens spread <strong>across borders</strong>, and</u> the <u><strong>spillover effects</u></strong> of even a targeted bioterrorist attack <u>could kill many unintended victims</u>. Thus, <u>the United States must work with <strong>other countries</strong> to protect against</u> the <u><strong>bioterror</u></strong>ist threat, <u>monitor</u> the emergence of <u><strong>new viruses</u></strong> and bacteria that could be leveraged for a bioweapon, <u><strong>limit access</strong> to the most dangerous pathogens</u> (and data associated with those), <u>and build <strong>global response networks</u></strong> in the event of an attack. Importantly, <u>this</u> collaboration <u>should emphasize <strong>working with allies</u></strong>, but should also include adversaries: if China or Russia remain unregulated, an attack within their borders would still affect the United States and its allies.</p><p>Emerging biotechnology will result in new medicines and medical techniques, a greater understanding of how pathogens function and spread (and thus a better understanding of how to combat them), a healthier populace, innovative new capabilities that could transform daily life, and greater engagement with the biological sciences. While ensuring that these benefits are maintained, the <u>United States and</u> its <u><strong>allies</u></strong> and partners <u>must take logical steps to protect themselves</u> from the worst-case scenarios. The <u>risk of bioterrorism is <strong>growing</strong>, and the United States <strong>must</strong> be prepared to face the future</u>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Bessler ‘16 (John, Associate Professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law , “The Inequality of America's Death Penalty: A Crossroads for Capital Punishment at the Intersection of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,” 73 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Online 487, https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol73/iss1/22/) fulltext: But in this second decade of the twenty-first century, the U.S. Supreme Court now finds itself at a crossroads as regards the punishment of death. It can let it continue, or it can say no more--no more will the United States of America engage in state-sanctioned killing. "The most profound consequence of the Court's failure to address the issue of race in its capital jurisprudence," the Steikers aptly note, "is that the unjust influence of race in the capital punishment process continues unchecked." 292 As they explain in their book: More broadly, the Court's failure to address forthrightly the death penalty's racialized history and current practice has disserved the Court in its role as chronicler of history and social and political practices. Had the Court framed its constitutional regulation of capital punishment against the backdrop of antebellum codes, lynchings, mob-dominated trials, and disparate enforcement patterns, the Court would have done a much better job of explaining why the American death penalty deserved the sustained attention of the American judiciary. This would have been true even if the Court ultimately had framed its doctrines in nonracial terms. 293 VI. Conclusion The death penalty's racial and gender bias is clear. 294 Congressman John Conyers once took note of the "gender [*566] discrimination" associated with capital sentencing, 295 and Professor Elizabeth Rapaport--a law professor at the University of New Mexico School of Law--has written of the "chivalrous disinclination to sentence women to die." While articulating her "chivalry" theory, she simultaneously posits an "evil woman" hypothesis to explain "the gender stereotyping that has historically dehumanized despised female murderers" and resulted in their execution when they violate "sex role expectations" (e.g., by killing their children or husbands). 296 The Washington, D.C.-based Death Penalty Information Center, documenting the racial prejudice in the death penalty's administration, also cites study after study showing that killers of whites are much more likely to be sentenced to death than killers of blacks. In the modern era, the statistics for those [*567] executed for interracial homicides are particularly telling. While 20 people have been executed for interracial homicides involving a white defendant and a black victim, an exponentially higher number of people--282--have been executed where the defendant was black and the victim was white. 297 Such discrimination calls for a remedy, and in the case of the death penalty, the only remedy that will suffice is the death penalty's abolition. In "Matters of Strata," Professor Goldfarb emphasizes that "when race, gender, and class play an explanatory role in decisions about who receives a death sentence, under the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence those decisions constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment." 298 And her perceptive essay, in tracing Joseph Giarratano's case and the ideologies and long history of discrimination undergirding the death penalty that "undermine" its legitimacy, 299 makes clear that, as a society, we need "to find other approaches." 300 Just as the U.S. Supreme Court, in Shelley v. Kraemer, 301 held in the 1940s that judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants attempting to bar minorities from ownership or occupancy of real property violated due process and equal protection principles, a wholly arbitrary and discriminatory death penalty regime--one still in place in the twenty-first century--should not be tolerated. 302 A government [*568] should not involve itself with such a cruel and torturous punishment--one that, throughout American history, has been imbibed with racial discrimination, gender inequities, malice and hatred, and lottery-like arbitrariness. 303 In their 2015 dissent in Glossip v. Gross, 304 Justice Stephen Breyer--joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg--called for a "full briefing" on whether capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment and concluded that it is "highly likely" that it does. 305 In a subsequent speech in Chicago, Illinois, Justice Ginsburg--in talking about their dissenting opinion in Glossip--specifically highlighted the death penalty's arbitrariness, telling her audience: "Factors that should not affect imposition of the death penalty, studies documented, often do, prime among those factors, race and geography." 306 "Ultimately," she said, "the considerations Justice Breyer discussed at length may bring us back to the years 1972-76, when no executions took place in the United States." 307 Already, the American death penalty is actively [*569] used in only a small fraction of U.S. counties. 308 As Emily Bazelon wrote for the New York Times Magazine in 2016: "A new geography of capital punishment is taking shape, with just 2 percent of the nation's counties now accounting for a majority of the people sitting on death row." 309 In State v. Santiago, 310 the Connecticut Supreme Court declared that state's death penalty unconstitutional. In doing so, it held that "the eighth amendment is offended not only by the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, but also by the greater evils of racial discrimination and other forms of pernicious bias in the selection of who will be executed." 311 As that court emphasized: "Unfortunately, numerous studies have found that '[e]rrors can and have been made repeatedly in the trial of death penalty cases because of poor representation, racial prejudice, prosecutorial misconduct, or simply the presentation of erroneous evidence.'" 312 "A study of all death sentences in the United States in the two decades following Furman," it pointed out, "found 'extremely high error rates' . . . ; with at least two thirds of capital sentences eventually overturned on appeal." 313 "Statistical analyses studies," it added, "have demonstrated to a near certainty that innocent Americans have been and will continue to be executed in the post-Furman era." 314 As the court concluded after compiling all of the evidence: "To the extent that the ultimate punishment is imposed on an offender on the basis [*570] of impermissible considerations such as his, or his victim's, race, ethnicity, or socio-economic status, rather than the severity of his crime, his execution does not restore but, rather, tarnishes the moral order." 315 Hopefully, the U.S. Supreme Court will soon follow suit, looking to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Connecticut and other judicial systems around the world that have already outlawed the punishment of death. Way back in 1995, South Africa's Constitutional Court--in the wake of apartheid's demise--declared the death penalty to be unconstitutional as a "cruel, inhuman or degrading" punishment. 316 Ironically, the President of the Court, Arthur Chaskalson, in writing for South [*571] Africa's highest court, looked to the reasoning of an American case--Furman v. Georgia--to support the propositions that "[a]t every stage of the process there is an element of chance" and that "poverty, race and chance play roles in the outcome of capital cases and in the final decision as to who should live and who should die." 317 If the present-day U.S. Supreme Court would only return to its own roots--Furman's denunciation of the death penalty as a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 318 --the American legal system could finally uproot a barbaric, discriminatory practice rooted in the Dark Ages and the institution of slavery.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><u>First</u>, only <u>complete abolition</u> of the death penalty can remedy the state’s <u>racist murder</u> of innocents.</h4><p><strong>Bessler ‘16</strong> (John, Associate Professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law , “The Inequality of America's Death Penalty: A Crossroads for Capital Punishment at the Intersection of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,” 73 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Online 487, https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol73/iss1/22/)</p><p>But in this second decade of the twenty-first century, <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> U.S. Supreme <u><strong><mark>Court</u></strong></mark> now finds itself at a crossroads as regards the punishment of death. It can let it continue, or it <u><strong><mark>can say</u></strong></mark> no more--<u><strong><mark>no more will</u></strong></mark> the United States of <u><strong><mark>America engage in state-sanctioned killing</u></strong></mark>. "<mark>The most profound consequence of the Court's failure to address the issue</mark> of race in its capital jurisprudence," the Steikers aptly note, "<mark>is that <u><strong>the unjust influence of race in</mark> the <mark>capital punishment</mark> process <mark>continues unchecked</u></strong></mark>." 292 As they explain in their book: More broadly, the Court's failure to address forthrightly the death penalty's racialized history and current practice has disserved the Court in its role as chronicler of history and social and political practices. Had the Court framed its constitutional regulation of capital punishment against the backdrop of antebellum codes, lynchings, mob-dominated trials, and disparate enforcement patterns, the Court would have done a much better job of explaining why the American death penalty deserved the sustained attention of the American judiciary. This would have been true even if the Court ultimately had framed its doctrines in nonracial terms. 293 VI. Conclusion The death penalty's racial and gender bias is clear. 294 Congressman John Conyers once took note of the "gender [*566] discrimination" associated with capital sentencing, 295 and Professor Elizabeth Rapaport--a law professor at the University of New Mexico School of Law--has written of the "chivalrous disinclination to sentence women to die." While articulating her "chivalry" theory, she simultaneously posits an "evil woman" hypothesis to explain "the gender stereotyping that has historically dehumanized despised female murderers" and resulted in their execution when they violate "sex role expectations" (e.g., by killing their children or husbands). 296 The Washington, D.C.-based Death Penalty Information Center, documenting the racial prejudice in the death penalty's administration, also cites <u><strong>study after study showing that killers of whites are much more likely to be sentenced to death than killers of blacks</u></strong>. In the modern era, the statistics for those [*567] executed for interracial homicides are particularly telling. While 20 people have been executed for interracial homicides involving a white defendant and a black victim, an exponentially higher number of people--282--have been executed where the defendant was black and the victim was white. 297 <u><strong>Such discrimination calls for a remedy, and</u></strong> in the case of the death penalty, <u><strong><mark>the only remedy </mark>that will suffice <mark>is the death penalty's abolition</mark>.</u></strong> In "Matters of Strata," Professor Goldfarb emphasizes that "when race, gender, and class play an explanatory role in decisions about who receives a death sentence, under the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence those decisions constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment." 298 And her perceptive essay, in tracing Joseph Giarratano's case and the ideologies and long history of discrimination undergirding the death penalty that "undermine" its legitimacy, 299 makes clear that, as a society, we need "to find other approaches." 300 Just as the U.S. Supreme Court, in Shelley v. Kraemer, 301 held in the 1940s that judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants attempting to bar minorities from ownership or occupancy of real property violated due process and equal protection principles, a wholly arbitrary and discriminatory death penalty regime--one still in place in the twenty-first century--should not be tolerated. 302 A <u><strong><mark>government</u></strong></mark> [*568] <u><strong><mark>should not involve itself with</mark> such <mark>a</mark> cruel and torturous <mark>punishment</mark>--one <mark>that</mark>, throughout American history, <mark>has been imbibed with racial discrimination, gender inequities</mark>, malice <mark>and</mark> hatred, and <mark>lottery-like arbitrariness</u></strong></mark>. 303 In their 2015 dissent in Glossip v. Gross, 304 Justice Stephen Breyer--joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg--called for a "full briefing" on whether capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment and concluded that it is "highly likely" that it does. 305 In a subsequent speech in Chicago, Illinois, Justice Ginsburg--in talking about their dissenting opinion in Glossip--specifically highlighted the death penalty's arbitrariness, telling her audience: "Factors that should not affect imposition of the death penalty, studies documented, often do, prime among those factors, race and geography." 306 "Ultimately," she said, "the considerations Justice Breyer discussed at length may bring us back to the years 1972-76, when no executions took place in the United States." 307 Already, the American death penalty is actively [*569] used in only a small fraction of U.S. counties. 308 As Emily Bazelon wrote for the New York Times Magazine in 2016: "A new geography of capital punishment is taking shape, with just 2 percent of the nation's counties now accounting for a majority of the people sitting on death row." 309 In State v. Santiago, 310 the Connecticut Supreme Court declared that state's death penalty unconstitutional. In doing so, it held that "the eighth amendment is offended not only by the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, but also by the greater evils of racial discrimination and other forms of pernicious bias in the selection of who will be executed." 311 As that court emphasized: "Unfortunately, numerous studies have found that '[e]rrors can and have been made repeatedly in the trial of death penalty cases because of poor representation, racial prejudice, prosecutorial misconduct, or simply the presentation of erroneous evidence.'" 312 <u><strong>"A study of all death sentences in the</u></strong> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>in the two decades following Furman</u></strong>," it pointed out, <u><strong>"found 'extremely high error rates' . . . ; with at least two thirds of capital sentences eventually overturned on appeal."</u></strong> 313 "<mark>Statistical analyses</mark> studies," it added, "have <mark>demonstrated</mark> to <u><strong><mark>a near certainty that innocent Americans have been and will continue to be executed</mark> in the post-Furman era."</u></strong> 314 As the court concluded after compiling all of the evidence: "To the extent that the ultimate punishment is imposed on an offender on the basis [*570] of impermissible considerations such as his, or his victim's, race, ethnicity, or socio-economic status, rather than the severity of his crime, his execution does not restore but, rather, tarnishes the moral order." 315 <u><strong>Hopefully, the</u></strong> U.S. <u><strong>Supreme Court will soon follow suit, looking to</u></strong> the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of <u><strong>Connecticut and other judicial systems around the world that have already outlawed the punishment of death.</u></strong> Way back in 1995, South Africa's Constitutional Court--in the wake of apartheid's demise--declared the death penalty to be unconstitutional as a "cruel, inhuman or degrading" punishment. 316 Ironically, the President of the Court, Arthur Chaskalson, in writing for South [*571] Africa's highest court, looked to the reasoning of an American case--Furman v. Georgia--to support the propositions that "[a]t every stage of the process there is an element of chance" and that "poverty, race and chance play roles in the outcome of capital cases and in the final decision as to who should live and who should die." 317 <u><strong><mark>If the</u></strong></mark> present-day U.S. Supreme <u><strong><mark>Court would</mark> only <mark>return to</mark> its own roots--Furman's <mark>denunciation of the death penalty as a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments</u></strong></mark> 318 --<u><strong><mark>the American legal system could</mark> finally <mark>uproot a barbaric</mark>, discriminatory <mark>practice rooted in</mark> the Dark Ages and <mark>the institution of slavery</mark>.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Kallis et al 20. Giorgos Kallis, ICREA professor @ ICTAUAB, ecological economics and political ecology. “The Case for Degrowth,” Polity Press, 2020. ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-3562-0 fulltext: As this book goes to press, in April 2020, the World Health Organization has declared a global pandemic of COVID-19. We write these lines quarantined in our homes in Barcelona and Florida. We are not prophets, so we cannot predict how health and economic crises will have unfolded by the time you read this book. One thing we do know is that the case for degrowth will remain as relevant as ever. We make a case for attributing current ecological disequilibrium and a range of social ills to the relentless pursuit of growth. It would be naive to claim that this pandemic is proof of limits to growth, a messianic reckoning for our unsustainable ways. Epidemics happened in the past and will happen in the future. Yet the speed and scope of this contagion are clearly driven by interconnectivities of accelerated global economies, exemplified in its spread via airplane and ship routes. The growing ease with which viruses jump from animals to humans is conditioned by expansion of corporate agricultural systems, encroachment of humans on habitats, and the commodification of wildlife, all integral to current growth economies. The failure of some leaders to respond quickly and to protect their populations, as well as urges to restart economies before the pandemic is over, can likewise be understood in the context of ongoing pushes to sustain growth analyzed in this book. One dangerous dimension of these pushes is rejection of scientific evidence and advice. In recent decades, climate change deniers have undermined faith in science among a portion of the public in efforts to defend fossil-fueled growth. Not welcoming scientific findings that threaten growth economies, some governments have cut funding for pandemic research units and epidemic control teams, as well as studies on mitigation and adaptation to climate change. Several decades of budget cuts to public health and to social and civil security infrastructures, enacted in the name of economic growth, have eroded capacities of many states to respond to this crisis. The pandemic has lain bare the fragility of existing economic systems. Wealthy nations have more than enough resources to cover public health and basic needs during a crisis, and could weather declines in non-essential parts of the economy by reallocating work and resources to essential ones. Yet the way current economic systems are organized around constant circulation, any decline in market activity threatens systemic collapse, provoking generalized unemployment and impoverishment. It doesn’t have to be this way. To be more resilient to future crises – pandemic, climatic, financial, or political – we need to build systems capable of scaling back production in ways that do not cause loss of livelihood or life. Some of you might protest, “Isn’t the coronavirus crisis revealing the misery of degrowth?” We invite you to first read this book. What is happening during the pandemic is not degrowth. The goal of degrowth is to purposefully slow things down in order to minimize harm to humans and earth systems. The current situation is terrible, not because carbon emissions are declining, which is good, but because many lives are lost; it is terrible not because GDPs are going down, to which we are indifferent, but because there are no processes in place to protect livelihoods when growth falters. For us, caring and community solidarity are vital principles of degrowth societies, and engines for moving in more equitable and sustainable directions. We would like to see societies become slower by design, not disaster. This pandemic exemplifies the types of growth-induced disasters we diagnose in this book. The economic policies and social arrangements we propose offer ways to make such situations more livable and just, to emerge stronger and better post-crisis, and to reorient practices and politics that are setting the scene for future disasters. The end of growth will not necessarily involve a smooth transition. It may very well be unplanned, unwilled, and messy, in conditions not of our own choosing. Conditions like the ones we are living through now. History often evolves with punctuations; our analysis shows how periods of paralysis can reach a tipping point, when unexpected events open new possibilities and violently close others. The COVID-19 pandemic is such an event. Suddenly, things take radical new directions, and the unthinkable becomes thinkable, for better or for worse. Severe economic depression led to Roosevelt’s New Deal, and also to Hitler’s Third Reich. What are the possibilities and dangers now? Amid this pandemic, many scientific, political, and moral authorities are communicating the message that caring for people’s health and wellbeing should come before profit, and that is great. A resurgence of the care ethic that we advocate is evident in the willingness of younger people to stay home to protect their elders, and in the spirit of duty and sacrifice among care and health workers. Of course, many stay home also because they fear the virus and worry about themselves, or to avoid police fines. And many care workers go to work because they must earn a living. But, as we argue, acting collectively against such crises requires combinations of sacrifice and solidarity, self and collective interest, government interventions and popular consensus about the right thing to do. Deep inequalities are coming into play in new ways. While some have the luxury of sheltering at home, others must choose between unemployment without an adequate safety net and exposure to the coronavirus in jobs involving care work and provisioning. As the pandemic plays out differently in different parts of the world, those who are in more vulnerable identities and positions are likely to suffer more than others. These injustices coexist with an awareness that, unless whole populations are protected, not even the wealthiest are fully safe from contagion. In this crisis, like others before, people have mobilized and self-organized where businesses and governments have failed to provide for their needs – from mutual aid groups delivering food and medicines for elders, to groups of doctors, engineers, and hackers collaborating to 3-D print components for oxygen ventilators, to students babysitting the children of doctors and nurses. The proliferation of caring and commoning endeavors, which form the bedrock of the degrowth societies we envision, are all the more commendable given the contagious nature of the virus. After the pandemic is over, and the difficult path of economic reconstruction starts, this resurgent dynamism of commoning and care will be vital. Positive impulses among individuals and grassroots networks are necessary but not sufficient for sustained change. We need states to secure safety and healthcare, protect the environment, and provide economic safety nets. The policies we advocate in this book were necessary before the pandemic, and are vital during and after: a Green New Deal and public investment program, work-sharing, a basic care income, universal public services, and support of community economies. So is the reorganization of public finance through measures including carbon fees and taxes on wealth, high incomes, natural resource use, and pollution. Whereas our book focuses on demobilizing resource-intensive and ecologically damaging aspects of current economies, pandemic responses deal with demobilizing those aspects not immediately essential for sustaining life. We coincide in facing the fundamental challenge of managing political economies without growth during and after the pandemic: how to demobilize parts of the capitalist economy while securing the provisioning of basic goods and services, experimenting with resource-light ways of enjoying ourselves, and finding positive meanings in life. Radical proposals are already being considered and selectively adopted across the political spectrum as they provide concrete solutions amid the pandemic. Companies and governments have reduced working hours and implemented worksharing; different forms of basic income are being debated; financial measures have been instituted to subsidize workers in the quarantine period and after businesses close; an international campaign for care income has been launched; governments have engaged the productive apparatus to secure vital supplies and services; and moratoriums are being considered or imposed on rent, mortgage, and debt payments. There is growing understanding that vast government spending will be required.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Turn---redistribution <u>solves transition</u>, BUT <u>rapid collapse</u> derails it. </h4><p><strong>Kallis et al 20.<u></strong> Giorgos Kallis, ICREA professor @ ICTAUAB, ecological economics and political ecology. “The Case for Degrowth,” Polity Press, 2020. ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-3562-0</p><p></u>As this book goes to press, in April 2020, <u>the World Health Organization has declared a global pandemic of COVID-19.</u> We write these lines quarantined in our homes in Barcelona and Florida. We are not prophets, so <u>we cannot predict how health and economic crises will have unfolded by the time you read this book. One thing we do know is that the case for <strong>degrowth</strong> will remain as relevant as ever.</u> We make a case for attributing current ecological disequilibrium and a range of social ills to the relentless pursuit of growth. It would be naive to claim that this pandemic is proof of limits to growth, a messianic reckoning for our unsustainable ways. Epidemics happened in the past and will happen in the future. Yet the speed and scope of this contagion are clearly driven by interconnectivities of accelerated global economies, exemplified in its spread via airplane and ship routes. The growing ease with which viruses jump from animals to humans is conditioned by expansion of corporate agricultural systems, encroachment of humans on habitats, and the commodification of wildlife, all integral to current growth economies. <u>The failure of</u> some <u>leaders to <strong>respond quickly</strong> and to protect their populations, as well as urges to <strong>restart economies</strong> before the pandemic is over, can</u> likewise <u>be understood in the context of ongoing pushes to sustain growth</u> analyzed in this book. One dangerous dimension of these pushes is rejection of scientific evidence and advice. In recent decades, climate change deniers have undermined faith in science among a portion of the public in efforts to defend fossil-fueled growth. <u>Not welcoming scientific findings that threaten growth economies, some governments have cut funding for <strong>pandemic research</strong> units and <strong>epidemic control</strong> teams, as well as studies on <strong>mitigation</strong> and <strong>adaptation</strong> to <strong>climate change</strong>. Several decades of budget <mark>cuts to public</mark> health and to social and civil <strong>security <mark>infrastructures</strong></mark>, enacted in the name of economic growth, have <mark>eroded capacities</mark> of many states <mark>to respond</mark> to this crisis. The pandemic has lain bare the <strong>fragility</strong> of existing economic systems. Wealthy nations <strong><mark>have</mark> more than <mark>enough</strong></mark> resources <mark>to</mark> <strong>cover public health and basic needs</strong> during a crisis, and could <mark>weather declines</mark> in non-essential parts of the economy <mark>by <strong>reallocating</strong></mark> work and <mark>resources</mark> to essential ones. Yet the way current economic systems are organized around constant circulation, <strong>any decline</strong> in market activity threatens <strong>systemic collapse</strong>, provoking generalized unemployment and impoverishment. It doesn’t have to be this way. <mark>To be</mark> <strong>more <mark>resilient</strong></mark> to future crises – pandemic, climatic, financial, or political – <mark>we need</mark> to build <mark>systems</mark> capable of scaling back production in ways that do not cause loss of livelihood or life.</u> Some of you might protest, “Isn’t the coronavirus crisis revealing the misery of degrowth?” We invite you to first read this book. What is happening during the pandemic is not degrowth. The goal of degrowth is to purposefully slow things down in order to minimize harm to humans and earth systems. <u>The current situation is terrible</u>, not because carbon emissions are declining, which is good, but <u>because many lives are lost</u>; it is terrible not because GDPs are going down, to which we are indifferent, but because <u>there are no processes in place to protect livelihoods when growth falters.</u> For us, caring and community solidarity are vital principles of degrowth societies, and engines for moving in more equitable and sustainable directions. <u>We would like <mark>to</mark> see societies <mark>be</mark>come <mark>slower <strong>by design, not disaster</strong></mark>.</u> This pandemic exemplifies the types of growth-induced disasters we diagnose in this book. <u>The economic policies and social arrangements we propose offer ways to make such situations more livable and just, to emerge stronger and better post-crisis, and to reorient practices and politics that are setting the scene for future disasters.