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<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Walton '15 [Brett; 8/6/15; writer for Circle of Blue and the Federal Water Tap, winter of two Society of environmental Journalists reporting awards, and the Sierra Club’s Distinguished Service Award; "EPA Clean Water Rule Meets Political Pushback," https://www.circleofblue.org/2015/world/epa-clean-water-rule-meets-political-pushback/] fulltext: In an era of fierce and frustrating political division, legislative collaboration is exceedingly rare. In few arenas of government is the stalemate more clear than in legislative oversight of the nation’s land, air, and especially of water. Though toxic spills, sewage overflows, salts, contaminated stormwater, and nutrient-rich wastes from big confined animal production facilities and farmland runoff are pouring into the nation’s coastal areas and freshwater reserves, Congress emphatically resists updating the Clean Water Act, one of the nation’s landmark environmental laws. Congress last amended the law in 1987. The nation’s waters are undoubtedly cleaner today, but serious impairments remain. Algae blooms choke the western basin of Lake Erie each summer. The flush of nitrogen and urban grime into Chesapeake Bay from rainstorms is growing. Salts from roads and nutrients from fields are flowing into rivers at increasing rates. Pollutants from coal ash piles and manure from livestock and poultry operations rushes unfiltered into the nation’s waters. The 21st century history of the law, moreover, also is graphically reflected in the differing views on environmental responsibility of the Obama White House, and the Bush administration before it. President Obama has largely avoided resistance from Republican lawmakers and dispatched the Environmental Protection Agency and other federal departments to install expanded Clean Water safeguards to stem pollution from mines, sewage plants, electrical generating stations, farms and oilfields. The president’s executive level actions also encouraged the EPA and the Justice Department to more aggressively pursue big civil and criminal water pollution cases. Just last month BP agreed to pay $US 18.7 billion to settle all federal and state claims related to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. It was the largest water pollution and environmental fine in U.S. history. In May, Duke Energy agreed to pay $US 102 million in fines as restitution for a coal ash spill into the Dan River in North Carolina, and for mismanagement of coal ash at other power plants. Most recently a new Clean Water rule, drafted by the Obama administration and opposed by Congress and many states, to clarify the law’s reach into small streams is set to take effect on August 28. The Bush administration established a different strategy for clean water oversight and enforcement. The White House, following the lead of the act’s opponents in Congress, pursued court cases to weaken oversight of safeguards for wetlands and pollution from industry, and supported Congressional efforts to pull back the law’s reach. According to a Congressional investigation in 2008, the Bush administration neglected, dismissed or failed to prosecute more than 500 enforcement actions it was pursuing following a 2006 U.S. Supreme Court ruling that altered federal oversight of some wetlands. The result is that an environmental statute enacted in 1972, and specifically designed to be periodically updated to reflect new conditions, has existed in a state of stasis — neither advancing very far nor retreating very much as the nation’s water quality needs change. “We’re hanging on to the laws we have on the books,” Pat Parenteau, senior counsel and professor at Vermont Law School, told Circle of Blue. “We’re trying to keep Congress from dismantling environmental protections.” Water Used to Unite The ideological battle lines for clean water were not always so stark. Parenteau recalls that the political tone on Capitol Hill in the late 1970s, when he was working as counsel for the National Wildlife Federation and litigating Clean Water Act cases, was a striking counterpoint to the entrenched positions today. “There were arguments and debates, which were vital to asking hard questions about the costs of the Clean Water Act and the level of government that should be involved,” Parenteau said. “The debate was rich, intellectual, and grounded. It was not perfect but it produced results.” The results were needed. Two-thirds of the deep water in Lake Erie in 1966 did not hold enough oxygen in the summer to support aquatic life, according to an EPA analysis, which asserted that the lake was “prematurely aging.” Beaches were often closed because of fecal bacteria. Rivers burned. As the crippling effects of industrial pollution on public health, wildlife, and the social and economic vitality of cities grew more apparent in the post-World War II era, Congress, with increasing frequency, revised and strengthened the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, the first major federal water law. Congress passed amendments in 1961, 1966, and 1970 that authorized water pollution research programs, prohibited the dumping of oil in national waters, established the Environmental Protection Agency, and funded a string of pollution-control projects along the Great Lakes, then a dumpster for the heavy metals, nitrates, ammonia, chlorides, and phosphates that were toxic byproducts of industrial and urban development. Deeper, far-reaching reforms came in 1972, when the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was retrofitted into an all-purpose vehicle to make the nation’s waters fishable and swimmable, activities that are now perhaps taken for granted but at the time were risky ventures. Renamed the Clean Water Act, it instituted a national permitting system to stem the flow of waste from factory pipes and sewage plants into lakes, rivers, and streams and provided billions of dollars to cities, to help with the technological transition. President Richard Nixon lauded the intent of the bill, but recoiling at its cost, he vetoed it. The House and Senate closed ranks. Urging the members to rebuff the veto, Howard Baker, then a freshman Republican senator from Tennessee who would later earn the nickname The Great Conciliator, spoke out in favor of the act. “There are many, many federal programs that are wasteful, and many American tax dollars are idly spent on programs that do not produce commensurate results,” Baker said. “But that is not true of the federal pollution effort. I have spent more time, as an individual senator, on environmental legislation than on any other field of endeavor since coming to the Congress in 1967. “I believe that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 is far and away the most significant and promising piece of environmental legislation ever enacted by the Congress.” Both chambers embraced that promise and squashed the veto. A few years later, in 1977, Baker again defended the act and its encompassing interpretation of regulated waters, as Congress debated a new set of amendments. “A fundamental element of the Water Act is broad jurisdiction over water for pollution control purposes,” Baker said. “It is important to understand that toxic substances threaten the aquatic environment when discharged into small streams or into major waterways.” Baker continued: “The once seemingly separable types of aquatic systems are, we now know, interrelated and interdependent. We cannot expect to preserve the remaining qualities of our water resources without providing appropriate protection for the entire resource.” Drawing New Lines around Clean Water There is little conciliation in today’s 114th Congress, nor in any of the recent meetings of the deliberative body. The last amendments to the Clean Water Act came in 1987. The smelliest, most toxic, and most flammable industrial pollution have been stanched, but a host of problems have emerged that deserve no less rigorous a debate about solutions than in Howard Baker’s time: pharmaceuticals contaminants, nutrient pollution from farms, severe storms that overwhelm urban sewers, and the costs and benefits of the permitting process. The question of the day, the question that the EPA rule addresses and the same one that Baker pondered, is basic and fundamental to the act’s effectiveness: which waters have federal protection? Congress had opportunities to write the definition. U.S. Supreme Court decisions in 2001 and 2006 — Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Rapanos v. United States — brought confusion, not clarity, about which water bodies are covered by Section 404, which requires permits for destroying wetlands and streams. Congress could have stepped in and reworked the language of the act. It did not. No serious attempts were mustered. The few proposals that did appear hewed to the ends of the political spectrum, finding no common ground, said Holly Doremus, a University of California, Berkeley law professor who studies the Clean Water Act. “None has passed because there isn’t bipartisan agreement,” Doremus told Circle of Blue. “There hasn’t been sufficient control by one side to get a version passed. There’s no compromise. There are not even proposals to find compromise.” Instead, the White House and the EPA, arguably the most politically beleaguered federal agency, began writing rules to clarify the Clean Water Act’s jurisdiction. On August 28, a new Clean Water Act rule goes into effect that sets the first-ever boundaries on the waters that are covered under the law. More than two years in development, the rule was buttressed by an extensive scientific review. Though its regulatory reach is less expansive than the science suggested, the rule nonetheless stirred waves of opposition after it was released on May 27. Since then, 27 states – only four of which have Democratic attorneys general — joined lawsuits to block its implementation. Lawsuits from the coal industry and the American Farm Bureau Federation seek the same result. A lawsuit from environmental groups swings in the opposite direction, contending that the rule sets the bar for federal protection of wetlands and streams too low. Even the Army Corps of Engineers, which is responsible for issuing Section 404 permits, argued that the proposal is too weak. The final rule pays deference to Justice Anthony Kennedy’s ambiguous test of jurisdiction from the 2006 Rapanos case, his bit of muddled language that threw the federal government’s regulatory powers in question: that the waterbody have a “significant nexus” to downstream waters. Rivers and their main tributaries are clearly within the law’s scope. Large lakes too. But what about creeks that are dry half the year? Or wetlands in the middle of the prairie? Or the water that drains from farm fields? For the first time, the EPA says that certain waters — farm ditches, agricultural drainage, reservoirs storing coal waste, channels that fill with water after rainstorms — were excluded from the act’s jurisdiction. Agency officials also set limits to define this “nexus” that are based on the distance a wetland is from a river. “We established clear boundaries here that we have never done before so that people would be able to see [what is covered],” EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy said on a May 27 press call to announce the rule. “[Farm groups] asked us about ditches, and they asked us about ditches, and they asked us about ditches. So we not only kept all the exclusions and exemptions for agriculture that are in current rules, we actually expanded those.” By adding the exclusions, the EPA was trying to find “a sweet spot” for defending the rule in court, argued Jeff Kray, a partner with Marten Law, a firm that specializes in environmental law. Still, the states and industry sued, arguing that the federal government overstepped its authority and that the states are in a better position to regulate water quality. The lawsuits seek to force the EPA back to the drawing board. They were filed courts that, judging by legal precedent, would be most sympathetic to the opposing view — courts with conservative justices, Kray said. What this means for how the EPA and the Army Corps administer and enforce the law is not clear. Kray said that the EPA is not talking as if it will back down. Others still have worries. A judicial decision or an injunction that throws the validity of the rule into question could choke off serious enforcement action at the EPA’s 10 regional offices, according to Parenteau, who served as counsel from 1984 to 1987 for EPA Region I, which covers the New England states. “The reaction is basically to shut down and wait,” Parenteau said. “The field offices don’t want to get too far ahead of headquarters. They are risk averse in that environment. They are not going to take chances. They are not going to put their career and job at risk if they don’t have clear authority. That’s the chilling effect of the lawsuits.” Legal observers say that the dispute reflects broader political disagreements about federal power that are reflected in health care reform, immigration, and other environmental laws such as the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Air Act. Many industries and a number of states argue that federal regulation is an undo intrusion. Water crosses political boundaries and requires uniform standards, the Obama administration retorts. “The stalemate is another piece of the larger social discourse of the role of the federal government and the role of the states,” Kray told Circle of Blue. Kray and others think that the challenges to the EPA rule will land in the U.S. Supreme Court. In the meantime, opposition to the rule — from congressional Republicans out to block agency funding, to states and industries seeking to invalidate it, to green groups wanting to strengthen it — will be a test of agency tenacity to enforce and administer standards that it spent considerable time and resources developing. “It’s politics that will control how aggressive the EPA goes after enforcing the rule,” Doremus said.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The plan gets fought from all sides---water protection <u>ignites lawsuits</u> and <u>congressional backlash</u> that turns case.</h4><p><strong>Walton '15 </strong>[Brett; 8/6/15; writer for Circle of Blue and the Federal Water Tap, winter of two Society of environmental Journalists reporting awards, and the Sierra Club’s Distinguished Service Award; "EPA Clean Water Rule Meets Political Pushback," https://www.circleofblue.org/2015/world/epa-clean-water-rule-meets-political-pushback/]</p><p><u>In an era of <strong>fierce</strong> and frustrating <strong>political division</strong>, legislative collaboration is <strong>exceedingly rare</strong>. In few arenas of government is the <strong>stalemate</strong> more clear than in <strong>legislative oversight</strong> of the nation’s</u> land, air, and especially of <u><strong>water</u></strong>.</p><p>Though toxic spills, sewage overflows, salts, contaminated stormwater, and nutrient-rich wastes from big confined animal production facilities and farmland runoff are pouring into the nation’s coastal areas and freshwater reserves, <u>Congress <strong>emphatically resists</strong> updating the <strong>C</strong>lean <strong>W</strong>ater <strong>A</strong>ct</u>, one of the nation’s landmark environmental laws.</p><p><u>Congress last amended the law in 1987</u>. The nation’s waters are undoubtedly cleaner today, but serious impairments remain. Algae blooms choke the western basin of Lake Erie each summer. The flush of nitrogen and urban grime into Chesapeake Bay from rainstorms is growing. Salts from roads and nutrients from fields are flowing into rivers at increasing rates. Pollutants from coal ash piles and manure from livestock and poultry operations rushes unfiltered into the nation’s waters.</p><p><u>The 21st century history of the law</u>, moreover, also <u>is graphically reflected in the <strong>differing views</strong> on <strong>environmental responsibility</u></strong> of the Obama White House, and the Bush administration before it.</p><p>President Obama has largely avoided resistance from Republican lawmakers and dispatched the Environmental Protection Agency and other federal departments to install expanded Clean Water safeguards to stem pollution from mines, sewage plants, electrical generating stations, farms and oilfields. The president’s executive level actions also encouraged the EPA and the Justice Department to more aggressively pursue big civil and criminal water pollution cases. Just last month BP agreed to pay $US 18.7 billion to settle all federal and state claims related to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. It was the largest water pollution and environmental fine in U.S. history. In May, Duke Energy agreed to pay $US 102 million in fines as restitution for a coal ash spill into the Dan River in North Carolina, and for mismanagement of coal ash at other power plants.</p><p>Most recently <u>a new Clean Water rule, drafted by</u> the <u>Obama</u> administration <u>and <strong>opposed by Congress</u></strong> and many states, to clarify the law’s reach into small streams <u>is set to take effect</u> on August 28.</p><p>The <u>Bush</u> administration <u>established a</u> different <u>strategy for clean water <strong>oversight</strong> and <strong>enforcement</strong>. The White House, following the lead of</u> the act’s <u>opponents in Congress, pursued <strong>court cases</strong> to <strong>weaken oversight</strong> of safeguards for wetlands</u> and pollution from industry, <u>and supported Congressional efforts to <strong>pull back</strong> the law’s reach</u>. According to a Congressional investigation in 2008, the Bush administration neglected, dismissed or failed to prosecute more than 500 enforcement actions it was pursuing following a 2006 U.S. Supreme Court ruling that altered federal oversight of some wetlands.</p><p><u>The result is that an environmental statute</u> enacted in 1972, and specifically designed to be periodically updated to reflect new conditions, <u>has existed in a <strong>state of stasis</u></strong> — neither advancing very far nor retreating very much as the nation’s water quality needs change.</p><p>“We’re hanging on to the laws we have on the books,” Pat Parenteau, senior counsel and professor at Vermont Law School, told Circle of Blue. “We’re trying to keep Congress from dismantling environmental protections.”</p><p>Water Used to Unite</p><p><u>The <strong>ideological battle lines</strong> for clean water were not always so stark</u>. Parenteau recalls that the political tone on Capitol Hill in the late 1970s, when he was working as counsel for the National Wildlife Federation and litigating Clean Water Act cases, was a striking counterpoint to the entrenched positions today.</p><p><u>“There were <strong>arguments</strong> and <strong>debates</u></strong>, which were vital to asking hard questions <u>about the <strong>costs</strong> of the <strong>C</strong>lean <strong>W</strong>ater <strong>A</strong>ct and the <strong>level of government</strong> that should be involved</u>,” Parenteau said. “The debate was rich, intellectual, and grounded. It was not perfect but it produced results.”</p><p>The results were needed. Two-thirds of the deep water in Lake Erie in 1966 did not hold enough oxygen in the summer to support aquatic life, according to an EPA analysis, which asserted that the lake was “prematurely aging.” Beaches were often closed because of fecal bacteria. Rivers burned.</p><p>As the crippling effects of industrial pollution on public health, wildlife, and the social and economic vitality of cities grew more apparent in the post-World War II era, Congress, with increasing frequency, revised and strengthened the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, the first major federal water law. Congress passed amendments in 1961, 1966, and 1970 that authorized water pollution research programs, prohibited the dumping of oil in national waters, established the Environmental Protection Agency, and funded a string of pollution-control projects along the Great Lakes, then a dumpster for the heavy metals, nitrates, ammonia, chlorides, and phosphates that were toxic byproducts of industrial and urban development.</p><p>Deeper, far-reaching reforms came in 1972, when the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was retrofitted into an all-purpose vehicle to make the nation’s waters fishable and swimmable, activities that are now perhaps taken for granted but at the time were risky ventures. Renamed the Clean Water Act, it instituted a national permitting system to stem the flow of waste from factory pipes and sewage plants into lakes, rivers, and streams and provided billions of dollars to cities, to help with the technological transition.</p><p>President Richard Nixon lauded the intent of the bill, but recoiling at its cost, he vetoed it. The House and Senate closed ranks. Urging the members to rebuff the veto, Howard Baker, then a freshman Republican senator from Tennessee who would later earn the nickname The Great Conciliator, spoke out in favor of the act.</p><p>“There are many, many federal programs that are wasteful, and many American tax dollars are idly spent on programs that do not produce commensurate results,” Baker said. “But that is not true of the federal pollution effort. I have spent more time, as an individual senator, on environmental legislation than on any other field of endeavor since coming to the Congress in 1967.</p><p>“I believe that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 is far and away the most significant and promising piece of environmental legislation ever enacted by the Congress.”</p><p>Both chambers embraced that promise and squashed the veto.</p><p>A few years later, in 1977, Baker again defended the act and its encompassing interpretation of regulated waters, as Congress debated a new set of amendments.</p><p>“A fundamental element of the Water Act is broad jurisdiction over water for pollution control purposes,” Baker said. “It is important to understand that toxic substances threaten the aquatic environment when discharged into small streams or into major waterways.”</p><p>Baker continued: “The once seemingly separable types of aquatic systems are, we now know, interrelated and interdependent. We cannot expect to preserve the remaining qualities of our water resources without providing appropriate protection for the entire resource.”</p><p>Drawing New Lines around Clean Water</p><p>There is little conciliation in today’s 114th Congress, nor in any of the recent meetings of the deliberative body. The last amendments to the Clean Water Act came in 1987. The smelliest, most toxic, and most flammable industrial pollution have been stanched, but a host of problems have emerged that deserve no less rigorous a debate about solutions than in Howard Baker’s time: pharmaceuticals contaminants, nutrient pollution from farms, severe storms that overwhelm urban sewers, and the costs and benefits of the permitting process.</p><p>The question of the day, the question that the EPA rule addresses and the same one that Baker pondered, is basic and fundamental to the act’s effectiveness: which waters have federal protection?</p><p><u>Congress had opportunities to write the definition. U.S. Supreme Court decisions</u> in 2001 and 2006 — Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Rapanos v. United States — <u>brought confusion, not clarity, about which water bodies are covered</u> by Section 404, which requires permits for destroying wetlands and streams. <u>Congress could have stepped in and <strong>reworked the language</strong> of the act. It did not. <strong>No serious attempts</strong> were mustered. The few proposals that did appear hewed to the ends of the <strong>political spectrum</strong>, finding <strong>no common ground</u></strong>, said Holly Doremus<u>, a University of California, Berkeley law professor who studies the Clean Water Act.</p><p>“None has passed because <strong>there isn’t bipartisan agreement</strong>,”</u> Doremus told Circle of Blue. “<u>There hasn’t been sufficient control by one side to get a version passed. <strong>There’s no compromise</strong>. There are <strong>not even proposals</strong> to find compromise.”</p><p></u>Instead, <u>the White House and the EPA</u>, arguably the most politically beleaguered federal agency, <u>began writing rules to clarify</u> the Clean Water Act’s jurisdiction.</p><p>On August 28, a new Clean Water Act rule goes into effect that sets the first-ever boundaries on the waters that are covered under the law. More than two years in development, the rule was buttressed by an extensive scientific review.</p><p>Though its regulatory reach is less expansive than the science suggested, <u>the <strong>rule</strong> nonetheless stirred <strong>waves of opposition</strong> after it was released</u> on May 27. Since then, <u>27 states</u> – only four of which have Democratic attorneys general — <u>joined <strong>lawsuits</strong> to block its implementation. Lawsuits from the <strong>coal industry</strong> and the American <strong>Farm Bureau</strong> Federation seek the same result. A lawsuit from <strong>environmental groups</strong> swings in the opposite direction, contending that the rule sets the bar for <strong>federal protection</strong> of <strong>wetlands</strong> and <strong>streams</strong> too <strong>low</u></strong>. Even the Army Corps of Engineers, which is responsible for issuing Section 404 permits, argued that the proposal is too weak.</p><p>The final rule pays deference to Justice Anthony Kennedy’s ambiguous test of jurisdiction from the 2006 Rapanos case, his bit of muddled language that threw the federal government’s regulatory powers in question: that the waterbody have a “significant nexus” to downstream waters.</p><p>Rivers and their main tributaries are clearly within the law’s scope. Large lakes too. But what about creeks that are dry half the year? Or wetlands in the middle of the prairie? Or the water that drains from farm fields?</p><p>For the first time, the EPA says that certain waters — farm ditches, agricultural drainage, reservoirs storing coal waste, channels that fill with water after rainstorms — were excluded from the act’s jurisdiction. Agency officials also set limits to define this “nexus” that are based on the distance a wetland is from a river.</p><p>“We established clear boundaries here that we have never done before so that people would be able to see [what is covered],” EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy said on a May 27 press call to announce the rule. “[Farm groups] asked us about ditches, and they asked us about ditches, and they asked us about ditches. So we not only kept all the exclusions and exemptions for agriculture that are in current rules, we actually expanded those.”</p><p><u>By adding</u> the <u><strong>exclusions</strong>, the EPA was trying to find “a sweet spot” for defending the rule</u> in court, argued Jeff Kray, a partner with Marten Law, a firm that specializes in environmental law.</p><p><u>Still, the <strong>states and industry sued</strong>, arguing that the federal government <strong>overstepped its authority</strong> and that the states are in a <strong>better position</strong> to regulate water quality. The lawsuits seek to <strong>force the EPA</strong> back to the <strong>drawing board</u></strong>. They were filed courts that, judging by legal precedent, would be most sympathetic to the opposing view — courts with conservative justices, Kray said.</p><p>What this means for how the EPA and the Army Corps administer and enforce the law is not clear. Kray said that the EPA is not talking as if it will back down.</p><p>Others still have worries. <u>A <strong>judicial decision</strong> or an <strong>injunction</strong> that throws the <strong>validity</strong> of the rule <strong>into question</strong> could choke off serious enforcement action</u> at the EPA’s 10 regional offices, according to Parenteau, who served as counsel from 1984 to 1987 for EPA Region I, which covers the New England states.</p><p>“The reaction is basically to shut down and wait,” Parenteau said. “The field offices don’t want to get too far ahead of headquarters. They are risk averse in that environment. They are not going to take chances. They are not going to put their career and job at risk if they don’t have clear authority. That’s the chilling effect of the lawsuits.”</p><p><u>Legal observers say that the <strong>dispute reflects broader political disagreements</strong> about <strong>federal power</strong> that are reflected in <strong>health care</strong> reform, <strong>immigration</strong>, and other <strong>environmental laws</u></strong> such as the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Air Act. <u>Many <strong>industries</strong> and a number of <strong>states</strong> argue that <strong>federal regulation</strong> is an <strong>undo intrusion</u></strong>. Water crosses political boundaries and requires uniform standards, the Obama administration retorts.</p><p><u>“The stalemate is another piece of the <strong>larger social discourse</strong> of the role of the federal government and</u> the role of <u>the states</u>,” Kray told Circle of Blue.</p><p>Kray and others think that the challenges to the EPA rule will land in the U.S. Supreme Court. In the meantime, <u>opposition to the rule — from <strong>congressional Republicans</strong> out to <strong>block agency funding</strong>, to states and industries seeking to <strong>invalidate</strong> it, to <strong>green groups</strong> wanting to strengthen it — will be a test</u> of agency tenacity to enforce and administer standards that it spent considerable time and resources developing.</p><p><u>“It’s <strong>politics</strong> that will <strong>control</strong> how aggressive the EPA goes after <strong>enforcing the rule</u></strong>,” Doremus said.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Scheffler 13 — (Samuel Scheffler, professor of philosophy and law at New York University, is the author of the forthcoming book “Death and the Afterlife, “The Importance of the Afterlife. Seriously.“, NYT Opinionator, 9-21-2013, Available Online at https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/21/the-importance-of-the-afterlife-seriously/#more-149307, accessed 12-25-2018, HKR-AM) fulltext: My belief in life after death is more mundane. What I believe is that other people will continue to live after I myself have died. You probably make the same assumption in your own case. Although we know that humanity won’t exist forever, most of us take it for granted that the human race will survive, at least for a while, after we ourselves are gone. Because we take this belief for granted, we don’t think much about its significance. Yet I think that this belief plays an extremely important role in our lives, quietly but critically shaping our values, commitments and sense of what is worth doing. Astonishing though it may seem, there are ways in which the continuing existence of other people after our deaths — even that of complete strangers — matters more to us than does our own survival and that of our loved ones. Consider a hypothetical scenario. Suppose you knew that although you yourself would live a long life and die peacefully in your sleep, the earth and all its inhabitants would be destroyed 30 days after your death in a collision with a giant asteroid. How would this knowledge affect you? If you are like me, and like most people with whom I have discussed the question, you would find this doomsday knowledge profoundly disturbing. And it might greatly affect your decisions about how to live. If you were a cancer researcher, you might be less motivated to continue your work. (It would be unlikely, after all, that a cure would be found in your lifetime, and even it were, how much good would it do in the time remaining?) Likewise if you were an engineer working to improve the seismic safety of bridges, or an activist trying to reform our political or social institutions or a carpenter who cared about building things to last. What difference would these endeavors make, if the destruction of the human race was imminent? If you were a novelist or playwright or composer, you might see little point in continuing to write or compose, since these creative activities are often undertaken with an imagined future audience or legacy in mind. And faced with the knowledge that humanity would cease to exist soon after your death, would you still be motivated to have children? Maybe not. Notice that people do not typically react with such a loss of purpose to the prospect of their own deaths. Of course, many people are terrified of dying. But even people who fear death (and even those who do not believe in a personal afterlife) remain confident of the value of their activities despite knowing that they will die someday. Thus there is a way in which the survival of other people after our deaths matters more to us than our own survival. The explanation for this may seem simple: if the earth will be destroyed 30 days after we die, then everyone we care about who is alive at that time will meet a sudden, violent end. Spouses and partners, children and grandchildren, friends and lovers: all would be doomed. Perhaps it is our concern for our loved ones that explains our horror at the prospect of a post-mortem catastrophe. But I don’t think this is the full story. Consider another hypothetical scenario, drawn from P. D. James’s novel “The Children of Men.” In Ms. James’s novel, humanity has become infertile, with no recorded birth having occurred in over 25 years. Imagine that you found yourself living in such circumstances. Nobody now alive is younger than 25, and the disappearance of the human race is imminent as an aging population inexorably fades away. How would you react? As in the case of the asteroidal collision, many activities would begin to seem pointless under these conditions: cancer research, seismic safety efforts, social and political activism and so on. Beyond that, as Ms. James’s novel vividly suggests, the onset of irreversible global infertility would be likely to produce widespread depression, anxiety and despair. Some people would seek consolation in religious faith, and some would find it. Others would take what pleasure they could in activities that seemed intrinsically rewarding: listening to music, exploring the natural world, spending time with family and friends and enjoying the pleasures of food and drink. But even these activities might seem less fulfilling, and be tinged with sadness and pain, when set against the background of a dying humanity. NOTICE that in this scenario, unlike that of the asteroidal collision, nobody would die prematurely. So what is dismaying about the prospect of living in an infertile world cannot be that we are horrified by the demise of our loved ones. (They would die eventually, of course, but that is no different from our actual situation.) What is dismaying is simply that no new people would come into existence. This should give us pause. The knowledge that we and everyone we know and love will someday die does not cause most of us to lose confidence in the value of our daily activities. But the knowledge that no new people would come into existence would make many of those things seem pointless. I think this shows that some widespread assumptions about human egoism are oversimplified at best. However self-interested or narcissistic we may be, our capacity to find purpose and value in our lives depends on what we expect to happen to others after our deaths. Even the egotistic tycoon who is devoted to his own glory might discover that his ambitions seemed pointless if humanity’s disappearance was imminent. Although some people can afford not to depend on the kindness of strangers, virtually everyone depends on the future existence of strangers. Similarly, I think that familiar assumptions about human individualism are oversimplified. Even though we as individuals have diverse values and goals, and even though it is up to each of us to judge what we consider to be a good or worthy life, most of us pursue our goals and seek to realize our values within a framework of belief that assumes an ongoing humanity. Remove that framework of belief, and our confidence in our values and purposes begins to erode. There is also a lesson here for those who think that unless there is a personal afterlife, their lives lack any meaning or purpose. What is necessary to underwrite the perceived significance of what we do, it seems, is not a belief in the afterlife but rather a belief that humanity will survive, at least for a good long time. But will humanity survive for a good long time? Although we normally assume that others will live on after we ourselves have died, we also know that there are serious threats to humanity’s survival. Not all of these threats are human-made, but some of the most pressing certainly are, like those posed by climate change and nuclear proliferation. People who worry about these problems often urge us to remember our obligations to future generations, whose fate depends so heavily on what we do today. We are obligated, they stress, not to make the earth uninhabitable or to degrade the environment in which our descendants will live. I agree. But there is also another side to the story. Yes, our descendants depend on us to make possible their existence and well-being. But we also depend on them and their existence if we are to lead flourishing lives ourselves. And so our reasons to overcome the threats to humanity’s survival do not derive solely from our obligations to our descendants. We have another reason to try to ensure a flourishing future for those who come after us: it is simply that, to an extent that we rarely recognize or acknowledge, they already matter so much to us.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>11. Threat of extinction destroys the value structures of life – the idea of value assumes there will be generations after us – their contention doesn’t <u>assume our impacts</h4><p></u><strong>Scheffler 13</strong> — (Samuel Scheffler, professor of philosophy and law at New York University, is the author of the forthcoming book “Death and the Afterlife, “The Importance of the Afterlife. Seriously.“, NYT Opinionator<u>, 9-21-2013, Available Online at https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/21/the-importance-of-the-afterlife-seriously/#more-149307, accessed 12-25-2018, HKR-AM)</p><p></u>My belief in life after death is more mundane. <u>What I believe is that other people will continue to live after I myself have died. You probably make the same assumption in your own case. Although <mark>we</mark> know that humanity won’t exist forever, most of us <mark>take it for granted that the human race will survive</mark>, at least for a while, after we ourselves are gone.</p><p></u>Because we take this belief for granted, <u>we don’t think much about its significance. </u>Yet I think that <u><mark>this</mark> belief <mark>plays an extremely important role</mark> in our lives, quietly but critically <mark>shaping our values</mark>, commitments and sense of what is worth doing. Astonishing though it may seem, there are ways in which the continuing existence of other people after our deaths — even that of complete strangers — matters more to us than does our own survival and that of our loved ones.</p><p></u>Consider a hypothetical scenario. <u>Suppose <mark>you knew that</mark> although you yourself would live a long life and die peacefully in your sleep, <mark>the earth</mark> and all its inhabitants <mark>would be destroyed 30 days after your death</mark> in a collision with a giant asteroid. How would this knowledge affect you?</p><p></u>If you are like me, and like most people with whom I have discussed the question, <u><mark>you would find</mark> <mark>this</mark> doomsday knowledge profoundly <mark>disturbing</mark>. <mark>And</mark> it might greatly <mark>affect your decisions</mark> about how to live. <mark>If you were a cancer researcher</mark>, you might be <mark>less motivated to continue your work</mark>. (It would be unlikely, after all, that a cure would be found in your lifetime, and even it were, how much good would it do in the time remaining?) <mark>Likewise if you were an engineer</mark> working to improve the seismic safety of bridges, <mark>or an activist</mark> trying to reform our political or social institutions or a carpenter who cared about building things to last. <mark>What difference would</mark> these <mark>endeavors make, if</mark> the <mark>destruction</mark> of the human race <mark>was imminent?</p><p></u></mark>If you were a novelist or playwright or composer, you might see little point in continuing to write or compose, since these creative activities are often undertaken with an imagined future audience or legacy in mind. And faced with the knowledge that humanity would cease to exist soon after your death, would you still be motivated to have children? Maybe not.</p><p>Notice that <u>people do not typically react with such a loss of purpose to the prospect of their own deaths. Of course, many people are terrified of dying. But even <mark>people who fear death</mark> (and even those who do not believe in a personal afterlife) <mark>remain confident of the value of their activities</mark> despite knowing that they will die someday. Thus there is a way in which the <mark>survival of other people</mark> after our deaths <mark>matters more</mark> to us <mark>than our own</mark> survival</u>.</p><p>The explanation for this may seem simple: if the earth will be destroyed 30 days after we die, then everyone we care about who is alive at that time will meet a sudden, violent end. Spouses and partners, children and grandchildren, friends and lovers: all would be doomed. Perhaps it is our concern for our loved ones that explains our horror at the prospect of a post-mortem catastrophe.</p><p>But I don’t think this is the full story. Consider another hypothetical scenario, drawn from P. D. James’s novel “The Children of Men.” In Ms. James’s novel, humanity has become infertile, with no recorded birth having occurred in over 25 years. Imagine that you found yourself living in such circumstances. Nobody now alive is younger than 25, and the disappearance of the human race is imminent as an aging population inexorably fades away. How would you react?</p><p>As in the case of the asteroidal collision, many activities would begin to seem pointless under these conditions: cancer research, seismic safety efforts, social and political activism and so on. Beyond that, as Ms. James’s novel vividly suggests, the onset of irreversible global infertility would be likely to produce widespread depression, anxiety and despair.</p><p>Some people would seek consolation in religious faith, and some would find it. Others would take what pleasure they could in activities that seemed intrinsically rewarding: listening to music, exploring the natural world, spending time with family and friends and enjoying the pleasures of food and drink. But even these activities might seem less fulfilling, and be tinged with sadness and pain, when set against the background of a dying humanity.</p><p>NOTICE that in this scenario, unlike that of the asteroidal collision, nobody would die prematurely. So<u> what is dismaying about the prospect of living in an infertile world cannot be that we are horrified by the demise of our loved ones. (They would die eventually, of course, but that is no different from our actual situation.) What is dismaying is simply that no new people would come into existence.</p><p></u>This should give us pause. The knowledge that we and everyone we know and love will someday die does not cause most of us to lose confidence in the value of our daily activities. But <u>the knowledge that no new people would come into existence would make many of those things seem pointless.</p><p></u>I think this shows that some widespread assumptions about human egoism are oversimplified at best. However self-interested or narcissistic we may be, <u>our capacity to find purpose and value in our lives depends on what we expect to happen to others after our deaths. Even the egotistic tycoon who is devoted to his own glory might discover that his ambitions seemed pointless if humanity’s disappearance was imminent. Although some people can afford not to depend on the kindness of strangers, virtually <mark>everyone depends on the future existence of strangers</mark>.</p><p></u>Similarly, I think that familiar assumptions about human individualism are oversimplified. <u>Even though we as individuals have diverse values and goals, and even though it is up to each of us to judge what we consider to be a good or worthy life, most of us pursue our goals and seek to realize our values within a framework of belief that assumes an ongoing humanity. Remove that framework of belief, and our confidence in our values and purposes begins to erode.</p><p>There is also a lesson here for those who think that unless there is a personal afterlife, their lives lack any meaning or purpose. What is necessary to underwrite the perceived significance of what we do, it seems, is not a belief in the afterlife but rather a belief that humanity will survive, at least for a good long time.</p><p></u>But <u>will humanity survive for a good long time? Although we normally assume that others will live on after we ourselves have died, we also know that <mark>there are serious threats to humanity</mark>’s survival. Not all of these threats are human-made, but some of the most pressing certainly are, like those posed by climate change and nuclear proliferation. People who worry about these problems often urge us to remember our obligations to future generations, whose fate depends so heavily on what we do today. We are obligated, they stress, not to make the earth uninhabitable or to degrade the environment in which our descendants will live.</p><p></u>I agree. <u>But there is also another side to the story. Yes, <mark>our descendants depend on us to make possible their existence</mark> and well-being. <mark>But we also depend on them</mark> and their existence if we are <mark>to lead flourishing lives</mark> ourselves. And so our <mark>reason</mark>s<mark> to overcome the threats to humanity’s survival</mark> do not derive solely from our obligations to our descendants. We have another reason to try to ensure a flourishing future for those who come after us: it is simply that, to an extent that we rarely recognize or acknowledge, they already matter so much to us</u>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Drury 17 – journalist for VICE, citing Ian Shield, associate lecturer in international relations at Anglia Ruskin University, Vladimir Zhirinovsky who is a Russian lawmaker, Keri Giles, associate fellow with the UK foreign-policy think tank Chatham House, a RAND study (Colin, “What Would Happen if Russia and Europe Went to War?,” VICE, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4xe5a3/what-would-happen-if-russia-and-europe-went-to-war) fulltext: But peace is not inevitable. If you think Europe can't descend into a bar fight like drunks at closing time again, know you're not the first to believe it. Some people dreamed something similar during the Concert of Europe—a system put in place to uphold the balance of power in the mid-19th century—and again in the four decades of calm that followed the 1870–71 Franco-Prussian conflict. The second period ended with WWI. So they misjudged that. Could we also have misjudged the proximity of mass conflict in the 21st century? Some say so. Security experts are increasingly investigating scenarios where a stronger Russia on one side and Europe's NATO allies on the other go from diplomatic tensions to full on slapping each other. This, they stress, is unlikely. But if global events have taught us anything, it's that unlikely doesn't mean impossible. In fact, the above could happen in three simple steps. One: Donald Trump makes good on his hints and pulls the US out of NATO. Two: An emboldened Vladimir Putin decides to help himself to the Baltic states—Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia—he has long believed should be part of Russia. Three: Given these states have been NATO members since 2004, the rest of the alliance—the UK, Germany, France, and others—go to their aid. The result? "Hiroshimas and Nagasakis everywhere," reckoned the Russian lawmaker Vladimir Zhirinovsky when discussing the possibility last year. So that's not ideal. But could Russia and Europe really go to war? And if they did, how would that work out? Be warned: As Keir Giles, associate fellow with the UK foreign-policy think tank Chatham House, that is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization based in London tells me, "There's not much good news." WATCH: The Special Ops Olympics—War Games 1. Tensions Rise Tensions between Russia and Europe are always high. Even so, the present unease is ominous. On one hand, Russia has been holding major nuclear drills for 40 million citizens, sending submarines into the territorial waters of other nations and running mock bombing missions on the edge of British airspace. Forcibly annexing part of another country, This behavior isn't generally viewed as good neighborliness, either. Yet NATO isn't entirely averse to mucking things up. The alliance has almost 10,000 troops in countries that border Russia, while a two-week war game featuring thousands of personnel and 50 aircrafts is being held in Scotland right now. The enemy state in such rehearsals is often given a somewhat unambiguous name: the Reds. 2. The Flash Point It's not wildly anti-Russian to say the current administration favors the countries that border the Baltic Sea—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Putin believes these former Soviet states should never have become independent: Each has a large Russian population and strategically excellent sea ports. He's certainly not keen on them being NATO members and sees the alliance—not without rationale—as encircling Russia. "If you compress a spring," he warned in 2014, "eventually it will snap back." With America gone, that snap back could happen instantly. "They would move on the Baltic states more or less immediately," says Giles, who is also director of the Conflict Studies Research Center in Oxfordshire. "Putin believes Russian security requires the Baltic states under its domain. But you need to look further. It's hard to put a definitive border on how far ambitious Russians think the frontier should expand. But certainly you're looking at Poland and Finland too." 3. Internet Down! Shots Fired! Photo by Sean MacEntee via Flickr In 2015, a study by research institute the RAND Corporation concluded it would take just 60 hours for Russia to overrun Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Giles, however, believes the signs would be there sometime in advance. "There would be a noticeable rise in Russian diplomacy and media focusing on issues that could give rationale for an armed intervention," he says. On some pretense, such as a peacekeeping mission, thousands of troops would gather on the border. In the days before any invasion or attack, the target's internet would be shut down or disrupted by specialist telecommunications soldiers. Power supplies would fail, and ATMs would stop functioning. Cellphones and TV signals would be jammed. Perhaps most ominously, personalized texts would be sent direct to opposition officials, soldiers, and citizens, creating confusion and panic. In some cases, these texts would appear to come from someone already in the recipient's phone book. "In the right circumstances, this could be enough," says Giles. "Russia doesn't need to roll tanks across a border. They can stage an attack without a military presence. Misinformation and civil disorder could lead to regime change with a client government of Moscow taking charge. That would meet Russia's security and economic objectives." And if no such regime change happened? Think hybrid warfare: all the above combined with the sudden movement of troops into the country. "We don't know how exactly an occupation would look, but Russia does practice this scenario," says Giles. "What we do know is it would be over pretty swiftly." 4. NATO: Fight or Fall Once diplomacy fails, the hard fact is that a US-less NATO almost certainly doesn't have the firepower to win a war with Russia. We'll ignore nuclear weapons for now and keep things conventional. Russia has more men (the reserves alone are 2.5 million strong) and hardware. As a single country, its chain of command is better streamlined. Soldiers are battle-hardened from Ukraine and Syria. After a decade of $40 billion-a-year military upgrades, its weaponry—such as the Pantsir-S1, a tank that can literally destroy cruise missiles—is superior too. It's also possible some NATO members would withdraw—in particular Turkey, given the warm relationship between President Putin and President Recep Erdoğan. That's 600,000 men—the second-biggest contingent after the US—gone. The result would be the last of NATO facing an existential decision: Fight and probably lose, or, in this scenario, cut the Baltic states loose. Or, as Ian Shield, associate lecturer in international relations at Anglia Ruskin University, puts it: "The choice would be between reneging on the treaty—which would certainly lead to the disintegration of NATO and probably, by extension, the whole European order—or participating in a cataclysmic war extending up to nuclear weapons." Rock and a hard place, basically. 5. War on the Ground Ballistic short range missiles. Photo via Wikimedia Let's carry on gaming, though, and say NATO engages Russia. How does that go? Not well for either side, says Shields: "On any battlefield, there would be annihilation—although these wouldn't be battlefields like we have previously known. Missiles and artillery have far greater range and precision, meaning enemy posts, infrastructure, armories, and even entire towns could be destroyed from within home territory. What you have is fewer individual battles but far greater destruction. If neither side backed down, entire swathes of Europe—it's impossible to know where—would be reduced to rubble. The death tolls would be unimaginable." Britain wouldn't be safe; the English Channel has become a hopelessly outdated moat. "Russian aircrafts wouldn't need to even enter British airspace," says Shields. "They could land precision strikes from well outside." Both sides would wrestle for control of the seas around Scandinavia. Cyber attacks, meanwhile, could shut down transport infrastructure, hospitals, media, and utilities. Russia's main advantage amid the carnage would be two-fold. First, because it has more weaponry and men, it can, essentially, keep blasting away longer. Second, its sheer landmass means it could better absorb the devastation: NATO could wipe out every single structure hundreds of miles into its adversary's territory, and Moscow wouldn't even be scratched. 6. Going Nuclear As any history student knows, it doesn't matter if you have 7,000 nuclear weapons (Russia) or 200 (Britain and France); their cataclysmic qualities level things up. The thought goes that the pressing of the red button means MAD: mutually assured destruction. If one side starts throwing warheads about, the other responds in kind. Both adversaries are wiped out. Right? Wrong. "What Russia has in its arsenal that the West doesn't is tactical nuclear weapons," explains Giles. "These are not big city-leveling nukes, but ones that can destroy battlefields or neighborhoods. The West had these weapons but got rid of them. So its only response to a tactical nuclear strike would be a full nuclear attack. Which is self-defeating because it would also ensure their own destruction. The West is missing several rungs on the escalation ladder that Russia has built into its strategy." Nonetheless, once things go nuclear, it all becomes unpredictable: cities wiped out, millions dead. At this point, even the most advanced strategists tend to stop plotting possible paths. 7. But Cheer Up If the US leaving NATO is a gateway to Armageddon, the good news is it seems increasingly unlikely. Trump probably won't ditch the alliance. That's because it doesn't only keep the US secure; it's also politically and economically advantageous. It gives Washington influence in Europe and protects a vast and prosperous continent that—and this is important—spends much of its wealth with American companies. That said, maybe it's still worth remembering peace here really does hang by threads. Maybe go out and play more.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>EU-Russia war <u>escalates</u> and goes <u>nuclear</u> </h4><p><strong>Drury 17</strong> – journalist for VICE, citing Ian Shield, associate lecturer in international relations at Anglia Ruskin University, Vladimir Zhirinovsky who is a Russian lawmaker, Keri Giles, associate fellow with the UK foreign-policy think tank Chatham House, a RAND study (Colin, “What Would Happen if Russia and Europe Went to War?,” VICE, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4xe5a3/what-would-happen-if-russia-and-europe-went-to-war)</p><p>But peace is not inevitable. If you think Europe can't descend into a bar fight like drunks at closing time again, know you're not the first to believe it. Some people dreamed something similar during the Concert of Europe—a system put in place to uphold the balance of power in the mid-19th century—and again in the four decades of calm that followed the 1870–71 Franco-Prussian conflict. The second period ended with WWI. So they misjudged that. Could we also have misjudged the proximity of mass conflict in the 21st century? Some say so. Security experts are increasingly investigating scenarios where a stronger Russia on one side and Europe's NATO allies on the other go from diplomatic tensions to full on slapping each other. This, they stress, is unlikely. But if global events have taught us anything, it's that unlikely doesn't mean impossible. In fact, the above could happen in three simple steps. One: Donald Trump makes good on his hints and pulls the US out of NATO. Two: An emboldened Vladimir <u><mark>Putin decides to help himself to the Baltic states</u></mark>—Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia—<u>he has long believed should be part</u> of Russia. Three: <u>Given these states have been NATO members since 2004, the rest of the alliance—the UK<mark>, Germany, France</mark>, and others—<mark>go to their aid</u></mark>. <u>The result? "<strong><mark>Hiroshimas and Nagasakis everywhere</u></strong></mark>," reckoned the Russian lawmaker Vladimir Zhirinovsky when discussing the possibility last year. So that's not ideal. But could Russia and Europe really go to war? And if they did, how would that work out? Be warned: As Keir Giles, associate fellow with the UK foreign-policy think tank Chatham House, that is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization based in London tells me, "There's not much good news." WATCH: The Special Ops Olympics—War Games 1. Tensions Rise <u>Tensions between Russia and Europe are always high. Even so, the present unease is ominous.</u> On one hand, <u><mark>Russia has been</mark> <mark>holding</mark> <mark>major</mark> <mark>nuclear</mark> <mark>drills for 40 million</mark> citizens, <mark>sending submarines</mark> <mark>into</mark> <mark>the territorial waters</mark> of other nations <mark>and running mock bombing missions</mark> on the edge of British airspace</u>. <u>Forcibly annexing part of another country, This behavior isn't generally viewed as good neighborliness</u>, either. Yet NATO isn't entirely averse to mucking things up. The alliance has almost 10,000 troops in countries that border Russia, while a two-week war game featuring thousands of personnel and 50 aircrafts is being held in Scotland right now. The enemy state in such rehearsals is often given a somewhat unambiguous name: the Reds. 2. The Flash Point It's not wildly anti-Russian to say the current administration favors the countries that border the Baltic Sea—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Putin believes these former Soviet states should never have become independent: Each has a large Russian population and strategically excellent sea ports. He's certainly not keen on them being NATO members and sees the alliance—not without rationale—as encircling Russia. "If you compress a spring," he warned in 2014, "eventually it will snap back." With America gone, that snap back could happen instantly. "They would move on the Baltic states more or less immediately," says Giles, who is also director of the Conflict Studies Research Center in Oxfordshire. "Putin believes Russian security requires the Baltic states under its domain. But you need to look further. It's hard to put a definitive border on how far <u>ambitious Russians think the frontier should expand. But certainly you're looking at Poland and Finland too</u>." 3. Internet Down! Shots Fired! Photo by Sean MacEntee via Flickr In 2015, a study by research institute the RAND Corporation concluded <u><mark>it would take</mark> just <mark>60 hours for Russia to overrun Lithuania</u></mark>, Latvia, and Estonia. Giles, however, believes the signs would be there sometime in advance. "<u><mark>There would</mark> <mark>be</mark> a noticeable rise in Russian <mark>diplomacy and</mark> <mark>media focus</mark>ing on issues <mark>that could give rationale for an armed intervention</mark>,"</u> he says. <u>On some pretense, <mark>such as</mark> a <mark>peacekeeping</mark> mission, thousands of <mark>troops would gather</mark> on the border</u>. In the days before any invasion or attack, <u>the target's <mark>internet would be shut down</u></mark> or disrupted by specialist telecommunications soldiers. Power supplies would fail, and ATMs would stop functioning. Cellphones and TV signals would be jammed. Perhaps most ominously, <u>personalized <mark>texts would be sent</mark> direct <mark>to opposition officials</mark>, soldiers, and citizens, creating confusion</u> and panic. In some cases, these texts would appear to come from someone already in the recipient's phone book. "In the right circumstances, this could be enough," says Giles. "Russia doesn't need to roll tanks across a border. They can stage an attack without a military presence. <u><mark>Misinformation and civil disorder could lead to regime change with a client government</mark> of Moscow <mark>taking</mark> <mark>charge</u></mark>. That would meet Russia's security and economic objectives." And if no such regime change happened? Think hybrid warfare: all the above combined with the sudden movement of troops into the country. "We don't know how exactly an occupation would look, but <u><strong><mark>Russia does practice</mark> this scenario</u></strong>," says Giles. "What we do know is it would be over pretty swiftly." 4. NATO: Fight or Fall <u>Once diplomacy fails, the hard fact is that a US-less NATO almost certainly doesn't have the firepower to win a war with Russia</u>. We'll ignore nuclear weapons for now and keep things conventional. Russia has more men (the reserves alone are 2.5 million strong) and hardware. As a single country, its chain of command is better streamlined. Soldiers are battle-hardened from Ukraine and Syria. After a decade of $40 billion-a-year military upgrades, its weaponry—such as the Pantsir-S1, a tank that can literally destroy cruise missiles—is superior too. <u>It's also possible some NATO members would withdraw</u>—in particular Turkey, given the warm relationship between President Putin and President Recep Erdoğan. That's 600,000 men—the second-biggest contingent after the US—gone. <u>The result would be the last of NATO facing an existential decision: Fight and probably lose, or, in this scenario, cut the Baltic states loose</u>. Or, as Ian Shield, associate lecturer in international relations at Anglia Ruskin University, puts it: "<u>The choice would be between reneging on the treaty—which would certainly lead to the disintegration of NATO and probably, by extension, the whole European order</u>—or participating in a cataclysmic war extending up to nuclear weapons." Rock and a hard place, basically. 5. War on the Ground Ballistic short range missiles. Photo via Wikimedia Let's carry on gaming, though, and say NATO engages Russia. How does that go? Not well for either side, says Shields: "On any battlefield, <u>there would be annihilation</u>—although these wouldn't be battlefields like we have previously known. Missiles and artillery have far greater range and precision, meaning enemy posts, infrastructure, armories, and even entire towns could be destroyed from within home territory. What you have is fewer individual battles but far greater destruction. If neither side backed down, <u>entire swathes of <mark>Europe</u></mark>—it's impossible to know where—<u><mark>would be reduced</mark> to rubble. The <mark>death</mark> tolls <mark>would be unimaginable</u></mark>." <u>Britain wouldn't be safe</u>; the English Channel has become a hopelessly outdated moat. "Russian aircrafts wouldn't need to even enter British airspace," says Shields. "They could land precision strikes from well outside." <u>Both sides would wrestle for control of the seas around Scandinavia. <mark>Cyber attacks</mark>, meanwhile, <mark>could shut down</mark> transport <mark>infrastructure</mark>, <mark>hospitals</mark>, <mark>media, and utilities</u></mark>. Russia's main advantage amid the carnage would be two-fold. First, because it has more weaponry and men, it can, essentially, keep blasting away longer. Second, its sheer landmass means it could better absorb the devastation: NATO could wipe out every single structure hundreds of miles into its adversary's territory, and Moscow wouldn't even be scratched. 6. Going Nuclear As any history student knows, it doesn't matter if you have 7,000 nuclear weapons (Russia) or 200 (Britain and France); their cataclysmic qualities level things up. The thought goes that the pressing of the red button means MAD: mutually assured destruction. <u>If one side starts throwing warheads about, the other responds in kind</u>. Both adversaries are wiped out. Right? Wrong. "What Russia has in its arsenal that the West doesn't is tactical nuclear weapons," explains Giles. "These are not big city-leveling nukes, but ones that can destroy battlefields or neighborhoods. The West had these weapons but got rid of them. So its only response to a tactical nuclear strike would be a full nuclear attack. Which is self-defeating because it would also ensure their own destruction. The West is missing several rungs on the escalation ladder that Russia has built into its strategy." Nonetheless, <u>once <mark>things go nuclear</mark>, it all becomes unpredictable: <mark>cities wiped out, millions dead</mark>. At this point, even the most advanced strategists tend to stop plotting possible paths</u>. 7. But Cheer Up If <u><strong>the US leaving NATO is a gateway to Armageddon</u></strong>, the good news is it seems increasingly unlikely. Trump probably won't ditch the alliance. That's because it doesn't only keep the US secure; it's also politically and economically advantageous. It gives Washington influence in Europe and protects a vast and prosperous continent that—and this is important—spends much of its wealth with American companies. That said, maybe <u><strong>it's still worth remembering <mark>peace</mark> here <mark>really does hang by threads</u></strong></mark>. Maybe go out and play more.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Ezell and Cory 19 (Stephen Ezell – Global Innovation Policy Vice President and Nigel Cory – Information Technology and Innovation Foundation Trade Policy Associate Director, April 25, 2019, “The Way Forward for Intellectual Property Internationally”, https://itif.org/publications/2019/04/25/way-forward-intellectual-property-internationally, accessed 8/30/21, DL) fulltext: Innovation represents the creation of new value for the world, whether that “value” is created through new technologies, new business models, new products and services, or new forms of social entrepreneurship. Innovation should be at the top of policymakers’ agenda, as it is the principal driver of both long-term economic growth and improvements in quality of life. For instance, the U.S. Department of Commerce reported in 2010 that technological innovation can be linked to three-quarters of the U.S. growth rate since the end of World War II.1 Similarly, two-thirds of United Kingdom private-sector productivity growth between 2000 and 2007 resulted from innovation.2 Intellectual property plays a key role in driving innovation and economic growth.3 Everywhere we go, we are surrounded by intellectual property. Trademarks signal the origin of products to consumers. Designs specify how products look. Copyrights enable artistic creations, such as books, music, paintings, photos, and films. Patents protect technical inventions in all fields of technology. Intellectual property’s role has evolved into a force that influences a wide swath of demand and sectors, making it an increasingly influential framework condition that affects not only innovation, but also trade, competition, taxes, and other areas.4 The reality is intellectual property is mainstream and pervasive. In today’s economy, the generation and management of knowledge plays a predominant role in wealth creation, particularly when compared with traditional factors of production such as land, labor, and capital.5 IP plays a key role in driving innovation and economic growth. Intellectual property represents the main value component of many trade transactions.6 Indeed, global trade flows are increasingly dominated by knowledge-intensive goods and services, which are growing faster than capital- and labor-intensive flows.7 Global cross-border exports of commercial knowledge- and technology-intensive goods and services reached an estimated $4 trillion in 2014, consisting of $1.6 trillion of commercial knowledge-intensive services and $2.4 trillion of exports of high-tech products.8 In fact, knowledge—rather than labor, capital, or resource-intensive components—represents about one-half of current global trade flows; and this knowledge-intensive component is growing faster, at about 1.3 times the rate of labor-intensive flows.9 This is partly due to the rise of knowledge-intensive business services—such as computer-related services (e.g., software and information processing), research and development (R&D) services, and business services (e.g., legal, accounting, and advertising)—which provide critical intermediate inputs into other economic activity. Research estimates that while services account for just 20 percent of gross exports worldwide, the share more than doubles to 41 percent when considering value-added exports.10 Although developed economies as a group dominate knowledge-intensive flows, developing countries’ share is growing rapidly. China’s knowledge-intensive flows are the world’s second largest.11 Indicative of a broadening distribution, a recent European Commission (EC) and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report into intellectual property and the world’s top 2,000 companies by R&D spending showed these companies’ headquarters were distributed across 44 countries, while their subsidiaries were spread across more than 100 countries.12 While multinationals may only represent one source of R&D investment, the broader trend is evident as emerging economies’ world share of R&D expenditure increased from 12 percent in 1992 to 26 percent in 2010. Furthermore, as a common measure of innovative activity, patent applications filed by the residents of emerging economies at their national offices grew by 10.4 percent annually from 1992 to 2011, compared with 2.3 percent growth for OECD countries.13 In 2015, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) reported that IP offices in Asia received the bulk of world IP filings (for industrial designs, patents, trademarks, and utility models).14 In China alone, the number of patents increased from 600,000 in 2010 to almost 1.5 million in 2014, while the country also has the most active trademarks in the world and one-third of the world’s industrial design registrations. In 2015, for the second consecutive year, Huawei Technologies of China was the top Patent Cooperation Treaty applicant, with 3,898 applications published.15 IP represents the main value component of many trade transactions. Flows of knowledge and technology lie at the center of new networks driving production and innovation, notably with regard to global value chains (GVCs) and global innovation networks (GINs). GVCs refer to how companies move “material” goods and services (both final and intermediate) across borders. GINs represent how companies transfer intangibles and immaterial assets between countries. Of the two, GVCs are more prevalent and sophisticated as they reflect the trend of companies establishing international production and distribution networks for physical goods, while GINs relate to the more recent trend of firms developing and deploying intangible goods and R&D alongside these production networks, or elsewhere as part of dispersed, specialized global operations. The rise of GVCs and GINs reflects how technology and globalization have allowed businesses to change how they structure and manage their design, production, marketing, customer support, and other processes in order to optimize their competitiveness and innovation. GINs are emerging as companies seek to leverage foreign knowledge, technology, and human capital by establishing international R&D facilities and local collaborative partnerships and networks.16 This not only reflects a change in how companies structure their own R&D, but in how they pursue innovation, as many companies open up their processes to greater collaboration and engagement with outside partners.17 Chemicals, electronics, business services, and wholesale and retail trade are some of the sectors most actively pursuing co-inventions and GINs. Companies in these and other sectors are establishing new interdisciplinary and cross-sectoral arrangements with suppliers, customers, universities, and government institutions. Indicative of GINs is the rise of international co-inventions. The number of international co-inventions (wherein patents are filed in multiple countries under the Patent Cooperation Treaty) has increased from fewer than 2,000 in 1995 to 12,000 in 2013.18 While North America and Europe are home to many of these collaborations, a growing share come from Asia. Asia’s intra-regional and extra-regional co-inventions have both increased as these countries invest more in science, technology, and innovation, and as more European and American companies establish research and production networks throughout the region. Given the global nature of these networks, multinational corporations play a key role in driving this type of international innovation, although they are not the sole driver.19 While GVCs and GINs represent relatively new constructs, there is early evidence they will be central to future deliberations around trade and innovation policy. World Bank modeling shows a strong and positive correlation between bilateral trade and co-invention, suggesting interdependence between GVCs and GINs at the country level.20 The inverse also holds true in that having no trade relationship with a partner country strongly decreases the propensity and extent of co-invention with that country. Furthermore, in contrast to previous research, the results indicate co-invention is more likely the larger the technological gap between trade partners, as less-innovative countries purposely set up links with stronger partners in order to access knowledge. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDERPINS INNOVATION AND GROWTH Intellectual property rights arrangements are well recognized, going back to the Middle Ages, as enabling innovators to earn the returns necessary to continue to innovate and promote the availability of leading-edge technologies. Nobel laureate economist Douglas North, one of the foremost scholars of economic history, argues that the introduction of intellectual property rights had one of the most profound impacts on spurring economic growth in human history. North points out that average global economic growth rates for about one and a half millennia prior to the Industrial Revolution were essentially zero. Eighteenth-century elites in England had practically the same per capita income as their counterparts in third-century Rome.21 North has shown that the inflection point toward greater economic growth was the widespread development of patent systems in the 19th century.22 Gregory Clark, in his seminal book, Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World, reached a similar conclusion that the introduction of IPRs was catalytic to turbo-charging global economic growth.23 Robust intellectual property rights spur innovative activity by increasing the appropriability of the returns to innovation, enabling innovators to capture enough of the benefits of their own innovative activity to justify taking considerable risks. By raising the private rate of return closer to the social rate of return, intellectual property rights address the knowledge-asset incentive problem, allowing inventors to realize economic gain from their inventions, thereby catalyzing investment in knowledge creation. If innovators know that most of the benefits from their innovations would go to others without compensation, they would be much less likely and capable of engaging in future innovations. In addition, as they capture a larger portion of the benefits of their innovative activity, innovating companies obtain the resources to pursue the next generation of innovative activities. IP thus produces a number of positive benefits, including: 1) creating powerful incentives for domestic innovation; 2) inducing knowledge spillovers that help others to innovate; 3) ensuring a country’s companies can focus on operating productively and innovating, instead of having to devote an undue amount of their time and resources to protecting their IP in an environment where it’s at risk; 4) promoting the international diffusion of technology, innovation, and knowhow; and 5) boosting a country’s levels of research and development, inbound foreign direct investment (FDI), and exports of goods and services.24 Robust intellectual property rights spur innovative activity by increasing the appropriability of the returns to innovation, enabling innovators to capture enough of the benefits of their own innovative activity to justify taking considerable risks. The evidence shows that strong intellectual property rights protections are vitally important for both developed and developing countries alike. As the definitive 2010 OECD review of the effects of intellectual property rights protections on developing countries, “Policy Complements to the Strengthening of IPRs in Developing Countries” found, “The results point to a tendency for IPR reform to deliver positive economic results.”25 The OECD study found that developing-country IPR reforms concerning patent protection have tended to deliver the most substantial results, although the results for copyright reform and trademark reform are also positive and significant. But to have the greatest impact on economic growth, IPR reforms must occur concomitantly with other positive complements, particularly ones regarding inputs for innovative and productive processes and the ability to conduct business. These include policies that influence the macro-environment for firms as well as the availability of resources (e.g., related to education), a country’s legal and institutional conditions, and fiscal incentives.26 The evidence shows that strong intellectual property rights protections are vitally important for both developed and developing countries alike. The following section details the broad swath of academic literature reviewing the relationships between IPR strengthening and trade, FDI, and technology transfer; IPR reform and innovation and R&D; and IPR reform and exports and industry growth, revealing the benefits of stronger IPR protections for developed and developing countries alike. IPRs Strengthen Trade, FDI, and Technology Transfer A wealth of academic research has documented the relationship between the strength of a country’s intellectual property protections and the extent of trade, foreign direct investment, and technology transfer it enjoys.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>strong ip laws are key to growth</h4><p><strong>Ezell and Cory 19</strong> (Stephen Ezell – Global Innovation Policy Vice President and Nigel Cory – Information Technology and Innovation Foundation Trade Policy <u>Associate Director, April 25, 2019, “The Way Forward for Intellectual Property Internationally”, https://itif.org/publications/2019/04/25/way-forward-intellectual-property-internationally, accessed 8/30/21, DL)</p><p></u>Innovation represents the creation of new value for the world, whether that “value” is created through new technologies, new business models, new products and services, or new forms of social entrepreneurship. <u><mark>Innovation</mark> should be at the <strong>top</strong> of policymakers’ agenda, as it <mark>is the <strong>principal driver</strong> of</mark> both long-term <mark>economic growth and improvements in quality of life</mark>.</u> For instance, <u>the U.S. Department of Commerce reported in 2010 that <strong><mark>tech</strong></mark>nological <mark>innovation can be linked to <strong>three-quarters</strong> of</mark> the U.S. <mark>growth</mark> rate</u> since the end of World War II.1 Similarly, <u>two-thirds of United Kingdom private-sector productivity growth between 2000 and 2007 resulted from innovation.</u>2 <u><strong><mark>I</strong></mark>ntellectual <strong><mark>p</strong></mark>roperty <mark>plays a <strong>key role</strong></mark> in driving innovation and economic growth.</u>3 Everywhere we go, <u>we are surrounded by intellectual property.</u> Trademarks signal the origin of products to consumers. Designs specify how products look. Copyrights enable artistic creations, such as books, music, paintings, photos, and films. <u>Patents protect technical inventions in all fields of technology. Intellectual property’s role has evolved into a force <mark>that influences a wide swath </mark>of demand and <mark>sectors, making it an increasingly influential <strong>framework condition</strong> that affects</mark> not only innovation, but also trade, <mark>competition</mark>, taxes, and other areas.</u>4 <u>The reality is intellectual property is mainstream and pervasive.</u> In today’s economy, <u>the generation and management of knowledge plays a predominant role in wealth creation, particularly when compared with traditional factors of production such as land, labor, and capital.</u>5 IP plays a key role in driving innovation and economic growth. <u><strong>I</strong>ntellectual <strong>p</strong>roperty represents the <strong>main value component</strong> of many trade transactions.</u>6 Indeed, <u>global <mark>trade flows are <strong>increasingly dominated</strong> by knowledge</mark>-intensive goods and services, which are <mark>growing faster than capital- and labor</mark>-intensive flows.</u>7 <u>Global cross-border exports of commercial knowledge- and technology-intensive goods and services reached an estimated $4 trillion</u> in 2014, consisting of $1.6 trillion of commercial knowledge-intensive services and $2.4 trillion of exports of high-tech products.8 In fact, <u>knowledge</u>—rather than labor, capital, or resource-intensive components—<u>represents about one-half of current global trade flows; and</u> this knowledge-intensive component <u>is growing faster, at about 1.3 times the rate of labor-intensive flows.</u>9 This is partly due to the rise of knowledge-intensive business services—such as computer-related services (e.g., software and information processing), research and development (R&D) services, and business services (e.g., legal, accounting, and advertising)—which provide critical intermediate inputs into other economic activity. Research estimates that while services account for just 20 percent of gross exports worldwide, the share more than doubles to 41 percent when considering value-added exports.10 Although developed economies as a group dominate knowledge-intensive flows, developing countries’ share is growing rapidly. China’s knowledge-intensive flows are the world’s second largest.11 Indicative of a broadening distribution, a recent European Commission (EC) and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report into intellectual property and the world’s top 2,000 companies by R&D spending showed these companies’ headquarters were distributed across 44 countries, while their subsidiaries were spread across more than 100 countries.12 While multinationals may only represent one source of R&D investment, the broader trend is evident as emerging economies’ world share of R&D expenditure increased from 12 percent in 1992 to 26 percent in 2010. Furthermore, as a common measure of innovative activity, patent applications filed by the residents of emerging economies at their national offices grew by 10.4 percent annually from 1992 to 2011, compared with 2.3 percent growth for OECD countries.13 In 2015, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) reported that IP offices in Asia received the bulk of world IP filings (for industrial designs, patents, trademarks, and utility models).14 In China alone, the number of patents increased from 600,000 in 2010 to almost 1.5 million in 2014, while the country also has the most active trademarks in the world and one-third of the world’s industrial design registrations. In 2015, for the second consecutive year, Huawei Technologies of China was the top Patent Cooperation Treaty applicant, with 3,898 applications published.15 IP represents the main value component of many trade transactions. <u><mark>Flows of knowledge and <strong>tech</strong></mark>nology lie <mark>at the center of</mark> new networks driving production and innovation, notably with regard to <mark>global value chains</u></mark> (GVCs) <u><mark>and</mark> global <mark>innovation networks</u></mark> (GINs). GVCs refer to how companies move “material” goods and services (both final and intermediate) across borders. GINs represent how companies transfer intangibles and immaterial assets between countries. Of the two, GVCs are more prevalent and sophisticated as they reflect the trend of companies establishing international production and distribution networks for physical goods, while GINs relate to the more recent trend of firms developing and deploying intangible goods and R&D alongside these production networks, or elsewhere as part of dispersed, specialized global operations. <u>The rise of GVCs and GINs reflects how technology and globalization have allowed businesses to change how they structure and manage their design, production, marketing, customer support, and other processes in order to optimize their competitiveness and innovation. </u>GINs are emerging as companies seek to leverage foreign knowledge, technology, and human capital by establishing international R&D facilities and local collaborative partnerships and networks.16 This not only reflects a change in how companies structure their own R&D, but in how they pursue innovation, as many companies open up their processes to greater collaboration and engagement with outside partners.17 Chemicals, electronics, business services, and wholesale and retail trade are some of the sectors most actively pursuing co-inventions and GINs. Companies in these and other sectors are establishing new interdisciplinary and cross-sectoral arrangements with suppliers, customers, universities, and government institutions. <u>Indicative of GINs is the rise of international co-inventions.</u> The number of international co-inventions (wherein patents are filed in multiple countries under the Patent Cooperation Treaty) has increased from fewer than 2,000 in 1995 to 12,000 in 2013.18 While North America and Europe are home to many of these collaborations, a growing share come from Asia. Asia’s intra-regional and extra-regional co-inventions have both increased as these countries invest more in science, technology, and innovation, and as more European and American companies establish research and production networks throughout the region. Given the global nature of these networks, multinational corporations play a key role in driving this type of international innovation, although they are not the sole driver.19 While GVCs and GINs represent relatively new constructs, there is early evidence they will be central to future deliberations around trade and innovation policy. World Bank modeling shows a strong and positive correlation between bilateral trade and co-invention, suggesting interdependence between GVCs and GINs at the country level.20 The inverse also holds true in that having no trade relationship with a partner country strongly decreases the propensity and extent of co-invention with that country. Furthermore, in contrast to previous research, the results indicate co-invention is more likely the larger the technological gap between trade partners, as less-innovative countries purposely set up links with stronger partners in order to access knowledge. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDERPINS INNOVATION AND GROWTH <u>Intellectual property rights arrangements are well recognized</u>, going back to the Middle Ages, as enabling innovators to earn the returns necessary to continue to innovate and promote the availability of leading-edge technologies. <u>Nobel laureate economist Douglas North</u>, one of the foremost scholars of economic history, <u>argues</u> that <u>the introduction of intellectual property rights had one of the most profound impacts on spurring economic growth in human history. North points out that average global economic growth rates for about one and a half millennia prior to the Industrial Revolution were essentially <strong>zero</strong>.</u> Eighteenth-century elites in England had practically the same per capita income as their counterparts in third-century Rome.21 North has shown that the inflection point toward greater economic growth was the widespread development of patent systems in the 19th century.22 <u>Gregory Clark</u>, in his seminal book, Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World, <u>reached a similar conclusion that</u> the introduction of <u>IPRs was catalytic to <strong><mark>turbo-charging</strong> <strong>global economic growth</strong></mark>.</u>23 <u>Robust intellectual property rights spur innovative activity by increasing the appropriability of the returns to innovation, enabling innovators to capture enough of the benefits of their own innovative activity to justify taking considerable risks.