</u> The end of growth will not necessarily involve a smooth transition. It may very well be unplanned, unwilled, and messy, in conditions not of our own choosing. Conditions like the ones we are living through now. History often evolves with punctuations; our analysis shows how <u><mark>periods</u></mark> of paralysis <u>can <mark>reach</mark> a <strong><mark>tipping point</strong></mark>, when unexpected events open new possibilities and violently close others. The COVID-19 pandemic is such an event. Suddenly, things take radical new directions, and <mark>the unthinkable becomes thinkable</mark>, for better or for worse. Severe economic depression led to Roosevelt’s New Deal, and also to Hitler’s Third Reich. What are the possibilities and dangers now? Amid this pandemic, many scientific, political, and moral authorities are communicating the message that caring for people’s health and wellbeing should come before profit, and that is great.</u> A resurgence of the care ethic that we advocate is evident in the willingness of younger people to stay home to protect their elders, and in the spirit of duty and sacrifice among care and health workers. Of course, many stay home also because they fear the virus and worry about themselves, or to avoid police fines. And many care workers go to work because they must earn a living. <u>But</u>, as we argue, <u>acting collectively against such crises requires combinations of sacrifice and solidarity, self and collective interest, government interventions and popular consensus about the right thing to do.</u> Deep inequalities are coming into play in new ways. While some have the luxury of sheltering at home, others must choose between unemployment without an adequate safety net and exposure to the coronavirus in jobs involving care work and provisioning. As the pandemic plays out differently in different parts of the world, those who are in more vulnerable identities and positions are likely to suffer more than others. These <u>injustices coexist with an awareness that, unless whole populations are protected, not even the wealthiest are fully safe from contagion. In this crisis, like others before, people have mobilized and self-organized where businesses and governments have failed to provide for their needs</u> – from mutual aid groups delivering food and medicines for elders, to groups of doctors, engineers, and hackers collaborating to 3-D print components for oxygen ventilators, to students babysitting the children of doctors and nurses. The proliferation of caring and commoning endeavors, which form the bedrock of the degrowth societies we envision, are all the more commendable given the contagious nature of the virus. <u>After the pandemic is over, and the difficult path of <strong>economic reconstruction</strong> starts, this resurgent dynamism of commoning and care will be vital. Positive impulses among individuals and <mark>grassroots</mark> networks <mark>are</mark> necessary but <strong><mark>not sufficient</strong></mark> for sustained change. <mark>We need states to</mark> secure safety and <strong>healthcare</strong>, protect the environment, and <mark>provide </mark>economic <strong><mark>safety nets</strong></mark>. The <mark>policies</mark> we advocate in this book were <mark>necessary</mark> before the pandemic, and <mark>are</mark> vital during and after: a</u> Green New Deal and <u><mark>public investment</mark> program</u>, work-sharing, <u>a basic care income, universal public services, <mark>and</mark> support of community economies. So is the <strong><mark>reorganization</strong> of</mark> public <mark>finance through</mark> measures including</u> carbon fees and <u><strong><mark>taxes on wealth</u></strong></mark>, high incomes, natural resource use, and pollution. Whereas our book focuses on demobilizing resource-intensive and ecologically damaging aspects of current economies, pandemic responses deal with demobilizing those aspects not immediately essential for sustaining life. We coincide in facing the fundamental challenge of managing political economies without growth during and after the pandemic: how to demobilize parts of the capitalist economy while securing the provisioning of basic goods and services, experimenting with resource-light ways of enjoying ourselves, and finding positive meanings in life. Radical proposals are already being considered and selectively adopted across the political spectrum as they provide concrete solutions amid the pandemic. Companies and governments have reduced working hours and implemented worksharing; different forms of basic income are being debated; financial measures have been instituted to subsidize workers in the quarantine period and after businesses close; an international campaign for care income has been launched; governments have engaged the productive apparatus to secure vital supplies and services; and moratoriums are being considered or imposed on rent, mortgage, and debt payments. <u>There is growing understanding that vast government spending will be required.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Baum 16 – Seth, is executive director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, a nonprofit think tank that Baum co-founded in 2011. Baum’s research focuses on risk, ethics, and policy questions about major threats to human civilization, including nuclear war, global warming, and emerging technologies, December 9th ("What Trump means for global catastrophic risk," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Available online at http://thebulletin.org/what-trump-means-global-catastrophic-risk10266, MSCOTT) fulltext: In 1987, Donald Trump said he had an aggressive plan for the United States to partner with the Soviet Union on nuclear non-proliferation. He was motivated by, among other things, an encounter with Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi’s former pilot, who convinced him that at least some world leaders are too unstable to ever be trusted with nuclear weapons. Now, 30 years later, Trump—following a presidential campaign marked by impulsive, combative behavior—seems poised to become one of those unstable world leaders. Global catastrophic risks are those that threaten the survival of human civilization. Of all the implications a Trump presidency has for global catastrophic risk—and there are many—the prospect of him ordering the launch of the massive US nuclear arsenal is by far the most worrisome. In the United States, the president has sole authority to launch atomic weapons. As Bruce Blair recently argued in Politico, Trump’s tendency toward erratic behavior, combined with a mix of difficult geopolitical challenges ahead, mean the probability of a nuclear launch order will be unusually high. If Trump orders an unwarranted launch, then the only thing that could stop it would be disobedience by launch personnel—though even this might not suffice, since the president could simply replace them. Such disobedience has precedent, most notably in Vasili Arkhipov, the Soviet submarine officer who refused to authorize a nuclear launch during the Cuban Missile Crisis; Stanislav Petrov, the Soviet officer who refused to relay a warning (which turned out to be a false alarm) of incoming US missiles; and James Schlesinger, the US defense secretary under President Richard Nixon, who reportedly told Pentagon aides to check with him first if Nixon began talking about launching nuclear weapons. Both Arkhipov and Petrov are now celebrated as heroes for saving the world. Perhaps Schlesinger should be too, though his story has been questioned. US personnel involved in nuclear weapons operations should take note of these tales and reflect on how they might act in a nuclear crisis. Risks and opportunities abroad. Aside from planning to either persuade or disobey the president, the only way to avoid nuclear war is to try to avoid the sorts of crises that can prompt nuclear launch. China and Russia, which both have large arsenals of long-range nuclear weapons and tense relationships with the United States, are the primary candidates for a nuclear conflagration with Washington. Already, Trump has increased tensions with China by taking a phone call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. China-Taiwan relations are very fragile, and this sort of disruption could lead to a war that would drag in the United States. Meanwhile, Trump’s presidency could create some interesting opportunities to improve US relations with Russia. The United States has long been too dismissive of Moscow’s very legitimate security concerns regarding NATO expansion, missile defense, and other encroachments. In stark defiance of US political convention, Trump speaks fondly of Russian President Vladimir Putin, an authoritarian leader, and expresses little interest in supporting NATO allies. The authoritarianism is a problem, but Trump’s unconventional friendliness nonetheless offers a valuable opportunity to rethink US-Russia relations for the better. On the other hand, conciliatory overtures toward Russia could backfire. Without US pressure, Russia could become aggressive, perhaps invading the Baltic states. Russia might gamble that NATO wouldn’t fight back, but if it was wrong, such an invasion could lead to nuclear war. Additionally, Trump’s pro-Russia stance could mean that Putin would no longer be able to use anti-Americanism to shore up domestic support, which could lead to a dangerous political crisis. If Putin fears a loss of power, he could turn to more aggressive military action in hopes of bolstering his support. And if he were to lose power, particularly in a coup, there is no telling what would happen to one of the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals. The best approach for the United States is to rethink Russia-US relations while avoiding the sorts of military and political crises that could escalate to nuclear war. The war at home. Trump has been accused many times of authoritarian tendencies, not least due to his praise for Putin. He also frequently defies democratic norms and institutions, for instance by encouraging violence against opposition protesters during his presidential campaign, and now via his business holdings, which create a real prospect he may violate the Constitution’s rule against accepting foreign bribes. Already, there are signs that Trump is profiting from his newfound political position, for example with an end to project delays on a Trump Tower in Buenos Aires. The US Constitution explicitly forbids the president from receiving foreign gifts, known as “emoluments.” What if, under President Trump, the US government itself becomes authoritarian? Such an outcome might seem unfathomable, and to be sure, achieving authoritarian control would not be as easy for Trump as starting a nuclear war. It would require compliance from a much larger portion of government personnel and the public—compliance that cannot be taken for granted. Already, government officials are discussing how best to resist illegal and unethical moves from the inside, and citizens are circulating expert advice on how to thwart creeping authoritarianism. But the president-elect will take office at a time in which support for democracy may be declining in the United States and other Western countries, as measured by survey data. And polling shows that his supporters were more likely to have authoritarian inclinations than supporters of other Republican or Democratic primary candidates. Moreover, his supporters cheered some of his clearly authoritarian suggestions, like creating a registry for Muslims and implying that through force of his own personality, he would achieve results where normal elected officials fail. An authoritarian US government would be a devastating force. In theory, dictatorships can be benevolent, but throughout history, they have been responsible for some of the largest human tragedies, with tens of millions dying due to their own governments in the Stalinist Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and Maoist China. Thanks to the miracles of modern technology, an authoritarian United States could wield overwhelming military and intelligence capabilities to even more disastrous effect. Return to an old world order. Trump has suggested he might pull the United States back from the post-World War II international order it helped build and appears to favor a pre-World War II isolationist mercantilism that would have the United States look out for its unenlightened self-interest and nothing more. This would mean retreating from alliances and attempts to promote democracy abroad, and an embrace of economic protectionism at home. Such a retreat from globalization would have important implications for catastrophic risk. The post-World War II international system has proved remarkably stable and peaceful. Returning to the pre-World War II system risks putting the world on course for another major war, this time with deadlier weapons. International cooperation is also essential for addressing global issues like climate change, infectious disease outbreaks, arms control, and the safe management of emerging technologies. On the other hand, the globalized economy can be fragile. Shocks in one place can cascade around the world, and a bad enough shock could collapse the whole system, leaving behind few communities that are able to support themselves. Globalization can also bring dangerous concentrations of wealth and power. Nevertheless, complete rejection of globalization would be a dangerous mistake. Playing with climate dangers. Climate change will not wipe out human populations as quickly as a nuclear bomb would, but it is wreaking slow-motion havoc that could ultimately be just as devastating. Trump has been all over the map on the subject, variously supporting action to reduce emissions and calling global warming a hoax. On December 5th he met with environmental activist and former vice president Al Gore, giving some cause for hope, but later the same week said he would appoint Oklahoma Attorney General Scott Pruitt, who denies the science of climate change, to lead the Environmental Protection Agency. Trump’s energy plan calls for energy independence with development of both fossil fuels and renewables, as well as less environmental regulation. If his energy policy puts more greenhouse gas into the atmosphere—as it may by increasing fossil fuel consumption—it will increase global catastrophic risk. For all global catastrophic risks, it is important to remember that the US president is hardly the only important actor. Trump’s election shifts the landscape of risks and opportunities, but does not change the fact that each of us can help keep humanity safe. His election also offers an important reminder that outlier events sometimes happen. Just because election-winning politicians have been of a particular mold in the past, doesn’t mean the same kind of leaders will continue to win. Likewise, just because we have avoided global catastrophe so far doesn’t mean we<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Trump causes <u>extinction</u> – <u>nuclear war</u>, <u>climate change</u>, <u>disease</u>, and <strong>prolif</h4><p>Baum 16 </strong>– Seth, is executive director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, a nonprofit think tank that Baum co-founded in 2011. Baum’s research focuses on risk, ethics, and policy questions about major threats to human civilization, including nuclear war, global warming, and emerging technologies, December 9th ("What Trump means for global catastrophic risk," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Available online at http://thebulletin.org/what-trump-means-global-catastrophic-risk10266, MSCOTT)</p><p>In 1987, Donald Trump said he had an aggressive plan for the United States to partner with the Soviet Union on nuclear non-proliferation. He was motivated by, among other things, an encounter with Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi’s former pilot, who convinced him that at least some world leaders are too unstable to ever be trusted with nuclear weapons. Now, 30 years later, <u><mark>Trump</u></mark>—<u>following a presidential campaign <mark>marked by</u> <u><strong>impulsive</u></strong>, <u><strong>combative behavior</u></strong></mark>—<u>seems poised to become one of those</u> <u><strong><mark>unstable world leaders</u></strong></mark>. <u>Global catastrophic risks are those that <mark>threaten the survival of human civilization</mark>. Of all the implications a Trump presidency has for <strong><mark>global catastrophic risk</u></strong></mark>—and there are many—<u>the <strong>prospect of him ordering the <mark>launch of the massive US nuclear arsenal</mark> is by far the most worrisome</u></strong>. In the United States, <u><strong>the president has sole authority to launch atomic weapons</u></strong>. As Bruce Blair recently argued in Politico, <u>Trump’s <mark>tendency toward</u> <u><strong>erratic behavior</u></strong></mark>, <u>combined <mark>with</mark> a mix of difficult <mark>geopolitical challenges</mark> ahead, <mark>mean</mark> the <mark>probability of</mark> a <mark>nuclear launch</mark> order <mark>will be <strong></mark>unusually <mark>high</strong></mark>. </u>If Trump orders an unwarranted launch, then the only thing that could stop it would be disobedience by launch personnel—though even this might not suffice, since <u>the president could simply replace them</u>. Such disobedience has precedent, most notably in Vasili Arkhipov, the Soviet submarine officer who refused to authorize a nuclear launch during the Cuban Missile Crisis; Stanislav Petrov, the Soviet officer who refused to relay a warning (which turned out to be a false alarm) of incoming US missiles; and James Schlesinger, the US defense secretary under President Richard Nixon, who reportedly told Pentagon aides to check with him first if Nixon began talking about launching nuclear weapons. Both Arkhipov and Petrov are now celebrated as heroes for saving the world. Perhaps Schlesinger should be too, though his story has been questioned. US personnel involved in nuclear weapons operations should take note of these tales and reflect on how they might act in a nuclear crisis. Risks and opportunities abroad. Aside from planning to either persuade or disobey the president, <u>the only way to avoid <mark>nuclear war</mark> is to try to avoid the sorts of crises that can <mark>prompt</mark> nuclear launch</u>. <u><strong><mark>China and Russia</u></strong></mark>, <u>which both have large arsenals of long-range nuclear weapons and tense relationships with the United States, are the primary candidates for a nuclear conflagration with Washington</u>. Already, Trump has increased tensions with China by taking a phone call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. <u><mark>China-Taiwan relations</mark> are very fragile, and this sort of disruption could lead to a war that would drag in the United States. </u>Meanwhile, Trump’s presidency could create some interesting opportunities to improve US relations with Russia. <u>The United States has long been too dismissive of Moscow’s very legitimate security concerns regarding NATO expansion, missile defense, and other encroachments.</u> In stark defiance of US political convention, Trump speaks fondly of Russian President Vladimir Putin, an authoritarian leader, and <u>expresses little interest in supporting NATO allies</u>. The authoritarianism is a problem, but Trump’s unconventional friendliness nonetheless offers a valuable opportunity to rethink US-Russia relations for the better. On the other hand, conciliatory overtures toward Russia could backfire. Without US pressure, <u><strong><mark>Russia could become aggressive</u></strong></mark>, <u>perhaps <mark>invading the Baltic states</mark>. Russia might <mark>gamble </mark>that <mark>NATO</mark> wouldn’t fight back, but if it was wrong, <strong>such an <mark>invasion could lead to nuclear war</u></strong></mark>. <u>Additionally, Trump’s pro-Russia stance could mean that Putin would no longer be able to use anti-Americanism to shore up domestic support, which could lead to a <strong>dangerous political crisis</u></strong>. If <u>Putin</u> fears a loss of power, he <u>could turn to more <strong>aggressive military action</strong> in hopes of bolstering his support</u>. And if he were to lose power, particularly in a coup, there is <u>no telling what would happen to one of the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals</u>. The best approach for the United States is to rethink Russia-US relations while avoiding the sorts of military and political crises that could escalate to nuclear war. The war at home. <u><mark>Trump</mark> has been accused many times of <strong><mark>authoritarian tendencies</u></strong></mark>, not least due to his praise for Putin. <u>He also frequently <strong><mark>defies democratic norms and institutions</strong></mark>, for instance <mark>by <strong>encouraging violence</u></strong> <u>against opposition protesters</mark> during his presidential campaign</u>, and now via his business holdings, which create a real prospect he may violate the Constitution’s rule against accepting foreign bribes. Already, there are signs that Trump is profiting from his newfound political position, for example with an end to project delays on a Trump Tower in Buenos Aires. The US Constitution explicitly forbids the president from receiving foreign gifts, known as “emoluments.” What if, under President Trump, the US government itself becomes authoritarian? Such an outcome might seem unfathomable, and to be sure, achieving authoritarian control would not be as easy for Trump as starting a nuclear war. It would require compliance from a much larger portion of government personnel and the public—compliance that cannot be taken for granted. Already, <u>government officials are discussing how best to <strong><mark>resist</strong> illegal and unethical moves</mark> from the inside, and citizens are circulating expert advice on how to <strong>thwart <mark>creeping authoritarianism</strong></mark>. </u>But the president-elect will take office at a time in which support for democracy may be declining in the United States and other Western countries, as measured by survey data. And polling shows that his supporters were more likely to have authoritarian inclinations than supporters of other Republican or Democratic primary candidates. Moreover, his supporters cheered some of his clearly authoritarian suggestions, like creating a registry for Muslims and implying that through force of his own personality, he would achieve results where normal elected officials fail. <u><strong>An <mark>authoritarian US</mark> government <mark>would be</mark> a <mark>devastating</mark> force.</u></strong> In theory, <u>dictatorships</u> can be benevolent, but <u>throughout history, they have been responsible for some of the largest human tragedies, with tens of millions dying due to their own governments in the Stalinist Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and Maoist China</u>. <u>Thanks to the miracles of modern technology, an authoritarian United States could wield overwhelming <mark>military and intelligence capabilities</mark> to <strong>even more <mark>disastrous effect</u></strong></mark>. Return to an old world order. <u>Trump has suggested he might pull the United States back from the post-World War II <strong>international order</u></strong> it helped build and appears to favor a pre-World War II isolationist mercantilism that would have the United States look out for its unenlightened self-interest and nothing more. This would mean retreating from alliances and attempts to promote democracy abroad, and an embrace of economic protectionism at home.<u> Such a</u> <u><strong><mark>retreat from globalization</mark> would <mark>have important implications for catastrophic</mark> risk</u></strong>. <u>The post-World War II international system has proved <strong>remarkably stable and peaceful</u></strong>. <u><mark>Returning to the pre-World War II</mark> system risks <mark>putting</mark> the <mark>world on course for another</u> <u><strong>major war</u></strong></mark>, <u>this time <mark>with</u> <u><strong>deadlier weapons</u></strong>. <u><strong>International cooperation</u></strong> <u>is also essential for</mark> addressing global issues like</u> <u><strong><mark>climate change</u></strong>, <u><strong>infectious disease outbreaks</u></strong>, <u><strong>arms control</u></strong>, <u>and</mark> the safe management of</u> <u><strong>emerging <mark>technologies</u></strong></mark>. On the other hand, the globalized economy can be fragile. Shocks in one place can cascade around the world, and a bad enough shock could collapse the whole system, leaving behind few communities that are able to support themselves. Globalization can also bring dangerous concentrations of wealth and power. Nevertheless, <u>complete rejection of globalization would be a dangerous mistake. <strong><mark>Playing with climate dangers</u></strong></mark>. <u>Climate change will not wipe out human populations as quickly as a nuclear bomb would, but it is wreaking slow-motion havoc that could <mark>ultimately</mark> be just <mark>as devastating</u></mark>. Trump has been all over the map on the subject, variously supporting action to reduce emissions and calling global warming a hoax. On December 5th he met with environmental activist and former vice president Al Gore, giving some cause for hope, but later the same week said he would appoint Oklahoma Attorney General Scott Pruitt, who denies the science of climate change, to lead the Environmental Protection Agency. Trump’s energy plan calls for energy independence with development of both fossil fuels and renewables, as well as less environmental regulation. <u>If his energy policy puts more greenhouse gas into the atmosphere—as it may by increasing fossil fuel consumption—it will <strong>increase global catastrophic risk. </u></strong>For all global catastrophic risks, it is important to remember that the US president is hardly the only important actor. Trump’s election shifts the landscape of risks and opportunities, but does not change the fact that each of us can help keep humanity safe. His election also offers an important reminder that outlier events sometimes happen. Just because election-winning politicians have been of a particular mold in the past, doesn’t mean the same kind of leaders will continue to win. Likewise, just because we have avoided global catastrophe so far doesn’t mean we</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Kolodziej ’17 [Edward; May 19; Emeritus Research Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; EUC Paper Series, “Challenges to the Democratic Project for Governing Globalization,” https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/96620/Kolodziej Introduction 5.19.17.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y] fulltext: The Rise of a Global Society Let me first sketch the global democratic project for global governance as a point of reference. We must first recognize that globalization has given rise to a global society for the first time in the evolution of the human species. We are now stuck with each other; seven and half billion people today — nine to ten by 2050: all super connected and interdependent. In greater or lesser measure, humans are mutually dependent on each other in the pursuit of their most salient values, interests, needs, and preferences — concerns about personal, community, and national security, sustainable economic growth, protection of the environment, the equitable distribution of the globe’s material wealth, human rights, and even the validation of their personal and social identities by others. Global warming is a metaphor of this morphological social change in the human condition. All humans are implicated in this looming Anthropogenic-induced disaster — the exhausts of billions of automobiles, the methane released in fracking for natural gas, outdated U.S. coal-fired power plants and newly constructed ones in China. Even the poor farmer burning charcoal to warm his dinner is complicit. Since interdependence surrounds, ensnares, and binds us as a human society, the dilemma confronting the world’s diverse and divided populations is evident: the expanding scope as well as the deepening, accumulating, and thickening interdependencies of globalization urge global government. But the Kantian ideal of universal governance is beyond the reach of the world’s disparate peoples. They are profoundly divided by religion, culture, language, tribal, ethnic and national loyalties as well as by class, social status, race, gender, and sexual orientation. How have the democracies responded to this dilemma? How have they attempted to reconcile the growing interdependence of the world’s disputing peoples and need for global governance? What do we mean by the governance of a human society? A working, legitimate government of a human society requires simultaneous responses to three competing imperatives: Order, Welfare, and Legitimacy. While the forms of these OWL imperatives have differed radically over the course of human societal evolution, these constraints remain predicable of all human societies if they are to replicate themselves and flourish over time. The OWL imperatives are no less applicable to a global society. 1. Order refers to a society’s investment of awesome material power in an individual or body to arbitrate and resolve value, interest, and preference conflicts, which cannot be otherwise resolved by non-violent means — the Hobbesian problematic. 2. The Welfare imperative refers to the necessity of humans to eat, drink, clothe, and shelter themselves and to pursue the full-range of their seemingly limitless acquisitive appetites. Responses to the Welfare imperative, like that of Order, constitute a distinct form of governing power and authority with its own decisional processes and actors principally associated either with the Welfare or the Order imperative. Hence we have the Marxian-Adam Smith problematic. 