</u> By raising the private rate of return closer to the social rate of return, intellectual property rights address the knowledge-asset incentive problem, allowing inventors to realize economic gain from their inventions, thereby catalyzing investment in knowledge creation. If innovators know that most of the benefits from their innovations would go to others without compensation, they would be much less likely and capable of engaging in future innovations. In addition, as they capture a larger portion of the benefits of their innovative activity, innovating companies obtain the resources to pursue the next generation of innovative activities. <u><mark>IP</mark> thus <mark>produces</mark> a number of positive benefits, including: 1) creating <strong><mark>powerful incentives</strong> for domestic innovation</mark>; 2) inducing <mark>knowledge spillovers</mark> that help others to innovate; 3) ensuring a country’s companies can focus on operating productively and innovating, instead of having to devote an undue amount of their time and resources to protecting their IP in an environment where it’s at risk; 4) promoting the international <mark>diffusion of <strong>tech</strong></mark>nology, innovation, and knowhow; and 5) boosting a country’s levels of research and development, inbound foreign direct investment (<mark>FDI</mark>), <mark>and exports</mark> of goods and services.</u>24<u> </u>Robust intellectual property rights spur innovative activity by increasing the appropriability of the returns to innovation, enabling innovators to capture enough of the benefits of their own innovative activity to justify taking considerable risks. The <u>evidence shows that strong intellectual property rights protections are vitally important for both developed and developing countries alike.</u> As the definitive 2010 OECD review of the effects of intellectual property rights protections on developing countries, “Policy Complements to the Strengthening of IPRs in Developing Countries” found, “The results point to a tendency for IPR reform to deliver positive economic results.”25 The OECD study found that developing-country IPR reforms concerning patent protection have tended to deliver the most substantial results, although the results for copyright reform and trademark reform are also positive and significant. But to have the greatest impact on economic growth, IPR reforms must occur concomitantly with other positive complements, particularly ones regarding inputs for innovative and productive processes and the ability to conduct business. These include policies that influence the macro-environment for firms as well as the availability of resources (e.g., related to education), a country’s legal and institutional conditions, and fiscal incentives.26 The evidence shows that strong intellectual property rights protections are vitally important for both developed and developing countries alike. The following section details <u><mark>the broad swath of academic literature</mark> reviewing the relationships between IPR strengthening and trade, FDI, and technology transfer; IPR reform and innovation and R&D; and IPR reform and exports and industry growth, revealing the benefits of stronger IPR protections for developed and developing countries alike. </u>IPRs Strengthen Trade, FDI, and Technology Transfer <u>A wealth of academic research has <mark>documented the relationship</mark> between the strength of a country’s intellectual property protections and the extent of trade, foreign direct investment, and technology transfer it enjoys.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Cohn 2013 (Nate, “Improving the Norms and Practices of Policy Debate,” CEDADebate.org, College Policy Debate Forums, November 24, 2013, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=5416.0;wap2) fulltext: There were other problems. Many of the small affirmatives were unstrategic—teams rarely had solvency deficits to generic counterplans. It was already basically impossible to win that some morality argument outweighed extinction; it was totally untenable to win that a moral obligation outweighed a meaningful risk of extinction; it made even less sense if the counterplan solved most of the morality argument. The combined effect was devastating: As these debates are currently argued and judged, I suspect that the negative would win my ballot more than 95 percent of the time in a debate between two teams of equal ability. But even if a “soft left” team did better—especially by making solvency deficits and responding to the specifics of the disadvantage—I still think they would struggle. They could compete at the highest levels, but, in most debates, judges would still assess a small, but meaningful risk of a large scale conflict, including nuclear war and extinction. The risk would be small, but the “magnitude” of the impact would often be enough to outweigh a higher probability, smaller impact. Or put differently: policy debate still wouldn’t be replicating a real world policy assessment, teams reading small affirmatives would still be at a real disadvantage with respect to reality. . Why? Oddly, this is the unreasonable result of a reasonable part of debate: the burden of refutation or rejoinder, the responsibility of debaters to “beat” arguments. If I introduce an argument, it starts out at 100 percent—you then have to disprove it. That sounds like a pretty good idea in principle, right? Well, I think so too. But it’s really tough to refute something down to “zero” percent—a team would need to completely and totally refute an argument. That’s obviously tough to do, especially since the other team is usually going to have some decent arguments and pretty good cards defending each component of their disadvantage—even the ridiculous parts. So one of the most fundamental assumptions about debate all but ensures a meaningful risk of nearly any argument—even extremely low-probability, high magnitude impacts, sufficient to outweigh systemic impacts. There’s another even more subtle element of debate practice at play. Traditionally, the 2AC might introduce 8 or 9 cards against a disadvantage, like “non-unique, no-link, no-impact,” and then go for one and two. Yet in reality, disadvantages are underpinned by dozens or perhaps hundreds of discrete assumptions, each of which could be contested. By the end of the 2AR, only a handful are under scrutiny; the majority of the disadvantage is conceded, and it’s tough to bring the one or two scrutinized components down to “zero.” And then there’s a bad understanding of probability. If the affirmative questions four or five elements of the disadvantage, but the negative was still “clearly ahead” on all five elements, most judges would assess that the negative was “clearly ahead” on the disadvantage. In reality, the risk of the disadvantage has been reduced considerably. If there was, say, an 80 percent chance that immigration reform would pass, an 80 percent chance that political capital was key, an 80 percent chance that the plan drained a sufficient amount of capital, an 80 percent chance that immigration reform was necessary to prevent another recession, and an 80 percent chance that another recession would cause a nuclear war (lol), then there’s a 32 percent chance that the disadvantage caused nuclear war. I think these issues can be overcome. First, I think teams can deal with the “burden of refutation” by focusing on the “burden of proof,” which allows a team to mitigate an argument before directly contradicting its content. Here’s how I’d look at it: modern policy debate has assumed that arguments start out at “100 percent” until directly refuted. But few, if any, arguments are supported by evidence consistent with “100 percent.” Most cards don’t make definitive claims. Even when they do, they’re not supported by definitive evidence—and any reasonable person should assume there’s at least some uncertainty on matters other than few true facts, like 2+2=4. Take Georgetown’s immigration uniqueness evidence from Harvard. It says there “may be a window” for immigration. So, based on the negative’s evidence, what are the odds that immigration reform will pass? Far less than 50 percent, if you ask me. That’s not always true for every card in the 1NC, but sometimes it’s even worse—like the impact card, which is usually a long string of “coulds.” If you apply this very basic level of analysis to each element of a disadvantage, and correctly explain math (.4*.4*.4*.4*.4=.01024), the risk of the disadvantage starts at a very low level, even before the affirmative offers a direct response. Debaters should also argue that the negative hasn’t introduced any evidence at all to defend a long list of unmentioned elements in the “internal link chain.” The absence of evidence to defend the argument that, say, “recession causes depression,” may not eliminate the disadvantage, but it does raise uncertainty—and it doesn’t take too many additional sources of uncertainty to reduce the probability of the disadvantage to effectively zero—sort of the static, background noise of prediction. Now, I do think it would be nice if a good debate team would actually do the work—talk about what the cards say, talk about the unmentioned steps—but I think debaters can make these observations at a meta-level (your evidence isn’t certain, lots of undefended elements) and successfully reduce the risk of a nuclear war or extinction to something indistinguishable from zero. It would not be a factor in my decision. Based on my conversations with other policy judges, it may be possible to pull it off with even less work. They might be willing to summarily disregard “absurd” arguments, like politics disadvantages, on the grounds that it’s patently unrealistic, that we know the typical burden of rejoinder yields unrealistic scenarios, and that judges should assess debates in ways that produce realistic assessments. I don’t think this is too different from elements of Jonah Feldman’s old philosophy, where he basically said “when I assessed 40 percent last year, it’s 10 percent now.” Honestly, I was surprised that the few judges I talked to were so amenable to this argument. For me, just saying “it’s absurd, and you know it” wouldn’t be enough against an argument in which the other team invested considerable time. The more developed argument about accurate risk assessment would be more convincing, but I still think it would be vulnerable to a typical defense of the burden of rejoinder. To be blunt: I want debaters to learn why a disadvantage is absurd, not just make assertions that conform to their preexisting notions of what’s realistic and what’s not. And perhaps more importantly for this discussion, I could not coach a team to rely exclusively on this argument—I’m not convinced that enough judges are willing to discount a disadvantage on “it’s absurd.” Nonetheless, I think this is a useful “frame” that should preface a following, more robust explanation of why the risk of the disadvantage is basically zero—even before a substantive response is offered. There are other, broad genres of argument that can contest the substance of the negative’s argument. There are serious methodological indictments of the various forms of knowledge production, from journalistic reporting to think tanks to quantitative social science. Many of our most strongly worded cards come from people giving opinions, for which they offer very little data or evidence. And even when “qualified” people are giving predictions, there’s a great case to be extremely skeptical without real evidence backing it up. The world is a complicated place, predictions are hard, and most people are wrong. And again, this is before contesting the substance of the negative’s argument(!)—if deemed necessary. So, in my view, the low probability scenario is waiting to be eliminated from debate, basically as soon as a capable team tries to do it. That would open to the door to all of the arguments, previously excluded, de facto, by the prevalence of nuclear war impacts. It’s been tough to talk about racism or gender violence, since modest measures to mitigate these impacts have a difficult time outweighing a nuclear war. It’s been tough to discuss ethical policy making, since it’s hard to argue that any commitment to philosophical or ethical purity should apply in the face of an existential risk. It’s been tough to introduce unconventional forms of evidence, since they can’t really address the probability of nuclear war.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Reject their low probability disads – they’re designed to make extinction always outweigh morality arguments – you should substitute a low risk of DA probability</h4><p><strong><mark>Cohn 2013</strong></mark> (Nate, “Improving the Norms and Practices of Policy Debate,” CEDADebate.org, College Policy Debate Forums, November 24, 2013, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=5416.0;wap2)</p><p>There were other problems. Many of the small affirmatives were unstrategic—teams rarely had solvency deficits to generic counterplans.<u><strong> <mark>It was</u></strong></mark> already <u><strong>basically <mark>impossible to win that</u></strong></mark> some <u><strong><mark>morality</u></strong></mark> argument <u><strong><mark>outweighed extinction</u></strong></mark>; it was totally untenable to win that a moral obligation outweighed a meaningful risk of extinction;<u><strong> <mark>it made</mark> even <mark>less sense if the counterplan solved </mark>most of the <mark>morality </mark>argument</u></strong>. <u><strong>The combined effect was devastating: As these debates are currently argued</u></strong> and judged, I suspect that <u><strong><mark>the negative would win my ballot </mark>more than <mark>95 percent of the time </mark>in a debate between two teams of equal ability.</u></strong> But <u><strong>even if a “soft left” team did better</u></strong>—especially by making solvency deficits and responding to the specifics of the disadvantage—I still think <u><strong>they would struggle.</u></strong> They could compete at the highest levels, but, <u><strong>in most debates, judges would still assess a small,</u></strong> but meaningful<u><strong> risk of a large scale conflict,</u></strong> including nuclear war and extinction. The risk would be small, but the “<u><strong><mark>magnitude</u></strong></mark>” of the impact <u><strong>would <mark>often</mark> be enough to <mark>outweigh a higher probability, smaller impact</mark>.</u></strong> Or put differently: <u><strong>policy debate still wouldn’t be replicating a real world policy assessment, teams reading small affirmatives would still be at a real disadvantage with respect to reality.</u></strong> . Why? Oddly, <u><strong><mark>this is the unreasonable result of</u></strong></mark> a reasonable part of debate: <u><strong><mark>the burden of refutation</mark> </u></strong>or rejoinder, the responsibility of debaters to “beat” arguments. <u><strong>If I introduce an argument, it starts out at 100 percent—you then have to disprove it</u></strong>. That sounds like a pretty good idea in principle, right? Well, I think so too. But <u><strong><mark>it’s</u></strong></mark> really<u><strong> <mark>tough to refute something down to “zero” percent</mark>—a team would need to completely and totally refute an argument. That’s</u></strong> obviously <u><strong>tough</u></strong> to do, especially <u><strong>since the other team is usually going to have some decent arguments and pretty good cards defending each component of their disadvantage—even the ridiculous parts</u></strong>. So <u><strong>one of the most fundamental assumptions about debate</u></strong> all but <u><strong>ensures a meaningful risk of nearly any argument—even extremely low-probability, high magnitude impacts, sufficient to outweigh systemic impacts</u></strong>. There’s another even more subtle element of debate practice at play. Traditionally, the 2AC might introduce 8 or 9 cards against a disadvantage, like “non-unique, no-link, no-impact,” and then go for one and two. Yet in reality, <u><strong><mark>disadvantages are underpinned by</mark> dozens or perhaps <mark>hundreds of </mark>discrete <mark>assumptions</mark>, each of which could be contested. By the</u></strong> end of the <u><strong>2AR, <mark>only a handful are under scrutiny</mark>; the majority</u></strong> of the <u><strong>disadvantage is conceded, and <mark>it’s tough to bring the one</mark> or two scrutinized <mark>components down to “zero</mark>.”</u></strong> And <u><strong>then there’s a bad understanding of probability. If the affirmative questions</u></strong> four or <u><strong>five elements of the disadvantage, but the negative was</u></strong> still “clearly <u><strong>ahead” on all five elements, most judges would assess that the negative was</u></strong> “clearly <u><strong>ahead” on the disadvantage. In reality, the risk of the disadvantage has been reduced considerably</u></strong>. If there was, say, <u><strong>an 80 percent chance that</u></strong> immigration <u><strong>reform would pass, an 80 percent chance that political capital was key, an 80 percent chance that the plan drained</u></strong> a sufficient amount of <u><strong>capital, an 80 percent chance that immigration reform was necessary to prevent another recession, and an 80 percent chance that another recession would cause a nuclear war</u></strong> (lol), <u><strong>then there’s a 32 percent chance that the disadvantage caused nuclear war.</u></strong> I think these issues can be overcome. First, I think <u><strong>teams can deal with the “burden of refutation” by focusing on the “burden of proof,” which allows a team to mitigate an argument before directly contradicting its content.</u></strong> Here’s how I’d look at it: modern policy debate has assumed that arguments start out at “100 percent” until directly refuted. But <u><strong>few</u></strong>, if any, <u><strong>arguments are supported by evidence consistent with “100 percent.”</u></strong> Most <u><strong><mark>cards don’t make definitive claims</mark>. Even when they do, they’re not supported by definitive evidence</u></strong>—and any reasonable person should assume there’s at least some uncertainty on matters other than few true facts, like 2+2=4. Take <u><strong>Georgetown’s</u></strong> immigration <u><strong>uniqueness evidence from Harvard</u></strong>. It <u><strong>says <mark>there “may be a window” for immigration</u></strong></mark>. So, based on the negative’s evidence, <u><strong>what are <mark>the odds</mark> that immigration reform will pass? <mark>Far less than 50 percent</u></strong></mark>, if you ask me. That’s not always true for every card in the 1NC, but sometimes it’s even worse—like <u><strong><mark>the impact card</u></strong></mark>, which <u><strong><mark>is</mark> usually <mark>a long string of “coulds</mark>.” If you apply this very basic level of analysis to each element of a disadvantage, and correctly explain math</u></strong> (.4*.4*.4*.4*.4=.01024), <u><strong><mark>the risk of the disadvantage starts </mark>at a <mark>very low </mark>level, even<mark> before the affirmative offers a </mark>direct <mark>response</u></strong></mark>. Debaters should also argue that <u><strong>the negative hasn’t introduced</u></strong> any <u><strong>evidence</u></strong> at all <u><strong>to defend a long list of unmentioned elements in the “internal link chain</u></strong>.” The absence of evidence to defend the argument that, say, “recession causes depression,” may not eliminate the disadvantage, but it does raise uncertainty—and <u><strong>it doesn’t take too many</u></strong> additional <u><strong>sources of uncertainty to reduce the probability of the disadvantage to effectively zero—sort of the static, background noise of prediction</u></strong>. Now, I do think it would be nice if a good debate team would actually do the work—talk about what the cards say, talk about the unmentioned steps—but I think <u><strong>debaters can make these observations at a meta-level</u></strong> (your evidence isn’t certain, lots of undefended elements) <u><strong>and successfully reduce the risk of a nuclear war or extinction to something indistinguishable from zero. It would not be a factor in my decision</u></strong>. Based on my conversations with other policy judges, it may be possible to pull it off with even less work. They might be willing to summarily disregard “absurd” arguments, like politics disadvantages, on the grounds that it’s patently unrealistic, that we know the typical burden of rejoinder yields unrealistic scenarios, and that judges should assess debates in ways that produce realistic assessments. I don’t think this is too different from elements of Jonah Feldman’s old philosophy, where he basically said “when I assessed 40 percent last year, it’s 10 percent now.” Honestly, I was surprised that the few judges I talked to were so amenable to this argument. For me, just saying “it’s absurd, and you know it” wouldn’t be enough against an argument in which the other team invested considerable time. The more developed argument about accurate risk assessment would be more convincing, but I still think it would be vulnerable to a typical defense of the burden of rejoinder. To be blunt:<u><strong> I want debaters to learn why a disadvantage is absurd, not just make assertions that conform to their preexisting notions of what’s realistic</u></strong> and what’s not. And perhaps more importantly for this discussion, I could not coach a team to rely exclusively on this argument—I’m not convinced that enough judges are willing to discount a disadvantage on “it’s absurd.” Nonetheless, I think <u><strong><mark>this</u></strong></mark> is a useful “<u><strong><mark>frame</u></strong></mark>” that <u><strong><mark>should preface a</u></strong></mark> following, more <u><strong>robust <mark>explanation of why the risk </mark>of the disadvantage <mark>is</mark> basically <mark>zero</mark>—even before a substantive response</u></strong> is offered. There are other, broad genres of argument that can contest the substance of the negative’s argument. There are serious methodological indictments of the various forms of knowledge production, from journalistic reporting to think tanks to quantitative social science. <u><strong>Many of our most strongly worded cards come from people giving opinions, for which they offer very little </u></strong>data or <u><strong>evidence. And even when “qualified” people are giving predictions, there’s a great case to be extremely skeptical without real evidence backing it up. <mark>The world is</u></strong></mark> a <u><strong><mark>complicated</u></strong></mark> place, <u><strong><mark>predictions are hard, and </mark>most <mark>people are wrong</u></strong></mark>. And again, this is before contesting the substance of the negative’s argument(!)—if deemed necessary. So, in my view, the low probability scenario is waiting to be eliminated from debate, basically as soon as a capable team tries to do it. That would open to the door to all of the arguments, previously excluded, de facto, by the prevalence of nuclear war impacts. <u><strong>It’s been tough to talk about racism or gender violence, since modest measures to mitigate these impacts have a difficult time outweighing a nuclear war. It’s been tough to discuss ethical policy making, since it’s hard to argue that any commitment to</u></strong> philosophical or <u><strong>ethical purity should apply in the face of an existential risk. It’s been tough to introduce unconventional forms of evidence, since they can’t really address the probability of nuclear war</u></strong>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Primus 6-26 (Richard Primus, Primus is the Theodore J. St. Antoine Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School and a former clerk for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 6-26-2018, "No, the Supreme Court Won’t Stop a Runaway President," POLITICO Magazine, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/06/26/no-the-supreme-court-wont-stop-a-runaway-president-218897 //DashW) fulltext: The Supreme Court’s decision upholding President Trump’s travel ban on Tuesday came with a number of interesting wrinkles. It contained an implicit rebuke of Trump’s motives in signing the order, even though it let the order stand. And it repudiated Korematsu v. United States, a discredited 1944 decision that allowed the U.S. to send Japanese-American citizens to internment camps during wartime, even as it upheld a policy with a discriminatory motive on grounds similar to that 70-year-old ruling. But the decision’s most important takeaway is the one articulated between the lines of a short concurrence by Justice Anthony Kennedy: When a real threat to the American constitutional order comes — when a president decides to act contrary to fundamental constitutional values — we cannot count on the courts to save us. Especially since Brown v. Board of Education held school segregation unconstitutional in 1954, many Americans have expected the Supreme Court to stand up for constitutional rules that other government actors refuse to respect. To be sure, not everyone approves of each decision the Court makes about what the Constitution requires, but almost everyone can point to some important modern decisions in which the court has vindicated what they see as fundamental rights. For some, it might be cases recognizing the individual right to own a gun. For others, it might be the right to an abortion. But however each of us rates specific decisions, the general assumption among most Americans is that the Supreme Court acts as a crucial final check when someone in power crosses the line. The reality is more complicated. Sometimes the court is willing to deem a government action constitutional by pretending that the government’s underlying purpose was something acceptable, rather than something forbidden. And sometimes the court decides that even if a governmental action is or might be fully unconstitutional, there’s simply nothing to be done about it by the justice system. In other words, the court sometimes lets unconstitutional behavior stand. If Tuesday’s decision is read closely, it is possible to see both of those limits at work. Indeed, it is reasonable to read the opinions to mean that at least five Justices, not just the dissenting four, believe the president acted unconstitutionally in proclaiming his travel ban. But just because something is unconstitutional doesn’t mean that the court will strike it down. Consider first the majority opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts, which found a way to acknowledge the president’s unconstitutional motivations without concluding that the policy itself was unconstitutional. Roberts’ opinion spent no less than a page and a half chronicling some of Trump’s statements, as a candidate and as president, suggesting that the travel ban is motivated by anti-Muslim animus. (The ban, which restricts travel from Iran, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Venezuela and North Korea, is the third version of an order that originally applied only to a group of Muslim countries.) An anti-Muslim motive would make the ban unconstitutional under the First Amendment, which forbids the government to disfavor particular religions. But that’s not what Roberts ruled. In the end, the chief justice decided for the president on the theory that the policy “can reasonably be understood to result from a justification independent of unconstitutional grounds.” This is what constitutional lawyers call the “rational-basis test”: even if the actual reason the ban exists is rooted in an unconstitutional motive like religious bigotry, the court will let the ban stand if the judges can imagine some legitimate interest that could have motivated the order. In framing his analysis as he did, Roberts found a way to sustain the ban without denying Trump’s anti-Muslim bias. Given the public record, saying that the ban was in fact not motivated by animus toward Muslims would merely have made the chief justice look foolish, and Roberts is nobody’s fool. So he wrote an opinion according to which the ban’s validity does not depend on the president’s having constitutionally acceptable motives. Roberts strongly hinted that Trump’s expressed attitudes run contrary to the values of the First Amendment: In addition to acknowledging Trump’s record of bigoted statements, Roberts included a long paragraph about previous presidents who used their bully pulpit to support “the principles of religious freedom and tolerance on which this nation was founded” and then wrote that, unfortunately, presidents have “performed unevenly” in living up to our constitutional ideals. That doesn’t exactly count as a public shaming of Trump, but it’s nonetheless clear that Roberts is telling an in-the-know audience that he isn’t blind to Trump’s bad behavior, even though he’s upholding the entry ban. Justice Anthony Kennedy also clearly felt the need to express his disapproval of the entry ban, even as he voted to sustain it. In a short concurring opinion, Kennedy wrote that sometimes courts must let unconstitutional actions stand, because not every unconstitutional action has a judicial remedy. That idea—that there is a difference between what is unconstitutional and what courts can strike down—is counterintuitive to many well-educated Americans but nonetheless a well-established principle of constitutional law. Under what constitutional lawyers call the “political question doctrine,” some constitutional issues must be settled by decision-makers other than judges. (For example, courts will not second-guess impeachments.) In Tuesday’s decision, Kennedy insisted that it is precisely those officials to whom judges give substantial deference—like the president—who must be especially scrupulous about keeping their own behavior within constitutional bounds. “It is an urgent necessity,” Kennedy wrote, that such officials adhere to “constitutional guarantees and mandates in all their actions, even in the sphere of foreign affairs. An anxious world must know that our Government remains committed always to the liberties the Constitution seeks to preserve and protect[.]” This hand-wringing is curious from Kennedy. Among modern Justices, Kennedy has been one of most willing to use judicial power aggressively. He does not often say, “There’s a serious constitutional problem here, but I’m not the one to fix it.” And given Kennedy’s decision to stay his hand on the entry ban, it is not clear how he thinks the “urgent necessity” of getting officials to behave constitutionally can be met. Surely Kennedy does not think that Trump is going to start taking constitutional limits seriously now that Kennedy has reminded him that he has a responsibility to discipline himself. On the contrary, today’s lesson for Trump is that he can institute policy as he likes and the Supreme Court will not stand in his way, even when the justices know that his motives were unconstitutionally discriminatory. If the president is constitutionally heedless and the court is inclined to defer, it’s no wonder that the world is a bit anxious about whether the United States remains committed to fundamental constitutional liberties. Kennedy’s opinion communicates his awareness of that anxiety. His uncharacteristic deference to the president feeds it. In a powerful dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor argued that the ban should be struck down even on the majority’s deferential standard, because there is no reasonable way to understand the ban apart from the president’s bigotry. In the course of her argument, she drew parallels between Tuesday’s decision and Korematsu v. United States. Sotomayor didn’t argue that the entry ban is the exact equivalent of the Japanese wartime internment; history does not repeat itself that precisely. But, as in Korematsu, Sotomayor wrote, the court is letting a weak national-security rationale validate a policy that everyone should recognize as unconstitutional bigotry. Naturally, Chief Justice Roberts denied the parallel. “[I]t is wholly inapt,” he wrote “to liken [Korematsu’s] morally repugnant order to a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the privilege of admission.” And to further distance his own ruling from the much-condemned decision in Korematsu, Roberts took the occasion to repudiate Korematsu entirely, something no prior majority opinion had done. Korematsu, Roberts wrote, was “gravely wrong the day it was decided” and “has no place in law under the Constitution.” The first of those phrases—“wrong the day it was decided”—is a deliberate echo of something the Court said in 1992 about Plessy v. Ferguson, the infamous 1896 decision upholding racial segregation. The other—“no place in law under the Constitution”—is taken from Justice Robert Jackson’s dissent in Korematsu itself. But for the true importance of today’s ruling, it’s more fitting to look at another one of Jackson’s other great opinions. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, decided eight years after Korematsu, the court invalidated President Harry Truman’s seizure of the nation’s steel mills—a seizure Truman said was necessary to avert a strike that would imperil national security during the Korean War. The Court’s willingness to reject Truman’s argument demonstrated that at least in some cases, the court is willing to police the limits of presidential power, even when the president has claimed a national-security justification. But Jackson warned his readers against inferring that the court would always be so stalwart. In Jackson’s understanding, courts simply lack the institutional heft to stand against a truly abusive president. So when a president who poses a real threat to the constitutional order comes, Jackson wrote, the courts will not save the country. Salvation must come from Congress, responding to an energized electorate. To be sure, courts do play an important role in checking presidents, as the Youngstown case itself demonstrated. And even in the entry-ban saga, the judiciary did not give the President free rein. The first two iterations of the entry ban were struck down, after which the president retreated to the current version. Even with respect to the third version, the outcome could have been different: A Supreme Court including Merrick Garland rather than Neil Gorsuch would likely have reached a different conclusion, and even the court with its current composition could be imagined rejecting this third Trump policy. But as things have actually played out, it is hard not to imagine Justice Jackson today pointing to his Youngstown concurrence, not his Korematsu dissent. Yes, the official repudiation of Korematsu is nice. But the larger lesson of today’s decision may be about the limited role that the judiciary will play in checking the power of a dangerous president.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The Supreme Court is expressing <u>judicial restraint</u> in the status quo – travel ban ruling proves.</h4><p><strong>Primus 6-26 </strong>(Richard Primus, Primus is the Theodore J. St. Antoine Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School and a former clerk for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 6-26-2018, "No, the Supreme Court Won’t Stop a Runaway President," POLITICO Magazine, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/06/26/no-the-supreme-court-wont-stop-a-runaway-president-218897 //DashW<u><strong>)</p><p></strong>The Supreme Court’s decision</u> upholding President Trump’s travel ban on Tuesday came with a number of interesting wrinkles. <u>It contained an implicit rebuke of Trump’s motives</u> in signing the order, <u>even though it let the order stand</u>. And it repudiated Korematsu v. United States, a discredited 1944 decision that allowed the U.S. to send Japanese-American citizens to internment camps during wartime, even as it upheld a policy with a discriminatory motive on grounds similar to that 70-year-old ruling. But <u><strong>the decision’s most important </strong>takeaway is the one articulated between the lines of a short concurrence by Justice Anthony Kennedy</u>: <u><mark>When a</mark> real <mark>threat to the</mark> American <mark>constitutional order comes</u></mark> <u>— when a president decides to act contrary to fundamental constitutional values —</u> <u><strong><mark>we cannot count on the courts to save us</mark>. </u></strong>Especially since Brown v. Board of Education held school segregation unconstitutional in 1954, <u>many Americans have expected the Supreme Court to stand up for constitutional rules that other government actors refuse to respect.</u> To be sure, not everyone approves of each decision the Court makes about what the Constitution requires, but almost everyone can point to some important modern decisions in which the court has vindicated what they see as fundamental rights. For some, it might be cases recognizing the individual right to own a gun. For others, it might be the right to an abortion. But however each of us rates specific decisions, <u><mark>the general assumption</mark> among most Americans <mark>is that the Supreme Court acts as a crucial final check</mark> when someone in power crosses the line. The reality is more complicated. Sometimes the court is willing to deem a government action constitutional by pretending that the government’s underlying purpose was something acceptable,</u> rather than something forbidden. And<u> <mark>sometimes the court decides</u></mark> that <u>even if a governmental action is or might be fully unconstitutional, <mark>there’s</mark> simply <mark>nothing to be done about it by the justice system</u></mark>. In other words<u>, the court sometimes lets unconstitutional behavior stand</u>.<u><strong> If Tuesday’s decision is read closely, it is possible to see both of those limits at work. </strong>Indeed, it is reasonable to read the opinions to mean that at least five Justices</u>, not just the dissenting four, <u>believe the president acted unconstitutionally</u> in proclaiming his travel ban. But <u>just because something is unconstitutional doesn’t mean that the court will strike it down. </u>Consider first the majority opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts, which found a way to acknowledge the president’s unconstitutional motivations without concluding that the policy itself was unconstitutional. <u>Roberts’ opinion spent no less than a page and a half</u> chronicling some of Trump’s statements, as a candidate and as president, <u>suggesting that the travel ban is motivated by anti-Muslim animus</u>. (The ban, which restricts travel from Iran, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Venezuela and North Korea, is the third version of an order that originally applied only to a group of Muslim countries.) An anti-Muslim motive would make the ban unconstitutional under the First Amendment, which forbids the government to disfavor particular religions<u>. But that’s not what Roberts ruled.</u> In the end<u>, <mark>the chief justice decided</mark> for the president <mark>on</mark> </u>the theory that the policy “can reasonably be understood to result from a justification independent of unconstitutional grounds.” This is what constitutional lawyers call <u><mark>the “rational-basis test”:</u></mark> even if the actual reason the ban exists is rooted in an unconstitutional motive like religious bigotry, the court will let the ban stand if the judges can imagine some legitimate interest that could have motivated the order. In framing his analysis as he did, Roberts found a way to sustain the ban without denying Trump’s anti-Muslim bias. Given the public record, saying that the ban was in fact not motivated by animus toward Muslims would merely have made the chief justice look foolish, and Roberts is nobody’s fool. So he wrote an opinion according to which the ban’s validity does not depend on the president’s having constitutionally acceptable motives. Roberts strongly hinted that Trump’s expressed attitudes run contrary to the values of the First Amendment: In addition to acknowledging Trump’s record of bigoted statements, Roberts included a long paragraph about previous presidents who used their bully pulpit to support “the principles of religious freedom and tolerance on which this nation was founded” and then wrote that, unfortunately, presidents have “performed unevenly” in living up to our constitutional ideals. That doesn’t exactly count as a public shaming of Trump, but it’s nonetheless clear that Roberts is telling an in-the-know audience that he isn’t blind to Trump’s bad behavior, even though he’s upholding the entry ban. Justice Anthony <u>Kennedy also clearly felt the need to express his disapproval of the entry ban, even as he voted to sustain it</u>. In a short concurring opinion<u>, Kennedy wrote that</u> <u><strong><mark>sometimes courts must let unconstitutional actions stand, because not every unconstitutional action has a judicial remedy</mark>.</u></strong> <u>That idea</u>—<u>that there is a difference between what is unconstitutional and what courts can strike down</u>—<u>is counterintuitive to many well-educated Americans but nonetheless a well-established principle of constitutional law</u>. Under what constitutional lawyers call the “political question doctrine,” some constitutional issues must be settled by decision-makers other than judges. (For example, courts will not second-guess impeachments.) In Tuesday’s decision, Kennedy insisted that<u><strong> it is precisely those officials to whom <mark>judges give substantial deference</mark>—like the president</u></strong>—<u>who must be especially scrupulous about keeping their own behavior within constitutional bounds. </u>“It is an urgent necessity,” Kennedy wrote, that such officials adhere to “constitutional guarantees and mandates in all their actions, even in the sphere of foreign affairs. An anxious world must know that our Government remains committed always to the liberties the Constitution seeks to preserve and protect[.]” <u>This hand-wringing is curious</u> from Kennedy. Among modern Justices, <u>Kennedy has been one of most willing to use judicial power aggressively</u>. <u>He does not often say, “There’s a serious constitutional problem here, but I’m not the one to fix it.”</u> <u>And given Kennedy’s decision to stay his hand on the entry ban</u>, <u>it is not clear how he thinks the “urgent necessity</u>” of getting officials to behave constitutionally <u>can be met</u>. Surely Kennedy does not think that Trump is going to start taking constitutional limits seriously now that Kennedy has reminded him that he has a responsibility to discipline himself. On the contrary, today’s lesson for Trump is that he can institute policy as he likes and the Supreme Court will not stand in his way, even when the justices know that his motives were unconstitutionally discriminatory. If the president is constitutionally heedless and the court is inclined to defer, it’s no wonder that the world is a bit anxious about whether the United States remains committed to fundamental constitutional liberties. Kennedy’s opinion communicates his awareness of that anxiety. His uncharacteristic deference to the president feeds it. In a powerful dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor argued that the ban should be struck down even on the majority’s deferential standard, because there is no reasonable way to understand the ban apart from the president’s bigotry. In the course of her argument, she drew parallels between Tuesday’s decision and Korematsu v. United States. Sotomayor didn’t argue that the entry ban is the exact equivalent of the Japanese wartime internment; history does not repeat itself that precisely. But, as in Korematsu, Sotomayor wrote, the court is letting a weak national-security rationale validate a policy that everyone should recognize as unconstitutional bigotry. Naturally, Chief Justice Roberts denied the parallel. “[I]t is wholly inapt,” he wrote “to liken [Korematsu’s] morally repugnant order to a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the privilege of admission.” And to further distance his own ruling from the much-condemned decision in Korematsu, Roberts took the occasion to repudiate Korematsu entirely, something no prior majority opinion had done. Korematsu, Roberts wrote, was “gravely wrong the day it was decided” and “has no place in law under the Constitution.” The first of those phrases—“wrong the day it was decided”—is a deliberate echo of something the Court said in 1992 about Plessy v. Ferguson, the infamous 1896 decision upholding racial segregation. The other—“no place in law under the Constitution”—is taken from Justice Robert Jackson’s dissent in Korematsu itself. But for the true importance of today’s ruling, <u>it’s more fitting to look at another one of Jackson’s other</u> great <u>opinions. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer</u>, decided eight years after Korematsu<u>, the court invalidated</u> President Harry <u>Truman’s seizure of the nation’s steel mills</u>—a seizure Truman said was necessary to avert a strike that would imperil national security during the Korean War. The Court’s willingness to reject Truman’s argument demonstrated that at least in some cases, the court is willing to police the limits of presidential power, even when the president has claimed a national-security justification. But <u><strong>Jackson warned his readers against inferring that the court would always be so stalwart.</u></strong> In Jackson’s understanding, <u><strong>courts simply lack the institutional heft to stand against a truly abusive president.</u></strong> So when a president who poses a real threat to the constitutional order comes, <u>Jackson wrote<strong><mark>, the courts will not save the country</strong>. Salvation must come from Congress</mark>, responding to an energized electorate. </u>To be sure, courts do play an important role in checking presidents, as the Youngstown case itself demonstrated. And even in the entry-ban saga, the judiciary did not give the President free rein. The first two iterations of the entry ban were struck down, after which the president retreated to the current version. Even with respect to the third version, the outcome could have been different: A Supreme Court including Merrick Garland rather than Neil Gorsuch would likely have reached a different conclusion, and even the court with its current composition could be imagined rejecting this third Trump policy. But as things have actually played out, it is hard not to imagine Justice Jackson today pointing to his Youngstown concurrence, not his Korematsu dissent. Yes, the official repudiation of Korematsu is nice. But <u><strong><mark>the larger lesson of today’s decision may be about the limited role that the judiciary will play in checking</mark> the <mark>power of a</mark> dangerous <mark>president</mark>.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Coulthard et al 14 [Matthew Wildcat is a PhD student in the Political Science department at the University of British Columbia. Mandy McDonald holds a B.A. Honours in Political Science with a Minor in Indigenous Studies from the University of Victoria, and is currently an M.A. candidate in the Indigenous Governance Program. Stephanie Irlbacher-Fox, PhD (Cantab.) has spent the past two decades working for Indigenous peoples' organizations in the Northwest Territories, Canada. Glen Coulthard is an assistant professor in the First Nations Studies Program and the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 3, No. 3, 2014, pp. I-XV 2014 M. Wildcat, M. Simpson, S. Irlbacher-Fox & G. Coulthard Learning from the land: Indigenous land based pedagogy and decolonization, pages II-IV, accessed 12.4.2015] fulltext: What does it mean to think of land as a source of knowledge and understanding? How do our relationships with land inform and order the way humans conduct relationships with each other and other-than-human beings? How do we offer education to people on the land in ways that are grounded in Indigenous knowledge? What does it mean to understand “land” – as a system of reciprocal social relations and ethical practices – as a framework for decolonial critique? These are a few of the central questions that have been answered by contributors to this special edition on land-based education, in Decolonization: Education, Indigeneity and Society. Settler-colonialism has functioned, in part, by deploying institutions of western education to undermine Indigenous intellectual development through cultural assimilation and the violent separation of Indigenous peoples from our sources of knowledge and strength – the land. If settler colonialism is fundamentally premised on dispossessing Indigenous peoples from their land, one, if not the primary, impact on Indigenous education has been to impede the transmission of knowledge about the forms of governance, ethics and philosophies that arise from relationships on the land. As Leanne Simpson argues in the feature article of this issue, if we are serious about decolonizing education and educating people within frameworks of Indigenous intelligence, we must find ways of reinserting people into relationships with and on the land as a mode of education. Key to the set of inquiries contained in this special issue is moving from talk about the land within conventional classroom settings, to studying instances where we engage in conversations with the land and on the land in a physical, social and spiritual sense. In addition to the comprehensive theoretical engagement with land based practices, the ten articles in this issue provide us with a specific examples of how land based activities are occurring on and with the land. What is gained from moving the classroom to the land? As Leanne Simpson, in a recent interview conducted by Eric Ritskes with her and Glen Coulthard, summarizes, land-based education sustains and grows Indigenous governance, ethics and philosophy – and life: We’re practicing conflict management, agency and transparency and the things that Indigenous political cultures value. We’re asking students to engage in a fairly rigorous process from a Dene perspective, in an intellectual, emotional and a spiritual and a physical way… we have to remember the ways that we replicated our nations through education and what were those critical components that produced people who could embody our political cultures and survive in our lands and think within Nishinaabeg or Dene thought and live a life where they were promoting more life in the coming generations. (Simpson & Coulthard, 2014) In that same interview, Glen Coulthard also reflects on how land based education has been fundamental to his own understanding of Dene knowledge: I had learned as much as I could in the archive, talking to people, and reading about that history, but it was only when I started to commit myself to re-learning those practices and re-embedding myself in those social relationships with place, that I understood in a more concrete and embodied way, what was wrong with the forms of economic development that have come to be dominant in the North and elsewhere. (Simpson & Coulthard, 2014) Land-based education, in resurging and sustaining Indigenous life and knowledge, acts in direct contestation to settler colonialism and its drive to eliminate Indigenous life and Indigenous claims to land. In their own unique ways, each contribution to this volume aims to sever the historical and contemporary relationship between education and the reproduction of settler-colonial power and associated forms of knowledge. On the one hand, the pairing of colonial domination with western education has had a devastating effect on Indigenous students, contributing to a contemporary educational deficit that expresses itself in lower academic success rates and experiences of racism and alienation in the classroom. On the other, institutions of mainstream education have fostered high levels of ignorance regarding Indigenous issues within the nonNative student and educator community. In different ways, each paper in this collection takes stock of what settler colonialism makes lost, damaged, and destroyed, as well as what is being and can be changed, gained and restored through various forms of land-based resurgence. In doing so, the examples of Indigenous land-based pedagogy discussed in this volume all offer a way of fostering individual and collective empowerment for students by re-embedding them in the land-connected social relationships that settler-colonialism, through education and otherwise, sought to destroy. The initiatives discussed in this issue, each focused on resurging Indigenous knowledges, leaves us with room for optimism despite the stranglehold that colonial education currently has in Canada and other settler nations. But, contrary to mainstream discourse, ours is not an optimism grounded in the ideal or hope of reconciliation through inclusion. Our optimism is grounded in a call for Indigenous resurgence and settler reckoning. This issue highlights the diversity of land-based education and is a major contribution to the Indigenous Resurgence paradigm of intellectual thought. For scholars working on Indigenous political issues within Canadian universities and elsewhere, Indigenous resurgence has become one of the most robust scholarly paradigms to study Indigenous politics from. The term owes its intellectual origin to Taiaiake Alfred’s (2009) work in Wasase: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom and is now widely used by many scholars in the field including many of the editors and contributors to this journal issue. For Alfred, the resurgence paradigm was a way of theorizing how a shift in the consciousness of Indigenous peoples, away from reconciliation and towards decolonization, would provide the foundation of an Indigenous social movement capable of transforming Canadian society. To create this social movement, what was needed was initially a regeneration of Indigenous cultural, spiritual and political practices. This revitalization would provide the personal and collective strength necessary for a confrontation with Canadian society. Having undergone cultural regeneration, an Indigenous resurgence would engage in an outward, disciplined confrontation with settler society. Due to the protracted struggle and engagement with this Indigenous movement, settler society would be forced into reckoning with its colonial past and present and undertake in its own decolonizing journey. This issue can then be read as a useful contribution to the resurgence paradigm in its emphasis on both the importance of cultural regeneration, as well as outward resurgence and contestation with settler colonial incursions and violence in the realms of education, and more broadly against Indigenous peoples, knowledges, languages, and the relationships with the land that sustain these. This issue is a reminder that Alfred’s original formulation equally emphasized regeneration of Indigenous knowledges and ways of being in the world, as well as their necessary contestation with settler colonial power. The issue begins with a feature article by Leanne Simpson and then traverses ten articles, two creative writing pieces, a video and a poem. We encounter Mohawk lives disrupted by industrial pollution and Métis landscapes transformed through the rise of industrial capitalism; Tlingit and Mono places whose names, stories and ecological realities have been overwritten by colonial relations; contributions from three Anishnaabe authors who discuss land as both culturally grounding and contested; the social relations of Chisasibi Cree; stories from the land provided by a Swampy Cree author and a Tłı̨chǫ author; and we see the perspective of a Maori knowledge keeper in film. Many of these contributions include collaborations between settler scholars working in the academy and Indigenous community members, and we also have two great contributions from settler scholars working in collaboration with Indigenous peoples of Denedeh/NWT. Including the cover from a Coast Salish artist and the work of Plains Cree and Yellowknives Dene editors, we have here an edition with contributions from Indigenous people from 12 different nations. Taken together, we believe the issue offers a nuanced and diverse appreciation for the significance of land based pedagogy and practices as a catalyst for regenerating Indigenous social, spiritual and physical land-connection. In lieu of descriptions of each piece, our introduction will highlight important insights provided by the ten articles and two creative writing pieces. These insights provide only a small sample of the theoretical complexity and empirical richness developed by the authors. We conclude by examining areas for further exploration and inquiry in land-based education.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The alternative is a decolonial pedagogy which situates land based education as the political priority – k2 indigenous life affirmation </h4><p><strong>Coulthard et al 14</strong> [Matthew Wildcat is a PhD student in the Political Science department at the University of British Columbia. Mandy McDonald holds a B.A. Honours in Political Science with a Minor in Indigenous Studies from the University of Victoria, and is currently an M.A. candidate in the Indigenous Governance Program. Stephanie Irlbacher-Fox, PhD (Cantab.) has spent the past two decades working for Indigenous peoples' organizations in the Northwest Territories, Canada. Glen Coulthard is an assistant professor in the First Nations Studies Program and the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 3, No. 3, 2014, pp. I-XV 2014 M. Wildcat, M. Simpson, S. Irlbacher-Fox & G. Coulthard Learning from the land: Indigenous land based pedagogy and decolonization, pages II-IV, accessed 12.4.2015]</p><p><u>What does it mean to think of land as a source of knowledge and understanding?</u> How do our relationships with land inform and order the way humans conduct relationships with each other and other-than-human beings? <u>How do we offer education to people on the land in ways that are grounded in Indigenous knowledge?</u> What does it mean to understand “land” – as a system of reciprocal social relations and ethical practices – as a framework for decolonial critique? These are a few of the central questions that have been answered by contributors to this special edition on land-based education, in Decolonization: Education, Indigeneity and Society. <u><mark>Settler-colonialism has functioned</mark>,</u> in part, <u><mark>by deploying</mark> institutions of <mark>western education to undermine Indigenous</mark> intellectual <mark>development through</mark> cultural assimilation</u> <u>and the <mark>violent separation of Indigenous peoples from</mark> our sources of knowledge and strength</u> – <u><mark>the land</mark>.</u> <u>If settler colonialism is fundamentally premised on dispossessing Indigenous peoples from their land</u>, one, if not <u>the primary</u>, <u>impact on Indigenous education has been to impede the transmission of knowledge about the forms of governance, ethics and philosophies that arise from relationships on the land</u>. As Leanne Simpson argues in the feature article of this issue, <u><strong><mark>if we are serious about decolonizing education</strong></mark> and educating people within frameworks of Indigenous intelligence</u>, <u><mark>we must</mark> find ways of <mark>reinsert</mark>ing people into relationships with and on the <strong><mark>land as a mode of education</u></strong></mark>. <u>Key</u> to the set of inquiries contained in this special issue <u>is moving from talk about the land within conventional classroom settings</u>, <u>to studying instances where we engage in conversations with the land and on the land in a physical, social and spiritual sense</u>. In addition to the comprehensive theoretical engagement with land based practices, the ten articles in this issue provide us with a specific examples of how land based activities are occurring on and with the land. What is gained from moving the classroom to the land? As Leanne Simpson, in a recent interview conducted by Eric Ritskes with her and Glen Coulthard, summarizes, <u><mark>land-based education sustains</mark> and grows <mark>Indigenous governance, ethics</mark> and <mark>philosophy</u></mark> – <u><mark>and life</u></mark>: <u>We’re practicing conflict management, agency and transparency and the things that Indigenous political cultures value</u>. <u>We’re asking students to engage in a fairly rigorous process</u> from a Dene perspective, <u>in an intellectual, emotional and a spiritual and a physical</u> <u>way</u>… we have to remember the ways that we replicated our nations through education and what were those critical components that produced people who could embody our political cultures and survive in our lands and think within Nishinaabeg or Dene thought and live a life where they were promoting more life in the coming generations. (Simpson & Coulthard, 2014) In that same interview, Glen Coulthard also reflects on how land based education has been fundamental to his own understanding of Dene knowledge: I had learned as much as I could in the archive, talking to people, and reading about that history, but <u>it was only when I started to commit myself to re-learning those practices and re-embedding myself in those social relationships with place, that I understood in a more concrete and embodied way, what was wrong with the forms of economic development that have come to be dominant in the North and elsewhere</u>. (Simpson & Coulthard, 2014<u>) <mark>Land-based education</u></mark>, <u>in resurging and sustaining Indigenous life and knowledge, <mark>acts in direct contestation to settler colonialism</mark> <mark>and its drive to eliminate Indigenous</mark> life and Indigenous <mark>claims to land</u></mark>. In their own unique ways, each contribution to this volume aims to sever the historical and contemporary relationship between education and the reproduction of settler-colonial power and associated forms of knowledge. On the one hand, <u><strong><mark>the pairing of colonial domination with western education has had a devastating effect on Indigenous students</strong></mark>, contributing to a contemporary educational deficit that expresses itself in lower academic success rates and experiences of racism and alienation in the classroom</u>. On the other, <u>institutions of mainstream education have fostered high levels of ignorance regarding Indigenous issues within the nonNative student and educator community</u>. In different ways, each paper in this collection takes stock of what settler colonialism makes lost, damaged, and destroyed, as well as what is being and can be changed, gained and restored through various forms of land-based resurgence. In doing so, the examples of <u><mark>Indigenous land-based pedagogy</u></mark> discussed in this volume all <u>offer a way of <mark>foster</mark>ing individual and collective <mark>empowerment for students</mark> <mark>by re-embedding them</mark> <mark>in the land-connected social relationships that</mark> <mark>settler-colonialism</mark>, through education and otherwise, <mark>sought to destroy</u></mark>. <u><mark>The initiatives</u></mark> discussed in this issue, each focused on resurging Indigenous knowledges, <u><mark>leave</mark>s <mark>us with room for <strong>optimism</strong></mark> despite the stranglehold that colonial education currently has</u> in Canada and other settler nations. <u>But</u>, <u>contrary to mainstream discourse, ours is not an optimism grounded in the ideal or hope of reconciliation through inclusion</u>. <u>Our optimism is grounded in a call for Indigenous resurgence and settler reckoning</u>. This issue highlights the diversity of land-based education and is a major contribution to the Indigenous Resurgence paradigm of intellectual thought. For scholars working on Indigenous political issues within Canadian universities and elsewhere, Indigenous resurgence has become one of the most robust scholarly paradigms to study Indigenous politics from. The term owes its intellectual origin to Taiaiake Alfred’s (2009) work in Wasase: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom and is now widely used by many scholars in the field including many of the editors and contributors to this journal issue. For Alfred, the resurgence paradigm was a way of theorizing how <u><mark>a shift</mark> in the consciousness of Indigenous peoples, <mark>away from reconciliation and towards decolonization</mark>, <mark>would provide the foundation of an Indigenous social movement capable of transforming</u></mark> Canadian <u><mark>society</u></mark>. <u>To create this social movement, what was needed was initially a regeneration of Indigenous cultural, spiritual and political practices</u>. <u>This revitalization would provide the personal and collective strength necessary </u>for a confrontation with Canadian society. Having undergone cultural regeneration, <u>an Indigenous resurgence would engage in an outward, disciplined confrontation with settler society.</u> Due to the protracted struggle and engagement with this Indigenous movement, <u><strong><mark>settler society would be forced into reckoning with its colonial past and</strong></mark> present and <strong><mark>undertake in its own decolonizing journey</u></strong></mark>. This issue can then be read as a useful contribution to the resurgence paradigm in its emphasis on both the importance of cultural regeneration, as well as outward resurgence and contestation with settler colonial incursions and violence in the realms of education, and more broadly against Indigenous peoples, knowledges, languages, and the relationships with the land that sustain these. This issue is a reminder that <u>Alfred’s original formulation equally emphasized regeneration of Indigenous knowledges and ways of being in the world, as well as their necessary contestation with settler colonial power.</u> The issue begins with a feature article by Leanne Simpson and then traverses ten articles, two creative writing pieces, a video and a poem. We encounter Mohawk lives disrupted by industrial pollution and Métis landscapes transformed through the rise of industrial capitalism; Tlingit and Mono places whose names, stories and ecological realities have been overwritten by colonial relations; contributions from three Anishnaabe authors who discuss land as both culturally grounding and contested; the social relations of Chisasibi Cree; stories from the land provided by a Swampy Cree author and a Tłı̨chǫ author; and we see the perspective of a Maori knowledge keeper in film. Many of these contributions include collaborations between settler scholars working in the academy and Indigenous community members, and we also have two great contributions from settler scholars working in collaboration with Indigenous peoples of Denedeh/NWT. Including the cover from a Coast Salish artist and the work of Plains Cree and Yellowknives Dene editors, we have here an edition with contributions from Indigenous people from 12 different nations. Taken together, we believe <u>the issue offers a nuanced and diverse appreciation for the significance of land based pedagogy and practices as a catalyst for regenerating Indigenous social, spiritual and physical land-connection</u>. In lieu of descriptions of each piece, our introduction will highlight important insights provided by the ten articles and two creative writing pieces. These insights provide only a small sample of the theoretical complexity and empirical richness developed by the authors. We conclude by examining areas for further exploration and inquiry in land-based education.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Perkinson 12 Jessica Perkinson, Master School Of International Service American University, “The Potential For Instability in the PRC: How The Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark” There are a number of areas of concern among China’s immediate regional neighbors and partners, including those on the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, Japan, and India. Though China currently adheres to a strict foreign policy regime based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence151 and has been able to significantly advance their own interests internationally using this method, the potentially destabilizing effect that forced political reform could have on the country may derail their relations and security with their neighbors. Chief among these regional concerns are North Korea’s dependence on China’s exports, South Korea’s dependence on China’s North Korea deterrence and trade, the security and stability of the Taiwan Strait, Japan’s reliance on Chinese trade and message consistency regarding territorial disputes, and stability of the Sino-Indian border area. First, the stability of the Korean Peninsula rests in large part on the stability of China’s political system. Both North and South Korea have vested interests in the continued stability of the CCP for their own security. As is generally well-known in the international community, North Korea relies in large part on China superseding international trade sanctions not only for luxury goods, but for basic needs such as food and oil. For example, the United States led the charge and enacted its first set of sanctions against North Korea over two decades ago in response to the existence of fissile material on the Korean Peninsula and its risk for proliferation.152 Over time, these sanctions have been expanded upon and have attracted the support and participation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Specifically, these sanctions have included blocked property and interests in property, banned transactions involving North Korean vessels and bans on reception of imports originating in North Korea.153 Though these sanctions have not encouraged the North Korean regime to change its policies (and in some cases have made them more militant), they have unfortunately had a devastating effect on the North Korean people, including depravation of access to critical resources such as medication, food and water and energy supplies such as oil.154 In addition, due to a succession of floods and droughts and the refusal of the international community to intervene in a country violating international laws, pervasive malnutrition has led to “up to one million excess deaths since the 1990’s.155 In order to maintain stability on the Peninsula and prevent the North Koreans from becoming desperate, China continues to export both luxury goods and basic commodities into North Korea. For example, in 2005, China accounted for 53% of North Korea’s international commerce. However, this has increased rapidly since sanctions have become stricter and have increased pressure in the country. In 2009, China accounted for 79% in North Korea’s international commerce and as of 2010 was up to 83% of North Korea’s $4.2 billion in trade156 in order to ease the effect of the existing international sanctions. In addition, China has been a facilitator of the Six-Party Talks, the primary international diplomatic forum for handling tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Countries involved in the Six-Party Talks include China, North Korea, Russia, the United States, South Korea and Japan, and the first round of talks was initiated and hosted by China, taking place in Beijing in August 2003.157 During the talks, China served as a moderator between the US and North Korea during tense times of debate, also insisting on certain thresholds of success before members could leave the talks, such as the drafting of diplomatic agreements158. Though the talks have remained in an on-and-off pattern over the last decade, China still makes consistent efforts to bring North Korea back to the diplomatic negotiations over their nuclear regime.159 South Korea’s dependence on China’s continued stability is twofold. Not only does South Korea rely on China’s continued deterrence of North Korean aggression both through diplomacy and satisfaction of their trade needs, but they also rely on China as a trade partner. For example, on November 23, 2010, North Korea fired dozens of missiles onto the South’s Yeonpyeong Island, killing two South Korean soldiers, significantly escalating tension on the Peninsula as South Korea threatened military retaliation for the attack.160 In response, China focused their energy on deterring an armed response by the South Koreans, which could have potentially led to protracted civil war between the two countries. Though the international community has expressed deep disagreement with China’s soft-line approach toward North Korea, it appears their understanding, ‘big-brother’ style of handling North Korean aggression toward South Korea has at least prevented a violent, protracted conflict, though not necessarily further North Korean acts of aggression.161 Not only does South Korea rely on the continued intervention of the Chinese in North-South relations, but they have a deep economic integration and dependence on Chinese trade. For example, in 2010, South Korea was China’s fourth-largest trading partner, exchanging goods of $207.2 billion, up 32.6% over 2009.162 In other words, both North and South Korea rely heavily on China not only for their continued economic prosperity, but also for the survival of their people and territorial security. Should the Chinese government undergo a period of reform and instability great enough to interrupt these benefits to the Korean Peninsula, the international system may be faced with a serious nuclear and conventional military conflict between North and South Korea. A second region that relies heavily on the continued stability of China’s government is the island of Taiwan. Because China and Taiwan have a long history of conflict over the status of Taiwan’s sovereignty, maintenance of stability in the Taiwan Strait continues to be an issue of critical interest to the international community as a whole. For example, in 1995, the third Taiwan Strait Crisis occurred in response to what may seem like a small event to the international community, but what was viewed by the Chinese as a grave threat to their sovereignty. In 1995, then-US President Bill Clinton allowed Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui to come and visit his alma-mater at Cornell University. Though the visit alone sparked some controversy between the US, China and Taiwan, the remarks made at Cornell by Lee Teng-Hui during an address tipped the security balance on the Taiwan Strait. In his address, Lee referred to Taiwan as the “Republic of China” on multiple occasions, and made references to “nation” and “country”.163 These events led the Chinese leadership to believe that the US was making overtures toward Taiwanese independence from the mainland. The following year, the PLA fired missiles off the coast of Taiwan, nearly drawing the international community – including the US – into a conflict on the Strait.164 Some scholars argue this was to deter the US from developing closer ties with Taiwan.165 However, since that incident, the Strait has remained relatively calm and stable, as the Taiwanese leadership under Ma Ying-jeou has remained very moderate in their stance on China-Taiwan relations and has been very careful not to make any inflammatory statements that could set off conflict on the Strait. However, a period of significant reform within the CCP could lend itself to instability on the Taiwan Strait. There is no guarantee that pro-independence factions within Taiwan would not take advantage of the CCP and PLA’s distraction with their own transformation to take dramatic, perhaps militaristic, steps toward independence. For example, during Taiwan’s most recent election cycle, the pro-independence candidate Tsai Ing-wen, though she lost the election, garnered enough support to make the government in mainland China nervous about her rise in support.166 The potential destabilization of the Taiwan Strait could spell disaster for the entire region, as other countries and allies could be pulled into a protracted conflict between the two regions. A third region that has a deep interest in China’s political stability is their neighbor Japan. Not only is Japan deeply integrated economically into the Chinese trade system, it also has a number of ongoing territorial disputes with the country. For example, in January 2007, total trade between China and Japan was $18.1 million. That amount spiked to $344.9 million in December, 2011 (an 1808.1% increase)167, a clear indicator that China and Japan are growing their trade dependence at an astounding rate. In addition, Japan and China continue to disagree over the status of some hotly contested territories, including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Not only do both countries have a territorial claim to the islands, but the area contains vast amounts of oil and natural gas resources that both countries want to develop. For example, it is estimated that the Japanese side of the disputed East China Sea area contains up to 500 million kiloliters of crude oil volume.168 As China is the world’s second-largest consumer of oil and Japan third, with Chinese demand for oil expected to rise 14% by 2025, these oil deposits are of crucial national security interest to both countries.169 Tension in the region has been rising as China has continued to press closer to the median line that Japan has drawn around the islands, at one point coming as close as five kilometers from the line.170 The consistency of the Chinese message on the status of these disputed territories, though tense and combative for the Japanese, have at least lent a level of predictability to China’s stance and actions. However, should the CCP undergo a period of instability and reform, and if their message or actions were to change regarding the status of these islands, it could cause a significant conflict over these territories between China and Japan, and could severely destabilize an already weakened Japanese economy. Much like the potential destabilization of the Taiwan Strait, the destabilization of the East China Sea region could draw the countries’ regional neighbors and international partners fulltext: into a protracted conflict between the two nations. A fourth region that would be negatively affected by political destabilization in China is their southern neighbor, India. Though China and India are becoming increasingly reliant on one another economically, they still suffer from a number of serious areas of conflict, including a hotly contested border area and India’s support of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile. In 1962, the PLA invaded India through the Arunachal Pradesh region, laying claim to portions of the Himalayas that had previously been under Indian control in what became known as the Sino-Indian War. Though the Chinese eventually called a cease-fire and withdrew from the region171, the conflict over it remains tense for a number of reasons, including access to water resources, forestry resources and China’s enduring theme of territorial integrity. Similar to the destabilization of the two regions mentioned above, the inconsistency of China’s message during a time of political destabilization or reform could lead the Indian military to either panic from the unpredictability of China’s potential actions or move to take the Arunachal Pradesh region by force. Not only could political instability in China cause a border conflict between India and China, but it could also cause an influx of Tibetans into the country, as India’s government is sympathetic to the Tibetan plight. Though China has labeled the Dalai Lama and his government-in-exile a separatist force working to separate Tibet from mainland China, India has provided the group sanctuary in Dharamsala, India.172 Abroad, the Dalai Lama continues to draw supporters from around the world, occasionally attracting Tibetans inside Tibet to make the treacherous journey across the Himalayas to Dharamsala. China, in turn, has taken up guarding this area in an attempt to prevent flows of Tibetans out of Tibet and into India to reach the Dalai Lama.173 However, should the CCP undergo a period of significant political reform, this could encourage Tibetans to either take advantage of the CCP’s distraction to seek independence by force, or could cause massive immigrant flows across the Sino-Indian border. Both China and India already have a regional example of destabilization due to immigrant flows, as China already suffers from this issue on its border with North Korea. In addition, any political stability within the CCP would spell disaster for the Indian economy, which is becoming increasingly reliant on China as a trading partner. Partially as a counterweight to the two nations’ conflict, India and China have been dramatically growing their bilateral trade in the last three decades. Though this has served to promote peace in the region and between the two giants in particular, it has also made India increasingly reliant on China’s continued stability for its economic prosperity. For example, in 1990, trade between India and China had bottomed out at near $0. However, this figure shot up drastically between 2000 and 2008 to around $35 billion174, with no sign of leveling off. It is obvious from these statistics that the two nations continue to build their trade dependency and that India’s economy is deeply intertwined with China’s. The consistency of China’s message on the contested border area, as well as the fairly stable environment surrounding the Tibetan dispute, lend at least some predictability to the disagreement between the two nations. However, if China were to undergo a period of political instability, this series of predictable messages and actions from China on these disagreements could change, and cause aggression from either side, destabilizing the region and India’ economy in the process. Outside of China’s immediate vicinity, there exist a number of countries that would be challenged by political instability in China. Due to intense and growing economic and military integration between China, the East Asian region and the world, these other countries have a significant reliance on the continued stability of the CCP. Chief among these global concerns are China’s growing integration with European countries and its continued commitment of foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries, primarily on the African continent.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>Global hotspot escalation!</h4><p>Perkinson 12<u> Jessica Perkinson, Master School Of International Service American University, “The Potential For Instability in the PRC: How The Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark”</p><p></strong>There are a number of areas of concern among China’s immediate regional neighbors and partners, including</u> those on <u>the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, Japan, and India</u>. Though China currently adheres to a strict foreign policy regime based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence151 and has been able to significantly advance their own interests internationally using this method, <u><strong>the potentially <mark>destabilizing effect</mark> that forced political reform could have on the country may <mark>derail</mark> their <mark>relations</mark> <mark>and security</mark> with their neighbors</strong>. Chief among these</u> regional <u>concerns are North Korea</u>’s dependence on China’s exports, <u>South Korea</u>’s dependence on China’s North Korea deterrence and trade, the security and stability of the <u>Taiwan</u> Strait, <u>Japan</u>’s reliance on Chinese trade and message consistency regarding territorial disputes, <u>and</u> stability of <u>the Sino-Indian border</u> area. First, <u><strong>the <mark>stability of</mark> the <mark>Korean Peninsula rests in</u></strong></mark> large part on <u><strong>the <mark>stability of China’s political system</strong></mark>. Both North and South Korea have vested interests in the continued stability of the CCP for</u> their own <u>security</u>. As is generally well-known in the international community, North Korea relies in large part on China superseding international trade sanctions not only for luxury goods, but for basic needs such as food and oil. For example, the United States led the charge and enacted its first set of sanctions against North Korea over two decades ago in response to the existence of fissile material on the Korean Peninsula and its risk for proliferation.152 Over time, these sanctions have been expanded upon and have attracted the support and participation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Specifically, these sanctions have included blocked property and interests in property, banned transactions involving North Korean vessels and bans on reception of imports originating in North Korea.153 Though these sanctions have not encouraged the North Korean regime to change its policies (and in some cases have made them more militant), they have unfortunately had a devastating effect on the North Korean people, including depravation of access to critical resources such as medication, food and water and energy supplies such as oil.154 In addition, due to a succession of floods and droughts and the refusal of the international community to intervene in a country violating international laws, pervasive malnutrition has led to “up to one million excess deaths since the 1990’s.155 <u>In order <mark>to maintain stability</mark> on the Peninsula and prevent the North Koreans from becoming desperate, <mark>China</mark> continues to <mark>export</u></mark> both luxury goods and <u>basic commodities</u> in<u><strong><mark>to</u></strong></mark> North <u><strong><mark>Korea</u></strong></mark>. For example, in 2005, China accounted for 53% of North Korea’s international commerce. However, this has increased rapidly since sanctions have become stricter and have increased pressure in the country. In 2009, China accounted for 79% in North Korea’s international commerce and as of 2010 was up to 83% of North Korea’s $4.2 billion in trade156 in order to ease the effect of the existing international sanctions. In addition, <u>China has been a facilitator of the Six-Party Talks, the</u> primary international diplomatic <u>forum for hand<strong>l</u></strong>ing <u>tensions on the Korean Peninsula</u>. Countries involved in the Six-Party Talks include China, North Korea, Russia, the United States, South Korea and Japan, and the first round of talks was initiated and hosted by China, taking place in Beijing in August 2003.157 During the talks, <u>China served as a moderator between the US and North Korea</u> during tense times of debate, also insisting on certain thresholds of success before members could leave the talks, such as the drafting of diplomatic agreements158. Though the talks have remained in an on-and-off pattern over the last decade, China still makes consistent efforts to bring North Korea back to the diplomatic negotiations over their nuclear regime.159 <u>South Korea’s dependence on China</u>’s continued <u>stability is twofold. Not only does South Korea rely on China’s</u> continued <u>deterrence</u> of North Korean aggression both through diplomacy and satisfaction of their trade needs, <u>but they also rely on China as a trade partner</u>. For example, on November 23, 2010, North Korea fired dozens of missiles onto the South’s Yeonpyeong Island, killing two South Korean soldiers, significantly escalating tension on the Peninsula as South Korea threatened military retaliation for the attack.160 In response, <u><strong>China focused their energy on deterring</u></strong> an armed <u><strong>response</u></strong> by the South Koreans, <u><strong>which could have potentially led to</u></strong> protracted civil <u><strong>war</u></strong> between the two countries. Though the international community has expressed deep disagreement with <u>China’s</u> soft-line <u>approach</u> toward North Korea, it appears their understanding, ‘big-brother’ style of handling North Korean aggression toward South Korea <u>has</u> at least <u><strong>prevented a violent, protracted conflict</u></strong>, though not necessarily further North Korean acts of aggression.161 <u>Not only does South Korea rely on the continued intervention of the Chinese in North-South relations, but they have a deep economic integration and dependence on Chinese trade</u>. For example, in 2010, South Korea was China’s fourth-largest trading partner, exchanging goods of $207.2 billion, up 32.6% over 2009.162 In other words, both North and South Korea rely heavily on China not only for their continued economic prosperity, but also for the survival of their people and territorial security. <u><mark>Should</mark> the <mark>Chinese government undergo</mark> a period of reform and <mark>instability</mark> great enough to interrupt these benefits to the Korean Peninsula, <strong>the <mark>international system may be faced with</mark> a serious <mark>nuclear</mark> and conventional military <mark>conflict</mark> between North and South Korea</u></strong>. <u>A second region that relies</u> heavily <u>on</u> the continued <u>stability of China’s government is</u> the island of <u>Taiwan. Because China and Taiwan have a long history of conflict</u> over the status of Taiwan’s sovereignty, <u>maintenance of stability in the Taiwan Strait continues to be an issue of critical interest</u> to the international community as a whole. For example, in 1995, the third Taiwan Strait Crisis occurred in response to what may seem like a small event to the international community, but what was viewed by the Chinese as a grave threat to their sovereignty. In 1995, then-US President Bill Clinton allowed Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui to come and visit his alma-mater at Cornell University. Though the visit alone sparked some controversy between the US, China and Taiwan, the remarks made at Cornell by Lee Teng-Hui during an address tipped the security balance on the Taiwan Strait. In his address, Lee referred to Taiwan as the “Republic of China” on multiple occasions, and made references to “nation” and “country”.163 These events led the Chinese leadership to believe that the US was making overtures toward Taiwanese independence from the mainland. The following year, the PLA fired missiles off the coast of Taiwan, nearly drawing the international community – including the US – into a conflict on the Strait.164 Some scholars argue this was to deter the US from developing closer ties with Taiwan.165 However, since that incident, the Strait has remained relatively calm and stable, as the Taiwanese leadership under Ma Ying-jeou has remained very moderate in their stance on China-Taiwan relations and has been very careful not to make any inflammatory statements that could set off conflict on the Strait. However, <u>a period of significant reform</u> with<u>in the CCP could lend itself to instability on the Taiwan Strait. There is no guarantee that pro-independence factions</u> with<u>in <mark>Taiwan</mark> would not take advantage of the CCP</u> and PLA’s distraction<u> with their own transformation to <mark>take</u></mark> dramatic, perhaps <u><mark>militaristic, steps to</u></mark>ward <u><mark>independence</u></mark>. For example, <u>during Taiwan’s most recent election cycle, the pro-independence candidate</u> Tsai Ing-wen, though she lost the election, <u>garnered enough support to make the government in mainland China nervous</u> about her rise in support.166 <u><strong>The potential <mark>destabilization of</mark> the <mark>Taiwan Strait</mark> could <mark>spell disaster for</mark> the <mark>entire region</u></strong></mark>, as other <u><strong><mark>countries </mark>and allies <mark>could be pulled into</mark> a protracted <mark>conflict</u></strong></mark> between the two regions. <u>A third region that has a deep interest in China’s political stability is</u> their neighbor <u><strong>Japan. Not only</strong> is <mark>Japan</mark> deeply <mark>integrated economically into</mark> the <mark>Chinese</mark> trade <mark>system</mark>, it also has a number of ongoing territorial disputes</u> with the country. For example, in January 2007, total trade between China and Japan was $18.1 million. That amount spiked to $344.9 million in December, 2011 (an 1808.1% increase)167, a clear indicator that China and Japan are growing their trade dependence at an astounding rate. In addition, <u>Japan and China continue to disagree over the status of some hotly contested territories</u>, including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Not only do <u>both countries have a territorial claim to the islands</u>, but the area contains vast amounts of oil and natural gas resources that both countries want to develop. For example, it is estimated that the Japanese side of the disputed East China Sea area contains up to 500 million kiloliters of crude oil volume.168 As China is the world’s second-largest consumer of oil and Japan third, with Chinese demand for oil expected to rise 14% by 2025, these oil deposits are of crucial national security interest to both countries.169 <u>Tension in the region has been rising as China has continued to press closer to the median line that Japan has drawn around the islands</u>, at one point coming as close as five kilometers from the line.170 The consistency of the Chinese message on the status of these disputed territories, though tense and combative for the Japanese, have at least lent a level of predictability to China’s stance and actions. However, <u>should the <mark>CCP</mark> undergo a period of <mark>instability</mark> and reform, and if their message or actions were to change regarding the status of these islands, <strong>it could <mark>cause</mark> a significant <mark>conflict</mark> <mark>over</mark> these <mark>territories</mark> between China and Japan, <mark>and</mark> could severely <mark>destabilize</mark> an already weakened <mark>Japanese economy</u></strong></mark>. Much like the potential destabilization of the Taiwan Strait, <u><strong>the <mark>destabilization</u></strong></mark> of the East China Sea region <u><strong>could <mark>draw</mark> the <mark>countries’</mark> regional <mark>neighbors and</mark> international <mark>partners</mark> </p><p>into a protracted conflict between the two nations</u></strong>. <u>A fourth region that would be negatively affected by political destabilization in China is</u> their southern neighbor, <u>India. Though China and India are becoming</u> increasingly <u>reliant on one another economically, they</u> still <u>suffer from a number of serious areas of conflict</u>, including a hotly contested border area and India’s support of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile. In 1962, the PLA invaded India through the Arunachal Pradesh region, laying claim to portions of the Himalayas that had previously been under Indian control in what became known as the Sino-Indian War. Though the Chinese eventually called a cease-fire and withdrew from the region171, the conflict over it remains tense for a number of reasons, including access to water resources, forestry resources and China’s enduring theme of territorial integrity. Similar to the destabilization of the two regions mentioned above, <u><strong>the <mark>inconsistency of China’s message during </mark>a time of political <mark>destabilization</mark> or reform could <mark>lead</mark> the <mark>Indian military to</mark> either <mark>panic</mark> from the unpredictability of China’s potential actions <mark>or</mark> move to <mark>take</mark> the <mark>Arunachal Pradesh</mark> region <mark>by force</mark>. </strong>Not only could political <mark>instability</u></mark> in China <u><mark>cause</mark> a <mark>border conflict</mark> between India and China, but it could <mark>also</mark> cause an <mark>influx of Tibetans</mark> into the country</u>, as India’s government is sympathetic to the Tibetan plight. Though China has labeled the Dalai Lama and his government-in-exile a separatist force working to separate Tibet from mainland China, India has provided the group sanctuary in Dharamsala, India.172 Abroad, the Dalai Lama continues to draw supporters from around the world, occasionally attracting Tibetans inside Tibet to make the treacherous journey across the Himalayas to Dharamsala. China, in turn, has taken up guarding this area in an attempt to prevent flows of Tibetans out of Tibet and into India to reach the Dalai Lama.173 However, <u><strong>should the CCP undergo a period of significant political reform, this could encourage <mark>Tibetans</mark> to either <mark>take advantage of</mark> the <mark>CCP’s distraction to seek independence </mark>by force, or could cause massive immigrant flows across the Sino-Indian border</strong>. Both China and India already have a regional example of destabilization due to immigrant flows</u>, as China already suffers from this issue on its border with North Korea. In addition, <u><strong>any <mark>political stability</u></strong></mark> with<u><strong><mark>in</mark> the <mark>CCP</mark> would <mark>spell disaster for</mark> the <mark>Indian economy</strong></mark>, which is becoming increasingly reliant on China as a trading partner.