3. Legitimacy is no less a form of governing power and authority, independent of the Order and Welfare imperatives. Either by choice, socialization, or coerced acquiescence, populations acknowledge a regime’s governing authority and their obligation to submit to its rule. Here arises the Rousseaunian problematic. The government of a human society emerges then as an evolving, precarious balance and compromise of the ceaseless struggle of these competing OWL power domains for ascendancy of one of these imperatives over the others. It is against the backdrop of these OWL imperatives — Order, Welfare, and Legitimacy — that we are brought to the democratic project for global governance. The Democratic Project For Order, open societies constructed the global democratic state and, in alliance, the democratic global-state system. Collectively these initiatives led to the creation of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the European Union to implement the democratic project’s system of global governance. The democratic global state assumed all of the functions of the Hobbesian Westphalian security state — but a lot more. The global state became a Trading, Banking, Market, and Entrepreneurial state. To these functions were added those of the Science, Technology and the Economic Growth state. How else would we be able to enjoy the Internet, cell phones and iPhones, or miracle cures? These are the products of the iron triangle of the global democratic state, academic and non-profit research centers, and corporations. It is a myth that the Market System did all this alone. Fueled by increasing material wealth, the democratic global state was afforded the means to become the Safety Net state, providing education, health, social security, leisure and recreation for its population. And as the global state’s power expanded across this broad and enlarging spectrum of functions and roles, the global state was also constrained by the social compacts of the democracies to be bound by popular rule. The ironic result of the expansion of the global state’s power and social functions and its obligation to accede to popular will was a Security state and global state-system that vastly outperformed its principal authoritarian rivals in the Cold War. So much briefly is the democratic project’s response to the Order imperative. Now let’s look at the democratic project’s response to the Welfare imperative. The democracies institutionalized Adam Smith’s vision of a global Market System. The Market System trucks and barters, Smith’s understanding of what it means to be human. But it does a lot more. The Market System facilitates and fosters the free movement of people, goods and services, capital, ideas, values, scientific discoveries, and best technological practices. Created is a vibrant global civil society oblivious to state boundaries. What we now experience is De Tocqueville’s Democracy in America on global steroids. As for the imperative of Legitimacy, the social compacts of the democracies affirmed Rousseau’s conjecture that all humans are free and therefore equal. Applied to elections each citizen has one vote. Democratic regimes are also obliged to submit to the rule of law, to conduct free and fair elections, to honor majority rule while protecting minority rights, and to promote human rights at home and abroad. The Authoritarian Threat to the Democratic Project The democratic project for global governance is now at risk. Let’s start with the challenges posed by authoritarian regimes, with Russia and China in the lead. Both Russia and China would rest global governance on Big Power spheres of influence. Both would assume hegemonic status in their respective regions, asserting their versions of the Monroe Doctrine. Their regional hegemony would then leverage their claim to be global Big Powers. Moscow and Beijing would then have an equal say with the United States and the West in sharing and shaping global governance. The Russo-Chinese global system of Order would ascribe to Russia and China governing privileges not accorded to the states both aspire to dominate. Moscow and Beijing would enjoy unconditional recognition of their state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in their domestic affairs, but they would reserve to themselves the right to intervene in the domestic and foreign affairs of the states and peoples under their tutelage in pursuit of their hegemonic interests. President Putin has announced that Russia’s imperialism encompasses the millions of Russians living in the former republics of the Soviet Union. Russia contends that Ukraine and Belarus also fall under Moscow’s purported claim to historical sovereignty over these states. Forceful re-absorption of Crimea and control over eastern Ukraine are viewed by President Putin as Russia’s historical inheritances. Self-determination is not extended to these states or to other states and peoples of the former Soviet Union. Moscow rejects their right to freely align, say, with the European Union or, god forbid, with NATO. In contrast to the democratic project, universal in its reach, the Russo-Chinese conception of a stable global order rests on more tenuous and conflict-prone ethno-national foundations. Russia’s proclaimed enemies are the United States and the European Union. Any means that undermines the unity of these entities is viewed by Moscow as a gain. The endgame is a poly-anarchical interstate system, potentially as war-prone as the Eurocentric system before and after World War I, but now populated by states with nuclear weapons.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Democratic governance solves Existential Threats – climate change, economic crises, and nuclear war are all exacerbated in an autocratic world. </h4><p><strong>Kolodziej ’17 </strong>[Edward; May 19; Emeritus Research Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; EUC Paper Series, “Challenges to the Democratic Project for Governing Globalization,” https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/96620/Kolodziej Introduction 5.19.17.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y]</p><p>The Rise of a Global Society Let me first sketch the global democratic project for global governance as a point of reference. We must first recognize that globalization has given rise to a global society <u>for the <strong>first time</strong> in</u> the <u>evolution of the</u> human <u><strong>species</strong>. We are</u> now <u><strong>stuck with each other</strong>; <strong>seven and half billion</strong> people today — </u>nine to <u><strong>ten</strong> by <strong>2050</strong>: </u>all <u><strong>super connected</strong> and <strong>interdependent</strong>. In greater or lesser measure, humans are mutually dependent</u> on each other in the pursuit of their most salient values, interests, needs, and preferences — <u>concerns about</u> personal, community, and national <u><strong><mark>security</strong></mark>, sustainable</u> economic <u><strong><mark>growth</u></strong></mark>, protection of <u>the <strong><mark>environment</u></strong></mark>, the <u>equitable <strong><mark>distribution</strong></mark> of</u> the globe’s material <u>wealth, human <strong><mark>rights</strong></mark>, and</u> even the <u>validation of</u> their personal and social <u>identities</u> by others. Global <u><strong><mark>warming</strong> is a metaphor</mark> of this morphological social change </u>in the human condition. <u><strong><mark>All</strong></mark> humans <mark>are <strong>implicated</strong> in</mark> this looming </u>Anthropogenic-induced <u><strong><mark>disaster</u></strong></mark> — the exhausts of billions of automobiles, the methane released in fracking for natural gas, outdated U.S. coal-fired power plants and newly constructed ones in China. Even the poor farmer burning charcoal to warm his dinner is complicit. Since <u>interdependence surrounds, ensnares, and binds us as a human society</u>, the dilemma confronting the world’s diverse and divided populations is evident: the <u><strong>expanding scope</strong> as well as</u> the <u><strong><mark>deepening</strong></mark>, <strong>accumulating</strong>, and <strong>thickening</strong> <mark>interdependencies</mark> of globalization <mark>urge global government</mark>. But</u> the Kantian ideal of universal governance is beyond the reach of the world’s disparate peoples. <u>They are <strong>profoundly divided</strong> by religion, culture, language, tribal, ethnic and national loyalties as well as </u>by <u>class, social status, race, gender, and sexual orientation. How have the democracies responded</u> to this dilemma? How have they attempted to reconcile the growing interdependence of the world’s disputing peoples and need for global governance? What do we mean by the governance of a human society? <u>A working, <strong>legitimate government</u></strong> of a human society <u>requires simultaneous responses to three</u> competing <u>imperatives: Order, Welfare, and Legitimacy</u>. While the forms of these OWL imperatives have differed radically over the course of human societal evolution, <u>these</u> constraints <u>remain predicable of all human societies if they are to replicate</u> themselves <u>and flourish over time</u>. The OWL imperatives are no less applicable to a global society. 1. <u>Order</u> refers to a society’s investment of awesome <u>material power</u> in an individual or body <u>to arbitrate and resolve</u> value, interest, and preference <u>conflicts, which cannot be otherwise resolved by non-violent means</u> — the Hobbesian problematic. 2. The <u>Welfare</u> imperative <u>refers to the necessity</u> of humans <u>to eat, drink, clothe, and shelter</u> themselves and to pursue the full-range of their seemingly limitless acquisitive appetites. Responses to the Welfare imperative, like that of Order, constitute a distinct form of governing power and authority with its own decisional processes and actors principally associated either with the Welfare or the Order imperative. Hence we have the Marxian-Adam Smith problematic. 3. <u>Legitimacy</u> is no less a form of governing power and authority, independent of the Order and Welfare imperatives. Either by choice, socialization, or coerced acquiescence, <u>populations acknowledge a regime’s governing authority and</u> their <u>obligation to submit</u> to its rule. Here arises the Rousseaunian problematic. The government of a human society emerges then as an evolving, precarious balance and compromise of the ceaseless struggle of these competing OWL power domains for ascendancy of one of these imperatives over the others. It is against the backdrop of these OWL imperatives — Order, Welfare, and Legitimacy — that we are brought to the democratic project for global governance. The Democratic Project For Order, open societies constructed the global democratic state and, in alliance, the democratic global-state system. Collectively these initiatives led to the creation of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the European Union to implement the democratic project’s system of global governance. The democratic global state assumed all of the functions of the Hobbesian Westphalian security state — but a lot more. The global state became a Trading, Banking, Market, and Entrepreneurial state. To these functions were added those of the Science, Technology and the Economic Growth state. How else would we be able to enjoy <u>the <strong>Internet</strong>, <strong>cell phones</strong> and iPhones, or <strong>miracle cures</u></strong>? These <u>are</u> the <u>products of the <strong>iron triangle</strong> of the <mark>global democratic state</u></mark>, academic and non-profit <u>research</u> centers, <u>and corporations. It is a <strong>myth</u></strong> that <u>the Market</u> System <u>did</u> all <u>this <strong>alone</strong>. Fueled by increasing material wealth, the democratic global state was afforded the means to become the <strong>Safety Net</strong> state, <mark>providing <strong>ed</strong></mark>ucation, <strong><mark>health</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>social security</strong></mark>, leisure and recreation</u> for its population. And as the global state’s power expanded across this broad and enlarging spectrum of functions and roles, the global state was also constrained by the social compacts of the democracies to be bound by popular rule. The ironic result of the expansion of the global state’s power and social functions and its obligation to accede to popular will was a Security state and global state-system that vastly outperformed its principal authoritarian rivals in the Cold War. So much briefly is the democratic project’s response to the Order imperative. Now let’s look at the democratic project’s response to the Welfare imperative. The democracies institutionalized Adam Smith’s vision of a global Market System. The Market System trucks and barters, Smith’s understanding of what it means to be human. But it does a lot more. The Market System facilitates and fosters the free movement of people, goods and services, capital, ideas, values, scientific discoveries, and best technological practices. Created is a vibrant global civil society oblivious to state boundaries. What we now experience is De Tocqueville’s Democracy in America on global steroids. As for the imperative of Legitimacy, the social compacts of the democracies affirmed Rousseau’s conjecture that all humans are free and therefore equal. Applied to elections each citizen has one vote. <u>Democratic <mark>regimes</u></mark> are also obliged to submit to the rule of law, to conduct free and fair elections, to honor majority rule while protecting minority rights, and to <u><strong><mark>promote</strong></mark> human <mark>rights</mark> </u>at home and <u><strong><mark>abroad</u></strong></mark>.<u> </u>The Authoritarian Threat to the Democratic Project <u>The <strong>democratic project</strong> for <strong>global <mark>governance</strong> is</mark> now <mark>at <strong>risk</strong></mark>.</u> Let’s start with the challenges posed by authoritarian regimes, with Russia and China in the lead. Both <u><mark>Russia and China would <strong>rest</mark> global <mark>governance</strong></mark> on Big Power spheres of influence. Both</u> would <u><mark>assume <strong>hegemonic status</strong></mark> in their</u> respective <u>regions, asserting their versions of the <strong>Monroe Doctrine</u></strong>. Their <u>regional hegemony would</u> then <u><strong>leverage</strong> their claim to be global <strong>Big Powers</u></strong>. Moscow and Beijing would then have an equal say with the United States and the West in sharing and shaping global governance. <u><strong>The</strong> Russo-Chinese global <strong>system</u></strong> of Order <u>would ascribe</u> to Russia and China governing privileges not accorded to the states both aspire to dominate. <u>Moscow and Beijing</u> would enjoy <u><strong>unconditional</strong> recognition of</u> their state <u><strong>sovereignty</u></strong>, territorial integrity, and non-interference in their domestic affairs, <u>but they would</u> reserve to themselves the right to <u><strong>intervene</strong> in</u> the domestic and foreign affairs of the <u>states</u> and peoples under their tutelage <u>in pursuit of</u> their <u>hegemonic interests</u>. President <u>Putin</u> has <u>announced</u> that <u>Russia’s <strong>imperialism</strong> encompasses</u> the <u><strong>millions</u></strong> of Russians <u>living in the former</u> republics of the <u>Soviet Union</u>. Russia contends that Ukraine and Belarus also fall under Moscow’s purported claim to historical sovereignty over these states. <u>Forceful re-absorption of <strong>Crimea</strong> and control over eastern <strong>Ukraine</strong> are viewed by</u> President <u>Putin as Russia’s historical inheritances</u>. Self-determination is not extended to these states or to other states and peoples of the former Soviet Union. Moscow rejects their right to freely align, say, with the European Union or, god forbid, with NATO. In contrast to the democratic project, universal in its reach, <u>the <mark>Russo-Chinese</u></mark> conception of a stable <u>global <mark>order rests on</u></mark> more <u><strong><mark>tenuous</u></strong></mark> and <u><strong><mark>conflict</mark>-prone ethno-<mark>national foundations</u></strong></mark>. Russia’s proclaimed enemies are the United States and the European Union. Any means that undermines the unity of these entities is viewed by Moscow as a gain. <u><mark>The endgame</mark> is a <strong>poly-anarchical</strong> interstate system</u>, potentially <u>as <strong>war-prone</strong> as the Eurocentric system <strong>before</strong> and <strong>after World War I</strong>, but</u> now <u>populated by states with <strong><mark>nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s.</p></u></strong></mark><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: James Plested 20, Red Flad editor, "Capitalist roots of the environment crisis," 2-17-2020, https://climateandcapitalism.com/2020/02/18/capitalist-roots-environment-crisis/ fulltext: Climate change is only one aspect of the problem. Everywhere we look, the natural systems that maintain our planet in its habitable state are rapidly deteriorating. Can we survive the destruction of the tropical rain forests of the Amazon – the lungs of Earth? Can we survive the spread of dead zones – areas too low in oxygen to sustain life – across our oceans? Can we make do without the bees and other insects we currently depend on to pollinate our crops? Perhaps the scariest thing about the situation isn’t the vast scale of breakdown in natural systems but the fact that those entrusted with the leadership of our society appear determined to hasten us to our doom. Instead of listening to the advice of the scientists, firefighters, land managers and others who’ve been sounding the alarm about climate change for decades, Scott Morrison and Co. parrot propaganda points from the Murdoch press. Instead of agreeing, finally, to contribute more to global efforts to reduce carbon emissions, they double down on the expansion of Australia’s booming coal and gas industries, attempting all the while to distract the public with fairy tales about greenies preventing back-burning and the fires just being part of Australia’s natural cycle. Elsewhere in the world, the picture is the same. Decades of global climate negotiations have gone nowhere. Despite the increasingly urgent warnings of scientists, emissions continue to rise. And with the likes of Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Jair Bolsonaro in charge of some of the world’s biggest economies, the prospects for a major shift occurring soon appear terrifyingly dim. Where did it all go wrong? The answer is suggested by the increasingly popular slogan System change, not climate change. Morrison, Trump and their fellow fossil fuel enthusiasts act not simply in accordance with their personal whims and desires but as the conscious servants of a system: capitalism. Proponents of capitalism talk as if it’s the natural form of human society – something that has existed since the dawn of time. The reality, however, is that the age of capitalism spans only the past two to three centuries. For the vast majority of our 200-300,000 year history, humans lived in societies, like those of the Indigenous inhabitants of Australia prior to invasion, characterized by collective decision making and sharing of resources, not the system of private property and the endless competitive scramble for individual gain that define the world today. If the capitalist system was most befitting of our human nature, you would expect its emergence to have been embraced by all whose lives were transformed by it. But the birth of capitalism in the 17th and 18th centuries was an extremely violent process that was strongly resisted from the start. As Karl Marx put it in Capital: “The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signaled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production.” Capital came into the world, he wrote, “dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt.” Since the earliest days of human existence, we have had a significant impact on the environment. Scientists believe, for instance, that hunting, along with the use of fire and other land management techniques employed by Australia’s Indigenous population, contributed to the extinction of the continent’s megafauna. Deforestation was a major problem in ancient Greece and the Roman Empire. Air pollution from the burning of wood and coal was an issue in London as early as the 12th and 13th centuries. All this, however, was on a minuscule scale compared to the devastation of the past 200 years, and particularly in the period after World War Two – the era in which capitalism came to dominate every corner of the globe. In 1950, global carbon emissions totaled 5.28 billion tonnes. By 2017, they were 36.15 billion tonnes. According to the World Wildlife Fund’s Living Planet Report 2018, the total population of mammals, birds, fish and reptiles has declined by 60 percent since 1970. Every year, the rate of extinctions rises, and scientists estimate that a million animal and plant species may go extinct over the coming decades. According to a 2016 report by the Ellen MacArthur Foundation, the production of plastic has risen 20-fold since 1964 and is expected to double again in the next 20 years and quadruple by 2050. Only around 5 percent of plastic ends up being recycled. If current trends continue, the report predicts, by 2050 there will, by weight, be more plastic in the world’s oceans than fish. No one of these gloomy metrics, considered alone, can capture the depths of the crisis we face. In only 200 years of existence, capitalism has brought us to the brink of such a calamitous breakdown in the world’s natural systems that our entire civilization is now under threat. Among Marx’s most evocative metaphors for the operation of capital is his description of it as “dead labor, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labor, and lives the more, the more labor it sucks”. It’s not only “living labor,” however, that sustains the vampire of capital, but also the natural inputs of the productive process – the raw materials that labor works up into the products that capitalists sell on the market for their coveted profits. What makes capitalism uniquely destructive in comparison to previous systems is the rupture of the connection between the main drivers of economic life and the natural world that sustains us. A capitalist may own a significant amount of land. But unlike the feudal lords of the Middle Ages, their wealth isn’t tied to the piece of land that they own. If a capitalist destroys their land – say by digging up all the coal or oil it contains, poisoning it with chemicals or exhausting the fertility of the soil through over-farming – they can simply take the profits they’ve generated from it and buy more land elsewhere. The vampire metaphor is powerful precisely because it speaks to this fundamental rift between the lifeblood of capitalism – profit – and society’s underlying life systems, including labor and the natural environment, that are the ultimate source of all wealth. Rolling Stone contributor Matt Taibbi’s description of investment bank Goldman Sachs as “a great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money”, can be extended to the whole capitalist class. The environmental (or other) consequences of their activities don’t give them much pause for concern as long as they’re making money. The wealth of the capitalist ruling class of today is so immense that even the existential threat ‘posed by climate change won’t shake them into action. According to Oxfam, the combined wealth of the world’s 2,153 billionaires exceeds that of the poorest 4.6 billion people, who make up 60 percent of the global population. Catastrophic events like the Australian bush fires are unlikely to faze them – in contrast to the mass of ordinary people impacted by the fires, they can easily buy their way to safety. The ruling class’s lack of concern for the environment is reinforced by the competitive nature of the system. Each individual capitalist must keep their costs low and their profits high to stay ahead of their rivals. The main way they do this is by keeping workers’ wages down. But if they can save money by not dealing with the environmental costs of their operations, they’ll do that too. The capitalist class gains immense savings from treating environmental destruction as an “externality” that they can pass on to society. The International Monetary Fund calculated that global subsidies to fossil fuel companies amount to US$5.2 trillion a year, approximately 6.4 percent of world GDP. Most subsidies relate to the cost of dealing with the destructive consequences of all the carbon emissions produced by burning fossil fuels. This includes the impacts of climate change, along with the costs of health care associated with air pollution and so on. You might wonder why governments are willing to let fossil fuel companies and other destructive industries get away with this. The answer lies in the role of the capitalist state. We’re taught that it is a neutral body that mediates between the conflicting interests of different social layers and guides society in the collective interest. The state, however, has never been neutral. Modern capitalist states emerged in conjunction with the rise of the capitalist class as the dominant economic power in society, and they’ve always, as Marx put it, been “a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.” The role of the capitalist state, in other words, is to protect and advance the interests of big business and the rich, rather than the mass of the population who suffer the consequences of their environmentally destructive practices. And again, this dynamic is reinforced by competition on an international scale. Each national state defends the interests of its capitalist class against those of their foreign rivals. This involves both maintaining good business conditions (e.g. low wages and a lack of environmental and other regulations) at home and projecting power externally, through diplomatic and military means, to ensure access to resources and markets around the world. The destructive consequences of these dynamics can be seen in capitalism’s almost uninterrupted history of war. And they also help explain the continuing failure of global efforts to secure agreement on any serious action to reduce carbon emissions or address other major environmental issues. Sacrificing short term profits in the name of long term sustainability goes against the DNA of the capitalist nation state. This is particularly clear in the case of Australia, one of the world’s most fossil fuel-dependent nations. Neither the Liberals nor Labor are prepared to forgo the tens of billions in profits that flow from coal and gas exports. The strength of the fossil fuel industry is just too important to Australia’s status as a major regional power. We’re in a battle for our lives. The entire future of the human experiment – so utterly miraculous and so terrifyingly fragile – depends on what we do in the coming years and decades. As Russian Marxist Nikolai Bukharin, writing a few years after the revolution of 1917, put it: “No system, including that of human society, can exist in empty space; it is surrounded by an ‘environment,’ on which all its conditions ultimately depend. If human society is not adapted to its environment, it is not meant for this world; all its culture will inevitably pass away; society itself will be reduced to dust.”<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>State-sanctioned <u>environmental destruction</u> is intrinsic to capitalist growth---culminates in <u>extinction</u>. </h4><p>James <strong>Plested 20, <u>Red Flad editor, "Capitalist roots of the environment crisis," 2-17-2020, https://climateandcapitalism.com/2020/02/18/capitalist-roots-environment-crisis/</p><p><mark>Climate change</strong></mark> is only <strong>one aspect</strong> of the problem. Everywhere we look, the <strong>natural <mark>systems</strong></mark> that maintain our planet in its <strong>habitable state</strong> <mark>are</mark> rapidly <strong><mark>deteriorating</strong></mark>. Can we survive the <strong><mark>destruction</strong> of</mark> the tropical <strong><mark>rain forests</strong></mark> of the <strong>Amazon</strong> – the <strong>lungs of Earth</strong>? Can we survive the <strong><mark>spread</strong> of <strong>dead zones</u></strong></mark> – areas too low in oxygen to sustain life – <u>across our <strong>oceans</strong>? Can we make do without the <strong><mark>bees</strong> and</mark> other <strong><mark>insects</strong></mark> we</u> currently <u>depend on to <strong>pollinate</strong> our <strong>crops</strong>?</u> <u>Perhaps the <strong>scariest thing</u></strong> about the situation <u>isn’t the <strong><mark>vast</mark> scale</strong> of <mark>breakdown in natural systems</mark> but the fact that those entrusted with the <strong><mark>leadership</strong></mark> of our society appear determined to <strong><mark>hasten</mark> us to <mark>our doom</u></strong>.</mark> Instead of listening to the advice of the scientists, firefighters, land managers and others who’ve been sounding the alarm about climate change for decades, Scott Morrison and Co. parrot propaganda points from the Murdoch press. Instead of agreeing, finally, to contribute more to global efforts to reduce carbon emissions, they double down on the expansion of Australia’s booming coal and gas industries, attempting all the while to distract the public with fairy tales about greenies preventing back-burning and the fires just being part of Australia’s natural cycle. Elsewhere in the world, the picture is the same. <u>Decades of global <strong>climate negotiations</strong> have gone <strong>nowhere</strong>. Despite the increasingly urgent warnings of scientists, <strong><mark>emissions</mark> continue to <mark>rise</u></strong></mark>. And with the likes of Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Jair Bolsonaro in charge of some of the world’s biggest economies, the prospects for a major shift occurring soon appear terrifyingly dim. Where did it all go wrong? The answer is suggested by the increasingly popular slogan System change, not climate change. Morrison, Trump and their fellow <u><mark>fossil fuel enthusiasts</mark> act not simply in accordance with their personal whims</u> and desires <u>but as the <strong>conscious <mark>servants</strong> of</mark> a system: <strong><mark>capitalism</strong></mark>. Proponents of capitalism talk as if it’s the <strong>natural form</strong> of human society</u> – something that has existed since the dawn of time. <u>The reality,</u> however, <u>is that the age of capitalism spans only the past two to three centuries.</u> For the vast majority of our 200-300,000 year history, humans lived in societies, like those of the Indigenous inhabitants of Australia prior to invasion, characterized by collective decision making and sharing of resources, not the system of private property and the endless competitive scramble for individual gain that define the world today. If the capitalist system was most befitting of our human nature, you would expect its emergence to have been embraced by all whose lives were transformed by it. But <u>the birth of capitalism</u> in the 17th and 18th centuries <u>was an extremely <strong>violent process</strong> that was <strong>strongly resisted</strong> from the start.</u> As Karl Marx put it in Capital: “The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signaled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production.” Capital came into the world, he wrote, “dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt.” <u>Since the earliest days of human existence, we have had a significant impact on the environment</u>. Scientists believe, for instance, that hunting, along with the use of fire and other land management techniques employed by Australia’s Indigenous population, contributed to the extinction of the continent’s megafauna. Deforestation was a major problem in ancient Greece and the Roman Empire. Air pollution from the burning of wood and coal was an issue in London as early as the 12th and 13th centuries. <u>All this, however, was on a <strong>minuscule scale</strong> compared to the <strong>devastation</strong> of the past <strong>200 years</strong>, and particularly</u> in the period <u>after World War Two – the era in which <strong>capitalism came to dominate</strong> every corner</u> of the globe. In 1950, global carbon emissions totaled 5.28 billion tonnes. By 2017, they were 36.15 billion tonnes. According to the World Wildlife Fund’s Living Planet Report 2018, <u>the <strong>total population</strong> of <strong>mammals</strong>, <strong>birds</strong>, <strong>fish</strong> and <strong>reptiles</strong> has <strong>declined by 60 percent</strong> since 1970. Every year, the rate of <strong><mark>extinctions</strong> rises</mark>,</u> and scientists estimate that <u>a million animal and plant species may go extinct over the coming decades</u>. According to a 2016 report by the Ellen MacArthur Foundation, the production of plastic has risen 20-fold since 1964 and is expected to double again in the next 20 years and quadruple by 2050. Only around 5 percent of plastic ends up being recycled. If current trends continue, the report predicts, <u>by 2050 there will, by weight, be <strong>more plastic</strong> in the world’s oceans <strong>than fish</u></strong>. No one of these gloomy metrics, considered alone, can capture the depths of the crisis we face. <u>In only 200 years</u> of existence, <u>capitalism has brought us to the brink of such a <strong>calamitous breakdown</strong> in the world’s natural systems that <strong>our <mark>entire civilization</mark> is <mark>now under threat</u></strong></mark>. <u>Among Marx’s most evocative metaphors for</u> the operation of <u>capital is his description of it as “dead labor, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labor,</u> and lives the more, the more labor it sucks”. It’s not only “living labor,” however, that sustains the vampire of capital, <u>but also the <strong>natural inputs</strong> of the <strong>productive process</strong> – the <strong>raw materials</strong> that labor works up into the products that capitalists sell on</u> the market for their coveted profits. <u>What makes <mark>capitalism <strong>uniquely destructive</strong></mark> in comparison</u> to previous systems <u>is the <strong><mark>rupture</strong> of the <strong>connection</strong> between</mark> the main drivers of <strong><mark>economic life</strong> and the</mark> <strong>natural <mark>world</strong></mark> that sustains us</u>. A capitalist may own a significant amount of land. But unlike the feudal lords of the Middle Ages, their wealth isn’t tied to the piece of land that they own. <u>If a capitalist <strong>destroys</strong> their land</u> – say by digging up all the coal or oil it contains, poisoning it with chemicals or exhausting the fertility of the soil through over-farming – <u>they can simply take the <strong><mark>profits</strong></mark> they’ve generated from it and <strong><mark>buy more</strong> land</mark> elsewhere</u>. The vampire metaphor is powerful precisely because it speaks to this fundamental rift between the lifeblood of capitalism – profit – and society’s underlying life systems, including labor and the natural environment, that are the ultimate source of all wealth. Rolling Stone contributor Matt Taibbi’s description of investment bank Goldman Sachs as “a great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money”, can be extended to the whole capitalist class. <u>The <mark>environmental</mark> (or other) <strong><mark>consequences</strong></mark> of their activities <mark>don’t give them</mark> much <strong><mark>pause</strong></mark> for concern as long as they’re <strong>making money</u></strong>. <u>The <mark>wealth</mark> of the capitalist ruling class</u> of today <u>is so immense that even the <strong><mark>existential threat</strong></mark> ‘posed by <strong>climate change</strong> won’t shake them into action</u>. According to Oxfam, the combined wealth of the world’s 2,153 billionaires exceeds that of the poorest 4.6 billion people, who make up 60 percent of the global population. <u>Catastrophic events</u> like the Australian bush fires <u>are unlikely to faze them</u> – in contrast to the mass of ordinary people impacted by the fires, they can easily buy their way to safety. <u>The ruling class’s <strong>lack of concern</strong> for the <strong>environment</strong> is <mark>reinforced by</mark> the <strong><mark>competitive nature</strong></mark> of the system. Each individual <mark>capitalist must keep</mark> their <strong><mark>costs low</strong></mark> and their <strong>profits high</strong> to stay ahead of their rivals. The main way</u> they do this <u>is by keeping workers’ <strong>wages down</strong>. But if they can <mark>save money</mark> by not dealing <mark>with</mark> the <strong><mark>environmental costs</mark> </strong>of their operations, they’ll do that too</u>. <u>The capitalist class gains immense savings from treating <strong>environmental destruction</strong> as an “externality” that they can pass on to society</u>. The International Monetary Fund calculated that global subsidies to fossil fuel companies amount to US$5.2 trillion a year, approximately 6.4 percent of world GDP. Most subsidies relate to the cost of dealing with the destructive consequences of all the carbon emissions produced by burning fossil fuels. This includes the impacts of climate change, along with the costs of health care associated with air pollution and so on. <u>You might wonder why governments are willing to let</u> fossil fuel companies and other <u><strong>destructive industries</strong> get away with this. The answer lies in the <strong>role</strong> of the <strong>capitalist state</strong>. We’re taught that it is a neutral body</u> that mediates between the conflicting interests of different social layers and guides society in the collective interest. <u>The state, however, has <strong>never been neutral</strong>. Modern <strong>capitalist states</strong> emerged in <strong>conjunction</strong> with the rise of the <strong>capitalist class</strong> as the dominant economic power in society, and they’ve always</u>, as Marx put it, <u>been “a <strong>committee</strong> for managing the <strong>common affairs</strong> of the <strong>whole bourgeoisie</u></strong>.” <u>The role of <mark>the capitalist state</u></mark>, in other words, <u>is to <strong><mark>protect</strong> and <strong>advance</strong></mark> the interests of <strong><mark>big business</strong></mark> and the <strong>rich</strong>, rather than the mass of the population who <strong>suffer the consequences</strong> of their <strong>environmentally destructive</strong> practices</u>. And again, this dynamic is reinforced by competition on an international scale. Each national state defends the interests of its capitalist class against those of their foreign rivals. This involves both maintaining good business conditions (e.g. low wages and a lack of environmental and other regulations) at home and projecting power externally, through diplomatic and military means, to ensure access to resources and markets around the world. <u>The <strong>destructive consequences</strong> of these dynamics can be seen in capitalism’s almost uninterrupted <strong>history of war</u></strong>. And they also help explain the continuing failure of global efforts to secure agreement on any serious action to reduce carbon emissions or address other major environmental issues. <u>Sacrificing <strong>short term profits</strong> in the name of <strong>long term <mark>sustainability</strong> goes against</mark> the DNA of the <mark>capitalist</mark> <mark>nation state</u>. This</mark> is particularly clear in the case of Australia, one of the world’s most fossil fuel-dependent nations. Neither the Liberals nor Labor are prepared to forgo the tens of billions in profits that flow from coal and gas exports. The strength of the fossil fuel industry is just too important to Australia’s status as a major regional power. We’re in a battle for our lives. <u>The <strong>entire future</strong> of the <strong>human experiment</u></strong> – so utterly miraculous and so terrifyingly fragile – <u>depends on what we do in the <strong>coming years</u></strong> and decades. As Russian Marxist Nikolai Bukharin, writing a few years after the revolution of 1917, put it: “<u>No system, including that of human society, can exist in empty space; it is surrounded by an ‘environment,’ on which all its conditions ultimately depend. If <strong><mark>human society</strong></mark> is not <strong>adapted</strong> to its environment, it is not meant for this world; all its culture <mark>will <strong>inevitably pass</mark> away</strong>; <mark>society</mark> itself <mark>will be <strong>reduced to dust</u></strong></mark>.”</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Siegel 20 “This Multi-Trillion Dollar Disaster Is Coming, And Solar Astronomy Is Our Prime Defense” Ethan Siegel [Ph.D. astrophysicist, author, and science communicator, who professes physics and astronomy at various colleges] January 31, 2020 https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2020/01/31/this-multi-trillion-dollar-disaster-is-coming-and-solar-astronomy-is-our-prime-defense/?sh=6ecc0e367613 SM On December 12, 2019, the world's most powerful solar observatory — the National Science Foundation's Daniel K. Inouye Solar Telescope — opened its eyes for the first time. With a whopping 4-meter diameter primary mirror and a unique, off-center design, the Inouye Solar Telescope is capable of imaging features as small as 30 km in size on the Sun. Already, in its first light images released on January 29, 2020, features in-between the Texas-sized convective cells were revealed for the first time ever. fulltext: But the Inouye Solar Telescope offers so much more than just gorgeous images of our parent star; it's one of a number of solar astronomy projects that are all working together to protect our planet from a multi-trillion dollar disaster that's definitely coming: a catastrophic solar flare. It could come anytime this year or not for another few centuries, but studying the Sun is the only way to be prepared. Here's the science behind these beautiful images and videos. Until 1859, solar astronomy was extremely simple: scientists studied the light from the Sun, the sunspots that occasionally dotted the Sun's surface, and viewed the corona during solar eclipses. But in 1859, solar astronomer Richard Carrington happened to be looking at the Sun, tracking a large, irregular sunspot, when something unprecedented occurred: a "white light flare" was observed, intensely bright and moving across the spot itself for around 5 minutes before disappearing entirely. This turned out to be the first-ever observation of what we now call a solar flare. Some 18 hours later (about three to four times the speed of most solar flares), the largest geomagnetic storm in recorded history occurred on Earth. Aurorae were observed around the world: miners awoke in the Rockies; newspapers could be read by the aurora's light; the bright green curtain appeared in Cuba, Hawaii, Mexico and Colombia. Telegraph systems, even when disconnected, experienced their own induced currents, causing shocks and even starting fires. If such an event were to occur today, the infrastructure we have for electricity and electronics would experience devastating effects that could easily cause trilions of dollars in damage. The problem is that geomagnetic storms, formed when certain space weather events penetrate our magnetosphere and interact with the atmosphere, can cause massive currents to flow even in electronic circuits that are completely disconnected. A key science goal for solar astronomy is to understand how the interplay between the Sun, the space weather that causes these storms, and the effects on Earth itself are all related. This is why the NSF's Inouye Solar Telescope has, as its prime science goal, to measure the magnetic field of the Sun at three different layers: at the photosphere, in the chromosphere, and throughout the solar corona. With its enormous 4-meter diameter and its five science instruments — four of which are spectro-polarimeters designed for measuring the Sun's magnetic properties — it will measure the magnetic fields on and around the Sun as never before. Measuring the magnetic field at various layers on the Sun is the most important thing we can do for predicting space weather, which comes as a surprise to most people. In the late 1980s, everyone was talking about solar flares as the drivers of space weather, and that's what most discussions still focus on. However, that only tells a tiny part of the story, since sometimes solar flares can cause spectacular geomagnetic storms on Earth, but at other times, they have no effect. Our first major step towards understanding the role of magnetic fields came in 1995, when NASA's SOHO observatory was launched. What it saw was not just solar flares occurring at the photosphere, but a new type of phenomenon: coronal mass ejections (CMEs), which originate farther away from the Sun than the photosphere. If you've ever seen a blue animation of the Sun where the solar disk is blocked by a coronagraph, you've seen an image from SOHO. When CMEs come to Earth, that's what causes a space weather event. A solar flare without a CME won't be capable of causing a large geomagnetic storm; one of the things that SOHO taught us is that that the Earth's magnetic field will protect us from normal solar flares extremely well, leading to a minor auroral event at most. But many solar flares will lead to coronal mass ejections, particularly if there's a solar prominence nearby. Prominences are high-density collections of material that reside in the corona, and CMEs typically occur where the prominences found on the Sun magnetically break, which leads to the ejection of material. The CMEs themselves are directionally oriented, and it's only the ones that wind up striking Earth that put us at risk. When a CME goes off to the side, there's no worry; but when we see an annular CME from our perspective, that's when they're headed right for us. But even solar flares that cause CMEs that are directed right at Earth don't necessarily cause geomagnetic storms; there needs to be one other piece of the puzzle that lines up just right: there needs to be the right magnetic connection. Remember that magnets typically have North and South poles, where like poles (North-North or South-South) repel, but opposite poles (North-South or South-North) attract. Earth has its own magnetic field, which — from a distance — looks kind of like a bar magnet aligned close to our axis of rotation. If the magnetic field of the material ejected during a CME is aligned with Earth's field, the solar particles will be repelled, and no geomagnetic event will occur on Earth. But if the fields are anti-aligned, like they almost certainly were 161 years ago for the infamous Carrington event, you'll get a spectacular (and possibly dangerous) event, with the greatest auroral displays and much, much more. Since the 2000s, our best tools for measuring the magnetic fields of the charged particles from CMEs that head towards Earth are the slew of satellites and observatories placed at the L1 Lagrange point: a point in space located about 1,500,000 km away from Earth on the Sun-facing side. Unfortunately, that's already 99% of the way from the Sun to the Earth; we typically only get about ~45 minutes from when a CME arrives at L1 until it arrives on Earth, and either produces a geomagnetic storm or not. Ideally, what our next generation of solar observatories would bring us is a great increase in the amount of time we'll have to know whether we need to take the appropriate mitigating actions when such a potentially catastrophic coronal mass ejection occurs. There are plenty of things we can do, but we need more than an hour of advanced notice in order to do them. The way we can best mitigate the damage from space weather events on Earth is to have power companies cut off the currents in their electrical grids, and disconnect (and sufficiently ground) stations and substations instead, so that the induced current doesn't flow into homes, businesses and industrial buildings. Because of the enormous magnitude of the currents, they need to be safely and gradually ramped down, which typically takes around a day, rather than an hour, to enact. The key to knowing whether a CME has the appropriate component of its magnetic field aligned or anti-aligned well in advance of its arrival on Earth is to measure the magnetic field on the Sun; instead of ~45 minutes of lead time, you can get the full ~3 days or so that it typically takes ejected coronal material to travel from the Sun to the Earth. The Inouye Solar Telescope is precisely this amazing solar-measuring magnetometer that we need to make these observations. Practically every problem we're trying to solve about the Sun is a magnetic problem. If we want to understand what's occurring at the Sun's photosphere, it's driven by the heating from the inner layers of the Sun, but is distributed according to the magnetic field and its distribution throughout the Sun's outer layers. Magnetic connectivity extends from the photosphere to the chromosphere to the corona, which provides heating, winds, and enables the corona to be so energetic. The winds generated in the hot corona creates the magnetic connection between the Earth and the Sun, and in fact between the Sun and the remainder of the Solar System, relevant for aurorae on planets even in the outer Solar System. No matter how well we measure the other properties of material from the Sun — velocity, kinematics, energy, calorimetry, etc. — the magnetic properties are key to understanding what drives the Sun's processes. To understand what's going to impact Earth and how, we need a comprehensive understanding of what's occurring not only on the Sun itself, but from the particles ejected from it at every level: from the photosphere, through the chromosphere, to the corona, through interplanetary space, through the L1 Lagrange point, and onto our planet itself. A combination of the Inouye Solar Telescope, the Parker Solar Probe, the upcoming Solar Orbiter mission, along with L1 satellites such as SOHO and SDO, will enable us to understand the magnetic connection between the Sun and the Earth as never before. The NSF's Inouye Solar Telescope, which measured not only the Texas-sized convective cells on the Sun to better precision than ever but also features lining the space between those cells for the first time, is an indispensible part of that. Although the largest solar flares are rare, they do occur with some regularity. Some of them create coronal mass ejections; some coronal mass ejections head directly towards Earth; some of the ones that do head towards Earth have exactly the right properties to create spectacular aurorae and potentially catastrophic geomagnetic storms. Only now, with this new generation of solar astronomy tools, are we finally in position to scientifically prepare for the inevitable disaster. For decades, we've avoided the ruination of our modern infrastructure through sheer luck alone. A Carrington-level event, if it were to strike us unawares, would certainly cause trillions of dollars worth of damage worldwide. With the advent of these new heliophysics-focused observatories, led by the NSF's Daniel K. Inouye Solar Telescope, we'll finally have the opportunity to know when "the big one" is coming.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Accurate astronomy is key to avert solar flares which are coming now and wreck the grid.</h4><p><u><strong>Siegel 20 </u></strong>“This Multi-Trillion Dollar Disaster Is Coming, And Solar Astronomy Is Our Prime Defense” Ethan Siegel [Ph.D. astrophysicist, author, and science communicator, who professes physics and astronomy at various colleges] January 31, 2020 https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2020/01/31/this-multi-trillion-dollar-disaster-is-coming-and-solar-astronomy-is-our-prime-defense/?sh=6ecc0e367613 SM</p><p>On December 12, 2019, <u><strong>the world's most powerful solar observatory — the National Science Foundation's Daniel K. <mark>Inouye Solar Telescope</mark> — opened its eyes for the first time. With a whopping 4-meter diameter primary mirror and a unique, off-center design, the Inouye Solar Telescope is <mark>capable of imaging features</mark> as small as 30 km in size <mark>on</mark> the <mark>Sun</mark>.</u></strong> Already, in its first light images released on January 29, 2020, features in-between the Texas-sized convective cells were revealed for the first time ever.</p><p>But the Inouye Solar Telescope offers so much more than just gorgeous images of our parent star; <u><strong>it's one of a number of <mark>solar astronomy projects</mark> that <mark>are</mark> all <mark>working</mark> together <mark>to</mark> <mark>protect</mark> our planet <mark>from</mark> a multi-trillion dollar disaster that's definitely coming<mark>: a catastrophic solar flare</u></strong></mark>. It could come anytime this year or not for another few centuries, but studying the Sun is the only way to be prepared. Here's the science behind these beautiful images and videos.</p><p><u><strong>Until 1859, solar astronomy was extremely simple: scientists studied the light from the Sun, the sunspots that occasionally dotted the Sun's surface, and viewed the corona during solar eclipses. But in 1859, solar astronomer Richard Carrington happened to be looking at the Sun, tracking a large, irregular sunspot, when something unprecedented occurred: a "white light flare" was observed, intensely bright and moving across the spot itself for around 5 minutes before disappearing entirely.</p><p></u></strong>This turned out to be <u><strong>the first-ever observation of what we now call <mark>a solar flare.</mark> Some 18 hours later (about three to four times the speed of most solar flares), the largest geomagnetic storm in recorded history occurred on Earth. Aurorae were observed around the world: miners awoke in the Rockies; newspapers could be read by the aurora's light; the bright green curtain appeared in Cuba, Hawaii, Mexico and Colombia. Telegraph systems, even when disconnected, experienced their own induced currents, causing shocks and even starting fires.</p><p>If such an event were to occur <mark>today</mark>, the <mark>infrastructure</mark> we have <mark>for</mark> electricity and <mark>electronics would experience devastating effects that could easily cause trilions of dollars in damage</mark>. The problem is that <mark>geomagnetic storms</mark>, formed when certain space weather events penetrate our magnetosphere and interact with the atmosphere, can <mark>cause massive currents to flow even in</mark> electronic <mark>circuits</mark> that are completely <mark>disconnected</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>A key science goal for solar astronomy is to understand how the interplay between the Sun, the space weather that causes these storms, and the effects on Earth itself are all related. This is why the NSF's Inouye Solar Telescope has, as its prime science goal, to measure the magnetic field of the Sun at three different layers:</p><p>at the photosphere,</p><p>in the chromosphere,</p><p>and throughout the solar corona.</p><p>With its enormous 4-meter diameter and its five science instruments — four of which are spectro-polarimeters designed for measuring the Sun's magnetic properties — it will measure the magnetic fields on and around the Sun as never before.</p><p><u><strong>Measuring the magnetic field at various layers on the Sun is the most important thing we can do for predicting space weather,</u></strong> which comes as a surprise to most people. In the late 1980s, everyone was talking about solar flares as the drivers of space weather, and that's what most discussions still focus on. However, that only tells a tiny part of the story, since sometimes solar flares can cause spectacular geomagnetic storms on Earth, but at other times, they have no effect.</p><p><u><strong>Our first major step towards understanding the role of magnetic fields came in 1995, when NASA's SOHO observatory was launched. What it saw was not just solar flares occurring at the photosphere, but a new type of phenomenon: coronal mass ejections (CMEs), which originate farther away from the Sun than the photosphere.</u></strong> If you've ever seen a blue animation of the Sun where the solar disk is blocked by a coronagraph, you've seen an image from SOHO.</p><p><u><strong>When CMEs come to Earth, that's what causes a space weather even</u></strong>t. A solar flare without a CME won't be capable of causing a large geomagnetic storm; one of the things that SOHO taught us is that that the Earth's magnetic field will protect us from normal solar flares extremely well, leading to a minor auroral event at most.</p><p><u><strong>But many solar flares will lead to coronal mass ejections, particularly if there's a solar prominence nearby. Prominences are high-density collections of material that reside in the corona, and CMEs typically occur where the prominences found on the Sun magnetically break, which leads to the ejection of material.</u></strong> The CMEs themselves are directionally oriented, and it's only the ones that wind up striking Earth that put us at risk. When a CME goes off to the side, there's no worry; but when we see an annular CME from our perspective, that's when they're headed right for us.</p><p><u><strong>But even solar flares that cause CMEs that are directed right at Earth don't necessarily cause geomagnetic storms; there needs to be one other piece of the puzzle that lines up just right: there needs to be the right magnetic connection. Remember that magnets typically have North and South poles, where like poles (North-North or South-South) repel, but opposite poles (North-South or South-North) attract.</p><p></u></strong>Earth has its own magnetic field, which — from a distance — looks kind of like a bar magnet aligned close to our axis of rotation. If the magnetic field of the material ejected during a CME is aligned with Earth's field, the solar particles will be repelled, and no geomagnetic event will occur on Earth. But <u><strong>if the fields are anti-aligned, like they almost certainly were 161 years ago for the infamous Carrington event, you'll get a spectacular (and possibly dangerous) event, with the greatest auroral displays and much, much more.</p><p>Since the 2000s, our best tools for measuring the magnetic fields of the charged particles from CMEs that head towards Earth are the slew of satellites and observatories placed at the L1 Lagrange point: a point in space located about 1,500,000 km away from Earth on the Sun-facing side. Unfortunately, that's already 99% of the way from the Sun to the Earth; we typically only get about ~45 minutes from when a CME arrives at L1 until it arrives on Earth, and either produces a geomagnetic storm or not.</p><p>Ideally, what our next generation of <mark>solar observatories</mark> would <mark>bring</mark> us is a great <mark>increase in</mark> the amount of <mark>time we'll</mark> have to <mark>know</mark> whether we need <mark>to take the</mark> appropriate <mark>mitigating actions when such a</mark> potentially catastrophic <mark>coronal mass ejection occurs.</mark> There are plenty of things we can do, but we need more than an hour of advanced notice in order to do them.</p><p>The way we can best mitigate the damage from space weather events on Earth is to have power companies cut off the currents in their electrical grids, and disconnect (and sufficiently ground) stations and substations instead, so that the induced current doesn't flow into homes, businesses and industrial buildings. Because of the enormous magnitude of the currents, they need to be safely and gradually ramped down, which typically takes around a day, rather than an hour, to enact.</p><p>The key to knowing whether a CME has the appropriate component of its magnetic field aligned or anti-aligned well in advance of its arrival on Earth is to measure the magnetic field on the Sun; instead of ~45 minutes of lead time, you can get the full ~3 days or so that it typically takes ejected coronal material to travel from the Sun to the Earth.</p><p>The Inouye Solar Telescope is precisely this amazing solar-measuring magnetometer that we need to make these observations.</p><p></u></strong>Practically every problem we're trying to solve about the Sun is a magnetic problem. If we want to understand what's occurring at the Sun's photosphere, it's driven by the heating from the inner layers of the Sun, but is distributed according to the magnetic field and its distribution throughout the Sun's outer layers. Magnetic connectivity extends from the photosphere to the chromosphere to the corona, which provides heating, winds, and enables the corona to be so energetic.</p><p>The winds generated in the hot corona creates the magnetic connection between the Earth and the Sun, and in fact between the Sun and the remainder of the Solar System, relevant for aurorae on planets even in the outer Solar System. No matter how well we measure the other properties of material from the Sun — velocity, kinematics, energy, calorimetry, etc. — the magnetic properties are key to understanding what drives the Sun's processes.</p><p>To understand what's going to impact Earth and how, we need a comprehensive understanding of what's occurring not only on the Sun itself, but from the particles ejected from it at every level:</p><p>from the photosphere,</p><p>through the chromosphere,</p><p>to the corona,</p><p>through interplanetary space,</p><p>through the L1 Lagrange point,</p><p><u><strong>and onto our planet itself.</p><p>A combination of the Inouye <mark>Solar Telescope</mark>, the Parker Solar Probe, the upcoming Solar Orbiter mission, along with L1 satellites such as SOHO and SDO, will <mark>enable us to understand the magnetic connection between the Sun and the Earth</mark> as never before. The NSF's Inouye Solar Telescope, which measured not only the Texas-sized convective cells on the Sun to better precision than ever but also features lining the space between those cells for the first time, is an indispensible part of that.</p><p>Although the <mark>largest solar flares</mark> are rare, they do <mark>occur with</mark> some <mark>regularity</u></strong></mark>. Some of them create coronal mass ejections; some coronal mass ejections head directly towards Earth; some of the ones that do head towards Earth have exactly the right properties to create spectacular aurorae and potentially catastrophic geomagnetic storms. <u><strong><mark>Only now</mark>, with this new generation of solar astronomy tools, <mark>are we finally in position to</mark> scientifically <mark>prepare</mark> for the inevitable disaster.</p><p><mark>For decades, we've avoided</mark> the <mark>ruination of</mark> our modern <mark>infrastructure through</mark> sheer <mark>luck alone</mark>. A Carrington-level event, <mark>if it were to strike us unawares</mark>, would certainly <mark>cause trillions of dollars worth of damage</mark> worldwide. With the advent of these new heliophysics-focused observatories, led by the NSF's Daniel K. Inouye Solar Telescope, we'll finally have the opportunity to know when "the big one" is coming.