</u> Partially as a counterweight to the two nations’ conflict, India and China have been dramatically growing their bilateral trade in the last three decades. Though this has served to promote peace in the region and between the two giants in particular, it has also made India increasingly reliant on China’s continued stability for its economic prosperity. For example, in 1990, trade between India and China had bottomed out at near $0. However, this figure shot up drastically between 2000 and 2008 to around $35 billion174, with no sign of leveling off. It is obvious from these statistics that the two nations continue to build their trade dependency and that India’s economy is deeply intertwined with China’s. The consistency of China’s message on the contested border area, as well as the fairly stable environment surrounding the Tibetan dispute, lend at least some predictability to the disagreement between the two nations. However, <u><strong>if China were to undergo a period of political instability, this series of predictable messages and <mark>actions from China on</mark> these <mark>disagreements</mark> could <mark>change</mark>, and cause aggression from either side, destabilizing the region and India’ economy in the process. </u></strong>Outside of China’s immediate vicinity, <u>there exist a number of countries that would be challenged by political instability in China. Due to intense and growing economic and military integration between China, the East Asian region and the world</u>, these <u>other countries have a significant reliance on the continued stability of the CCP</u>. Chief among these global concerns are China’s growing integration with European countries and its continued commitment of foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries, primarily on the African continent.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Brands 18 [Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments." American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump." Page 129-133] fulltext: Since World War II, the United States has had a military second to none. Since the Cold War, America has committed to having overwhelming military primacy. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6 From the early 1990s, for example, the United States consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained peerless global power-projection capabilities.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas strategic regions—Europe, East Asia, the Middle East. From thrashing Saddam Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power superior to anything a regional rival could employ even on its own geopolitical doorstep. This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the unstable multipolarity of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing liberal political values and an open international economy, and to suppressing international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and catastrophic terrorism. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of military preponderance. Washington would need the military power necessary to underwrite worldwide alliance commitments. It would have to preserve substantial overmatch versus any potential great-power rival. It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global norms generally reflect hard-power realities, America would need the superiority to assure that its own values remained ascendant. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge,” but it was not at all inaccurate. American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap. Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. Alliances would lose credibility; the stability of key regions would be eroded; rivals would be emboldened; international crises would go unaddressed. American primacy was thus like a reasonably priced insurance policy. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled. THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by remarkably low levels of great-power competition, high levels of security in key theaters such as Europe and East Asia, and the comparative weakness of those “rogue” actors—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, the strategic horizon is darkening, due to four factors. First, great-power military competition is back. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—China and Russia—are seeking regional hegemony, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the military punch to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a buildup of historic proportions, with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of power-projection and antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) tools necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment. Second, the international outlaws are no longer so weak. North Korea’s conventional forces have atrophied, but it has amassed a growing nuclear arsenal and is developing an intercontinental delivery capability that will soon allow it to threaten not just America’s regional allies but also the continental United States.12 Iran remains a nuclear threshold state, one that continues to develop ballistic missiles and A2/AD capabilities while employing sectarian and proxy forces across the Middle East. The Islamic State, for its part, is headed for defeat, but has displayed military capabilities unprecedented for any terrorist group, and shown that counterterrorism will continue to place significant operational demands on U.S. forces whether in this context or in others. Rogue actors have long preoccupied American planners, but the rogues are now more capable than at any time in decades. Third, the democratization of technology has allowed more actors to contest American superiority in dangerous ways. The spread of antisatellite and cyberwarfare capabilities; the proliferation of man-portable air defense systems and ballistic missiles; the increasing availability of key elements of the precision-strike complex— these phenomena have had a military leveling effect by giving weaker actors capabilities which were formerly unique to technologically advanced states. As such technologies “proliferate worldwide,” Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein commented in 2016, “the technology and capability gaps between America and our adversaries are closing dangerously fast.”13 Indeed, as these capabilities spread, fourth-generation systems (such as F-15s and F-16s) may provide decreasing utility against even non-great-power competitors, and far more fifth-generation capabilities may be needed to perpetuate American overmatch. Finally, the number of challenges has multiplied. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Washington faced rogue states and jihadist extremism—but not intense great-power rivalry. America faced conflicts in the Middle East—but East Asia and Europe were comparatively secure. Now, the old threats still exist—but the more permissive conditions have vanished. The United States confronts rogue states, lethal jihadist organizations, and great-power competition; there are severe challenges in all three Eurasian theaters. “I don’t recall a time when we have been confronted with a more diverse array of threats, whether it’s the nation state threats posed by Russia and China and particularly their substantial nuclear capabilities, or non-nation states of the likes of ISIL, Al Qaida, etc.,” Director of National Intelligence James Clapper commented in 2016. Trends in the strategic landscape constituted a veritable “litany of doom.”14 The United States thus faces not just more significant, but also more numerous, challenges to its military dominance than it has for at least a quarter century.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Primacy solves <u>arms races</u>, <u>land grabs</u>, <u>rogue states</u>, and <u>great power war</u>---reject old defense that ignores <u>emerging instability</u> and <u>compounding risk</u> </h4><p><strong>Brands 18</strong> [Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments." American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump." Page 129-133]</p><p><u>Since World War II, the United States has had a military <strong>second to none</u></strong>. Since the Cold War, <u><mark>America </mark>has <strong><mark>committed</strong> to</mark> having</u> <u><strong><mark>overwhelming</mark> military <mark>primacy</mark>. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6 </p><p></u></strong>From the early 1990s, for example, the <u><strong><mark>U</strong></mark>nited<mark> <strong>S</strong></mark>tates<mark> </mark>consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and <mark>maintained <strong>peerless </mark>global <mark>power-projection</mark> capabilities</u></strong>.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. <u>primacy was also <mark>unrivaled in key</mark> overseas <strong>strategic <mark>regions</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>Europe, East Asia, the Middle East</u></strong>. <u>From <strong>thrashing Saddam</u></strong> Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military <u>during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, <mark>Washington has been able to project military power <strong>superior</strong> to any</mark>thing a <strong>regional<mark> rival </strong></mark>could employ even <strong><mark>on its own </mark>geopolitical <mark>doorstep</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>This <u><strong><mark>military dominance</u></strong></mark> <u>has <mark>constituted the</u> <u><strong>hard-power backbone </strong>of</mark> an ambitious <mark>global strategy</mark>. </u>After the Cold War, U.S.<u> policymakers committed to averting a return to the <strong>unstable multipolarity</strong> of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order.</u> <u>They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing <strong>liberal political values</strong> and an open international <strong>economy</strong>, <mark>and</mark> to <strong><mark>suppressing</strong></mark> international scourges such as <strong>rogue <mark>states</strong>, <strong>nuclear proliferation</strong>, and catastrophic <strong>terrorism</strong></mark>. </u>And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, <u>they understood the</u> <u><strong>centrality</u></strong> <u>of military preponderance. </p><p><mark>Washington would <strong>need</strong> the <strong>military power</u></strong></mark> <u>necessary <mark>to <strong>underwrite</strong></mark> worldwide <strong><mark>alliance commitments</strong></mark>. <mark>It would have to preserve <strong>substantial overmatch</u></strong> <u></mark>versus any potential</u> <u><strong>great-power rival. </u></strong>It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, <u>because prevailing global <strong><mark>norms</strong></mark> generally <mark>reflect <strong>hard-power realities</strong></mark>, America would need the superiority to assure that its own <strong>values remained ascendant</strong>. It was impolitic to say that U.S.<mark> strategy</mark> and the international order <mark>required</mark> “<strong><mark>strengths beyond challenge</strong></mark>,” but it was not at all inaccurate.</p><p>American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap. </p><p></u>Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, <u>the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits</u>. <u><strong><mark>Alliances</u></strong> <u>would</u> <u><strong>lose credibility</u></strong></mark>; <u>the</u> <u><mark>stability</mark> of key <strong>regions</strong> <mark>would be <strong>eroded</u></strong>; <u><strong>rivals would be emboldened</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong>international <mark>crises would go unaddressed</u></strong></mark>. American <u><mark>primacy was</mark> thus like <mark>a <strong>reasonably priced insurance policy</u></strong></mark>. <u>It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.</u>9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more<u> recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled.</p><p></u>THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for <u>two decades after the Soviet collapse, <mark>the world was characterized by <strong></mark>remarkably low levels of great-power competition, </strong><mark>high levels of <strong>security</strong> in</mark> key theaters such as <strong><mark>Europe</strong> and <strong>East Asia</strong>, and </mark>the <strong>comparative <mark>weakness</strong> of</mark> those “<strong><mark>rogue” actors</strong></mark>—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power.</u> During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, <u><strong><mark>the </mark>strategic <mark>horizon is darkening</mark>, due to four factors.</p><p></u></strong>First, <u><strong><mark>great-power </mark>military <mark>competition is back</u></strong></mark>. <u>The world’s two leading authoritarian powers</u>—<u><strong><mark>China</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>Russia</u></strong>—<u>are seeking <strong>regional hegemony</u></strong>,</mark> <u>contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, <mark>and developing the <strong>military punch</strong> </mark>to underwrite these ambitions</u>. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems<u>, <mark>Russia</mark> has <mark>conducted a major </mark>military <strong><mark>modernization</strong> emphasizing <strong>nuclear weapons</strong></mark>, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria</u>.10 <u><mark>China</u></mark>, meanwhile, <u>has <mark>carried out a <strong>buildup of historic proportions,</u></strong></mark> with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, <u>these <mark>expenditures</mark> have <mark>funded</mark> development of <strong><mark>power-projection</strong> and</mark> antiaccess/area denial</u> <mark>(<u><strong>A2/AD) </mark>tools</u></strong> <u>necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf</u>. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; <u>Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment. </p><p></u>Second, the <u><strong>international outlaws</strong> are no longer so <strong>weak</strong>.</u> <u><strong><mark>North Korea</mark>’s</u></strong> <u>conventional forces have atrophied, but it has <mark>amassed a </mark>growing <strong><mark>nuclear arsenal</u></strong></mark> <u>and is developing an intercontinental delivery capability that will soon allow it to threaten not just America’s regional allies but also the <strong>continental United States</u></strong>.12 <u><strong><mark>Iran</u></strong> <u>remains a</u> <u><strong>nuclear threshold </mark>state,</u></strong> one <u>that continues to develop ballistic missiles and A2/AD capabilities while employing <strong>sectarian</strong> and <strong>proxy forces</strong> across the Middle East</u>. <u><mark>The Islamic State</u></mark>, for its part, <u>is headed for defeat, but has <mark>displayed</u></mark> <u>military <mark>capabilities <strong>unprecedented</u></strong> <u>for any <strong>terrorist group</strong>,</u> <u></mark>and shown that</u> <u><strong>counterterrorism</u></strong> <u>will continue to place <strong>significant operational demands</strong> on U.S. forces whether in this context or in others. </u>Rogue actors have long preoccupied American planners, but<u> <strong>the rogues are now more capable</strong> than at any time in decades.</p><p></u>Third, <u>the</u> <u><strong>democratization of <mark>technology</u></strong> <u></mark>has <mark>allowed</mark> more <mark>actors to <strong>contest American superiority</strong></mark> in dangerous ways</u>. The spread of <u><strong><mark>antisatellite</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>cyber</mark>warfare</u></strong> <u>capabilities</u>; <u>the proliferation of man-portable air defense systems and ballistic missiles; the increasing availability of key elements of the precision-strike complex— these phenomena have <mark>had a <strong></mark>military <mark>leveling effect</strong> by giving weaker actors <strong>capabilities</strong> </mark>which were <strong>formerly <mark>unique</strong> to</mark> technologically <mark>advanced states</u>.</mark> <u>As such technologies</u> “<u><strong>proliferate worldwide</u></strong>,” Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein commented in 2016, “<u><mark>the</u> <u><strong>tech</mark>nology</u></strong><mark> <u>and</u> <u><strong>capability gaps</u></strong></mark> <u>between America and our adversaries <mark>are <strong>closing </mark>dangerously <mark>fast</u></strong></mark>.”13 Indeed, as these capabilities spread, <u>fourth-generation systems</u> (such as F-15s and F-16s) <u>may provide <strong>decreasing utility</u></strong> <u>against even <strong>non-great-power competitors</u></strong>, <u>and <strong><mark>far more fifth-gen</mark>eration <mark>capabilities may be needed </mark>to perpetuate American overmatch</strong>.</p><p></u>Finally, <u>the number of <mark>challenges </mark>has <strong><mark>multiplied</u></strong></mark>. <u>During the 1990s and early 2000s, Washington faced rogue states and jihadist extremism—but not intense great-power rivalry</u>. America faced conflicts in the Middle East—but East Asia and Europe were comparatively secure. Now, <u>the old threats still exist—but the more <strong><mark>permissive conditions</strong> </mark>have <strong><mark>vanished</u></strong></mark>. <u>The <strong><mark>U</strong></mark>nited<mark> <strong>S</strong></mark>tates<mark> confronts <strong>rogue states</strong>, </mark>lethal <strong><mark>jihadist organizations</strong>, and <strong>great-power competition</strong></mark>; there are severe challenges in all <strong>three Eurasian theaters</strong>. “I don’t <strong>recall a time</strong> when we have been confronted with a <strong>more diverse array of threats</strong>, whether it’s the nation state threats posed by <strong>Russia</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>China</u></strong> <u>and particularly their substantial nuclear capabilities, or non-nation states of the likes of ISIL, Al Qaida, etc</u>.,” Director of National Intelligence James Clapper commented in 2016. <u><mark>Trends</mark> in the strategic landscape <mark>constituted </mark>a veritable “<strong><mark>litany of doom</u></strong></mark>.”14 The <u>United States thus faces not just more significant, but also more numerous, challenges to its <strong>military dominance</strong> than it has for at least a <strong>quarter century</strong>.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Zweibelson 21 [Ben Zweibelson, PhD, is the Director (GS15) for the U.S. Space Command’s (USSPACECOM) Strategic Innovation Group (SIG) located at Peterson Space Force Base, Colorado, two PhDs – one in Philosophy with an emphasis on design at the University of Connecticut, second PhD in Design at Lancaster University, three different master’s degrees (Louisiana State University, Air Command and Staff College, US Army School of Advanced Military Studies), previously, Ben was the lead design educator/facilitator for U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) through the Joint Special Operations University, retired U.S. Army Infantry officer and veteran of multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, While in the Army, he earned the Combat Infantryman’s Badge, Expert Infantryman’s Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, Pathfinder Badge, Air Assault Badge, and the Ranger Tab. He was awarded four Bronze Star Medals during combat deployments in addition to numerous other awards and citations.; “Deleuzian Folds: Alternative Strategic Arrangements in Complex Warfare”; This is an excerpt from a design monograph that addresses design, NATO operational planning and Joint planning methodologies (NATO-OPP, JPP, and various service-specific deviations therein). This monograph is pending publication and was produced through the Joint Special Operations University. The title of the monograph is: “Disrupting Modern Military Decision-Making: Deconstructing Institutionalized Rituals through Design Synthesis.”; December 23, 2021; https://benzweibelson.medium.com/deleuzian-folds-alternative-strategic-arrangements-in-complex-warfare-64d210446f9e]//eleanor Strategic designers might move away from ‘root-tree’ models and systematic, analytic reasoning on warfare (repeating Iceberg Models upon complex reality in various incarnations) is to consider Deleuzian Folds instead. Several figures below provide suggestions and possible ways of using these systemic and postmodern options to transform existing modern military decision-making such as the RAMP toward novel alternatives that address complex security challenges in ways that legacy military methods cannot. These applications do insert alternative philosophical language, metaphors, and constructs into what has previously been an exclusively systematic, reductionist and ‘Newtonian styled’ mode of modern military decision-making. Critics of postmodernism aside, Chia offers the observation of Serres (one of France’s most gifted and original thinkers) with: “whether knowledge is written in philosophical, literary, or scientific language it nevertheless articulates a common set of problems that transcend academic disciplines and intellectual boundaries.”[24] As military organizations must address some of the most complex, even chaotic sort of human challenges in existence, the legacy barriers against philosophical, literary, and scientific concepts that do not reinforce institutionally recognized beliefs or values must be softened. fulltext: In the below illustration, Deleuzian Folds are presented in the Russian Doll metaphoric device of various folds creating interior and exterior interactions in three different areas of security interest. ‘Organization’, ‘beliefs’, and ‘actions’ are granted folding treatments. It is important to highlight the complex fusion of tangible (objective) and intangible (subjective, social) aspects of these three suggested folds. Folding objects, stakeholders, nation states, or other clearly bounded, isolate-able and quantifiable constructs would potentially encourage strategists and planners to reinforce systematic thinking such as how the Iceberg Model does. “Under the fold’s regime the self ceases to be individual, offering in its place a plenum of infinitely permutating bodies”[25] where the interaction of interiors and exteriors dismantles the traditional boundaries of things, people, bounded concepts, and rigid organizational frames. In the illustration below, a pattern of folding, unfolding and refolding interactions expresses through each treatment, where the numbered sequence ‘1, 2 and 3’ present one way of exploring complex relationships, nonlinear networking, and emergent patterns that are relevant to the security challenge under inquiry. Each folding treatment offers bullet statements that correspond with examples of systemic appreciation of how those strategic designers might explore through Deleuzian Folds. Deleuzian Folds present different philosophical (epistemological and ontological difference on what war is, how and why it forms and functions) constructs that are not a substitution for the familiar legacy modes of decision-making. Thus, inserting a Deleuzian Fold approach into some step in NATO-OPP or the Joint Planning Process while leaving the rest of the framework largely unchanged will not accomplish much and likely create confusion and hostility toward this alien interlocuter. Such application of a postmodern construct requires different language, the application of unfamiliar metaphoric devices, new methodologies and the formation of different conceptual models that draw from different theories on war. “The mind folds a body that floods another body’s mind until… your own discourse is the other’s unconscious.”[26] The swirling of ideas, objects, minds, and living beings become tangled in relationships that shatter traditional (Western, modern military) orderings of things. In another suggested example of how strategic designers might apply Deleuzian Folds, the unfamiliar mathematical and scientific concept of a ‘Mobius Strip’ is incorporated as a metaphoric device and modelling framework. The illustration below introduces a Mobius Strip to operate in the similar ‘Russian Doll’ series of complex folds. A Mobius Strip is a peculiar construct discovered in Germany in 1858, several decades after the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s theory of modern nation-state warfare would publish. Yet despite the close chronological ordering of the ideas, the Mobius Strip has never (in any searches conducted by the author) been applied to warfare or military strategy. This is probably because the concept itself is challenging and disruptive, and in many ways paradoxical to Newtonian Style thinking. The Mobius Strip presents several curious properties that make it quite different from straight lines of effort, systematic causal (input leads to expected output) structures and other spatial frameworks that underpin classical military thinking; the traditional domains of land, sea and air that fostered much of modern military theory and practice does not have many practical examples of what the Mobius Strip introduces. It is the simplest non-orientable surface in three-dimensional space, meaning it is a surface with only one side and does not feature the concepts of ‘clockwise’, ‘counterclockwise’, or other orientable phenomenon of everyday life. For instance, were one to start at one point on a Mobius Strip and begin a path around the entire surface, at the completion of the strip one is in an opposite point to where one began. Only by completing a second full loop will one return to the original starting point, making the strip a peculiar non-orientable surface. Were an object to rotate around a Mobius Strip and attempt to look at oneself as if in a mirror, there would be no ‘mirror effect’ because anything within a Mobius Strip cannot orient to itself. In orientable contexts and spaces, a person can look into a mirror and see everything reversed. The peculiar property of a Mobius Strip denies this phenomenon for those existing within a reality shaped in a Mobius Strip form. There are several other unique mathematical properties of the Mobius Strip that exceed the intent of this section, and for a Deleuzian Fold application for strategic designers the illustration below builds off the previous graphic in the Russian Doll ‘nesting’ for folds. However, this nesting arrangement now has Mobius Strips within other Mobius Strips, creating folds within folds, where each Mobius Strip creates itself with a twist in its one-sided surface and the nesting of multiple Mobius Strips creates interiorities and exteriorities of Deleuzian Folds as well. If readers reapply the same ‘1, 2, 3’ sequence of organizational, belief-based, and action-oriented security topics from the earlier Deleuzian Fold illustration here once again, the peculiar twists of the Mobius Strips arranged in a nesting relationship of folds, unfolding, and refolding provides a sophisticated arrangement of ideas on a complex security challenge differently than possible in traditional military campaign designs or strategies. This does not correlate to ‘better’ or any potential evaluation, rather the change in rendering complex security challenges using postmodern ideas enables a greater opportunity to think divergently, toward potential advantages when considering complex, dynamic systems, and an ever-emerging reality. There are an infinite expansion of other ways to envision Deleuzian Folds for complex security challenges; these two examples are provided to stimulate further research and experimentation by strategic designers. This monograph introduced Deleuzian Folds along with the overlapping postmodern concept of ‘rhizomes’ as part of the idea of indirect strategic design and how complexity requires vastly different conceptual tools than what the legacy frame for warfare offers. Defenders of the modern military institution may object to these positions as well as the notion of bringing postmodern concepts, complexity theory, systems theory, and social paradigm theory into a Newtonian Styled, technologically rationalist approach to modern warfare. Yet modern military decision-making methodologies and strategies have never successfully accounted for how objectivity (science of war) and subjectivity (art of war) interact systemically. McCaffery cites Merleu-Ponty with an important idea on this: “No matter how strict the connection between external facts, it is not the external world which is the ultimate justification of the internal; they participate together in an ‘interior’ which their connection manifests.”[27] This perspective illustrates how Deleuzian Folds work logically, where the interiority of ideas within an individual mind fold and unfold with external reality. Objective facts that are quantifiable interact with subjective perspectives enabled by a second-order complexity of human socialized construction where qualitative is perhaps the only option of inquiry. This gap between qualitative and quantitative is itself an artificial imposition created by academics of rival disciplines and belief systems, yet both ultimately admit that complex reality encompasses both of them… and neither can ever sufficiently address that complex reality in total.[28] Modern militaries are institutionalized to obsess over scientific objectivity and analytic optimization at the detriment of subjectivity, interpretivism, and those significant phenomenon and patterns in warfare that cannot be measured, isolated, or rendered predictable in formulas and rules. NATO and Joint Forces use their military decision-making today to attempt an objective rendering of a complex reality. Tomorrow’s military decision-making design could shift from this and consider alternatives that might produce deeper appreciation of those same complex security challenges.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The plan is necessary to <u>move away</u> from centralized hierarchal linkages and ‘root-tree’ models of <u>rationalist planning</u> and decision-making. <u>New</u>, <u>non-patterned</u>, and <u>non-linear</u> modes of thought are necessary to <u>deterritorialize</u><strong> the Newtonian worldview and analytical methodologies. </h4><p>Zweibelson 21 [Ben Zweibelson, PhD, is the Director (GS15) for the U.S. Space Command’s (USSPACECOM) Strategic Innovation Group (SIG) located at Peterson Space Force Base, Colorado, two PhDs – one in Philosophy with an emphasis on design at the University of Connecticut, second PhD in Design at Lancaster University, three different master’s degrees (Louisiana State University, Air Command and Staff College, US Army School of Advanced Military Studies), previously, Ben was the lead design educator/facilitator for U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) through the Joint Special Operations University, retired U.S. Army Infantry officer and veteran of multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, While in the Army, he earned the Combat Infantryman’s Badge, Expert Infantryman’s Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, Pathfinder Badge, Air Assault Badge, and the Ranger Tab. He was awarded four Bronze Star Medals during combat deployments in addition to numerous other awards and citations.; “Deleuzian Folds: Alternative Strategic Arrangements in Complex Warfare”; This is an excerpt from a design monograph that addresses design, NATO operational planning and Joint planning methodologies (NATO-OPP, JPP, and various service-specific deviations therein). This monograph is pending <u></strong>publication and was produced through the Joint Special Operations University. The title of the monograph is: “Disrupting Modern Military Decision-Making: Deconstructing Institutionalized Rituals through Design Synthesis.”; December 23, 2021; https://benzweibelson.medium.com/deleuzian-folds-alternative-strategic-arrangements-in-complex-warfare-64d210446f9e]//eleanor</p><p><mark>Strategic designers might <strong>move </mark>away <mark>from ‘root-tree’ models</strong> and <strong></mark>systematic<mark>, analytic reasoning on warfare</strong></mark> (repeating Iceberg Models upon complex reality in various incarnations) is <mark>to <strong></mark>consider <mark>Deleuzian Folds </mark>instead</u></strong>. Several figures below provide suggestions and possible ways of using these <u><strong>systemic and <mark>postmodern options</u></strong></mark> to <u><strong><mark>transform </mark>existing modern <mark>military decision-making</u></strong> </mark>such as the RAMP <u><mark>toward</mark> novel <mark>alternatives that address complex security challenges in ways</mark> that <mark>legacy </mark>military <mark>methods cannot</mark>. These applications do <mark>insert</mark> <strong><mark>alternative </mark>philosophical language</strong>, <strong>metaphors, and <mark>constructs</strong> into what</mark> <mark>has</mark> previously <mark>been</mark> an <strong>exclusively <mark>systematic, reductionist</strong> and ‘<strong>Newtonian</mark> styled’ mode</strong> of modern military decision-making</u>. Critics of postmodernism aside, Chia offers the observation of Serres (one of France’s most gifted and original thinkers) with: “whether knowledge is written in philosophical, literary, or scientific language it nevertheless articulates a common set of problems that transcend academic disciplines and intellectual boundaries.”[24] As <u><mark>military organizations must address</mark> some of the most <mark>complex</mark>, even <mark>chaotic</mark> sort of <mark>human challenges</mark> in existence, the legacy barriers against philosophical, literary, and scientific concepts that do not reinforce institutionally recognized beliefs or values must be softened. </p><p></u>In the below illustration, <u><strong><mark>Deleuzian Folds</u></strong></mark> <u>are presented</u> in the Russian Doll metaphoric device of various folds <u><mark>creating interior and exterior interactions</mark> in three different areas of security interest. ‘Organization’, ‘beliefs’, and ‘actions’ are granted folding treatments. It is important to highlight the complex fusion of tangible (objective) and intangible (subjective, social) aspects of these three suggested folds. Folding objects, stakeholders, nation states, or other clearly bounded, isolate-able and quantifiable constructs would potentially encourage strategists and planners to reinforce systematic thinking such as how the Iceberg Model does.</u> “<u><strong><mark>Under the fold</mark>’s regime</strong> <strong><mark>the self ceases to be individual</strong>, offering </mark>in its place a <strong>plenum of <mark>infinitely permutating bodies</u></strong></mark>”[25] where <u>the interaction of interiors and exteriors dismantles the traditional boundaries of things, people, bounded concepts, and rigid organizational frames. </u>In the illustration below, a pattern of folding, unfolding and refolding interactions expresses through each treatment, where the numbered sequence ‘1, 2 and 3’ present one way of exploring complex relationships, nonlinear networking, and emergent patterns that are relevant to the security challenge under inquiry. <u>Each folding treatment offers bullet statements that correspond with examples of systemic appreciation of how those strategic designers might explore through Deleuzian Folds.</p><p><strong><mark>Deleuzian Folds</strong> present <strong></mark>different philosophical</strong> (<strong><mark>epistemological </mark>and <mark>ontological difference</strong> on <strong></mark>what <mark>war is</mark>, how and <mark>why it forms and functions</strong></mark>) <mark>constructs</mark> that <mark>are <strong>not a substitution for</mark> the <mark>familiar</mark> legacy <mark>modes</strong></mark> of decision-making.</u> Thus, <u><strong><mark>inserting a Deleuzian Fold approach</strong> into </mark>some step in <strong><mark>NATO-</mark>OPP</strong> or the <strong>Joint Planning Process</strong> <strong><mark>while leaving the rest of the framework</mark> largely <mark>unchanged will not accomplish much</mark> and likely create confusion and hostility toward this alien interlocuter</u></strong>. <u>Such <mark>application </mark>of a postmodern construct <strong><mark>requires different language</strong></mark>, the application of <strong>unfamiliar metaphoric devices</strong>, <strong>new <mark>methodologies</strong></mark> and the formation of <strong>different conceptual models</strong> that draw from <strong><mark>different theories on war</strong></mark>. </u>“The mind folds a body that floods another body’s mind until… your own discourse is the other’s unconscious.”[26] <u><strong>The swirling of ideas, <mark>objects, minds, and </mark>living <mark>beings become tangled in relationships that shatter </mark>traditional <mark>(Western</mark>, modern <mark>military) orderings </mark>of things</u></strong>. In another suggested example of how strategic designers might apply Deleuzian Folds, <u>the unfamiliar mathematical and scientific concept of a ‘<strong>Mobius Strip’</strong> is incorporated as a metaphoric device and modelling framework</u>. The illustration below introduces a Mobius Strip to operate in the similar ‘Russian Doll’ series of complex folds. </p><p>A Mobius Strip is a peculiar construct discovered in Germany in 1858, several decades after the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s theory of modern nation-state warfare would publish. Yet despite the close chronological ordering of the ideas, <u>the Mobius Strip has never</u> (in any searches conducted by the author) <u>been applied to warfare or military strategy</u>. This is probably because <u>the concept itself is challenging and disruptive, and</u> in many ways <u><strong>paradoxical to Newtonian Style thinking</u></strong>. <u>The Mobius Strip presents several curious properties that make it quite different from straight lines of effort, systematic causal (input leads to expected output) structures and other spatial frameworks that underpin classical military thinking</u>; the traditional domains of land, sea and air that fostered much of modern military theory and practice does not have many practical examples of what the Mobius Strip introduces. It is the simplest non-orientable surface in three-dimensional space, meaning it is a surface with only one side and does not feature the concepts of ‘clockwise’, ‘counterclockwise’, or other orientable phenomenon of everyday life.</p><p>For instance, were one to start at one point on a Mobius Strip and begin a path around the entire surface, at the completion of the strip one is in an opposite point to where one began. Only by completing a second full loop will one return to the original starting point, making the strip a peculiar non-orientable surface. Were an object to rotate around a Mobius Strip and attempt to look at oneself as if in a mirror, there would be no ‘mirror effect’ because anything within a Mobius Strip cannot orient to itself. <u>In orientable contexts and spaces, a person can look into a mirror and see everything reversed. The peculiar property of a Mobius Strip denies this phenomenon for those existing within a reality shaped in a Mobius Strip form.</u> There are several other unique mathematical properties of the Mobius Strip that exceed the intent of this section, and <u>for a Deleuzian Fold application for strategic designers the illustration below builds off the previous graphic in the Russian Doll ‘nesting’ for folds</u>. However, <u>this <mark>nesting arrangement </mark>now <mark>has Mobius Strips within</mark> other <mark>Mobius Strips</mark>, creating <mark>folds within folds</mark>, where each Mobius Strip creates itself with a twist in its one-sided surface and the nesting of multiple Mobius Strips creates interiorities and exteriorities of Deleuzian Folds as well. </p><p></u>If readers reapply the same ‘1, 2, 3’ sequence of organizational, belief-based, and action-oriented security topics from the earlier Deleuzian Fold illustration here once again, <u>the peculiar twists of the <mark>Mobius Strips</mark> arranged in a nesting relationship of folds, unfolding, and refolding <mark>provides a sophisticated arrangement of ideas on a complex security challenge</mark> differently than possible in traditional military campaign designs or strategies</u>. This does not correlate to ‘better’ or any potential evaluation, rather the <u><strong><mark>change in rendering complex security challenges</u></strong></mark> <u>using postmodern ideas <mark>enables</mark> a <strong>greater <mark>opportunity to think divergently</strong>, <strong>toward</mark> potential <mark>advantages</strong> </mark>when <strong>considering complex, dynamic systems, and an ever-emerging reality</strong>. There are an infinite expansion of other ways to envision Deleuzian Folds for complex security challenges; these two examples are provided to stimulate further research and experimentation by strategic designers. </p><p></u>This monograph introduced Deleuzian Folds along with the overlapping postmodern concept of ‘rhizomes’ as part of the idea of indirect strategic design and how <u><strong><mark>complexity requires </mark>vastly <mark>different conceptual tools</mark> than what the legacy frame for warfare offers</u></strong>. <u>Defenders of the modern military institution may object to these positions as well as the notion of bringing postmodern concepts, complexity theory, systems theory, and social paradigm theory into a <strong>Newtonian Styled, technologically rationalist approach to modern warfare</strong>. </u>Yet <u><mark>modern military</mark> decision-making <mark>methodologies</mark> and strategies <strong><mark>have never </mark>successfully <mark>accounted</strong> for <strong>how objectivity</mark> (science of war)</strong> <mark>and <strong>subjectivity</mark> (art of war</strong>) <strong><mark>interact</mark> systemically</strong>.</u> McCaffery cites Merleu-Ponty with an important idea on this: “<u>No matter how strict the connection between external facts, it is not the external world which is the ultimate justification of the internal; they participate together in an ‘interior’ which their connection manifests.”[</u>27] This perspective illustrates how <u><strong>Deleuzian Folds work logically,</u></strong> where <u>the interiority of ideas within an individual mind fold and unfold with external reality. </p><p><strong>Objective facts that are quantifiable</strong> <strong>interact with subjective perspectives</strong> enabled by a second-order complexity of human socialized construction where qualitative is perhaps the only option of inquiry. This <strong><mark>gap between qualitative and quantitative</strong> is</mark> itself <mark>an <strong>artificial imposition </mark>created by academics of rival disciplines and belief systems</strong>, yet both ultimately admit that complex reality encompasses both of them… and neither can ever sufficiently address that complex reality in total</u>.[28] <u><strong><mark>Modern militaries</strong> are <strong>institutionalized to obsess over scientific objectivity</strong> and <strong>analytic optimization</strong> at the <strong>detriment of subjectivity, interpretivism</strong>, and</mark> those significant <strong><mark>phenomenon and patterns in warfare</strong> that <strong>cannot be measured, isolated, or rendered predictable</strong></mark> in <strong>formulas and rules</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>NATO</u></strong></mark> and Joint Forces <u>use their military <mark>decision-making </mark>today to <strong><mark>attempt </mark>an <mark>objective rendering of </mark>a <mark>complex reality</strong></mark>. Tomorrow’s <strong><mark>military </mark>decision-making <mark>design</strong> could <strong></mark>shift from this and <mark>consider alternatives</strong> that</mark> might <mark>produce </mark>deeper <mark>appreciation of</mark> those same <mark>complex security challenges.</p></u></mark><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Correia and Wall 18 — David Correia, Associate Professor in the Department of American Studies at the University of New Mexico, holds a Ph.D. in Geography from the University of Kentucky, and Tyler Wall, Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, holds a Ph.D. in Justice Studies from Arizona State University, 2018 (“Models of Policing: How the Police Are Organized and Defended,” Police: A Field Guide, Published by Verso, ISBN 9781786630148, p. ebook) fulltext: Police Oversight Police oversight, sometimes called civilian, community, or citizen police oversight, is the idea that police should submit to a local, independent authority of elected or appointed officials who audit or monitor police departments for misconduct including, but not limited to, the use of, and discretion to use, force. Contemporary police oversight generally follows one of four models. Some investigate police misconduct only when official complaints have been filed. They make recommendations on discipline to the chief of police or the sheriff, who has final authority to accept or reject those findings and recommendations. Some have no investigative authority whatsoever and instead review police internal affairs investigations of misconduct and then make recommendations to the chief of police or sheriff, who has final authority to accept or reject the findings and recommendations. Others only hear appeals by complainants whose charges of misconduct have been previously heard and denied by the chief of police or sheriff. But as with the first two, the appeal culminates in a recommendation that can be rejected by the chief of police or the sheriff. Lastly, some are constituted as independent agencies with a director, a board of commissioners and a staff of investigators. Some of these even hold the authority to issue subpoenas and others have the authority to examine and make recommendations regarding specific police policies. But like the other models, their findings and recommendations are advisory only. No police oversight agency or board operating anywhere in the United States has the authority to discipline or fire police officers. In the history of police oversight in Albuquerque, New Mexico, for example, every police chief has rejected every police oversight commission recommendation regarding police misconduct since the formal practice of police oversight by commission began in the late 1990s. The guarantee that police oversight will hold police accountable even though it hasn’t, and that police oversight will resolve the problem of police violence even though it won’t, is among the most frequently claimed and widely believed promises of police reform. Despite the fact that the authors of the May 2015 report issued by President Barack Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing concluded that there existed no “strong research evidence that [oversight] works,” new or improved police oversight procedures were among the first reforms the US Department of Justice called for following the police killings of James Boyd in Albuquerque, Mike Brown in Ferguson, and Tamir Rice in Cleveland, among many other places and following many other police killings. This faith in police reform via police oversight as a way to end police violence, despite the failure of police oversight to end police violence, is shared by some anti–police violence activists as well. Campaign Zero, a series of police reform policies proposed in August 2015 by a number of prominent Black Lives Matter activists, put police oversight at the center of its call to “end police violence in America.” Their online campaign demanded “effective civilian oversight structures” that included a “Police Commission” with the power to “discipline and dismiss police officers” and a “Civilian Complaints Office” with the power to “interrogate officers … where deadly force is used.” Campaign Zero’s faith in oversight appears at first glance as something altogether different from the reformist models that reserve for police chiefs and sheriffs the authority to discipline police officers. If the “community” holds the power to monitor and discipline police, then police will be held accountable to the “community.” There are three primary reasons, however, why police oversight of existing police will not end police violence. First, even if there had been a Campaign Zero–like model of police oversight in, say, Ferguson, Missouri on August 9, 2014, Mike Brown would still be dead. The only difference would be that a community oversight commission could have used its authority to investigate the actions of Darren Wilson, the officer who shot and killed Mike Brown. That commission might have fired Darren Wilson, the strongest disciplinary action available, whether wielded by a Chief of Police or a community oversight agency. But Darren Wilson is no longer working at the Ferguson police department as it is. And since no police oversight model includes the authority to charge an officer with a crime, the establishment of the kind of police oversight called for by Campaign Zero would have produced the same outcome that happened in Ferguson without oversight. Second, police oversight is as old as policing itself. The first police departments in the United States submitted to oversight by, usually, a local political boss. This structure served the interests of police and political elites. The lack of transparency and accountability in the political boss model of oversight gave way in the Progressive Era to supposedly independent police oversight commissions. But these were usually made up of prominent and politically connected businessmen appointed by local mayors—the same political bosses whose political authority over police Progressive Era reformers sought to replace through independent oversight. Contemporary models of oversight limit authority to an advisory capacity but have sought to sever the influence of local mayors or political authorities by providing police oversight agencies with legal representation and budgets and staff that are all independent of local political authority. And despite all these models and reforms, none of them, whether with or without the authority to discipline, or under or free from local political influence, have been able to hold police accountable or end or even significantly reduce police violence. And lastly, if the goal is to end police violence, a better approach would be to abolish police, or at least reduce police in size and authority, rather than improve police oversight. After all, there is police violence because there are police. Police oversight, unlike abolition, does not reject police violence per se, but only rejects unjustified police violence. The goal of any form of public oversight, whether of police or any other government activity, is to improve, not abolish, services and practices. Police oversight thus subscribes to the notion—one shared by conservatives and many liberals—that police are necessary for good order, that cops need to use violence to impose that order, and that police oversight works to improve that violence, which means justified violence. Conservatives are content to let police chiefs provide that oversight, while progressives want that oversight to be “independent.” Either way the outcome is the same. So picture the best police chief or police oversight agency you can imagine. Imagine that it (or she) is independent, aggressive, community-minded, and highly critical of the police use of force. And then remember: Mike Brown would still be dead and Darren Wilson would still not be held accountable.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The aff’s call for stronger police oversight <u>legitimizes</u> the institution of policing <u>without making a dent</u> in police violence. Only <u>abolition</u> solves. </h4><p><strong>Correia and Wall 18</strong> — <u>David Correia</u>, Associate Professor in the Department of American Studies at the University of New Mexico, holds a Ph.D. in Geography from the University of Kentucky, and <u>Tyler Wall</u>, Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, holds a Ph.D. in Justice Studies from Arizona State University, 2018 (“Models of Policing: How the Police Are Organized and Defended,” Police: A Field Guide, Published by Verso, ISBN 9781786630148, p. ebook) </p><p>Police Oversight</p><p><u>Police oversight</u>, sometimes called civilian, community, or citizen police oversight, <u>is the idea that police should submit to a local, independent authority of elected or appointed officials who audit or monitor police departments for misconduct including</u>, but not limited to, <u>the use of</u>, <u>and discretion to use</u>, <u>force</u>.</p><p><u>Contemporary police oversight generally follows one of four models. Some investigate police misconduct only when official complaints have been filed</u>. They make recommendations on discipline to the chief of police or the sheriff, who has final authority to accept or reject those findings and recommendations. <u>Some have no investigative authority whatsoever and instead review police internal affairs investigations of misconduct and then make recommendations to the chief of police or sheriff, who has final authority</u> to accept or reject the findings and recommendations. <u>Others only hear appeals by complainants whose charges of misconduct have been previously heard and denied by the chief of police or sheriff</u>. But as with the first two, the appeal culminates in a recommendation that can be rejected by the chief of police or the sheriff. Lastly, <u>some are constituted as independent agencies with a director, a board of commissioners and a staff of investigators</u>. Some of these even hold the authority to issue subpoenas and others have the authority to examine and make recommendations regarding specific police policies. <u>But like the other models, their findings and recommendations are advisory only. <strong><mark>No</mark> police <mark>oversight agency or board</mark> operating anywhere in the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong><mark>has the authority to discipline or fire</mark> police <mark>officers</u></strong></mark>. In the history of police oversight in Albuquerque, New Mexico, for example, every police chief has rejected every police oversight commission recommendation regarding police misconduct since the formal practice of police oversight by commission began in the late 1990s.</p><p><u><mark>The guarantee that</mark> police <mark>oversight will hold police accountable even though it hasn’t</mark>, <mark>and that</mark> police <mark>oversight will resolve</mark> the problem of police <mark>violence even though it won’t</mark>, <mark>is</mark> among the most frequently claimed and <mark>widely believed</mark> promises of police reform. Despite the fact that the authors of</u> the May 2015 report issued by President Barack <u><mark>Obama’s Task Force</mark> on 21st Century Policing <mark>concluded</mark> that <mark>there existed <strong>no</strong></mark> “<strong><mark>strong research evidence that [oversight] works</strong></mark>,” new or improved police oversight procedures were among the first reforms the</u> US <u>D</u>epartment <u>o</u>f <u>J</u>ustice <u>called for following the police killings of</u> James <u>Boyd</u> in Albuquerque, Mike <u>Brown</u> in Ferguson, <u>and</u> Tamir <u>Rice</u> in Cleveland, among many other places and following many other police killings.</p><p><u>This faith in police reform via police oversight as a way to end police violence, despite the failure of police oversight to end police violence, is shared by some anti–police violence activists</u> as well. <u><mark>Campaign Zero</u></mark>, a series of police reform policies proposed in August 2015 by a number of prominent Black Lives Matter activists, <u><mark>put</mark> police <mark>oversight at the center of its call</mark> to “end police violence in America.” Their online campaign demanded “effective civilian oversight structures” that included a “Police Commission” with the power to “discipline and dismiss police officers” and a “Civilian Complaints Office” with the power to “interrogate officers … where deadly force is used.” Campaign Zero’s faith in oversight appears at first glance as something altogether different from the reformist models that reserve for police chiefs and sheriffs the authority to discipline police officers. If the “community” holds the power to monitor and discipline police, then police will be held accountable to the “community.”</p><p></u><u>There are three primary reasons, <mark>however,</mark> why police <mark>oversight</mark> of existing police <mark>will not end</mark> police <mark>violence</u></mark>. First, <u><mark>even if there had been</mark> a Campaign Zero–like model of police <mark>oversight in</u></mark>, say, <u><mark>Ferguson</u></mark>, Missouri on August 9, 2014, Mike <u><mark>Brown would still be dead</mark>. The only difference would be that <mark>a</mark> community oversight <mark>commission could have</mark> used its authority to investigate the actions of</u> Darren <u>Wilson</u>, the officer who shot and killed Mike Brown. <u>That commission might have <mark>fired</u></mark> Darren <u><mark>Wilson</u></mark>, the strongest disciplinary action available, whether wielded by a Chief of Police or a community oversight agency. <u><mark>But</u></mark> Darren <u><mark>Wilson is no longer working at the Ferguson p</mark>olice <mark>d</mark>epartment as it is. And since no police oversight model includes the authority to charge an officer with a crime, the establishment of the kind of police <mark>oversight</mark> called for by Campaign Zero <mark>would have produced the same outcome</mark> that happened in Ferguson without oversight</u>.</p><p>Second, <u>police oversight is as old as policing itself. The first police departments in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>submitted to oversight by</u>, usually, <u>a local political boss. This structure served the interests of police and political elites. The lack of transparency and accountability in the political boss model of oversight gave way in the Progressive Era to supposedly independent police oversight commissions. But these were usually made up of prominent and politically connected businessmen appointed by local mayors—the same political bosses whose political authority over police Progressive Era reformers sought to replace through independent oversight. Contemporary <mark>models</mark> of oversight <mark>limit authority to an advisory capacity</mark> but have sought to sever the influence of local mayors or political authorities by providing police oversight agencies with legal representation and budgets and staff that are all independent of local political authority</u>. And <u><mark>despite</mark> all <mark>these models and reforms</mark>, <mark>none</mark> of them, whether with or without the authority to discipline, or under or free from local political influence, <mark>have been able to hold police accountable or</mark> end or <mark>even significantly reduce</mark> police <mark>violence</u></mark>.</p><p>And lastly, <u><mark>if the goal is to end</mark> police <mark>violence, a better approach would be to <strong>abolish</strong></mark> police</u>, or at least reduce police in size and authority, <u>rather than improve police oversight</u>. After all, <u><mark>there is</mark> police <mark>violence because there are police</mark>. Police <mark>oversight, unlike abolition, does not reject</mark> police <mark>violence per se, but only rejects <strong>unjustified</strong></mark> police <mark>violence. The goal</mark> of any form of public oversight</u>, whether of police or any other government activity, <u><mark>is to <strong>improve</strong>, not abolish</mark>, services and practices. Police oversight thus subscribes to the notion</u>—one shared by conservatives and many liberals—<u>that police are necessary for good order, that cops need to use violence to impose that order, and that police oversight works to improve that violence, which means justified violence. <mark>Conservatives are content to let</mark> police <mark>chiefs provide</mark> that <mark>oversight, while progressives want</mark> that <mark>oversight to be “independent.” <strong>Either way the outcome is the same</strong></mark>. So <mark>picture the best</mark> police chief or police <mark>oversight agency you can imagine</mark>. Imagine that it (or she) is independent, aggressive, community-minded, and highly critical of the police use of force. And <mark>then remember:</u></mark> Mike <u><mark>Brown would still be dead and</u></mark> Darren <u><mark>Wilson would still not be held accountable</u></mark>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Stone 16 (Christopher Stone (B.A., M.A.) is a senior space professional and Flight Commander with the 222nd Command and Control Squadron supporting National Security Space Operations. In his civilian capacity he is Senior Space Analyst (Policy Integration) with the DoD Executive Agent for Space Staff, Pentagon, through Falcon Research, Inc, a space strategic consulting company. He assumed role of corporate Vice President of Falcon Research in 2010. “Rethinking the national security space strategy: part 3,” The Space Review, 2/8/16, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2918/1) dwc 19 fulltext: Second, strategic reality in space requires an acknowledgement that active defense, in concert with passive defense measures, of US space infrastructures are vital to maintain information dominance in both diplomatic and military instruments of national power. It also supports homeland defense and overseas force projection in defense of US interests as well as allied defense treaty obligations. For example, James G. Lee of Air University wrote: //// …since information dominance can create uncertainty regarding the focus and thrust of the theater campaign, offensive counterspace operations should normally precede other theater operations. To attain information dominance, offensive counterspace operations should use a combination of [kinetic and non-kinetic] weapon systems to attack the operational center of gravity of a space system. Depending on the space system, the enemy, and the level of conflict, the center of gravity can be located in any of the three segments of an enemy’s space system.21 //// The Chinese understand this as part of the counter-intervention strategy with their space attack system enabled “informationalization.” As such, in order for the United States to generate sufficient friction and uncertainty in the mind of an adversary, information dominance supplied through counterspace operations is a must. This can be accomplished through “soft kill” or a “hard kill” and, depending on what type of space power the US employs, could target the ground segment or the space segment.22//// Strategists must acknowledge that space is an offense-dominant domain and, in order to provide effective deterrence, the United States must actively protect its space systems through a credible offensive counterforce capability to reverse the first-strike instability due to the Chinese KE ASATs and their satellite reconstitution launch capacity. //// While some assert that first strike stability is something that can be gained through the present NSSS, the facts as observed show the opposite is true. Space is indeed unique from other domains, but not in the way that some describe it. Space is an offensive-dominant domain and thus defense is challenging, especially in the kinetic, irreversible sphere. As a result, the Chinese view of deterrence makes much more sense in assuring space protection than the NSSS’ view of space deterrence.//// In this view, the posturing of forces for use as kinetic strikes against critical space infrastructure can be viewed as an escalation of threat and therefore, this threat to the homeland and interests of the nation should be neutralized before the attack can be made against whatever target or system is at risk. Mao once said he believed the Western view of waiting until one was attacked to be too passive.23 Our current posture attempts to treat space as if there is a means to defense, while not providing for a defense or real protection of this vital resource for our homeland. //// Finally, American strategists should recognize that deterrence requires getting into an adversary’s decision process through observation and analysis of their strategic culture, doctrine, and strategic behavior. They should orient the US force posture accordingly and be prepared to engage in military operations preventatively when necessary to actively defend space infrastructure and maintain escalation dominance in crisis or conflict. //// In short, the US must remove the temptation to strike at what has become the image of “soft ribs” for both deterrence of attack on the homeland as well as extended deterrence protections of allies as well.//// Deterrence, or war prevention, requires an understanding of the adversary, the adversary leadership’s decision cycle informed by its strategic culture, and resulting worldview. Deterrence must be focused on the adversary’s senior leadership decision processes, including the means of commanding and controlling forces and shaping the strategic and operational levels through the holding of vital adversary targets at risk. How does one accomplish this strategic deterrence formulation between a Western nation that traditionally relies on its near-term technological gains, training, and linear-based tactical planning to formulate operational objectives and strategic end states, versus a potential adversary that thinks holistically, identifies themselves collectively, and maintains a long-term vision? //// The US senior leadership must develop a realistic strategy that Defense Department and intelligence community spacepower can support and that highlights the unique space domain defense requirements in order to effectively protect its space based critical infrastructure. How can the United States gain real, effective deterrence in the Pacific? Understanding the adversary decision calculus is the first step. This requires observation into the adversary command and control structures and processes.//// The United States defense leadership should create a space support strategy that enables the means to remove the perception that attacking space infrastructure is a low-threshold action that will have no response in kind. This perception has led the PLA down the path of creating space weapons as part of the Chinese overarching counter-intervention strategy that targets the vulnerability of the architecture, the perceived lack of will to actively defend those assets, or counter those increasing risks to American way of life and operations. In short, the US must remove the temptation to strike at what has become the image of “soft ribs” for both deterrence of attack on the homeland as well as extended deterrence protections of allies as well. This image must be reversed. How? We must act upon the knowledge and understanding of strategic reality and use our resources at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries. //// One way to do this is to take what America already has in current programs of record, across multiple services and agencies, and flip the Tao on its head. The United States should exploit operations and weapons that: //// Generate a rapidly changing environment (quick/clear observations, orientation and decisions, fast-tempo, fast transient maneuvers, leading to quick kill when needed).//// Inhibit a potential adversary’s capacity to adapt to such an environment by clouding or distorting their observations, orientation, and decision calculus.//// Simultaneously improve our own command and control and space force posture, offensive deterrence capabilities and options for senior leaders to compress our own time to decision and actions (kinetic or non-kinetic), while stretching out the adversary’s time to generate a favorable mismatch in time/ability to shape and adapt to change.//// The goal would be to collapse the Chinese’s current strategy of counter-intervention (supported and enabled by multi-layered space forces) into confusion and disorder by causing them to over- or under-react to activity that appears simultaneously menacing as well as ambiguous, chaotic, or misleading. In short, the goal is to get ahead in their own strategic game of expansion and domination of the space environment as well as the terrestrial engagements supported by offensive space deterrence.24<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The threat of pre-emptive attack collapses Chinese intervention strategy.</h4><p><strong>Stone 16</strong> (Christopher Stone (B.A., M.A.) is a senior space professional and Flight Commander with the 222nd Command and Control Squadron supporting National Security Space Operations. In his civilian capacity he is Senior Space Analyst (Policy Integration) with the DoD Executive Agent for Space Staff, Pentagon, through Falcon Research, Inc, a space strategic consulting company. He assumed role of corporate Vice President of Falcon Research in 2010. “Rethinking the national security space strategy: part 3,” The Space Review, 2/8/16, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2918/1) dwc 19</p><p>Second, strategic reality in space requires an acknowledgement that <u><strong><mark>active defense</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>in concert with passive defense measures, of US space infrastructures are <mark>vital to maintain</mark> information <mark>dominance</mark> in both diplomatic and military instruments of national power</u></strong>. It also supports homeland defense and overseas force projection in defense of US interests as well as allied defense treaty obligations. For example, James G. Lee of Air University wrote: //// …since information dominance can create uncertainty regarding the focus and thrust of the theater campaign, <u><strong><mark>offensive counterspace operations should</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>normally</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>precede</u></strong></mark> other theater operations. To attain information dominance, <u><strong>offensive <mark>counterspace</mark> operations <mark>should use</mark> a <mark>combination of [kinetic and non-kinetic] weapon systems</mark> to attack the operational center of gravity of a space system</u></strong>. Depending on the space system, the enemy, and the level of conflict, the center of gravity can be located in any of the three segments of an enemy’s space system.21 //// The Chinese understand this as part of the counter-intervention strategy with their space attack system enabled “informationalization.” As such, in order for the United States to generate sufficient friction and uncertainty in the mind of an adversary, information dominance supplied through counterspace operations is a must. This can be accomplished through “soft kill” or a “hard kill” and, depending on what type of space power the US employs, could target the ground segment or the space segment.22//// Strategists must acknowledge that space is an offense-dominant domain and, <u><strong>in order <mark>to provide</mark> effective <mark>deterrence</mark>, the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>must</mark> actively <mark>protect</mark> its space systems <mark>through</mark> a <mark>credible</mark> offensive <mark>counterforce</mark> capability <mark>to reverse</mark> the <mark>first-strike instability due to</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>Chinese</u></strong></mark> KE <u><strong><mark>ASATs</u></strong></mark> and their satellite reconstitution launch capacity. //// While some assert that first strike stability is something that can be gained through the present NSSS, the facts as observed show the opposite is true. <u><strong>Space is indeed unique from other domains, but not in the way that some describe</u></strong> it. Space is an offensive-dominant domain and thus <u><strong>defense is challenging, especially in the kinetic, irreversible sphere. </u></strong>As a result, the Chinese view of deterrence makes much more sense in assuring space protection than the NSSS’ view of space deterrence.//// In this view, the posturing of forces for use as kinetic strikes against critical space infrastructure can be viewed as an escalation of threat and therefore, this threat to the homeland and interests of the nation should be neutralized before the attack can be made against whatever target or system is at risk. Mao once said he believed the Western view of waiting until one was attacked to be too passive.23 Our current posture attempts to treat space as if there is a means to defense, while not providing for a defense or real protection of this vital resource for our homeland. //// Finally, American strategists should recognize that <u><strong>deterrence requires getting into an adversary’s decision process through observation and analysis of their strategic culture, doctrine, and strategic behavior</u></strong>. They <u><strong><mark>should orient</mark> the US force <mark>posture accordingly and</mark> be prepared to <mark>engage in military operations preventatively when necessary to</mark> actively defend space infrastructure and <mark>maintain escalation dominance</mark> in crisis or conflict. </u></strong>//// In short, <u><strong><mark>the US must remove</mark> the <mark>temptation to strike at</mark> what has become the image of “<mark>soft ribs” for</mark> both deterrence of attack on the <mark>homeland as well as</mark> extended deterrence protections of <mark>allies</mark> as well</u></strong>.//// Deterrence, or war prevention, requires an understanding of the adversary, the adversary leadership’s decision cycle informed by its strategic culture, and resulting worldview. Deterrence must be focused on the adversary’s senior leadership decision processes, including the means of commanding and controlling forces and shaping the strategic and operational levels through the holding of vital adversary targets at risk. How does one accomplish this strategic deterrence formulation between a Western nation that traditionally relies on its near-term technological gains, training, and linear-based tactical planning to formulate operational objectives and strategic end states, versus a potential adversary that thinks holistically, identifies themselves collectively, and maintains a long-term vision? //// The US senior leadership must develop a realistic strategy that Defense Department and intelligence community spacepower can support and that highlights the unique space domain defense requirements in order to effectively protect its space based critical infrastructure. How can the United States gain real, effective deterrence in the Pacific? Understanding the adversary decision calculus is the first step. This requires observation into the adversary command and control structures and processes.//// The <u><strong><mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates defense leadership <mark>should create</mark> a space support <mark>strategy that </mark>enables the means to <mark>remove</mark> the <mark>perception</mark> that <mark>attacking space infrastructure</mark> is a low-threshold action that <mark>will have no response</mark> in kind. <mark>This perception</mark> has <mark>led the PLA</mark> down the path of <mark>creating space weapons</mark> as part of the Chinese overarching counter-intervention strategy that targets the vulnerability of the architecture</u></strong>, the perceived lack of will to actively defend those assets, or counter those increasing risks to American way of life and operations. In short, the US must remove the temptation to strike at what has become the image of “soft ribs” for both deterrence of attack on the homeland as well as extended deterrence protections of allies as well. This image must be reversed. How? We must act upon the knowledge and understanding of strategic reality and use our resources at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries. //// One way to do this is to take what America already has in current programs of record, across multiple services and agencies, and flip the Tao on its head. The United States should exploit operations and weapons that: //// Generate a rapidly changing environment (quick/clear observations, orientation and decisions, fast-tempo, fast transient maneuvers, leading to quick kill when needed).//// Inhibit a potential adversary’s capacity to adapt to such an environment by clouding or distorting their observations, orientation, and decision calculus.//// Simultaneously improve our own command and control and space force posture, offensive deterrence capabilities and options for senior leaders to compress our own time to decision and actions (kinetic or non-kinetic), while stretching out the adversary’s time to generate a favorable mismatch in time/ability to shape and adapt to change.//// <u><strong><mark>The goal would be to collapse</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>Chinese’s</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>current</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>strategy of counter-intervention</u></strong></mark> (supported and enabled by multi-layered space forces) <u><strong><mark>into confusion</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and disorder</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>by causing them to over- or under-react</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to activity that appears simultaneously menacing as well as ambiguous, chaotic, or misleading</u></strong>. In short, the goal is <u><strong><mark>to get ahead in their</mark> </u></strong>own strategic <u><strong><mark>game of</mark> expansion and</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>domination of</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>space</u></strong></mark> environment <u><strong><mark>as well as</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>terrestrial engagements supported by</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>offensive</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>space deterrence</u></strong></mark>.24</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Busby 17 — Joshua Busby, Associate Professor of Public Affairs at the University of Texas-Austin, Distinguished Scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, PhD in Government from Georgetown University, 2017 (“Water and U.S. National Security,” Center on Foreign Relations, January, Available Online at https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2017/01/Discussion_Paper_Busby_Water_and_US_Security_OR.pdf, Accessed on 08-09-2021) fulltext: Water and security are inextricably linked in every region of the world. While shared interests have historically facilitated cooperation in managing water, the future could be different. Climate change, combined with increased and more diverse demands for water, makes disputes more likely. Moreover, many of the security problems associated with water will occur in areas where the United States has strategic interests, including the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific. Yet water as an issue for U.S. national security lacks sustained visibility and sufficient funding. To address global water issues, pragmatic steps are necessary. These include an enhanced priority for water and security at the highest levels in the U.S. government; more support for data collection, analysis, and early warning efforts; investments in institutions to manage transboundary rivers and domestic water supplies; and more public-private partnerships to increase water supplies, water conservation, and to waterproof at-risk infrastructure. Water is essential for drinking, agriculture, and livestock. It is also used for electricity generation and industry. But around the world, hundreds of millions of people live without access to sufficient water for part or all of the year. The largest numbers of people who face constant water scarcity live in China and India, but high proportions of the populations of Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Yemen also face severe year-round water stress. Acute droughts periodically put millions of lives and livelihoods at risk. In a world of climate change and increased population growth, challenges related to water scarcity will only grow. A number of the states affected by chronic water scarcity also have weak governance, and some are already experiencing conflict. Where watersheds are shared across borders, governments may dispute control of those water resources, particularly where upstream dam construction diverts water from downstream countries. While violence is not inevitable, and history shows extensive water sharing between countries, conflicts over water are likely to become more severe in a world of nearly eight billion people experiencing increased demand for water, growing urbanization, and climate change. Within states, the effects of water scarcity on lives and livelihoods can lead to economic downturns and migration. Too little water can lead to crop failure, starvation, and thirst. Water scarcity in countries dependent on hydropower can lead to electricity shortages that adversely affect economies and contribute to civil unrest. In extreme circumstances, those who control water can use it as a coercive tool. Scarcity is not the only source of water-related security problems. Too much water can lead to flooding and large-scale loss of life, while irregular or volatile water supplies can upend planting cycles and prevent effective preparations and adaptations. Changes in rainfall patterns can also shift the geographic range of disease vectors, such as mosquitoes. Institutions, both domestic and international, mediate how conflicts over water are handled. They provide frameworks for competing interests to peacefully resolve disputes and establish water sharing. They guide sustainable investments in conservation and water storage. Inadequate or absent institutions can contribute to poor planning and insufficient water supplies, potentially exacerbating social and political tensions. The United States is not blind to the risks related to water security. A report on global water security, released by the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) in March 2012, identified some of the main risks and areas of concern.1 The State Department has a small office led by the special coordinator for water resources that oversees an Interagency Water Working Group to coordinate U.S. efforts on water across the executive branch. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has supported some analytical products and projects on water, though mostly relating to sanitation and hygiene. Beyond this, the United States is the leading producer of satellite information on water and the environment. That said, the U.S. government has not sufficiently mobilized to prepare for water-related challenges. It has not fully utilized the capabilities of U.S. civil society, universities, and the private sector to anticipate and address water-related problems around the world. Improved data sources and methods, including satellite data collected by U.S. government assets, now make it possible to identify fragile states and river basins where water problems are most likely. The failure to invest in water and security now could mean that the United States and other international actors will pay billions later to respond to crises, whether they be humanitarian emergencies, disease outbreaks, or conflicts within or between states. As the nexus between water and security gains attention, policymakers should keep in mind the need to “do no harm.” Outside countries and institutions should pay careful attention to the local context of a water dispute and its ripeness for resolution. In some instances, direct U.S. involvement could be appropriate. In others, the United States will be better served by working with partners to shore up its interests. Linking Water and Security Climate change has made natural water variability and scarcity more acute and will continue to do so. Periods of low rainfall and high temperatures are likely to last longer, be less predictable, and be punctuated by high rainfall events and rapid rises in sea level from storm surges. 2 Though some states may be able to compensate for decreased surface water by drawing from deeper groundwater, increased demand threatens to draw down groundwater to unsustainable levels.3 In May 2016, the World Bank released a report, High and Dry: Climate Change, Water, and the Economy. The report concluded that nearly 25 percent of the world’s population, approximately 1.6 billion people, live with water scarcity—and that number could potentially double in two decades.4 South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa currently face constant water stress. Another 2016 study found that two-thirds of the world’s population face severe water scarcity for at least one month a year, with half of those people in India and China. The study found that, globally, five hundred million people face water scarcity year round.5 Although these studies used different methodologies, their common conclusion is clear: substantial portions of humanity do not have access to enough water. Currently, nearly 70 percent of fresh water demand comes from agriculture. 6 But over the next thirty years, the demand for water will increasingly come from urban areas and their related energy needs. 7 As many as 2.5 billion more people may be living in cities by 2050, with 90 percent of that increase occurring in Africa and Asia, in countries with insufficient institutions or infrastructure to handle the rising demand for water. 8 In addition to the urban planning and humanitarian concerns that these realities raise, they also have real security implications. It is rare for states to go to war over water, but conflicts over resources within states are common. Humanitarian emergencies and disease epidemics can also become security problems when civilian agencies are unprepared or unable to respond. Local insecurity can spill over to neighboring states through migration, the spread of conflict across borders, or disease, triggering U.S. national security concerns. This is particularly true when the states involved are strategically important to the United States—for instance, because they provide important raw materials, are located along vital sea lanes, are important to the global economy, or coincide with active U.S. military operations.9 Water and Security Between Countries Analysts have periodically claimed that the world is poised for “water wars.” 10 However, there are only a few historical examples of violent conflict between countries explicitly over water.11 But the fact that it has rarely happened does not mean that it will not in the future, particularly when climate change threatens to make water problems more acute. Historically, tensions between states over water have led to water-sharing agreements that have alleviated the risk of violent conflict.12 More than 680 water treaties have been signed since 1820, more than half of which were agreed upon in the past half century.13 While these agreements are frequently far from fair, even governments that are otherwise politically opposed often find it possible to collaborate on water. As a 2014 Adelphi report on water diplomacy noted: “The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty has thus survived three wars between India and Pakistan, cooperation on the Mekong persisted throughout the Indochinese wars, and water has served as a crucial means for strengthening cooperation in Southern Africa.” 14 While it is possible to deal with water stress peacefully, transboundary water agreements are usually facilitated by robust institutions. River basins with stronger institutions—characterized by mechanisms to allocate water, manage water variability, resolve conflicts, and govern river basins—tend to have less conflict. The most severe security challenges between states emerge when countries—such as China, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, Thailand, and Turkey—have some domestic capacity to develop their water resources but insufficient institutional capacity to manage them properly. Along with sudden physical changes in the quantity or quality of water, tensions between or among states are often triggered by one party’s unilateral action to build a dam or water transfer project without consulting other affected states.15 These pressures could become increasingly difficult to manage without strong institutions, domestically and internationally. Unfortunately, institutions often leave something to be desired. In early 2016, for example, the worst drought in a century threatened Vietnam’s rice harvest, fisheries, and electricity production. Thai farmers upstream on the Mekong River began diverting water,which left both Vietnam and Cambodia in a difficult situation, having already endured diminished flows from dam-building further upstream by China and Laos.16 The river basin authority, the Mekong River Commission, is increasingly incapable of managing these disputes. China is not a member, and the Commission lost credibility and foreign funding after Laos, the host country, unilaterally approved dam-building in its territory.17 Given U.S. interests in the South China Sea, conflict along the Mekong River adds to the security frictions in this region. Cooperation on the Mekong could be easier to achieve than in the contentious South China Sea, and could help pave the way for better relations on other issues. New projects or events can even put reasonably robust institutions under strain. In September 2016, attacks on the Indian military by militants in Kashmir led the Indian government to threaten to withdraw from its water-sharing agreement with Pakistan over the Indus River.18 For the United States, tensions between India and Pakistan are undesirable, as would be actions that precipitated significant economic losses in the region, such as the unilateral diversion of upstream headwaters. Asia is not the only region to suffer from weak water institutions. Turkey has long dominated the use of water from the Tigris and Euphrates, having built large upstream dams and planned a number of others that could hurt Syria and Iraq downstream. While there is a water-sharing agreement on the Euphrates, no such agreement exists for the Tigris, and political turmoil in the region has made pursuit of a region-wide water-sharing agreement difficult.19 Tensions have also emerged between Iran and Afghanistan over the Helmand River. While the countries have a water-sharing agreement dating back to 1973, turmoil has harmed the Hamoun wetlands that straddle the border. Moreover, U.S. efforts to help reconstruct Afghanistan’s agricultural economy and water systems undermined Iran’s water security and contributed to Iranian support for the Taliban.20 Iran blames Afghanistan for the diversion of water and is opposed to Afghanistan’s completion of various dam projects in Nimruz Province, where there have been cross-border skirmishes over water.21 These episodes all underscore the need for strong institutions to facilitate water-sharing and conflict resolution. Strong institutions provide venues for data-sharing and consultation before major water projects are set in motion and affect other users. They can facilitate water allocation between parties deal with unexpected drops in water levels, and help resolve disputes, all of which are preferable to crisis diplomacy or military intervention.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Otherwise, weak U.S. water institutions cause global conflict. </h4><p><strong>Busby 17</strong> — Joshua Busby, Associate Professor of Public Affairs at the University of Texas-Austin, Distinguished Scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, PhD in Government from Georgetown University, 2017 (“Water and U.S. National Security,” Center on Foreign Relations, January, Available Online at https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2017/01/Discussion_Paper_Busby_Water_and_US_Security_OR.pdf<u><strong>, Accessed on 08-09-2021)</p><p>Water and security are inextricably linked in every region of the world</u></strong>. While <u><strong>shared interests have historically facilitated cooperation in managing water</u></strong>, the future could be different. <u><strong>Climate change, combined with increased and more diverse demands for water, makes disputes more likely</u></strong>. Moreover, <u><strong>many of the security problems associated with water will occur in areas where the United States has strategic interests, including the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific</u></strong>. Yet <u><strong>water as an issue for U.S. national security lacks sustained visibility and sufficient funding.</p><p>To address global water issues, pragmatic steps are necessary</u></strong>. These <u><strong>include an enhanced priority for water and security at the highest levels in the U.S. government; more support for data collection, analysis, and early warning efforts; investments in institutions to manage transboundary rivers and domestic water supplies; and more public-private partnerships to increase water supplies, water conservation, and to waterproof at-risk infrastructure.</p><p></u></strong>Water is essential for drinking, agriculture, and livestock. It is also used for electricity generation and industry. But around the world, hundreds of millions of people live without access to sufficient water for part or all of the year. The largest numbers of people who face constant water scarcity live in <u><strong>China and India, but high proportions of the populations of Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Yemen also face severe year-round water stress</u></strong>. Acute droughts periodically put millions of lives and livelihoods at risk. <u><strong>In a world of climate change and increased population growth, challenges related to water scarcity will only grow.</p><p></u></strong>A number of the <u><strong>states affected by chronic water scarcity also have weak governance, and some are already experiencing conflict.</u></strong> Where watersheds are shared across borders, <u><strong>governments may dispute control of those water resources, particularly where upstream dam construction diverts water from downstream countries. While violence is not inevitable, and history shows extensive water sharing between countries, conflicts over water are likely to become more severe </u></strong>in a world of nearly eight billion people experiencing increased demand for water, growing urbanization, and climate change.</p><p>Within states, the effects of water scarcity on lives and livelihoods can <u><strong>lead to economic downturns and migration. Too little water can lead to crop failure, starvation, and thirst. Water scarcity in countries dependent on hydropower can lead to electricity shortages that adversely affect economies and contribute to civil unrest</u></strong>. In extreme circumstances, those who control water can use it as a coercive tool.</p><p>Scarcity is not the only source of water-related security problems. <u><strong>Too much water can lead to flooding and large-scale loss of life, while irregular or volatile water supplies can upend planting cycles and prevent effective preparations and adaptations. Changes in rainfall patterns can also shift the geographic range of disease vectors, such as mosquitoes.</p><p>Institutions, both domestic and international, mediate how conflicts over water are handled</u></strong>. <u><strong>They provide frameworks for competing interests to peacefully resolve disputes and establish water sharing.</u></strong> They guide sustainable investments in conservation and water storage. <u><strong>Inadequate or absent institutions can contribute to poor planning and insufficient water supplies, potentially exacerbating social and political tensions.</p><p></u></strong>The United States is not blind to the risks related to water security. A report on global water security, released by the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) in March 2012, identified some of the main risks and areas of concern.1 The State Department has a small office led by the special coordinator for water resources that oversees an Interagency Water Working Group to coordinate U.S. efforts on water across the executive branch. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has supported some analytical products and projects on water, though mostly relating to sanitation and hygiene. Beyond this, <u><strong>the United States is the leading producer of satellite information on water and the environment.</p><p></u></strong>That said, <u><strong>the U.S. government has not sufficiently mobilized to prepare for water-related challenges. It has not fully utilized the capabilities of U.S. civil society, universities, and the private sector to anticipate and address water-related problems around the world.</u></strong> Improved data sources and methods, including satellite data collected by U.S. government assets, now make it possible to identify fragile states and river basins where water problems are most likely. <u><strong>The failure to invest in water and security now could mean that the United States and other international actors will pay billions later to respond to crises, whether they be humanitarian emergencies, disease outbreaks, or conflicts within or between states.</p><p></u></strong>As the nexus between water and security gains attention, policymakers should keep in mind the need to “do no harm.” <u><strong>Outside countries and institutions should pay careful attention to the local context of a water dispute and its ripeness for resolution. In some instances, direct U.S. involvement could be appropriate. In others, the United States will be better served by working with partners to shore up its interests.</p><p></u></strong>Linking Water and Security</p><p>Climate change has made natural water variability and scarcity more acute and will continue to do so. Periods of low rainfall and high temperatures are likely to last longer, be less predictable, and be punctuated by high rainfall events and rapid rises in sea level from storm surges. 2 <u><strong>Though some states may be able to compensate for decreased surface water by drawing from deeper groundwater, increased demand threatens to draw down groundwater to unsustainable levels.3</p><p></u></strong>In May 2016, the World Bank released a report, High and Dry: Climate Change, Water, and the Economy. The report concluded that nearly 25 percent of the world’s population, approximately 1.6 billion people, live with water scarcity—and that number could potentially double in two decades.4 <u><strong>South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa currently face constant water stress. Another 2016 study found that two-thirds of the world’s population face severe water scarcity for at least one month a year, with half of those people in India and China. The study found that, globally, five hundred million people face water scarcity year round.</u></strong>5 Although these studies used different methodologies, their common conclusion is clear: substantial portions of humanity do not have access to enough water.</p><p>Currently, nearly <u><strong>70 percent of fresh water demand comes from agriculture. 6 But over the next thirty years, the demand for water will increasingly come from urban areas and their related energy needs</u></strong>. 7 <u><strong>As many as 2.5 billion more people may be living in cities by 2050, with 90 percent of that increase occurring in Africa and Asia, in countries with insufficient institutions or infrastructure to handle the rising demand for water. 8</p><p></u></strong>In addition to the urban planning and humanitarian concerns that these realities raise, they also <u><strong>have real security implications. It is rare for states to go to war over water, but conflicts over resources within states are common. Humanitarian emergencies and disease epidemics can also become security problems when civilian agencies are unprepared or unable to respond.</p><p>Local insecurity can spill over to neighboring states through migration, the spread of conflict across borders, or disease, triggering U.S. national security concerns</u></strong>. This is particularly true when the <u><strong>states</u></strong> involved are strategically important to the United States—for instance, because they <u><strong>provide important raw materials, are located along vital sea lanes, are important to the global economy, or coincide with active U.S. military operations</u></strong>.9</p><p><u><strong>Water and Security Between Countries</p><p></u></strong>Analysts have periodically claimed that the <u><strong>world is poised for “water wars.”</u></strong> 10 However, there are only a few historical examples of violent conflict between countries explicitly over water.11 But <u><strong>the fact that it has rarely happened does not mean that it will not in the future, particularly when climate change threatens to make water problems more acute.</p><p>Historically, tensions between states over water have led to water-sharing agreements that have alleviated the risk of violent conflict.12 More than 680 water treaties have been signed since 1820, more than half of which were agreed upon in the past half century.13 While these agreements are frequently far from fair, even governments that are otherwise politically opposed often find it possible to collaborate on water. As a 2014 Adelphi report on water diplomacy noted: “The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty has thus survived three wars between India and Pakistan, cooperation on the Mekong persisted throughout the Indochinese wars, and water has served as a crucial means for strengthening cooperation in Southern Africa.” 14</p><p>While it is possible to deal with water stress peacefully, transboundary water agreements are usually facilitated by robust institutions. River basins with stronger institutions—characterized by mechanisms to allocate water, manage water variability, resolve conflicts, and govern river basins—tend to have less conflict.</p><p></u></strong>The <u><strong>most severe security challenges between states emerge when countries—such as China, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, Thailand, and Turkey—have some domestic capacity to develop their water resources but insufficient institutional capacity to manage them properly. Along with sudden physical changes in the quantity or quality of water, tensions between or among states are often triggered by one party’s unilateral action to build a dam or water transfer project without consulting other affected states.15 These pressures could become increasingly difficult to manage without strong institutions, domestically and internationally</u></strong>.</p><p>Unfortunately, <u><strong>institutions often leave something to be desired</u></strong>. In early 2016, for example, the worst drought in a century threatened Vietnam’s rice harvest, fisheries, and electricity production. Thai farmers upstream on the Mekong River began diverting water,which left both Vietnam and Cambodia in a difficult situation, having already endured diminished flows from dam-building further upstream by China and Laos.16 The river basin authority, the Mekong River Commission, is increasingly incapable of managing these disputes. China is not a member, and the Commission lost credibility and foreign funding after Laos, the host country, unilaterally approved dam-building in its territory.17 <u><strong>Given U.S. interests in the South China Sea, conflict along the Mekong River adds to the security frictions in this region. Cooperation on the Mekong could be easier to achieve than in the contentious South China Sea, and could help pave the way for better relations on other issues.</p><p>New projects or events can even put reasonably robust institutions under strain</u></strong>. In September 2016, attacks on the Indian military by militants in Kashmir led the Indian government to threaten to withdraw from its water-sharing agreement with Pakistan over the Indus River.18 <u><strong>For the United States, tensions between India and Pakistan are undesirable, as would be actions that precipitated significant economic losses in the region, such as the unilateral diversion of upstream headwaters.</p><p>Asia is not the only region to suffer from weak water institutions. Turkey has long dominated the use of water from the Tigris and Euphrates, having built large upstream dams and planned a number of others that could hurt Syria and Iraq downstream</u></strong>. While there is a water-sharing agreement on the Euphrates, no such agreement exists for the Tigris, and political turmoil in the region has made pursuit of a region-wide water-sharing agreement difficult.19</p><p><u><strong>Tensions have also emerged between Iran and Afghanistan over the Helmand River</u></strong>. While the countries have a water-sharing agreement dating back to 1973, turmoil has harmed the Hamoun wetlands that straddle the border. Moreover, U.S. efforts to help reconstruct Afghanistan’s agricultural economy and water systems undermined Iran’s water security and contributed to Iranian support for the Taliban.20 Iran blames Afghanistan for the diversion of water and is opposed to Afghanistan’s completion of various dam projects in Nimruz<u><strong> Province, where there have been cross-border skirmishes over water.21</p><p></u></strong>These <u><strong>episodes all underscore the need for strong institutions to facilitate water-sharing and conflict resolution</u></strong>. <u><strong>Strong institutions provide venues for data-sharing and consultation before major water projects are set in motion and affect other users. They can facilitate water allocation between parties deal with unexpected drops in water levels, and help resolve disputes, all of which are preferable to crisis diplomacy or military intervention.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Pummer 15 — (Theron Pummer, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford, “Moral Agreement on Saving the World“, Practical Ethics University of Oxford, 5-18-2015, Available Online at http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/, accessed 7-2-2018, HKR-AM) **we do not endorse ableist language** fulltext: There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Extinction o/ws under any framework, even under moral uncertainty – infinite future generations </h4><p><strong>Pummer 15</strong> — (Theron Pummer, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford, “Moral Agreement on Saving the World“, Practical Ethics University of Oxford, 5-18-2015, Available Online at http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/, accessed 7-2-2018, HKR-AM) **we do not endorse ableist language**</p><p><u>There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy.</u> Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe <u>there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war.</u> How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here<u>. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how <mark>reducing existential risk is</mark> easily <mark>the most important</mark> thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – <mark>there are</mark> <mark>trillions upon trillions</mark>… upon trillions.</u> <u>There are so many possible <mark>future people</mark> that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world,</u> <u><mark>even if the well-being</mark> of these possible people <mark>were</mark> <mark>given</mark> only <mark>0.001% </mark>as much <mark>weight</mark> as that of existing people</u>. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that <u>there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists</u>. But that is a huge mistake. <u><mark>Non-consequentialism </mark>is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it <mark>is not</mark> the view <mark>that the latter don’t matter</mark>. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” <mark>Minimally plausible versions of deont</mark>ology <mark>and virtue ethics must be concerned</mark> in part <mark>with promoting the good</mark>, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus <mark>imply</mark> very <mark>strong reasons to reduce existential risk</mark>, </u>at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. <u>We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree</u>. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct<u>. <mark>Even if they were 90% sure </mark>that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), <mark>they would have </mark>pretty strong <mark>reason, from </mark>the standpoint of <mark>moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk</mark>. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world</u>. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. <u>Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately:</u> “We live during the hinge of history. <u>Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period.</u> <u>Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly</u>.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters) </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: King 2k8 (Neil, Peak Oil: A Survey of Security Concerns, Center for a New American Security, p. 14-17) fulltext: Many commentators in the United States and abroad have begun to wrestle with the question of whether soaring oil prices and market volatility could spark an outright oil war between major powers—possibly ignited not by China or Russia, but by the United States. In a particularly pointed speech on the topic in May, James Russell of the Naval Postgraduate School in California addressed what he called the increasing militarization of international energy security. “Energy security is now deemed so central to ‘national security’ that threats to the former are liable to be refl exively interpreted as threats to the latter,” he told a gathering at the James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy at Houston’s Rice University.6 The possibility that a large-scale war could break out over access to dwindling energy resources, he wrote, “is one of the most alarming prospects facing the current world system.”7 Mr. Russell figures among a growing pool of analysts who worry in particular about the psychological readiness of the United States to deal rationally with a sustained oil shock. Particularly troubling is the increasing perception within Congress that the fi nancial side of the oil markets no longer functions rationally. It has either been taken over by speculators or is being manipulated, on the supply side, by producers who are holding back on pumping more oil in order to drive up the price. A breakdown in trust for the oil markets, these analysts fear, could spur calls for government action—even military intervention. “The perceptive chasm in the United States between new [oil] market realities and their impact on the global distribution of power will one day close,” Mr. Russell said. “And when it does, look out.”8 The World at Peak: Taking the Dim View For years, skeptics scoffed at predictions that the United States would hit its own domestic oil production peak by sometime in the late 1960s. With its oil fields pumping full out, the U.S. in 1969 was providing an astonishing 25 percent of the world’s oil supply—a role no other country has ever come close to matching. U.S. production then peaked in December 1970, and has fallen steadily ever since, a shift that has dramatically altered America’s own sense of vulnerability and reordered its military priorities. During World War II, when its allies found their own oil supplies cut off by the war, the United States stepped in and made up the difference. Today it is able to meet less than a third of its own needs. A similar peak in worldwide production would have far more sweeping consequences. It would, for one, spell the end of the world’s unparalleled economic boom over the last century. It would also dramatically reorder the wobbly balance of power between nations as energy-challenged industrialized countries turn their sights on the oil-rich nations of the Middle East and Africa. In a peak oil future, the small, fl attened, globalized world that has awed recent commentators would become decidedly round and very vast again. Oceans will reemerge as a hindrance to trade, instead of the conduit they have been for so long. An energy-born jolt to the world economy would leave no corner of the globe untouched. Unable to pay their own fuel bills, the tiny Marshall Islands this summer faced the possibility of going entirely without power. That is a reality that could sweep across many of the smallest and poorest countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, reversing many of the tentative gains in those regions and stirring deep social unrest. Large patches of the world rely almost entirely on diesel-powered generators for what skimpy electricity they now have. Those generators are the first to run empty as prices soar. A British parliamentary report released in June on “The Impact of Peak Oil on International Development” concluded that “the deepening energy crisis has the potential to make poverty a permanent state for a growing number of people, undoing the development efforts of a generation.”9 We are seeing some of the consequences already in Pakistan – a country of huge strategic importance, with its own stash of nuclear weapons – that is now in the grips of a severe energy crisis. By crippling the country’s economy, battering the stock market, and spurring mass protests, Pakistan’s power shortages could end up giving the country’s Islamic parties the leverage they have long needed to take power. It’s not hard to imagine similar scenarios playing out in dozens of other developing countries. Deepening economic unrest will put an enormous strain on the United Nations and other international aid agencies. Anyone who has ever visited a major UN relief hub knows that their fleets of Land Rovers, jumbo jets and prop planes have a militarysize thirst for fuel. Aid agency budgets will come under unprecedented pressure just as the need for international aid skyrockets and donor countries themselves feel pressed for cash. A peaking of oil supplies could also hasten the impact of global climate change by dramatically driving up the use of coal for power generation in much of the world. A weakened world economy would also put in jeopardy the massively expensive projects, such as carbon capture and storage, that many experts look to for a reduction in industrial emissions. So on top of the strains caused by scarce fossil fuels, the world may also have to grapple with the destabilizing effects of more rapid desertification, dwindling fisheries, and strained food supplies. An oil-constricted world will also stir perilous frictions between haves and have-nots. The vast majority of all the world’s known oil reserves is now in the hands of national oil companies, largely in countries with corrupt and autocratic governments. Many of these governments—Iran and Venezuela top the list—are now seen as antagonists of the United States. Tightened oil supplies will substantially boost these countries’ political leverage, but that enhanced power will carry its own peril. Playing the oil card when nations are scrambling for every barrel will be a far more serious matter that at any time in the past. The European continent could also undergo a profound shift as its needs—and sources of energy—diverge all the more from those of the United States. A conservation-oriented Europe (oil demand is on the decline in almost every EU country) will look all the more askance at what it sees as the gluttonous habits of the United States. At the same time, Europe’s governments may have little choice but to shy from any political confrontations with its principal energy supplier, Russia. An energy-restricted future will greatly enhance Russia’s clout within settings like the UN Security Council but also in its dealings with both Europe and China. Abundant oil and gas have fueled Russia’s return to power over the last decade, giving it renewed standing within the UN and increasing sway over European capitals. The peak oil threat is already sending shivers through the big developing countries of China and India, whose propulsive growth (and own internal stability) requires massive doses of energy. For Beijing, running low on fuel spells economic chaos and internal strife, which in turn spawns images of insurrection and a breaking up of the continentsized country. Slumping oil supplies will automatically pit the two largest energy consumers—the United States and China—against one another in competition over supplies in South America, West Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. China is already taking this competition very seriously. It doesn’t require much of a leap to imagine a Cold War-style scramble between Washington and Beijing—not for like-minded allies this time but simply for reliable and tested suppliers of oil. One region that offers promise and peril in almost equal measure is the Artic, which many in the oil industry consider the last big basin of untapped hydrocarbon riches. But the Artic remains an ungoverned ocean whose legal status couldn’t be less clear, especially so long as the United States continues to remain outside the international Law of the Sea Treaty. As the ices there recede, the risk increases that a scramble for assets in the Artic could turn nasty<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Oil volatility sparks great power war --- forces U.S. intervention and goes nuclear</h4><p><strong>King 2k8 (Neil, Peak Oil: A Survey of Security Concerns, Center for a New American Security, p. 14-17)</p><p></strong>Many <u><strong>commentators</u></strong> in the United States and abroad <u><strong>have begun to wrestle with the question of whether</u></strong> soaring <u><strong><mark>oil</u></strong></mark> prices and <u><strong><mark>market volatility could spark an outright oil war between</mark> <mark>major powers</u></strong></mark>—possibly ignited not by China or Russia, but by the United States. In a particularly pointed speech on the topic in May, James Russell of the Naval Postgraduate School in California addressed what he called the increasing militarization of international energy security. “<u><strong>Energy security is now deemed so central to ‘national security’ that threats to the former are liable to be refl exively interpreted as threats to the latter</u></strong>,” he told a gathering at the James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy at Houston’s Rice University.6 <u><strong><mark>The possibility that a large-scale war could break out over access to dwindling</mark> energy <mark>resources</u></strong></mark>, he wrote, “<u><strong><mark>is one of the most alarming prospects</mark> facing the current world system</u></strong>.”7 Mr. Russell figures among a growing pool of analysts who worry in particular about the psychological readiness of the United States to deal rationally with a sustained oil shock. Particularly troubling is the increasing perception within Congress that the fi nancial side of the oil markets no longer functions rationally. It has either been taken over by speculators or is being manipulated, on the supply side, by producers who are holding back on pumping more oil in order to drive up the price. <u><strong><mark>A breakdown in trust for the oil markets</u></strong></mark>, these analysts fear, <u><strong><mark>could spur calls for</u></strong></mark> government action—even <u><strong><mark>military intervention</u></strong></mark>. “The perceptive chasm in the United States between new [oil] market realities and their impact on the global distribution of power will one day close,” Mr. Russell said. “And when it does, look out.”8 The World at Peak: Taking the Dim View For years, skeptics scoffed at predictions that the United States would hit its own domestic oil production peak by sometime in the late 1960s. With its oil fields pumping full out, the U.S. in 1969 was providing an astonishing 25 percent of the world’s oil supply—a role no other country has ever come close to matching. U.S. production then peaked in December 1970, and has fallen steadily ever since, a shift that has dramatically altered America’s own sense of vulnerability and reordered its military priorities. During World War II, when its allies found their own oil supplies cut off by the war, the United States stepped in and made up the difference. Today it is able to meet less than a third of its own needs. A similar peak in worldwide production would have far more sweeping consequences. It would, for one, spell the <u><strong><mark>end</mark> </u></strong>of <u><strong><mark>the world’s unparalleled economic boom</u></strong></mark> over the last century. <u><strong>It would</u></strong> also <u><strong><mark>dramatically reorder the</u></strong></mark> wobbly <u><strong><mark>balance of power</u></strong></mark> between nations as energy-challenged industrialized countries turn their sights on the oil-rich nations of the Middle East and Africa. In a peak oil future, the small, fl attened, globalized world that has awed recent commentators would become decidedly round and very vast again. <u><strong><mark>Oceans</mark> will <mark>reemerge as</mark> <mark>a hindrance to trade</u></strong></mark>, instead of the conduit they have been for so long. <u><strong>An energy-born jolt</u></strong> to the world economy <u><strong>would leave no corner of the globe untouched</u></strong>. Unable to pay their own fuel bills, the tiny Marshall Islands this summer faced the possibility of going entirely without power. That is a reality that could sweep across many of the smallest and poorest countries in <u><strong>Africa, Asia, and Latin America</u></strong>, reversing many of the tentative gains in those regions and <u><strong>stirring deep social unrest</u></strong>. Large patches of the world rely almost entirely on diesel-powered generators for what skimpy electricity they now have. Those generators are the first to run empty as prices soar. A British parliamentary report released in June on “The Impact of Peak Oil on International Development” concluded that “the deepening energy crisis has the potential to make poverty a permanent state for a growing number of people, undoing the development efforts of a generation.”9 We are seeing some of the consequences already in Pakistan – a country of huge strategic importance, with its own stash of nuclear weapons – that is now in the grips of a severe energy crisis. By crippling the country’s economy, battering the stock market, and spurring mass protests, <u><strong><mark>Pakistan</mark>’s <mark>power shortages could</mark> end up <mark>givi</mark>ng <mark>the country’s Islamic parties the leverage</mark> they have long <mark>needed to take power</mark>. It’s not hard to imagine similar scenarios playing out in dozens of other developing countries</u></strong>. Deepening economic unrest will put an enormous strain on the United Nations and other international aid agencies. Anyone who has ever visited a major UN relief hub knows that their fleets of Land Rovers, jumbo jets and prop planes have a militarysize thirst for fuel. Aid agency budgets will come under unprecedented pressure just as the need for international aid skyrockets and donor countries themselves feel pressed for cash. A peaking of oil supplies could also hasten the impact of global climate change by dramatically driving up the use of coal for power generation in much of the world. A weakened world economy would also put in jeopardy the massively expensive projects, such as carbon capture and storage, that many experts look to for a reduction in industrial emissions. So on top of the strains caused by scarce fossil fuels, the world may also have to grapple with the destabilizing effects of <u><strong>more <mark>rapid desertification, dwindling fisheries, and strained food supplies</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>An oil-constricted world will also stir perilous frictions between haves and have-nots</u></strong>. The vast majority of all the world’s known oil reserves is now in the hands of national oil companies, largely in countries with corrupt and autocratic governments. Many of these governments—<u><strong>Iran and Venezuela</u></strong> top the list—are now seen as antagonists of the United States. <u><strong>Tightened oil supplies will substantially boost these countries’ political leverage</u></strong>, but that enhanced power will carry its own peril. Playing the oil card when nations are scrambling for every barrel will be a far more serious matter that at any time in the past. The European continent could also undergo a profound shift as its needs—and sources of energy—diverge all the more from those of the United States. A conservation-oriented Europe (oil demand is on the decline in almost every EU country) will look all the more askance at what it sees as the gluttonous habits of the United States. At the same time, <u><strong>Europe’s governments may have little choice but to shy from any political confrontations with its principal energy supplier, Russia</u></strong>. An energy-restricted future will greatly enhance Russia’s clout within settings like the UN Security Council but also in its dealings with both Europe and China. Abundant oil and gas have fueled Russia’s return to power over the last decade, giving it renewed standing within the UN and increasing sway over European capitals. The peak oil threat is already sending shivers through the big developing countries of China and India, whose propulsive growth (and own internal stability) requires massive doses of energy. <u><strong><mark>For Beijing,</mark> running low on fuel spells<mark> economic chaos and internal strife</mark>, which in turn spawns images of <mark>insurrection and a breaking up of the continentsized country</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Slumping oil supplies will</mark> </u></strong>automatically <u><strong><mark>pit</u></strong></mark> the two largest energy consumers—the <u><strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>and China—against one another</mark> in competition over supplies in South America</u></strong>, West Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. China is already taking this competition very seriously. It doesn’t require much of a leap to <u><strong>imagine a Cold War-style scramble between Washington and Beijing</u></strong>—not for like-minded allies this time but simply <u><strong>for reliable and tested suppliers of oil.</u></strong> One region that offers promise and peril in almost equal measure is the Artic, which many in the oil industry consider the last big basin of untapped hydrocarbon riches. But the Artic remains an ungoverned ocean whose legal status couldn’t be less clear, especially so long as the United States continues to remain outside the international Law of the Sea Treaty. As the ices there recede, the risk increases that <u><strong>a scramble for assets</u></strong> in the Artic <u><strong>could turn nasty</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: PANETTA, 12 -- LEON E. PANETTA, Secretary of Defense, (10-11-2012, accessed on 7-21-2020, US Department of Defense, "Defense.gov Transcript: Remarks by Secretary Panetta on Cybersecurity to the Business Executives for National Security, New York City", https://archive.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5136) ICW-AZL fulltext: I've long appreciated, from my own experience, New York's role as the center of gravity for our nation's economy. This is where it's at. And for that reason, it's an honor to be able to speak before this kind of distinguished audience of business leaders and innovators because you understand what a strong national defense is all about and you understand that a strong national defense and a strong economy go hand in hand. With that in mind, tonight I'd like to discuss with you an issue that I think is at the very nexus of business and national security: the threats facing the United States in cyberspace and the role that the Defense Department must play in defending this country from those kinds of threats. We're on an aircraft carrier, a famous and great aircraft carrier and it's a fitting and appropriate venue to have this discussion. This ship and the technology that's on display at this museum, attests to one of the central achievements of the United States in the 20th century, our ability to project power and strength across the land, across the high seas, across the skies and across outer space. We secured those domains. Securing them helped ensure that they were used to advance peace and prosperity and were not used to promote war and aggression. It is with that same goal in mind, today we have to address a new domain that we must secure to have peace and prosperity in the world of tomorrow. Cyberspace has fundamentally transformed the global economy. It's transformed our way of life, providing two billion people across the world with instant access to information to communication, to economic opportunities. Cyberspace is the new frontier, full of possibilities to advance security and prosperity in the 21st century. And yet, with these possibilities, also come new perils and new dangers. The Internet is open. It's highly accessible, as it should be. But that also presents a new terrain for warfare. It is a battlefield of the future where adversaries can seek to do harm to our country, to our economy, and to our citizens. I know that when people think of cybersecurity today, they worry about hackers and criminals who prowl the Internet, steal people's identities, steal sensitive business information, steal even national security secrets. Those threats are real and they exist today. But the even greater danger -- the greater danger facing us in cyberspace goes beyond crime and it goes beyond harassment. A cyber attack perpetrated by nation states are violent extremists groups could be as destructive as the terrorist attack on 9/11. Such a destructive cyber-terrorist attack could virtually paralyze the nation. Let me give you some examples of the kinds of attacks that we have already experienced. In recent weeks, as many of you know, some large U.S. financial institutions were hit by so-called Distributed Denial of Service attacks. These attacks delayed or disrupted services on customer websites. While this kind of tactic isn't new, the scale and speed with which it happened was unprecedented. But even more alarming is an attack that happened two months ago when a very sophisticated virus called Shamoon infected computers in the Saudi Arabian State Oil Company Aramco. Shamoon included a routine called a ‘wiper’, coded to self-execute. This routine replaced crucial systems files with an image of a burning U.S. flag. But it also put additional garbage data that overwrote all the real data on the machine. More than 30,000 computers that it infected were rendered useless and had to be replaced. It virtually destroyed 30,000 computers. Then just days after this incident, there was a similar attack on RasGas of Qatar, a major energy company in the region. All told, the Shamoon virus was probably the most destructive attack that the private sector has seen to date. Imagine the impact an attack like that would have on your company or your business. These attacks mark a significant escalation of the cyber threat and they have renewed concerns about still more destructive scenarios that could unfold. For example, we know that foreign cyber actors are probing America's critical infrastructure networks. They are targeting the computer control systems that operate chemical, electricity and water plants and those that guide transportation throughout this country. We know of specific instances where intruders have successfully gained access to these control systems. We also know that they are seeking to create advanced tools to attack these systems and cause panic and destruction and even the loss of life. Let me explain how this could unfold. An aggressor nation or extremist group could use these kinds of cyber tools to gain control of critical switches. They could, for example, derail passenger trains or even more dangerous, derail trains loaded with lethal chemicals. They could contaminate the water supply in major cities or shutdown the power grid across large parts of the country. The most destructive scenarios involve cyber actors launching several attacks on our critical infrastructure at one time, in combination with a physical attack on our country. Attackers could also seek to disable or degrade critical military systems and communication networks. The collective result of these kinds of attacks could be a cyber Pearl Harbor; an attack that would cause physical destruction and the loss of life. In fact, it would paralyze and shock the nation and create a new, profound sense of vulnerability. As director of the CIA and now Secretary of Defense, I have understood that cyber attacks are every bit as real as the more well-known threats like terrorism, nuclear weapons proliferation and the turmoil that we see in the Middle East. And the cyber threats facing this country are growing. With dramatic advances, this is an area of dramatic developments in cyber technology. With that happening, potential aggressors are exploiting vulnerabilities in our security. But the good news is this, we are aware of this potential. Our eyes are wide open to these kinds of threats and we are a nation that, thank God, is on the cutting edge of this new technology. We are the best and we have to stay there. The Department of Defense, in large part through the capabilities of the National Security Agency, NSA, has develop the world's most sophisticated system to detect cyber intruders and attackers. We are acting aggressively to get ahead of this problem, putting in place measures to stop cyber attacks dead in their tracks. We are doing this as part of a broad whole of government effort to confront cyber threats. The Department of Homeland Security has the lead for domestic cybersecurity, the FBI also has a key part to play and investigating and preventing cyber-attacks. And our intelligence agencies, of course, are focused on this potential threat as well. The State Department is trying to forge international consensus on the roles and responsibilities of nations to help secure cyberspace. The Department of Defense also has a role. It is a supporting role but it is an essential role. And tonight I want to explain what that means. But first let me make clear what it does not mean. It does not mean that the Department of Defense will monitor citizens’ personal computers. We're not interested in personal communication or in e-mails or in providing the day to day security of private and commercial networks. That is not our goal. That is not our job. That is not our mission. Our mission is to defend the nation. We defend. We deter, and if called upon, we take decisive action to protect our citizens. In the past, we have done so thorough operations on land and at sea, in the skies and in space. In this century, the United States military must help defend the nation in cyberspace as well. If a foreign adversary attacked U.S. soil, the American people have every right to expect their national defense forces to respond. If a crippling cyber attack were launched against our nation, the American people must be protected. And if the Commander in Chief orders a response, the Defense Department must be ready to obey that order and to act. To ensure that we fulfill our role to defend the nation in cyberspace, the department is focusing on three main tracks. One, developing new capabilities. Two, putting in place the policies and organizations we need to execute our mission. And three, building much more effective cooperation with industry and with our international partners. Let me briefly talk about each of these. First, developing new capabilities. DoD is investing more than $3 billion annually in cybersecurity because we have to retain that cutting edge capability in the field. Following our new defense strategy, the department is continuing to increase key investments in cybersecurity even in an era of fiscal restraint. Our most important investment is in skilled cyber warriors needed to conduct operations in cyberspace. Just as DoD developed the world's finest counterterrorism force over the past decade, we need to build and maintain the finest cyber force and operations. We're recruiting, we're training, we're retaining the best and the brightest in order to stay ahead of other nations. It's no secret that Russia and China have advanced cyber capabilities. Iran has also undertaken a concerted effort to use cyberspace to its advantage. Moreover, DoD is already in an intense daily struggle against thousands of cyber actors who probe the Defense Department's networks, millions of time a day. Throughout the innovative efforts of our cyber operators, we've been trying to enhance the department's cyber-defense programs. These systems rely on sensors; they rely on software to hunt down the malicious code before it harms our systems. We actively share our own experience defending our systems with those running the nation's critical private sector networks. In addition to defending the department's networks, we also help deter attacks. Our cyber adversaries will be far less likely to hit us if they know that we will be able to link to the attack or that their effort will fail against our strong defenses. The department has made significant advances in solving a problem that makes deterring cyber adversaries more complex: the difficulty of identifying the origins of that attack. Over the last two years, DoD has made significant investments in forensics to address this problem of attribution and we're seeing the returns on that investment. Potential aggressors should be aware that the United States has the capacity to locate them and to hold them accountable for their actions that may try to harm America. But we won't succeed in preventing a cyber attack through improved defenses alone. If we detect an imminent threat of attack that will cause significant, physical destruction in the United States or kill American citizens, we need to have the option to take action against those who would attack us to defend this nation when directed by the president. For these kinds of scenarios, the department has developed that capability to conduct effective operations to counter threats to our national interests in cyberspace. Let me clear that we will only do so to defend our nation, to defend our interests, to defend our allies and we will only do so in a manner that is consistent with the policy principles and legal frameworks that the department follows for other domains including the law of armed conflict. Which brings me to the second area of focus, policies and organization. Responding to the cyber threat requires the right policies and organizations across the federal government. For the past year, the Department of Defense has been working very closely with other agencies to understand where are the lines of responsibility when it comes to cyber defense. Where do we draw those lines? And how do those responsibilities get executed? As part of that effort, the department is now finalizing the most comprehensive change to our rules of engagement in cyberspace in seven years. The new rules will make clear that the department has a responsibility, not only to defend DoD's networks, but also to be prepared to defend the nation and our national interests against an attack in or through cyberspace. These new rules make the department more agile and provide us with the ability to confront major threats quickly.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Cyberterrorism escalates.</h4><p><strong>PANETTA, 12</strong> -- LEON E. PANETTA, Secretary of Defense, (10-11-2012, accessed on 7-21-2020, US Department of Defense, "Defense.gov Transcript: Remarks by Secretary Panetta on Cybersecurity to the Business Executives for National Security, New York City", https://archive.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5136) ICW-AZL</p><p>I've long appreciated, from my own experience, New York's role as the center of gravity for our nation's economy. This is where it's at. And for that reason, it's an honor to be able to speak before this kind of distinguished audience of business leaders and innovators because you understand what a strong national defense is all about and you understand that a strong national defense and a strong economy go hand in hand. With that in mind, tonight I'd like to discuss with you an issue that I think is at <u>the very nexus of business and national security</u>: the <u>threats facing the United States in cyberspace and the role that the Defense Department must play in defending this country from those kinds of threats</u>. We're on an aircraft carrier, a famous and great aircraft carrier and it's a fitting and appropriate venue to have this discussion. This ship and the technology that's on display at this museum, attests to <u>one of the central achievements of the United States in the 20th century, our ability to project power and strength across the land, across the high seas, across the skies and across outer space</u>. We secured those domains. <u>Securing them helped ensure that they were used to advance peace and prosperity and were not used to promote war and aggression</u>. It is with that same goal in mind, today <u>we have to address a new domain that we must secure to have peace and prosperity in the world of tomorrow</u>. <u><mark>Cyberspace has</mark> fundamentally <mark>transformed the </mark>global <mark>economy</mark>. </u>It's transformed our way of life, <u>providing two billion people across the world with instant access to information to communication, to economic opportunities. Cyberspace is the new frontier, full of possibilities to advance security and prosperity in the 21st century</u>. And <u>yet</u>, with <u>these possibilities, also come new perils and new dangers. The Internet is open. It's highly accessible</u>, as it should be. But <u>that also presents a new terrain for warfare. It is a battlefield of the future where adversaries can seek to do harm to our country, to our economy, and to our citizens</u>. I know that when people think of cybersecurity today, they worry about <u>hackers and criminals who prowl the Internet, steal people's identities, steal sensitive business information, steal even national security secrets. </u>Those threats <u>are real and they exist today</u>. <u>But the even greater danger</u> -- the greater danger facing us in cyberspace goes beyond crime and it goes beyond harassment. <u>A <mark>cyber attack</mark> perpetrated by nation states are violent extremists groups <mark>could be <strong>as destructive as </mark>the terrorist attack on <mark>9/11</strong></mark>.</u> <u>Such a destructive cyber-terrorist attack <mark>could virtually paralyze the nation</mark>.</u> Let me give you <u>some</u> examples of the kinds of attacks that <u>we have already experienced. </u>In recent weeks, as many of you know, some <u>large U.S. financial institutions were hit by so-called Distributed Denial of Service attacks</u>. These attacks delayed or disrupted services on customer websites. While this kind of tactic isn't new, <u>the scale and speed with which it happened was unprecedented</u>. But even more alarming is an attack that happened two months ago when <u>a very sophisticated virus called <mark>Shamoon infected computers</mark> in the Saudi Arabian State Oil Company Aramco. Shamoon included a routine called a ‘wiper’, coded to self-execute</u>. <u>This routine replaced crucial systems files with an image of a burning U.S. flag</u>. But <u>it also put additional garbage data that overwrote all the real data on the machine</u>. More than <u>30,000 computers</u> that it infected <u>were rendered useless</u> and had to be replaced. It virtually destroyed 30,000 computers. Then just days after this incident, there was a <u>similar attack on</u> <u>RasGas of</u> <u>Qatar</u>, a major energy company in the region. All told, the Shamoon virus was probably the most destructive attack that the private sector has seen to date. Imagine the impact an attack like that would have on your company or your business. <u>These attacks mark a significant escalation of the cyber threat and they have renewed concerns about still more destructive scenarios that could unfold</u>. For example, we know that <u><strong>foreign <mark>cyber actors are probing America</mark>'s critical infrastructure networks</u></strong>. They are <u>targeting the computer control systems <mark>that operate chemical, electricity and water plants</mark> and <mark>those that guide transportation</mark> throughout this country</u>. <u>We know of specific instances where intruders have successfully gained access</u> to these control systems. <u>We</u> also <u>know</u> that <u>they are seeking</u> to create advanced tools <u>to attack these systems and <mark>cause panic and destruction and</mark> even the <mark>loss of life</u></mark>. <u>Let me explain how this could unfold. An aggressor nation or <mark>extremist group could</mark> use these kinds of cyber tools to <mark>gain control of critical switches</mark>. They could</u>, for example, <u><mark>derail passenger trains</mark> or even more dangerous, <mark>derail trains loaded with lethal chemicals</mark>. </u>They could <u><mark>contaminate the water supply</mark> in major cities or <mark>shutdown the power grid</mark> across large parts of the country.</u> <u>The most destructive scenarios involve cyber actors launching several attacks on our critical infrastructure at one time, in combination with a physical attack on our country</u>. <u>Attackers could</u> also seek to <u>disable or degrade critical military systems and communication networks</u>. <u>The collective result</u> of these kinds of attacks could be <u><strong><mark>a cyber Pearl Harbor</u></strong></mark>; an attack <u>that would cause physical destruction and the loss of life</u>. In fact, <u>it would paralyze and shock the nation and create a new, profound sense of vulnerability.</u> <u>As director of the CIA and now Secretary of Defense, I have understood that <strong>cyber attacks are every bit as real as the more well-known threats like terrorism, nuclear weapons proliferation and the turmoil that we see in the Middle East</u>.</strong> <u>And the cyber threats facing this country are growing.</u> With dramatic advances, this is an area of dramatic developments in cyber technology. With that happening, <u>potential aggressors are exploiting vulnerabilities in our security</u>. But the good news is this, we are aware of this potential. Our eyes are wide open to these kinds of threats and we are a nation that, thank God, is on the cutting edge of this new technology. We are the best and we have to stay there. The Department of Defense, in large part through the capabilities of the National Security Agency, NSA, has develop the world's most sophisticated system to detect cyber intruders and attackers. We are acting aggressively to get ahead of this problem, putting in place measures to stop cyber attacks dead in their tracks. We are doing this as part of a broad whole of government effort to confront cyber threats. The Department of Homeland Security has the lead for domestic cybersecurity, the FBI also has a key part to play and investigating and preventing cyber-attacks. And our intelligence agencies, of course, are focused on this potential threat as well. The State Department is trying to forge international consensus on the roles and responsibilities of nations to help secure cyberspace. The Department of Defense also has a role. It is a supporting role but it is an essential role. And tonight I want to explain what that means. But first let me make clear what it does not mean. It does not mean that the Department of Defense will monitor citizens’ personal computers. We're not interested in personal communication or in e-mails or in providing the day to day security of private and commercial networks. That is not our goal. That is not our job. That is not our mission. Our mission is to defend the nation. We defend. We deter, and if called upon, we take decisive action to protect our citizens. In the past, we have done so thorough operations on land and at sea, in the skies and in space. In this century, the United States military must help defend the nation in cyberspace as well. <u>If a foreign adversary attacked U.S. soil, the American people have every right to expect their <strong>national defense forces</strong> to <strong>respond</strong>.</u> If a crippling cyber attack were launched against our nation, the American people must be protected. And if the Commander in Chief orders a response, the Defense Department must be ready to obey that order and to act. To ensure that we fulfill our role to defend the nation in cyberspace, the department is focusing on three main tracks. One, developing new capabilities. Two, putting in place the policies and organizations we need to execute our mission. And three, building much more effective cooperation with industry and with our international partners. Let me briefly talk about each of these. First, developing new capabilities. DoD is investing more than $3 billion annually in cybersecurity because we have to retain that cutting edge capability in the field. Following our new defense strategy, the department is continuing to increase key investments in cybersecurity even in an era of fiscal restraint. Our most important investment is in skilled cyber warriors needed to conduct operations in cyberspace. Just as DoD developed the world's finest counterterrorism force over the past decade, we need to build and maintain the finest cyber force and operations. We're recruiting, we're training, we're retaining the best and the brightest in order to stay ahead of other nations. It's no secret that Russia and China have advanced cyber capabilities. Iran has also undertaken a concerted effort to use cyberspace to its advantage. Moreover, DoD is already in an intense daily struggle against thousands of cyber actors who probe the Defense Department's networks, millions of time a day. Throughout the innovative efforts of our cyber operators, we've been trying to enhance the department's cyber-defense programs. These systems rely on sensors; they rely on software to hunt down the malicious code before it harms our systems. We actively share our own experience defending our systems with those running the nation's critical private sector networks. In addition to defending the department's networks, we also help deter attacks. Our cyber adversaries will be far less likely to hit us if they know that we will be able to link to the attack or that their effort will fail against our strong defenses. The department has made significant advances in solving a problem that makes deterring cyber adversaries more complex: the difficulty of identifying the origins of that attack. Over the last two years, DoD has made significant investments in forensics to address this problem of attribution and we're seeing the returns on that investment. Potential aggressors should be aware that the United States has the capacity to locate them and to hold them accountable for their actions that may try to harm America. But we won't succeed in preventing a cyber attack through improved defenses alone. If we detect an imminent threat of attack that will cause significant, physical destruction in the United States or kill American citizens, we need to have the option to take action against those who would attack us to defend this nation when directed by the president. For these kinds of scenarios, the department has developed that capability to conduct effective operations to counter threats to our national interests in cyberspace. Let me clear that we will only do so to defend our nation, to defend our interests, to defend our allies and we will only do so in a manner that is consistent with the policy principles and legal frameworks that the department follows for other domains including the law of armed conflict. Which brings me to the second area of focus, policies and organization. Responding to the cyber threat requires the right policies and organizations across the federal government. For the past year, <u>the Department of Defense</u> has been working very closely with other agencies to understand where are the lines of responsibility when it comes to cyber defense. Where do we draw those lines? And how do those responsibilities get executed? As part of that effort, the department is now finalizing the most comprehensive change to our rules of engagement in cyberspace in seven years. The new <u>rules</u> will <u>make clear that the department has a responsibility</u>, not only to defend DoD's networks, but also to be prepared <u>to defend the nation and our national interests against an attack in or through cyberspace.</u> These new <u>rules make the department</u> <u>more agile and provide us with the ability to confront major threats quickly</u>. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Murillo 16 [Dr. John Murillo III – graduate of Brown University with a PhD in English. His primary research interests include twentieth century black literature, afro-pessimism, critical theory, quantum mechanics, astrophysics, and cosmology. “Quantum Blackanics: Untimely Blackness, and Black Literature Out of Nowhere.” Brown Library Repository. May 2016; Rehan] fulltext: Black “life” and “death” do not matter. This is the structural truth of the antiblack world, and this truth (or “fact”1) telegraphs an unethical, gratuitously violent antagonism between Black folk who “live” and “die,” and the antiblack world that sanctions, desires, and demands the meaninglessness of even those quotation marks.2 The most attentive and radical Black thought and action works to examine the forces that drive the antiblack world, and contend the destructive, terrorizing manifestations and effects of those forces as they position Blacks in space and time. My dissertation attempts to map these forces from a Black position through a careful examination of twentieth century Black literature. Specifically, I am guided by this set of questions: How do the forces that position Blacks in the space and time antiblack world affect the kind of (literary) creation we might produce? How might we engage Black (literary) creation? And what is at stake in both Black (literary) creation, and our engagements with it? “Living,” “dying “ and creating in the “afterlife of slavery,”3 the undying, haunting and structural subjection of Blacks that seals us into “crushing objecthood,” (Fanon, 82) is to “live,” “die” and create in relation to an antagonism that is temporal, spatial, and political-ontological in nature. As Dionne Brand writes in A Map to the Door of No Return, slavery violently disfigures time and space, creating a rift or “tear in the world...a rupture in history, a rupture in the quality of being [and] a physical rupture, a rupture of geography” (Brand, 4-5). Time and space shatter in slavery’s unending wake, such that slavery persists as an afterlife, framing and disfiguring the scenes of subjection4 we endure and to which we bear witness across time and space. My dissertation reads time and space in and through Black literature, and draws from Physics—from modern and emergent theories in quantum mechanics, astrophysics, and general relativity—to help develop a nuanced, unique approach that both merges my interests in Black Studies and theoretical physics, but also illuminates what I understand to be two, underthought— or uncritically thought of—fundamental features of being (time and space). On the one hand, it is as if time “shows no movement,” slavery’s persistence in “endless disguise” (e.g. see: footnote 3) throwing the idea of linear progress (read: temporal movement away from slavery) into violent disarray.5 On the other, it is as if all possible temporal movement and “all moments” in the antiblack world “somehow gesture back” (24-5) to this inaugural “tear,” creating a series of endless, overlapping loops entangling all of time with the time of enslavement. This untimely problem is what girds the longue durée of social death: that slavery creates a problem that halts and loops time disperses the political-ontological position of the socially dead across all temporal moments and movements in its wake. Blackness and Slaveness collapse into the same political-ontological position, in part because of a distortion, or warping, of time as we know it. So when Fanon writes, “the problem to be considered here is one of time,” (Fanon, 176) I take this very seriously. In the first chapter of the dissertation, “Black (in) Time: Untimely Blackness,” which bears his words as its epigraph, I aim to read Black literature that meditates on this untimely force. I begin by engaging extremely recent work by Michelle M. Wright who, in Physics of Blackness, examines the prevailing assumptions about time’s relation to Blackness in and outside the academy in order to suggest that a novel understanding of this relation might produce deeper and more inclusive investigations into what it means to be Black in an antiblack world. I contend with her theory of “epiphenomenal time” on the grounds that although it is founded on a proper critique of the way Black thought (and all thought) takes its understanding of time for granted by uncritically clinging to an outdated, “Newtonian” theory of time6, it is too easily and carelessly recuperative. Specifically, she must set aside or ignore the violence at the heart of the relation between Blackness and time in order to present “epiphenomenal time” as a corrective to this problem. In order to suggest my own theory of the relation, called unethical time, or “untime,” I read a range of literary and theoretical works that unflinchingly center this violence. I also draw from Physical concepts (e.g. Blueshift) and theories (e.g. of Black holes) to enrich my readings of the mechanics and effects of “untime.” This must accomplish two things: first, it must provide a map of time’s violent relation to Blackness; second, this map must provide a new way to understand the Black position in its untimeliness. In terms of literary work, Gayl Jones’s Corregidora provides useful insight into the persistence of slavery’s violence across generations. Jones mobilizes the violence of time to produce questions about relationality and generation—in a double sense, procreative and creative—sustaining a meditation on untimely Blackness creates problems for the relations between and among Blacks, and between Blackness and the possibility of (pro)creation. Through David Marriott and Frantz Fanon, I extend my engagement with these problems into a theorization of the “deathliness” (Marriott, 231) that characterizes what I call “untime” as a way of naming the force behind the violent relation that Jones traces. And I end with a reading of Octavia Butler’s Kindred, which seems to take untime’s force very seriously, mobilizing it as a real and serious problem in the novel, and so rendering it more readily available for our attention. Untimeliness characterizes part of the Black position, and this has consequences for the possibilities of Black creation. The second chapter, “Untimely Wor(l)ds in the Key of Love,” seeks to examine the kind of (literary) creation this “untime” renders available to Black folk. Animated by Christina Sharpe’s recent essay in The Black Scholar, I read untimely Black creation as a form of “wake work,” a kind of work in the ceaseless wake of Slavery that seeks to “care for, comfort, and defend the dead, the dying, and those lives consigned, in the aftermath of legal chattel slavery, to death that is always-imminent and immanent” (Sharpe, 59-60). I aim to unpack Sharpe’s conceptualization in order to examine how Black literature, Black literary work, inhabits the untimeliness of the “wake” and works from the Black position of that inhabitation. Kiese Laymon’s Long Division wields untime’s force while metafictionally meditating on questions about the connections between Black “life” and Black “death,” Black words, and Black (literary) creation. I read his text as asking: How do we write and string together sentences while Black in an antiblack world? And how does Black writing relate to the untimely relation between Blackness and time? I then turn to Toni Morrison’s Beloved, which provides an interesting set of questions about “narrative” and the way these stories never “pass on” (Morrison, 323)—never die, become ghastly and ghostly— are, or must not be, “passed on”—either avoided or dismissed—and must be “passed on”—shared, distributed, dispersed. In that last sense of the phrase, I ask: “Passed on” to where? To turn back to Dionne Brand’s quote, and how the “tear in the world” also produces a spatial problem for Blackness. Slavery’s mutation of time into a violent, antiblack force, comes with a similarly violent distortion of Blackness’s political-ontological, imaginative and physical relation to space. Being relegated to a deathly space, a “zone of nonbeing,” precipitates in a displacement of Black being from the antiblack world of the living to a veritable “underworld” of the dying, the dead, and those who “live” in inescapable proximity to death. Black nonbeings lose “all bearings,” and so vertiginously7 lose a relation to “geography” or place, which problematizes the possibility of a Black “Diaspora” that takes for granted this relation. And Black nonbeings suffer a violent loss of a sense of being, subject to a psychic shattering (Fanon describes this as a “split” and a “dislocation”) that violently disperses Black being’s fragments across a psychic, or imaginative, space that, itself, is “a sterile and arid region.” I am particularly interested in the creation of textual space from this displaced position.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Theorize the world as <u>antiblack</u>---only this <u>structural analysis</u> can come to terms with timebound <u>political grammars</u> that continue <u>ontological violence</u>.</h4><p><strong>Murillo 16</strong> [Dr. John Murillo III – graduate of Brown University with a PhD in English. His primary research interests include twentieth century black literature, afro-pessimism, critical theory, quantum mechanics, astrophysics, and cosmology. “Quantum Blackanics: Untimely Blackness, and Black Literature Out of Nowhere.” Brown Library Repository. May 2016; Rehan]</p><p><u><strong>Black “life” and “death” do not matter</strong>.</u> <u><strong><mark>This</mark> is the <mark>structural truth</mark> of the antiblack world</u></strong>, <u>and this truth</u> (<u>or <strong>“fact”</u></strong>1) <u><mark>telegraphs</mark> <mark>a</u></mark>n unethical, <u>gratuitously <mark>violent <strong>antagonism</strong></mark> between Black folk who “live” and “die</u>,” <u>and the antiblack world <mark>that</mark> <strong>sanctions</u></strong>, <u><strong>desires</u></strong>, <u>and <strong><mark>demands</u></strong></mark> the <u>meaningless</u>ness of even those <u>quotation marks</u>.2 The most attentive and radical Black thought and action works to examine the forces that drive the antiblack world, <u>and</u> contend the <u>destructive</u>, <u>terrorizing manifestations</u> and effects of those forces as they position Blacks in space and time. My dissertation attempts to map these forces from a Black position through a careful examination of twentieth century Black literature. Specifically, I am guided by this set of questions: How do the forces that position Blacks in the space and time antiblack world affect the kind of (literary) creation we might produce? How might we engage Black (literary) creation? And what is at stake in both Black (literary) creation, and our engagements with it? “Living,” “dying “ and <u>creating <mark>in the</u></mark> “<u><strong><mark>afterlife of slavery</u></strong></mark>,”3 <u><mark>the</mark> undying</u>, <u>haunting</u> and <u><strong><mark>structural</strong></mark> subjection of</u> Blacks that seals us into <strong><mark>“<u>crushing objecthood</u>,”</strong></mark> (Fanon, 82) is to “live,” “die” and create <u>in relation to an antagonism <mark>that is <strong>temporal</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>spatial</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and</mark> <strong>political-<mark>ontological</strong></mark> in nature</u>. As Dionne <u>Brand writes</u> in A Map to the Door of No Return, slavery violently disfigures time and space, <u>creating a rift or</u> <strong>“<u>tear in the world...a rupture in <mark>history</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>a rupture in the quality of <mark>being</mark> [and] a physical rupture</u></strong>, <u><strong>a rupture of <mark>geography</u></mark>”</strong> (Brand, 4-5). <u><strong>Time</strong> and <strong>space</strong> <mark>shatter in slavery’s unending wake</u></mark>, <u>such that slavery persists as an afterlife</u>, <u>framing and <mark>disfiguring</mark> the <strong><mark>scenes of subjection</u></strong></mark>4 we endure and to which we bear witness across time and space. My dissertation reads time and space in and through Black literature, and draws from Physics—from modern and emergent theories in quantum mechanics, astrophysics, and general relativity—to help develop a nuanced, unique approach that both merges my interests in Black Studies and theoretical physics, but also illuminates what I understand to be two, underthought— or <u>uncritically thought</u> of—fundamental features of being (time and space). On the one hand, <u>it is as if <strong><mark>time</u> “<u>shows no movement</u>,”</strong></mark> <u>slavery’s persistence in</u> <strong>“<u>endless disguise</u>” </strong>(e.g. see: footnote 3) <u><mark>throwing</mark> the idea of <strong><mark>linear progress</u></strong></mark> (<u>read</u>: <u>temporal movement away from slavery</u>) <u><mark>into</mark> violent <strong><mark>disarray</u></strong></mark>.5 On the other, <u>it is as if <mark>all</mark> possible <mark>temporal</mark> movement and</u> <strong>“<u>all <mark>moments</u></mark>”</strong> <u>in the antiblack world</u> <strong><mark>“<u>somehow gesture back</u>”</strong></mark> (24-5) <u>to this inaugural</u> “<u>tear</u>,” <u><strong><mark>creating a series of endless</u></mark>, <u>overlapping <mark>loops</mark> entangling all of time with the time <mark>of enslavement</u></strong></mark>. <u>This untimely problem is what girds <mark>the <strong>longue durée</strong></mark> of <strong>social death</u></strong>: <u>that</u> slavery creates a problem that <u>halts and loops time disperses the political-ontological position of the socially dead</u> across all temporal moments and movements in its wake. Blackness and Slaveness collapse into the same political-ontological position, <u>in part because of a distortion</u>, <u>or warping</u>, <u>of time as we know it</u>. So when <u>Fanon writes</u>, <strong>“<u>the problem to be considered here is one of time</u>,”</strong> (Fanon, 176) I take this very seriously. In the first chapter of the dissertation, “Black (in) Time: Untimely Blackness,” which bears his words as its epigraph, I aim to read Black literature that meditates on this untimely force. I begin by engaging extremely recent work by Michelle M. <u>Wright</u> who, in Physics of Blackness, <u>examines the prevailing assumptions about time’s relation to Blackness <mark>in and outside the <strong>academy</u></strong></mark> in order to suggest that a <u>novel understanding of this relation <mark>might produce deeper</mark> and more inclusive <strong><mark>investigations</strong> into</mark> what it means to be Black in an antiblack world</u>. I contend with her theory of “epiphenomenal time” on the grounds that although it is founded on a proper critique of the way Black thought (and all thought) takes its understanding of time for granted by uncritically clinging to an outdated, <strong>“<u>Newtonian</u>”</strong> <u><mark>theory</mark> of time</u>6, <u>it is<strong> <mark>too easily and carelessly recuperative</u></strong></mark>. Specifically, she must set aside or ignore the violence at the heart of the relation between Blackness and time in order to present “epiphenomenal time” as a corrective to this problem. In order to suggest my own theory of the relation, called unethical time, or “untime,” I read a range of literary and theoretical works that unflinchingly center this violence. I also draw from Physical concepts (e.g. Blueshift) and theories (e.g. of Black holes) to enrich my readings of the mechanics and effects of “untime.” This must accomplish two things: first, it must provide a map of time’s violent relation to Blackness; second, this map must provide a new way to understand the Black position in its untimeliness. In terms of literary work, Gayl Jones’s Corregidora provides useful insight into the persistence of slavery’s violence across generations. Jones mobilizes the violence of time to produce questions about relationality and generation—in a double sense, procreative and creative—sustaining a meditation on untimely Blackness creates problems for the relations between and among Blacks, and between Blackness and the possibility of (pro)creation. Through David Marriott and Frantz Fanon, I extend my engagement with these problems into a theorization of the “deathliness” (Marriott, 231) that characterizes what I call “untime” as a way of naming the force behind the violent relation that Jones traces. And I end with a reading of Octavia Butler’s Kindred, which seems to take untime’s force very seriously, mobilizing it as a real and serious problem in the novel, and so rendering it more readily available for our attention. Untimeliness characterizes part of the Black position, and this has consequences for the possibilities of Black creation. The second chapter, “Untimely Wor(l)ds in the Key of Love,” seeks to examine the kind of (literary) creation this “untime” renders available to Black folk. Animated by Christina Sharpe’s recent essay in The Black Scholar, I read untimely Black creation as a form of “wake work,” a kind of work in the ceaseless wake of Slavery that seeks to “care for, comfort, and defend the dead, the dying, and those lives consigned, in the aftermath of legal chattel slavery, to death that is always-imminent and immanent” (Sharpe, 59-60). I aim to unpack Sharpe’s conceptualization in order to examine how Black literature, Black literary work, inhabits the untimeliness of the “wake” and works from the Black position of that inhabitation. Kiese Laymon’s Long Division wields untime’s force while metafictionally meditating on questions about the connections between Black “life” and Black “death,” Black words, and Black (literary) creation. I read his text as asking: How do we write and string together sentences while Black in an antiblack world? And how does Black writing relate to the untimely relation between Blackness and time? I then turn to Toni Morrison’s Beloved, which provides an interesting set of <u><mark>questions</mark> about</u> “<u>narrative</u>” and the way these stories never “pass on” (Morrison, 323)—<u><mark>never die</u></mark>, <u>become ghastly <mark>and</mark> ghostly</u>— are, or <u><mark>must not be</u></mark>, “passed on”—either <u><strong><mark>avoided</strong> or <strong>dismissed</u></strong></mark>—<u>and must be</u> “<u>passed on</u>”—shared, distributed, dispersed. In that last sense of the phrase, I ask: “Passed on” to where? To turn back to Dionne Brand’s quote, and how the “tear in the world” also produces a spatial problem for Blackness. <u><mark>Slavery’s</mark> mutation of time into a violent</u>, <u><mark>antiblack force</u></mark>, <u><mark>comes with a</mark> similarly violent <strong><mark>distortion</strong> of</mark> Blackness’s <strong>political-ontological</u></strong>, <u><strong>imaginative</u></strong> <u>and <strong>physical</strong> relation to space</u>. <u><strong><mark>Being</strong> relegated to</mark> a deathly space</u>, <u>a</u> <strong>“<u>zone of nonbeing</u>,”</strong> <u>precipitates in a <strong><mark>displacement</strong></mark> of <strong>Black being</strong> <mark>from the</mark> antiblack <strong><mark>world</strong></mark> of the living to a veritable</u> <strong>“<u>underworld</u>”</strong> <u>of the dying</u>, <u>the dead</u>, <u>and those who</u> “<u>live</u>” <u>in inescapable proximity to death</u>. Black nonbeings lose “all bearings,” and so vertiginously7 lose a relation to “geography” or place, which problematizes the possibility of a Black “Diaspora” that takes for granted this relation. And <u>Black nonbeings suffer a violent loss of a sense of being</u>, <u>subject to a psychic shattering</u> (Fanon describes this as <u>a</u> “<u>split</u>” and <u>a</u> “<u>dislocation</u>”) <u>that violently disperses Black being’s fragments <mark>across</mark> a psychic</u>, or imaginative, <u><strong><mark>space</strong></mark> that</u>, itself, <u>is</u> “<u>a sterile and arid region</u>.” I am particularly interested in the creation of textual space from this displaced position.