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Shaw 21 Ryan Shaw, Senior Advisor and Professor of Practice in History and Strategy at Arizona State University, PhD, MA history, Yale University, BA American Government and Politics, US Military Academy at West Point, “In Defense of Competition,” Real Clear Defense, 11-11-2021, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2021/11/11/in_defense_of_competition_803143.html /GoGreen! fulltext: As the Pentagon readies its new National Defense Strategy, the commentariat—unsurprisingly—has some thoughts. While the perspectives are, no doubt, as varied as the array of think tanks and universities from which they spring, there seems to be a significant piling on against both the “Great Power Competition” that animated Trump-era guidance and the (allegedly distinct) “Strategic Competition” terminology advanced by the Biden administration. But “competition” is a rare instance of bipartisan continuity because it speaks to real and important dynamics in the international system, and it has led to important new thinking in our approach to national security. We should not be so quick to discard it. Rather than abandoning competition, it is time now to double down. The Pentagon strategy should embrace a robust concept of integrated deterrence, and the White House should lead with a National Security Strategy (NSS) rooted in a holistic approach to Competitive Statecraft. The critics are right that Great Power Competition (“GPC”) has become a vacuous catch-all, a magic word, as CNAS’s Wasser and Pettyjohn tell it, that can justify “every force, capability, or resource request.” But that’s a perennial bureaucratic tendency; the same was true of CT and then COIN in the Bush and Obama years, and probably any number of terms du jour in prior eras. We should always work to minimize these abuses, but we won't eliminate them as long as we use words to describe our priorities. Other critiques are less valid and far less helpful. The idea that an emphasis on competition precludes the possibility of cooperation is an unhelpful reductio ad absurdum. Pundits may not be able to sustain two competing ideas at once, but the international system always does, and the military clearly can: emerging U.S. doctrine envisions a competition continuum, in which “the joint force… campaigns through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict calculated to achieve the desired strategic objectives.” As Daniel H. Nexon points out, “Even during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union worked out a variety of formal and informal rules that helped them manage competition, limit nuclear proliferation, and otherwise structure international relations.” (It is unclear how Nexon intends this observation to support his argument against competition.) Equally unhelpful is the common complaint that the phrase “‘strategic competition’ reflects uncertainty about what that competition is over and what it means to win.” Here again, while it might stymie the pundits, this intellectual hurdle seems not to have tripped up our military leaders—they have been consistent in identifying the stakes of this competition as the “rules-based international order that brought prosperity and relative peace for the last seven decades.” And “what it means to win” is just the wrong question—that’s the whole point. Echoing George Kennan ("We have been handicapped … by a popular attachment to the concept of a basic difference between peace and war…"), the competition discussion is enabling the military to finally—against all odds—shed the idea of war as a finite game that starts with an opening salvo of munitions and ends with a ceasefire and a treaty. The fixation on “winning” breeds fatal short-termism—see the common refrain that we didn't fight a twenty-year war in Afghanistan, but rather twenty one-year wars. What all these simplistic critiques miss is the simple old truth that the enemy gets a vote. Nexon wants us to consider competition as a means rather than an end. But it’s neither—it’s just a plain fact of our strategic environment, and the last round of guidance intended to highlight it as the most salient one for U.S. strategy. It may or may not have been true, but we operated for much of the last thirty years as though we did not have any real competitors, ideologically or materially. The “end of history” trope after the Cold War was premised on the absence of an ideological alternative to liberal democracy; and if 9-11 proved that wrong, the “asymmetric” modifier we appended to the “warfare” of the Global War on Terror reassured us that proponents of radical Islam lacked the resources to make their vision an existential threat. But the long-term ascendency of liberal, democratic ideals and rules-based international order is neither inevitable nor irreversible. There are alternatives on offer, and they are actively being pursued by adversaries whose capabilities across many domains threaten to eclipse our own in the not-so-distant future. These are the facts, and they demand our attention. The last NSS and NDS were right to frame them that way. We must prevent the loss of our competitive advantage and deterrent capacity in conventional and nuclear warfare—competition should not prevent that; properly conceived, competition demands it. (The Pentagon understands this, too.) But the most pernicious element of these arguments against competition is the insinuation—or the outright assertion—that we can or should focus on high-end capabilities to the exclusion of all else. This requires a willful disregard of everything we have learned about the gray zone/hybrid warfare/choose-your-appellation. After all, while our high-end advantage has eroded, it is not gone. We have so far deterred major conventional and nuclear war, but our adversaries—especially those near-peer “great powers”—have found countless ways to improve their strategic position and degrade ours without triggering a conventional military response. High-end deterrence is necessary, but it’s clearly not sufficient. The accumulation of minor setbacks can be existential, not just because of their obvious and immediate effects, but because they can degrade our long-term ability to generate and project conventional power. For all its emphasis on GPC, the last NDS recognized the interrelated nature of threats at all points on the competition continuum. This was made especially clear in the Irregular Warfare Annex: “State adversaries and their proxies increasingly seek to prevail through their own use of irregular warfare, [suggesting] the need for a revised understanding of IW to account for its role as a component of great power competition.” What we need is not a narrower concept of deterrence but a broader one that focuses not just on the future conflict we could lose but also on the ongoing competition we are currently losing. Perhaps this is where Secretary Austin’s nascent “integrated deterrence” idea is headed. He seems to want to integrate across domains and technologies and with allies, and who could argue? Well, lots of people, including Representative Mike Gallagher (R, WI), who has apparently been reading his Pettyjohn: “What we actually need to integrate is more conventional hard power—more ships, more long-range missiles and more long-range bombers in the Indo-Pacific.” Gallagher here is giving voice to a perpetual false choice we frame between conventional and irregular capabilities. But as the IW Annex said, competing in the contested space “does not require significant new resources… it requires new ideas and new means of employing existing capabilities.” The limiting factor is not in our pocketbooks, it’s between our ears. Educating for IW may not lead to great photo-ops, but it could lead to better outcomes below the threshold of major war, which would be worth a great deal more. Unfortunately, after our inglorious exit from Afghanistan, it seems we are determined to repeat what the Annex called “the ‘boom and bust’ cycle that has left the United States underprepared for irregular warfare in both Great Power Competition and conflict.” Some Congressional leaders are pushing back. Last year's NDAA included authorization to establish a DOD center for studying irregular warfare. This year's bill is still in draft, but both chambers have provisions demanding an implementation plan for the IW Annex, and the House bill would require a report on the establishment of the center. Educating for IW may not lead to great photo-ops, but it could lead to better outcomes below the threshold of major war, which would be worth a great deal more. With all due respect to Secretary Austin, an integrated deterrence worth its name would be integrated both vertically and horizontally. Vertically, it would supplement our nuclear and conventional deterrence with unconventional deterrence to provide creative and seamless response options other than “do nothing” and “all-out war.” Horizontally, along with allies and partners, it would integrate military force with the other instruments of U.S. national power.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Extinction.</h4><p><strong>Shaw 21</strong> Ryan Shaw, Senior Advisor and Professor of Practice in History and Strategy at Arizona State University, PhD, MA history, Yale University, BA American Government and Politics, US Military Academy at West Point, “In Defense of Competition,” Real Clear Defense, 11-11-2021, <u>https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2021/11/11/in_defense_of_competition_803143.html</u> /GoGreen!</p><p>As the Pentagon readies its new National Defense Strategy, <u>the <strong>commentariat</strong>—unsurprisingly—has</u> some t<u>houghts</u>. While the perspectives are, no doubt, as varied as the array of think tanks and universities from which they spring, there seems to be <u>a significant <strong>piling on</strong> against both the <strong>“Great Power Competition”</u></strong> that animated Trump-era guidance <u>and</u> the (allegedly distinct) <u><strong>“Strategic Competition”</strong> terminology advanced by the Biden administration</u>. <u>But “competition” is a rare instance of bipartisan continuity because it <strong>speaks to real and important dynamics</strong> in the international system</u>, and it has led to important new thinking in our approach to national security. <u>We should not be so quick to discard it</u>.</p><p><u>Rather than <strong>abandoning competition</strong>, <strong>it is time now to double down</u></strong>. The Pentagon strategy <u>should embrace</u> a robust concept of <u><strong>integrated deterrence</u></strong>, and the White House should lead with a National Security Strategy (NSS) <u>rooted in a <strong>holistic approach</strong> to <strong>Competitive Statecraft</u></strong>.</p><p>The <u>critics are right that</u> Great Power Competition (<u><strong>“GPC”</u></strong>) <u>has become a vacuous catch-all, a <strong>magic word</u></strong>, as CNAS’s Wasser and Pettyjohn tell it, <u>that can justify “every force, capability, or resource request.” But</u> that’s a perennial bureaucratic tendency; <u>the same was true of CT and then COIN</u> in the Bush and Obama years, <u>and</u> probably <u>any number of <strong>terms du jour</strong> in prior eras</u>. We should always work to minimize these abuses, but we won't eliminate them as long as we use words to describe our priorities. Other <u><strong>critiques</strong> are <strong>less valid</strong> and far <strong>less helpful</u></strong>.</p><p><u>The idea that an emphasis on <strong>competition precludes</strong> the possibility of <strong>cooperation</strong> is an <strong>unhelpful reductio ad absurdum</u></strong>. <u>Pundits may not be able to sustain two competing ideas at once, but the international system always does, and the military clearly can: emerging U.S. doctrine envisions a <strong>competition continuum</u></strong>, in which “the joint force… campaigns through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict calculated to achieve the desired strategic objectives.” As Daniel H. Nexon points out, “<u><strong>Even during the Cold War</strong>, the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and the Soviet Union worked out a variety of formal and informal rules that helped them <strong>manage competition</strong>, limit <strong>nuclear prolif</strong>eration, and otherwise <strong>structure international relations</u></strong>.” (<u>It is <strong>unclear</strong> how <strong>Nexon</strong> intends this observation to <strong>support</strong> his <strong>argument against competition</u></strong>.)</p><p><u>Equally <strong>unhelpful</strong> is the common <strong>complaint</strong> that the phrase “‘strategic competition’ reflects <strong>uncertainty</strong> about <strong>what that competition is over</strong> and <strong>what it means to win</u></strong>.” Here again, <u>while it might stymie the pundits</u>, this intellectual hurdle <u>seems not to have tripped up our military leaders</u>—they have been consistent in <u>identifying the <strong>stakes</strong> of this <strong>competition</strong> as the “<strong>rules-based <mark>international order</strong></mark> that <mark>brought</mark> <strong>prosperity</strong> and <strong>relative <mark>peace</strong></mark> for the last <strong>seven decades</u></strong>.”</p><p><u>And “<strong>what it means to win</strong>” is just the <strong>wrong question</strong>—that’s the <strong>whole point</u></strong>. Echoing George Kennan ("<u>We have been <strong>handicapped</strong> … by</u> a popular <u><strong>attachment to</strong> the concept of a <strong>basic difference between peace and war</u></strong>…"), the <u><strong>competition</u></strong> discussion <u>is enabling the military to finally</u>—against all odds—<u><strong>shed the idea of war as a finite game</strong> that starts with an opening salvo of munitions and ends with a ceasefire and a treaty. The fixation on “winning” breeds <strong>fatal short-termism</u></strong>—see the common refrain that we didn't fight a twenty-year war in Afghanistan, but rather twenty one-year wars.</p><p>What all these simplistic critiques miss is the simple old truth that the enemy gets a vote. <u><strong>Nexon</strong> wants us to <strong>consider competition as a means rather than an end</strong>. <strong>But it’s neither</strong>—it’s just <strong>a plain fact of our strategic environment</strong>, and the last round of guidance intended to highlight it as <strong>the most salient one for U.S. strategy</u></strong>. <u>It may or may not have been true, but we operated for much of the last thirty years as though we did not have any real competitors, ideologically or materially</u>. The “end of history” trope after the Cold War was premised on the absence of an ideological alternative to liberal democracy; and if 9-11 proved that wrong, <u>the “asymmetric” modifier we appended to the “warfare” of the Global War on Terror reassured us that</u> proponents of radical Islam <u>lacked the <strong>resources</strong> to make their vision an <strong>existential threat</u></strong>.</p><p><u>But the long-term ascendency of</u> liberal, democratic ideals and <u><strong>rules-based international order</strong> is <strong>neither inevitable</strong> <strong>nor irreversible</u></strong>. <u>There are <strong>alternatives</strong> on offer, and they are <strong>actively being pursued</strong> by <strong><mark>adversaries</strong></mark> whose <strong><mark>capabilities</strong></mark> <strong>across many domains</strong> <mark>threaten to <strong>eclipse our own</u></strong></mark> in the not-so-distant future. These are the facts, and they demand our attention. The last NSS and NDS were right to frame them that way.</p><p><u>We <strong><mark>must prevent</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>loss of</mark> our <mark>competitive advantage</strong></mark> and <strong>deterrent capacity</strong> in <strong>conventional</strong> and <strong>nuclear warfare</strong>—competition should not prevent that; properly conceived, competition demands it</u>. (The Pentagon understands this, too.) But the most pernicious element of these arguments against competition is the insinuation—or the outright assertion—that we can or should focus on high-end capabilities to the exclusion of all else. This requires a willful disregard of everything we have learned about the gray zone/hybrid warfare/choose-your-appellation. After all, while our high-end advantage has eroded, it is not gone. We have so far deterred major conventional and nuclear war, but our adversaries—especially those near-peer “great powers”—have found countless ways to improve their strategic position and degrade ours without triggering a conventional military response. High-end deterrence is necessary, but it’s clearly not sufficient. <u>The <strong>accumulation of <mark>minor setbacks</strong></mark> can be <strong><mark>existential</strong></mark>, not just because of their obvious and <strong>immediate effects</strong>, but because they can <strong>degrade</strong> our long-term ability to generate and <strong>project conventional power</u></strong>.</p><p>For all its emphasis on GPC, the last NDS <u>recognized the interrelated nature of threats at all points on the competition continuum</u>. This was made especially clear in the Irregular Warfare Annex: “State adversaries and their proxies increasingly seek to prevail through their own use of irregular warfare, [suggesting] the need for a revised understanding of IW to account for its role as a component of great power competition.”</p><p><u>What we need is <strong>not</strong> a <strong>narrower concept of deterrence</strong> but a <strong>broader</strong> one that <mark>focus</mark>es <strong>not just</strong> on the <strong>future conflict</strong> we <strong>could lose</strong> but also <mark>on the <strong>ongoing competition</strong></mark> we are <strong>currently losing</u></strong>. Perhaps <u>this is where</u> Secretary Austin’s nascent <u>“<strong><mark>integrated deterrence</strong></mark>”</u> idea <u>is headed.</u> He seems to want <u>to <strong>integrate across domains</strong> and <strong>tech</strong>nologie<strong>s</strong> and <strong>with allies</u></strong>, and who could argue? Well, lots of people, including Representative Mike Gallagher (R, WI), who has apparently been reading his Pettyjohn: “What we actually need to integrate is more conventional hard power—more ships, more long-range missiles and more long-range bombers in the Indo-Pacific.”</p><p>Gallagher here is giving voice to <u>a perpetual <strong>false choice</u></strong> we frame <u>between <strong>conventional</strong> and <strong>irregular</strong> capabilities</u>. But as the IW Annex said, <u>competing in the contested space “<strong>does not require significant new resources</strong>… it <mark>requires</mark> new ideas and <strong><mark>new means of employing existing capabilities</u></strong></mark>.” The limiting factor is not in our pocketbooks, it’s between our ears. Educating for IW may not lead to great photo-ops, but it could lead to better outcomes below the threshold of major war, which would be worth a great deal more. Unfortunately, after our inglorious exit from Afghanistan, it seems we are determined to repeat what the Annex called “the ‘boom and bust’ cycle that has left the United States underprepared for irregular warfare in both Great Power Competition and conflict.”</p><p>Some Congressional leaders are pushing back. Last year's NDAA included authorization to establish a DOD center for studying irregular warfare. This year's bill is still in draft, but both chambers have provisions demanding an implementation plan for the IW Annex, and the House bill would require a report on the establishment of the center. Educating for IW may not lead to great photo-ops, but it could lead to better outcomes below the threshold of major war, which would be worth a great deal more.</p><p>With all due respect to Secretary Austin, <u>an <strong>integrated deterrence</strong> worth its name would be integrated <strong>both</strong> vertically and horizontally. <strong>Vertically</strong>, it would supplement our <strong>nuclear</strong> and <strong>conventional</strong> <strong>deterrence</strong> with <strong>unconventional</strong> deterrence to provide creative and seamless response <strong>options other than “do nothing” and “all-out war</strong>.” <strong>Horizontally</strong>, along <strong>with allies</strong> and partners, it would <strong>integrate military force</strong> with the <strong>other instruments</strong> of U.S. national power</u>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Bomassi ’19 [Lizza Bomassi and Pierre Vimont, * deputy director of Carnegie Europe, where she is responsible for harmonizing Carnegie Europe’s strategic and operational priorities and managing relations with Carnegie’s global centers and programs as well as partner organizations in Europe, ** senior fellow at Carnegie Europe, Carnegie Europe, "Reimagining a Global Europe," 12/11/19, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/12/11/reimagining-global-europe-pub-80554, Date Accessed: 01/06/21, EA] What does a collective vision of a global Europe look like from the point of view of the demand side? And how can this vision be translated into an operational program? The picture that emerges confirms that the EU must develop a more flexible and nuanced view of responding to global challenges. fulltext: Multilateralism Outside partners consider the EU the standard-bearer for multilateralism and, as such, a natural ally in this environment. But the verdict on multilateralism in its current form is resounding—even deafening—ambivalence. Many Europeans regard it as an end in itself, whereas for other powers it is at best a means to be employed for any number of competing agendas. Its credibility is repeatedly put to the test when nation-states undermine the collective interest if doing so serves their purpose. In its worst form, multilateralism becomes a screen to hide behind, leading to indecision and inaction. Multilateralism in its current incarnation is seen as antiquated and out of touch with today’s globalized, transactional world. From the trade negotiations between the United States and China to the ongoing talks over the conflicts in Syria or Libya, multilateral organizations appear sidelined, outmaneuvered, and irrelevant—overtaken by events and left to deal with their aftermath. Yet as a tool, multilateralism also reveals its strengths, as illustrated by the EU itself in its long journey toward closer integration. Once clear boundaries and operational lines have been drawn, the EU has shown—with the competencies that the member states have given it—that a multilateral framework can be a force for good. This is nowhere more evident than in the EU’s trade and economic sphere, where Europe’s whole is stronger than the sum of its parts. The lesson here is that Europe needs to update both its internal cohesion and its multilateral doctrine to be considered a credible architect for a revised and more consensual multilateral global order. That order should be based on a vision of common political values that the EU and its outside partners can share equally. Democracy It is on democracy, unsurprisingly, that the traditional debate on values is most palpable. Today, the state of democracy and human rights globally is poor. Many see a waning commitment to these values from the traditional bastions of the current democratic world order. Yet this depiction hides a more nuanced picture. While executive-level support for democracy promotion in its more traditional homes has declined, its operational manifestation remains largely intact. Governments still channel a considerable amount of financial assistance toward the technical level in this field. And various democracy initiatives, such as Sweden’s Drive for Democracy, illustrate how individual EU member states have acted as champions of democracy promotion. This has sent a confusing message and led to different responses from different parts of the globe. Some have opted to approach this issue from a utilitarian perspective, either by providing purely technical assistance or by molding democratic models of engagement to the local context. Others perceive the Western democratic model as simply one of many different forms of governance. While Russia and China are not particularly keen for a European—or, for that matter, Western—leadership model, some countries in Asia, like India, and in South America and sub-Saharan Africa find some merit in the EU being involved in democracy promotion. But these countries see such investment as requiring a lighter touch and a deeper consideration of local specificities. It is by sharing Europe’s own experience and adopting what the EU’s outside partners often consider a less patronizing attitude that Europe is recognized as a useful partner. So, while there is space for the EU to lead in this field, it must choose to do so in a much more incisive yet nuanced way. Global Trade The EU’s outside partners clearly recognize the union as an economic power. Yet a global player this does not make. Being a global leader means that economic strength must be complemented by political and military weight, which the EU is sorely lacking. This has left the EU vulnerable in a world that is increasingly witnessing the weaponization of trade and the resurgence of demagoguery. Countries apply traditional global norms and rules on trade inconsistently—a sort of “do as I say, not as I do” attitude. There is an overall perception that the United States is getting away with a lot of unfair practice because it can. Europe’s behavior is not excused here, either. There has been profound disappointment from some important allies, which have become concerned by China’s growing presence on European soil and the way certain EU member states have responded with open arms to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, a major infrastructure program. This feeling has translated into disenchantment with the failure of the EU’s multilateral framework to live up to its collective vision of sustainability, transparency, and responsible environmental stewardship. It should therefore come as no surprise that Russia and China have begun to toe the line of “no politics, just business” and promote more transaction-led trade. The lesson here is that the EU cannot keep referring to the rule book. Individual member states have shown they can circumvent procedures when it suits their needs. So, the EU will have to get much more creative about playing in this space. Simply relying on one’s strengths and technical competence can lead one to become complacent and overlook the manipulation of existing norms. International Security On security and defense, the key words are strategic relevance. Aside from a handful of EU member states, in terms of hard security, the union still lacks credibility in this field. Efforts in Brussels to shore up Europe’s defense industries and upgrade its operational capabilities are observed not only with interest but also with hardly hidden skepticism. In the eyes of its partners, Europe’s security guarantee remains firmly entrenched in NATO and—by extension—solidly attached to, and dependent on, the U.S. military. That weakens any significant effort toward security autonomy. In this context, and with the United Kingdom due to leave the EU, NATO remains relevant for continental Europe’s collective security. For Europe’s outside partners, it is doubtful that—barring a devastating shock to the system, such as the United States abandoning NATO—France’s vision of a militarily capable and autonomous EU will become a reality for the foreseeable future. The reality is that aside from a few EU countries, on international security, Europeans must operate in a multilateral framework, where there is little room for maneuver. Outside partners lament a perceived European apathy toward the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, from which the United States withdrew in August 2019, and a lackluster European response to the wars in Ukraine and Syria, which have only strengthened this narrative. The EU must continue to pursue cooperation and be resourceful where it can bring real value. Investment in military capabilities and the development of a common strategic doctrine for a future EU security policy must continue—and must increase in preparation for the day when U.S. strategic patience runs out. Climate Change On climate change, the EU scores highly for being determined and showing real leadership in the face of adversity. The good news is that most nation-states recognize that this is not an area where one can go it alone. And while there remain skeptics on the causes of climate change, there is overall recognition that its physical manifestation is affecting all. India is justifiably proud of its admirable track record on climate change; yet it must deal with the reality that over 40 percent of its labor force is employed in agriculture. That is a serious vote bank for any politician. In this context, reconciling cleaner agriculture with industrialization is a political economy problem that trumps long-term growth. China and Middle Eastern countries are eager to cooperate on the technical level, but the technology transfers and capacity building needed to make a more climate-friendly infrastructure operational could have serious economic implications. The Russians recognize the importance of climate change because it is affecting some of their physical infrastructures. But they fear the narrative will be hijacked by overly politicized ideologies. Clearly, the EU cannot tackle climate change on its own, nor can it build a fortress around its effects. The union is simply not influential or rich enough to make the world follow its lead. However, the EU does have enough legitimacy and leverage to give a sense of direction to the climate issue. The overall message for the EU in this context is to persevere: find the areas where it can build support and stick it out. Leadership is sorely lacking in this space, and the EU’s choice to fill that role is primordial. Cybersecurity and Data Privacy In the realm of cybersecurity and data privacy, again the EU scores highly. There is a strong consensus that the union has shown clear regulatory leadership in this space with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which gives EU citizens more control over their personal data, and the Network and Information Systems (NIS) Directive, which boosts the overall level of cybersecurity in the union. But this leadership status can be broadly broken down into three distinct elements where the EU has—more or less—true competence: social questions, economic issues, and hard security. On the first two, the EU is considered a first mover, leading others to adapt. For example, there are countries that are deliberately emulating GDPR standards and companies that are adjusting their operational model to it because the EU is such a consequential economic player. In many ways, this was a masterstroke of the carrot-and-stick methodology: adjust and you can continue to play the game; don’t and you’ll face big fines. At the same time, the EU’s pursuit of a more regulated approach contrasts with the U.S. emphasis on public-private partnerships. And while the jury is still out on which approach will be more effective in the long term, outside partners are having to watch this evolution closely and adjust accordingly. The litmus test for the EU will come during the implementation phase, which is just beginning. The new cadre of EU heads will be overseeing the major consequences of the GDPR and the NIS Directive over the next five years. This will involve a crossover of many different competencies in the EU institutions, and there are potential dogfights in the works with the member states, which retain ultimate jurisdiction.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>Leadership is an <u>impact filter</u>.</h4><p>Bomassi</strong> <strong>’19 <u>[Lizza Bomassi and Pierre Vimont, * deputy director of Carnegie Europe, where she is responsible for harmonizing Carnegie Europe’s strategic and operational priorities and managing relations with Carnegie’s global centers and programs as well as partner organizations in Europe, ** senior fellow at Carnegie Europe, Carnegie Europe, "Reimagining a Global Europe," 12/11/19, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/12/11/reimagining-global-europe-pub-80554, Date Accessed: 01/06/21, EA]</p><p></u></strong>What does a collective vision of a global Europe look like from the point of view of the demand side? And how can this vision be translated into an operational program? The picture that emerges confirms that<u> <mark>the EU must develop</mark> a <strong>more <mark>flex</mark>ible</u></strong> and nuanced <u>view of responding to <strong>global challenges.</p><p><mark>Multilateralism</p><p></u></strong></mark>Outside partners consider the EU the standard-bearer for multilateralism and, as such, a natural ally in this environment. But <u>the verdict on multilateralism</u> in its current form <u>is<strong> resounding</u></strong>—even deafening—<u><strong>ambivalence</u></strong>. Many <u><mark>Europeans regard it as an <strong>end in itself</u></strong></mark>, whereas for other powers it is at best a means to be employed for any number of competing agendas. <u>Its <mark>credibility is</u></mark> repeatedly <u><mark>put to the test when nation</mark>-state<mark>s <strong>undermine</strong></mark> </u>the <u><strong><mark>collective interest</strong></mark> if doing so serves their purpose.</u> In its worst form, <u>multilateralism becomes a <strong>screen to hide behind</u></strong>, leading to indecision and inaction.</p><p>Multilateralism in its current incarnation is seen as antiquated and out of touch with today’s globalized, transactional world. From the trade negotiations between the United States and China to the ongoing talks over the conflicts in Syria or Libya, <u>multilateral organizations appear</u> sidelined, outmaneuvered, and <u><strong>irrelevant</u></strong>—<u>overtaken by events and left to deal with their aftermath.</u> Yet as a tool, <u>multilateralism</u> also <u><strong>reveals its strengths</u></strong>, as <u>illustrated by the EU itself in its long journey toward closer integration.</u> Once clear boundaries and operational lines have been drawn, <u>the <mark>EU</mark> has shown</u>—<u>with</u> the <u>competencies</u> that the <u>member states have given it—that a multilateral <mark>framework can be</mark> a force for <mark>good</mark>.