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Bandow 20 (Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. He worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry; “Washington Should Stop Pretending to Be Turkey’s Ally”; CATO Institute; 10/13/20; https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/washington-should-stop-pretending-be-turkeys-ally kp) fulltext: However, by the end of the decade, Erdogan and his party had immersed themselves in corruption and initiated authoritarian rule. His commitment to Islam turned harsh and political. Rule of law, individual liberties, and democratic procedures all were sacrificed to enhance regime power. The 2016 attempted coup was Erdogan’s Reichstag fire, justifying the brutal crackdown and purge that he’d long wanted and may have planned. Last year, for the first time, Erdogan tampered with the actual vote, forcing a rerun of the Istanbul mayoral race, which his party ended up losing twice. Next time he may be more desperate—and simply steal the election. The cumulative impact has been to destroy what was always a flawed and limited democracy. The group Freedom House rates the country as not free. The State Department points to “reports of arbitrary killings; suspicious deaths of persons in custody; forced disappearances; torture; arbitrary arrest and detention of tens of thousands of persons,” and that’s just the start. All of which has undermined NATO. The Europeans take democracy more seriously than during the Cold War. Indeed, they justified the alliance’s post‐​Cold War expansion as a means of integrating the former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe into the West. The allies also perceive Russia’s slide backward into authoritarianism as part of its menace. Even more problematic for NATO is Ankara’s increasingly independent and hostile foreign policy. Russia is Europe’s only conceivable serious adversary. Yet Erdogan has become the equivalent of a fifth columnist, more likely to support Moscow than Brussels. His policy toward Russia was irresponsibly reckless when, five years ago, Ankara shot down a Russian warplane operating in Syria for briefly straying into Turkish airspace. Had war erupted, Washington would have been expected to confront nuclear‐​armed Russia. Erdogan then staged a dramatic policy pirouette and joined with Moscow to manage the denouement of the Syrian civil war. Moreover, Ankara decided to purchase the S-400 air defense system, triggering an administration cut-off from the F-35 program and congressional demands for economic sanctions. The Russian and Turkish governments have still ended up on opposite sides in the fight over opposition‐​controlled Syrian territory, Libya’s civil war, and the growing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, they so far have maintained their political bonds. Indeed, Ankara’s allegiance to NATO looks a lot like Italy’s pre-World War I membership in the Triple Alliance. When armies started marching, Rome refused to honor its promises and eventually entered the war on the other side (bribed by the Entente with promises of Austro‐​Hungarian territory). How likely is Turkey to declare war on Russia to help defend, say, Estonia? This factor alone warrants ejection of Ankara from the transatlantic alliance. However, Turkey’s involvement in Syria is not just a problem of cooperation with Moscow. During the early years of the civil war, the Erdogan government allowed the Islamic State free transit across the Turkish border; Turkish intelligence is believed to have directly assisted the group. Moreover, Erdogan family and staff members may have profited through trade with ISIS. Ankara also launched two invasions targeting Washington’s Kurdish allies, which led the ground assault on the Islamist movement’s Syria‐​based “caliphate.” Turkey employed Islamist Arabic forces, which committed ethnic cleansing and other atrocities against the Syrian Kurds. Now Ankara is threatening war against fellow NATO members and prospective EU partners. Perhaps the most enduring dispute is over control of Aegean Sea waters. Greek islands near Turkey greatly restrict the latter’s sovereignty over areas that Ankara considers to be its own. Air and naval confrontations between Greece and Turkey are routine. Moreover, Ankara continues to occupy much of Cyprus 46 years later. The presence of undersea oil and natural gas created a new dispute, leading to naval clashes between Turkey and the internationally recognized Cypriot government. Ankara is promoting energy exploration in areas claimed by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognized only by Turkey. Israel also is involved, working with Cyprus and Greece. Turkey’s relationship with Israel remains poor, and the Erdogan government recently ignored U.S. objections to meet with leaders of Hamas. Ankara entered Libya’s continuing civil war on the side of the Tripoli‐​based Government of National Accord, from which Turkey extracted a maritime boundary agreement giving the latter energy development rights in waters claimed by Cyprus and Greece. Ankara broke the United Nations arms embargo and safeguarded its weapons shipments with a naval escort, which led to confrontations with Greek and French ships deployed to enforce the ban. Ongoing ground combat in Libya could trigger a larger conflagration. Ranged against Turkey are France, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Russia. Much could go wrong. Imagine an exchange of fire between American allies, with Russia tossed in for good measure. Most everyone would see Washington as the inevitable defense backstop, expected to go to war over some damn fool thing in the Mediterranean, to paraphrase Otto von Bismarck. Finally, Turkey appears poised to intervene in the burgeoning conflict between Armenia, backed by Russia and Iran, and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-​Karabakh, Azerbaijani territory largely populated by ethnic Armenians, seized after a lengthy conflict that ended in an uneasy ceasefire in 1994. Ankara subsequently helped train the Azerbaijani armed forces; in the latest flare‐​up it has been accused of shooting down an Armenian aircraft and introducing Syrian mercenaries in the fighting. The claims are unverified, but Turkey has publicly backed Baku, promising weapons and training. These many seemingly isolated actions reflect an increasingly aggressive Turkish foreign policy. In his speech last Thursday to Turkey’s National Assembly, Erdogan suggested a far-​reaching revisionist agenda: “There is no chance left for this distorted order, in which the entire globe is encumbered by a handful of greedy people, to continue to exist the way it currently does.” He also dismissed the effectiveness of outside pressure: “those who ignored our country in the region for years—and confronted us with maps and demands that would imprison us into our coasts—first tried the language of threat and blackmail after the steps we took.” So Ankara no longer is the perceived ally of old. With the Cold War over, nothing requires the U.S. to ignore the autocratic elephant that was always in the room, even during the Cold War. Worse are the divergent security interests. No one in the West knows how far Turkey is prepared to push. If Ankara ends up in a shooting war with someone, including Russia, Europe and the U.S. could be dragged along. Erdogan long ago dissipated any reservoir of trust with other Western powers, but some analysts advocate waiting for him to leave the political scene. However, at age 66 he could rule for another decade or more. Moreover, both his Islamism and nationalism enjoy strong domestic support; antagonism toward the West and especially America is strong. Even a more democratic regime would not be inclined to yield on important geopolitical questions. For instance, over the last decade the expansive maritime doctrine known as “Blue Homeland,” seeking control over waters claimed by Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel, has gained widespread support.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Their Bandow evidence specifies <u>ground-combat</u> as the internal link. </h4><p><strong>Bandow 20</strong> (Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. He worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry; “Washington Should Stop Pretending to Be Turkey’s Ally”; CATO Institute; 10/13/20; https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/washington-should-stop-pretending-be-turkeys-ally kp)</p><p>However, <u>by the end of the decade, Erdogan and his party had immersed themselves in corruption and initiated authoritarian rule</u>. His commitment to Islam turned harsh and political. Rule of law, individual liberties, and <u>democratic procedures</u> all <u>were <strong>sacrificed</strong> to <strong>enhance regime power</strong>. The 2016 attempted coup</u> was Erdogan’s Reichstag fire,<u> justifying the brutal crackdown and purge that he’d long wanted and may have planned</u>. Last year, for the first time, <u>Erdogan tampered with the actual vote, forcing a rerun of the Istanbul mayoral race</u>, which his party ended up losing twice. Next time he may be more desperate—and simply steal the election.</p><p>The cumulative impact has been to destroy what was always a flawed and limited democracy. The group Freedom House rates the country as not free. The State Department points to “reports of arbitrary killings; suspicious deaths of persons in custody; forced disappearances; torture; arbitrary arrest and detention of tens of thousands of persons,” and that’s just the start.</p><p><u>All of which has <strong>undermined NATO</u></strong>. The Europeans take democracy more seriously than during the Cold War. Indeed, they justified the alliance’s post‐​Cold War expansion as a means of integrating the former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe into the West. The allies also perceive Russia’s slide backward into authoritarianism as part of its menace.</p><p><u>Even <strong>more <mark>problematic</strong></mark> for <strong>NATO</strong> <mark>is Ankara’s</mark> increasingly independent and <strong><mark>hostile fo</mark>reign <mark>po</mark>licy</strong>. Russia is Europe’s only</u> conceivable <u>serious adversary</u>. Yet <u><mark>Erdogan</mark> has become the equivalent of a fifth columnist, <strong>more <mark>likely</strong> to support <strong>Moscow</mark> than Brussels</u></strong>.</p><p>His policy toward Russia was irresponsibly reckless when, five years ago, Ankara shot down a Russian warplane operating in Syria for briefly straying into Turkish airspace. Had war erupted, Washington would have been expected to confront nuclear‐​armed Russia.</p><p><u>Erdogan</u> then <u>staged a dramatic policy pirouette and joined with Moscow to manage the</u> denouement of the <u>Syrian civil war</u>. Moreover, <u>Ankara decided to purchase the <strong>S-400 air defense</strong> system, triggering an administration <strong>cut-off from the F-35</u></strong> program <u>and <strong>congressional demands</strong> for <strong>economic sanctions</strong>. The Russian and Turkish governments have still ended up on opposite sides in the fight over</u> opposition‐​controlled <u>Syrian territory, Libya’s civil war, and the growing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. <strong>Nevertheless</strong>, they so far have <strong>maintained</strong> their <strong>political bonds</u></strong>.</p><p>Indeed, <u><mark>Ankara’s allegiance to NATO looks</mark> a lot <mark>like Italy’s</mark> pre-World War I membership in the Triple Alliance</u>. When armies started marching, <u><mark>Rome <strong>refused to honor</strong></mark> its <strong><mark>promises</strong> and</mark> eventually <mark>entered</mark> the <strong><mark>war</mark> on the other side</u></strong> (bribed by the Entente with promises of Austro‐​Hungarian territory). <u><mark>How likely is Turkey to</mark> <strong>declare <mark>war</mark> on <mark>Russia</strong> to help</mark> defend, say, <strong><mark>Estonia</strong></mark>?</p><p></u>This factor alone warrants ejection of Ankara from the transatlantic alliance. However, <u><mark>Turkey’s involvement in Syria</mark> is not just a problem of cooperation with Moscow</u>. During the early years of the civil war, <u>the Erdogan government <mark>allowed</mark> the <strong><mark>I</strong></mark>slamic <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>tate <strong>free <mark>transit</strong></mark> across the Turkish border</u>; Turkish intelligence is believed to have directly assisted the group. Moreover, Erdogan family and staff members may have profited through trade with ISIS. <u>Ankara also launched two invasions targeting Washington’s <strong>Kurdish allies</u></strong>, which led the ground assault on the Islamist movement’s Syria‐​based “caliphate.” <u>Turkey employed Islamist Arabic forces, which committed ethnic cleansing and other atrocities against the Syrian Kurds</u>.</p><p>Now <u>Ankara is <strong><mark>threatening war</strong></mark> against</u> fellow <u>NATO members</u> and prospective EU partners. Perhaps <u>the most enduring dispute is <mark>over</mark> control of <strong><mark>Aegean</mark> Sea</strong> waters</u>. Greek islands near Turkey greatly restrict the latter’s sovereignty over areas that Ankara considers to be its own. <u>Air and naval <strong><mark>confrontations</strong></mark> between Greece and Turkey <strong><mark>are routine</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Moreover, <u>Ankara continues to <strong>occupy</strong> <strong>much of Cyprus</u></strong> 46 years later. <u>The presence of undersea oil and natural gas created a new dispute, leading to <strong>naval clashes</strong> between Turkey and the internationally recognized Cypriot government</u>. Ankara is promoting energy exploration in areas claimed by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognized only by Turkey. Israel also is involved, working with Cyprus and Greece. Turkey’s relationship with Israel remains poor, and the <u><mark>Erdogan</mark> government recently <mark>ignored</mark> <strong>U.S. <mark>objections</strong></mark> to meet with leaders of Hamas</u>.</p><p><u>Ankara entered <strong>Libya’s</strong> continuing <strong>civil war</u></strong> on the side of the Tripoli‐​based Government of National Accord, from which Turkey extracted a maritime boundary agreement giving the latter energy development rights in waters claimed by Cyprus and Greece. <u>Ankara broke the U</u>nited <u>N</u>ations <u>arms embargo and safeguarded its weapons shipments with a naval escort, which led to <strong>confrontations</strong> with <strong>Greek and French</strong> ships</u> deployed to enforce the ban.</p><p><u><strong>Ongoing ground combat</strong> in Libya could trigger <strong>a larger conflagration</strong>. Ranged <mark>against</mark> Turkey are France, <mark>Saudi</mark> Arabia, the <mark>UAE, Egypt, and Russia</mark>. <strong>Much could go wrong</u></strong>. Imagine an exchange of fire between American allies, with Russia tossed in for good measure. Most <u><mark>everyone</mark> would <mark>see Washington as <strong>the inevitable</mark> defense <mark>backstop</u></strong></mark>, expected to go to war over some damn fool thing in the Mediterranean, to paraphrase Otto von Bismarck.</p><p>Finally, <u><mark>Turkey</mark> appears <mark>poised to intervene in</mark> the burgeoning <strong>conflict</strong> between <strong>Armenia</u></strong>, backed by Russia and Iran, <u>and <strong>Azerbaijan</strong> over <strong><mark>Nagorno-​Karabakh</u></strong></mark>, Azerbaijani territory largely populated by ethnic Armenians, seized after a lengthy conflict that ended in an uneasy ceasefire in 1994. <u>Ankara subsequently helped train the Azerbaijani armed forces</u>; in the latest flare‐​up it has been accused of shooting down an Armenian aircraft and introducing Syrian mercenaries in the fighting. The claims are unverified, but Turkey has publicly backed Baku, promising weapons and training.</p><p><u><mark>These</mark> many seemingly isolated <mark>actions reflect an</mark> increasingly <strong><mark>aggressive</strong></mark> Turkish foreign policy</u>. In his speech last Thursday to Turkey’s National Assembly, <u>Erdogan suggested <strong>a far-​reaching <mark>revisionist agenda</u></strong></mark>: “There is no chance left for this distorted order, in which the entire globe is encumbered by a handful of greedy people, to continue to exist the way it currently does.” He also dismissed the effectiveness of outside pressure: “those who ignored our country in the region for years—and confronted us with maps and demands that would imprison us into our coasts—first tried the language of threat and blackmail after the steps we took.”</p><p>So <u>Ankara <strong>no longer</strong> is the perceived ally of old</u>. With the Cold War over, nothing requires the U.S. to ignore the autocratic elephant that was always in the room, even during the Cold War. Worse are the divergent security interests. <u>No one in the West knows <strong>how far</strong> Turkey is <strong>prepared to push</strong>. If <mark>Ankara</mark> ends up <mark>in a shooting war</mark> with someone, including <strong><mark>Russia</strong></mark>, <strong>Europe</strong> <mark>and the <strong>U.S.</strong></mark> could be <strong><mark>dragged along</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>Erdogan long ago <strong>dissipated</strong> any <strong>reservoir of trust</strong> with other Western powers</u>, but some analysts advocate waiting for him to leave the political scene. However, at age 66 he could rule for another decade or more. Moreover, both his Islamism and nationalism enjoy strong domestic support; antagonism toward the West and especially America is strong. <u>Even a <strong>more democratic regime</strong> would not be inclined to yield on important geopolitical questions</u>. For instance, over the last decade the expansive maritime doctrine known as “Blue Homeland,” seeking control over waters claimed by Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel, has gained widespread support.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Pan, IR Prof @ Deakin University, 12 fulltext: (Chengxin, “Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China's Rise,” Introduction, pp. ebook) Critical epistemological reflection on the field of China’s international relations is anything but trivial. At one level, some measure of selfreflectivity is not only necessary but also unavoidable. It pervades all literary works, as literature is always implicitly a reflection on literature itself.25 All forms of knowledge contain within themselves some conscious or unconscious, direct or indirect, autobiographical accounts of the knowing/writing self at either individual or certain collective levels. As evidenced in the selfimage of positivist knowledge in general, the very absence of critical self reflection in China watching already denotes a particular way of speaking about itself, namely, as a cumulative body of empirical knowledge on China. The problem is that this scientistic self-understanding is largely uncritical and unconsciously so. If Pierre Macherey is right that what a work does not say is as important as what it does say,26 then this curious silence and unconscious-ness in the writing of China’s rise needs to be interrupted and made more conscious, a process which Jürgen Habermas calls reflection.27 Besides, it seems impossible for China watching to watch only China. Aihwa Ong notes that ‘When a book about China is only about China, it is suspect’.28 We may add that it is also self-delusional. China as an object of study does not simply exist in an objectivist or empiricist fashion, like a freefloating, self-contained entity waiting to be directly contacted, observed and analysed. This is not to say that China is unreal, unknowable or is only a ghostly illusion constructed entirely out of literary representation. Of course China does exist: the Great Wall, the Communist Party, and more than one billion people living there are all too real. And yet, to say something is real does not mean that its existence corresponds with a single, independent and fixed meaning for all to see. None of those aforementioned ‘real’ things and people beam out their meaning at us directly, let alone offer an unadulterated, panoramic view of ‘China’ as a whole. China’s existence, while real, is better understood, to use Martin Heidegger’s term, as a type of ‘being-in-theworld’. 29 The ‘in-the-world-ness’ is intrinsically characteristic of China’s being, which always needs to be understood in conjunction with its world, a world which necessarily includes China-bound discourse and representation. R. G. Collingwood once said that ‘all history is the history of thought’, meaning that no historian can speak directly of hard historical facts without reference to various thoughts about those facts.30 Likewise, insofar as China cannot exist meaningfully outside of language and discursive construction of it, no study of it is ever possible, let alone complete, without studying our thoughts about it. For this reason, echoing George Marcus and Michael Fisher’s call for ethnography to ‘turn on itself’ and ‘to create an equally probing, ethnographic knowledge of its social and cultural foundations’, 31 this book takes the representation of China (rather than ‘China’ itself) as its main object of study. It calls for a critical autoethnographic turn in China watching. Certainly, there has been no shortage of study on Western representations of China. Alongside Western intellectual interest in this country is a longstanding tradition of documenting this interest, as evidenced in an extensive and diverse body of literature on Western images of China.32 If we also count the works on Western perceptions of Asia, the size of that literature is even more impressive. 33 But this makes it all the more conspicuous that to date precious little has been said or written about contemporary China watching in global politics. For instance, a large portion of the existing study is fixated either on past perceptions of China or perceptions of China’s past. Historical investigation, valuable as it is, cannot substitute for an up-to-date account of contemporary Western knowledge on China. Meanwhile, most literature tends to limit its purview to ‘non-scholarly’ sources, such as government documents, official speeches, mass media, public opinion, travel writings, novels, documentaries and films. As a result, by design or by accident, scholarly literature is often able to escape attention. Furthermore, even as some academic writings in historiographical, sociological, philosophical, cultural, and linguistic contexts have begun to be critically scrutinised, 34 with few exceptions Western IR scholarship on China’s rise continues to be overlooked. 35 This is especially curious given that since the US consolidated its global dominance after World War II (WWII), IR discourses have become a main frame of reference for mainstream Western worldviews. 36 Is this because discipline-based scholarship such as IR is better able to minimise the prejudice of Orientalism? Edward Said once claimed that ‘interesting work is most likely to be produced by scholars whose allegiance is to a discipline defined intellectually and not to a “field” like Orientalism defined either canonically, imperially, or geographically’. 37 However, it would be naïve, as Said himself would probably agree, to give the disciplines of IR and Political Science such benefit of the doubt. Though apparently defined intellectually rather than geographically, neither field is politically innocent or neutral. In fact, both remain largely an American/Western social science, whose implicit or unintended loyalty to the United States (US) is probably not dissimilar to that of Orientalism to Europe.38 Indeed, precisely because these disciplines have now gained a false reputation of being value-free or scientifically objective, their contribution to Western construction of other societies could be all the more significant and lasting, thus deserving closer investigation. Failing that, it would be difficult for us to grasp the dynamics and complexities of contemporary Western representations of China in global politics. No doubt, critical scholarship in the fields of IR and postcolonial studies has begun to problematise mainstream IR knowledge. Several important works in IR and cultural studies have examined at length the social construction of self/Other and the politics of representation in relation to the South, the East (‘Near East’), and Asia.39 However, none of their focus is primarily on Western representations of China. Said’s seminal work Orientalism, despite its sweeping subtitle ‘Western Conceptions of the Orient’, is concerned mainly with the Middle East.40 When sometimes Said is invoked in China analysis, it is often, perhaps justifiably, to probe China’s own ‘Orientalist’ legacy (or in Xiaomei Chen’s term, Occidentalism).41 Finally, where there exists useful criticism of Western IR discourses on China’s rise, the criticism is often confined to empirical debate or concerned with factual or narrowly-conceived methodological matters related to specific works, claims, or issues. 42 Most participants in such debates agree that there is a real China out there, and that the main problem with Western representa-tion lies in its misrepresentation, bias, or tainted perceptions: once such distortion is rectified, objective knowledge of China will be within reach. For example, having insightfully noted that ‘Our uncertainties about China are as much a product of uncertainties about ourselves as they are about China’, Brantly Womack then goes on to suggest that we should strive for an ‘accurate understanding of China’ through looking at the ‘real’ China and ‘its internal dynamic’. 43 To many, Womack’s approach makes perfect sense: How could it be otherwise? And yet, appeals to ‘reality’ through more empirical research are ultimately of limited value. As Eric Hayot et al. put it, ‘noting the discrepancy between reality and representation, as it applies to particular objects of discourse, no longer works as critique… critique has to acknowledge imagination as something more than a distorter of fact’. 44 Understanding representation as ‘something more’ than an empirical matter is crucial, though this does not mean that empirical analysis has become irrelevant; it has not and will not. But if our critique of Western representations stays at an empirical level, it will be ultimately ineffective, if not misleading itself. For one thing, there is no compelling reason to suggest that our newer empirical data can serve as a more reliable base on which to build China knowledge. Moreover, as will be made clear in the book, the overall function of Western representations is self-imagination. For all their claims to scientific objectivity, they have not been primarily about presenting an empirically accurate picture of China in the first instance. As such, no amount of ‘accurate’ empirical facts or logical reasoning contrary to Western assumptions of China is likely to succeed in challenging those assumptions. Consequently, in spite of the vast body of works that focus on Western images and representations of China, there is a glaring lack of critical analysis of contemporary Western thought on China’s rise in the field of IR (broadly defined), a gap which this book aims to fill. The book is not interested in asking whether or to what extent various forms of China knowledge accurately reflect ‘Chinese reality’. Nor will it offer my own ‘authentic’ or ‘objective’ picture of that reality—so long as it is ‘my own’, it can be neither authentic nor objective. Instead, it will examine how various representations of ‘Chinese reality’, created under the guises of objective knowledge, are discursively and socially constructed, and how such constructions function in international relations theory and practice. Different from a conventional study of national image in foreign policy making, the main concern of the book is with a sociology of knowledge and politics of representation in relation to China watching. To this end, the book draws attention to two dominant and recurring themes and assumptions on China’s rise: the ‘China threat’ and ‘China opportunity’. These themes may be variously termed as ‘regimes of truth’, ‘metanarratives’, or a certain ‘style of thought’, 45 but here they are referred to as ‘paradigms’, a term made academically popular by Thomas Kuhn.46 More on the definition of the term will be said in a moment and in the next chapter. For now, like colonial discourse, a paradigm is ‘a signifying system without an author’. 47 In this sense, to illustrate my misgivings with the two China paradigms is not to pick on any individual scholars/authors or their specific works, even though in order to critically engage with those paradigms we have no choice but to rely on examples found in specific publications. Also, these paradigms are not to be confused with any specific arguments or theoretical frameworks. A paradigm is a type of basic conceptual lens through which what can and cannot be known about a certain object of study is delineated, and from which certain specific arguments and theoretical frameworks can flow. Though the paradigms of ‘China threat’ and ‘China opportunity’ may be found more readily in the IR field of China watching, they are not the exclusive patents of IR scholars. To better illustrate these two paradigms, it is necessary to select the relevant literature on an eclectic basis. Coming within the purview of my analysis are, consequently, not just academic writings on China’s foreign policy and international relations, but also other pieces in the ‘China representation’ puzzle such as media reports, commentaries, and official discourses. As well as cutting across genre lines, the ‘China threat’ and ‘China opportunity’ paradigms are not confined within any particular geographical boundaries. True, the US has played a leading role in setting the agenda for Western perceptions of China’s rise and much attention of the book will therefore be paid to the American discourse, but these paradigms are by no means distinctively American. This is why I use the designation ‘Western’ to cast a wider geopolitical net (and at the same time to leave out ‘non-Western’ sources to avoid making my enterprise too unwieldy). Of course, by ‘Western’ here I do not really mean ‘Western’ per se, whatever that term might mean. My source materials, in most cases, are drawn from English literature published in a few selected Western countries, notably the US, Britain, and Australia. Discourses from other Western countries, such as France and Germany, will not be examined, for the simple reason that their inclusion is beyond the scope and capacity of this single volume. Furthermore, even as I focus almost exclusively on English literature, I do not claim to do full justice to the inherently heterogeneous quality of China writings in those ‘Anglophone’ locales. My understanding is that no matter how hard we try to narrow down our scope of investigation, we are bound to encounter still subtler spatial differences, contextual nuances, and temporal variations, which could well exist in the writings of the same author. Consequently, this study, its subtitle notwithstanding, does not claim to capture the full complexities or ‘totality’ of Western IR representations of China’s rise, let alone China watching in general.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>The alternative is a prerequisite to the case- Western political science are subject to implicit bias in favor of the US- especially in the context of IR theory. Only a reevaluation of our representations of china can lead to affective policy making- anything else (such as the perm) is error replication.</h4><p>Pan</strong>, IR Prof @ Deakin University,<strong> 12 </p><p></strong>(Chengxin, “Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China's Rise,” Introduction, pp. ebook) </p><p><u>Critical epistemological reflection</u> <u>on</u> the field of <u>China’s <strong>i</u></strong>nternational<u><strong> r</u></strong>elations <u><strong>is anything but trivial</u></strong>. At one level, some measure of selfreflectivity is not only necessary but also unavoidable. It pervades all literary works, as literature is always implicitly a reflection on literature itself.25 <u>All forms of knowledge contain within themselves some conscious or <strong>unconscious</u></strong>, direct or indirect, autobiographical <u><strong>accounts</strong> of the knowing/writing self at either individual or certain collective levels</u>. As evidenced in the selfimage of positivist knowledge in general, <u>the very absence of critical <strong>self reflection in China watching</u></strong> already <u>denotes a particular way of speaking about itself</u>, namely, <u>as a cumulative body of empirical knowledge on China</u>. The problem is that <u>this scientistic self-understanding is largely uncritical and unconsciously so. If </u>Pierre Macherey is right that what a work does not say is as important as what it does say,26 then this curious silence and unconscious-ness in the writing of China’s rise needs to be interrupted and made more conscious, a process which Jürgen Habermas calls reflection.27 Besides, it seems impossible for China watching to watch only China. Aihwa Ong notes that ‘When a book about China is only about China, it is suspect’.28 We may add that it is also self-delusional. <u>China as an object of study does not simply exist in an <strong>objectivist or empiricist fashion</strong>, like a freefloating, self-contained entity waiting</u> <u>to be directly contacted, observed and analysed</u>. <u>This is not to say that China is unreal, unknowable or is only a ghostly illusion</u> constructed entirely out of literary representation. Of course China does exist: the Great Wall, the Communist Party, and more than one billion people living there are all too real. And yet, <u>to say something is real does not mean that its existence corresponds with a single, independent and fixed meaning for all to see.</u> None of those aforementioned ‘real’ things and people beam out their meaning at us directly, let alone offer an unadulterated, panoramic view of ‘China’ as a whole. China’s existence, while real, is better understood, to use Martin Heidegger’s term, as a type of ‘being-in-theworld’. 29 The ‘in-the-world-ness’ is intrinsically characteristic of China’s being, which always needs to be understood in conjunction with its world, a world which necessarily includes China-bound discourse and representation. R. G. Collingwood once said that ‘all history is the history of thought’, meaning that no historian can speak directly of hard historical facts without reference to various thoughts about those facts.30 Likewise, <u><mark>insofar as China cannot exist</mark> meaningfully <mark>outside of language and discursive construction</mark> of it,</u> <u><mark>no study of it is ever possible</u></mark>, let alone complete, <u><strong><mark>without studying our thoughts about it</u></strong></mark>. For this reason, echoing George Marcus and Michael Fisher’s call for ethnography to ‘turn on itself’ and ‘to create an equally probing, ethnographic knowledge of its social and cultural foundations’, 31 this book takes the representation of China (rather than ‘China’ itself) as its main object of study. It calls for a critical autoethnographic turn in China watching. Certainly, there has been no shortage of study on Western representations of China. Alongside Western intellectual interest in this country is a longstanding tradition of documenting this interest, as evidenced in an extensive and diverse body of literature on Western images of China.32 If we also count the works on Western perceptions of Asia, the size of that literature is even more impressive. 33 But this makes it all the more conspicuous that to date precious little has been said or written about contemporary China watching in global politics. For instance, a large portion of the existing study is fixated either on past perceptions of China or perceptions of China’s past. Historical investigation, valuable as it is, cannot substitute for an up-to-date account of contemporary Western knowledge on China. Meanwhile, <u><mark>most literature tends to limit its purview to ‘</mark>non-scholarly’ sources, such as <strong><mark>government documents</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>official speeches</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>mass media</u></strong>, <u><strong>public opinion</u></strong></mark>, travel writings, novels, documentaries and films<u>. As a result</u>, by design or by accident, scholarly <u>literature is</u> often <u>able to escape attention</u>. Furthermore, even as some academic writings in historiographical, sociological, philosophical, cultural, and linguistic contexts have begun to be critically scrutinised, 34 with few exceptions Western IR scholarship on China’s rise continues to be overlooked. 35 This is especially curious given that since the US consolidated its global dominance after World War II (WWII), IR discourses have become a main frame of reference for mainstream Western worldviews. 36 Is this because discipline-based scholarship such as IR is better able to minimise the prejudice of Orientalism? Edward Said once claimed that ‘interesting work is most likely to be produced by scholars whose allegiance is to a discipline defined intellectually and not to a “field” like Orientalism defined either canonically, imperially, or geographically’. 37 However, it would be naïve, as Said himself would probably agree, to give the disciplines of <u><mark>IR and Political Science</u></mark> such benefit of the doubt. Though apparently defined intellectually rather than geographically, neither field is politically innocent or neutral. In fact, both <u><mark>remain largely an</mark> American/<mark>Western social science</u></mark>, <u><mark>whose implicit </mark>or unintended <mark>loyalty to the</u></mark> United States <mark>(<u>US</u>) <u>is</mark> probably <strong><mark>not dissimilar</strong></mark> <strong><mark>to</strong></mark> that of <strong><mark>Orientalism</strong></mark> to Europe.</u>38 Indeed, precisely <u>because <mark>these disciplines have</mark> </u>now <u><mark>gained a false reputation of being</mark> value-free or <mark>scientifically objective</mark>, their contribution to Western construction of other societies could be all the more significant and lasting, thus <mark>deserving closer investigation</mark>. <mark>Failing that</u></mark>, <u><mark>it would be difficult for us to grasp the dynamics </mark>and complexities <mark>of </mark>contemporary <mark>Western representations of China</u></mark> in global politics. No doubt, critical scholarship in the fields of IR and postcolonial studies has begun to problematise mainstream IR knowledge. Several important works in IR and cultural studies have examined at length the social construction of self/Other and the politics of representation in relation to the South, the East (‘Near East’), and Asia.39 However, none of their focus is primarily on Western representations of China. Said’s seminal work Orientalism, despite its sweeping subtitle ‘Western Conceptions of the Orient’, is concerned mainly with the Middle East.40 When sometimes Said is invoked in China analysis, it is often, perhaps justifiably, to probe China’s own ‘Orientalist’ legacy (or in Xiaomei Chen’s term, Occidentalism).41 Finally, where there exists useful criticism of Western IR discourses on China’s rise, the criticism is often confined to empirical debate or concerned with factual or narrowly-conceived methodological matters related to specific works, claims, or issues. 42 Most <u>participants in</u> such <u><strong>debates</u></strong> <u>agree that there is a real China out there</u>, and <u>that <mark>the main problem</mark> <mark>with Western representa-tion</mark> <strong><mark>lies in its misrepresentation</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>bias, or tainted</strong></mark> <strong><mark>perceptions</u></strong></mark>: <u>once such distortion is rectified</u>, <u>objective knowledge of China will be within reach.</u> For example, having insightfully noted that ‘Our uncertainties about China are as much a product of uncertainties about ourselves as they are about China’, Brantly Womack then goes on to suggest that we should strive for an ‘accurate understanding of China’ through looking at the ‘real’ China and ‘its internal dynamic’. 43 To many, Womack’s approach makes perfect sense: How could it be otherwise? And yet, <u><strong><mark>appeals to ‘reality’ through more empirical research are ultimately of limited value</u></strong></mark>. As Eric Hayot et al. put it, ‘noting the discrepancy between reality and representation, as it applies to particular objects of discourse, no longer works as critique… critique has to acknowledge imagination as something more than a distorter of fact’. 44 <u>Understanding representation as ‘something more’ than an empirical matter is crucial, </u>though this does not mean that empirical analysis has become irrelevant; it has not and will not. But <u><mark>if our critique of Western representations stays at an <strong>empirical level,</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>it will be <strong>ultimately ineffective</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>if not misleading</u></strong></mark> itself. For one thing, <u><mark>there is no compelling reason to suggest that our <strong>newer empirical data</strong> can</u> <u>serve as a <strong>more reliable base</strong> on which to <strong>build China knowledge</u></strong></mark>. Moreover, as will be made clear in the book, <u>the overall function of Western representations is <strong>self-imagination</strong>. For all their claims to scientific objectivity</u>, <u>they have not been primarily about presenting an empirically accurate picture of China</u> in the first instance. As such, <u><mark>no amount of ‘<strong>accurate’ empirical facts</u></strong> <u>or</u> <u><strong>logical reasoning</u></strong> <u>contrary to Western assumptions of China is likely to succeed in challenging those assumptions</u></mark>. Consequently, in spite of the vast body of works that focus on Western images and representations of China, <u><mark>there is a glaring lack of critical analysis of contemporary Western thought on China’s rise in the field of IR</mark> </u>(broadly defined), a gap which this book aims to fill. The book is not interested in asking whether or to what extent various forms of China knowledge accurately reflect ‘Chinese reality’. Nor will it offer my own ‘authentic’ or ‘objective’ picture of that reality—so long as it is ‘my own’, it can be neither authentic nor objective. Instead, it will examine how various representations of ‘Chinese reality’, created under the guises of objective knowledge, are discursively and socially constructed, and how such constructions function in international relations theory and practice. Different from a conventional study of national image in foreign policy making, the main concern of the book is with a sociology of knowledge and politics of representation in relation to China watching. To this end, the book draws attention to two dominant and recurring themes and assumptions on China’s rise: the ‘China threat’ and ‘China opportunity’. These themes may be variously termed as ‘regimes of truth’, ‘metanarratives’, or a certain ‘style of thought’, 45 but here they are referred to as ‘paradigms’, a term made academically popular by Thomas Kuhn.46 More on the definition of the term will be said in a moment and in the next chapter. <u>For now, like colonial discourse, a paradigm is ‘a signifying system without an author’. </u>47 In this sense, to illustrate my misgivings with the two China paradigms is not to pick on any individual scholars/authors or their specific works, even though in order to critically engage with those paradigms we have no choice but to rely on examples found in specific publications. Also, these paradigms are not to be confused with any specific arguments or theoretical frameworks. A paradigm is a type of basic conceptual lens through which what can and cannot be known about a certain object of study is delineated, and from which certain specific arguments and theoretical frameworks can flow. Though the paradigms of ‘China threat’ and ‘China opportunity’ may be found more readily in the IR field of China watching, they are not the exclusive patents of IR scholars. To better illustrate these two paradigms, it is necessary to select the relevant literature on an eclectic basis. Coming within the purview of my analysis are, consequently, not just academic writings on China’s foreign policy and international relations, but also other pieces in the ‘China representation’ puzzle such as media reports, commentaries, and official discourses. As well as cutting across genre lines, the ‘China threat’ and ‘China opportunity’ paradigms are not confined within any particular geographical boundaries. True, <u>the US has played a leading role in setting the agenda for Western perceptions of China’s rise </u>and much attention of the book will therefore be paid to the American discourse, <u>but these paradigms are by no means distinctively American</u>. This is why I use the designation ‘Western’ to cast a wider geopolitical net (and at the same time to leave out ‘non-Western’ sources to avoid making my enterprise too unwieldy). Of course, by ‘Western’ here I do not really mean ‘Western’ per se, whatever that term might mean. My source materials, in most cases, are drawn from English literature published in a few selected Western countries, notably the US, Britain, and Australia. Discourses from other Western countries, such as France and Germany, will not be examined, for the simple reason that their inclusion is beyond the scope and capacity of this single volume. Furthermore, even as I focus almost exclusively on English literature, I do not claim to do full justice to the inherently heterogeneous quality of China writings in those ‘Anglophone’ locales. My understanding is that <u>no matter how hard we try to narrow down our scope of investigation</u>, <u>we are bound to encounter still subtler spatial differences</u>, <u>contextual nuances, and temporal variations, which could well exist in the writings of the same author</u>. Consequently, this study, its subtitle notwithstanding, does not claim to capture the full complexities or ‘totality’ of Western IR representations of China’s rise, let alone China watching in general. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: The Interstellar Railroad, or Speculation and Shareholder Whiteness in the Space Economy Réka Patrícia Gál April 14, 2021 fulltext: Indeed, Musk has carefully positioned his company as a space transportation company, and has explicitly compared the SpaceX project to building the Union-Pacific Railroad — for space (Robertson 2016). The colonial comparison is not surprising (Cowen 2020). Proponents of space colonization have long drawn parallels to the colonization of the Americas, enthusiastically representing frontier pioneering and imperialist expansionism as imperative to US American national identity (Billings 2007). The explicit comparison to North American railroad construction hints at a specific trend of space colonization advocacy that is focused on stimulating commercial space operations. The industrialist argument is that just as the construction of the transcontinental railroad was best undertaken by private entrepreneurs who were incentivized by the government with land grants and subsidies, the US American government should similarly aid private entrepreneurs in the establishment of the New Space industry (Mazlish 1965, Launius 2014, McCurdy 2019a). In fact, from the founding of SpaceX up to 2012, the additional government funding provided to SpaceX raised returns on investment by more than two percent--this is approximately the same return that a nineteenth century investor might have expected to gain if the railroad company they invested in received federal land grant subsidies (McCurdy 2019b, 48). Looking at the transcontinental railroad and current space colonial initiatives in parallel can therefore provide a helpful analytic for understanding, and struggling against, such a colonial expansion. What questions and conceptual understandings can thinking of commercial space travel alongside the transcontinental railroad generate? I am particularly interested in thinking this analogy through some of the concepts advanced by Manu Karuka in his recent monograph Empire’s Tracks (2019). Karuka argues that the construction of the transcontinental railroad was foundational to the development of the modern US colonial state, which grew in tandem with finance capitalism and the modern corporation. Karuka’s systematic analysis unveils two central concepts that are useful for understanding the outer spatial analogies. First, that the financial speculation accompanying the gold rush was foundational to the establishment of the settler society’s extractive social order. And second, that the logic of corporate shareholding has served, and continues to serve, as the core vehicle upholding the white supremacist social order. While SpaceX stocks are not publicly available yet, numerous venture capital firms have invested in the aerospace company, with some key investors being Peter Thiel’s Founders Fund, Google, and the Bank of America (McCurdy 2019a). A landscape of speculation enfolds over the lonesome weightlessness of outer space as these powerful companies are investing towards capitalizing on future shareholding profits. A future, which has been called into question by numerous people, because, as Shannon Stirone has put it simply: “Mars is a hellhole. [...] Mars will kill you.” Stirone explains that Mars has a very thin atmosphere and no magnetic field, which means that it has extremely high radiation, and no breathable air. All the while, the surface of the planet is −63 °C, and dust storms are extremely common. These concerns, however, continue to be ignored in favor of high-risk investment. The corporate expansion into outer space is coated in a language of equality – of providing equal access to the wonders of outer space for all. An example of this is the recent private mission into space entitled Inspiration4, which developed in cooperation with the online payments startup Shift4Payments, and is currently raffling a seat to a random winner. The lottery acts as aspirational evidence of equal opportunity: Musk claims that these private missions are necessary to eventually make it possible for “everyone” to go to space (Chang, 2021). But Musk’s vision of making space travel affordable through economies of scale can only be made possible by creating initial demand through aspirational marketing. Just as railroad companies, aided by government grants and loosened regulations, facilitated the westward expansion of European colonists over Indigenous lands, so ought the colonization of Mars create a pastoral utopia in which inspiration and creativity for all abound. Exactly how a trip to a Martian colony could be paid by anyone was revealed in recent Tweets by Musk in which he has reinvented indentured servitude for extraplanetary colonization (McKay 2020). Territorial expansion, based on financial speculation, facilitated by corporations and using unfree imported laborers is exactly what Karuka unveils about the logics of railroad colonialism. He explains, As investors became increasingly disconnected from the sources of their revenue, financial profits seemed to arise through agreements between individuals, seemingly separated from, even independent of, the sweat of specific bodies in specific places. With the maturation of the modern corporation in the wake of emancipation, investors imagined financial accumulation as autonomous from labor, whiteness as autonomous from blackness and indigeneity. (2019, 150) Here I want to hone in on Karuka’s key concept of shareholder whiteness. Karuka explains that slaveholders maintained their economic advantages after the emancipation of slaves by excluding Black people, the Chinese workers who constructed the railroad, and the Indigeous peoples whose lands they occupied, from corporate ownership. According to Karuka, “Racism is an effect, not a cause, of imperialism. [...] Whiteness is fiction, not a biological reality, [...] Finance capital and whiteness ripened through a historical elaboration of relationships between imperial corporations and colonial states, forging and sustaining continental imperialism” (Karuka 2019, 150). The extension into the cosmos has already been theorized by scholars as a way to allow for the unfettered continuation of capitalist accumulation, and the New Space companies of the last decade have repeatedly claimed humanity’s extension into the cosmos as an inevitable consequence of “progress” (Dickens 2007; Valentine 2012; Klinger 2017). With little left on Earth to be financialized, companies are turning outer space itself into an asset. I could hardly think of a better example of fictitious capital that would produce such profound alien-ation from the act of production. Whether we are thinking of asteroid mining, space settlements, or simply private space voyages, the shareholders are, and will continue to be, removed from production on our planet, but will in the event of space colonization also be separated from it by several atmospheric layers, hatches, pressurized rooms, and spacesuits. Karuka writes, “the future of the corporation presupposes the future of the colonial state, and the law of the corporation colonizes the future” (2019, 153), and his analysis of the role of the modern corporation in the establishment of the US colonial state proves to be an entirely-too fitting prediction of a future neoliberal space dystopia. The particular colonial expansion perpetrated through the railroad was achieved through “blending the economic and military functions of the state” (Karuka 2019, xiv). The policing of racial and territorial borders was at the heart of imperial expansion as the colonizing states guarded reservation borders as sites of containment. It also allowed the states to enforce the rules of colonial market relations on occupied Indigenous lands. To this day, the militaries of the US naval empire serve the vital functions of presenting their interests at sea. This produces another apt analogy when we consider the same mercantilist logic is being extended into space with the recent development of the United States Space Force, a new branch of the Armed Forces that is meant to facilitate, and ultimately guard, the supremacy of the United States in outer space. Rather than produce a new world or a vastly different future, interstellar-railroad-colonialism seems to aim, at best, to re-entrench and, at worst, to exacerbate the ongoing inequalities that exist on Earth. This is especially true for conditions produced in and through colonial relations. Space exploration is explicitly settler-colonial. It projects the same logic of terra nullius into outer space that was used as a justification for the appropriation and colonization of the North American lands that were inhabited by various Indigenous nations, while also reproducing existing colonial relations on Earth through the expansion of space colonization infrastructure. For example, the observatories, telescopes, and other space exploration related buildings continue to be erected on Indigenous lands all over Earth, from Hawaiʻi, through French Guiana all the way to Aolepān Aorōkin Ṃajeḷ (Marshall Islands) (Smiles 2020; Prescod-Weinstein et al. 2020; Durrani 2019). As his Tweet about indentured servitude in space shows, Musk is already counting on the extension of the (likely racialized) material exploitative practices from Earth to outer space. But this is also the one major difference between railroad colonialism and space colonization: while the colonial expansion in North America was articulated as the colonizing European’s ongoing fight against the sovereignty of the Indigenous peoples of Turtle Island, the fight over territory in outer space might not be fought against extraterrestrial natives. Instead, it will likely continue to be fought against the sovereignty of Indigenous peoples on Earth, and in space, against other spacefaring nations, such as China and India. As such, what remains open for me is to what extent shareholder whiteness remains the same, or transforms with this move of the corporation into outer space. Will whiteness remain the currency of the future, or will the shareholder privilege of the future turn towards something else, something new yet equally insidious? How does shareholder whiteness function under a global economy? And more importantly, what tools for resistance can we learn from those who struggled against colonial expansion and specifically, the transcontinental railroad? Can we break with the logics of finance capital, empire, and whiteness in interstellar space, and speculate towards a better future?<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Don’t be fooled by the aff’s claims to anti-capitalism—all they do is trade globalist capitalist exploitation for mercantilist capitalist exploitation. Private entities don’t need to appropriate themselves if they can rely on the colonial state to do it for them.</h4><p>The Interstellar Railroad, or Speculation and Shareholder Whiteness in the Space Economy Réka Patrícia Gál April 14, 2021</p><p>Indeed, <u><strong><mark>Musk</mark> has</u></strong> carefully <u><strong><mark>positioned his company as</mark> a <mark>space transportation</mark> company, <mark>and</mark> has <mark>explicitly compared</mark> the <mark>SpaceX project to</mark> <mark>building the Union-Pacific Railroad</mark> — for space</u></strong> (Robertson 2016). The colonial comparison is not surprising (Cowen 2020). <u><strong>Proponents of <mark>space colonization have</mark> long drawn <mark>parallels to</mark> the <mark>colonization of the Americas</mark>, enthusiastically <mark>representing frontier pioneering and imperialist expansionism as</mark> imperative to <mark>US</mark> American <mark>national identity</u></strong></mark> (Billings 2007). The explicit comparison to North American railroad construction hints at a specific trend of space colonization advocacy that is focused on stimulating commercial space operations. <u><strong><mark>The industrialist argument is</mark> that <mark>just as the construction of the transcontinental railroad was best</mark> undertaken <mark>by private entrepreneurs</mark> who were <mark>incentivized by the government with land grants and subsidies</mark>, the US American <mark>government should similarly aid</mark> private entrepreneurs</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>in</mark> the establishment of <mark>the New Space industry</u></strong></mark> (Mazlish 1965, Launius 2014, McCurdy 2019a). In fact, from the founding of SpaceX up to 2012, the additional government funding provided to SpaceX raised returns on investment by more than two percent--this is approximately the same return that a nineteenth century investor might have expected to gain if the railroad company they invested in received federal land grant subsidies (McCurdy 2019b, 48). <u><strong>Looking at the transcontinental railroad and current space colonial initiatives in parallel can therefore provide a helpful analytic for understanding, and struggling against, such a colonial expansion. </u></strong>What questions and conceptual understandings can thinking of commercial space travel alongside the transcontinental railroad generate? I am particularly interested in thinking this analogy through some of the concepts advanced by Manu Karuka in his recent monograph Empire’s Tracks (2019). Karuka argues that <u><strong>the <mark>construction of the</mark> transcontinental <mark>railroad was foundational to</mark> the development of <mark>the modern US colonial state</mark>, which grew in tandem with finance capitalism and the modern corporation.</u></strong> Karuka’s systematic analysis unveils two central concepts that are useful for understanding the outer spatial analogies. First, that the financial speculation accompanying the gold rush was foundational to the establishment of the settler society’s extractive social order. And second, that the logic of corporate shareholding has served, and continues to serve, as the core vehicle upholding the white supremacist social order. While SpaceX stocks are not publicly available yet, numerous venture capital firms have invested in the aerospace company, with some key investors being Peter Thiel’s Founders Fund, Google, and the Bank of America (McCurdy 2019a). <u><strong>A landscape of speculation enfolds over the lonesome weightlessness of outer space as these powerful companies are investing towards capitalizing on future shareholding profits.</u></strong> A future, which has been called into question by numerous people, because, as Shannon Stirone has put it simply: “Mars is a hellhole. [...] Mars will kill you.” Stirone explains that Mars has a very thin atmosphere and no magnetic field, which means that it has extremely high radiation, and no breathable air. All the while, the surface of the planet is −63 °C, and dust storms are extremely common. These concerns, however, continue to be ignored in favor of high-risk investment. The corporate expansion into outer space is coated in a language of equality – of providing equal access to the wonders of outer space for all. An example of this is the recent private mission into space entitled Inspiration4, which developed in cooperation with the online payments startup Shift4Payments, and is currently raffling a seat to a random winner. The lottery acts as aspirational evidence of equal opportunity: Musk claims that these private missions are necessary to eventually make it possible for “everyone” to go to space (Chang, 2021). But <u><strong>Musk’s vision of making space travel affordable through economies of scale can only be made possible by creating initial demand through aspirational marketing. <mark>Just as railroad companies</mark>, aided by government grants and loosened regulations, <mark>facilitated</mark> the <mark>westward expansion</mark> of European colonists over Indigenous lands, <mark>so ought the colonization of Mars</mark> create a pastoral utopia in which inspiration and creativity for all abound.</u></strong> Exactly how a trip to a Martian colony could be paid by anyone was revealed in recent Tweets by Musk in which he has reinvented indentured servitude for extraplanetary colonization (McKay 2020). <u><strong><mark>Territorial expansion</mark>, based on financial speculation, facilitated by corporations and using unfree imported laborers is exactly what Karuka <mark>unveils</mark> about <mark>the logics of railroad colonialism</u></strong></mark>. He explains, As investors became increasingly disconnected from the sources of their revenue, financial profits seemed to arise through agreements between individuals, seemingly separated from, even independent of, the sweat of specific bodies in specific places. With the maturation of the modern corporation in the wake of emancipation, investors imagined financial accumulation as autonomous from labor, whiteness as autonomous from blackness and indigeneity. (2019, 150) Here I want to hone in on Karuka’s key concept of shareholder whiteness. Karuka explains that slaveholders maintained their economic advantages after the emancipation of slaves by excluding Black people, the Chinese workers who constructed the railroad, and the Indigeous peoples whose lands they occupied, from corporate ownership. According to Karuka, “<u><strong>Racism is an effect, not a cause, of imperialism</u></strong>. [...] Whiteness is fiction, not a biological reality, [...] Finance capital and whiteness ripened through a historical elaboration of relationships between imperial corporations and colonial states, forging and sustaining continental imperialism” (Karuka 2019, 150). The extension into the cosmos has already been theorized by scholars as a way to allow for the unfettered continuation of capitalist accumulation, and the New Space companies of the last decade have repeatedly claimed humanity’s extension into the cosmos as an inevitable consequence of “progress” (Dickens 2007; Valentine 2012; Klinger 2017). <u><strong>With little left on Earth to be financialized, companies are turning outer space itself into an asset. I could hardly think of a better example of fictitious capital that would produce such profound alien-ation from the act of production</u></strong>. Whether we are thinking of asteroid mining, space settlements, or simply private space voyages, the shareholders are, and will continue to be, removed from production on our planet, but will in the event of space colonization also be separated from it by several atmospheric layers, hatches, pressurized rooms, and spacesuits. Karuka writes, <u><strong>“the future of the corporation presupposes the future of the colonial state, and the law of the corporation colonizes the future”</u></strong> (2019, 153), and his analysis of the role of the modern corporation in the establishment of the US colonial state proves to be an entirely-too fitting prediction of a future neoliberal space dystopia<u><strong>. The particular colonial expansion perpetrated through the railroad was achieved through “blending the economic and military functions of the state” </u></strong>(Karuka 2019, xiv). The policing of racial and territorial borders was at the heart of imperial expansion as the colonizing states guarded reservation borders as sites of containment. <u><strong><mark>It</mark> also <mark>allowed</mark> the <mark>states to enforce</mark> <mark>the</mark> rules of <mark>colonial market relations on occupied Indigenous lands.</mark> To this day, the militaries of the US naval empire serve the vital functions of presenting their interests at sea. This produces another apt analogy when we consider <mark>the same mercantilist logic is being extended into space</mark> with the recent development of the United States Space Force, a new branch of the Armed Forces that is meant to facilitate, and ultimately guard, the supremacy of the United States in outer space.</u></strong> <u><strong>Rather than produce a new world or a vastly different future, <mark>interstellar-railroad-colonialism</mark> seems to aim, at best, to re-entrench and, at worst, to <mark>exacerbate</mark> the <mark>ongoing inequalities</mark> that exist on Earth</u></strong>. This is especially true for conditions produced in and through colonial relations. <u><strong><mark>Space exploration is explicitly settler-colonial</mark>.</u></strong> It projects the same logic of terra nullius into outer space that was used as a justification for the appropriation and colonization of the North American lands that were inhabited by various Indigenous nations, while also reproducing existing colonial relations on Earth through the expansion of space colonization infrastructure. For example, the observatories, telescopes, and other space exploration related buildings continue to be erected on Indigenous lands all over Earth, from Hawaiʻi, through French Guiana all the way to Aolepān Aorōkin Ṃajeḷ (Marshall Islands) (Smiles 2020; Prescod-Weinstein et al. 2020; Durrani 2019). As his Tweet about indentured servitude in space shows, Musk is already counting on the extension of the (likely racialized) material exploitative practices from Earth to outer space. But this is also the one major difference between railroad colonialism and space colonization: while the colonial expansion in North America was articulated as the colonizing European’s ongoing fight against the sovereignty of the Indigenous peoples of Turtle Island<u><strong>, <mark>the fight over territory in</mark> outer <mark>space</mark> might <mark>not</mark> be fought <mark>against extraterrestrial natives</mark>. Instead, <mark>it will</mark> likely continue to <mark>be fought against the sovereignty of Indigenous peoples on Earth</mark>, and in space, against other spacefaring nations, such as China and India.</u></strong> As such, what remains open for me is to what extent shareholder whiteness remains the same, or transforms with this move of the corporation into outer space. Will whiteness remain the currency of the future, or will the shareholder privilege of the future turn towards something else, something new yet equally insidious? How does shareholder whiteness function under a global economy? And more importantly, what tools for resistance can we learn from those who struggled against colonial expansion and specifically, the transcontinental railroad? Can we break with the logics of finance capital, empire, and whiteness in interstellar space, and speculate towards a better future?</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Medha D. Makhlouf, Assistant Professor and Director, Medical-Legal Partnership Clinic, Penn State University – Dickinson Law; Assistant Professor, Department of Public Health Sciences, Penn State College of Medicine, 2020 fulltext: (“The Ethics of DNA Testing at the Border” American Journal of Law & Medicine, 46 (2020): 253-273, https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1148&context=fac-works, LASA-IZP) III. PRIVACY RISKS OF EXPANDING DNA SURVEILLANCE As a foundation for analyzing DOJ’s justification for expanding DNA collection from immigration detainees, this Part provides an overview of privacy harms related to mass collection and sharing of biometric information by the government, with a focus on potential privacy harms arising from the new policy. Concerns about privacy harms are among the most important reasons for the government to refrain from expanding DNA databases and are often voiced when the government proposes to expand biometrics surveillance on a mass scale.77 Increased collection and sharing of DNA information across agencies enhances the government’s ability to surveil members of the population.78 However, policymakers and courts have always balanced the value of individual privacy with other values that are considered socially beneficial.79 For example, privacy harms associated with a certain level of government surveillance in order to investigate crimes and protect public safety are generally tolerated. U.S. law enforcement first began using DNA testing to investigate crimes by linking crime scene evidence with the DNA of violent offenders.80 DNA profiles in CODIS are stored permanently and can be accessed by law enforcement at any level without consent, suspicion, or a warrant.81 Over time, state and federal laws rapidly expanded the list of offenses eligible for DNA collection and profile retention in CODIS, and some jurisdictions began collecting DNA from people who had merely been arrested on suspicion of having committed a crime.82 The issue of whether the government may collect DNA from people who have not been convicted of a crime implicates the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search.83 Several federal and state courts that initially considered this question reached opposite conclusions.84 In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Maryland’s statute authorizing pre-conviction collection of arrestees’ DNA as a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, “[i]n light of the context of a valid arrest supported by probable cause” relating to an alleged crime.85 The Court considered compulsory DNA collection in this context to be reasonable because (1) it serves important governmental interests related to law enforcement, (2) CODIS provides adequate privacy protections, and (3) a cheek swab to collect DNA is a minimal intrusion on individual privacy.86 In Immigration Surveillance, a seminal article documenting the rise of surveillance mechanisms in immigration enforcement activities, Anil Kalhan adopts the following definition of surveillance: “the systematic monitoring, gathering, and analysis of information in order to make decisions, minimize risk, sort populations, and exercise power.”87 He describes in detail the use of four surveillance activities in immigration enforcement: “identification, screening and authorization, mobility tracking and control, and information sharing.”88 In immigration enforcement, biometric identifiers such as fingerprints, facial recognition-ready digital photographs, iris scans, palm prints, hand vein scans, voice prints, and DNA are favored over documentation as more efficient and accurate mechanisms to identify individuals.89 They are used to analyze, screen, and authorize noncitizens in a variety of settings unrelated to international travel, including at “local police stations, private workplaces, benefits agencies, universities, [and] health insurers and providers.”90 Biometric information systems are one of several tools that the government uses to track and control the movement of U.S. citizens and noncitizens across borders.91 Finally, biometrics information of noncitizens is shared among several government database systems, including systems housed in “intelligence agencies, law enforcement, immigration authorities, international entities, foreign governments, and other institutions, both public and private.”92 Biometric information about noncitizens—specifically fingerprints, facial recognition-ready digital photographs, and iris scans—are stored in DHS’s Automated Biometric Identification System (“IDENT”), which is housed in government-run data centers.93 DHS is developing a new cloud-based system, the Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology System (“HART”), which will contain all of the information currently stored in IDENT and will have expanded capacity to store and analyze additional biometric identifiers such as palm prints, scars, tattoos, physical markings, and voices.94 Biometric information is linked to machine-readable travel documents such as passports and visas, which incorporate biometric identifiers.95 ICE has recently ramped up the routine collection of fingerprints from children in immigration detention, including those held by CBP at or near the border with their parents and those in ORR shelters.96 DOJ justifies its new policy requiring DNA collection from all immigration detainees by describing several governmental interests that parallel the interests served by collection from arrestees and that the Supreme Court relied upon in Maryland v. King: “identification of persons in custody, facilitating safe and secure custody, informing decisions concerning detention and release pending further proceedings, clearing the innocent, and bringing the guilty to justice.”97 Ensuring public safety is the overarching rationale.98 Finally, it is important to note that the title of this Article refers to DNA testing at “the border.” By this term, I am referring not merely to a territorial boundary, but to the more nuanced concept in which it is understood in the context of immigration governance.99 Even after noncitizens have entered and are residing within the country, they are subject to direct and indirect immigration enforcement, which “draws the migration border inward, self-consciously constructing virtual, domestic border checkpoints throughout the country’s interior.”100 Direct enforcement is the initiation of removal proceedings based on unlawful presence or post-entry conduct such as criminal convictions.101 Indirect enforcement can occur whenever a public or private actor must verify immigration or citizenship status in order to make an eligibility determination.102 This includes many activities of day-to-day life, such as applying for a job, public benefits, or a driver’s license; registering for school; seeking health care; renting a home; or buying a bus ticket.103 Both types of enforcement have increased dramatically in recent decades and can affect immigrants who have not recently crossed a territorial border.104 Post-entry enforcement actions have fueled the growth of immigration detention and will therefore fuel the growth of DNA surveillance of immigrants under DOJ’s new policy. UNPREDICTED USES OF DNA DATA DNA contains much more information than other biometrics, including information that many people consider sensitive such as “gender, familial relationships, and other hereditary information, race, health, disease history and predisposition to disease, and perhaps even sexual orientation.”105 The potential applications of DNA analysis are infinite and are expanding every day.106 Even as the law has struggled to keep pace with these new applications, it can be surmised from recent history that, as technology improves, the role of DNA in immigration and criminal processes will continue to grow. In its new policy, DOJ seeks to alleviate concerns about privacy harms by characterizing the DNA profiles stored in CODIS as “sanitized ‘genetic fingerprints,’” claiming that they are useful only to identify an individual and cannot be used to “disclose the individual’s traits, disorders, or dispositions.”107 However, it is becoming increasingly evident that this “non-coding” DNA contains more information than previously believed and that technological advances will likely enable more information to be mined from the profiles stored in CODIS.108 In addition, because DOJ retains DNA samples and not just DNA profiles, it is entirely possible for the government to mine these samples for sensitive information that we know to be linked with DNA.109 The sample itself contains information about a person’s entire genetic make-up, which is significantly more than and different in kind from the type of biometric information that is currently gathered, as some courts have recognized.110 Government access to a person’s DNA information goes far beyond serving the purpose of identifying that person.111 The combination of interoperable data systems storing biometric information, unlimited data retention times, and little oversight and transparency over the retrieval and use of sensitive biometric information increases the likelihood of function creep.112 B. PERPETUA TION OF INACCURACIES Widespread collection and sharing of DNA information across government agencies can perpetuate inaccuracies that originate from one source.113 These inaccuracies can cause the wrong people to be profiled and surveilled, subjecting them to repeated intrusions of privacy in the form of searches and interrogations.114 Based on current information-sharing practices designed to protect national security, we know that existing immigration records are “notoriously inaccurate and out-of-date.”115 For example, thousands of U.S. citizens have been transferred to ICE custody by state and local law enforcement based on inaccurate immigration records.116 As this experience shows, we know that when such errors are disseminated across multiple systems and agencies, they can be very difficult to correct.117 Even when the information in DNA databases is accurate, those whose DNA is in the system are more likely to be wrongly implicated in a crime.118 In a comment opposing the DOJ regulations expanding compulsory DNA testing of immigration detainees, the Electronic Frontier Foundation describes the case of Lukis Anderson, whose DNA was transferred by the paramedics who had treated him to a crime scene where they treated a victim hours later.119 Anderson was arrested and charged with murder even though he was in the hospital at the time the murder occurred.120 If his DNA had not been in the system, he would not have been wrongly implicated in the crime. While Anderson’s DNA was in the state criminal database because of a prior felony charge, immigration detainees’ DNA will be entered into CODIS even if they have never been arrested for a crime.121 This means that the risk of this type of mistake is disproportionately likely to affect immigrants who have never had any involvement with the criminal justice system. C. ALIENAGE DIFFERENTIAL The new DOJ rule is an example of an alienage differential in privacy under the Fourth Amendment.122 The circumstances leading an immigrant to be detained by immigration law enforcement officers are distinct from the circumstances that lead to criminal arrests because, in the vast majority of cases, immigrants in civil detention have not been suspected of committing a crime.123 Although there is no link between lack of immigration status and criminality, the new DOJ policy seems to assume that an immigration detainee, like a criminal arrestee, is under heightened suspicion of criminal behavior.124 Therefore, the collection of DNA under the new DHS policy represents an “unprecedented shift” from an intrusion on privacy based on conduct to one that is based on status.125 In other words, every immigrant is a suspect. Legal experts on immigration and genetic privacy recently opined in The New York Times, that “[b]y severing the longstanding prerequisite of prior (alleged) criminal conduct for compelled DNA collection, the government puts us all at risk.”126 They warn that “once you break the norm requiring criminal conduct for inclusion in CODIS, it is difficult to re-establish.”127 D. EXACERBATING RACIAL AND ETHNIC INEQUITIES Black and Latino men are disproportionately represented in U.S. law enforcement biometrics databases, including in CODIS.128 Existing racial bias in the criminal justice system has caused Black and Latino men to be unequally targeted by law enforcement for arrest and convicted of crimes.129 The new policy would exacerbate this inequity in the criminal justice system by adding a disproportionate amount of genetic information about Latinx people to CODIS.130 E. DATA BREACH Whenever personal information is stored in a database, it is subject to breach.131 DOJ has dismissed concerns about privacy harms in the event of a data breach affecting CODIS.132 However, a recent report of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs identified numerous vulnerabilities in the computer networks of federal agencies that hold personal data.133 One of the worst federal agency data breaches in recent years was the 2015 Office of Personnel Management breach, which resulted in the disclosure of security clearance data of more than 20 million current and former federal employees, including more than 5.6 million fingerprint records.134 Those whose DNA profiles are stored in CODIS therefore face greater privacy risks from unauthorized access to their genetic information than do people who have not been subjected to a DNA test by law enforcement.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>DNA info spills over into other sectors of life and effects social opportunities – available info and lack of CODIS regulations exposes vulnerable populations to <u>function creep </u>and data breaches</h4><p>Medha D. <strong>Makhlouf</strong>, Assistant Professor and Director, Medical-Legal Partnership Clinic, Penn State University – Dickinson Law; Assistant Professor, Department of Public Health Sciences, Penn State College of Medicine, 20<strong>20</p><p></strong>(“The Ethics of DNA Testing at the Border” American Journal of Law & Medicine, 46 (2020): 253-273, https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1148&context=fac-works, LASA-IZP)</p><p>III. PRIVACY RISKS OF EXPANDING DNA SURVEILLANCE</p><p>As a foundation for analyzing DOJ’s justification for expanding DNA collection from immigration detainees,<u> this Part provides an overview of privacy harms related to mass collection and sharing of biometric information by the government, with a focus on potential privacy harms arising from the new policy</u>. <u>Concerns about privacy harms are among the most important reasons for the government to refrain from expanding DNA databases and are often voiced when the government proposes to expand biometrics surveillance on a mass scale</u>.77 <u>Increased collection and sharing of DNA information across agencies enhances the government’s ability to surveil members of the population</u>.78 However, policymakers and courts have always balanced the value of individual privacy with other values that are considered socially beneficial.79</p><p>For example, privacy harms associated with a certain level of government surveillance in order to investigate crimes and protect public safety are generally tolerated. U.S. law enforcement first began using DNA testing to investigate crimes by linking crime scene evidence with the DNA of violent offenders.80 DNA profiles in CODIS are stored permanently and can be accessed by law enforcement at any level without consent, suspicion, or a warrant.81 Over time, state and federal laws rapidly expanded the list of offenses eligible for DNA collection and profile retention in CODIS, and some jurisdictions began collecting DNA from people who had merely been arrested on suspicion of having committed a crime.82</p><p>The issue of whether the government may collect DNA from people who have not been convicted of a crime implicates the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search.83 Several federal and state courts that initially considered this question reached opposite conclusions.84 In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Maryland’s statute authorizing pre-conviction collection of arrestees’ DNA as a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, “[i]n light of the context of a valid arrest supported by probable cause” relating to an alleged crime.85 The Court considered compulsory DNA collection in this context to be reasonable because (1) it serves important governmental interests related to law enforcement, (2) CODIS provides adequate privacy protections, and (3) a cheek swab to collect DNA is a minimal intrusion on individual privacy.86</p><p>In Immigration Surveillance, a seminal article documenting the rise of surveillance mechanisms in immigration enforcement activities, <u>Anil Kalhan adopts the following definition of surveillance: “the systematic monitoring, gathering, and analysis of information in order to make decisions, minimize risk, sort populations, and exercise</u> <u>power</u>.”87 <u>He describes in detail the use of four surveillance activities in immigration enforcement: “identification, screening and authorization, mobility tracking and control, and information sharing</u>.”88</p><p><u>In immigration enforcement, biometric identifiers such as</u> fingerprints, facial recognition-ready digital photographs, iris scans, palm prints, hand vein scans, voice prints, and <u><mark>DNA</u></mark> are favored over documentation as more efficient and accurate mechanisms to identify individuals.89 They <u><mark>are used</mark> to analyze, screen, and authorize noncitizens <mark>in</mark> a variety of settings unrelated to international travel, including at “local <mark>police</mark> <mark>stations</mark>, private <mark>workplaces</mark>, <mark>benefits agencies</mark>, <mark>universities, [and] health insurers and providers</mark>.</u>”90 <u><mark>Biometric info</mark>rmation systems <mark>are</mark> <mark>one of</mark> several <mark>tools</mark> that <mark>the gov</mark>ernment <mark>uses to track and control</mark> the <mark>movement </mark>of U.S. citizens and noncitizens across borders</u>.91 Finally, biometrics information of noncitizens is shared among several government database systems, including systems housed in “intelligence agencies, law enforcement, immigration authorities, international entities, foreign governments, and other institutions, both public and private.”92</p><p>Biometric information about noncitizens—specifically fingerprints, facial recognition-ready digital photographs, and iris scans—are stored in DHS’s Automated Biometric Identification System (“IDENT”), which is housed in government-run data centers.93 DHS is developing a new cloud-based system, the Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology System (“HART”), which will contain all of the information currently stored in IDENT and will have expanded capacity to store and analyze additional biometric identifiers such as palm prints, scars, tattoos, physical markings, and voices.94 <u>Biometric information is linked to machine-readable travel documents such as passports and visas, which incorporate biometric identifiers</u>.95 ICE has recently ramped up the routine collection of fingerprints from children in immigration detention, including those held by CBP at or near the border with their parents and those in ORR shelters.96 </p><p>DOJ justifies its new policy requiring DNA collection from all immigration detainees by describing several governmental interests that parallel the interests served by collection from arrestees and that the Supreme Court relied upon in Maryland v. King: “identification of persons in custody, facilitating safe and secure custody, informing decisions concerning detention and release pending further proceedings, clearing the innocent, and bringing the guilty to justice.”97 Ensuring public safety is the overarching rationale.98</p><p><u>Finally, it is important to note that the title of this Article refers to DNA testing at “the border.” By this term, I am referring not merely to a territorial boundary, but to the more nuanced concept in which it is understood in the context of immigration governance</u>.99 <u>Even after noncitizens have entered and are residing within the country, they are subject to direct and indirect immigration enforcement, which “draws the migration border inward, self-consciously constructing virtual, domestic border checkpoints throughout the country’s interior</u>.”<u>100 Direct enforcement is the initiation of removal proceedings based on unlawful presence or post-entry conduct such as criminal convictions.101 Indirect enforcement can occur whenever a public or private actor must verify immigration or citizenship status in order to make an eligibility determination</u>.102 <u>This includes many activities of day-to-day life, such as applying for a job, public benefits, or a driver’s license; registering for school; seeking health care; renting a home; or buying a bus ticket.</u>103 Both types of enforcement have increased dramatically in recent decades and can affect immigrants who have not recently crossed a territorial border.104 Post-entry enforcement actions have fueled the growth of immigration detention and will therefore fuel the growth of DNA surveillance of immigrants under DOJ’s new policy.</p><p><u>UNPREDICTED USES OF DNA DATA</p><p><mark>DNA contains </mark>much more <mark>info</mark>rmation than other biometrics, including information that many people consider sensitive <mark>such as “gender, </mark>familial <mark>relationships</mark>, and other <mark>hereditary info</mark>rmation, <mark>race</mark>, <mark>health</mark>, disease history and <mark>predisposition to disease</mark>, <mark>and</mark> perhaps even <mark>sexual orientation</u></mark>.”105 <u><mark>The potential applications of DNA </mark>analysis <mark>are</mark> infinite and are <mark>expanding every</mark> <mark>day</u></mark>.106 Even as the law has struggled to keep pace with these new applications, <u>it can be surmised from recent history that, as technology improves, the role of DNA in immigration and criminal processes will continue to grow.</p><p>In its new policy, DOJ seeks to alleviate concerns about privacy harms by characterizing the <mark>DNA profiles </mark>stored <mark>in CODIS</mark> as “sanitized ‘genetic fingerprints,’” claiming that they are useful only to identify an individual and cannot be used to “disclose the individual’s traits, disorders, or dispositions.”</u>107 <u>However, it is becoming increasingly evident that this “non-coding” DNA <mark>contain</mark>s <mark>more</mark> <mark>info</mark>rmation <mark>than previously believed</mark> <mark>and</mark> that <mark>tech</mark>nological <mark>advances</mark> <mark>will</mark> likely <mark>enable</mark> <mark>more info</mark>rmation <mark>to be mined</mark> from the profiles stored in CODIS</u>.108</p><p>In addition, <u>because DOJ retains DNA samples and not just DNA profiles, it is entirely possible for the government to mine these samples for sensitive information that we know to be linked with DNA.</u>109 <u>The sample itself contains information about a person’s entire genetic make-up, which is significantly more than and different in kind from the type of biometric information that is currently gathered, as some courts have recognized</u>.110 Government access to a person’s DNA information goes far beyond serving the purpose of identifying that person.111 <u>The combination of interoperable data systems storing biometric information, unlimited data retention times, and <mark>little oversight and transparency</mark> over the retrieval and use of sensitive biometric information <mark>increases the likelihood of function</mark> <mark>creep</u></mark>.112</p><p>B. PERPETUA TION OF INACCURACIES</p><p><u>Widespread collection and sharing of DNA information across government agencies can perpetuate inaccuracies that originate from one source</u>.113 <u>These inaccuracies can cause the wrong people to be profiled and surveilled, subjecting them to repeated intrusions of privacy in the form of searches and interrogations</u>.114 Based on current information-sharing practices designed to protect national security, we know that existing immigration records are “notoriously inaccurate and out-of-date.”115 For example, thousands of U.S. citizens have been transferred to ICE custody by state and local law enforcement based on inaccurate immigration records.116 As this experience shows, we know that <u>when such errors are disseminated across multiple systems and agencies, they can be very difficult to correct.117</p><p>Even when the information in DNA databases is accurate, those whose DNA is in the system are more likely to be wrongly implicated in a crime</u>.118 In a comment opposing the DOJ regulations expanding compulsory DNA testing of immigration detainees, the Electronic Frontier Foundation describes the case of Lukis Anderson, whose DNA was transferred by the paramedics who had treated him to a crime scene where they treated a victim hours later.119 Anderson was arrested and charged with murder even though he was in the hospital at the time the murder occurred.120 If his DNA had not been in the system, he would not have been wrongly implicated in the crime. While Anderson’s DNA was in the state criminal database because of a prior felony charge<u>, immigration detainees’ DNA will be entered into CODIS even if they have never been arrested for a crime</u>.121 <u>This means that the risk of this type of mistake is disproportionately likely to affect immigrants who have never had any involvement with the criminal justice system.</p><p></u>C. ALIENAGE DIFFERENTIAL</p><p>The new DOJ rule is an example of an alienage differential in privacy under the Fourth Amendment.122<u> The circumstances leading an immigrant to be detained by immigration law enforcement officers are distinct from the circumstances that lead to criminal arrests because, in the vast majority of cases, immigrants in civil detention have not been suspected of committing a crime</u>.123 Although there is no link between lack of immigration status and criminality, <u>the new DOJ policy seems to assume that an immigration detainee, like a criminal arrestee, is under heightened suspicion of criminal behavior</u>.124 <u>Therefore, the collection of DNA under the new DHS policy represents an “unprecedented shift” from an intrusion on privacy based on conduct to one that is based on status</u>.125 <u>In other words, every immigrant is a suspect. Legal experts on immigration and genetic privacy recently opined in The New York Times, that “[b]y severing the longstanding prerequisite of prior (alleged) criminal conduct for compelled DNA collection, the government puts us all at risk.”</u>126 They warn that “once you break the norm requiring criminal conduct for inclusion in CODIS, it is difficult to re-establish.”127</p><p>D. EXACERBATING RACIAL AND ETHNIC INEQUITIES</p><p><u>Black and Latino men are disproportionately represented in U.S. law enforcement biometrics databases, including in CODIS</u>.128 <u>Existing racial bias in the criminal justice system has caused Black and Latino men to be unequally targeted by law enforcement for arrest and convicted of crimes</u>.129 <u>The new policy would exacerbate this inequity in the criminal justice system by adding a disproportionate amount of genetic information about Latinx people to CODIS.</u>130</p><p><u>E. DATA BREACH</p><p>Whenever <mark>personal info</mark>rmation is <mark>stored in a database, </mark>it <mark>is subject to breach</u></mark>.131 <u>DOJ has dismissed concerns about privacy harms in the event of a data breach affecting CODIS</u>.132 <u>However, <mark>a recent</mark> <mark>report</mark> of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs <mark>identified numerous vulnerabilities in</mark> the <mark>computer networks of federal agencies that hold personal</mark> <mark>data</u></mark>.133 <u><mark>One of the worst federal</mark> agency data <mark>breaches</mark> in recent years <mark>was the 2015</mark> <mark>O</mark>ffice of <mark>P</mark>ersonnel <mark>M</mark>anagement <mark>breach</mark>, <mark>which</mark> <mark>resulted in the disclosure of</mark> security clearance <mark>data of</mark> more than <mark>20 million</mark> current and former federal <mark>employees</mark>, including more than 5.6 million fingerprint records</u>.134 <u><mark>Those whose DNA profiles are stored in CODIS</mark> therefore <mark>face</mark> <mark>great</mark>er<mark> privacy risks from unauthorized access</mark> to their genetic information than do people who have not been subjected to a DNA test by law enforcement.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Abraham 16 (John – PhD, professor of thermal sciences, “Fossil fuel funded report denies the expert global warming consensus”, 2/22/16, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2016/feb/22/fossil-fuel-funded-report-denies-the-expert-global-warming-consensus, Guardian) fulltext: We all know about the various organizations that fund or support the climate-change denial industry. Perhaps the best known is the Heartland Institute, which actually puts on climate “conferences” and publishes materials that appear at first glance to be scientifically sound. We who work and follow the climate change science and public discussions know enough to be skeptical about anything produced by groups like the Heartland Institute – their veneer of scientific credibility is very thin. On the other hand, perhaps the intended audience isn’t scientists are even people who closely follow the science. Perhaps their intended audience is legislators, teachers, and others who have influence over society? With this as a backdrop, I received a copy of a humorous report from an elected official in the USA. The report was entitled “Why Scientists Disagree about Global Warming,” published by Heartland. Since elected officials have too much going on to do a thorough debunking, I looked into this report to see what substance was there. As a scientist, when I read any manuscript I ask a number of questions. Who wrote it and what is their expertise in the field? When statements and conclusions are made, what is the evidence? How do these conclusions fit into prior work in the field? Is the new study confirming prior work or in conflict with it? If there is conflict, why? The authors of this manuscript are Craig Idso, the late Robert Carter, and Fred Singer. These three are not exactly (or even nearly) a trio of reputable climate scientists. According to a literature search performed using the search engine SCOPUS, neither Idso nor Singer published a credible paper on global climate change or its implications in years. One way to measure the authors’ impact is by counting how many people have read and cited their work. For both of these authors, the number of people who have cited them is shockingly low. To put their impact in perspective, a scientist like Kevin Trenberth receives three times more citations each year than the combined citations of Singer and Idso in their entire careers. So, having these guys be lead author on a climate change document is a bit like hiring retired scientists or op-ed writers to do your research. But just because they are not active and reputable scientists, could they be correct? Sure, they could be. So let’s look at the content. The central theme of this manuscript is an attack against the expert consensus on human-caused global warming. The consensus refers to the very strong and repeatable measure of what scientists think about climate change. What do the best scientists say? It turns out multiple groups have measured the consensus. The measurements have been done many different ways, all leading to the same conclusion – the consensus is strong. Not only is the consensus strong, contrarian scientists are less talented than those in the consensus. They publish less on the subject, and peer review has found the work of most high-profile contrarians to be faulty. So, on the one hand, you have approximately 97% of the best scientists in agreement, and on the other hand, you have about 3% of the less-talented scientists in dissent. Dr. Naomi Oreskes conducted the first major study that looked at consensus more than a decade ago. Dr. Oreskes examined the abstracts of hundreds of papers and found that they strongly confirmed the human influence on climate. In fact, she found no papers that dissented. The Heartland publication falsely calls Dr. Oreskes a “non-scientist.” In fact her scientific impact measured by citations is approximately four times that of the combination of Idso and Singer. Instead, they try to refute her with references to think-tank non-reviewed publications and websites. Peter Doran and Margaret Zimmerman performed the second major consensus study in 2009. This was the first peer-reviewed study that quantified that 97% agreement among climate scientists. The authors accessed a large database of Earth scientists and created a secure polling system to ask about their level of agreement. The authors broke the scientists into groups based on whether climate change was their field of study and whether they published a majority of their papers in that field. Approximately 10% of the respondents were in the most expert category. There were a series of questions for the respondents and a very strong consensus that temperatures had increased and humans were the cause. The Heartland Institute falsely claimed that the survey was only two questions, and their sole reference used to rebut the paper was an article in the National Post. William Anderegg and his colleagues completed the third major measure of consensus in 2010. They created a database of the most prominent climate scientists by searching the scientific literature for papers and citations. They found that only 2% of the experts were unconvinced on the extent of human impact. Importantly, the contrarian scientists were found to publish less and publish less impactful studies – simply put, the best scientists agreed. How does the Heartland document counter this study? They claimed that the mainstream scientists are “hyper productive.” They even accuse these scientists by saying “It is unlikely these scientists actually participated in most of the experiments or research contain in the articles bearing their name.” Next, they point out that the contrarians tend to be older and retired. I wouldn’t disagree with either of their conclusions. The 97% of scientists that agree are more productive and younger than those who disagree. The references that the Heartland uses to support its conclusions are from its own website, from the Wall Street Journal, and other non-scientific outlets. Not very convincing. The Heartland document finally attacks the 2013 study by John Cook and colleagues of the scientific literature. The authors examined over 12,000 abstracts and found that among those taking a position, less than 3% rejected or minimized human-induced climate change. Among the abstracts that gave a position, 97% were in agreement. Just like before, in response to this the Heartland document cites no peer-reviewed scientific sources — just think-tank literature, websites, and blog posts. What was surprising was that the Heartland report actually cited a consensus in favor of their viewpoint. The article “Scientists’ Views about Attribution of Global Warming” was published in 2014. The authors found a strong correlation of expertise with recognition that humans are a cause of climate change. For instance, for scientists who have published more than 10 papers on the topic, there is a 90% consensus that human influences dominate. I could go on, but you get the point. What we see is that it doesn’t matter how you measure the consensus. Whether you ask the scientists, whether you read the papers, or whether you trawl the literature in other ways. The results are reinforcing, which why we know there is such a strong consensus. While I won’t spend too much time on the scientifically incorrect or misleading statements in the Heartland report, I will mention a few. In chapter 4, they claim that a doubling of carbon dioxide would result in approximately 1°C warming. They neglected to remind the readers that we have nearly already reached that and we are nowhere near doubling of carbon dioxide yet. The report claims that meteorological observations are consistent with a climate sensitivity of 1°C but they provide no support for this assertion and in fact, the research does not support this. The report falsely claims that climate models assume all the warming since the industrial revolution is from carbon dioxide. Climate models include many factors in addition to carbon dioxide. The report also falsely claims that models do not attempt to simulate internal climate oscillations. They claim that thawing of permafrost is not likely to emit dangerous methane, which will add to the warming, but they give no evidence to support their claim. This is what happens when you have a fossil fuel-funded political organization parade a document as a scientific publication. You get nonsense and non-science. This is why we should be skeptical of anything published by an advocacy organization such as Heartland. Fortunately, we are used to their nonsense.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>heartland is garbage – that’s who all their authors work for – prefer consensus</h4><p><strong>Abraham 16</strong> (John – PhD, professor of thermal sciences, “Fossil fuel funded report denies the expert global warming consensus”, 2/22/16, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2016/feb/22/fossil-fuel-funded-report-denies-the-expert-global-warming-consensus, Guardian)</p><p>We all know about the various organizations that fund or support the climate-change denial industry. Perhaps the best known is the Heartland Institute, which actually puts on climate “conferences” and publishes materials that appear at first glance to be scientifically sound. We who work and follow the climate change science and public discussions know enough to be skeptical about anything produced by groups like <u>the <mark>Heartland</mark> Institute</u> – their <u><mark>veneer of</mark> scientific <mark>credibility is very thin</u></mark>. On the other hand, perhaps the intended audience isn’t scientists are even people who closely follow the science. Perhaps their intended audience is legislators, teachers, and others who have influence over society? With this as a backdrop, I received a copy of a humorous report from an elected official in the USA. The report was entitled “Why Scientists Disagree about Global Warming,” published by Heartland. Since elected officials have too much going on to do a thorough debunking, I looked into this report to see what substance was there. As a scientist, when I read any manuscript I ask a number of questions. Who wrote it and what is their expertise in the field? When statements and conclusions are made, what is the evidence? How do these conclusions fit into prior work in the field? Is the new study confirming prior work or in conflict with it? If there is conflict, why? <u>The authors of this manuscript are </u>Craig<u><strong> <mark>Idso</strong></mark>, </u>the late Robert <u><strong><mark>Carter</strong>, <strong>and</u></strong></mark> Fred<u> <strong><mark>Singer</u></strong></mark>. <u>These three <strong><mark>are not </mark>exactly</u></strong> (or even nearly) <u>a trio of <strong><mark>reputable</strong> climate</mark> scientists</u>. According to a literature search performed using the search engine SCOPUS, <u>neither Idso nor Singer published a credible paper on global climate change or its implications in years. </u>One way to measure the authors’ impact is by counting how many people have read and cited their work. <u>For both of these authors, the number of <strong><mark>people who</strong></mark> have <strong><mark>cite</strong></mark>d <strong><mark>them is shockingly low</u></strong></mark>. To put their impact in perspective, a scientist like Kevin Trenberth receives three times more citations each year than the combined citations of Singer and Idso in their entire careers. So, <u><strong>having these guys be lead author on a climate change document is a bit like hiring retired scientists or op-ed writers to do your research</strong>. </u>But just because they are not active and reputable scientists, could they be correct? Sure, they could be. So let’s look at the content. The central theme of this manuscript is an attack against the expert consensus on human-caused global warming. The consensus refers to the very strong and repeatable measure of what scientists think about climate change. What do the best scientists say? It turns out multiple groups have measured the consensus. <u>The <strong><mark>measurements have been done many different ways</strong></mark>, all leading to the same conclusion – <strong><mark>the consensus is strong</u></strong></mark>. Not only is the consensus strong, <u><strong><mark>contrarian scientists are less talented</strong></mark> than those in the consensus</u>. <u><strong><mark>They publish less</strong></mark> on the subject, <strong><mark>and peer review has found</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>work</strong></mark> of most high-profile contrarians <strong><mark>to be faulty</u></strong></mark>. So, on the one hand, <u><mark>you have</mark> approximately <mark>97%</mark> of the best scientists <mark>in agreement</mark>, <mark>and</mark> </u>on the other hand, you have about<u> <mark>3%</mark> <mark>of</mark> the <mark>less-talented scientists in dissent</mark>. </u>Dr. Naomi Oreskes conducted the first major study that looked at consensus more than a decade ago. Dr. Oreskes examined the <u>abstracts of hundreds of papers and found that they strongly confirmed the human influence on climate</u>. In fact, <u>she found no papers that dissented</u>. <u>The Heartland publication falsely calls Dr. Oreskes a “non-scientist.”</u> In fact <u>her scientific impact measured by citations is approximately four times that of the combination of Idso and Singer</u>. Instead, <u>they try to refute her with references to think-tank <strong>non-reviewed</strong> publications and websites. </u>Peter <u>Doran</u> <u>and</u> Margaret <u>Zimmerman</u> performed the second major consensus study in 2009. This <u>was the first peer-reviewed study that quantified that 97% agreement among climate scientists</u>. The authors accessed a large database of Earth scientists and created a secure polling system to ask about their level of agreement. The authors broke the scientists into groups based on whether climate change was their field of study and whether they published a majority of their papers in that field. Approximately 10% of the respondents were in the most expert category. There were a series of questions for the respondents and a very strong consensus that temperatures had increased and humans were the cause. The Heartland Institute falsely claimed that the survey was only two questions, and their sole reference used to rebut the paper was an article in the National Post. William <u>Anderegg</u> and his colleagues completed the third major measure of consensus in 2010. They created a database of the most prominent climate scientists by searching the scientific literature for papers and citations. They <u>found that only 2% of the experts were unconvinced on the extent of human impact.</u> Importantly, <u>the contrarian scientists were found to publish less and publish less impactful studies – simply put, <strong>the best scientists agreed</strong>.</u> How does the Heartland document counter this study? They claimed that the mainstream scientists are “hyper productive.” They even accuse these scientists by saying “It is unlikely these scientists actually participated in most of the experiments or research contain in the articles bearing their name.” Next, they point out that the contrarians tend to be older and retired. I wouldn’t disagree with either of their conclusions. <u>The 97% of scientists that agree are more productive and younger than those who disagree. The <mark>references</mark> that the <mark>Heartland uses</mark> to support its conclusions <mark>are <strong>from its own website</strong></mark>, from the Wall Street Journal, <mark>and other non-scientific outlets</mark>.</u> Not very convincing. The Heartland document finally attacks the 2013 study by John <u>Cook</u> and colleagues of the scientific literature. The authors <u>examined over 12,000 abstracts and found that among those taking a position, less than 3% rejected or minimized human-induced climate change</u>. Among the abstracts that gave a position, <u>97% were in agreement</u>. Just like before, <u>in response</u> to this the <u><mark>Heartland</u></mark> document <u>cites no peer-reviewed scientific sources</u> — just think-tank literature, websites, and blog posts. What was surprising was that the Heartland report actually cited a consensus in favor of their viewpoint. The article “Scientists’ Views about Attribution of Global Warming” was published in 2014. The authors found a strong correlation of expertise with recognition that humans are a cause of climate change. For instance, for scientists who have published more than 10 papers on the topic, there is a 90% consensus that human influences dominate. I could go on, but you get the point. What we see is that <u>it doesn’t matter how you measure the consensus</u>. Whether you ask the scientists, whether you read the papers, or whether you trawl the literature in other ways. <u>The results are reinforcing, which why we know there is such a strong consensus. </u>While I won’t spend too much time on the scientifically incorrect or misleading statements in the Heartland report, I will mention a few. In chapter 4, <u>they claim that a doubling of carbon dioxide would result in approximately 1°C warming. They neglected to remind the readers that we have nearly already reached that and we are nowhere near doubling of carbon dioxide yet</u>. The report claims that meteorological observations are consistent with a climate sensitivity of 1°C but <u>they provide no support for this assertion and in fact, the research does not support this. The report falsely claims that climate models assume all the warming since the industrial revolution is from carbon dioxide</u>. Climate models include many factors in addition to carbon dioxide. <u>The report also <mark>falsely claims</mark> that <mark>models do not</mark> attempt to <mark>simulate internal</mark> climate <mark>oscillations</u></mark>. They claim that thawing of permafrost is not likely to emit dangerous methane, which will add to the warming, but <u><strong><mark>they give no evidence</mark> to support their claim</u></strong>. <u>This is what happens when you have <strong><mark>a fossil fuel-funded political</strong> <strong>organization</mark> parade a document as a scientific publication.</strong> You get <strong><mark>nonsense and non-science</strong></mark>. <strong>This is why we should <mark>be skeptical of</mark> anything published by <mark>an</mark> advocacy <mark>organization such as Heartland</strong></mark>. </u>Fortunately, we are used to their nonsense.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Hudson 22 [Sam Hudson; undergraduate studying Natural Sciences at Cambridge; 3-29-2022; "The Progressive Case for NATO"; Areo; https://areomagazine.com/2022/03/29/the-progressive-case-for-nato/; KL] fulltext: Many will see the Young Labour Twitter account saga as yet another battle in the perpetual civil war between the left and the right of Labour, and as Young Labour—one of the last bastions of Corbynite socialist supremacy—attempting to undermine Keir Starmer’s leadership, which they see as a betrayal of Labour values. While Starmer’s moderation on economic policy, as seen in his attempts to reposition the Labour Party as business-friendly and his equivocations over tax policy, may be misplaced overreactions to Corbyn’s devastating loss in 2019, his return to foreign policy more in line with international norms certainly is not. Corbyn’s anti-American, “anti-imperialist” politics not only alienated much of the electorate (according to a 2020 poll, 65% of people in the UK support NATO), but were only dubiously progressive. The left was correct to call out America’s foreign policy blunders in Iraq and elsewhere—however, constructive criticism of American overreach has now been replaced by an overarching, hyper-reductive ideology that places America and neoliberalism at the centre of the world’s ills. Corbyn’s sympathy for Nicolás Maduro’s authoritarian regime in Venezuela and his flirtations with Hamas and Hezbollah are symptomatic of this outlook. And there is no clearer example of the manifestation of this ideology than in the supposedly left-wing criticisms of NATO, which Corbyn himself espouses. Young Labour’s preposterous idea that it was “NATO aggression” that precipitated the Russian invasion betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of NATO’s function. NATO troops were deployed in Poland and the Baltic states in a defensive response to the largest military build-up since World War II. This was not escalatory brinkmanship by the US trying to impose its will on the world. Unlike the Russians in Belarus and in Russian-occupied Crimea, the US offered no shows of force and undertook no “military exercises,” as they are euphemistically called. This was NATO operating at its most fundamental level: as an alliance for mutual defence. Countries that still bear deep scars from centuries of Russian imperialism were understandably concerned at the potential of spillover from any conflict in Ukraine and so—quite reasonably—requested additional support from their larger NATO allies. It is rather ironic that the “anti-imperialist” contingent of the left would have quite happily abandoned the very defensive commitments that have prevented these sovereign nations from being preyed on by a revanchist, imperialist Russia. Some of NATO’s left-wing critics argue that it is the organisation’s expansion into Eastern Europe that has forced Russia onto a paranoid warpath, but this argument does not hold water either. Countries join NATO by democratic consent—a fact that only the most absurd CIA conspiracy theories can explain away. Had Russia been a good neighbour to its Eastern European former client and satellite states, perhaps NATO would not have expanded beyond Germany. Instead, Russian leaders since Boris Yeltsin have viewed Russia’s former sphere as the country’s birth right, crushing nascent separatist movements within Russia’s own borders with horrific brutality, while supporting pro-Russian separatist movements in Moldova and Georgia. This cynical policy would have collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions had it not devolved into the blood-and-soil imperialism that we see playing out in the invasion of Ukraine. Yeltsin may be remembered through rose-tinted glasses as a cheery drunkard, but his desperation to maintain Russia’s status as a superpower set Russian foreign policy on course to where it is today. Putin has now simply taken that foreign policy to its logical conclusion. No wonder much of Eastern Europe wished to join NATO, the one alliance that could give these nations credible anti-imperialist protection. NATO is too often viewed reductively, as an American sphere of influence, in much the same way as the Warsaw Pact countries comprised a Soviet sphere of influence. It is true that a degree of alignment with some American foreign policy goals and values is implicit in NATO membership, but this is in no way equivalent to the influence the Soviets exerted over their client states during the Cold War. NATO members are sovereign states and have acted against US interests in the past. For instance, Turkey recently (wrongly) invaded America’s Kurdish allies in Syria. Likewise, NATO (rightly) refused US requests for assistance during the invasion of Iraq. As these concrete actions demonstrate, NATO is far more than an American-led sphere and has remained grounded in the democratic principles upon which it was founded, even though the US is able to leverage more power than it did at NATO’s founding in 1949. The characterisation of NATO as a tool of American imperialism, then, is demonstrably false. Criticism of NATO is not limited to the realm of geopolitical machinations. Many on the left see it as a vessel for American business interests and neoliberal capitalism. History has shown otherwise. It was Clement Attlee’s British Labour government that signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1947, founding NATO. And while Article 2 of the treaty stipulates that signatories should “eliminate conflict in their international economic policies” and “encourage economic collaboration,” this did not prevent Attlee’s government from being one of the most transformative in British history: it established the modern welfare state and continues to be widely celebrated by the Labour left today. Norway and Denmark, both founding members of NATO, are flourishing social democracies where social democrats and democratic socialists have spent more time in power than in opposition since 1949. Clearly, NATO has not impeded progressive political movements within its member states. In fact, the existence of NATO has had positive repercussions for the European left. The unification of Western Europe under a single military alliance forced member states to abandon the nationalist and revanchist grudges that had dogged European politics for centuries. The political moderation this encouraged has meant that—even in those European countries where social democrats have not had much political success—the right-wing opposition generally takes the form of Christian Democrats, who are far more moderate than the reactionary, nationalist conservative parties that were prominent prior to World War II. At the same time, the strength of NATO’s collective opposition to the Soviet Union prevented that brand of highly authoritarian and reactionary socialism from gaining traction in Europe. Instead, leftist movements have been largely characterised by a more liberal tradition, which opposes state-sponsored violence and emphasises human rights. Far from propping up the military-industrial complex—as NATO is often accused of doing—mutual defence and the guarantee of peace have allowed defence spending to be dramatically decreased throughout Europe. Part of this decrease may be attributed to the end of the Cold War—but defence spending has been on the decline since the 1960s and this is at least partly due to the peace between Western European neighbours that NATO has assured. In fact, defence spending has arguably declined too much. Most nations in the alliance have still not met NATO’s defence spending target of 2% of GDP, leaving America to foot the remaining bill. While this has meant that many European nations have been able to develop their welfare states, this has been at the expense of Americans, who still face a particularly vicious brand of capitalism with limited safety nets. As Germany’s overnight policy shift following the invasion of Ukraine has shown, committing to the 2% target is not a tall order. It would enable us to maintain our collective defence while allowing America a much-needed financial reprieve. It would also diminish America’s influence upon the alliance, allowing European nations more of a say on collective defence policy and procurement. Hopefully, this would encourage a shift away from the American military-industrial complex and toward a more competitive, less monopolised defence industry, which holds less sway over governments. History is often viewed as an inexorable march of progress and development from the barbarism of war to enlightened peace. This seems to be the underlying thinking of NATO’s left-wing detractors. But just as Rome fell, peace and progress are never inevitable, nor should they ever be taken for granted. Francis Fukuyama’s argument that we have reached the end of history has been widely derided by many on the left who find the idea that humanity will not progress past neoliberal democracy absurd. I agree with them—but in looking only forward, they have failed to look back. The fact that they see capitalist liberal democracy as the archenemy of peace and progress is not only extraordinarily privileged but terrifyingly dangerous. The west’s terrible interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have confirmed this narrative for many. This thinking explains Young Labour’s tweets: NATO is to blame for Putin’s invasion, since neoliberalism is the sole force of evil in the world. However, as the tanks rolled into Ukraine, history returned once more to remind us that there are far darker, more dangerous enemies of progress. It is these enemies that NATO continues to forestall and, in doing so, allow for the peace and progress of which we Europeans are beneficiaries today. While it is a tragedy that it has taken the whiplash of war for us to look back at history, I hope these events may foster newfound gratitude for NATO and the peace and progress that it has helped achieve. I look forward to the day when the progressive left—of which I am proud to be a part—will view NATO, alongside the NHS and the welfare state, as one of Labour’s greatest achievements.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>NATO is <u>not</u> imperialist.</h4><p><strong>Hudson 22</strong> [Sam Hudson; undergraduate studying Natural Sciences at Cambridge; 3-29-2022; "The Progressive Case for NATO"; Areo; https://areomagazine.com/2022/03/29/the-progressive-case-for-nato/; KL]</p><p>Many will see the Young Labour Twitter account saga as yet another battle in the perpetual civil war between the left and the right of Labour, and as Young Labour—one of the last bastions of Corbynite socialist supremacy—attempting to undermine Keir Starmer’s leadership, which they see as a betrayal of Labour values. While Starmer’s moderation on economic policy, as seen in his attempts to reposition the Labour Party as business-friendly and his equivocations over tax policy, may be misplaced overreactions to Corbyn’s devastating loss in 2019, his return to foreign policy more in line with international norms certainly is not. Corbyn’s anti-American, “anti-imperialist” politics not only alienated much of the electorate (according to a 2020 poll, 65% of people in the UK support NATO), but were only dubiously progressive. The left was correct to call out America’s foreign policy blunders in Iraq and elsewhere—however, <u>constructive criticism of American overreach has now been replaced by an <strong>overarching</u></strong>, <u><strong>hyper-reductive</u></strong> <u>ideology that places America and neoliberalism at the <strong>centre</strong> of the world’s ills</u>. Corbyn’s sympathy for Nicolás Maduro’s authoritarian regime in Venezuela and his flirtations with Hamas and Hezbollah are symptomatic of this outlook. And <u>there is <strong>no clearer example</strong> of the manifestation of this ideology than in the supposedly left-wing <strong>criticisms of NATO</u></strong>, which Corbyn himself espouses.</p><p>Young Labour’s preposterous <u><mark>idea that</mark> it was</u> “<u><mark>NATO</mark> aggression</u>” <u>that <mark>precipitated</mark> the <mark>Russian invasion</mark> betrays a <strong>fundamental <mark>misunderstand</mark>ing</u></strong> <u>of <mark>NATO’s function</u>. <u>NATO troops were deployed</mark> in Poland and the Baltic states <mark>in a <strong>defensive response</u></strong></mark> <u>to the <strong>largest military build-up</strong> since <strong>World War II</u></strong>. <u>This was <strong>not escalatory brinkmanship</u></strong> <u>by the US trying to impose its will on the world</u>. Unlike the Russians in Belarus and in Russian-occupied Crimea, the <u>US offered <strong>no shows of force</u></strong> and undertook no “military exercises,” as they are euphemistically called. <u>This was <mark>NATO operating</mark> at its most <strong>fundamental level</u></strong>: <u><mark>as an alliance for <strong>mutual defence</u></strong></mark>. <u>Countries that still bear <strong>deep scars</strong> from <strong>centuries</strong> of <strong>Russian imperialism</u></strong> <u>were <strong>understandably concerned</strong> at the potential of spillover from any conflict in Ukraine and so</u>—<u><strong>quite reasonably</u></strong>—<u>requested additional support from their larger NATO allies</u>. <u>It is rather <strong>ironic</u></strong> <u>that the </u>“<u>anti-imperialist</u>” <u>contingent of the left would have quite <strong>happily abandoned</u></strong> <u>the very defensive commitments that have prevented these sovereign nations from being <strong>preyed on</strong> by a <strong>revanchist</strong>, <strong>imperialist</strong> Russia</u>.</p><p>Some of NATO’s left-wing critics argue that it is the organisation’s expansion into Eastern Europe that has forced Russia onto a paranoid warpath, but this argument does not hold water either. <u>Countries join NATO by <strong>democratic consent</u></strong>—<u>a fact that only the <strong>most absurd</strong> CIA conspiracy theories can explain away</u>. <u><mark>Had Russia been a <strong>good neighbour</strong></mark> to its Eastern European former client and satellite states, perhaps <mark>NATO would not have expanded</u></mark> beyond Germany. <u>Instead, Russian leaders</u> since Boris Yeltsin <u>have viewed Russia’s <strong>former sphere</strong> as the country’s <strong>birth right</u></strong>, <u>crushing nascent separatist movements within Russia’s own borders with <strong>horrific brutality</u></strong>, <u>while supporting pro-Russian separatist movements in <strong>Moldova</strong> and <strong>Georgia</u></strong>. This cynical policy would have collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions had it not devolved into the blood-and-soil imperialism that we see playing out in the invasion of Ukraine. Yeltsin may be remembered through rose-tinted glasses as a cheery drunkard, but his desperation to maintain Russia’s status as a superpower set Russian foreign policy on course to where it is today. Putin has now simply taken that foreign policy to its logical conclusion. No wonder much of Eastern Europe wished to join NATO, the one alliance that could give these nations credible anti-imperialist protection.</p><p><u><mark>NATO is</mark> too often <strong><mark>viewed reductively</u></strong></mark>, <u>as an American sphere of influence, in much the same way as the <strong>Warsaw Pact</strong> countries comprised a Soviet sphere of influence</u>. <u>It is true that a <strong>degree of alignment</strong> with some <mark>American</mark> foreign policy <mark>goals</mark> and values is <mark>implicit in NATO</mark> membership, but this <mark>is</mark> in <strong><mark>no way</u></strong> <u>equivalent to the influence the Soviets exerted over</mark> their <mark>client states</mark> during the Cold War</u>. <u><mark>NATO members are <strong>sovereign</mark> states</strong> <mark>and have <strong>acted against</strong> US interests</mark> in the past</u>. For instance, Turkey recently (wrongly) invaded America’s Kurdish allies in Syria. Likewise, <u>NATO</u> (<u><strong>rightly</u></strong>) <u><strong>refused</u></strong> <u>US requests for assistance during the invasion of <strong>Iraq</u></strong>. As <u>these <strong>concrete actions</strong> demonstrate</u>, <u>NATO is <strong>far more</strong> than an American-led sphere and has remained <strong>grounded</u></strong> <u>in the <strong>democratic principles</u></strong> <u>upon which it was founded</u>, even though the US is able to leverage more power than it did at NATO’s founding in 1949. <u>The <mark>characterisation of NATO as a tool of</mark> American <mark>imperialism</u></mark>, then, <u><mark>is</mark> <strong>demonstrably <mark>false</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>Criticism of NATO is not limited to the realm of geopolitical machinations</u>. <u>Many on <mark>the left see it as a vessel for</mark> American business interests and neoliberal <mark>capitalism</u></mark>. <u><mark>History has <strong>shown otherwise</u></strong></mark>. It was Clement Attlee’s British Labour government that signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1947, founding NATO. And while Article 2 of the treaty stipulates that signatories should “eliminate conflict in their international economic policies” and “encourage economic collaboration,” this did not prevent Attlee’s government from being one of the most transformative in British history: it established the modern welfare state and continues to be widely celebrated by the Labour left today. <u><strong><mark>Norway</strong> and <strong>Denmark</u></strong></mark>, <u>both <strong>founding members</strong> of NATO</u>, <u><mark>are <strong>flourishing</strong> social democracies where</mark> social democrats and <strong><mark>democratic socialists</strong></mark> have spent <strong>more time</strong> in power than in opposition since 1949</u>.</p><p>Clearly, <u>NATO <strong>has not impeded</strong> progressive political movements within its member states</u>. In fact, <u>the existence of <mark>NATO has had <strong>positive repercussions</u></strong> <u>for the</mark> European <mark>left</u></mark>. The <u><mark>unification</mark> of Western Europe under a single military alliance</u> <u><mark>forced</mark> member <mark>states to <strong>abandon</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>nationalist</u></strong></mark> <u>and <strong>revanchist <mark>grudges</u></strong></mark> <u>that had dogged European politics for <strong>centuries</u></strong>. The political moderation this encouraged has meant that—even in those European countries where social democrats have not had much political success—the right-wing opposition generally takes the form of Christian Democrats, who are far more moderate than the reactionary, nationalist conservative parties that were prominent prior to World War II. At the same time, the strength of NATO’s collective opposition to the Soviet Union prevented that brand of highly authoritarian and reactionary socialism from gaining traction in Europe. Instead, leftist movements have been largely characterised by a more liberal tradition, which opposes state-sponsored violence and emphasises human rights.</p><p><u>Far from propping up the military-industrial complex</u>—as NATO is often accused of doing—<u>mutual defence and the guarantee of peace have allowed <strong>defence spending</strong> to be <strong>dramatically decreased</u></strong> <u>throughout Europe</u>. Part of this decrease may be attributed to the end of the Cold War—but defence spending has been on the decline since the 1960s and this is at least partly due to the peace between Western European neighbours that NATO has assured. In fact, defence spending has arguably declined too much. Most nations in the alliance have still not met NATO’s defence spending target of 2% of GDP, leaving America to foot the remaining bill. While this has meant that many European nations have been able to develop their welfare states, this has been at the expense of Americans, who still face a particularly vicious brand of capitalism with limited safety nets.</p><p>As Germany’s overnight policy shift following the invasion of Ukraine has shown, committing to the 2% target is not a tall order. It would enable us to maintain our collective defence while allowing America a much-needed financial reprieve. It would also diminish America’s influence upon the alliance, allowing European nations more of a say on collective defence policy and procurement. Hopefully, this would encourage a shift away from the American military-industrial complex and toward a more competitive, less monopolised defence industry, which holds less sway over governments.</p><p>History is often viewed as an inexorable march of progress and development from the barbarism of war to enlightened peace. This seems to be the underlying thinking of NATO’s left-wing detractors. But just as Rome fell, <u>peace and progress are never inevitable, nor should they ever be <strong>taken for granted</u></strong>. Francis Fukuyama’s argument that we have reached the end of history has been widely derided by many on <u>the left</u> who find the idea that humanity will not progress past neoliberal democracy absurd. I agree with them—but <u>in looking only forward, they have <strong>failed</strong> to <strong>look back</u></strong>. <u>The fact that they see capitalist liberal democracy as the <strong>archenemy</strong> of peace and progress is not only <strong>extraordinarily privileged</u></strong> <u>but <strong>terrifyingly dangerous</u></strong>. The west’s terrible interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have confirmed this narrative for many. This thinking explains Young Labour’s tweets: NATO is to blame for Putin’s invasion, since neoliberalism is the sole force of evil in the world. However, <u>as the tanks rolled into Ukraine, history returned once more to remind us that there are <strong>far darker</strong>, <strong>more dangerous</strong> enemies of progress</u>. <u>It is these enemies that <mark>NATO continues to</mark> <strong>forestall</strong> and, in doing so, <mark>allow for the <strong>peace</strong> and <strong>progress</strong> of</mark> which</u> we <u><mark>Europeans</mark> are beneficiaries today</u>. While it is a tragedy that it has taken the whiplash of war for us to look back at history, I hope these events may foster newfound gratitude for NATO and the peace and progress that it has helped achieve. I look forward to the day when the progressive left—of which I am proud to be a part—will view NATO, alongside the NHS and the welfare state, as one of Labour’s greatest achievements.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Clinton et al 2013 08 October 2013 Joshua D. Clinton Professor of Political Science at Princeton Ph.D. Political Science, M.S. Statistics, and M.A. Economics from Stanford University David E. Lewis Ph.D., Political Science, Stanford University M.A., Political Science, Stanford University M.A., Political Science, University of Colorado at Boulder Jennifer L. Selin Kinder Institute Assistant Professor of Constitutional Democracy in the University of Missouri’s Department of Political Science. She holds a Ph.D. from Vanderbilt University, a J.D. from Wake Forest University, and a B.A. from Lebanon Valley College “Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight” fulltext: Given the strong correlation between the number of involved congressional committees and relative presidential influence among and within agencies in the 110th Congress we document, which of the many possible reasons sketched in the first section are most likely responsible? One possibility is that as the number of committees involved in overseeing an agency increases, policy disagreements among the involved committees become more likely. Alternatively, more committee involvement may result in less influence even if committees agree because of collective action problems and increased transaction costs. Disentangling these two possible explanations is difficult given the available data. Doing so requires identifying which committees exercise oversight and locating the policy preferences of these committees relative to one another and to the agencies themselves in order to measure preference divergence. Moreover, even if these challenges are overcome, the data may be uninformative as to which aspect is most responsible for the relationship because the explanations are not mutually exclusive—Congress may simultaneously encounter both preference divergence among committees and increased transaction costs. Our survey provides some ability to measure the required concepts. To identify the committees involved in agency oversight, we use the responses of career executives to two open‐ended questions that asked for the name of the committee in the House and the Senate whose jurisdiction overlaps most with the work of the respondent's agency or program. We measure committee involvement using every committee mentioned in either the House or the Senate.13 The number of unique committees named by career executives within an agency varies from 3 (NLRB) to 21 (USDA). We are able to use the open‐ended responses for 30 agencies due to confidentiality agreements, and respondents in these agencies named 11 different committees on average.14 Not surprisingly, the Appropriations Committee was the most frequently mentioned committee in each chamber—it constituted 22% of the mentions in the House (408/1866) and 20% of the mentions in the Senate (361/1847). Using the list of committees named for each agency, we then identify the ideal point for the median member in each committee for each agency based on the roll calls from the 110th Congress using the estimator of Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004). Using the executives’ ideal points based on the 14 issues that were voted upon in the 109th Congress (Clinton et al. 2012), we locate the average ideal point of the careerists in the agency relative to the committee median.15 Figure 2 graphs the preference configuration for the 30 agencies and bureaus with more than 10 respondents. The figure plots the preferences of the average careerist in an agency (with 95% credible regions), the median committee member for every committee named by an agency member, and the median members of the chambers and majority parties. Agencies are ordered from the most liberal (bottom) to the most conservative (top), and the light‐gray shaded area denotes agencies located between the Democratic‐controlled House and Senate chamber medians. The number of circles reflects the number of named committees relevant for each agency, and the labeled vertical lines denote the location of median House and Senate Democrats as well as the House and Senate medians. President Bush's ideal point is omitted because it is more conservative than any of the agencies and committee medians (his ideal point is 1.25).16 For context, the most liberal committee in Figure 2 is the House Judiciary committee, and the most conservative committee is the House Homeland Security committee. [graphic omitted] Every agency except for one has multiple committee medians to the left of the agency's ideal point; 25 out of the 30 agencies have at least one committee on either side of their ideal point; and 17 agencies lie between the predicted location of the House and Senate median members. Figure 2 reveals there is almost always at least one committee (and often a chamber) that would oppose an attempt to move agency policy in either ideological direction in the 110th Congress for these agencies. The configuration of preferences in Figure 2 may suggest why Congress would have difficulty in responding to presidential influence, but the configuration also makes it impossible to determine whether the relationships of the third and fourth sections are primarily due to preference divergence among the committees overseeing the agency or transaction costs and coordination problems because of the number of committees involved in oversight because both aspects are present in nearly every case. Although necessarily speculative because the observations identifying the effect are rather weak, regressions controlling for the number of committees involved and the dispersion in the committee preferences using several measures (e.g., the range, the standard deviation) cannot reject the null that the ideological dispersion of the committee medians has no influence on the relative influence of Congress. In contrast, the number of involved committees continues to have a strong positive correlation with increased presidential influence over agency policymaking in these regressions. Conclusion and Implications Answering “who controls the policymaking in the bureaucracy?” has broad implications for governance and democratic accountability. Despite the importance of the question, however, it is a question that is notoriously difficult to answer. Our survey of federal executives provides an opportunity to break this logjam. Focusing on the variation among and within agencies in the 110th Congress (2007–2009), we offer some important conclusions about the relative ability of Congress and the president to influence agency policymaking. We demonstrate that there is a strong relationship between the number of committees involved in oversight and the lack of congressional influence relative to the White House. This relationship is evident both among agencies and the bureaus within agencies. Based on the perceptions and opinions of those individuals most responsible for implementing agency policy, the more congressional committees involved in the oversight of an agency, the weaker Congress is relative to the president. This suggests that the more Congress cares about an issue—at least as reflected in the structure of its committee system—the less influence Congress may have over the direction of agency policymaking. A troubling tension may therefore exist between the institutions that maximize members’ electoral benefits and constituency responsiveness and those that maximize congressional influence over policy outcomes. To be clear, our results do not suggest that Congress is ineffectual in influencing agency policy. Nor do they call into question prior findings that electorally minded members of Congress are able to influence the spending decisions of agencies. Instead, our results relate to the net effect of the interplay of presidential and congressional influence over the totality of agency policymaking (consisting of both the provision of private goods affecting particular localities and public goods concerning matters of general policy). Even if the committee system is optimally designed to allow members of Congress to respond to the demands of their constituents and claim credit for the goings‐on of the federal bureaucracy, this does not necessarily translate into an ability (or willingness) to influence agency policy overall. Interpreting our results alongside the existing literature suggests that increasing the number of committees with access to an agency may simultaneously increase the ability of members to secure electorally valuable private goods for their constituents but undermine the ability of Congress as an institution to respond collectively to the actions of the presidency or the bureaucracy. For example, the 108 committees and subcommittees overseeing the Department of Homeland Security may provide members with access to DHS resources but also affect the ability of Congress to compete with presidential influence over the general direction of agency policy. Members overly focused on securing district resources such as homeland security grants, visas for constituents, and disaster relief from the department may be unwilling or unable to focus on the larger policy goals. The ability and incentive of members of Congress to secure private goods for their district does not imply that a similar ability and incentive exists when dealing with the provision of public goods and the more diffuse policy goals. Congress is not unaware of the predicament it confronts when trying to oversee and influence the executive branch. The Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress in the 103rd Congress (1993–94), for example, weighed several different options of jurisdictional reform to eliminate policy overlaps, including a proposal to correspond committee jurisdiction with executive branch structure. While acknowledging that such a committee system could improve the relationship between Congress and the bureaucracy and might help facilitate more comprehensive oversight of the executive branch, the Joint Committee ultimately decided against a reorganization, and it reached the curious conclusion that “the Executive Branch is not optimally organized, making executive reorganization a desirable precursor to this arrangement” (U.S. Congress 1993, S. Prt. 103–55, 793). As was the case when the Department of Homeland Security was established, despite recognizing the potential difficulties for effective congressional oversight and influence (and, having to survey career executives to try to figure out which of its committees was interacting with the various executive agencies!), Congress intentionally decided against reorganizing the system of congressional oversight. Given the role played by the unelected bureaucracy in implementing policy, examining the ability of the elected branches to influence agency behavior is critically important. We find that the structure of the committee system leads to potential problems for congressional influence relative to the executive. Combined with the fact that members have little incentive to change a system that works for them (Adler 2002), the prospects for congressional control over the direction of agency policy seem remote in some areas. To the extent that the bureaucracy is responsive to elected officials when implementing policy, the structure and incentives present suggest a strong bias in favor of the president relative to Congress.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>Oversight fails</h4><p>Clinton et al 2013</p><p><u>08 October 2013 Joshua D. Clinton Professor of Political Science at Princeton Ph.D. Political Science, M.S. Statistics, and M.A. Economics from Stanford University David E. Lewis Ph.D., Political Science, Stanford University M.A., Political Science, Stanford University M.A., Political Science, University of Colorado at Boulder Jennifer L. Selin Kinder Institute Assistant Professor of Constitutional Democracy in the University of Missouri’s Department of Political Science. She holds a Ph.D. from Vanderbilt University, a J.D. from Wake Forest University, and a B.A. from Lebanon Valley College “Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight” </p><p></u></strong>Given the strong correlation between the number of involved congressional committees and relative presidential influence among and within agencies in the 110th Congress we document, which of the many possible reasons sketched in the first section are most likely responsible? <u><strong>One possibility is that <mark>as</mark> the number of <mark>committees</mark> <mark>involved</mark> <mark>in overseeing an agency</u></strong> <u><strong>increases</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>policy</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>disagreements</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>among</u></strong> the <u><strong>involved committees <mark>become more likely</u></strong></mark>. Alternatively, <u><strong><mark>more committee involvement</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>may result in less influence</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>even if committees agree</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>because of collective action</mark> <mark>problems</mark> <mark>and increased transaction costs</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>Disentangling these two possible explanations is difficult given the available data. Doing so requires identifying which committees exercise oversight and locating the policy preferences of these committees relative to one another and to the agencies themselves in order to measure preference divergence. Moreover, even if these challenges are overcome, the data may be uninformative as to which aspect is most responsible for the relationship because the explanations are not mutually exclusive—Congress may simultaneously encounter both preference divergence among committees and increased transaction costs.</p><p>Our survey provides some ability to measure the required concepts. To identify the committees involved in agency oversight, we use the responses of career executives to two open‐ended questions that asked for the name of the committee in the House and the Senate whose jurisdiction overlaps most with the work of the respondent's agency or program. We measure committee involvement using every committee mentioned in either the House or the Senate.13 The number of unique committees named by career executives within an agency varies from 3 (NLRB) to 21 (USDA). We are able to use the open‐ended responses for 30 agencies due to confidentiality agreements, and respondents in these agencies named 11 different committees on average.14 Not surprisingly, the Appropriations Committee was the most frequently mentioned committee in each chamber—it constituted 22% of the mentions in the House (408/1866) and 20% of the mentions in the Senate (361/1847).</p><p>Using the list of committees named for each agency, we then identify the ideal point for the median member in each committee for each agency based on the roll calls from the 110th Congress using the estimator of Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004). Using the executives’ ideal points based on the 14 issues that were voted upon in the 109th Congress (Clinton et al. 2012), we locate the average ideal point of the careerists in the agency relative to the committee median.15</p><p>Figure 2 graphs the preference configuration for the 30 agencies and bureaus with more than 10 respondents. The figure plots the preferences of the average careerist in an agency (with 95% credible regions), the median committee member for every committee named by an agency member, and the median members of the chambers and majority parties. Agencies are ordered from the most liberal (bottom) to the most conservative (top), and the light‐gray shaded area denotes agencies located between the Democratic‐controlled House and Senate chamber medians. The number of circles reflects the number of named committees relevant for each agency, and the labeled vertical lines denote the location of median House and Senate Democrats as well as the House and Senate medians. President Bush's ideal point is omitted because it is more conservative than any of the agencies and committee medians (his ideal point is 1.25).16 For context, the most liberal committee in Figure 2 is the House Judiciary committee, and the most conservative committee is the House Homeland Security committee.</p><p>[graphic omitted]</p><p>Every agency except for one has multiple committee medians to the left of the agency's ideal point; 25 out of the 30 agencies have at least one committee on either side of their ideal point; and 17 agencies lie between the predicted location of the House and Senate median members. Figure 2 reveals there is almost always at least one committee (and often a chamber) that would oppose an attempt to move agency policy in either ideological direction in the 110th Congress for these agencies.</p><p>The configuration of preferences in Figure 2 may suggest why Congress would have difficulty in responding to presidential influence, but the configuration also makes it impossible to determine whether the relationships of the third and fourth sections are primarily due to preference divergence among the committees overseeing the agency or transaction costs and coordination problems because of the number of committees involved in oversight because both aspects are present in nearly every case. Although necessarily speculative because the observations identifying the effect are rather weak, regressions controlling for the number of committees involved and the dispersion in the committee preferences using several measures (e.g., the range, the standard deviation) cannot reject the null that the ideological dispersion of the committee medians has no influence on the relative influence of Congress. In contrast, the number of involved committees continues to have a strong positive correlation with increased presidential influence over agency policymaking in these regressions.</p><p>Conclusion and Implications</p><p>Answering “who controls the policymaking in the bureaucracy?” has broad implications for governance and democratic accountability. Despite the importance of the question, however, it is a question that is notoriously difficult to answer. Our survey of federal executives provides an opportunity to break this logjam. Focusing on the variation among and within agencies in the 110th Congress (2007–2009), we offer some important conclusions about the relative ability of Congress and the president to influence agency policymaking.</p><p>We demonstrate that <u><strong><mark>there is a strong relationship</u></strong> <u><strong>between</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong>number of <mark>committees</mark> <mark>involved</mark> <mark>in oversight and the lack of congressional influence relative</u></strong> <u><strong>to the White House</u></strong></mark>. This relationship is evident both among agencies and the bureaus within agencies. Based on the perceptions and opinions of those individuals most responsible for implementing agency policy, <u><strong>the more congressional committees involved in the oversight of an agency, the weaker Congress is relative to the president</u></strong>. This suggests that <u><strong><mark>the more Congress cares about an issue</u></strong></mark>—at least as reflected in the structure of its committee system—<u><strong><mark>the less influence</mark> Congress may have over the direction of agency policymaking</u></strong>. A troubling tension may therefore exist between the institutions that maximize members’ electoral benefits and constituency responsiveness and those that maximize congressional influence over policy outcomes.</p><p>To be clear, our results do not suggest that Congress is ineffectual in influencing agency policy. Nor do they call into question prior findings that electorally minded members of Congress are able to influence the spending decisions of agencies. Instead, our results relate to the net effect of the interplay of presidential and congressional influence over the totality of agency policymaking (consisting of both the provision of private goods affecting particular localities and public goods concerning matters of general policy). Even if the committee system is optimally designed to allow members of Congress to respond to the demands of their constituents and claim credit for the goings‐on of the federal bureaucracy, this does not necessarily translate into an ability (or willingness) to influence agency policy overall.</p><p>Interpreting our results alongside the existing literature suggests that <u><strong><mark>increasing the number of committees with</mark> </u></strong>access to an agency <u><strong><mark>may</u></strong></mark> simultaneously increase the ability of members to secure electorally valuable private goods for their constituents but <u><strong><mark>undermine the ability of Congress as an institution to respond collectively to the actions of the presidency or the bureaucracy</u></strong></mark>. For example, <u><strong><mark>the 108 committees and subcommittees overseeing</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>the</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>D</u></strong></mark>epartment of <u><strong><mark>H</u></strong></mark>omeland <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>ecurity <u><strong><mark>may provide members with</mark> access to DHS <mark>resources</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>but</mark> also <mark>affect</mark> <mark>the ability of Congress to</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>compete with presidential influence</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>over</mark> the general <mark>direction of agency policy</u></strong></mark>.</p><p> <u><strong><mark>Members</mark> overly <mark>focused</mark> <mark>on</mark> securing district <mark>resources</u></strong></mark> such as homeland security grants, visas for constituents, and disaster relief from the department <u><strong><mark>may be unwilling or unable to focus on the larger policy goals</mark>. The ability and incentive of members of Congress to secure private goods for their district does not imply that a similar ability and incentive exists when dealing with the provision of public goods and the more diffuse policy goals</u></strong>.</p><p>Congress is not unaware of the predicament it confronts when trying to oversee and influence the executive branch. The Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress in the 103rd Congress (1993–94), for example, weighed several different options of jurisdictional reform to eliminate policy overlaps, including a proposal to correspond committee jurisdiction with executive branch structure. While acknowledging that such a committee system could improve the relationship between Congress and the bureaucracy and might help facilitate more comprehensive oversight of the executive branch, the Joint Committee ultimately decided against a reorganization, and it reached the curious conclusion that “the Executive Branch is not optimally organized, making executive reorganization a desirable precursor to this arrangement” (U.S. Congress 1993, S. Prt. 103–55, 793). As was the case when the Department of Homeland Security was established, despite recognizing the potential difficulties for effective congressional oversight and influence (and, having to survey career executives to try to figure out which of its committees was interacting with the various executive agencies!), Congress intentionally decided against reorganizing the system of congressional oversight.</p><p>Given the role played by the unelected bureaucracy in implementing policy, examining the ability of the elected branches to influence agency behavior is critically important. We find that <u><strong><mark>the structure of the committee system leads to</mark> potential <mark>problems for congressional influence</mark> relative to the executive. Combined with the fact that <mark>members have little incentive to change a system that works for them</u></strong></mark> (Adler 2002), the <u><strong><mark>prospects for congressional control </mark>over the direction of agency policy <mark>seem remote</mark> </u></strong>in some areas. To the extent that the bureaucracy is responsive to elected officials when implementing policy, the <u><strong><mark>structure and incentives present suggest a strong bias in favor of the president relative to Congress</u></strong></mark>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Whitworth ‘17 Andrew Whitworth is an author for the publication Christ and Pop Culture. Andrew is a graduate of Taylor University and alumnus of the Trinity Fellows Academy. He lives in DC working to build flourishing political communities. “DACA: A Shared Responsibility to Act” – Shared Justice – November 9th - #CutWithRJ- http://www.sharedjustice.org/domestic-justice/2017/11/9/daca-a-shared-responsibility-to-act fulltext: Imagine how different this situation would have been if my family had been crossing the border between countries, rather than between states - the ramifications change significantly. Imagine growing up under the constant threat of deportation, knowing that your future employment and educational opportunities would be severely limited, without the ability to obtain a driver’s license in many places. Imagine having to accept the consequences of a choice that you never had a say in making. Of course, in many ways these two situations could not be more different from one another. While in both situations the child is not responsible for the decision to move, the bearing of the future consequences that the move creates differ significantly between immigrant and nonimmigrant families. It is a complicated, difficult situation, but one that is familiar to thousands currently living in the U.S. For the last 16 years, Congress has been debating what to do about this particular group of immigrants who came to the United States as undocumented minors. Since the first DREAM Act (Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors) was introduced in 2001, members of both parties have tried to navigate the choppy political and cultural waters of immigration policy to pass some sort of protections for these immigrants, who have become known as “Dreamers.” Various bills related to this issue failed to pass for over a decade, eventually culminating in the failure to pass a version of the DREAM Act in 2010 by just a few votes in the Senate. After this failure, the Obama administration attempted to find a temporary solution through executive action, announcing the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program in 2012. The program sought to protect undocumented immigrants who had been brought to the U.S. as children and met certain criteria regarding education and criminal records from deportation. Since 2012, approximately 790,000 undocumented immigrants have been approved for the program, allowing them to enroll in college, obtain a valid driver’s license, be legally employed, and be relieved of the threat of deportation. The program does not provide a pathway to citizenship or full legal status, and must be renewed every two years. Recipients must also pay income taxes and a $465 fee to apply for renewal. The program has been controversial, with many claiming it is an overreach of executive powers. Among the critics of the program is President Trump. Ending DACA was one of his first promises on the campaign trail. In his speech announcing his candidacy, he stated that he would “immediately terminate President Obama's illegal executive order on immigration..” upon his election. Although he repeated this promise throughout his campaign as part of his anti-immigration platform, DACA’s repeal took a backseat to more immediate and controversial actions. However, DACA was back in the headlines this Fall as President Trump weighed whether or not to end the program, prompted by the threat of a lawsuit by a group of state attorney generals. Despite the immediate dismantling of DACA being one of Trump’s original campaign promises, the president wavered on whether or not to follow through with this promise.He was reportedly conflicted about the decision, citing potential direct harm to DACA recipients and their families, as well as indirect harm to the US economy. This wavering reflects a constant tension for the Trump presidency between satisfying a far-right support base and dealing with the political realities of governing, in this case ending a relatively popular and successful program. On September 5, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions, one of the program’s fiercest opponents, announced that the Trump administration would end DACA. New applications will no longer be accepted, and current recipients whose protection ends before March 5, 2018 had until October 5 to renew their protection, creating a six month window before DACA recipients will begin to lose their protection. In the announcement, Sessions said that this window is in place to give Congress the opportunity to pass legislation that would create a permanent solution for Dreamers. In 2014, two years after the enactment of DACA, Center for Public Justice CEO Stephanie Summers made the case that the enactment of DACA upheld public justice. Summers argued that “Congress violates the standards of public justice when it promotes policies that ultimately interfere with families’ abilities to uphold their responsibilities by subsuming the right authority of the family to the false sovereignty claim of the state.” The executive branch had a responsibility to intervene, and found a way to do so in DACA. Those eligible for DACA’s protections did not come to the U.S. by choice, and it isn’t fair to hold them responsible for the decisions of others. They have established their lives in the U.S. and are contributing members of American society. The rule of law is important—justice depends on it. However, to deny these protections to those who meet the qualifications of DACA is to violate justice. True justice has the ends of human flourishing, rather than misdirecting its ends towards laws that hold people to unfair standards and deny them the opportunity to live flourishing lives. Opponents of DACA often argue that undocumented immigrants pose a threat to public safety, that providing a pathway to citizenship will cost U.S. taxpayers significantly, and that giving legal status to undocumented immigrants will overcrowd the U.S. job market. However, these arguments do not hold up to scrutiny. Study after study has shown that immigrants commit crimes at a lesser rate than non-immigrants, suggesting perhaps that they contribute to more safe communities. The argument that those receiving DACA’s protections make the U.S. less safe is simply not factually supported. The elimination of DACA’s protections would also be a loss to the U.S. tax system, rather than a benefit. As the Cato Institute explains, “According to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), first-generation immigrants who enter the United States as children (including all DACA recipients) pay, on average, more in taxes over their lifetimes than they receive in benefits, regardless of their education level. DACA recipients end up contributing more than the average, because they are not eligible for any federal means-tested welfare: cash assistance, food stamps, Medicaid, health-care tax credits or anything else.” While the notion that DACA is too costly to U.S. taxpayers if often cited as a viable reason for repealing DACA, it also is not factually supported. Lastly, protecting DACA recipients and encouraging their employment in the U.S. would not cause fewer available jobs for American workers. Rather, if anything, this would boost the economy as a whole. DACA recipients are more educated than the average immigrant and, depending on the education requirements in the legislation, would add a sizable, young, well-educated, highly capable pool of workers and entrepreneurs to an aging U.S. population. The utilitarian argument for protecting Dreamers is strong, but a moral case is equally compelling. A debate about the value of immigrants’ lives and whether they deserve the opportunity to pursue safety and flourishing for their families should not depend on their education or projected economic benefit. Further, Christians should keep this commitment at the forefront of the conversation surrounding immigration policy. As the Center for Public Justice Guideline on Family states, “Government’s policies should aim to uphold the integrity and social viability of families.” Removing the protections and benefits of DACA violates this key responsibility of government. As a part of promoting a just society that respects the dignity of individuals and families, action needs to be taken to enshrine the protections of DACA into law.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The utilitarian case for the DREAM act is powerful – but the moral case is <u>a matter of obligatory justice<strong>.</h4><p>Whitworth ‘17</p><p></u></strong>Andrew Whitworth is an author for the publication Christ and Pop Culture. Andrew is a graduate of Taylor University and alumnus of the Trinity Fellows Academy. He lives in DC working to build flourishing political communities. “DACA: A Shared Responsibility to Act” – <u>Shared Justice</u> – November 9th - #CutWithRJ- http://www.sharedjustice.org/domestic-justice/2017/11/9/daca-a-shared-responsibility-to-act</p><p><u><mark>Imagine how different this</u></mark> situation <u><mark>would have been if my family had been crossing the border between countries</u></mark>, <u><mark>rather than between states</mark> </u>- the ramifications change significantly. <u><mark>Imagine growing up under <strong>the constant threat of deportation</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>knowing that your</mark> future <strong><mark>employment and educational opportunities</strong> would be severely limited</u></mark>, without the ability to obtain a driver’s license in many places. <u><mark>Imagine having to accept the consequences of a choice that you never had a say in making</u></mark>.</p><p>Of course, in many ways these two situations could not be more different from one another. <u><mark>While in both situations the child is not responsible for the decision to move</u></mark>, the bearing of <u><mark>the</u></mark> future <u><mark>consequences that the move creates differ significantly between immigrant and nonimmigrant families</mark>.</u> It is a complicated, difficult situation, but one that is familiar to thousands currently living in the U.S.</p><p><u><mark>For</u></mark> the last <u><mark>16 years</u></mark>, <u><mark>Congress has been debating what to do</u></mark> about this particular group of immigrants who came to the United States as undocumented minors. <u><mark>Since the first DREAM Act</u></mark> (Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors) <u>was introduced in 2001</u>, <u><mark>members of both parties have tried to</u></mark> navigate the choppy political and cultural waters of immigration policy to <u><mark>pass some sort of protections for</u></mark> these immigrants, who have become known as <u><mark>“Dreamers.”</p><p></u></mark>Various <u><mark>bills</mark> related to this issue</u> <u><mark>failed to pass</u></mark> for over a decade, eventually culminating in the failure to pass a version of the DREAM Act in 2010 by just a few votes in the Senate. <u><mark>After this failure</u></mark>, the <u><mark>Obama</u></mark> administration <u><mark>attempted to find a temporary</u></mark> <u><mark>solution through</u></mark> <u>executive action, announcing the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals</u> (<u><strong><mark>DACA</u></strong></mark>) program <u><strong>in 2012</strong>.</u> The program sought to protect undocumented immigrants who had been brought to the U.S. as children and met certain criteria regarding education and criminal records from deportation.</p><p><u><strong>Since 2012</u></strong>, <u><mark>approximately 790,000 undocumented immigrants have been approved for the program</u></mark>, allowing them to enroll in college, obtain a valid driver’s license, be legally employed, and be relieved of the threat of deportation. <u><mark>The program does not provide <strong>a pathway to citizenship</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>or <strong>full legal status</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and must be renewed every two years</u></mark>. <u>Recipients must also pay</u> income taxes and <u>a $465 fee to apply for renewal</u>.</p><p>The program has been controversial, with many claiming it is an overreach of executive powers. <u>Among the critics of the program is</u> President <u>Trump.</u> Ending DACA was one of his first promises on the campaign trail. In his speech announcing his candidacy, he stated that he would “immediately terminate President Obama's illegal executive order on immigration..” upon his election. Although he repeated this promise throughout his campaign as part of his anti-immigration platform, DACA’s repeal took a backseat to more immediate and controversial actions.</p><p><u>However, DACA was back in the headlines this Fall as President Trump weighed whether or not to end the program, prompted by the threat of a lawsuit by a group of state attorney generals. Despite the immediate dismantling of DACA being one of Trump’s original campaign promises, the president wavered on whether or not to follow through with this promise.He was reportedly conflicted about the decision, citing potential direct harm to DACA recipients and their families, as well as indirect harm to the US economy. This wavering reflects a constant tension for the Trump presidency between satisfying a far-right support base and dealing with the political realities of governing, in this case ending a relatively popular and successful program.</p><p><strong>On September 5, 2017,</u></strong> <u>Attorney General</u> Jeff <u><mark>Sessions,</u></mark> one of the program’s fiercest opponents, <u><mark>announced that</u></mark> the <u><mark>Trump</u></mark> administration <u><mark>would end DACA.</u></mark> New applications will no longer be accepted, and current recipients whose protection ends before March 5, 2018 had until October 5 to renew their protection, <u><mark>creating a six month window before DACA recipients will begin to lose their protection.</u></mark> In the announcement, <u><mark>Sessions said</u></mark> that <u><mark>this window is in place to give Congress the opportunity to pass legislation that would create a permanent solution for Dreamers.</p><p></u></mark>In 2014, two years after the enactment of DACA, Center for Public Justice CEO Stephanie Summers made the case that the enactment of DACA upheld public justice. Summers argued that “Congress violates the standards of public justice when it promotes policies that ultimately interfere with families’ abilities to uphold their responsibilities by subsuming the right authority of the family to the false sovereignty claim of the state.” The executive branch had a responsibility to intervene, and found a way to do so in DACA.</p><p><u><mark>Those eligible for DACA’s protections did not come to the U.S. by choice</u></mark>, <u><mark>and it isn’t fair to hold them responsible for the decisions of others</u></mark>. <u><mark>They</u></mark> have <u><mark>established</u></mark> their <u><mark>lives in the U.S.</u></mark> and are contributing members of American society. The rule of law is important—justice depends on it. However, <u><mark>to deny these protections</mark> </u>to those who meet the qualifications of DACA <u><strong><mark>is to violate justice.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>True justice has the ends of</u></mark> human <u><mark>flourishing</u></mark>, <u><mark>rather than <strong>misdirecting its ends</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>towards laws that hold people to unfair standards</u></mark> and deny them the opportunity to live flourishing lives.</p><p><u><mark>Opponents of DACA often argue that undocumented immigrants pose a threat</u></mark> to public safety, <u><mark>that providing a path</u></mark>way to <u><mark>citizenship will cost U.S. taxpayers</u></mark> significantly, <u><mark>and that giving legal status to undocumented immigrants will overcrowd the U.S. job market</u></mark>. However, <u><strong><mark>these arguments do not hold up to scrutiny.</p><p></u></strong></mark>Study after study has shown that immigrants commit crimes at a lesser rate than non-immigrants, suggesting perhaps that they contribute to more safe communities. The argument that those receiving DACA’s protections make the U.S. less safe is simply not factually supported.</p><p>The elimination of DACA’s protections would also be a loss to the U.S. tax system, rather than a benefit. As the Cato Institute explains,</p><p>“According to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), first-generation immigrants who enter the United States as children (including all DACA recipients) pay, on average, more in taxes over their lifetimes than they receive in benefits, regardless of their education level. DACA recipients end up contributing more than the average, because they are not eligible for any federal means-tested welfare: cash assistance, food stamps, Medicaid, health-care tax credits or anything else.”</p><p><u>While the notion that DACA is too costly to U.S. taxpayers if often cited as a viable reason for repealing DACA, it also is not factually supported.</p><p></u>Lastly, <u><mark>protecting DACA recipients and encouraging their employment in the U.S.</u></mark> would not cause fewer available jobs for American workers. Rather, if anything, this <u><mark>would boost the economy as a whole</u></mark>. <u><mark>DACA recipients</u></mark> are more educated than the average immigrant and, depending on the education requirements in the legislation, would <u><mark>add a sizable, young, well-educated, highly capable pool of workers and entrepreneurs to an aging U.S. population.</p><p>The <strong>utilitarian argument</strong> for protecting Dreamers is strong</u></mark>, <u><mark>but <strong>a moral case is equally compelling</strong>.</mark> A debate about the value of immigrants’ lives and whether they deserve the opportunity to pursue safety and flourishing for their families should not depend on their education or projected economic benefit. Further, Christians should keep this commitment at the forefront of the conversation surrounding immigration policy.</p><p></u>As the Center for Public Justice Guideline on Family states, “<u><mark>Government’s policies should aim to uphold</u></mark> the <u><mark>integrity</u></mark> and social viability of families.” <u><mark>Removing the protections and benefits of DACA violates this key responsibility of government</u></mark>. <u><mark>As a part of promoting a just society that respects</mark> </u>the <u><mark>dignity</u></mark> of individuals and families, <u><mark>action needs to be taken to enshrine the protections of DACA into law.</p></u></mark><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Santoro & Warden ‘15 fulltext: [David – Senior Fellow at the CSIS’ Pacific Forum. And John – Fellow at the CSIS’ Pacific Forum. “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age” The Washington Quarterly, Vol 38 N. 1. 2015. ln] Dubbed the second nuclear age, 2 the current context has been widely discussed for its differences with the Cold War, or the world’s first nuclear age. During this first age, two nuclear superpowers were locked in a competition for global dominance with allies on each side, a handful of which developed small nuclear arsenals. U.S.–Soviet competition was intense, but remained cold in part because Washington and Moscow developed arms - control and crisis - management mechanisms to regulate their behavior. Stability endured because even though Washington and Moscow did not control all the triggers, they had sufficient authority to keep bloc discipline and avoid becoming entrapped in a nuclear war. The security environment was always extremely dangerous because the possibility of global nuclear annihilation was omnipresent, but per the notorious formula, “a stable balance of terror” endured. 3 The end of the Cold War gave rise to hopes—mainly in Western quarters— that nuclear weapons would be relegated to the dustbin of history. 4 This belief led the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to downsize their arsenals and assist a financially - strapped Russia to do the same. Meanwhile, several states across Asia—in Western Asia (the Middle East), South Asia, and East Asia—developed nuclear and long - range missile programs. 5 China’s efforts to modernize its nuclear and missile forces continued steadily. India and Pakistan pushed forward with their own programs and, after exploding nuclear devices in 1998, became nuclear - armed states. North Korea conducted several rocket tests during the late 1990s and tested its first nuclear device in 2006. Iran, Syria, and others also developed nuclear and missile programs. By the early 21st century, the Cold War order tightly controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union was replaced by a multiplayer arena with several less experienced nuclear decision - making parties and an epicenter in Asia. As a result, today, while there is less risk of global annihilation— both because major - power relations have improved and because important firebreaks against conflict are in place, including robust crisis management mechanisms and enhanced economic interdependence—the potential for war, and even nuclear use, is growing. 