</u> This is nowhere more evident than in the EU’s trade and economic sphere, where Europe’s whole is stronger than the sum of its parts.</p><p>The lesson here is that <u>Europe <mark>needs</mark> to update</u> both <u>its <strong><mark>internal cohesion</strong></mark> and</u> its <u><strong>multilateral doctrine</strong> <mark>to be</mark> considered a <mark>credible</mark> architect<strong> for a revised and more consensual multilateral global order. That order should be based on a vision of common political values that the EU and its outside partners can share equally.</p><p>Democracy</p><p></u></strong>It is <u>on democracy</u>, unsurprisingly, that <u>the traditional debate on values is most palpable</u>. Today, the state of democracy and human rights globally is poor. Many see a waning commitment to these values from the traditional bastions of the current democratic world order.</p><p>Yet <u>this depiction hides a <strong>more nuanced picture.</u></strong> While executive-level support for democracy promotion in its more traditional homes has declined, its operational manifestation remains largely intact. Governments still channel a considerable amount of financial assistance toward the technical level in this field. And <u>various democracy initiatives</u>, such as Sweden’s Drive for Democracy, <u>illustrate how <strong><mark>individual</mark> EU member <mark>states</u></strong></mark> have <u><mark>acted as champions of democracy</mark> promotion.</p><p></u>This has sent a confusing message and led to different responses from different parts of the globe. Some have opted to approach this issue from a utilitarian perspective, either by providing purely technical assistance or by molding democratic models of engagement to the local context. Others perceive the Western democratic model as simply one of many different forms of governance. While Russia and China are not particularly keen for a European—or, for that matter, Western—leadership model, some <u>countries in Asia, like India, and in South America and sub-Saharan Africa find</u> some <u>merit in the EU being involved in democracy promotion.</p><p></u>But these countries see such investment as requiring a lighter touch and a deeper consideration of local specificities. It is <u>by <strong>sharing Europe’s own experience</strong> and adopting</u> what the EU’s outside partners often consider <u>a <strong>less patronizing attitude</u></strong> that <u>Europe is recognized as a useful partner<strong>. So, while there is space for the EU to lead in this field, it must choose to do so in a much more incisive yet nuanced way.</p><p>Global Trade</p><p></strong>The EU’s outside partners</u> clearly <u>recognize the union as an economic power.<strong> Yet a global player this does not make.</strong> Being a global leader means</u> that<u> economic strength must be complemented by <strong>political</u></strong> and military <u><strong>weight</strong>, which the EU is</u> sorely <u>lacking</u>. This has left the EU vulnerable in a world that is increasingly witnessing the weaponization of trade and the resurgence of demagoguery. Countries apply traditional global norms and rules on trade inconsistently—a sort of “do as I say, not as I do” attitude. There is an overall perception that the United States is getting away with a lot of unfair practice because it can.</p><p>Europe’s behavior is not excused here, either. There has been profound disappointment from some important allies, which have become concerned by<u> <mark>China’s</mark> growing <mark>presence</mark> on European soil and</u> the way certain EU member states have responded with open arms to <u>the</u> Chinese <u>Belt and Road Initiativ</u>e, a major infrastructure program. This feeling has <u><mark>translated into <strong>disenchantment</mark> with the failure of the EU’s multilateral framework</u></strong> to live up to its collective vision of sustainability, transparency, and responsible environmental stewardship. It should therefore come as no surprise that <u><strong>Russia and China have begun to toe the line of “no politics, just business” and promote more transaction-led trade.</p><p></u></strong>The lesson here is that <u>the <mark>EU <strong>cannot</mark> keep <mark>refer</mark>ring <mark>to</mark> the <mark>rule book</mark>.</strong> Individual member states have shown they can circumvent procedures when it suits their needs. So, the EU will have to <strong>get</u></strong> much <u><strong>more creative</u></strong> about playing in this space. Simply <u><mark>relying on</mark> </u>one’s <u><mark>strengths</mark> and technical competence can lead</u> one <u>to</u> become complacent and <u><strong><mark>overlook</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong>manipulation of <mark>existing norms</mark>.</p><p>International Security</p><p></u></strong>On security and defense, the key words are strategic relevance. Aside from a handful of EU member states, in terms of hard security, <u>the union</u> still <u>lacks credibility</u> in this field. Efforts in Brussels to shore up Europe’s defense industries and upgrade its operational capabilities are observed not only with interest but also with hardly hidden skepticism. In the eyes of its partners, <u><mark>Europe’s security</u></mark> guarantee <u><mark>remains</u></mark> firmly <u><mark>entrenched</mark> in NATO and</u>—by extension—<u>solidly attached to</u>, and dependent on, <u>the U.S. military.</u> That weakens any significant effort toward security autonomy.</p><p>In this context, and with the United Kingdom due to leave the EU, NATO remains relevant for continental Europe’s collective security. For Europe’s outside partners, it is doubtful that—barring a devastating shock to the system, such as the United States abandoning NATO—France’s vision of a militarily capable and autonomous EU will become a reality for the foreseeable future. The reality is that aside from a few EU countries, <u>on international security, <mark>Europeans must operate in</mark> a <strong><mark>multilateral framework</u></strong></mark>, where there is little room for maneuver. Outside partners lament a perceived European apathy toward the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, from which the United States withdrew in August 2019, and a lackluster European response to the wars in Ukraine and Syria, which have only strengthened this narrative.</p><p><u>The EU must</u> continue to <u><strong>pursue cooperation</strong> and <strong>be resourceful</strong> where it can bring real value.</u> Investment in military capabilities and the <u>development of</u> a <u><strong>common strategic doctrine</strong> for</u> a<u> future EU security policy must continue<strong>—and must increase in preparation for the day when U.S. strategic patience runs out.</p><p>Climate Change</p><p></strong>On <mark>climate change</mark>, the EU <mark>scores highly</mark> for <strong>being determined</strong> and <strong>showing real leadership</u></strong> in the face of adversity. The good news is that most nation-states recognize that this is not an area where one can go it alone. And while there remain skeptics on the causes of climate change, there is overall recognition that its physical manifestation is affecting all.</p><p>India is justifiably proud of its admirable track record on climate change; yet it must deal with the reality that over 40 percent of its labor force is employed in agriculture. That is a serious vote bank for any politician. In this context, reconciling cleaner agriculture with industrialization is a political economy problem that trumps long-term growth.</p><p><u>China and Middle Eastern countries are eager to cooperate on the technical level, but the technology transfers and capacity building needed to make a more climate-friendly infrastructure operational could have serious economic implications. The Russians recognize the importance of climate change because it is affecting some of their physical infrastructures. But they fear the narrative will be hijacked by overly politicized ideologies.</p><p></u>Clearly, the EU cannot tackle climate change on its own, nor can it build a fortress around its effects. The union is simply not influential or rich enough to make the world follow its lead. However, the EU does have enough legitimacy and leverage to give a sense of direction to the climate issue. <u>The</u> overall <u><mark>message for</mark> the <mark>EU</mark> in this context <mark>is to <strong>persevere</strong></mark>: find the areas where it can build support and stick it out. <mark>Leadership is</mark> <strong>sorely <mark>lacking</u></strong></mark> in this space, <u>and the <mark>EU’s</mark> choice to <strong><mark>fill that role</strong></mark> is <strong>primordial.</p><p>Cybersecurity and Data Privacy</p><p></strong>In</u> the realm of <u><mark>cybersec</mark>urity <mark>and data privacy</u></mark>, again <u>the EU <mark>scores highly</mark>. There is</u> a <u>strong consensus that the union has shown <strong>clear regulatory leadership</u></strong> in this space <u>with the General Data Protection Regulation</u> (GDPR), which gives EU citizens more control over their personal data,<u> and the Network and Information Systems</u> (NIS) <u>Directive, which boosts the overall level of cybersecurity in the union. But this leadership status can be broadly broken down into three distinct elements where the EU has—more or less—true competence: social questions, economic issues, and hard security.</p><p></u>On the first two, <u>the <mark>EU is</mark> considered <mark>a <strong>first mover</u></strong></mark>, leading others to adapt. For example, there are countries that are deliberately emulating GDPR standards and companies that are adjusting their operational model to it because the EU is such a consequential economic player. In many ways, this was a masterstroke of the carrot-and-stick methodology: adjust and you can continue to play the game; don’t and you’ll face big fines. At the same time, the EU’s pursuit of a more regulated approach contrasts with the U.S. emphasis on public-private partnerships. And while the jury is still out on which approach will be more effective in the long term, <u>outside partners are having to watch this evolution closely and adjust accordingly.</p><p>The <mark>litmus test</u></mark> for the EU <u><mark>will come during</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>implementation</u></strong></mark> phase, <u>which is just beginning.</u> The new cadre of EU heads will be overseeing the major consequences of the GDPR and the NIS Directive over the next five years. <u>This will involve</u> a <u><strong>crossover</strong> of</u> many <u>different competencies in the EU</u> institutions, and <u><mark>there are <strong>potential dogfights</u></strong></mark> in the works <u><mark>with</u></mark> the <u><mark>member states<strong></mark>, which retain ultimate jurisdiction.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Paul Heer 19, National Intelligence Officer for East Asia in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from 2007 to 2015. He has since served as Robert E. Wilhelm Research Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies and as Adjunct Professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs., 1-8-2019, "Rethinking U.S. Primacy in East Asia," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/rethinking-us-primacy-east-asia-40972?page=0%2C1 fulltext: American policy in the Western Pacific has long been framed in terms of preventing the emergence of an exclusive, hostile hegemon that could threaten vital U.S. interests and deny American access there. The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy respectively assert that “China seeks to displace the United States” in East Asia and thus achieve “Indo-Pacific regional hegemony.” Avoiding this possibility has required Washington, also as a matter of policy, to maintain its own hegemony in the region (although we prefer to call it “primacy” or “preeminence”) as the best and only guarantee against such a danger. This mantra was central to the Obama administration’s “rebalance” in East Asia, and remains central to the Trump administration’s advocacy of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” But this policy mantra has two fundamental problems: it mischaracterizes China’s strategic intentions in the region, and it is based on a U.S. strategic objective that is probably no longer achievable. First, China is pursuing hegemony in East Asia, but not an exclusive hostile hegemony. It is not trying to extrude the United States from the region or deny American access there. The Chinese have long recognized the utility—and the benefits to China itself—of U.S. engagement with the region, and they have indicated receptivity to peaceful coexistence and overlapping spheres of influence with the United States there. Moreover, China is not trying to impose its political or economic system on its neighbors, and it does not seek to obstruct commercial freedom of navigation in the region (because no country is more dependent on freedom of the seas than China itself). In short, Beijing wants to extend its power and influence within East Asia, but not as part of a “winner-take-all” contest. China does have unsettled and vexing sovereignty claims over Taiwan, most of the islands and other features in the East and South China Seas, and their adjacent waters. Although Beijing has demonstrated a willingness to use force in defense or pursuit of these claims, it is not looking for excuses to do so. Whether these disputes can be managed or resolved in a way that is mutually acceptable to the relevant parties and consistent with U.S. interests in the region is an open, long-term question. But that possibility should not be ruled out on the basis of—or made more difficult by—false assumptions of irreconcilable interests. On the contrary, it should be pursued on the basis of a recognition that all the parties want to avoid conflict—and that the sovereignty disputes in the region ultimately are not military problems requiring military solutions. And since Washington has never been opposed in principle to reunification between China and Taiwan as long as it is peaceful, and similarly takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the other disputed features, their long-term disposition need not be the litmus test of either U.S. or Chinese hegemony in the region. Of course, China would prefer not to have forward-deployed U.S. military forces in the Western Pacific that could be used against it, but Beijing has long tolerated and arguably could indefinitely tolerate an American military presence in the region—unless that presence is clearly and exclusively aimed at coercing or containing China. It is also true that Beijing disagrees with American principles of military freedom of navigation in the region; and this constitutes a significant challenge in waters where China claims territorial jurisdiction in violation of the UN Commission on the Law of the Sea. But this should not be conflated with a Chinese desire or intention to exclusively “control” all the waters within the first island chain in the Western Pacific. The Chinese almost certainly recognize that exclusive control or “domination” of the neighborhood is not achievable at any reasonable cost, and that pursuing it would be counterproductive by inviting pushback and challenges that would negate the objective. So what would Chinese “hegemony” in East Asia mean or look like? Beijing probably thinks in terms of something much like American primacy in the Western Hemisphere: a model in which China is generally recognized and acknowledged as the de facto central or primary power in the region, but has little need or incentive for militarily adventurism because the mutual benefits of economic interdependence prevail and the neighbors have no reason—and inherent disincentives—to challenge China’s vital interests or security. And as a parallel to China’s economic and diplomatic engagement in Latin America, Beijing would neither exclude nor be hostile to continued U.S. engagement in East Asia. A standard counterargument to this relatively benign scenario is that Beijing would not be content with it for long because China’s strategic ambitions will expand as its capabilities grow. This is a valid hypothesis, but it usually overlooks the greater possibility that China’s external ambitions will expand not because its inherent capabilities have grown, but because Beijing sees the need to be more assertive in response to external challenges to Chinese interests or security. Indeed, much of China’s “assertiveness” within East Asia over the past decade—when Beijing probably would prefer to focus on domestic priorities—has been a reaction to such perceived challenges. Accordingly, Beijing’s willingness to settle for a narrowly-defined, peaceable version of regional preeminence will depend heavily on whether it perceives other countries—especially the United States—as trying to deny China this option and instead obstruct Chinese interests or security in the region. This leads to the second inherent problem with the mantra that the United States must maintain its primacy in the Western Pacific to prevent a hostile rival hegemon: U.S. primacy in the region itself is not sustainable, and trying to sustain it will probably be counterproductive. For all intents and purposes, American primacy in East Asia—depending on how it is defined—is arguably already a thing of the past. Since about a decade ago, China has a larger share of East Asian regional trade than the United States, and is now the biggest trading partner of most of its neighbors. If defined in military terms, most net assessments suggest that the American advantage in power projection forces within the region is eroding relative to Chinese capabilities; and it is not at all clear in the wake of sequestration and competing budgetary priorities that the United States could or will devote the resources necessary to arrest this trend. American primacy in East Asia has often been characterized in terms of the United States serving as the guarantor of regional security, protecting the “global commons” and providing “public goods” there. The U.S. alliance network in the region certainly extends an umbrella of protection to those countries with which Washington has defense pacts; and its military freedom of navigation operations signal an intention to resist excessive Chinese maritime claims. But even U.S. allies do not perceive that China is being deterred in the South and East China Seas. More broadly, it is not clear what other public goods the United States is actually providing in the East Asian commons. For example, commercial shippers in the Western Pacific do not presume or rely on the protection of the U.S. Navy—which doesn’t have the fleet to provide it. And Washington’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership has undermined the idea of U.S. leadership in the region on behalf of shared economic interests. Indeed, most East Asian countries—including U.S. allies—appear increasingly uncertain about Washington’s attention to their interests and their security. Questions and even doubts about the substance and sustainability of the American commitment to the region have grown over the past decade, and most of the countries in the region—again, including U.S. allies—have already been adjusting their foreign and security policies to hedge against the potential unreliability of the United States. Indeed, such hedging and independent-mindedness by U.S. allies is itself contributing to the erosion of U.S. influence in the region. On balance, it is hard to make the case that the United States retains effective primacy in the Western Pacific when much of the region has doubts about Washington’s ability and willingness to exercise it. So what can and should Washington do to address these new historical circumstances? It may be possible to regain the confidence of U.S. allies and partners in East Asia, but restoring and retaining American primacy there over the long term is probably no longer achievable, given the shifts in the regional balance of power and the constraints on U.S. resources. It’s not 1945 anymore, or even 1991. The United States sought and maintained a preponderance of power during the Cold War, but this almost certainly is not permanently sustainable, either globally or within East Asia. American primacy in the Western Pacific was a historical anomaly, and sooner or later the United States will have to get used to a regional role that is something less than that. Moreover, policies and strategies aimed at upholding U.S. primacy in East Asia are likely to be counterproductive because such an approach, probably more than anything else, would reinforce Beijing’s belief that the United States seeks to contain China by keeping it subordinate within its own region. This would increase the chances of Beijing feeling compelled to adopt a more confrontational and aggressive posture. Chinese pursuit of a more exclusive hostile hegemony could thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Instead, the United States needs to recognize and acknowledge the emerging limits on its power, influence and position in East Asia; and accordingly reassess both its definition of its interests in the region and the strategies by which it will pursue and defend those interests. If U.S. primacy in the region is not materially sustainable, it becomes untenable to define it as a vital interest that must be upheld. Indeed, over the long term Washington will have to confront the question of whether there is a version of Chinese primacy in East Asia which—being neither exclusive nor hostile, and akin to U.S. primacy in the Western Hemisphere—would be compatible with American interests and thus acceptable to the United States. None of this means that Washington should withdraw its military forces or commitments in East Asia, downgrade its diplomatic and economic engagement with the region, and surrender the Western Pacific to a Chinese sphere of influence. Quite the contrary. The United States needs to redouble its commitments, and expand and accelerate its engagement, in order to reassure its friends and allies in East Asia and reaffirm its determination to sustain a sphere of influence and a decisive role there. The U.S. alliance network can and should remain central to this effort. It will still be key to balancing, leveraging, guarding and pushing back against China when Beijing overplays its hand in its own pursuit of regional power and influence. But Washington should not approach this competition on the basis of outdated assumptions—including the belief that U.S. primacy in East Asia can and should be perpetually sustained (an obsolete world view), a misunderstanding or mischaracterization of China’s regional ambitions, or a miscalculation of the United States’ own power and leverage. Washington should accept that strategic competition is unavoidable and absolute security is not possible. It should also recognize that even U.S. allies and partners in the region are already operating within overlapping American and Chinese spheres of influence—and they prefer this to being forced to choose between Washington and Beijing. The United States can and should continue to exercise leadership in East Asia, but will need to share it with China. Washington should seek to deescalate the current trend in the regional competition with Beijing—which is now heading toward a destabilizing and futile game of “king of the hill”—and instead pursue opportunities to engage Beijing toward establishing a long-term, stable balance of power in the region. This is a tall order that will challenge the diplomatic and security management skills and finesse of both sides, and will almost certainly remain a work in progress for many years. But it will always be preferable to an arms race or a cold war in East Asia.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>US primacy in Asia is unsustainable, and clinging creates a hostile China rise that undermines credibility with allies. China will accept US spheres of influence if the US signals accommodation. </h4><p>Paul <strong>Heer 19,</strong> National Intelligence Officer for East Asia in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from 2007 to 2015. He has since served as Robert E. Wilhelm Research Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies and as Adjunct Professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs., 1-8-2019, "Rethinking U.S. Primacy in East Asia," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/rethinking-us-primacy-east-asia-40972?page=0%2C1</p><p>American policy in the Western Pacific has long been framed in terms of preventing the emergence of an exclusive, hostile hegemon that could threaten vital U.S. interests and deny American access there. The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy respectively assert that “China seeks to displace the United States” in East Asia and thus achieve “Indo-Pacific regional hegemony.” Avoiding this possibility has required Washington, also as a matter of policy, to maintain its own hegemony in the region (although we prefer to call it “primacy” or “preeminence”) as the best and only guarantee against such a danger. This mantra was central to the Obama administration’s “rebalance” in East Asia, and remains central to the Trump administration’s advocacy of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” But <u>this policy mantra has two fundamental problems: it</u> <u>mischaracterizes China’s strategic intentions in the region, and it is based on a U.S. strategic objective that is probably no longer achievable. </u>First, <u><mark>China is pursuing hegemony</mark> in East Asia, <mark>but not an <strong>exclusive hostile hegemony</u></strong>. <u>It is not trying to extrude the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates from the region or deny American access there. The Chinese have long recognized the utility—and the benefits to China itself—of U.S. engagement with the region, <mark>and</mark> they have <mark>indicated receptivity to peaceful coexistence and overlapping s</mark>pheres <mark>o</mark>f<mark> i</mark>nfluence with the United States there.</u> <u>Moreover, <mark>China is not trying to impose its</mark> political or economic <mark>system on its neighbors</mark>, and it does not seek to obstruct commercial freedom</u> of navigation in the region (because no country is more dependent on freedom of the seas than China itself<u>). In short, Beijing wants to extend its power and influence within East Asia, but not as part of a “winner-take-all” contest. </u>China does have unsettled and vexing sovereignty claims over Taiwan, most of the islands and other features in the East and South China Seas, and their adjacent waters. Although Beijing has demonstrated a willingness to use force in defense or pursuit of these claims, it is not looking for excuses to do so. Whether these disputes can be managed or resolved in a way that is mutually acceptable to the relevant parties and consistent with U.S. interests in the region is an open, long-term question. But that possibility should not be ruled out on the basis of—or made more difficult by—false assumptions of irreconcilable interests. On the contrary, it should be pursued on the basis of a recognition that all the parties want to avoid conflict—and that the sovereignty disputes in the region ultimately are not military problems requiring military solutions. And since Washington has never been opposed in principle to reunification between China and Taiwan as long as it is peaceful, and similarly takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the other disputed features, their long-term disposition need not be the litmus test of either U.S. or Chinese hegemony in the region. <u>Of course, <mark>China</mark> would prefer not to have forward-deployed U.S. military forces in the Western Pacific that could be used against it, but Beijing has long tolerated and arguably <mark>could indefinitely tolerate an American military presence</mark> in the region—<strong><mark>unless that presence is</mark> clearly and exclusively <mark>aimed at</mark> coercing or <mark>containing China</mark>.</u></strong> It is also true that Beijing disagrees with American principles of military freedom of navigation in the region; and this constitutes a significant challenge in waters where China claims territorial jurisdiction in violation of the UN Commission on the Law of the Sea. But this should not be conflated with a Chinese desire or intention to exclusively “control” all the waters within the first island chain in the Western Pacific. <u>The <mark>Chinese</mark> almost certainly <mark>recognize</mark> that exclusive control or “<mark>domination</mark>” of the neighborhood <mark>is not achievable</mark> at any reasonable cost, and that pursuing it would be counterproductive by inviting pushback and challenges that would negate the objective. So what would Chinese “hegemony” in East Asia mean or look like? <mark>Beijing</mark> probably <mark>thinks in terms of</mark> something much like American primacy in the Western Hemisphere: <mark>a model in which China is</mark> generally recognized </u>and acknowledged <u>as the de facto central or <mark>primary power</mark> in the region</u>, <u><strong><mark>but has little need</mark> or incentive <mark>for militarily adventurism because</mark> the mutual benefits of <mark>economic interdependence prevail and the neighbors have no reason</u></strong></mark>—and inherent disincentives—<u><mark>to challenge</mark> China’s vital <mark>interests</mark> or security. </u>And as a parallel to China’s economic and diplomatic engagement in Latin America, Beijing would neither exclude nor be hostile to continued U.S. engagement in East Asia. <u>A standard counterargument to this relatively benign scenario is that Beijing would not be content with it for long because China’s strategic ambitions will expand as its capabilities grow</u>. <u>This is a valid hypothesis, but it usually overlooks <strong>the greater possibility</u></strong> <u>that <mark>China’s external ambitions</u> <u>will expand</u></mark> <u>not because its inherent capabilities have <strong>grown, but <mark>because Beijing sees the need to be more assertive in response to external challenges</u></strong></mark> to Chinese interests or security. <u>Indeed, much of China’s “<mark>assertiveness</mark>” within East Asia <mark>over the past decade</u></mark>—when Beijing probably would prefer to focus on domestic priorities—<u><strong><mark>has been a reaction</mark> to such perceived challenges. </strong>Accordingly, Beijing’s <mark>willingness to settle for</mark> a narrowly-defined, <mark>peace</mark>able version of regional preeminence <mark>will depend</mark> heavily <mark>on whether</mark> it perceives other countries</u>—<u>especially <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u>—<u><strong>as <mark>try</mark>ing <mark>to</mark> deny China this option</u></strong> <u>and instead <mark>obstruct Chinese interests</mark> or security in the region. </u>This leads to the second inherent problem with the mantra that the United States must maintain its primacy in the Western Pacific to prevent a hostile rival hegemon: <u><mark>U.S. primacy</mark> in the region itself <mark>is <strong>not sustainable</mark>, and trying to sustain it will probably be counterproductive. </u></strong>For all intents and purposes, <u>American primacy in East Asia—depending on how it is defined—is arguably already a thing of the past.</u> Since about a decade ago, <u>China has a larger share of East Asian regional trade than the United States, and is now the biggest trading partner of most of its neighbors</u>. <u>If defined in military terms, most net assessments suggest that the American advantage in <mark>power projection</mark> forces within the region <mark>is eroding relative to Chinese capabilities</mark>; and it is not at all clear <mark>in the wake of <strong>sequestration and competing budgetary priorities</strong></mark> that the United States could or will devote the resources necessary<strong> to arrest this trend.