6 Not surprisingly, these developments have led U.S. allies to seek strengthened assurances that the United States, their main security guarantor, will continue to protect them from coercion and attack. The assurance challenge is particularly difficult because it turns on more than effective deterrence. Deterrence primarily requires the United States to influence an adversary’s calculus at critical moments during a crisis. For allies to be fully assured, however, the United States must, during peacetime, convince them 1) that U.S. extended deterrence will succeed in preventing adversaries from challenging their core interests, and 2) that should deterrence fail, the United States can and will provide for their defense. Hence former British defense minister Denis Healey’s formulation that during the Cold War it took “only five percent credibility of U.S. retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety - five percent credibility to reassure the Europeans.” 7 In the second nuclear age, it is more difficult for the United States to assure its Northeast Asian allies than it was during the Cold War. James Schoff notes that during the Cold War “the U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little.” 8 Today, the United States must convince allies that it can deter multiple nuclear - armed adversaries, some of whom have less adversarial relations with the United States than the Soviet Union did. Just as important, the United States also faces an equally difficult task of convincing its allies that it could and would respond should extended deterrence fail. North Korea continues to develop long - range missiles and nuclear weapons, and China is modernizing its military and acting increasingly assertively. The United States’ relationship with China is also more complex than its Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union, featuring varying degrees of competition and cooperation. At the same time, the United States has shifted from a 1960s deterrent posture of deploying thousands of nuclear weapons, including 3,000 forward deployed in the Asia–Pacific (1,200 in Okinawa), to one with far fewer deployed nuclear weapons and none forward - deployed in Asia. 9 U.S. assurance of allies exists along a spectrum, and Washington must carefully balance its desire to reduce allied anxiety against other interests. There are some allied interests that the United States—rightly—does not deem worthy of risking war. But if the gap between the United States and its allies becomes too large, allies will lose faith in U.S. assurance, which could have disruptive consequences. In the worst case scenario for the United States, Japan or South Korea might choose to bandwagon with U.S. competitors in the region. Another slightly better, but still deeply troublesome, possibility is for Tokyo and Seoul to develop nuclear arsenals of their own, which would likely eviscerate the remaining credibility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In either case, a loss of confidence in the United States as a reliable security guarantor in Northeast Asia would send reverberations across the entire U.S. alliance system. Development of nuclear weapons by Japan or South Korea is not a far - fetched scenario. Both possess the latent capability to develop weapons programs relatively quickly, and some in South Korea and to a lesser extent Japan have advocated that their countries should go nuclear if the Northeast Asian security environment deteriorates or they lose confidence in the United States as a reliable guarantor. 10 In South Korea, there are also signs of public support for nuclearization. After North Korea’s third nuclear test, for example, an Asan Institute poll revealed that 66 percent of people in South Korea wanted nuclear weapons. 11 Initial Steps to Assure Japan and South Korea The United States has a variety of military and political tools at its disposal to assure Japan and South Korea. Because the requirements of assurance and extended deterrence overlap, actions designed to strengthen extended deterrence, such as modernizing U.S. nuclear forces and public declarations of will, also strengthen assurance as long as their effects are relayed to allies. Yet, these steps will not be sufficient. Assurance has to be tailored to the needs of each ally and include dialogue, consultations, joint planning, and improved relations beyond the military area. The Obama administration has reassured Japan and South Korea by committing to strengthen extended deterrence including extended nuclear deterrence. In nuclear policy, President Barack Obama is perhaps best known for his commitment to the long - term goal of a world without nuclear weapons, which resulted in him receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009 and set the tone for a successful NPT Review Conference in 2010. Yet, just as important is the work that his administration has done to strengthen extended deterrence and assurance. In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Washington reiterated that the United States must deploy strong and credible military forces tailored to regional needs. 12 Washington continues to ascribe an important role to nuclear weapons in extended deterrence. The Obama administration stated that U.S. nuclear weapons continue to deter non - nuclear attacks against the United States and its allies, rejecting the notion that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear use. In its revised nuclear employment strategy, it reiterated that “as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal that guarantees the defense of the United States and our allies and partners.” 13 The administration confirmed the U.S. reliance on central strategic forces to deter threats in Northeast Asia; committed to modernizing its triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine - launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear - capable bombers; and decided to maintain a capability to forward deploy nuclear - capable fighter - bombers. Bombers and fighter - bombers give the United States the ability to visibly show resolve to an adversary and assure an ally, as was the case in March 2013 when U.S. bombers flew through South Korean air space following North Korean belligerence. 14 At the same time, the NPR committed to reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons, in part by emphasizing the important and growing role of non - nuclear capabilities. 15 Because allies face a broad range of threats, many below the level of full - scale war, the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation may not always be credible. Conventional strike capabilities, by contrast, are generally perceived as more usable. The administration also highlighted the important role that missile defense plays in extended deterrence by complicating an adversary’s strategic calculus. While generally supportive of the Obama administration’s dual commitment to move toward a world without nuclear weapons while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist, some in Tokyo and Seoul were concerned that the United States might move away from the nuclear option too soon or too fast. 16 The administration, however, was able to allay these fears through frequent consultations during the NPR process, which shaped allied perceptions before new policies were finalized. 17 Without the prior consultations, the United States likely would have faced an assurance crisis. Consultations provided the United States an opportunity to demonstrate to allies that nuclear weapons would continue to remain an important part of extended deterrence. Washington explained how its nuclear forces would contribute to allied defense and avoided policy changes that would have unnecessarily increased allied anxiety. The United States, for example, talked through the decision to retire the nuclear variant of the Tomahawk cruise missile and convinced its allies—Japan in particular—that the combination of U.S. strategic nuclear forces and the ability to forward deploy fighter - bombers in the future was sufficient for extended deterrence. 18 The United States also avoided further narrowing its nuclear declaratory policy—opting to retain calculated ambiguity rather than adopting a sole purpose formulation—in part because of the concerns of allies. 19 The NPR concluded that regular extended deterrence dialogues with Japan and South Korea were needed. The United States has long held formal discussions about nuclear policy with its European allies under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but there had been no such process in Northeast Asia. Rather, consultations took place in an ad hoc manner, leaving allies mostly on the receiving end of U.S. decisions. Therefore, the Obama administration worked with Tokyo to establish the U.S.– Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) in 2010 and co - founded with Seoul the U.S.–South Korea Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) that same year. These forums, which build on years of unofficial discussions among experts and officials from the respective countries, 20 have institutionalized high - Level focus on ways to strengthen deterrence in Northeast Asia. This has enhanced assurance by helping Tokyo and Seoul better understand U.S. policies and capabilities, and giving them a greater sense of enfranchisement in matters involving their security. Finally, the Obama administration recognized that effective assurance goes beyond capabilities and deterrence - focused discussions. At root, assurance is a function of the nature of the relationship between the United States and its ally. Analyst Michael Wheeler explains that, “Security relationships are first and foremost political relationships...if the basic political relationship is strong, security relationships can better weather short - term challenges.” 21 For this reason, the Obama administration has worked to deepen political engagement with Japan and South Korea. Beginning in 2011, it announced that the United States would ‘rebalance’ the focus of its foreign policy to the Asia–Pacific, increasing diplomatic, economic, and military engagement in the region. 22 As part of the rebalance, the United States concluded the U.S.–ROK free - trade agreement (known as KORUS), rejuvenated efforts to negotiate and implement the Trans - Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would include Japan, and emphasized the important contributions that its allies make to regional security. Together, these initiatives served to solidify the U.S. political relationship with Japan and South Korea respectively, assuring them that the United States has an enduring interest in their partnerships.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>Alliance key to solve for prolif, Japanese rearm, and asia war</h4><p>Santoro & Warden ‘15</p><p></strong>[David – Senior Fellow at the CSIS’ Pacific Forum. And John – Fellow at the CSIS’ Pacific Forum. “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age” The Washington Quarterly<u><strong>, Vol 38 N. 1. 2015. ln]</p><p></u></strong>Dubbed the second nuclear age, 2 <u>the current context has been widely discussed for its differences with the Cold War</u>, or the world’s first nuclear age. During this first age, two nuclear superpowers were locked in a competition for global dominance with allies on each side, a handful of which developed small nuclear arsenals. U.S.–Soviet competition was intense, but remained cold in part because Washington and Moscow developed arms - control and crisis - management mechanisms to regulate their behavior. Stability endured because <u>even though Washington and Moscow did not control all the triggers, they had sufficient authority to keep bloc discipline and avoid</u> becoming entrapped in a nuclear <u>war</u>. The security environment was always extremely dangerous because the possibility of global nuclear annihilation was omnipresent, but per the notorious formula, “a stable balance of terror” endured. 3 The end of the Cold War gave rise to hopes—mainly in Western quarters— that nuclear weapons would be relegated to the dustbin of history. 4 This belief led the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to downsize their arsenals and assist a financially - strapped Russia to do the same. Meanwhile, <u>several states across Asia</u>—in Western Asia (the Middle East), South Asia, and East Asia—<u>developed nuclear and long - range missile programs</u>. 5 <u>China’s efforts to modernize its nuclear and missile forces continued steadily. India and Pakistan pushed forward</u> with their own programs and, after exploding nuclear devices in 1998, became nuclear - armed states. <u>North Korea conducted several rocket tests </u>during the late 1990s and tested its first nuclear device in 2006. <u>Iran, Syria</u>, and others also <u>developed nuclear and missile programs</u>. By the early 21st century, <u><strong>the Cold War order tightly controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union was replaced by a multiplayer arena with several less experienced nuclear decision - making parties and an epicenter in Asia</u></strong>. As a result, <u>today, while there is less risk of global annihilation</u>— both because major - power relations have improved and because important firebreaks against conflict are in place, including robust crisis management mechanisms and enhanced economic interdependence—<u><strong>the potential for war, and even nuclear use, is growing</u></strong>. 6 Not surprisingly, <u>these <mark>developments have led U.S. allies to seek strengthened assurances that the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u>, their main security guarantor, <u><strong><mark>will continue to protect them from coercion and attack</u></strong></mark>. The assurance challenge is particularly difficult because it turns on more than effective deterrence<mark>. <u>Deterrence</u></mark> <mark>primarily <u><strong>requires</u></strong> <u>the United States to influence an adversary’s calculus at critical moments</u></mark> during a crisis. For allies to be fully assured, however, <u>the United States must</u>, during peacetime, <u>convince them</u> 1) <u>that U.S. extended deterrence will succeed</u> in preventing adversaries from challenging their core interests, <u>and</u> 2) <u>that</u> should deterrence fail, <u>the United States </u>can and <u>will provide for their defense</u>. Hence former British defense minister Denis Healey’s formulation that during the Cold War it took “only five percent credibility of U.S. retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety - five percent credibility to reassure the Europeans.” 7 In the second nuclear age, <u><mark>it is more difficult for the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates<mark> to assure its Northeast Asian allies</u></mark> than it was during the Cold War. James Schoff notes that during the Cold War “the U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little.” 8 Today, <u>the United States must convince allies that it can deter multiple nuclear - armed adversaries, some of whom have</u> less <u><strong>adversarial relations with the United States</u></strong> than the Soviet Union did. Just as important, the <u>United States also faces an equally difficult task of convincing its allies that it could and would respond should extended deterrence fail. </u>North Korea continues to develop long - range missiles and nuclear weapons, and <u><strong>China is modernizing its military and acting increasingly assertively</u></strong>. <u>The United States’ relationship with China is</u> also more <u><strong>complex</u></strong> than its Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union, <u>featuring varying degrees of competition and cooperation.</u> At the same time, the United States has shifted from a 1960s deterrent posture of deploying thousands of nuclear weapons, including 3,000 forward deployed in the Asia–Pacific (1,200 in Okinawa), to one with far fewer deployed nuclear weapons and none forward - deployed in Asia. 9 <u>U.S. assurance of allies exists <strong>along a spectrum,</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u>Washington must carefully balance its desire to reduce allied anxiety</u> against other interests. There are some allied interests that the United States—rightly—does not deem worthy of risking war. But <u>if the gap between the United States and its allies becomes too large</u>, <u><strong><mark>allies will lose faith in U.S. assurance,</mark> which could have disruptive consequences</u></strong>. In the worst case scenario for the United States, <u><strong>Japan</u></strong> or South Korea <u><strong>might choose to bandwagon with U.S. competitors</u></strong> in the region. Another slightly better, but still deeply troublesome, possibility is for Tokyo and Seoul <u>to</u> <u><strong>develop nuclear arsenals</u></strong> of their own, <u>which would likely eviscerate the</u> remaining credibility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (<u>NPT</u>). In either case, <u><strong>a loss of confidence in the United States as a reliable security guarantor in Northeast Asia would send reverberations across the entire U.S. alliance system. </strong>Development of nuclear weapons by Japan</u> or South Korea <u>is <strong>not</u></strong> a <u><strong>far - fetched</u></strong> scenario. <u>Both possess the latent capability to develop weapons programs</u> relatively <u><strong>quickly</u></strong>, and some in South Korea and to a lesser extent Japan have advocated that their countries <u><strong>should</u></strong> go nuclear if the Northeast Asian security environment deteriorates or <u><strong>they lose confidence in the United States as a reliable guarantor</u></strong>. 10 In South Korea, there are also signs of public support for nuclearization. After North Korea’s third nuclear test, for example, an Asan Institute poll revealed that 66 percent of people in South Korea wanted nuclear weapons. 11 Initial Steps to Assure Japan and South Korea <u>The United States has a variety of </u>military and<u> political tools at its disposal to assure Japan</u> and South Korea. Because the<u> requirements of assurance and extended deterrence overlap, </u>actions designed to strengthen extended deterrence, such as modernizing U.S. nuclear forces and public declarations of will, also strengthen assurance as long as their effects are relayed to allies. Yet, these steps will not be sufficient. <u><mark>Assurance has to be tailored to</mark> </u>the needs of each ally and <u><strong><mark>include dialogue, consultations, joint planning, and improved relations beyond the military area</u></strong></mark>. The <u>Obama</u> administration <u>has reassured Japan</u> and South Korea <u>by committing to strengthen extended deterrence</u> including extended nuclear deterrence. In nuclear policy, President Barack Obama is perhaps best known for his commitment to the long - term goal of a world without nuclear weapons, which resulted in him receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009 and set the tone for a successful NPT Review Conference in 2010. Yet, just as important is the work that his administration has done to strengthen extended deterrence and assurance. In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Washington reiterated that the United States must deploy strong and credible military forces tailored to regional needs. 12 Washington continues to ascribe an important role to nuclear weapons in extended deterrence. The Obama administration stated that U.S. nuclear weapons continue to deter non - nuclear attacks against the United States and its allies, rejecting the notion that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear use. In its revised nuclear employment strategy, it reiterated that “as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal that guarantees the defense of the United States and our allies and partners.” 13 The administration confirmed the U.S. reliance on central strategic forces to deter threats in Northeast Asia; committed to modernizing its triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine - launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear - capable bombers; and decided to maintain a capability to forward deploy nuclear - capable fighter - bombers. Bombers and fighter - bombers give the United States the ability to visibly show resolve to an adversary and assure an ally, as was the case in March 2013 when U.S. bombers flew through South Korean air space following North Korean belligerence. 14 At the same time, the NPR committed to reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons, in part by emphasizing the important and growing role of non - nuclear capabilities. 15 <u>Because allies face a broad range of threats</u>, many <u>below the level of full - scale war</u>, <u>the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation may not always be credible.</u> Conventional strike capabilities, by contrast, are generally perceived as more usable. The administration also highlighted the important role that missile defense plays in extended deterrence by complicating an adversary’s strategic calculus. While generally supportive of the Obama administration’s dual commitment to move toward a world without nuclear weapons while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist, some in Tokyo and Seoul were concerned that the United States might move away from the nuclear option too soon or too fast. 16 <u>The administration</u>, however, <u>was able to allay</u> these <u>fears <strong>through frequent consultations</u></strong> during the NPR process, <u>which shaped allied perceptions before new policies were finalized</u>. 17 <u><mark>Without</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>prior consultations,</u></strong> <u>the U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates <mark>likely would have faced an assurance crisis</mark>. Consultations</u> <u>provided</u> the United States <u>an opportunity to demonstrate to </u>allies that nuclear weapons would continue to remain an important part of extended deterrence. Washington <u><strong>explain</u></strong>ed how its nuclear forces would contribute to allied defense and avoided <u><mark>policy changes that would have <strong>unnecessarily increased allied anxiety</u></strong></mark>. <u>The United States</u>, for example, <u>talked through the decision to retire the</u> nuclear variant of the <u>Tomahawk</u> cruise missile <u>and convinced</u> its allies—<u>Japan</u> in particular—<u>that the combination of U.S. strategic nuclear forces</u> and the ability to forward deploy fighter - bombers in the future <u>was sufficient for extended deterrence</u>. 18 The United States also avoided further narrowing its nuclear declaratory policy—opting to retain calculated ambiguity rather than adopting a sole purpose formulation—in part because of the concerns of allies. 19 The NPR concluded that regular extended deterrence dialogues with Japan and South Korea were needed. <u>The United States has long held formal discussions </u>about nuclear policy <u>with its European allies</u> <u>under</u> the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (<u>NATO</u>), <u><strong>but there had been no such process in Northeast Asia</u></strong>. Rather, <u><strong>consultations took place in an ad hoc manner</u></strong>, <u>leaving allies mostly on the <strong>receiving end</strong> of U.S. decisions</u>. Therefore, the Obama administration worked with Tokyo to establish the <u>U.S.– Japan</u> Extended Deterrence <u>Dialogue</u> (EDD) in 2010 and co - founded with Seoul the U.S.–South Korea Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) that same year. These forums, which build on years of unofficial discussions among experts and officials from the respective countries, 20 have institutionalized high - Level focus on ways to strengthen deterrence in Northeast Asia. This has <u>enhanced assurance by helping Tokyo and Seoul better understand U.S. policies and capabilities, and giving them a greater sense of enfranchisement in matters involving their security</u>. Finally, the <u>Obama</u> administration <u>recognized that effective assurance goes beyond capabilities and deterrence - focused discussions</u>. At root, <u><strong>assurance is a function of the nature of the relationship between the United States and its ally. </u></strong>Analyst Michael Wheeler explains that, “<u>Security relationships are <strong>first and foremost political relationships</u></strong>...<u>if the basic political relationship is strong, security relationships can better weather short - term challenges.” </u>21 For this reason, the <u>Obama</u> administration <u>has worked to deepen political engagement with Japan</u> and South Korea. Beginning in 2011, <u>it announced that the United States would ‘rebalance’ the focus of its foreign policy to</u> the Asia–Pacific, <u>increasing</u> diplomatic, economic, and military <u>engagement</u> <u>in the region</u>. 22 As part of the rebalance, the United States concluded the U.S.–ROK free - trade agreement (known as KORUS), rejuvenated efforts to negotiate and implement the Trans - Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would include Japan, and emphasized the important contributions that its allies make to regional security. Together, <u><mark>these initiatives served to solidify the U.S. political relationship with Japan</u></mark> and South Korea respectively, <u><strong><mark>assuring them that the U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates<mark> has an enduring interest in their partnerships</mark>. </p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Bachman 19 — Jeff Bachman, Professorial Lecturer in Human Rights and Director of the Ethics, Peace, and Human Rights MA Program at the School of International Service at American University, holds a Ph.D. in Law and Public Policy from Northeastern University, 2019 (“Senate Vote Could End US Complicity in the Saudi-Led Genocide in Yemen,” American University School of International Service, February 15th, Available Online at https://www.american.edu/sis/news/20181126-us-complicity-in-the-saudi-led-genocide-in-yemen-spans-obama-trump-administrations.cfm, Accessed 07-28-2019) fulltext: The U.S. House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly to pass legislation to deny further military assistance for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen. The bipartisan vote for the bill was a repudiation of the Obama and Trump administrations’ support for the Saudis and a war that many charge includes violations of human rights. A Saudi-led coalition of states has been aggressively bombing Yemen and imposing an air and naval blockade of its ports for more than three years, leading U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to describe Yemen as “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.” The legislation now goes to the Senate. President Trump has said that he would veto it if passed. Guterres put the crisis in stark perspective, emphasizing the near complete lack of security for the Yemeni people. More than 22 million people out of a total population of 28 million are in need of humanitarian aid and protection. Eighteen million people lack reliable access to food; 8.4 million people “do not know how they will obtain their next meal.” As a scholar of genocide and human rights, I believe the destruction brought about by these attacks combined with the blockade amounts to genocide. Based on my research, published online by Third World Quarterly, I believe the coalition would not be capable of committing this crime without the material and logistical support of both the Obama and Trump administrations. A ‘storm’ recast as ‘hope’ Yemen has been gripped by a civil war since 2015, pitting the Shia Houthi movement – which has fought for centuries for control of parts of Yemen – against a government backed by Sunni Saudi Arabia. Because of these religious differences, it would be easy to recast what is largely a political conflict in Yemen as a sectarian one. That characterization fits Saudi and U.S. assertions that the Houthis are controlled by Shiite Iran, a claim that has not gone uncontested. Both the Saudis and the U.S. are hostile to Iran, so U.S. support of Saudia Arabia in Yemen represents what U.S. administrations have said are strategic interests in the region. Besides Saudi Arabia, the coalition attacking Yemen includes the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar was part of the coalition but is no longer. During the first three years of “Operation Decisive Storm,” later renamed “Operation Renewal of Hope,” 16,749 coalition air attacks in Yemen were documented by the Yemen Data Project (YDP), which describes itself as an “independent data collection project aimed at collecting and disseminating data on the conduct of the war in Yemen.” Based on the information available to it using open sources, YDP reports that two-thirds of the coalition’s bombing attacks have been against non-military and unknown targets. The coalition isn’t accidentally attacking civilians and civilian infrastructure – it’s doing it deliberately. That’s evident from the kind – and volume – of civilian targets documented. They include places that are generally protected against attack even under the lax rules of international humanitarian law: Residential areas, vehicles, marketplaces and mosques as well as boats, social gatherings and camps for internally displaced persons. Because of the role it plays in movement of people, food and medicine, Yemen’s transportation infrastructure is especially important. Airports, ports, bridges and roads have all been repeatedly attacked. Yemen’s economic infrastructure – farms, private businesses and factories, oil and gas facilities, water and electricity lines and food storage – have also been hit. And the coalition has targeted and destroyed schools and medical facilities, too. Finally, Yemen’s cultural heritage has been attacked. In all, at least 78 cultural sites have been damaged or destroyed, including archaeological sites, museums, mosques, churches and tombs, as well as numerous other monuments and residences that have great historical and cultural significance. How to make a crisis The attacks aren’t the only way the coalition is creating a massive humanitarian crisis. The air and naval blockade, in effect since March 2015, “is essentially using the threat of starvation as a bargaining tool and an instrument of war,” according to the U.N. panel of experts on Yemen. The blockade stops and inspects vessels seeking entry to Yemen’s ports. That allows the coalition to regulate and restrict Yemenis’ access to food, fuel, medical supplies and humanitarian aid. In his analysis of the blockade’s legality, Dutch military scholar Martin Fink writes that the blockade means “massive time delays and uncertainty on what products would be allowed to enter.” Despite U.N. efforts to alleviate some of the worst delays, imports are often held up for a long time. In some cases, food that makes it through the blockade has already spoiled, if entry is not denied altogether. In some ways, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is unprecedented and can be tied directly to the conflict. As the World Bank notes, “Yemen’s very difficult economic challenges before the current conflict cannot be compared to the intensely critical situation the country is facing today.” Similarly, Tufts University scholar Alex de Waal describes Yemen as “the greatest famine atrocity of our lifetimes.” It was caused, writes de Waal, by the coalition “deliberately destroying the country’s food-producing infrastructure.” The failing security for the people of Yemen has been compounded by a failing health system. The World Health Organization reported in September 2017 that only 45 percent of health facilities in Yemen were functional. As Secretary-General Guterres put it, “Treatable illnesses become a death sentence when local health services are suspended and it is impossible to travel outside the country.” As of February 2018, according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the coalition had killed 6,000 people in airstrikes and wounded nearly 10,000 more. Yet, according to the OHCHR report, these counts are conservative. Tens of thousands of Yemenis have also died from causes related to the war. According to Save the Children, an estimated 85,000 children under five may have died since 2015, with more than 50,000 child deaths in 2017 alone from hunger and related causes. Coalition actions in Yemen amount to nothing short of what Raphael Lemkin, the individual who coined the term “genocide,” referred to as a “synchronized attack on different aspects of life.” The US contribution The coalition’s genocide in Yemen would not be possible without the complicity of the U.S. This has been a bipartisan presidential effort, covering both the Obama and Trump administrations. U.S. arms are being used to kill Yemenis and destroy their country. In 2016, well after the coalition began its genocidal assault on Yemen, four of the top five recipients of U.S. arms sales were members of the coalition. The U.S. has also provided the coalition with logistical support, including mid-air refueling, targeting advice and support, intelligence, expedited munitions resupply and maintenance. Other than the sale of arms, perhaps the most significant contribution to the coalition’s ability to commit genocide in Yemen has been the provision of fuel and mid-air refueling of coalition warplanes, which was halted in early November 2018. By the middle of 2017, the U.S. had delivered over 67 million pounds of fuel to the coalition and refueled coalition aircraft more than 9,000 times. Shared responsibility for genocide What does this mean? It means that the U.S. must cease and desist all activities that facilitate genocide in Yemen. This would include stopping all sales of weapons and ending logistical support for coalition action. The legislation passed by the House would largely accomplish this, though the House bill would allow intelligence sharing with Saudi Arabia to continue when “appropriate in the national security interest of the United States.” However, even if the Senate passes it, the president’s likely veto of the bill will mean no change in the deadly status quo unless the legislation garners enough support to override a presidential veto. In an ideal world, one in which all states are equally subjects before international law, the U.S. would also seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding what restitution it owes the people of Yemen for its role in the coalition’s genocide. Similarly, the U.S. would request an International Criminal Court investigation into individual culpability of U.S. officials in both the Obama and Trump administrations for their role in facilitating the crimes committed in Yemen. Of course, this is not an ideal world. The U.S. recognizes neither the International Court of Justice’s authority to judge the legality of its actions, nor the International Criminal Court’s authority to investigate the suspected criminal acts of individual U.S. officials. Such an investigation could be triggered by a U.N. Security Council referral, but the U.S. would simply veto any such effort. All that is left, then, is for the people of the U.S. to hold their own to account for the crimes committed in their names.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>There is an ongoing genocide in Yemen, and U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the <u>crucial mechanism</u> enabling it. <u>Tens of thousands</u> have already been killed, and <u>millions</u> are at risk. </h4><p><strong>Bachman 19</strong> — Jeff Bachman, Professorial Lecturer in Human Rights and Director of the Ethics, Peace, and Human Rights MA Program at the School of International Service at American University, holds a Ph.D. in Law and Public Policy from Northeastern University, 2019 (“Senate Vote Could End US Complicity in the Saudi-Led Genocide in Yemen,” American University School of International Service, February 15th, Available Online at https://www.american.edu/sis/news/20181126-us-complicity-in-the-saudi-led-genocide-in-yemen-spans-obama-trump-administrations.cfm, Accessed 07-28-2019)</p><p><u>The</u> U.S. <u>House</u> of Representatives <u>voted overwhelmingly to pass legislation to deny further military assistance for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen.</p><p></u>The bipartisan vote for the bill was a repudiation of the Obama and Trump administrations’ support for the Saudis and a war that many charge includes violations of human rights. <u>A Saudi-led coalition of states has been aggressively bombing Yemen and imposing an air and naval blockade of its ports for more than three years, leading U.N. Secretary-General</u> Antonio <u>Guterres to describe Yemen as “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.”</p><p></u>The legislation now goes to the Senate. President Trump has said that he would veto it if passed.</p><p>Guterres put the crisis in stark perspective, emphasizing the near complete lack of security for the Yemeni people. More than 22 million people out of a total population of 28 million are in need of humanitarian aid and protection. Eighteen million people lack reliable access to food; 8.4 million people “do not know how they will obtain their next meal.”</p><p>As a scholar of genocide and human rights, I believe <u>the destruction</u> brought about by these attacks combined with the blockade <u>amounts to <strong>genocide</u></strong>.</p><p>Based on my research, published online by Third World Quarterly, I believe <u>the coalition would not be capable of committing this crime without the <strong>material and logistical support</strong> of</u> both <u>the Obama and Trump administrations</u>.</p><p>A ‘storm’ recast as ‘hope’</p><p>Yemen has been gripped by a civil war since 2015, pitting the Shia Houthi movement – which has fought for centuries for control of parts of Yemen – against a government backed by Sunni Saudi Arabia. Because of these religious differences, it would be easy to recast what is largely a political conflict in Yemen as a sectarian one.</p><p>That characterization fits Saudi and U.S. assertions that the Houthis are controlled by Shiite Iran, a claim that has not gone uncontested. Both the Saudis and the U.S. are hostile to Iran, so U.S. support of Saudia Arabia in Yemen represents what U.S. administrations have said are strategic interests in the region.</p><p>Besides Saudi Arabia, the coalition attacking Yemen includes the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar was part of the coalition but is no longer.</p><p>During the first three years of “Operation Decisive Storm,” later renamed “Operation Renewal of Hope,” 16,749 coalition air attacks in Yemen were documented by the Yemen Data Project (YDP), which describes itself as an “independent data collection project aimed at collecting and disseminating data on the conduct of the war in Yemen.”</p><p>Based on the information available to it using open sources, YDP reports that <u>two-thirds of the coalition’s bombing attacks have been against non-military and unknown targets. The coalition isn’t accidentally attacking civilians and civilian infrastructure – <strong>it’s doing it deliberately</u></strong>.</p><p><u>That’s evident from the kind – and volume – of civilian targets documented. They include</u> places that are generally protected against attack even under the lax rules of international humanitarian law: <u><strong>Residential areas</strong>, <strong>vehicles</strong>, <strong>marketplaces</strong> and <strong>mosques</strong> as well as <strong>boats</strong>, <strong>social gatherings</strong> and <strong>camps for internally displaced persons</u></strong>.</p><p><u>Because of the role it plays in movement of people, food and medicine, Yemen’s transportation infrastructure is especially important. <strong>Airports</strong>, <strong>ports</strong>, <strong>bridges</strong> and <strong>roads</strong> have all been repeatedly attacked</u>.</p><p><u>Yemen’s economic infrastructure – <strong>farms</strong>, <strong>private businesses and factories</strong>, <strong>oil and gas facilities</strong>, <strong>water and electricity lines</strong> and <strong>food storage</strong> – have also been hit. And the coalition has targeted and destroyed <strong>schools</strong> and <strong>medical facilities</u></strong>, too.</p><p>Finally, <u>Yemen’s cultural heritage has been attacked</u>. In all, <u>at least 78 cultural sites have been damaged or destroyed, including <strong>archaeological sites</strong>, <strong>museums</strong>, <strong>mosques</strong>, <strong>churches</strong> and <strong>tombs</strong>, as well as numerous other <strong>monuments</strong> and residences that have great historical and cultural significance</u>.</p><p>How to make a crisis</p><p>The attacks aren’t the only way the coalition is creating a massive humanitarian crisis.</p><p><u>The air and naval blockade</u>, in effect since March 2015, “<u>is essentially using the threat of starvation as a bargaining tool and an <strong>instrument of war</u></strong>,” <u>according to the U.N. panel of experts</u> on Yemen.</p><p>The blockade stops and inspects vessels seeking entry to Yemen’s ports. That allows the coalition to regulate and restrict Yemenis’ access to food, fuel, medical supplies and humanitarian aid.</p><p>In his analysis of the blockade’s legality, Dutch military scholar Martin Fink writes that <u>the blockade means</u> “<u>massive time delays and uncertainty on what products would be allowed to enter</u>.”</p><p>Despite U.N. efforts to alleviate some of the worst delays, imports are often held up for a long time. In some cases, food that makes it through the blockade has already spoiled, if entry is not denied altogether.</p><p>In some ways, <u>the humanitarian crisis</u> in Yemen <u>is unprecedented and can be <strong>tied directly to the conflict</strong>. As the World Bank notes,</u> “<u>Yemen’s very difficult economic challenges before the current conflict <strong>cannot be compared</strong> to the intensely critical situation the country is facing today</u>.”</p><p>Similarly, Tufts University scholar Alex <u>de Waal describes Yemen as</u> “<u>the greatest famine atrocity of our lifetimes</u>.” It was caused, writes de Waal, by the coalition “deliberately destroying the country’s food-producing infrastructure.”</p><p><u>The failing security</u> for the people of Yemen <u>has been compounded by a failing health system</u>. The World Health Organization reported in September 2017 that only 45 percent of health facilities in Yemen were functional.</p><p>As Secretary-General Guterres put it, “<u>Treatable illnesses become a death sentence when local health services are suspended and it is impossible to travel outside the country</u>.”</p><p><u>As of February 2018, according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the coalition had killed 6,000 people in airstrikes and wounded nearly 10,000 more</u>.</p><p>Yet, according to the OHCHR report, <u>these counts are conservative. <strong>Tens of thousands</u></strong> of Yemenis <u>have</u> also <u>died from causes related to the war</u>. According to Save the Children, an estimated <u>85,000 children under five may have died since 2015, with more than 50,000 child deaths in 2017 alone from hunger and related causes</u>.</p><p><u>Coalition actions in Yemen amount to nothing short of</u> what Raphael Lemkin, the individual who coined the term “genocide,” referred to as <u>a</u> “<u><strong>synchronized attack on different aspects of life.”</p><p>The US contribution</p><p></strong>The coalition’s genocide</u> in Yemen <u><strong>would not be possible without the complicity of the U.S.</strong> This has been a bipartisan presidential effort</u>, covering both the Obama and Trump administrations.</p><p><u>U.S. arms are being used to kill Yemenis and destroy their country</u>. In 2016, well after the coalition began its genocidal assault on Yemen, four of the top five recipients of U.S. arms sales were members of the coalition.</p><p><u>The U.S. has also provided the coalition with logistical support, including mid-air refueling, <strong>targeting advice and support</strong>, <strong>intelligence</strong>, <strong>expedited munitions resupply</strong> and <strong>maintenance</u></strong>.</p><p>Other than the sale of arms, perhaps the most significant contribution to the coalition’s ability to commit genocide in Yemen has been the provision of fuel and mid-air refueling of coalition warplanes, which was halted in early November 2018. By the middle of 2017, the U.S. had delivered over 67 million pounds of fuel to the coalition and refueled coalition aircraft more than 9,000 times.</p><p>Shared responsibility for genocide</p><p>What does this mean? It means that <u>the U.S. must <strong>cease and desist all activities that facilitate genocide</strong> in Yemen. This would include stopping all sales of weapons and ending logistical support for coalition action. The legislation passed by the House would largely accomplish this</u>, though the House bill would allow intelligence sharing with Saudi Arabia to continue when “appropriate in the national security interest of the United States.”</p><p>However, <u>even if the Senate passes it, the president’s likely veto of the bill will mean no change in the deadly status quo unless the legislation garners enough support to override a presidential veto</u>.</p><p>In an ideal world, one in which all states are equally subjects before international law, the U.S. would also seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding what restitution it owes the people of Yemen for its role in the coalition’s genocide.</p><p>Similarly, the U.S. would request an International Criminal Court investigation into individual culpability of U.S. officials in both the Obama and Trump administrations for their role in facilitating the crimes committed in Yemen.</p><p>Of course, this is not an ideal world.</p><p>The U.S. recognizes neither the International Court of Justice’s authority to judge the legality of its actions, nor the International Criminal Court’s authority to investigate the suspected criminal acts of individual U.S. officials. Such an investigation could be triggered by a U.N. Security Council referral, but the U.S. would simply veto any such effort.</p><p><u>All that is left</u>, then, <u>is for the people of the U.S. to <strong>hold their own to account for the crimes committed in their names</u></strong>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Edwin Hodge, Helga Hallgrimsdottir, Marianne Much, “Performing Borders: Queer and Trans Experiences at the Canadian Border,” Social Sciences 2019, https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8070201 /as/ fulltext: 3. Biometrics, ‘Suspicious’ Bodies, and the Construction of the ‘Ideal’ Citizen Since the events of 9/11, border securitization has become the standard—indeed the principle—region of concern for North American states. This preoccupation was clearly spelled out in agreements such as the Smart Border Accord of 2001, which emphasized the role of the border as a security barrier, even as it attempted to maintain pre-9/11 levels of cross-border trade.17 While much of the language of such agreements emphasizes the permanence—and selective permeability—of the physical border (through checkpoints, customs agents and other physical and institutional barriers at points of entry), many of the initiatives had the effect of ‘stretching’ the border deep inside the state, through programs such as the NEXUS and FAST preclearance programs.18 Like border checkpoints and other physical barriers to entry, preclearance programs form another layer of a nation’s security regime, but unlike physical border controls, preclearance systems in effect distantiate the individual from the category of claims-seeker. As with “intent-management” at the Australian border (where pre-clearance type strategies are used to police and stratify entry into Australia prior to the border crossing), pre-clearance systems prioritize border-crossers demographic characteristics (i.e., membership in suspect groups) over individual claims.19 The irony that presents itself here is that this shift in regulatory scrutiny focuses attention on bodies at the most granular level possible: the level of the individual. Preclearance regimes often include certain body-specific preconditions for would-be ‘safe travelers’20, including specific wording aimed at establishing visual correspondence between a person’s physical appearance, and the (presumed immutable) identifying characteristics on government issued identification. Consider the language of Transport Canada’s 2011 amendment to its Identity Screening Regulations, which state: A) An air carrier shall not transport a passenger if… the passenger does not appear to be of the gender indicated on the identification he or she presents (Verification of identity, section 7(1)) B) … an air carrier may transport a passenger who presents a piece of photo identification but does not resemble the photograph if… the passenger’s appearance changed for medical reasons after the photograph was taken and the passenger presents the air carrier with a document signed by a health care professional and attesting to that fact.21 Though this language was repealed in subsequent amendments to the law, its existence illustrated the extent to which securitization had become inextricable from issues of gender, not to mention race, class, sexual orientation, and ability.22 As critics of the language of the law argued, preclearance stipulations, not to mention at-the-gate security measures designed to screen for suspicious activity, had the effect of singling out pre- and non-operative trans people, as well as gender-nonconforming and queer travelers as suspicious by definition.23 Despite the repeal of this language, the gendered nature of border securitization remains unchanged. In the language of the updated Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Chairperson’s Guidelines, a similar, problematic language exists, … to promote greater understanding of cases involving sexual orientation and gender identity and expression (SOGIE) and the harm individuals may face in presenting their cases before the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) and establishes guiding principles for decision-makers in adjudicating cases involving SOGIE. That the IRB recognized an area of concern is laudable, yet the attempts at addressing it have, paradoxically, reified the problem by entrenching gender as a space where difference becomes inextricably bound to risk. In other words, the rise of the ‘biometric border’ as a new frontier in border securitization has resulted in a reality where bodies themselves become sites that enclose multiple boundaries.24 The result is that the biometric border: … is the portable border par excellence, carried by mobile bodies at the very time as it is deployed to divide bodies at international boundaries, airports, railway stations, on subways or city streets, in the office or the neighborhood.25 The impacts of bordering processes on bodies are significant, especially for marginalized, non-normative, and nonconforming bodies. Those travelers or refugees whose bodies challenge normative conventions of sex and gender, such as a person who was assigned male at birth but presenting as feminine or read as “woman”, may trigger a security response in spaces that have evolved almost exclusively to scrutinize bodies for ‘irregularities’.26 Since security biometrics rely on standardized patterns of bodies, deviations constitute a de facto rational for additional scrutiny and explanation. Nonconforming bodies become subjects of pathologization and concern by virtue of their existence. The apparatus of biometric bordering creates a contentious space where some bodies can be declared “out of place” and therefore subject to increased scrutiny or even a refusal to grant entry at all, as such bodies represent “anomalies” that trigger a host of security protocols in ports of entry such as airports.27 Yet the categorization of variant bodies as “anomalous” under biometric protocols carries a deeper philosophical concern: If biometrics are increasingly used to screen “anomalous” bodies, then the barriers experienced by trans and nonconforming travelers are unlikely to remain isolated to them for long. Further, what are the implications of screening variant bodies when it comes to admitting and excluding people from avenues to citizenship? What does the “ideal” Canadian immigrant look like? Biometric bordering has two objectives: The first, as scholar Holger Pötzsch argues, is to “verify identities by comparing passport or ID card information with the biometric characteristics with the individual carrying the documents”.28 The second purpose of the biometric border is to establish the reality of identity through the collection of personal information of all kinds to construct composite images of a person’s day-to-day interactions.29 Relying on the growing body of electronic data about each individual, these technologies may potentially turn each body into “data-doubles, the enactments of which entail real material effects”.30 Such effects manifest into the question of border mobility, which can differ from one identity to another. Everyone, depending on race, gender, sexuality or class experiences the border and mobility differently. In addition to profiling based on intersections of race, gender, sexual orientation, class or ability, there is a development of coded categories that persons and groups will be sorted through.31 As some observers have indicated, if data can be collected on consumers to be used for targeted advertising, then the same systems can be deployed “to identify and isolate groups and persons that may be thought as perpetrators of ‘terrorist’ acts”32. Indeed, this social sorting “… has become a standard way of discriminating between different persons and groups for the purposes of providing differential treatment”.33 How then, might these same processes be deployed around identifications rooted in gender identity? In the early 1950s, intelligence agencies and law enforcement could use the group affiliations of homosexual men and women to attack pro-gay activist or social networks under the guise of combatting “criminal sexual psychopathy”34; clearly then, there is a precedent for such concern. Borders occupy another, psychically powerful position in national discussions, in addition to their regulatory role as a barrier around the state; borders are both a physical and cognitive barrier around national identity as well as citizenship.35 The practice of bordering is an act of nation-building, with the border acting as a literal and figurative container of the nation and its citizens.36 A delineation of the border line determines where Canada begins and ends and therefore serves as a visual and emotional proxy for where Canadians exist. Travelers who seek to gain entry to Canada, and ultimately, to become citizens must do so in a manner that is not merely legally valid but narratively satisfying; stories in national media about the transition of refugees from outside petitioners to full-fledged members of the Canadian body-politic emphasize the legal routes taken by individual agents through the regulatory regimes at Canadian borders. These narratives can be contrasted with the greater level of ambivalence displayed by Canadians to the presence of unregulated, illegal border crossings by refugees fleeing the United States in the first year of the Trump Administration37 and set against a backdrop of relative ambivalence towards refugees in general.38 With the move towards biometric bordering, the Canadian state has opened the possibility of an increasingly granular approach to managing the flows of labor, migration, and refugees across its borders. This practice enables the possibility of controlling the flow of specific bodies across borders and through the refugee claims process, such that the state can manage flows not only by category (high-skilled, medium-skilled or low-skilled labor, for example), but by body type or even by the performance of gender. For queer migrants, sexuality and gender identity become sites of tension—especially where these identities come into conflict with traditional patterns of gender and sexual identity on display in a state’s cultural discourse. For many countries in the Global North—Canada included—specific patterns of gender and sexual identity are woven into the identity of the nation state. As Eithne Luibheid argues, “heterosexuality [is] at once necessary to the state’s ability to constitute and imagine itself, [and] simultaneously mark[s] the site of its own instability”39. Luibheid points out that exclusion is also an act that delineates what counts as an ideal citizen and further suggests that these arbitrary traits demonstrate the nation’s insecurity with regard to its own self-image. Exclusion could be said to protect the traits of those who belong to a nation, therefore strengthening the idea of who rightfully can belong. If identities can affect border crossing mobility, then it is not the geographical border that matters but rather the specific identities in question that are bordered; new technologies can complicate this factor, especially in who can be bordered in the context of their class, race, nationality, gender or sexuality. Queer migrants must often not only contend with the heteronormative culture of their home nation, which might enforce strict adherence to gender binaries or adherence to compulsory heterosexuality, but they also encounter the new nation’s own perspectives, which could be similar. The state’s border control may in effect serve as an enforcer of preferred patterns of sexuality and gender; both Canada and the US have, at different points in their histories, excluded homosexuals from entering the country, for example, because homosexuality was argued to be a pattern of immoral behavior. In the twenty-first century, biometric border practices may compromise “a critical technology for (re)reproducing national heteronormativity within global and imperial fields”40 and national heteronormativity.41 4. Performativity If one accepts the preposition that national characters—and indeed national identities—are distinctly gendered phenomena, then it must hold true that bordering practices within and around states are similarly gendered. How else, after all, can the gendered national identity of a state be maintained, without consideration given to the gendered identities and performativities of those potential citizens who seek membership? Indeed, the gendered nature of border practices—of bordering—has been recognized for quite some time, from examinations of the narratives of border crossings,42 to deconstructions of national myths about ‘secure borders’ or nations as ‘safe havens’.43 The gendering of borders is not isolated to the securitization of nonbinary, queer or trans bodies but of all bodies; young cisgender men—particularly unaccompanied men—are often scrutinized as potential vectors for terrorist activity or simply as potential recruits for extant terrorist networks,44 which has the practical effect both relaxing and hardening border tpermeability along gender lines; borders are relaxed to accommodate bodies that conform to Western feminine ideals while remaining hardened against those bodies seen as potential vectors of threat, criminality or violence.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Modern border securitization is an extension of the biopolitical aim of regulating queer bodies and defining a heteronormative and gendered nation-state. Hodge et al 19</h4><p>Edwin Hodge, Helga Hallgrimsdottir, Marianne Much, “Performing Borders: Queer and Trans Experiences at the Canadian Border,” Social Sciences 2019, https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8070201 /as/</p><p>3. Biometrics, ‘Suspicious’ Bodies, and the Construction of the ‘Ideal’ Citizen Since the events of 9/11, <u><mark>border securitization</u></mark> has become the standard—indeed the principle—region of concern for North American states. This preoccupation was clearly spelled out in agreements such as the Smart Border Accord of 2001, which <u>emphasize</u>d the role of <u>the border as a security barrier</u>, even as it attempted to maintain pre-9/11 levels of cross-border trade.17 While much of the language of such agreements <u><mark>emphasizes the permanence</mark>—<mark>and selective permeability</mark>—<mark>of the physical border</mark> (through checkpoints, customs agents and other physical and institutional barriers at points of entry), <mark>many</mark> of the <mark>initiatives</mark> had the effect of ‘<mark>stretch</mark>ing’ <mark>the border deep inside the state</u></mark>, through programs such as the NEXUS and FAST preclearance programs.18 Like border checkpoints and other physical barriers to entry, preclearance programs form another layer of a nation’s security regime, but unlike physical border controls, <u>pre<mark>clearance systems</u></mark> in effect distantiate the individual from the category of claims-seeker. As with “intent-management” at the Australian border (where pre-clearance type strategies are used to police and stratify entry into Australia prior to the border crossing), pre-clearance systems prioritize border-crossers demographic characteristics (i.e., membership in suspect groups) over individual claims.19 The irony that presents itself here is that this shift in regulatory scrutiny focuses attention on bodies at the most granular level possible: the level of the individual. Preclearance regimes often <u><mark>include</u></mark> certain body-specific <u><mark>preconditions for</u></mark> would-be <mark>‘<u>safe travelers’20</u></mark>, including specific wording aimed at <u><mark>establishing visual correspondence between</mark> a person’s <mark>physical appearance, and</mark> the (presumed immutable) identifying characteristics on <mark>government</mark> issued <mark>identification</mark>.</u> Consider the language of Transport Canada’s 2011 amendment to its Identity Screening Regulations, which state: A) An air carrier shall not transport a passenger if… the passenger does not appear to be of the gender indicated on the identification he or she presents (Verification of identity, section 7(1)) B) … an air carrier may transport a passenger who presents a piece of photo identification but does not resemble the photograph if… the passenger’s appearance changed for medical reasons after the photograph was taken and the passenger presents the air carrier with a document signed by a health care professional and attesting to that fact.21 Though this language was repealed in subsequent amendments to the law, its existence illustrated the extent to which <u><mark>securitization had become inextricable from</mark> issues of <mark>gender</u></mark>, not to mention race, class<u>, <mark>sexual orientation,</u></mark> and ability.22 As critics of the language of the law argued, preclearance stipulations, not to mention at-the-gate <u><mark>security measures</u></mark> designed to screen for suspicious activity, had the effect of <u><mark>singling out</mark> pre- and non-op</u>erative <u>trans people, as well as</u> <u>g</u>ender-<u>n</u>on<u>c</u>onforming <u>and <mark>queer travelers as suspicious by definition</u></mark>.23 <u><mark>Despite</u></mark> the repeal of this <u>language</u>, the gendered nature of border securitization remains unchanged. In the language of the <u><mark>updated</mark> </u>Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Chairperson’s <u><mark>Guidelines</mark>,</u> a <u>similar, <mark>problem</u>atic language <u>exists</mark>,</u> … to promote greater understanding of cases involving sexual orientation and gender identity and expression (SOGIE) and the harm individuals may face in presenting their cases before the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) and establishes guiding principles for decision-makers in adjudicating cases involving SOGIE. That the IRB recognized an area of concern is laudable, <u>yet the <mark>attempts at addressing</u></mark> it <u><mark>have</u></mark>, paradoxically, <u><mark>reified the problem by entrenching gender</mark> as a space where difference becomes inextricably bound to risk.</u> In other words<u>, <mark>the rise of the ‘biometric border’</u></mark> as a new frontier in border securitization <u><mark>has resulted in a reality where bodies</mark> themselves <mark>become sites that enclose</mark> multiple <mark>boundaries</u></mark>.24 The result is that the biometric border: … is the portable border par excellence, carried by mobile bodies at the very time as it is deployed to divide bodies at international boundaries, airports, railway stations, on subways or city streets, in the office or the neighborhood.25 The <u>impacts of bordering processes on bodies are significant, especially for marginalized, non-normative, and <mark>nonconforming bodies</u></mark>. Those travelers or refugees whose <u>bodies challenge normative conventions of sex and gender</u>, such as a person who was assigned male at birth but presenting as feminine or read as “woman”, <u>may <mark>trigger a security response in</mark> <mark>spaces</mark> <mark>that</u></mark> have evolved almost exclusively to <u><mark>scrutinize</mark> <mark>bodies</mark> <mark>for</mark> ‘<mark>irregularities’</u></mark>.26 Since security biometrics rely on standardized patterns of bodies, <u>deviations constitute a de facto rational for additional scrutiny and explanation</u>. <u><mark>Nonconforming bodies become subjects of pathologization and concern by virtue of their existence</u>. </mark>The apparatus of biometric bordering creates a contentious space where some bodies can be declared “out of place” and therefore subject to increased scrutiny or even a refusal to grant entry at all, as such bodies represent “anomalies” that trigger a host of security protocols in ports of entry such as airports.27 Yet the categorization of variant bodies as “anomalous” under biometric protocols carries a deeper philosophical concern: If biometrics are increasingly used to screen “anomalous” bodies, then the barriers experienced by trans and nonconforming travelers are unlikely to remain isolated to them for long. Further, what are the implications of screening variant bodies when it comes to admitting and excluding people from avenues to citizenship? What does the “ideal” Canadian immigrant look like? Biometric bordering has two objectives: The first, as scholar Holger Pötzsch argues, is to “verify identities by comparing passport or ID card information with the biometric characteristics with the individual carrying the documents”.28 The second purpose of <u>the biometric border</u> is to establish the reality of identity through the <u>collect</u>ion of <u>personal information of all kinds to construct composite images of a person’s day-to-day interactions.</u>29 Relying on the growing body of electronic data about each individual, these <u>technologies may potentially turn each body into “data-doubles, the enactments of which entail real material effects”.</u>30 Such effects manifest into the question of border mobility, which can differ from one identity to another. Everyone, depending on race, gender, sexuality or class experiences the border and mobility differently. In addition to profiling based on intersections of race, gender, sexual orientation, class or ability, there is a development of coded categories that persons and groups will be sorted through.31 As some observers have indicated, if data can be collected on consumers to be used for targeted advertising, then the same systems can be deployed “to identify and isolate groups and persons that may be thought as perpetrators of ‘terrorist’ acts”32. Indeed, this social sorting “… has become a standard way of discriminating between different persons and groups for the purposes of providing differential treatment”.33 How then, might these same processes be deployed around identifications rooted in gender identity? In the early 1950s, intelligence agencies and law enforcement could use the group affiliations of homosexual men and women to attack pro-gay activist or social networks under the guise of combatting “criminal sexual psychopathy”34; clearly then, there is a precedent for such concern. Borders occupy another, psychically powerful position in national discussions, in addition to their regulatory role as a barrier around the state; borders are both a physical and cognitive barrier around national identity as well as citizenship.35 The practice of bordering is an act of nation-building, with the border acting as a literal and figurative container of the nation and its citizens.36 A delineation of the border line determines where Canada begins and ends and therefore serves as a visual and emotional proxy for where Canadians exist. Travelers who seek to gain entry to Canada, and ultimately, to become citizens must do so in a manner that is not merely legally valid but narratively satisfying; stories in national media about the transition of refugees from outside petitioners to full-fledged members of the Canadian body-politic emphasize the legal routes taken by individual agents through the regulatory regimes at Canadian borders. These narratives can be contrasted with the greater level of ambivalence displayed by Canadians to the presence of unregulated, illegal border crossings by refugees fleeing the United States in the first year of the Trump Administration37 and set against a backdrop of relative ambivalence towards refugees in general.38 With the move towards <u>biometric bordering</u>, the Canadian state has opened the possibility of an increasingly granular approach to managing the flows of labor, migration, and refugees across its borders. This practice <u>enables the possibility of controlling the flow of specific bodies across borders </u>and through the refugee claims process, such that the state can manage flows <u>not only by category</u> (high-skilled, medium-skilled or low-skilled labor, for example), <u>but by body type or even by the performance of gender</u>. <u>For queer migrants, sexuality and gender identity become sites of tension</u>—especially where these identities come into conflict with traditional patterns of gender and sexual identity on display in a state’s cultural discourse<u>. For many countries <mark>in the Global North</u></mark>—Canada included—<u><mark>specific patterns of</mark> gender and sexual <mark>identity</mark> <mark>are</mark> <mark>woven into the identity of the nation state</u>.</mark> As Eithne Luibheid argues, “<u><mark>heterosexuality</mark> [<mark>is</mark>] at once <mark>necessary</mark> <mark>to</mark> <mark>the</mark> <mark>state’s</mark> <mark>ability</mark> <mark>to</mark> constitute and <mark>imagine</mark> <mark>itself, [and] simultaneously mark[s] the site of its</mark> own <mark>instability</mark>”39</u>. <u>Luibheid points out that <mark>exclusion</mark> <mark>is</mark> also <mark>an act that delineates</mark> <mark>what counts as an ideal citizen</mark> <mark>and further suggests that these arbitrary traits demonstrate the nation’s insecurity</mark> <mark>with regard to its own self-image</u></mark>. Exclusion could be said to protect the traits of those who belong to a nation, therefore strengthening the idea of who rightfully can belong. <u>If identities</u> can <u>affect border</u> crossing <u>mobility,</u> <u>then it is not the geographical border that matters but rather the specific identities in question that are bordered;</u> new technologies can complicate this factor, especially in who can be bordered in the context of their class, race, nationality, gender or sexuality. Queer migrants must often not only contend with the heteronormative culture of their home nation, which might enforce strict adherence to gender binaries or adherence to compulsory heterosexuality, but they also encounter the new nation’s own perspectives, which could be similar. <u>The state’s border</u> control may in effect serve as an <u>enforce</u>r of <u>preferred patterns of sexuality and gender</u>; both Canada and the US have, at different points in their histories, excluded homosexuals from entering the country, for example, because homosexuality was argued to be a pattern of immoral behavior. In the twenty-first century, <u>biometric border practices</u> may <u>compromise “a critical technology for (re)reproducing national heteronormativity within global and imperial fields”40 and national heteronormativity.41 </u>4. Performativity If one accepts the preposition that national characters—and indeed national identities—are distinctly gendered phenomena, then it must hold true that bordering practices within and around states are similarly gendered. <u><mark>How else</u></mark>, after all, <u><mark>can the gendered national identity of a state be maintained, without consideration</u></mark> given <u><mark>to</u> <u>the</mark> </u>gendered <u><mark>identities</u></mark> and performativities <u><mark>of</mark> </u>those <u><mark>potential citizens</u></mark> who seek membership? Indeed, the gendered nature of border practices—of <u>bordering</u>—has been recognized for quite some time, from examinations of the narratives of border crossings,42 to deconstructions of national myths about ‘secure borders’ or nations as ‘safe havens’.43 The gendering of borders is not isolated to the securitization of nonbinary, queer or trans bodies but of all bodies; young cisgender men—particularly unaccompanied men—are often scrutinized as potential vectors for terrorist activity or simply as potential recruits for extant terrorist networks,44 which has the practical effect both relaxing and hardening border tpermeability along gender lines; borders are relaxed to accommodate bodies that conform to Western feminine ideals while remaining hardened against those bodies seen as potential vectors of threat, criminality or violence.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Mary Nardini Gang, MNG 2014, "Toward the queerest insurrection," Anarchist Library, https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/mary-nardini-gang-toward-the-queerest-insurrection //SW fulltext: Queer is a position from which to attack the normative more, a position from which to understand and attack the ways in which normal is reproduced and reiterated. In destabilizing and problematizing normalcy, we can destabilize and become a problem for the Totality. The history of organized queers was borne out of this position. The most marginalized transfolk, people of color, sex workers — have always been the catalysts for riotous explosions of queer resistance. These explosions have been coupled with a radical analysis wholeheartedly asserting that the liberation for queer people is intrinsically tied to the annihilation of capitalism and the state. It is no wonder, then, that the first people to publicly speak of sexual liberation in this country were anarchists, or that those in the last century who struggled for queer liberation also simultaneously struggled against capitalism, racism and patriarchy and empire. This is our history. VIII If history proves anything, it is that capitalism has a treacherous recuperative tendency to pacify radical social movements. It works rather simply, actually. A group gains privilege and power within a movement, and shortly thereafter sell their comrades out. Within a couple years of stonewall, affluent gay white males had thoroughly marginalized everyone that had made their movement possible and abandoned their revolution with them. It was once that to be queer was to be in direct conflict with the forces of control and domination. Now, we are faced with a condition of utter stagnation and sterility. As always, Capital recuperated brick-throwing street queens into suited politicians and activists. There are logcabin Republicans and “stonewall” refers to gay Democrats. There are gay energy drinks and a “queer” television station that wages war on the minds, bodies and esteem of impressionable youth. The “LGBT” political establishment has become a force of assimilation, gentrification, capital and statepower. Gay identity has become both a marketable commodity and a device of withdrawal from struggle against domination. Now they don’t critique marriage, military or the state. Rather we have campaigns for queer assimilation into each. Their politics is advocacy for such grievous institutions, rather than the annihilation of them all. “Gays can kill poor people around the world as well as straight people!” “Gays can hold the reigns of the state and capital as well straight people!” “We are just like you”. Assimilationists want nothing less than to construct the homosexual as normal — white, monogamous, wealthy, 2.5 children, SUVs with a white picket fence. This construction, of course, reproduces the stability of heterosexuality, whiteness, patriarchy, the gender binary, and capitalism itself. One weekend in August of 1966 — Compton’s, a twenty four hour cafeteria in San Francisco’s Tenderloin neighborhood was buzzing with its usual late-night crowd of drag queens, hustlers, slummers, cruisers, runaway teens and neighborhood regulars. The restaurant’s management became annoyed by a noisy young crowd of queens at one table who seemed to be spending a lot of time without spending a lot of money, and it called the police to roust them. A surly police officer, accustomed to manhandling Compton’s clientele with impunity, grabbed the arm of one of the queens and tried to drag her away. She unexpected threw her coffee in his face, however, and a melee erupted: Plates, trays, cups and silverware flew through the air at the startled police who ran outside and called for backup. The customer’s turned over the tables, smashed the plate-glass windows and poured onto the streets. When the police reinforcements arrived, street fighting broke out all throughout the Compton’s vicinity. Drag queens beat the police with their heavy purses and kicked them with their high-heeled shoes. A police car was vandalized, a newspaper box was burnt to the ground and general havoc was raised all throughout the Tenderloin. If we genuinely want to make ruins of this totality, we need to make a break. We don’t need inclusion into marriage, the military and the state. We need to end them. No more gay politicians, CEOs and cops. We need to swiftly and immediately articulate a wide gulf between the politics of assimilation and the struggle for liberation. We need to rediscover our riotous inheritance as queer anarchists. We need to destroy constructions of normalcy, and create instead a position based in our alienation from this normalcy, and one capable of dismantling it. We must use these positions to instigate breaks, not just from the assimilationist mainstream, but from capitalism itself. These positions can become tools of a social force ready to create a complete rupture with this world. Our bodies have been born into conflict with this social order. We need to deepen that conflict and make it spread. What began as an early morning raid on June 28th 1969 at New York’s Stonewall Inn, escalated to four days of rioting throughout Greenwich Village. Police conducted the raid as usual; targeting people of color, transpeople and gender variants for harassment and violence. It all changed, though, when a bull-dyke resisted her arrest and several street queens began throwing bottles and rocks at the police. The police began beating folks, but soon people from all over the neighborhood rushed to the scene, swelling the rioters numbers to over 2,000. The vastly outnumbered police barricaded themselves inside the bar, while an uprooted parking meter was used as a battering ram by the crowd. Molotov cocktails were thrown at the bar. Riot police arrived on scene, but were unable to regain control of the situation. Drag queens danced a conga line and sang songs amidst the street fighting to mock the inability of the police to re-establish order. The rioting continued until dawn, only to be picked up again at nightfall of the subsequent days. IX Susan Stryker writes that the state acts to “regulate bodies, in ways both great and small, by enmeshing them within norms and expectations that determine what kinds of lives are deemed livable or useful and by shutting down the space of possibility and imaginative transformation where peoples’ lives begin to exceed and escape the state’s use for them.” We must create space wherein it is possible for desire to flourish. This space, of course, requires conflict with this social order. To desire, in a world structured to confine desire, is a tension we live daily. We must understand this tension so that we can become powerful through it — we must understand it so that it can tear our confinement apart. On the night of May 21st 1979, in what has come to be known as the White Night Riots, the queer community of San Francisco was outraged and wanted justice for the murder of Harvey Milk. The outraged queers went to city hall where they smashed the windows and glass door of the building. The riotous crowd took to the streets, disrupting traffic, smashing storefronts and car windows, disabling buses and setting twelve San Francisco Police cruisers on fire. The rioting spread throughout the city as others joined in on the fun! This terrain, born in rupture, must challenge oppression in its entirety. This of course, means total negation of this world. We must become bodies in revolt. We need to delve into and indulge in power. We can learn the strength of our bodies in struggle for space for our desires. In desire we’ll find the power to destroy not only what destroys us, but also those who aspire to turn us into a gay mimicry of that which destroys us. We must be in conflict with regimes of the normal. This means to be at war with everything. If we desire a world without restraint, we must tear this one to the ground.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>This assimilation to traditional military epistemologies means that these conversations never include queer people, the state will never do shit for queers because it gives us a crumb then sells us out – thus, the ROTB is to disrupt the epistemology of inclusion</h4><p>Mary Nardini Gang, <strong>MNG 2014</strong>, "Toward the queerest insurrection," Anarchist Library, https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/mary-nardini-gang-toward-the-queerest-insurrection //SW</p><p><u>Queer is a position from which to attack the normative more, a position from which to understand and attack the ways in which normal is reproduced and reiterated. In destabilizing and problematizing normalcy, we can destabilize and become a problem for the Totality.</u> The history of organized queers was borne out of this position. The most marginalized transfolk, people of color, sex workers — have always been the catalysts for riotous explosions of queer resistance. These explosions have been coupled with a radical analysis wholeheartedly asserting that <u><mark>the liberation for queer people is intrinsically tied to the annihilation of </mark>capitalism and <mark>the state.</u></mark> It is no wonder, then, that the first people to publicly speak of sexual liberation in this country were anarchists, or that those in the last century who struggled for queer liberation also simultaneously struggled against capitalism, racism and patriarchy and empire. This is our history. VIII If history proves anything, it is <u>that capitalism has a treacherous recuperative tendency to pacify radical social movements.</u> It works rather simply, actually<u>. <mark>A group gains privilege and power </mark>within a movement<mark>, and shortly thereafter sell their comrades out.</u></mark> <u><mark>Within a couple years of stonewall, affluent gay white males had </mark>thoroughly <mark>marginalized everyone that had made their movement possible </mark>and abandoned their revolution with them. </u>It was once that to be queer was to be in direct conflict with the forces of control and domination. Now, we are faced with a condition of utter stagnation and sterility. As always, Capital recuperated brick-throwing street queens into suited politicians and activists. There are logcabin Republicans and “stonewall” refers to gay Democrats. There are gay energy drinks and a “queer” television station that wages war on the minds, bodies and esteem of impressionable youth. <u><mark>The “LGBT” political establishment has become a force of assimilation</mark>, gentrification, capital and statepower<mark>. Gay identity has become </mark>both <mark>a marketable commodity </mark>and a device of withdrawal from struggle against domination. <mark>Now they don’t critique marriage, military or the state.</mark> Rather <mark>we have campaigns for queer assimilation</mark> into each. Their politics is advocacy for such grievous institutions, rather than the annihilation of them all. “Gays can kill poor people around the world as well as straight people!”</u> “Gays can hold the reigns of the state and capital as well straight people!” “We are just like you”. Assimilationists want nothing less than to construct the homosexual as normal — white, monogamous, wealthy, 2.5 children, SUVs with a white picket fence. This construction, of course, reproduces the stability of heterosexuality, whiteness, patriarchy, the gender binary, and capitalism itself. One weekend in August of 1966 — Compton’s, a twenty four hour cafeteria in San Francisco’s Tenderloin neighborhood was buzzing with its usual late-night crowd of drag queens, hustlers, slummers, cruisers, runaway teens and neighborhood regulars. The restaurant’s management became annoyed by a noisy young crowd of queens at one table who seemed to be spending a lot of time without spending a lot of money, and it called the police to roust them. A surly police officer, accustomed to manhandling Compton’s clientele with impunity, grabbed the arm of one of the queens and tried to drag her away. She unexpected threw her coffee in his face, however, and a melee erupted: Plates, trays, cups and silverware flew through the air at the startled police who ran outside and called for backup. The customer’s turned over the tables, smashed the plate-glass windows and poured onto the streets. When the police reinforcements arrived, street fighting broke out all throughout the Compton’s vicinity. Drag queens beat the police with their heavy purses and kicked them with their high-heeled shoes. A police car was vandalized, a newspaper box was burnt to the ground and general havoc was raised all throughout the Tenderloin. If we genuinely want to make ruins of this totality, we need to make a break. <u><mark>We don’t need inclusion into marriage, the military and the state. We need to end them.</mark> No more gay politicians, CEOs and cops. We need to swiftly and immediately articulate a wide gulf between the politics of assimilation and the struggle for liberation. We need to rediscover our riotous inheritance as queer anarchists<mark>. We need to destroy constructions of normalcy, and create instead a position based in our alienation from this normalcy, and one capable of dismantling it.</u></mark> We must use these positions to instigate breaks, not just from the assimilationist mainstream, but from capitalism itself. These positions can become tools of a social force ready to create a complete rupture with this world. <u>Our bodies have been born into conflict with this social order. We need to deepen that conflict and make it spread.</u> What began as an early morning raid on June 28th 1969 at New York’s Stonewall Inn, escalated to four days of rioting throughout Greenwich Village. Police conducted the raid as usual; targeting people of color, transpeople and gender variants for harassment and violence. It all changed, though, when a bull-dyke resisted her arrest and several street queens began throwing bottles and rocks at the police. The police began beating folks, but soon people from all over the neighborhood rushed to the scene, swelling the rioters numbers to over 2,000. The vastly outnumbered police barricaded themselves inside the bar, while an uprooted parking meter was used as a battering ram by the crowd. Molotov cocktails were thrown at the bar. Riot police arrived on scene, but were unable to regain control of the situation. Drag queens danced a conga line and sang songs amidst the street fighting to mock the inability of the police to re-establish order. The rioting continued until dawn, only to be picked up again at nightfall of the subsequent days. IX Susan Stryker writes that <u>the state acts to “regulate bodies, in ways both great and small, by enmeshing them within norms and expectations that determine what kinds of lives are deemed livable or useful and by shutting down the space of possibility and imaginative transformation where peoples’ lives begin to exceed and escape the state’s use for them.” We must create space wherein it is possible for desire to flourish. This space</u>, of course, <u>requires conflict with this social order.</u> To desire, in a world structured to confine desire, is a tension we live daily. We must understand this tension so that we can become powerful through it — we must understand it so that it can tear our confinement apart. On the night of May 21st 1979, in what has come to be known as the White Night Riots, the queer community of San Francisco was outraged and wanted justice for the murder of Harvey Milk. The outraged queers went to city hall where they smashed the windows and glass door of the building. The riotous crowd took to the streets, disrupting traffic, smashing storefronts and car windows, disabling buses and setting twelve San Francisco Police cruisers on fire. The rioting spread throughout the city as others joined in on the fun! This terrain, born in rupture, must challenge oppression in its entirety. <u>This</u> of course, <u>means total negation of this world. We must become bodies in revolt. We need to delve into and indulge in power. We can learn the strength of our bodies in struggle for space for our desires.</u> In desire we’ll find the power to destroy not only what destroys us, but also those who aspire to turn us into a gay mimicry of that which destroys us. <u>We must be in conflict with regimes of the normal. This means to be at war with everything. If we desire a world without restraint, we must tear this one to the ground.</u> </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT fulltext: There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>2] Extinction comes first!</h4><p><strong>Pummer 15</strong> [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT</p><p><u>There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now</u>, whatever general moral view we adopt<u>: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war.</u> How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that <u>we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. </u>According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. <u>Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here.