</u></strong> American primacy in East Asia has often been characterized in terms of the United States serving as the guarantor of regional security, protecting the “global commons” and providing “public goods” there. The U.S. alliance network in the region certainly extends an umbrella of protection to those countries with which Washington has defense pacts; and its military freedom of navigation operations signal an intention to resist excessive Chinese maritime claims. But <u><strong>even U.S. <mark>allies do not perceive that China is being deterred</mark> in the South and East China Seas.</u></strong> <u>More broadly, it is not clear what other public goods the United States is actually providing in the East Asian commons. For example, commercial shippers in the Western Pacific do not presume or rely on the protection of the U.S. Navy</u>—which doesn’t have the fleet to provide it. <u>And Washington’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership has undermined the idea of U.S. leadership in the region on behalf of shared economic interests. Indeed, <mark>most East Asian</mark> countries—including U.S. <mark>allies</mark>—<mark>appear increasingly uncertain about Washington’s attention to their</mark> interests and their <mark>security</u></mark>. <u>Questions and even doubts about the substance and sustainability of the American commitment to the region have grown over the past decade, and most of the countries in the regio</u>n—again, including U.S. allies—<u>have already been <mark>adjusting</mark> their foreign and security <mark>policies to hedge against</mark> the potential <mark>unreliability</mark> of the United States</u>. <u>Indeed, such hedging and independent-mindedness by U.S. allies is itself contributing to the erosion of U.S. influence in the region.</u> <u><strong>On balance, it is hard to make the case that the United States retains effective primacy in the Western Pacific when much of <mark>the region has doubts about Washington’s ability and willingness</mark> to exercise it.</u></strong> So what can and should Washington do to address these new historical circumstances? <u>It may be possible to regain the confidence of U.S. allies and partners in East Asia, but restoring and retaining American primacy there over the long term is probably no longer achievable</u>, given the shifts in the regional balance of power and the constraints on U.S. resources. It’s not 1945 anymore, or even 1991. The United States sought and maintained a preponderance of power during the Cold War, but this almost certainly is not permanently sustainable, either globally or within East Asia. American primacy in the Western Pacific was a historical anomaly, and sooner or later the United States will have to get used to a regional role that is something less than that. <u>Moreover, policies and strategies aimed at <mark>upholding</mark> U.S. <mark>primacy</mark> in East Asia are likely to be counterproductive because such an approach, probably more than anything</u> <u>else, would <mark>reinforce Beijing’s belief that the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>seeks to</mark> contain China by <mark>keep</mark>ing <mark>it subordinate</mark> within its own region</u>. <u><strong><mark>This would increase the chances of</mark> Beijing feeling compelled to adopt a more confrontational and <mark>aggressive posture</u></strong>.</mark> <u>Chinese pursuit of a more exclusive <mark>hostile hegemony could</mark> thus <mark>become a self-fulfilling prophecy</mark>. Instead, the United States needs to recognize and acknowledge the emerging limits on its power, influence and position in East Asia</u>; and accordingly reassess both its definition of its interests in the region and the strategies by which it will pursue and defend those interests. If <u>U.S. primacy in the region is not materially sustainable, it becomes untenable to define it as a vital interest that must be upheld</u>. Indeed, over the long term Washington will have to confront the question of whether there is a version of Chinese primacy in East Asia which—being neither exclusive nor hostile, and akin to U.S. primacy in the Western Hemisphere—would be compatible with American interests and thus acceptable to the United States. None of this means that Washington should withdraw its military forces or commitments in East Asia, downgrade its diplomatic and economic engagement with the region, and surrender the Western Pacific to a Chinese sphere of influence. Quite the contrary. The United States needs to redouble its commitments, and expand and accelerate its engagement, in order to reassure its friends and allies in East Asia and reaffirm its determination to sustain a sphere of influence and a decisive role there. The U.S. alliance network can and should remain central to this effort. It will still be key to balancing, leveraging, guarding and pushing back against China when Beijing overplays its hand in its own pursuit of regional power and influence. <u>But Washington should not approach this competition on the basis of outdated assumptions—including the belief that U.S. primacy in East Asia can and should be perpetually sustained (an obsolete world view), a misunderstanding or mischaracterization of China’s regional ambitions, or a miscalculation of the United States’ own power and leverage. Washington should accept that strategic competition is unavoidable and absolute security is not possible. It should also recognize that even U.S. allies and partners in the region are already operating within overlapping American and Chinese spheres of influence—and they prefer this to being forced to choose between Washington and Beijing. <strong>The United States can and should continue to exercise leadership in East Asia, but will need to share it with China</u></strong>. <u><mark>Washington should</mark> seek to <mark>deescalate</mark> the current trend in the regional competition with Beijing—which is now heading toward a destabilizing and futile game of “king of the hill”—<mark>and</mark> instead <mark>pursue</mark> opportunities to engage</u> <u>Beijing</u> <u><strong>toward establishing <mark>a long-term, stable balance of power</mark> in the region</u></strong>. This is a tall order that will challenge the diplomatic and security management skills and finesse of both sides, and will almost certainly remain a work in progress for many years. But it will always be preferable to an arms race or a cold war in East Asia.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Colangelo 11 [Anthony J; 2011; Assistant Professor of Law at the SMU Dedman School of Law; “A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality,” https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/event/265497/media/slspublic/A_Unified_Approach_to-Extraterritoriality_1.pdf; DS] fulltext: This Article’s main objective is to bring these related, but until now analytically isolated, strands of thinking together to create a conceptually coherent, methodologically clean, and normatively appealing framework regarding extraterritoriality. My basic thesis is that the sources of Congress’s lawmaking power can and should inform both the statutory construction and due process analyses. I argue that this unified approach trims away doctrinal redundancy and confusion, supplies courts with an intuitive and cogent blueprint for extraterritoriality issues, and, not least, produces sound results. Broadly framed, extraterritoriality cases raise three types of issues: (1) What is the source of Congress’s power to legislate extraterritorially? (2) If a statute is silent on geographic scope, should it be construed extraterritorially? And, (3) does the extraterritorial application of U.S. law violate due process? The unified approach uses the answer to the first inquiry to help resolve the other two. In brief, some sources of legislative authority grant Congress power to implement international law or legal obligations.13 Other sources do not require a predicate international norm; Congress simply may enact national law and project it abroad.14 The unified approach holds that when Congress enacts a statute silent on geographic scope designed to implement international substantive law, courts should construe that statute in line with international jurisdictional law, including attendant principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction. That is to say, when Congress implements international law, courts should presume Congress intended to implement all of international law—including international jurisdictional law, which may permit, encourage, or even obligate extraterritoriality. In this respect, the relevant tool of statutory construction is the Charming Betsy canon, under which courts construe ambiguous statutes in conformity with international law.15 This result is superficially at odds with another popular interpretive canon regularly used to construe statutes quiet on geographic scope, the presumption against extraterritoriality, which presumes “that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”16 The tension vanishes, however, in light of the presumption’s original motivation: to avoid unintended discord with foreign nations.17 A presumption against extraterritoriality made sense when the international law of jurisdiction was strongly territorial in nature. But now that international law embraces and sometimes even requires extraterritorial jurisdiction, the presumption not only is anachronistic, but perversely may achieve precisely what it was designed to avoid: discord with foreign nations. Suppose Congress enacts a statute implementing an international customary or treaty-based norm that carries with it the encouragement or obligation to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. If courts apply the presumption against extraterritoriality to that statute, it will have accomplished exactly what it was designed to avoid by blocking fulfillment of U.S. international responsibilities.18 Unfortunately, when courts have been faced with this type of question, they have tended to do just that, sometimes triggering a swift response by Congress.19 Indeed, the reasons traditionally underwriting the presumption against extraterritoriality drop out for statutes implementing international law. Concerns about extraterritorial applications of U.S. law conflicting with foreign law inside foreign territory largely evaporate, since the U.S. law by nature will not conflict with the international law also operative inside the foreign territory. Moreover, while the conventional assumption that Congress legislates with only domestic concerns in mind may make sense for statutes reflecting national values and preferences,20 that assumption holds far less intuitive force when Congress implements international law—which, after all, deals by definition with foreign nations and shared values and preferences with those nations. Finally, concerns about courts usurping or intruding upon sensitive foreign policy decisions by extending U.S. law abroad21 can be turned upside down when it comes to statutes implementing international law. Here it is the deployment of a thoroughly judicial contrivance—the presumption against extraterritoriality—that threatens to interfere with U.S. foreign relations by potentially stunting the ability of the United States to fulfill its international obligations, not the construction of statutes in line with those obligations.22 All of this is not to say that potential frictions will never arise regarding the choice of forum, as opposed to the choice of law. But that is a separate question, governed by separate jurisdictional principles that take directly into account those frictions when evaluating whether U.S. courts can or should entertain suits involving foreign elements.23 My argument here relates only to the choice of law, which by definition is the same everywhere for statutes that implement or apply international law. By contrast, the reasons traditionally favoring the presumption against extraterritoriality persist for statutes enacted under legislative sources authorizing the enactment of purely national law. Extraterritorial application of these statutes elevates the risk of discord with foreign nations resulting from both jurisdictional overreaching and conflicts with foreign law in foreign territory. Furthermore, extending these laws abroad defeats the (here quite sensible) assumption that when Congress passes laws reflecting and advancing national values and preferences, those laws are directed primarily toward domestic concerns. And, because of all of these features—the risk of jurisdictional overreach, clashes with foreign law, and applying U.S. national values and preferences inside other countries—concerns about judicial interference in sensitive foreign policy matters have traction. A unified approach would affect extraterritoriality cases involving a range of hot-button issues including, among other things, modern piracy and terrorism, which are subjects of U.S. laws that implement international law. The theory’s crux that statutes implementing international norms ought to be construed differently also holds implications for jurisdictional statutes, such as the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”)—an ever more polemical law allowing foreigners to recover in U.S. courts for violations of international law.24 For one quick example discussed below,25 in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the Supreme Court very recently and very forcefully yanked back to U.S. borders the principal antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act, which lower courts had been construing extraterritorially for over four decades.26 On its face, the Court’s powerful reinvigoration of the presumption against extraterritoriality appears to cover other laws silent on geographic scope, like the ATS, instantly wiping away an avalanche of high-stakes cases alleging harms outside the United States. In fact, the Second Circuit already has used Morrison to cut off at the U.S. border another geographically silent statute, RICO.27 Unless one can come up with a principled reason for treating one context differently than the other, entertaining suits based on foreign conduct under the ATS appears in open tension with Morrison, and the ATS is now susceptible to judicial paring—all the way back to U.S. borders. The distinguishing principle this Article advances is that, unlike the Securities Exchange Act, the ATS applies international substantive law, and therefore should also apply international jurisdictional law. Because international law has evolved to authorize extraterritoriality, so too should the ATS. Accordingly, as long as courts apply international law under the statute (as opposed to, say, uniquely U.S. federal common law rules), the ATS’s scope should also be construed in conformity with international law, which contemplates extraterritoriality. In this regard, the approach meshes nicely with Morrison’s direction that courts may consult statutory “context” in construing geographic reach.28 Here the relevant context is that the statute authorizes application not of uniquely national law, but of international law, which applies everywhere and authorizes extraterritorial jurisdiction. Next, the legislative source behind a statute can inform current due process analyses of federal extraterritoriality. Courts are in agreement that Fifth Amendment due process shields parties from “arbitrary or fundamentally unfair” applications of federal law abroad,29 measured in large part by whether parties reasonably could have expected the law to govern their conduct when they engaged in it.30 Yet courts have applied federal common law rules to relationships between foreign corporations acting outside the United States, and have entertained suits by foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants for conduct taking place entirely abroad.31 The U.S. government similarly has claimed power to prosecute foreigners for terrorist acts halfway around the world with no overt connection to the United States.32 How, if at all, do these applications of U.S. law comport with due process and, more specifically, defendants’ reasonable expectations? Under a unified approach, the answer depends on whether the U.S. law implements an international law to which the defendant was already subject. If U.S. law does, the defendant is on notice and the application does not run afoul of due process. Thus, statutes that implement international law constitutionally may reach a wider variety of situations abroad than statutes that do not.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The plan harmonizes this, preventing under AND over-enforcement. </h4><p><strong>Colangelo 11</strong> [Anthony J; 2011; Assistant Professor of Law at the SMU Dedman School of Law; “A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality,” https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/event/265497/media/slspublic/A_Unified_Approach_to-Extraterritoriality_1.pdf<u>; DS]</p><p></u>This Article’s main objective is to bring these related, but until now analytically isolated, strands of thinking together to create a conceptually coherent, methodologically clean, and normatively appealing framework regarding extraterritoriality. My basic thesis is that the sources of <u><strong><mark>Congress</strong></mark>’s lawmaking power</u> can and <u><mark>should <strong>inform</u></strong></mark> both the <u><strong><mark>statutory construction</strong></mark> and due process analyses</u>. I argue that <u><mark>this </mark>unified approach <strong><mark>trims</strong></mark> away <strong><mark>doctrinal</strong></mark> redundancy and <strong><mark>confusion</strong>, supplies</mark> courts with <mark>an <strong>intuitive</strong></mark> and cogent <strong><mark>blueprint</strong> for <strong>extraterritoriality</mark> issues</strong>, <mark>and</u></mark>, not least, <u><mark>produces</mark> <strong>sound <mark>results</strong></mark>.</p><p></u>Broadly framed, extraterritoriality cases raise three types of issues: (1) What is the source of Congress’s power to legislate extraterritorially? (2) If a statute is silent on geographic scope, should it be construed extraterritorially? And, (3) does the extraterritorial application of U.S. law violate due process? The unified approach uses the answer to the first inquiry to help resolve the other two. In brief, <u>some sources of legislative authority grant Congress power to implement international law</u> or legal obligations.13 <u>Other sources do not</u> require a predicate international norm; <u>Congress simply may enact national law</u> and project it abroad.14 The unified approach holds that <u><mark>when Congress enacts a statute <strong>silent</strong> on <strong>geographic scope</strong> designed to</mark> implement international substantive law, courts should construe that statute in line with international jurisdictional law</u>, including attendant principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction. That is to say, <u>when <strong>Congress <mark>implement</mark>s <mark>i</mark>nternational <mark>law</strong>, courts should <strong>presume</strong> Congress intended to implement <strong>all</strong> of i</mark>nternational <mark>law</u></mark>—<u><mark>including</u></mark> international <u><mark>jurisdictional law, which may</u></mark> permit, encourage, or <u><mark>even <strong>obligate extraterritoriality</u></strong></mark>. In this respect, <u><mark>the <strong>relevant tool</strong></mark> of statutory construction <mark>is</mark> the <strong><mark>Charming Betsy </mark>canon</strong>, under which courts construe ambiguous statutes in conformity with international law</u>.15</p><p><u>This result is</u> superficially <u><strong>at odds</strong> with</u> another popular interpretive canon regularly used to construe statutes quiet on geographic scope, <u>the presumption against extraterritoriality</u>, which presumes “that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”16 <u>The tension vanishes</u>, however, <u>in light of the presumption’s</u> original <u>motivation: to avoid unintended discord with foreign nations</u>.17 A presumption against extraterritoriality made sense when the international law of jurisdiction was strongly territorial in nature. But <u><mark>now that i</mark>nternational <mark>law embraces</mark> and</u> sometimes even <u>requires <mark>extraterritorial jurisdiction, the <strong>presumption</u></strong></mark> not only is anachronistic, but perversely <u>may <strong><mark>achieve</strong></mark> precisely what it was <strong>designed to avoid</strong>: <strong><mark>discord</strong> with <strong>foreign nations</strong>. Suppose Congress enacts a <strong>statute</strong> implementing a</mark>n international customary or <strong><mark>treaty-based norm</strong></mark> that carries with it the</u> encouragement or <u>obligation to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. If courts apply the presumption against extraterritoriality</u> to that statute, <u><mark>it will</mark> have accomplished exactly what it was designed to avoid by <strong>blocking fulfillment</strong> of <strong>U.S. international responsibilities</u></strong>.18 Unfortunately, <u><mark>when <strong>courts</strong></mark> have been <mark>face</mark>d with <mark>this</mark> type of <mark>question, they</mark> have <strong>tended to do just that</u></strong>, sometimes triggering a swift response by Congress.19</p><p>Indeed, <u>the reasons</u> traditionally <u>underwriting the presumption</u> against extraterritoriality <u><strong>drop out</strong> for statutes implementing international law</u>. <u>Concerns about</u> extraterritorial <u>applications of U.S. law conflicting with foreign law</u> inside foreign territory <u>largely <strong>evaporate</strong>, since the U.S. law by nature will not conflict with the <strong>international law</strong> also <strong>operative</strong> inside the foreign territory</u>. Moreover, while the conventional assumption that Congress legislates with only domestic concerns in mind may make sense for statutes reflecting national values and preferences,20 that assumption holds far less intuitive force when Congress implements international law—which, after all, deals by definition with foreign nations and shared values and preferences with those nations. Finally, <u>concerns about <strong>courts</u></strong> usurping or <u><strong>intruding</strong> upon <strong>sensitive foreign policy</strong> decisions by extending U.S. law abroad</u>21 <u>can be <strong>turned upside down</u></strong> when it comes to statutes implementing international law. Here <u>it is the deployment of a thoroughly <strong>judicial contrivance</u></strong>—the presumption against extraterritoriality—that <u><strong><mark>threaten</mark>s</strong> to <strong>interfere</strong> with <strong>U.S. <mark>foreign relations</strong> by</mark> potentially <strong><mark>stunting</strong> the ability of the U</mark>nited <mark>St</mark>ates <mark>to <strong>fulfill</strong></mark> its <strong><mark>international obligations</strong></mark>, not the construction of statutes in line with those obligations</u>.22 All of this is not to say that potential frictions will never arise regarding the choice of forum, as opposed to the choice of law. But that is a separate question, governed by separate jurisdictional principles that take directly into account those frictions when evaluating whether U.S. courts can or should entertain suits involving foreign elements.23 My argument here relates only to the choice of law, which by definition is the same everywhere for statutes that implement or apply international law. </p><p>By contrast, <u>the <strong><mark>reasons</u></strong></mark> traditionally <u>favoring the presumption</u> against extraterritoriality <u><strong><mark>persist</strong> for statutes</mark> enacted under legislative sources <mark>authorizing</mark> the enactment of <strong><mark>purely national law</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Extraterritorial application</mark> of these</u> statutes <u><strong><mark>elevates</strong> the <strong>risk of discord</strong></mark> with <strong>foreign nations</strong> resulting <mark>from</mark> both <strong><mark>jurisdictional overreaching</strong> and <strong>conflicts</strong> with <strong>foreign law</strong></mark> in foreign territory</u>. Furthermore, extending these laws abroad defeats the (here quite sensible) assumption that when Congress passes laws reflecting and advancing national values and preferences, those laws are directed primarily toward domestic concerns. And, because of all of these features—the risk of jurisdictional overreach, clashes with foreign law, and applying U.S. national values and preferences inside other countries—concerns about judicial interference in sensitive foreign policy matters have traction. </p><p><u>A unified approach would affect</u> extraterritoriality <u>cases involving a range of <strong>hot-button issues</strong> including</u>, among other things, <u>modern <strong>piracy</strong> and <strong>terrorism</u></strong>, which are subjects of U.S. laws that implement international law. <u>The theory’s crux</u> that statutes implementing international norms ought to be construed differently also <u>holds implications for jurisdictional statutes, such as the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”)</u>—an ever more polemical law <u>allowing foreigners to recover in U.S. courts for violations of international law</u>.24 For one quick example discussed below,25 in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the Supreme Court very recently and very forcefully yanked back to U.S. borders the principal antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act, which lower courts had been construing extraterritorially for over four decades.26 On its face, the Court’s powerful reinvigoration of the presumption against extraterritoriality appears to cover other laws silent on geographic scope, like the ATS, instantly wiping away an avalanche of high-stakes cases alleging harms outside the United States. In fact, the Second Circuit already has used Morrison to cut off at the U.S. border another geographically silent statute, RICO.27 <u>Unless one can come up with a principled reason for treating one context differently than the other, <mark>entertaining suits based on foreign conduct</mark> under the ATS <mark>appears in <strong>open tension</strong> with <strong>Morrison</strong></mark>, and the ATS is now <strong>susceptible</strong> to <strong>judicial paring</strong>—all the way back to U.S. borders</u>.</p><p>The distinguishing principle this Article advances is that, unlike the Securities Exchange Act, the ATS applies international substantive law, and therefore should also apply international jurisdictional law. Because international law has evolved to authorize extraterritoriality, so too should the ATS. Accordingly, as long as courts apply international law under the statute (as opposed to, say, uniquely U.S. federal common law rules), the ATS’s scope should also be construed in conformity with international law, which contemplates extraterritoriality. In this regard, the approach meshes nicely with Morrison’s direction that courts may consult statutory “context” in construing geographic reach.28 Here the relevant context is that the statute authorizes application not of uniquely national law, but of international law, which applies everywhere and authorizes extraterritorial jurisdiction.</p><p>Next, <u><mark>the legislative source</mark> behind a statute <mark>can inform</u></mark> current due process <u>analyses of federal <mark>extraterritoriality</u></mark>. Courts are in agreement that <u>Fifth Amendment due process shields parties from</u> “arbitrary or fundamentally <u>unfair” applications of federal law abroad</u>,29 <u>measured in <strong>large part</strong> by whether parties <strong>reasonably</strong> could have <strong>expected</strong> the <strong>law to govern</strong> their conduct when they engaged in it</u>.30 <u>Yet <mark>courts</u></mark> have <u><mark>applied federal common law</mark> rules <mark>to</mark> relationships between <mark>foreign corporations</u></mark> acting outside the United States, <u><mark>and</mark> have <strong><mark>entertained suits</strong></mark> by foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants <mark>for conduct</u></mark> taking place <u><strong><mark>entirely abroad</u></strong></mark>.31 The U.S. government similarly has claimed power to prosecute foreigners for terrorist acts halfway around the world with no overt connection to the United States.32 <u>How</u>, if at all, <u>do these applications</u> of U.S. law <u>comport with due process and, more specifically, defendants’ reasonable expectations?</p><p></u>Under a unified approach, <u>the answer depends on whether the U.S. law implements an international law</u> to which the defendant was already subject. If U.S. law does, the defendant is on notice and the application does not run afoul of due process. Thus, <u>statutes that implement international law constitutionally</u> may <u>reach a <strong>wider variety</strong> of <strong>situations</strong> abroad than statutes that do not.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: White 9 (Joseph, Ph.D. Luxenberg Family Professor of Public Policy Case Western Reserve University, “Implementing Health Care Reform with All-Payer Regulation, Private Insurers, and a Voluntary Public Insurance Plan,” May 3, 2009, http://policy.case.edu/White_Implementing.pdf RMW) fulltext: The case for all-payer regulation in a system of multiple insurers is supported both by the importance of prices and administrative costs in cost control (see the companion paper), and the fact that a number of other countries have such systems. The advantages of coordinated payment, however, do not in and of themselves call for having a government-sponsored public plan in competition with nonprofit and/or forprofit insurers. Maryland currently sets hospital charges for all payers without having a public plan competing with private insurers. In Maryland and any other American state, of course, there are large public plans (Medicare and Medicaid) already. Yet that in itself does not provide an example of a public plan competing with private plans.3 There is a strong case, nevertheless, for creating a public plan to compete with private insurers as part of expanding guaranteed health insurance beyond the Medicaid and Medicare populations. It would both expand real choices available to enrollees and greatly assist in ensuring that insurers compete in ways that focus on value rather than on attempts to avoid beneficiaries who might get sick. Advantages of a public plan. Having a Medicare-linked public plan would improve any system of multiple insurers by providing an insurance option with maximum choice of caregivers. From the average citizen’s perspective, one of the great disadvantages of our current health care system is the fact that the vast majority of plans have restricted networks. Citizens choose a plan, and then find out later, when they get sick with some unexpected problem, whether the network fits their needs. Many of us have horror stories of a friend or relative who suffered from such constraints. In spite of its failings, selective contracting with restricted networks is, in the current system, the only way private insurers can control costs. They need to be able to choose among providers in order to force providers to bargain about contract terms. Even though, given current market conditions, selective contracting does not do much to constrain prices, it’s better than nothing. The public plan in a reformed system would be extremely likely to, like Medicare, have to offer free choice of providers in any area. The government faces different constraints than apply to private parties, and it would be quite difficult to justify discriminating against providers once governments have licensed them as competent to practice (Fox 1997).4 If there are good quality measures the public plan could publish them, but it would still need to let citizens choose among all possible caregivers, without the confusing set of exclusions and differential cost-sharing that characterizes current insurance options. This kind of choice is highly valued by citizens. Some analysts believe that a system of regulation would be sufficient to ensure that competition among private insurers pursues and achieves the goals of a fair and highvalue health care system. Even those analysts, however, acknowledge that experience is one reason for skepticism as to whether “new insurance market rules will prevent private insurers from putting their own bottom line ahead of quality care and patient safety” (Nichols and Bertko 2009: 5). Public plans could have their own management issues, but the incentives for public plan managers will be different enough from those for private plan managers so that the public plan should provide some competitive check on private plan behavior. One example of this benefit is how having a public plan might limit or at least help identify manipulation of any premium-setting process. In any system that combines government subsidies with multiple plans, there has to be some way to set the size of the subsidy, and it can’t be just based on whatever each plan decides to charge. Instead, many designs, such as those proposed during the Clinton effort to reform health insurance, base subsidies on a benchmark created by a formula, with the formula based on some combination of the bids submitted by insurers. Unfortunately, in such a system insurers have many incentives to distort the process with bids that attempt to manipulate the benchmark. It was easy to identify ways this could have happened with both the Clinton and other plans proposed in 1993-94 (White 1995: 303-08). In the reform discussed here, however, the public plan would not be a profit-maximizing entity with incentives to game the system. Its behavior therefore could help identify questionable behavior by the other participants, making it more likely that the other insurers will submit more credible bids. In Australia, which has a system of both gap and parallel private insurance that supplements the main public insurance scheme, one of the private insurers is actually a government corporation (Medibank Private). Some Australia provides an example of a public insurance plan appearing to have this positive effect on the behavior of private insurers.5 Contributions from the private plans. Having private plans competing with the public plan has two logical advantages. First, in countries with fairly standard benefits but all- payer regulation, plans compete in part by offering marginal extra benefits and through customer service. We tend in the United States not to talk much about the simple things, like quick and friendly interactions with our insurer over questions of benefits and billings. But they matter to people, and this is one concern for which competition seems like a good thing. I would be concerned especially that a public plan, subject to some pressures from budget-focused policy-makers who would surely be providing it with some taxpayer subsidies, might not receive quite the administrative funding it could use. Competition from private plans that could gain business by spending a small amount extra (relative to total costs) on service would be a useful discipline on the public plan.6 Second, precisely because the public plan would need to have free choice of caregiver, there would be room for value-improving innovation by the private plans. A standard fee schedule can leave room for a series of non-standard alternatives. For example, a traditional group-practice HMO, which pays its caregivers by salary and has exclusive relationships with its physicians, would be able to prosper if it did a better job of “managing care.” Instead of trying to get advantages over each other in fee negotiations, individual caregivers as well as insurers would have incentives to innovate and increase value by providing other delivery arrangements. Those incentives would be increased by the regulations described in the next section. In the present system, insurers have no incentive to offer particularly high-quality, or even lower cost, care for expensive conditions, because they do not want to attract sicker patients. It is better to have fewer diabetics, for example, than to deliver care to diabetics more efficiently. In a reformed system, data from diabetes patient costs for the rest of patients could be used to work out a risk-adjustment so that insurers would receive higher premiums for diabetics. Then an insurer that attracted a disproportionate number of diabetics and received the standard extra payment, but developed a model of chronic care case management that gave better quality at equal or lower cost, would actually profit from doing so. Similarly, a medical practice that developed such a model could market it to insurers. In these and other possible cases, if a health plan actually found a way to improve delivery, such that both caregivers and patients would choose to contract with it, this improvement would be better for everyone. This is not to suggest that the public plan should be prevented from innovating. It makes a great deal of sense, for example, for a public plan (or Medicare at present) to look for ways to structure and pay for case management, or have pilots on “paying for performance.” But these are very hard things to get right (which is why it hasn’t happened), and when it comes to innovation, it makes sense to let a hundred seeds be planted and see if anything blooms. At the same time, if all plans are “innovating,” citizens can just get confused, and so some stability in a plan available to all is highly desirable. The United States Federal Government should establish a public insurance option and set a common fee schedule for nearly all payers<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Even with all payer—the public option is key to stopping consolidation of the insurance industry</h4><p><strong>White 9</strong> (Joseph, Ph.D. Luxenberg Family Professor of Public Policy Case Western Reserve University, “Implementing Health Care Reform with All-Payer Regulation, Private Insurers, and a Voluntary Public Insurance Plan,” May 3, 2009, http://policy.case.edu/White_Implementing.pdf RMW)</p><p><u>The case for all-payer regulation in a system of multiple insurers is supported both by the importance of prices and administrative costs in cost control (see the companion paper), and the fact that a number of other countries have such systems</u>. The advantages of coordinated payment, however, do not in and of themselves call for having a government-sponsored public plan in competition with nonprofit and/or forprofit insurers. Maryland currently sets hospital charges for all payers without having a public plan competing with private insurers. In Maryland and any other American state, of course, there are large public plans (Medicare and Medicaid) already. Yet that in itself does not provide an example of a public plan competing with private plans.3 <u><mark>There is a strong case</mark>, nevertheless, <mark>for creating a public plan to compete with private insurers</mark> as part of expanding guaranteed health insurance beyond the Medicaid and Medicare populations</u><mark>. <u>It would both expand real choices</mark> available to enrollees and greatly assist in ensuring that insurers compete in ways that focus on value rather than on attempts to avoid beneficiaries who might get sick.</u> <u><mark>Advantages of a public plan. Having a Medicare-linked public plan would improve any system of multiple</mark> <mark>insurers</mark> by providing an insurance option with maximum choice of caregivers</u>. From the average citizen’s perspective, one of the great disadvantages of our current health care system is the fact that the vast majority of plans have restricted networks. Citizens choose a plan, and then find out later, when they get sick with some unexpected problem, whether the network fits their needs. Many of us have horror stories of a friend or relative who suffered from such constraints. In spite of its failings, selective contracting with restricted networks is, in the current system, the only way private insurers can control costs. They need to be able to choose among providers in order to force providers to bargain about contract terms. Even though, given current market conditions, selective contracting does not do much to constrain prices, it’s better than nothing. <u>The <mark>public plan in a reformed system would be extremely likely to</mark>, like Medicare, <mark>have to offer free choice of providers</mark> in any area. The government faces different constraints than apply to private parties, and it would be quite difficult to justify discriminating against providers once governments have licensed them as competent to practice (Fox 1997).4 If there are good quality measures the public plan could publish them, but it would still need to let citizens choose among all possible <mark>caregivers, without the confusing set of e</mark>xclusions and differential cost-sharing that <mark>characterizes current insurance options</mark>. This kind of choice is highly valued by citizens</u>. <u>Some analysts believe that a system of regulation would be sufficient to ensure that competition among private insurers pursues and achieves the goals of a fair and highvalue health care system. Even those analysts, however, acknowledge that experience is one reason for skepticism as to whether “new insurance market rules will prevent private insurers from putting their own bottom line ahead of quality care and patient safety”</u> (Nichols and Bertko 2009: 5). <u><strong><mark>Public plans could have their own management issues</mark>, but the <mark>incentives</mark> for public plan managers <mark>will be different enough from those for private plan managers</mark> so that the public plan should provide some competitive check on private plan behavior</u></strong>. <u>One example of this benefit is how having a public plan might limit or at least help identify manipulation of any premium-setting process. In any system that combines government subsidies with multiple plans, there has to be some way to set the size of the subsidy</u>, and it can’t be just based on whatever each plan decides to charge. Instead, <u>many designs, such as those proposed during the Clinton effort to reform health insurance, base subsidies on a benchmark created by a formula, with the formula based on some combination of the bids submitted by insurers</u>. <u>Unfortunately, in such a system insurers have many incentives to distort the process with bids that attempt to manipulate the benchmark</u>. It was easy to identify ways this could have happened with both the Clinton and other plans proposed in 1993-94 (White 1995: 303-08). In the reform discussed here, however, the <u><strong><mark>public plan would not be</mark> a <mark>profit-maximizing</mark> entity with incentives to game the system. Its behavior therefore <mark>could help identify questionable behavior by</mark> the <mark>other participants, making it more likely that the other insurers will submit</mark> more credible <mark>bids</u></strong></mark>. In <u>Aus<mark>t</mark>ralia, which has a system of both gap and parallel private insurance that supplements the main public insurance scheme, one of the private insurers is actually a government corporation</u> (Medibank Private). Some <u>Australia provides an example of a public insurance plan appearing to have this positive effect on the behavior of private insurers</u>.5 Contributions from the private plans. Having private plans competing with the public plan has two logical advantages. First, <u>in countries with fairly standard benefits but all- payer regulation, plans compete in part by offering marginal extra benefits and through customer service. We tend in the United States not to talk much about the simple things, like quick and friendly interactions with our insurer over questions of benefits and billings. But they matter to people, and this is one concern for which competition seems like a good thing. I would be concerned especially that a public plan, subject to some pressures from budget-focused policy-makers who would surely be providing it with some taxpayer subsidies, might not receive quite the administrative funding it could use. Competition from private plans that could gain business by spending a small amount extra (relative to total costs) on service would be a useful discipline on the public plan</u>.6 <u><strong>Second, precisely because the public plan would need to have free choice of caregiver, there would be room for value-improving innovation by the private plans</u></strong>. <u>A standard fee schedule can leave room for a series of non-standard alternatives</u>. For example, a <u>traditional group-practice HMO, which pays its caregivers by salary and has exclusive relationships with its physicians, would be able to prosper if it did a better job of “managing care.”</u> <u><mark>Instead of trying to get advantages over each other</mark> in fee negotiations, <mark>individual</mark> caregivers as well as <mark>insurers would have incentives to innovate</mark> and increase value <mark>by providing other delivery arrangement</mark>s</u>. <u>Those incentives would be increased by the regulations described in the next section. In the present system, insurers have no incentive to offer particularly high-quality, or even lower cost, care for expensive conditions, because they do not want to attract sicker patients</u>. <u><strong>It is better to have fewer diabetics, for example, than to deliver care to diabetics more efficiently</u></strong>. <u>In a reformed system, data from diabetes patient costs for the rest of patients could be used to work out a risk-adjustment so that insurers would receive higher premiums for diabetics. Then an insurer that attracted a disproportionate number of diabetics and received the standard extra payment, but developed a model of chronic care case management that gave better quality at equal or lower cost, would actually profit from doing so</u>. <u>Similarly, a medical practice that developed such a model could market it to insurers. In these and other possible cases, if a health plan actually found a way to improve delivery, such that both caregivers and patients would choose to contract with it, this improvement would be better for everyone.</u><strong> This is not to suggest that the public plan should be prevented from innovating. It makes a great deal of sense, for example, for a public plan (or Medicare at present) to look for ways to structure and pay for case management, or have pilots on “paying for performance.” But these are very hard things to get right (which is why it hasn’t happened), and when it comes to innovation, it makes sense to let a hundred seeds be planted and see if anything blooms. At the same time, if all plans are “innovating,” citizens can just get confused, and so some stability in a plan available to all is highly desirable.</p><p>The United States Federal Government should establish a public insurance option and set a common fee schedule for nearly all payers</p></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Blum and Neumann 20 (Marc-Michael Blum is a senior scientist within the verification division of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague, the Netherlands, after completing a two-year tenure as a director's fellow at Los Alamos National Laboratory; Peter R. Neumann is a German journalist and academic who frequently appears on radio and television as an expert on terrorism and political violence; “Corona and Bioterrorism: How Serious is the Threat?” War on the Rocks; June 22, 2020; https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/corona-and-bioterrorism-how-serious-is-the-threat/) fulltext: How serious is the threat? There is a long history of terrorists being fascinated by biological weapons, but it is also one of failures. For the vast majority, the technical challenges associated with weaponizing biological agents have proven insurmountable. The only reason this could change is if terrorists were to receive support from a state. Rather than panic about terrorists engaging in biological warfare, governments should be vigilant, secure their own facilities, and focus on strengthening international diplomacy. A History of Failures Biological warfare, which uses organisms and pathogens to cause disease, is nearly as old as war itself. The first known use of biological agents as a weapon dates back to 600 B.C., when an ancient Greek leader poisoned his enemies’ water supply. Throughout the Middle Ages, especially during the time of the Black Death, it was common to hurl infected corpses into besieged cities. And during the two world wars, all major powers maintained biological weapons programs (although only Japan used them in combat). Among terrorists, however, the use of biological weapons has been rarer, although groups from nearly all ideological persuasions have contemplated it. Recent examples include a plot to contaminate Chicago’s water supply in the 1970s; food poisoning by a religious cult in Oregon in the 1980s; and the stockpiling of ricin by members of the Minnesota Patriot Council during the 1990s. No one died in any of these instances. The same is true for the biological warfare programs of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group. Both groups have sought to buy, steal, or develop biological agents. For al-Qaeda, this seems to have been a priority in the 1990s, when its program was overseen by (then) deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, a trained physician. With the Islamic State, evidence dates back to 2014, when Iraqi forces discovered thousands of files related to biological warfare on a detainee’s laptop. Yet none of these efforts succeeded. The only al-Qaeda plot in which bioterrorism featured prominently — the so-called “ricin plot” in England in 2002 — was interrupted at such an early stage that none of the toxin had actually been produced. The Islamic State’s most serious attempt, in 2017, involved a small amount of ricin, whose only fatality was the hamster on which it was tested. Of the tens of thousands of people that jihadists have murdered, not a single one has died from biological agents. It may be no accident that the most lethal bioterrorist attack in recent decades was perpetrated by a scientist and government employee. In late 2001, the offices of several U.S. senators and news organizations received so-called “anthrax letters,” which killed five people and injured 17. Following years of investigation, the FBI identified the sender as Bruce Ivins, a PhD microbiologist and senior researcher at the U.S. Army’s Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. Unlike the others, he was no amateur or hoaxer, but a trained expert with years of experience and full access to the world’s largest repository of lethal biological agents. Technical Challenges Ivins’ case helps to explain why so many would-be bioterrorists have failed. At a technical level, launching a sophisticated, large-scale bioterrorist attack involves a toxin or a pathogen — generally a bacterium or a virus — which needs to be isolated and disseminated. But this is more difficult than it seems. As well as advanced training in biology or chemistry, isolating the agent requires significant experience. It also has to be done in a safe, contained environment, to stop it from spreading within the terrorist group. Contrary to what al-Qaeda said in one of its online magazines, you can’t just make a (biological) weapon “in the kitchen of your mom!” In addition, there is the challenge of dissemination. Unless the agent is super-contagious, a powerful biological attack relies on a large number of initial infections in perfect conditions. In the case of the bacterium anthrax, for example, only spores of a particular size are likely to be effective in certain kinds of weather. State-sponsored programs often needed years of testing and experimentation to understand how their weapons could be used. Though not impossible, it is unlikely that terrorist groups possess the resources, stable environment, and patience to do likewise. Doomsday Scenarios Even if terrorists somehow succeeded, it is nearly inconceivable that the resulting “weapon” would be as powerful as the recent coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2. One of its uniquely devastating features has been that people are infectious while experiencing no symptoms. As it spread across the globe, there was no treatment, no vaccine, an incomplete understanding of its pathological modes of action, and no easy, cheap and widely available testing. It was the viral equivalent of a “zero-day exploit” — a cyber-attack that happens before any patch is available. None of the viruses on the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s list of the most dangerous biological agents could be easily “weaponized” or would have the same, devastating effects as SARS-CoV-2. Pathogenic viruses such as smallpox, Ebola, Marburg, and Lassa are extremely hard to find, isolate, and spread. Botulinum and ricin are dangerous toxins, but not contagious, while Tularemia cannot be transmitted from human to human. The plague is, of course, capable of causing pandemics, but most countries are nowadays well prepared for this particular virus, and will be able to limit — and cope with — localized outbreaks. This leaves only anthrax, a soil bacterium which is relatively easy to obtain. Even so, isolating a highly pathogenic strain is difficult. More importantly, anthrax is not contagious, and while its spores are durable and affected areas can be hard to de-contaminate, it is unable to spread on its own. Regarding SARS-CoV-2, it is important to distinguish between the possibility that the virus occurred naturally and escaped from a laboratory, and the idea that it was engineered for maximum infectiousness and deliberately released. The first remains a possibility, although other explanations are equally — if not more — plausible, while the second has been debunked by a comprehensive examination in the journal Nature Medicine, which concluded that SARS-CoV-2 was “not a laboratory construct or a purposefully manipulated virus.” The chances that terrorists would be capable of engineering a virus such as SARS-CoV-2 without access to a state’s resources are virtually zero. If anything, the possibility of a lab escape — however remote — highlights the importance of biosafety. While governments have paid much attention to laboratories with the highest biosafety level (level 4), work on bat-born coronaviruses is regularly performed at lower levels (level 3, and even level 2), and should instead be subject to similar safety requirements. In sum, small-scale attacks using anthrax or other agents may be possible, but the risk of a highly advanced, weaponized pathogen that spreads among large populations — a terrorist-initiated biological doomsday — is very low. The only exception, of course, is if terrorists received support from a state, acted as its proxies, or were able to draw on its resources — as in Ivins’ case.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Zero risk of bioterrorism </h4><p><strong>Blum and Neumann 20 </strong>(Marc-Michael Blum is a senior scientist within the verification division of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague, the Netherlands, after completing a two-year tenure as a director's fellow at Los Alamos National Laboratory; Peter R. Neumann is a German journalist and academic who frequently appears on radio and television as an expert on terrorism and political violence; “Corona and Bioterrorism: How Serious is the Threat?” War on the Rocks; June 22, 2020; https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/corona-and-bioterrorism-how-serious-is-the-threat/)</p><p><u>How serious is the threat? There is a long history of terrorists being fascinated by biological weapons, but it is also one of failures</u>. For the vast majority, <u><strong>the <mark>technical</mark> <mark>challenges</mark> associated <mark>with</mark> weaponizing <mark>biological</mark> <mark>agents</mark> <mark>have</mark> <mark>proven insurmountable</u></strong></mark>. The only reason this could change is if terrorists were to receive support from a state. Rather than panic about terrorists engaging in biological warfare, governments should be vigilant, secure their own facilities, and focus on strengthening international diplomacy. A History of Failures Biological warfare, which uses organisms and pathogens to cause disease, is nearly as old as war itself. The first known use of biological agents as a weapon dates back to 600 B.C., when an ancient Greek leader poisoned his enemies’ water supply. Throughout the Middle Ages, especially during the time of the Black Death, it was common to hurl infected corpses into besieged cities. And during the two world wars, all major powers maintained biological weapons programs (although only Japan used them in combat). <u>Among terrorists</u>, however, <u>the use of biological weapons has been rare</u>r, although groups from nearly all ideological persuasions have contemplated it. Recent examples include a plot to contaminate Chicago’s water supply in the 1970s; food poisoning by a religious cult in Oregon in the 1980s; and the stockpiling of ricin by members of the Minnesota Patriot Council during the 1990s. <u><mark>No one died</mark> in any </u>of these <u>instances</u>. <u>The same is true for the biological warfare programs of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group</u>. Both groups have sought to buy, steal, or develop biological agents. For al-Qaeda, this seems to have been a priority in the 1990s, when its program was overseen by (then) deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, a trained physician. With the Islamic State, evidence dates back to 2014, when Iraqi forces discovered thousands of files related to biological warfare on a detainee’s laptop. Yet <u>none of these efforts succeeded</u>. <u>The only al-Qaeda plot in which bioterrorism featured prominently</u> — the so-called “ricin plot” in England in 2002 — <u>was interrupted at such an early stage that none of the toxin had actually been produced</u>. <u>The Islamic State’s most serious attempt</u>, in 2017, <u>involved a small amount of ricin, whose only fatality was the hamster on which it was tested. Of the tens of thousands of people that jihadists have murdered, not a single one has died from biological agents. </u>It may be no accident that the most lethal bioterrorist attack in recent decades was perpetrated by a scientist and government employee. In late 2001, the offices of several U.S. senators and news organizations received so-called “anthrax letters,” which killed five people and injured 17. Following years of investigation, the FBI identified the sender as Bruce Ivins, a PhD microbiologist and senior researcher at the U.S. Army’s Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. Unlike the others, he was no amateur or hoaxer, but a trained expert with years of experience and full access to the world’s largest repository of lethal biological agents. Technical Challenges Ivins’ case helps to explain why so many would-be bioterrorists have failed. At a technical level, <u><mark>launching</mark> <mark>a</mark> sophisticated, <mark>large-scale</mark> bioterrorist <mark>attack</mark> <mark>involves</mark> <mark>a</mark> toxin or a <mark>pathogen</mark> — generally a bacterium or a virus — <mark>which needs to be isolated</mark> and disseminated</u>. But <u><mark>this</mark> <mark>is</mark> more <mark>difficult</mark> than it seems. </u>As well as advanced training in biology or chemistry, is<u>olating the agent requires significant experience. <mark>It</mark> <mark>also</mark> <mark>has to be done</mark> <mark>in</mark> <mark>a</mark> safe, <mark>contained environment</mark>, <mark>to stop it from</mark> <mark>spreading within the terrorist group</u></mark>. Contrary to what al-Qaeda said in one of its online magazines, <u><strong><mark>you can’t just make a (biological) weapon</strong></mark> </u>“in the kitchen of your mom!” In addition, <u>there is the challenge of dissemination</u>. Unless the agent is super-contagious, <u>a powerful biological attack relies on a large number of initial infections in perfect conditions.</u> In the case of the bacterium anthrax, for example, <u>only spores of a particular size are likely to be effective in certain kinds of weather. State-sponsored programs often needed years of testing and experimentation to understand how their weapons could be used</u>. Though not impossible, <u><strong><mark>it is unlikely that</mark> <mark>terrorist</mark> <mark>groups</mark> <mark>possess the resources, stable environment</mark>,</strong> and patience to do likewise. </u>Doomsday Scenarios <u>Even if terrorists somehow succeeded, it is nearly inconceivable that the resulting “weapon” would be as powerful as the recent coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2. </u>One of its uniquely devastating features has been that people are infectious while experiencing no symptoms. As it spread across the globe, there was no treatment, no vaccine, an incomplete understanding of its pathological modes of action, and no easy, cheap and widely available testing. It was the viral equivalent of a “zero-day exploit” — a cyber-attack that happens before any patch is available. <u>None of the viruses on the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s list of the most dangerous biological agents could be easily “weaponized” or would have the same, devastating effects as SARS-CoV-2. Pathogenic viruses such as smallpox, Ebola, Marburg, and Lassa are extremely hard to find, isolate, and spread. Botulinum and ricin are dangerous toxins, but not contagious, while Tularemia cannot be transmitted from human to human. The plague is, of course, capable of causing pandemics, but most countries are nowadays well prepared for this particular virus, and will be able to limit — and cope with — localized outbreaks. </u>This leaves only anthrax, a soil bacterium which is relatively easy to obtain. Even so, <u>isolating a highly pathogenic strain is difficult</u>. More importantly, <u>anthrax is not contagious</u>, and while its spores are durable and affected areas can be hard to de-contaminate, it is unable to spread on its own. <u>Regarding SARS-CoV-2, it is important to distinguish between the possibility that the virus occurred naturally and escaped from a laboratory, and the idea that it was engineered for maximum infectiousness and deliberately released</u>. <u>The</u> first remains a <u>possibility</u>, although other explanations are equally — if not more — plausible, while the second <u>has been debunked by a comprehensive examination</u> in the journal Nature Medicine, <u>which concluded that <strong>SARS-CoV-2 was “not a laboratory construct or a purposefully manipulated virus.” <mark>The chances</mark> that terrorists would be capable of engineering a virus such as SARS-CoV-2 <mark>without access to a state’s resources</mark> <mark>are virtually zero</mark>.</u></strong> If anything, the possibility of a lab escape — however remote — highlights the importance of biosafety. While <u>governments have paid much attention to laboratories</u> with the highest biosafety level (level 4), work on bat-born coronaviruses is regularly performed at lower levels (level 3, and even level 2), and should instead be subject to similar safety requirements. In sum, small-<u>scale attacks using anthrax or other agents may be possible</u>, <u><strong>but the risk of a highly advanced, weaponized pathogen that spreads among large populations — a terrorist-initiated biological doomsday — is very low</u></strong>. The only exception, of course, is if terrorists received support from a state, acted as its proxies, or were able to draw on its resources — as in Ivins’ case.</p><|im_end|>