</u> If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how<u> <mark>reducing existential risk is </mark>easily <mark>the most important thing in the whole world.</mark> This is for the familiar reason that there are <mark>so many people </mark>who <mark>could exist in the future</mark> – there are <mark>trillions upon trillions</mark>… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that <mark>reducing existential risk is</mark> arguably <mark>the most important</mark> thing in the world, <mark>even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight </mark>as that of existing people.</u> Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, <u>this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But <strong>that is a huge mistake.</u></strong> <u>Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; <strong>it is not the view that the latter don’t matter</strong>.</u> Even John Rawls wrote, “<u>All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.</u>” <u><strong>Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good</strong>, from an impartial point of view.</u> <u>They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk</u>, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. <u>Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk.</u> It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). <u>To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being.</u> To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – <u>suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being</u>, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But <u>once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk.</u> Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. <u><strong><mark>We should also take into account moral uncertainty.</u></strong></mark> <u>What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts?</u> I’ve just argued that <u>there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree.</u> But <u>even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one </u>(and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), <u>they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk.</u> Perhaps most disturbingly still, <u><mark>even if we are only 1% sure that </mark>the <mark>well-being </mark>of possible future people <mark>matters, </mark>it is at least arguable that, <mark>from </mark>the standpoint of <mark>moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world.</u></mark> Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. <u>It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if</u>, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, <u><strong><mark>all minimally plausible moral views would converge </mark>on the conclusion <mark>that we should try to save the world</strong>.</u></mark> While there are some non-crazy <u>views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness</u>, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless <u>seem to be fairly implausible views.</u> And <u>even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve.</u> Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. <u>Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. </u>We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. <u>If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. </u>Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. <u>Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.</u>” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Bates, 18—Ph.D. candidate, Boston College, Morrissey College of Arts and Sciences (Julia, “The Occlusion of Empire in the Reification of Race: A Postcolonial Critique of the American Sociology of Race,” https://dlib.bc.edu/islandora/object/bc-ir%3A108103, dml) fulltext: Here, Patterson did not conceptualize race as a static category, or some kind of “original sin” that was passed on from U.S. slavery. Rather, he theorized racial categories particularly the category of blackness within the United States was continually produced and reproduced by U.S. Empire abroad. He argued the subordination of black Americans within the United States was dependent on the United States ability to produce the category of “race” abroad. With the production of race on a global level, the United States maintained racial hierarchy within the United States. He noted that as U.S. imperialism gained in power within global capitalism, African Americans’ internal subjugation within the United States increased. He stated, As American monopoly grows in strength, reaching out for control of the world, the exploitation of the Negro people in the United States grows in scope and severity. Thus, in 1947 the median wage or salary income of white wage earners was $1, 980 of non-white wage earners $863, or 43.6 per cent as much, according to the United States Department of Commerce. In 1949, according to the United States Bureau reports, while 16,800,000 Americans in 4,700,000 families had an income of less than $1,000 a year, the income of white families was two times greater than that of Negroes (136) Therefore, the global growth of capitalism in the 21 st century, did not decrease the significance of racial inequality relative to class inequality, but actually exponentially increased it. He argued race was not subsumed to class as capitalism progressed. Rather as capitalism progressed, racial and class inequality grew in strength in relation to one another. Thus, he saw the global growth in capitalism as a global growth in imperialism, or capitalist-imperialism. Imperialism was not seen as a past stage of capitalism, or something that was subsumed to a more pure form of capitalism in the future. Rather imperialism and capitalism were conceived of as integral to one another. Throughout the petition, Patterson highlighted how the expansion of U.S. Empire abroad was integral to the maintenance of racial inequality at home. He noted the maintenance of the slave system within the United States was maintained through U.S. imperial expansion in Mexico: The genocide that was American slavery, the killing of part of the group so that the remainder could be more readily exploited for profit, resulted in two wars. The first was the aggression against Mexico in 1846 seeking more territory for the expansion of slavery (24). Like corporations within the capitalist system that expand their markets globally to maintain profit, the United States government expanded slavery abroad to maintain slavery within. More specifically, to maintain the profits of the slave system, the United States government had to engage in acts of imperial conquest to increase land and resource extraction. This integrally linked the dynamics of racial structures within the United States to U.S. imperial expansion. Likewise, he noted that following the Civil War, the U.S. continued to repress anti-imperial insurgency within the United States through imperial expansion. He argued the U.S.’s imperial expansion into Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines helped to repress the threat posed to U.S. power by the Populist Party. The Populist Party brought together both black and white American workers against global corporate interests. By expanding into new territories, the U.S. government gained cheap labor and markets that offset the ability of the Populist Party to leverage the U.S. government for higher wages etc.: The Negro [black] people fought back chiefly through the Populist parties that opposed the Wall Street trusts through the eighties, nineties of the last century. But their fight became more hopeless against the increased power of American monopoly. Terror was unleashed against them at home…Side by side went terror unleashed abroad, as American imperialism entered the international arena by subjugating the Filipino, Puerto Rican, and Cuban peoples and reduced many Latin-American countries to economic and political vassalage (25). To put down a threat to U.S. Empire within the U.S. citizenry, the United States government expanded outwards. In doing so, they gained more land and cheap labor to use against the political threat to U.S. Empire within. Patterson argued this pattern persisted into the twenty first century. Discussing the Korean War, they note again that the U.S.’s expansion outward was integral to maintaining the United States’ Empire within: Jellied gasoline in Korea and the lynchers’ faggot at home are connected in more ways than that both result in death by fire. The lyncher and the atom bomber are related. The first cannot murder unpunished and unrebuked without so encouraging the latter that the peace of the world and the lives of millions are endangered. Nor is this metaphysics. The tie binding both is economic profit and political control. He observed the Korean War was coupled with an increased repression of black Americans within the United States. Thus, when the United States waged imperial wars abroad they increased the repression of African Americans within. Patterson did not view racism as a “baseless ideology”, nor did he view it as a psychological, or irrational phenomena. He asserted racism was based in global capitalist-imperialism. As a consequence, racism was not only rational, but also necessary to maintain the structure. It was not only used to produce and reproduce a class structure, but also as a means to prevent political counter-insurgency against U.S. Empire within the United States and other nations. Patterson viewed race, not just as a set of beliefs or a type of identity, but also as a structural category integral to the maintenance of capitalistimperialism. William Patterson argued U.S. racism has a base, and its base is imperialcapitalism; however, he also argued imperial-capitalism cannot be reduced on to the relationship between an unraced bourgeoisie and proletariat. In this definition, race is taken out and class is deemed just a material, non-cultural relationship between the proletariat and bourgeoisie. In this definition of capitalism, imperialism and racism are not conceptualized as integral, ongoing parts of capitalism (Chibber 2014). However, black Marxists, like William Patterson did see imperialism and racism as integral and ongoing parts of global capitalism. He stated, “It is because we Negro petitioners have no true and real recourse in these courts, because we receive no protection from the state, because police and courts are themselves involved in the genocide directed against us…” (41). He argued, the U.S. government was able to economically exploit African Americans more thoroughly than other Americans because they had politically dispossessed and geographically displaced them within the U.S. polity. More specifically, like colonial subjects they were contained in specific areas and unable to represent themselves in the polity. Likewise, he noted because the U.S. engaged in imperialism with African Americans it could easily use these same policies to promote U.S. imperialism abroad. Regarding the relationship between domestic genocide and global imperial genocide, they stated, This domestic genocide…was the foundation of predatory war and the prelude to the larger genocide that followed against the nationals of other countries, a genocide seeking the political and economic control of Europe, if not the world… (31) Thus, William Patterson bridged race and class, national and global. He stated the increasing subordination of black Americans increased the United States ability to dominate the world economy through a racial political order. Patterson also drew parallels between the U.S. Empire and the German Empire. He stated, “We cannot forget Hitler’s demonstration that genocide at home can become wider massacre abroad, that domestic genocide develops into a larger genocide that is predatory war…” Patterson noted the internal imperial order, within Germany gave way to an outward colonial expansion that dispossessed and murdered people based on race. Thus he predicted the United States would unleash more war abroad as racial inequality developed within. Likewise, he noted as American empire expanded outwards it would make the world’s peoples dependent on consuming commodities that were produced within a racist-imperial regime. He stated, “We speak of a progressive mankind because a policy of discrimination at home must inevitably create racist commodities for export abroad…” (xi). The American imperial regime first developed by the internalization of the global European imperial would now expand back outward making the world’s people dependent on cheap black American labor. Furthermore, he highlighted how the black labor regime within the United States was produced in relation to colonial labor regimes of European empires. He asserted, “The South’s plantation system, concealed by the United States census…produced for the world market in successful competition with the ‘coolie’ labor of Egypt and India, brought in one and a half billion dollars” (23). He noted the United States had to establish a system of colonial labor within the United States in order to be able to compete against European Empires. The United States solution to this predicament was slavery, and later, other forms of localized imperial structures to maintain colonial labor. He observed this structure within the United States can’t be reduced to a simple class relationship between an unraced proletariat and bourgeoisie. Rather with black Americans it was not just about economic alienation from the goods, but political alienation from the state and geographic dispossession from the territory. He stated, Most sharecroppers work from dawn- to dark for a living, which verges on starvation. Often these black Americans are not even able to quit or move not only because of lack of money but because of ancient debtors' laws which make it a crime to move while owing money…Much of the law of those states in the Black Belt, moreover, is directed towards guaranteeing an American peasantry without political or human rights available to work the land without pay sufficient for proper livelihood (23)<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Their explanation of blackness is <u>ahistorical</u>. Imperial expansion <u>produces antiblackness</u>, not the other way around.</h4><p><strong>Bates, 18</strong>—Ph.D. candidate, Boston College, Morrissey College of Arts and Sciences (Julia, “The Occlusion of Empire in the Reification of Race: A Postcolonial Critique of the American Sociology of Race,” https://dlib.bc.edu/islandora/object/bc-ir%3A108103, dml) </p><p>Here, <u>Patterson <strong>did not conceptualize race</strong> as a <strong>static category</strong>, or some kind of “<strong>original sin</strong>” that was <strong>passed on from U.S. slavery</strong>. Rather, he theorized</u> racial categories particularly the category of <u><mark>blackness</mark> within the United States was <strong>continually <mark>produced</strong> and <strong>reproduced by U.S. Empire </mark>abroad</u></strong>. He argued <u>the subordination of black Americans</u> within the United States <u>was <strong><mark>dependent on </mark>the United States ability to produce <mark>the category of “race” abroad</strong></mark>. With the production of race on a <strong>global level</strong>, the United States <strong>maintained racial hierarchy within the United States</u></strong>. He noted that <u>as U.S. imperialism <strong>gained in power</strong> within global capitalism, <strong>African Americans’ internal subjugation</strong> within the United States <strong>increased</u></strong>. He stated, As American monopoly grows in strength, reaching out for control of the world, the exploitation of the Negro people in the United States grows in scope and severity. Thus, in 1947 the median wage or salary income of white wage earners was $1, 980 of non-white wage earners $863, or 43.6 per cent as much, according to the United States Department of Commerce. In 1949, according to the United States Bureau reports, while 16,800,000 Americans in 4,700,000 families had an income of less than $1,000 a year, the income of white families was two times greater than that of Negroes (136) Therefore, the global growth of capitalism in the 21 st century, did not decrease the significance of racial inequality relative to class inequality, but actually exponentially increased it. He argued race was not subsumed to class as capitalism progressed. Rather as capitalism progressed, racial and class inequality grew in strength in relation to one another. Thus, he saw the global growth in capitalism as a global growth in imperialism, or capitalist-imperialism. Imperialism was not seen as a past stage of capitalism, or something that was subsumed to a more pure form of capitalism in the future. Rather imperialism and capitalism were conceived of as integral to one another. Throughout the petition, Patterson highlighted how <u>the <strong><mark>expansion of</mark> U.S. <mark>Empire</mark> abroad <mark>was integral</strong> to</mark> the <strong>maintenance of <mark>racial inequality at home</u></strong></mark>. He noted <u>the <strong>maintenance of <mark>the slave system</strong></mark> within the United States <mark>was <strong>maintained through</mark> U.S. imperial expansion in Mexico</u></strong>: <u>The genocide that was American slavery, the killing of part of the group so that the remainder could be more readily exploited for profit, resulted in</u> two wars. The first was the <u><mark>aggression</mark> <mark>against Mexico</mark> in 1846 <strong><mark>seeking more territory</strong> </mark>for the expansion of slavery</u> (24). Like corporations within the capitalist system that expand their markets globally to maintain profit, <u>the United States government <strong><mark>expanded slavery abroad </mark>to maintain slavery within</u></strong>. More specifically, <u><mark>to <strong>maintain</mark> the <mark>profits</strong></mark> of the slave system, the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates government <strong><mark>had to</mark> engage in acts of imperial <mark>conquest to increase land</strong> and <strong>resource extraction</strong>. </mark>This <strong>integrally linked</strong> the dynamics of racial structures within the United States to U.S. imperial expansion</u>. Likewise, he noted that <u>following the Civil War, the U.S. <strong>continued to repress anti-imperial insurgency</strong> within the United States through imperial expansion</u>. He argued <u>the U.S.’s imperial <mark>expansion</mark> into Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines helped to <strong><mark>repress the threat</strong></mark> posed to U.S. power <mark>by the <strong>Populist Party</u></strong></mark>. The Populist Party brought together both black and white American workers against global corporate interests. By expanding into new territories, the U.S. government gained cheap labor and markets that offset the ability of the Populist Party to leverage the U.S. government for higher wages etc.: The Negro <u>[<mark>black] people fought</mark> back <strong>chiefly <mark>through the Populist parties</strong></mark> that opposed the Wall Street trusts</u> through the eighties, nineties of the last century. <u>But their fight <strong>became more hopeless</strong> against the <strong>increased power of American monopoly</strong>. Terror was <strong>unleashed against them at home</strong>…<strong>Side by side went terror unleashed abroad</strong>, as American imperialism <strong>entered the international arena</strong> by subjugating the Filipino, Puerto Rican, and Cuban peoples and reduced many Latin-American countries to economic and political vassalage</u> (25). <u><mark>To <strong>put down a threat</mark> to U.S. Empire</strong> <mark>within the U.S.</mark> citizenry, <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates government <strong><mark>expanded outward</mark>s</strong>. In doing so, <mark>they <strong>gained more land</strong> and <strong>cheap labor to use against</mark> the political <mark>threat</strong></mark> to U.S. Empire <mark>within</u></mark>. Patterson argued this pattern persisted into the twenty first century. Discussing the Korean War, they note again that the U.S.’s expansion outward was integral to maintaining the United States’ Empire within: Jellied gasoline in Korea and the lynchers’ faggot at home are connected in more ways than that both result in death by fire. The lyncher and the atom bomber are related. The first cannot murder unpunished and unrebuked without so encouraging the latter that the peace of the world and the lives of millions are endangered. Nor is this metaphysics. The tie binding both is economic profit and political control. He observed <u>the Korean War was <strong>coupled</strong> with an <strong>increased repression of black Americans</strong> within the United States</u>. Thus, <u>when the United States waged imperial wars abroad they <strong>increased the repression of African Americans within</u></strong>. <u><mark>Patterson <strong>did not view racism as</mark> a</u></strong> “baseless ideology”, nor did he view it as a <u><strong><mark>psychological</u></strong></mark>, or irrational <u><strong>phenomena</u></strong>. He asserted <u>racism was <strong><mark>based in global capitalist-imperialism</strong></mark>. As a consequence, racism was<mark> </mark>not only <strong><mark>rational</strong>, </mark>but <mark>also <strong>necessary to maintain </mark>the structure</strong>. It was</u> not only <u>used</u> to produce and reproduce a class structure, but also <u>as a means <mark>to <strong>prevent</mark> political <mark>counter-insurgency</mark> against U.S. Empire</strong> within the United States and other nations</u>. Patterson viewed race, not just as a set of beliefs or a type of identity, but also as a structural category integral to the maintenance of capitalistimperialism. William Patterson argued U.S. racism has a base, and its base is imperialcapitalism; however, he also argued imperial-capitalism cannot be reduced on to the relationship between an unraced bourgeoisie and proletariat. In this definition, race is taken out and class is deemed just a material, non-cultural relationship between the proletariat and bourgeoisie. In this definition of capitalism, imperialism and racism are not conceptualized as integral, ongoing parts of capitalism (Chibber 2014). However, black Marxists, like William Patterson did see imperialism and racism as integral and ongoing parts of global capitalism. He stated, “It is because we Negro petitioners have no true and real recourse in these courts, because we receive no protection from the state, because police and courts are themselves involved in the genocide directed against us…” (41). He argued, <u>the U.S. government was able to economically exploit African Americans <strong>more thoroughly than other Americans</strong> because they had <strong>politically dispossessed</strong> and <strong>geographically displaced them</strong> within the U.S. polity</u>. More specifically, <u><mark>like colonial subjects they were <strong>contained in specific areas</strong> and <strong>unable to represent themselves</strong></mark> in the polity</u>. Likewise, he noted <u><mark>because the U.S. <strong>engaged in imperialism with African Americans</strong> it could</mark> <strong>easily</strong> <mark>use these</mark> same <mark>policies to <strong>promote</mark> U.S. <mark>imperialism abroad</u></strong></mark>. Regarding the relationship between domestic genocide and global imperial genocide, they stated, <u>This <mark>domestic genocide</u>…<u>was the <strong>foundation of predatory war</strong></mark> and the <strong>prelude</strong> to the <strong>larger genocide that followed</strong> against the nationals of other countries</u>, a genocide seeking the political and economic control of Europe, if not the world… (31) Thus, William Patterson bridged race and class, national and global. He stated <u>the increasing <mark>subordination of black Americans <strong>increased the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>ability to dominate the world econ</mark>omy</strong> through a <strong>racial political order</u></strong>. Patterson also drew parallels between the U.S. Empire and the German Empire. He stated, “We cannot forget Hitler’s demonstration that genocide at home can become wider massacre abroad, that domestic genocide develops into a larger genocide that is predatory war…” Patterson noted the internal imperial order, within Germany gave way to an outward colonial expansion that dispossessed and murdered people based on race. Thus he predicted the United States would unleash more war abroad as racial inequality developed within. Likewise, he noted as American empire expanded outwards it would make the world’s peoples dependent on consuming commodities that were produced within a racist-imperial regime. He stated, “We speak of a progressive mankind because a policy of discrimination at home must inevitably create racist commodities for export abroad…” (xi). The American imperial regime first developed by the internalization of the global European imperial would now expand back outward making the world’s people dependent on cheap black American labor. Furthermore, he highlighted how <u>the <mark>black labor regime</mark> within the United States was <strong><mark>produced in relation to colonial </mark>labor regimes of European empires</u></strong>. He asserted, “<u>The South’s plantation system</u>, concealed by the United States census…<u>produced for the <mark>world market in <strong>successful competition</u></strong></mark> with the ‘coolie’ labor of Egypt and India, brought in one and a half billion dollars” (23). He noted <u>the United States <strong>had to establish a system of colonial labor</strong> within the United States <strong>in order to be able to compete</strong> against European Empires. <mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <strong><mark>solution</strong></mark> to this predicament <mark>was <strong>slavery</strong>, and</mark> <strong>later</strong>, <strong>other forms of <mark>localized imperial structures</strong></mark> to maintain colonial labor</u>. He observed this structure within the United States can’t be reduced to a simple class relationship between an unraced proletariat and bourgeoisie. Rather with black Americans it was not just about economic alienation from the goods, but political alienation from the state and geographic dispossession from the territory. He stated, Most sharecroppers work from dawn- to dark for a living, which verges on starvation. Often these black Americans are not even able to quit or move not only because of lack of money but because of ancient debtors' laws which make it a crime to move while owing money…Much of the law of those states in the Black Belt, moreover, is directed towards guaranteeing an American peasantry without political or human rights available to work the land without pay sufficient for proper livelihood (23) </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Yang 18 (Tommy, writer for Sputnik News, “China Unlikely to Match India Strength in Indian Ocean in Near Future – Analysts”, Sputnik News, 5/3/18, https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201803051062243930-china-india-indian-ocean/)KJR fulltext: China first revealed its plan to build its first overseas naval base in Djibouti in 2016. As a focal point of the Belt and Road Initiative, championed by Chinese President Xi Jinping to boost the nation’s global influence, Pakistan’s ports on the Indian Ocean are widely expected to host a new Chinese military base in the near future. In response, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi secured access to naval facilities in Oman during an official visit last month. Earlier this year, India reached an agreement with Seychelles to build military infrastructure on the Assumption Island. Geographical Advantage As India and China both strive to boost their naval presence and strength in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi is likely to continue to enjoy an advantage over Beijing in the region thanks to is geographical proximity, military experts told Sputnik. Indian national flag © AP PHOTO / MAHESH KUMAR A India Overtakes China in GDP Growth But Data Suggest No Reprieve for Job Seekers "India is stronger in the Indian Ocean, because China has to go through choke points in the Southeast Asia. Their logistic line is very stretched. Although they have an aircraft carrier, it would take them a long time, probably decades, to incorporate that into an aircraft carrier battle group, which would allow them to achieve sea-control in the Indian Ocean. In this sense, I would say it would take maybe two-three decades. India still has a great advantage over the Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean. I am not talking about West Pacific. I’m only talking about the Indian Ocean," Gurpreet Khurana, an Indian Navy captain and executive director of the National Maritime Foundation in New Delhi, India, told Sputnik. READ MORE: India Turns to China-Based AIIB for Loans to Fund its Infrastructure Dream The Indian military expert explained the reasons behind China’s naval expansion in the Indian Ocean. "Geography is very important in assessing the comparative naval strength [between India and China]. China has a very adverse geography. Its land-to-coastline ratio is very adverse, which is one of the worst in the world. It means that a lot of China is land-oriented. Its coast in the east is very far from the source of natural resources. Because of this, it needs to come to the Indian Ocean desperately as its economic power continues to grow," Khurana said. India's Concerns Khurana illustrated why China’s increasing military presence in the Indian Ocean could cause concerns in New Delhi. Indian army soldiers keep watch at the Indo China border in Bumla at an altitude of 15,700 feet (4,700 meters) above sea level in Arunachal Pradesh, India. (File) © AP PHOTO / ANUPAM NATH India-China Bonhomie is Back on Track - Indian Army Chief "Because of India’s geographical position, the Indian Ocean becomes very critical to the country’s national security interests. In other parts of the world, such as the Indo-Pacific, we do not have the luxury of the West which has fought wars and got over it. We still have traditional military insecurities. India still has adversary relations with China, which has increasingly come into the Indian Ocean region. This has heightened the insecurity for India," he said. The New Delhi-based expert argued that India might decide to expand its military presence closer to Chinese territory in response. "Although India has sufficient strategic depth in terms of territory, because of the overwhelming security stretch, it needs to have a greater area. India’s strategic frontier needs to expand beyond the Northern Indian Ocean. It has to expand southward and eastward, to the Western Pacific. That’s how the concept of Indo-Pacific comes into play, because of China’s increasing presence in the Indian Ocean," he said. China's Vulnerability Chinese leaders understand the nation’s maritime weakness and seek to compensate this geographical disadvantage by establishing new naval bases in the Indian Ocean, Khurana suggested. "Although the Indian Navy has a distinct advantage over the Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean so far, Chinese realizes it. That’s why, they’re trying to offset India’s advantage by building facilities in the Indian Ocean. For example, Djibouti and [Pakistan’s] Gwadar or Jiwani could all have Chinese naval bases. What Chinese is trying to achieve is to shorten their logistic lines. They would be able to do it to a certain extent, but not completely. That’s because even when they have bases or facilities in the Indian Ocean, they would need to be resupplied from their home base in China," he said. The Indian naval officer pointed out a key vulnerability of China in the Indian Ocean. "The naval bases China has in the Indian Ocean would be very vulnerable to Indian military strikes. It would be difficult for them [China] to establish sea-control in the Indian Ocean. If you cannot establish sea-control, all your surface base and air base operations cannot be undertaken. Because of the historic adversary relations between the two nations, China is very vulnerable in the Indian Ocean because its energy supply lines passing through that area, where the Indian Navy traditional had a very strong presence. China would not be able to directly protect its oil shipments coming from the Gulf region or Africa through the Indian Ocean. What the Chinese is trying to do now is to increase their submarine presence in the Indian Ocean, as submarine warfare does not need sea-control. But the only way they can use submarine forces is in retaliation," he said. No Military Conflict in Near Future Following almost three months of military standoff over a disputed border area, China and India finally decided to withdraw their troops to end the conflict peacefully in August 2017. Rising rivalry between the two nations in the Indian Ocean raised questions about a possible future China-India warfare at sea. Military experts argued that such warfare in the Indian Ocean is unlikely to take place in the near future. "I do not foresee an armed conflict in the Indian Ocean in the foreseeable future, until China consolidates its economic and military power in the Asia-Pacific region. Currently, China has only one aircraft carrier for training purposes. When China finally builds up its nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, perhaps we can see more powerful Chinese forces going into the Indian Ocean. Right now, any Chinese forces sent to the Indian Ocean would be weak. I do not think they try to create a conflict with India," Ben Ho, a naval analyst with the Military Studies Program at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told Sputnik. The Singapore-based military expert believes new Chinese military bases in the Indian Ocean could serve other purposes, instead of providing support in a traditional warfare. "The establishment of new military facilities in the Indian Ocean, in countries like Sri Lanka or some of the Indian Ocean islands in the future, could give Chinese some advantages, but not in a high-end warfare sense. After all, they [the bases] are too small and isolated to provide much help for the Chinese military. They’re more for conflicts below the warfare, such as counter-piracy missions or evacuation of Chinese nationals from crisis regions," Ho said. The expert added that new naval bases in the Indian Ocean also fit China’s overall strategy of protecting its economic interests globally. China’s navy evacuated 600 Chinese nationals, along with over 200 foreigners, from the port of Aden in Southern Yemen in 2015, amid severe fighting in the restive African nation plagued by violence and domestic conflicts for years. The first massive evacuation of its citizens from overseas won applause for the Chinese military domestically. A Chinese movie depicted a similar story shattered domestic box office records last year, while invigorating overwhelming patriotic sentiment in China.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>No IOR conflict – China can’t and won’t challenge, even with basing</h4><p><strong>Yang 18</strong> (Tommy, writer for Sputnik News, “China Unlikely to Match India Strength in Indian Ocean in Near Future – Analysts”, Sputnik News, 5/3/18, https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201803051062243930-china-india-indian-ocean/)KJR</p><p>China first revealed its plan to build its first overseas naval base in Djibouti in 2016. As a focal point of the Belt and Road Initiative, championed by Chinese President Xi Jinping to boost the nation’s global influence, Pakistan’s ports on the Indian Ocean are widely expected to host a new Chinese military base in the near future. In response, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi secured access to naval facilities in Oman during an official visit last month. Earlier this year, India reached an agreement with Seychelles to build military infrastructure on the Assumption Island. Geographical Advantage As India and China both strive to boost their naval presence and strength in the Indian Ocean, <u><mark>New Delhi is likely to continue to enjoy an advantage over Beijing</mark> in the region thanks to is <mark>geographical proximity</u></mark>, military experts told Sputnik. Indian national flag © AP PHOTO / MAHESH KUMAR A India Overtakes China in GDP Growth But Data Suggest No Reprieve for Job Seekers "<u><mark>India is stronger in the Indian Ocean</u>,</mark> because <u><mark>China has to go through choke points</mark> in the Southeast Asia. Their logistic line is very stretched</u>. Although they have an aircraft carrier<u>, <mark>it would take</mark> them a long time, probably <mark>decades, to</mark> i<mark>ncorporate</mark> that into an <mark>aircraft</mark> carrier battle group</u>, which would allow them to achieve sea-control in the Indian Ocean. In this sense, I would say it would take maybe two-three decades. India still has a great advantage over the Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean. I am not talking about West Pacific. I’m only talking about the Indian Ocean," Gurpreet Khurana, an Indian Navy captain and executive director of the National Maritime Foundation in New Delhi, India, told Sputnik. READ MORE: India Turns to China-Based AIIB for Loans to Fund its Infrastructure Dream The Indian military expert explained the reasons behind China’s naval expansion in the Indian Ocean. "<u>Geography is very important in assessing the comparative naval strength</u> [between India and China]. China has a very adverse geography. Its land-to-coastline ratio is very adverse, which is one of the worst in the world. It means that <u>a lot of <mark>China is land-oriented</u></mark>. Its coast in the east is very far from the source of natural resources. Because of this, it needs to come to the Indian Ocean desperately as its economic power continues to grow," Khurana said. India's Concerns Khurana illustrated why China’s increasing military presence in the Indian Ocean could cause concerns in New Delhi. Indian army soldiers keep watch at the Indo China border in Bumla at an altitude of 15,700 feet (4,700 meters) above sea level in Arunachal Pradesh, India. (File) © AP PHOTO / ANUPAM NATH India-China Bonhomie is Back on Track - Indian Army Chief "Because of India’s geographical position, <u>the Indian Ocean becomes very critical to the country’s national security interests.</u> In other parts of the world, such as the Indo-Pacific, we do not have the luxury of the West which has fought wars and got over it. We still have traditional military insecurities. India still has adversary relations with China, which has increasingly come into the Indian Ocean region. This has heightened the insecurity for India," he said. The New Delhi-based expert argued that <u><mark>India</mark> might decide to <mark>expand its military presence</mark> <mark>closer to Chinese territory in response</mark>. </u>"Although India has sufficient strategic depth in terms of territory, because of the overwhelming security stretch, it needs to have a greater area. India’s strategic frontier needs to expand beyond the Northern Indian Ocean. It has to expand southward and eastward, to the Western Pacific. That’s how the concept of Indo-Pacific comes into play, because of China’s increasing presence in the Indian Ocean," he said. China's Vulnerability Chinese leaders understand the nation’s maritime weakness and seek to compensate this geographical disadvantage by establishing new naval bases in the Indian Ocean, Khurana suggested. "Although the Indian Navy has a distinct advantage over the Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean so far, Chinese realizes it. That’s why, they’re trying to offset India’s advantage by building facilities in the Indian Ocean. For example, Djibouti and [Pakistan’s] Gwadar or Jiwani could all have Chinese naval bases. What Chinese is trying to achieve is to shorten their logistic lines. They would be able to do it to a certain extent, but not completely. That’s because even when they have bases or facilities in the Indian Ocean, they would need to be resupplied from their home base in China," he said. The Indian naval officer pointed out a key vulnerability of China in the Indian Ocean. "<u>The <mark>naval bases</mark> China has in the Indian Ocean <mark>would be</mark> very <mark>vulnerable</mark> to Indian military strikes</u>. It would be difficult for them [China] to establish sea-control in the Indian Ocean. If you cannot establish sea-control, all your surface base and air base operations cannot be undertaken. Because of the historic adversary relations between the two nations, China is very vulnerable in the Indian Ocean because its energy supply lines passing through that area, where the Indian Navy traditional had a very strong presence. <u>China would not be able to directly protect its oil shipments</u> coming from the Gulf region or Africa through the Indian Ocean. What the Chinese is trying to do now is to increase their submarine presence in the Indian Ocean, as submarine warfare does not need sea-control. But the only way they can use submarine forces is in retaliation," he said. No Military Conflict in Near Future Following almost three months of military standoff over a disputed border area, China and India finally decided to withdraw their troops to end the conflict peacefully in August 2017. Rising rivalry between the two nations in the Indian Ocean raised questions about a possible future China-India warfare at sea. <u>Military experts argue</u>d that such <u><mark>warfare in the Indian Ocean is unlikely</u></mark> to take place in the near future. "<u><mark>I do not foresee an armed conflict in the Indian Ocean</mark> in the foreseeable future, until China consolidates its economic and military power in the Asia-Pacific region</u>. Currently, <u>China has only one aircraft carrier</u> for training purposes. When China finally builds up its nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, perhaps we can see more powerful Chinese forces going into the Indian Ocean. Right now, <u><mark>any Chinese forces</mark> sent to the Indian Ocean <mark>would be weak</u></mark>. I do not think they try to create a conflict with India," Ben Ho, a naval analyst with the Military Studies Program at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told Sputnik. The Singapore-based military expert believes new <u>Chinese military bases in the Indian Ocean could serve other purposes, instead of providing support in a traditional warfare.</u> "The establishment of new military facilities in the Indian Ocean, in countries like Sri Lanka or some of the Indian Ocean islands in the future, could give Chinese some advantages, but not in a high-end warfare sense. After all, they <mark>[<u>the bases] are too small and isolated</mark> to provide much help</u> <u>for the Chinese military</u>. They’re more for conflicts below the warfare, such as counter-piracy missions or evacuation of Chinese nationals from crisis regions," Ho said. The expert added that new naval bases in the Indian Ocean also fit China’s overall strategy of protecting its economic interests globally. China’s navy evacuated 600 Chinese nationals, along with over 200 foreigners, from the port of Aden in Southern Yemen in 2015, amid severe fighting in the restive African nation plagued by violence and domestic conflicts for years. The first massive evacuation of its citizens from overseas won applause for the Chinese military domestically. A Chinese movie depicted a similar story shattered domestic box office records last year, while invigorating overwhelming patriotic sentiment in China.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Ruskola 13 (Teemu, Professor of Law: Affiliated Faculty Member in Comparative Literature; East Asian Studies; History; and Women's, Gender and Sexuality Studies, Legal Orientalism : China, the United States, and Modern Law, Harvard University Press, p. 203 – 207) | js fulltext: Having sketched the broad outlines of Chinese law’s twentieth-century trajectory, let us turn to that of U.S. law, especially in terms of Sino-U.S. relations. Given the unfortunate history of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, how did American legal thought become an object of such admiration and emulation? World War II was followed not only by the decolonization of formal empires but also by the final disappearance of consular jurisdiction of the Oriental kind. The United States surrendered its extraterritorial jurisdiction in China in 1943. (It held onto the last vestiges of its Barbary Treaties until 1956, when it finally gave up extraterritorial privileges in Tangier, Morocco.)  However, emerging from World War II as a global superpower, the United States could easily afford to see old forms of imperial power vanish. In their place it built a new kind of international order that recognized American hegemony without the considerable administrative and ideological costs associated with formal territorial imperialism. As Kal Raustiala sums up the nature of America’s leadership in the postWar world, “It was predicated not on territorial control but on extraterritorial power and presence.”  From this perspective, the century of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, together with the Open Door policy of which it was an integral part, is better understood not simply as an institutional relic of early modern European– Ottoman relations that somehow found its way into the Far East and survived there into the twentieth century. Rather, it becomes visible as a precursor of modern— even postmodern—forms of neocolonial power, predicated on legally protected freedom of trade without formal territorial control. precisely the desire to extract economic profit from other lands assuming administrative responsibility for them that underlay the notion of “free trade imperialism” in the mid-Victorian era, which sought to realize the vision announced by Thomas Babington Macauley in British India: “To trade with civilised men is infinitely more profitable than to govern savages.”  For in no way does trade’s freedom imply substantive equality among those trading. As Bertrand Russell observed in 1922, at the conclusion of his Chinese lecture tour, “It is quite possible to dominate China without infringing the principle of the Open Door. This principle merely ensures that the domination everywhere shall be American, because America is the strongest Power financially and commercially.”  In his analysis of America’s post-War role, Raustiala identifies three contemporary forms of extraterritorial power: the establishment of a global network of military bases in other countries, the selective application of U.S. laws extraterritorially, and the creation of a system of multilateral institutions that extend American influence globally. It is illuminating to consider each in turn. In order to protect members of the military stationed at U.S. bases overseas as well as military contractors and accompanying civilians, so-called Status of Force Agreements (SOFAs) provide them with extraterritorial immunity.  Collectively these agreements represent a major extension of American law abroad, covering U.S. bases all around the globe; in 2007, the U.S. military operated 823 facilities in thirty-nine countries.  The SOFAs constitute the closest modern analogue to the Unequal Treaties of old, as they provide a blanket exemption from local law— civil and criminal—to those under their protection. At the same time the United States has extended the extraterritorial reach of its domestic legislation unilaterally, without even formal consent provided by treaties. Claiming jurisdiction based on the extraterritorial effects of a person’s actions (rather than merely the territorial location of the It was without British in turn person acting), the United States has begun to regulate increasingly aggressively activities that take place outside the nation’s borders. The extraterritorial enforcement of American law has been especially notable in securities regulation, antitrust law, environmental law, anti-corruption legislation, and criminal law—foreign protests notwithstanding. Yet by far the most important means of extending the reach of American power has been the establishment of a set of multinational institutions whose charters collectively make up the constitution of the world as we know it today: the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the United Nations. Under American leadership, these institutions, together with the World Trade Organization (WTO)—the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—have sought to reconstruct the world essentially in the image of the United States: a global community of liberal-democratic states committed to free trade. (Importantly, the promotion of democracy globally does not mean the promotion of global democracy : the United States continues to insist on its exceptional status as an international leader.) These post-War institutions have been so effective in harmonizing legal regimes across the world that in many areas, especially ones pertaining to the economy, it would be largely redundant for the United States to assert its laws extraterritorially. Indeed, the earlier regime of U.S. extraterritoriality in China, together with the U.S.-brokered Open Door policy, was in important ways functionally similar to the WTO— with the critical difference that China’s participation in the WTO is consensual.  (China was neither consulted about nor did it consent to the Open Door, which was an understanding by others regarding China, not a policy by China.) Both regimes are premised on respect for China’s territorial integrity, with open and equal access to Chinese markets. As we have seen, as part of the Open Door the United States and other Treaty Powers insisted on extraterritorial jurisdiction until China modernized its legal system. “Modernization,” in turn, was shorthand for adopting a legal system based on the Euro-American model that would in turn make Western rights of extraterritoriality superfluous. In this regard, the WTO regime is even bolder, insisting on obtaining directly what the Open Door sought only indirectly. As part of the price of admission into the WTO in the first place, China had to agree to alter its legal institutions to conform to North Atlantic standards. As the ideology of rule-of-law has become a key component in the globalization of norms of free trade and liberal democracy, the World Bank and the WTO count among its most dedicated adherents today. Yet the rule-of-law discourse today remains one of contradictions, as before. When China entered the WTO in 2001, its accession protocol was of record length and filled with unprecedented ad hoc directives for the reorganization of China’s economic and legal systems. Collectively, these directives exceeded both quantitatively and qualitatively what had been demanded of any other member of the WTO, including other so-called transition economies. Ironically, in order to ensure that China comply with the requirements of rule-of-law, the WTO ignored its own constitutional rules—much as the United States suspended the operation of the U.S. Constitution in excluding Chinese immigration in the nineteenth century. While WTO rules are based on market economy assumptions, they do not legally require that member states structure their political economies in a particular way. China’s accession protocol, however, makes it an international legal obligation for the PRC to convert to a market economy— an extraordinary surrender of China’s freedom to structure its political economy. As Julia Ya Qin points out, the singling out of China creates different classes among the member-states of the organization and thus violates the WTO’s fundamental principle of nondiscrimination, while also contravening the organization’s overall commitment to a rule-based trading system.  No doubt the sheer size of China’s economy was one major cause of Western anxiety about its WTO membership, but equally importantly, now as before, China continues to be defined by not-having-law, and as before, this means that China must be made lawful. As a goal, lawfulness is surely defensible, but its defense still needs to be articulated. It is not simply selfevident, and it must take into account the historical and logical contradictions that it necessarily entails. What does it mean for the WTO and others to demand , possibly even impose, a regime of rule-of-law, even as they suspend their own rules in dealing with China? As an ideal, rule-of-law is far more attractive than forcing China to open its markets for opium, yet that fact alone does not relieve its advocates from the burden of a history where demands for law were often window dressings for other agendas.  Indeed, China continues to occupy an unstable position in teleological schemas of U.S.-led legal development. The Chinese economic and legal systems are today said to be in transition, much in the same way as the post- Socialist states of Eastern Europe have been described by the ever-growing academic subfield of “transitologists.”  As Chapter 1 suggested, the unstated implication of the seemingly innocuous notion of transition is that whatever distinctive forms China may have adopted for now, those forms are ultimately not authentic. Until it has fully “modernized,” China will remain in transit. Moreover, to the extent that “we” are not in transition, by implication “we have arrived” at the ultimate destination: a (highly idealized) U.S.-style market economy.  Even if the naïve evangelism of the Law and Development movement of the 1970s has receded, at least in its overt form, it has been replaced with the ostensibly more generous assumption that China and the rest of the world will, one day, simply “catch up” with the West ( 䍩 Ϟ ).  Benign as this sounds, this developmental model is only one recent example of neoHegelian evolutionary schemes in which “China always furnishes a beginning to be improved on,” in Haun Saussy’s phrase.  It should be evident that the relationship between the Chinese legal tradition and modernity cannot be simply a one-sided affair, with the West providing the blueprint for a modern legal order and China merely executing it.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Multilateral institutions serve as instruments of US neocolonial power to impose Western rule-of-law on the “lawless Orient” </h4><p><strong>Ruskola 13</strong> (Teemu, Professor of Law: Affiliated Faculty Member in Comparative Literature; East Asian Studies; History; and Women's, Gender and Sexuality Studies, Legal Orientalism : China, the United States, and Modern Law<u>, Harvard University Press, p. 203 – 207) | js</p><p></u>Having sketched the broad outlines of Chinese law’s twentieth-century trajectory, let us turn to that of U.S. law, especially in terms of Sino-U.S. relations. Given the unfortunate history of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, <u>how did American legal thought become an object of such admiration and emulation? World War II was followed</u> not only by the decolonization of formal empires but also <u>by the final disappearance of consular jurisdiction of the Oriental kind.</u> The United States surrendered its extraterritorial jurisdiction in China in 1943. (It held onto the last vestiges of its Barbary Treaties until 1956, when it finally gave up extraterritorial privileges in Tangier, Morocco.)  However, emerging from World War II as a global superpower, <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>could</u> easily <u>afford to see old forms of imperial power vanish. In their place it built a new</u> kind of <u>international order that recognized American hegemony without the considerable administrative and ideological costs associated with formal territorial imperialism.</u> As Kal Raustiala sums up the nature of America’s leadership in the postWar world, “It was predicated not on territorial control but on extraterritorial power and presence.”  From this perspective, the century of <u>U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction in China</u>, together with the Open Door policy of which it was an integral part, <u>is better understood</u> not simply as an institutional relic of early modern European– Ottoman relations that somehow found its way into the Far East and survived there into the twentieth century. Rather, it becomes visible <u>as a precursor of modern</u>— even postmodern—forms of <u>neocolonial power, predicated on legally protected freedom of trade without formal territorial control.</u> <u>precisely the desire to extract economic profit from other lands assuming administrative responsibility for them that underlay the notion of “free trade imperialism” </u>in the mid-Victorian era, which sought to realize the vision announced by Thomas Babington Macauley in British India: “To trade with civilised men is infinitely more profitable than to govern savages.”  For <u>in no way does trade’s freedom imply substantive equality among those trading</u>. As Bertrand Russell observed in 1922, at the conclusion of his Chinese lecture tour, “<u>It is quite possible to dominate China without infringing the</u> principle of the <u>Open Door. </u>This principle merely ensures that the domination everywhere shall be American, because America is the strongest Power financially and commercially.”  In his analysis of America’s post-War role, <u>Raustiala identifies three contemporary forms of extraterritorial power: the establishment of a global network of military bases</u> in other countries, the <u>selective application of U.S. laws extraterritorially, and the creation of</u> a system of <u>multilateral institutions that extend American influence globally.</u> It is illuminating to consider each in turn. In order to protect members of the military stationed at U.S. bases overseas as well as military contractors and accompanying civilians, so-called Status of Force Agreements (SOFAs) provide them with extraterritorial immunity.  Collectively these agreements represent a major extension of American law abroad, covering U.S. bases all around the globe; in 2007, the U.S. military operated 823 facilities in thirty-nine countries.  The SOFAs constitute the closest modern analogue to the Unequal Treaties of old, as they provide a blanket exemption from local law— civil and criminal—to those under their protection. At the same time <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>has extended the extraterritorial reach of its domestic legislation unilaterally, without even formal consent provided by treaties.</u> Claiming jurisdiction based on the extraterritorial effects of a person’s actions (rather than merely the territorial location of the It was without British in turn person acting), <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>has begun to regulate increasingly aggressively activities that take place outside the nation’s borders</u>. The extraterritorial enforcement of American law has been <u>especially</u> notable <u>in securities regulation, antitrust law, environmental law, anti-corruption legislation, and criminal law</u>—foreign protests notwithstanding. Yet by far <u>the most important means of extending the reach of American power has been the establishment of a set of multinational institutions </u>whose charters collectively make up the constitution of the world as we know it today:<u> the World Bank, the I</u>nternational <u>M</u>onetary<u> F</u>und<u>, the G</u>eneral<u> A</u>greement on<u> T</u>ariffs and<u> T</u>rade<u>, </u>the<u> N</u>orth <u>A</u>tlantic <u>T</u>reaty<u> O</u>rganization<u>, and the U</u>nited<u> N</u>ations<u>. Under American leadership, these institutions</u>, together <u>with</u> <u>the</u> World Trade Organization (<u>WTO</u>)—the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—have <u>sought to reconstruct the world essentially in the image of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates: <u>a global community of liberal-democratic states committed to free trade.</u> (Importantly,<u> the promotion of democracy globally does not mean the promotion of global democracy : the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates<u> continues to insist on its exceptional status as an international leader.</u>) These post-War institutions have been so effective in harmonizing legal regimes across the world that in many areas, especially ones pertaining to the economy, it would be largely redundant for the United States to assert its laws extraterritorially. Indeed, <u>the earlier regime of U.S. extraterritoriality</u> <u>in China</u>, together <u>with the U.S.-brokered Open Door policy</u>, <u>was</u> in important ways <u>functionally similar to the WTO</u>— with the critical difference that China’s participation in the WTO is consensual.  (China was neither consulted about nor did it consent to the Open Door, which was an understanding by others regarding China, not a policy by China.) Both regimes are premised on respect for China’s territorial integrity, with open and equal access to Chinese markets. As we have seen, <u>as part of the Open Door the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates and other Treaty Powers <u>insisted on extraterritorial jurisdiction until China modernized its legal system. “Modernization,</u>” in turn<u>, was shorthand for adopting a legal system based on the Euro-American model that would in turn make Western rights of extraterritoriality superfluous.</u> In this regard, the WTO regime is even bolder, insisting on obtaining directly what the Open Door sought only indirectly. <u>As part of the price of admission into the WTO</u> in the first place, <u>China had to </u>agree to <u>alter its legal institutions to conform to North Atlantic standards</u>. As the ideology of <u>rule-of-law has become a key component in the globalization of norms of free trade and liberal democracy</u>, the World Bank and the WTO count among its most dedicated adherents today. Yet <u>the rule-of-law discourse today remains one of contradictions, as before. When China entered</u> <u>the WTO </u>in 2001<u>, its accession protocol was of record length and filled with unprecedented ad hoc directives for the reorganization of China’s economic and legal systems. </u>Collectively, <u>these directives exceeded both quantitatively and qualitatively what had been demanded of any other member of the WTO, including other </u>so-called<u> transition economies. </u>Ironically<u>, in order to ensure that China comply with the requirements of rule-of-law, the WTO ignored its own constitutional rules—much as the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>suspended the</u> <u>operation of the U.S. Constitution in excluding Chinese immigration </u>in the nineteenth century. While WTO rules are based on market economy assumptions, they do not legally require that member states structure their political economies in a particular way. China’s accession protocol, however, makes it an international legal obligation for the PRC to convert to a market economy— an extraordinary surrender of China’s freedom to structure its political economy. As Julia Ya Qin points out, the<u> singling out of China creates different classes among the member-states</u> of the organization <u>and</u> thus <u>violates the WTO’s fundamental principle of nondiscrimination</u>, <u>while</u> also <u>contravening the organization’s overall commitment to a rule-based trading system. </u> No doubt<u> the sheer size of China’s economy was one major cause of Western anxiety about its WTO membership</u>, <u>but equally importantly</u>, now as before, <u>China continues to be defined by not-having-law</u>, <u>and</u> as before, this means that China <u>must be made lawful.</u> As a goal, lawfulness is surely defensible, but its defense still needs to be articulated. It is not simply selfevident, and it must take into account the historical and logical contradictions that it necessarily entails. <u>What does it mean for the WTO and others to demand , possibly even impose, a regime of rule-of-law, even as they suspend their own rules in dealing with China?</u> As an ideal, rule-of-law is far more attractive than forcing China to open its markets for opium, yet that fact alone does not relieve its advocates from the burden of a history where demands for law were often window dressings for other agendas.  Indeed, <u>China continues to occupy an unstable position in teleological schemas of U.S.-led legal development.</u> The <u>Chinese economic and legal systems are today said to be in transition</u>, much in the same way as the post- Socialist states of Eastern Europe have been described by the ever-growing academic subfield of “transitologists.”  As Chapter 1 suggested, <u>the unstated implication </u>of the seemingly innocuous notion of transition <u>is that whatever distinctive forms China may have adopted for now</u>, those forms <u>are ultimately not authentic</u>. Until it has fully “modernized,” China will remain in transit. Moreover, to the extent that “<u>we” are not in transition</u>, by implication <u>“we have arrived” at the ultimate destination: a (highly idealized) U.S.-style market economy. </u> Even if the naïve evangelism of the Law and Development movement of the 1970s has receded, at least in its overt form, it has been replaced with the ostensibly more generous assumption that China and the rest of the world will, one day, simply “catch up” with the West ( 䍩 Ϟ ).  Benign as this sounds, this developmental model is only one recent example of neoHegelian evolutionary schemes in which “China always furnishes a beginning to be improved on,” in Haun Saussy’s phrase.  It should be evident that <u>the relationship between the Chinese legal tradition and modernity cannot be simply a one-sided affair, with the West providing the blueprint for a modern legal order and China merely executing it.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Muro and Vidal 17— Dr Diego Muro is Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) in International Relations at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews. He previously held positions at King’s College London (2003-2009) and the Pompeu Fabra University (2009-2016). He has also been Max Weber postdoctoral fellow at the European University Institute (2008-09) and Senior Fellow at the University of Oxford (2011-12). Guillem Vidal is a postdoctoral researcher at the chair for comparative politics at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, and at the Center for Civil Society Research at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. He obtained his Ph.D. in the Department of Social and Political Sciences at the European University Institute, where he was involved in the ERC-POLCON project. With a background in economics and international relations, he has a multidisciplinary approach to his areas of interest, which span across the fields of comparative politics, politi cal economy and political sociology. “Is Unemployment the Worst Enemy of Democracy? Political Mistrust and the Economic Crisis in Southern Europe”; pg. 16-20; https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/59773/Muro_Vidal_Political_Mistrust_post-print_version.pdf?sequence=1 As+ fulltext: Our second hypothesis (H2) is that political mistrust may be caused by changes in macroeconomic conditions. As we observe that changes of political attitudes coincide with the worsening of the global and European crisis, and that institutional performance appears not to be strongly correlated with political mistrust, we now turn to macroeconomic variables, in particular unemployment, to see whether there is any causal relationship. This second hypothesis is in line with recent empirical research (Roth, Nowak-Lehmann & Otter 2013; Morlino and Quaranta 2014), where unemployment levels appear to be closely related to the changes in the trust towards the main political institutions since 2008 in the EU. The underlying theory behind this hypothesis holds close parallelisms with studies of ‘economic voting’. According to this punishment-reward framework, growing levels of political mistrust would be the result of citizens’ unmet expectations with the perceived macroeconomic performance. In a nutshell, higher unemployment levels would generate higher rates of political mistrust. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the changes in trust towards the parliament, the unemployment levels for each country and the institutional performance rank, so as to provide an overall picture of each of these trends. Moreover, figure 5 illustrates those same variables conglomerated for each of the two 17 clusters. As opposed to the previous results, we find that unemployment behaves in a very similar manner to the changes in trust towards institutions, in particular from 2008 onwards. This is of course the case for the ‘debtor countries’, as little variation can be observed from the Northern European cluster. [Insert Figures 3, 4, and 5 about here] Regression analysis further supports the robustness of these results, as illustrated in Table 1. In order to account for the fixed effects of changes in unemployment on political mistrust we have controlled for other macroeconomic variables as well as institutional performance. Both clusters as well as the fixed effects from running panel data regressions indicate a strong positive impact of unemployment on mistrust towards parliament, that is, on political mistrust. Although other macroeconomic indicators such as inflation or GDP per capita also prove significant in the main regression, unemployment clearly remains the strongest indicator for both clusters. [Insert Table 1 about here] Thus our analysis produces results that corroborate existing research on the empirical correlation between unemployment and trust towards parliament. Variables that measure economic performance are significantly more relevant in describing changes towards political attitudes than perceptions of institutional performance. While it would be an oversimplification to assert that economic variables can explain mistrust without taking into account other perfectly compatible institutional performance explanations such as corruption, we observe that during the period studied unemployment is a far better predictor of mistrust. The fact that other economic indicators appear to have a smaller effect on political mistrust than unemployment suggests that citizens’ trust towards institutions is shaped on the basis of the information they receive from the national economic situation instead of ‘pocketbook evaluations’, that is, egotropic evaluations on personal finances. Confirming these results, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaiter (2007, p. 519) point out that ‘[i]n the overwhelming majority of studies, researchers have found that instead of emphasizing on personal finances, votes are much more likely to be considering the national economic situation when casting their vote’. This type of sociotropic evaluation could also serve as a framework to understand the formation of institutional trust beyond the punishment of the incumbent, especially under dire economic circumstances such as economic depressions. Although some studies have concluded that the weight of unemployment, as opposed to other macroeconomic variables, is relatively ‘modest’ (Clarke et al. 1992), our results side with scholarly literature that has found that ‘there is a major role for macroeconomic conditions in shaping confidence in democratic institutions [...] through the effects of unemployment’ (McAllister 1999, p. 189). This further suggests that unemployment becomes a key determinant of trust during economic depression or when its levels reach a certain point. To sum up, we find that sociotropic evaluations of the national economy (unemployment in particular) become the main explanatory variable of political mistrust in times of economic crisis for Southern European cases. 4. Conclusion This paper has examined the sources of political mistrust in Western Europe before and after the Great Recession. Prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, continental levels of mistrust were remarkably stable. After 2008, it was possible to trace an important variation between Southern and Northern clusters of EU member states. The combined effect of the Great Recession and the Eurozone’s debt crisis was especially hard-felt in the Southern periphery of the EU, which struggled with austerity measures and structural reforms in an attempt to regain competitiveness and market confidence from 2009 onwards. Europe’s internal disparity between creditor and debtor countries was due to the fact that the ‘economic crisis’ was not one and the same for everyone. Besides being a multi-level crisis of global, regional and national dimensions, the crisis was multifaceted and its impact on each country’s sovereign debt, banking system and economic growth was also different. Needless to say, country-level causes of the crisis – from housing bubbles to structural deficits – also accounted for the inner disparity. In order to explain variation in political mistrust, this paper has sided with the scholarly view that privileges short-term explanations of mistrust, as opposed to arguments that explain trust as a function of longstanding processes of political socialization. The paper rejected the so-called cultural model early on because one of the assumptions of this approach is that political attitudes change in the longterm and, as result, this approach could not account for short-term variations caused by the economic depression. Instead, the paper focused on two variants of the performance model. More specifically, the paper tested two hypotheses that connected political mistrust with either institutional performance (H1) or macroeconomic performance (H2). Another important research choice was to identify the Eurozone as a conglomerate of countries in which we could examine the role of an external shock (e.g., the Great Recession) in creating distinct clusters of countries (debtors vs. creditors) and producing different levels of political mistrust. The initial expectation of the paper was that different levels of trust (dependent variable) could be affected by the efficiency and responsiveness of political institutions to the economic crisis. We originally anticipated that effective and responsive political institutions that provided the general public with policies and goods they desired would have a positive impact on citizens’ evaluation of these institutions. Similarly, we expected governments that neglected the electorate’s preferences while insisting on fiscal austerity and structural reforms to alienate the public and implement self-defeating policies. This initial argument was both intuitive and plausible but our research findings suggested that, contrary to what political scientists may expect of an efficient principal-agent relationship, institutional performance is a less relevant independent variable than macroeconomic performance in predicting political mistrust. In the analysis we also discussed clarity of responsibility, that is, the extent to which citizens’ are able to identify the responsible agents of the economic situation and thus trust or mistrust institutions accordingly, as an intervening variable that could explain such unexpected results. The paper has shown that unemployment may be considered the worst enemy of democracy. In times of want individual citizens get first-hand experience of the economic crisis in the form of declining disposable income, lower social mobility, rising inequality and, above all, joblessness. However, it appears to be the case that individuals’ negative perception of the national economy (sociotropic evaluations) greatly affects political opinions and eventually produces a critical assessment of political institutions as ultimately responsible for the dire economic situation. The unemployment rate accurately predicts the increase of mistrust but it is unclear that a causal mechanism connects employment growth and decline of mistrust.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Unemployment is uniquely dangerous in a democratic system— empirics prove</h4><p><u><strong>Muro and Vidal 17</u></strong>— Dr Diego Muro is Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) in International Relations at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews. He previously held positions at King’s College London (2003-2009) and the Pompeu Fabra University (2009-2016). He has also been Max Weber postdoctoral fellow at the European University Institute (2008-09) and Senior Fellow at the University of Oxford (2011-12). Guillem Vidal is a postdoctoral researcher at the chair for comparative politics at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, and at the Center for Civil Society Research at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. He obtained his Ph.D. in the Department of Social and Political Sciences at the European University Institute, where he was involved in the ERC-POLCON project. With a background in economics and international relations, he has a multidisciplinary approach to his areas of interest, which span across the fields of comparative politics, politi cal economy and political sociology. “Is Unemployment the Worst Enemy of Democracy? Political Mistrust and the Economic Crisis in Southern Europe”; pg. 16-20; https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/59773/Muro_Vidal_Political_Mistrust_post-print_version.pdf?sequence=1 As+</p><p>Our second hypothesis (H2) is that political mistrust may be caused by changes in macroeconomic conditions. As we observe that changes of political attitudes coincide with the worsening of the global and European crisis, and that institutional performance appears not to be strongly correlated with political mistrust, we now turn to macroeconomic variables, in particular <u><strong>unemployment</u></strong>, to see whether there <u><strong>is a</u></strong>ny <u><strong>causal relationship</u></strong>. This second hypothesis is in line with recent empirical research (Roth, Nowak-Lehmann & Otter 2013; Morlino and Quaranta 2014), where <u><strong><mark>unemployment </mark>levels <mark>appear to be </mark>closely <mark>related to the changes in the trust towards </mark>the main <mark>political institutions</u></strong></mark> since 2008 in the EU. The underlying theory behind this hypothesis holds close parallelisms with studies of ‘economic voting’. According to this punishment-reward framework, growing levels of political mistrust would be the result of citizens’ unmet expectations with the perceived macroeconomic performance. In a nutshell, <u><strong><mark>higher unemployment levels </mark>would <mark>generate</mark> higher rates of <mark>political mistrust</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the changes in trust towards the parliament, <u><strong>the unemployment levels for each country and the institutional performance rank</u></strong>, so as to provide an overall picture of each of these trends. Moreover, figure 5 illustrates those same variables conglomerated for each of the two 17 clusters. As opposed to the previous results, we find that unemployment behaves in a very similar manner to the changes in trust towards institutions, in particular from 2008 onwards. This is of course the case for the ‘debtor countries’, as little variation can be observed from the Northern European cluster.</p><p>[Insert Figures 3, 4, and 5 about here]</p><p><u><strong>Regression analysis further supports the robustness of these results</u></strong>, as illustrated in Table 1. In order to account for the fixed effects of <u><strong>changes in unemployment on political mistrust</u></strong> we have controlled for other macroeconomic variables <u><strong><mark>as well as institutional performance</u></strong></mark>. Both clusters as well as the <u><strong>fixed effects from running panel data regressions <mark>indicate a strong</mark> positive <mark>impact of unemployment on mistrust</mark> </u></strong>towards<u><strong> </u></strong>parliament, that is, on political mistrust. Although other macroeconomic indicators such as inflation or GDP per capita also prove significant in the main regression, unemployment clearly remains the strongest indicator for both clusters. </p><p> [Insert Table 1 about here]</p><p><u><strong>Thus our <mark>analysis</mark> produces results that <mark>corroborate existing research on the empirical correlation between unemployment and trust</u></strong></mark> towards parliament. Variables that measure economic performance are significantly more relevant in describing changes towards political attitudes than perceptions of institutional performance. While it would be an oversimplification to assert that economic variables can explain mistrust without taking into account other perfectly compatible institutional performance explanations such as corruption, we observe that during the period <u><strong>studied unemployment is a far better predictor of mistrust</u></strong>.</p><p>The fact that other economic indicators appear to have a smaller effect on political mistrust than unemployment suggests that citizens’ trust towards institutions is shaped on the basis of the information they receive from the national economic situation instead of ‘pocketbook evaluations’, that is, egotropic evaluations on personal finances. Confirming these results, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaiter (2007, p. 519) point out that ‘[i]n <u><strong>the <mark>overwhelming majority of studies,</mark> researchers <mark>have found that</mark> instead of emphasizing on personal finances</u></strong>, votes are much more likely to be considering the national economic situation when casting their vote’. This type of sociotropic evaluation could also serve as a framework to understand the formation of institutional trust beyond the punishment of the incumbent, especially under dire economic circumstances such as economic depressions.</p><p>Although some studies have concluded that the weight of unemployment, as opposed to other macroeconomic variables, is relatively ‘modest’ (Clarke et al. 1992), our results side with scholarly literature that has found that ‘<u><strong><mark>there is a major role for macroeconomic conditions in shaping confidence in democratic institutions</u></strong></mark> [...] through the effects of unemployment’ (McAllister 1999, p. 189). <u><strong>This <mark>further suggests </mark>that <mark>unemployment becomes a key determinant</mark> of trust</u></strong> during economic depression or when its levels reach a certain point. To sum up, we find that sociotropic evaluations of the national economy (unemployment in particular) become the main explanatory variable of political mistrust in times of economic crisis for Southern European cases. </p><p>4. Conclusion</p><p>This paper has examined the sources of political mistrust in Western Europe before and after the Great Recession. <u><strong>Prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, continental levels of mistrust were remarkably stable. </u></strong>After 2008, it was possible to trace an important variation between Southern and Northern clusters of EU member states. The combined effect of the Great Recession and the Eurozone’s debt crisis was especially hard-felt in the Southern periphery of the EU, which struggled with austerity measures and structural reforms in an attempt to regain competitiveness and market confidence from 2009 onwards. Europe’s internal disparity between creditor and debtor countries was due to the fact that the ‘economic crisis’ was not one and the same for everyone. Besides being a multi-level crisis of global, regional and national dimensions, the crisis was multifaceted and its impact on each country’s sovereign debt, banking system and economic growth was also different. Needless to say, country-level causes of the crisis – from housing bubbles to structural deficits – also accounted for the inner disparity. </p><p><u><strong>In order to explain variation in political mistrust, this paper has sided with the scholarly view that privileges short-term explanations of mistrust</u></strong>, as opposed to arguments that explain trust as a function of longstanding processes of political socialization. The paper rejected the so-called cultural model early on because one of the assumptions of this approach is that <u><strong>political attitudes change in the longterm </u></strong>and, as result, this approach could not account for short-term variations caused by the economic depression. Instead, the paper focused on two variants of the performance model. More specifically, the paper tested two hypotheses that connected political mistrust with either institutional performance (H1) or macroeconomic performance (H2). Another important research choice was to identify the Eurozone as a conglomerate of countries in which we could examine the role of an external shock (e.g., the Great Recession) in creating distinct clusters of countries (debtors vs. creditors) and producing different levels of political mistrust.</p><p>The initial expectation of the paper was that different levels of trust (dependent variable) could be affected by the efficiency and responsiveness of political institutions to the economic crisis. We originally anticipated that effective and responsive political institutions that provided the general public with policies and goods they desired would have a positive impact on citizens’ evaluation of these institutions. Similarly, we expected governments that neglected the electorate’s preferences while insisting on fiscal austerity and structural reforms to alienate the public and implement self-defeating policies. <u><strong>This initial argument was both intuitive and plausible but our research findings suggested that, contrary to what political scientists may expect of an efficient principal-agent relationship, institutional performance is a less relevant independent variable than macroeconomic performance in predicting political mistrust</u></strong>. In the analysis we also discussed clarity of responsibility, that is, the extent to which citizens’ are able to identify the responsible agents of the economic situation and thus trust or mistrust institutions accordingly, as an intervening variable that could explain such unexpected results.</p><p>The paper has shown <u><strong><mark>that unemployment may be considered the worst enemy of democracy</u></strong></mark>. In times of want <u><strong><mark>individual citizens get first-hand experience of the economic crisis</mark> in the form of declining disposable income, lower social mobility, rising inequality and, above all, joblessness</u></strong>. However, it appears to be the case <u><strong>that <mark>individuals’ negative perception of the nation</mark>al economy (sociotropic evaluations) <mark>greatly affects political opinions and eventually produces a critical assessment of political institutions</mark> as ultimately responsible for the dire economic situation</u></strong>. The unemployment rate accurately predicts the increase of mistrust but it is unclear that a causal mechanism connects employment growth and decline of mistrust.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Galina and Green, Lecturer and professor at Department of Economic at McGill School of Environment, 9(Galiana, Isabel, and Christopher Green. "An Analysis of a Technology-led Climate Policy as a Response to Climate Change." (2009): n. pag. COPENHAGEN CONSENSUS ON CLIMATE. Web. 12 July 2017. <https://thebreakthrough.org/blog/AP_Technology_Galiana_Green_v.6.0.pdf>. SL) fulltext: Technological readiness implies deployable (on-the-shelf) technologies that are scalable and as cost competitive as possible. Assessments of “technological readiness” require comparing the magnitude of the technology challenge (section I) with the capabilities of current carbon emission-free (or “carbon neutral”) energy technologies. On this basis we are nowhere near ready to reduce global emissions substantially by mid century, much less achieve climate stabilization by the end of the century. Let us look at several energy technologies/sources and their potential contributions by 2050. (An excellent complement to the technology readiness assessment below is Barrett, 2009) 1. Hydroelectricity. Sites for hydroelectric power are limited. A doubling of the present capacity is probably the best we can do. Doubling capacity would add about 340 GWe and eliminate the need for construction of about seven hundred 500 MWe coal fired plants with total emissions of 2.4 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide (or about .65 GtC). The addition of time-of-day pricing, thereby raising the capacity factor of hydro from around 50% to 75%, might eliminate another .65 GtC 2. Nuclear electric. Nuclear energy has been and will likely be an important contributor to non-carbon emitting electric power generation. But in its current technological form there are resource and storage limits to its scalability (MIT, 2003). There are currently 439 nuclear reactors in the world producing an estimated 390 GWe. Many existing plants are approaching the end of their useful life. Assuming all the existing reactors are replaced when they wear out, it would require adding 15 reactors every year from 2010 to 2050 to raise nuclear generating capacity to 1TW. The additional 600 GWe of nuclear capacity would replace coal-fired electric capacity emitting 1.1 GtC a year. (MIT, 2003) 3. Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). Currently a lot of weight (hope) is being placed on the CCS option. There is little choice given the huge amount of coal-fired electric capacity now churning about a substantial fraction of global emissions (MIT, 2007). Moreover, the slow ramp up of nuclear capacity and huge hurdles to large scale, baseload energy from solar and wind (see below) suggest continued heavy reliance on coal to meet the rapid growth in electricity demand in many parts of the world, especially the developing world and parts of the developed world too. 4. But ramping up CCS will be slow (Edmonds et al, 2007) for several reasons: (a) CCS has not yet been applied to a coal-fired electricity generating plant; (b) the only examples of operational CCS involve relatively small scale operations, the best known being the Sleipner field project that stores about 1 Mt of CO2 (or 270,000 tonnes of carbon) each year from Norway’s North Sea natural gas operations: (c) it would take the equivalent of 3500 Sleipner fields (Pacala and Socolow, 2004) to store 1 GtC each year, and that means a large amount of geological investigation to assure the existence, safety and security of the required geologic sites; (d) pipelines would have to be built from the source of CO2 to the designated geologic sequestration sites; (e) capture technologies have not yet been perfected, and those that are operational at a test site level would not only increase plant capital costs, but would exact an energy penalty of 20 to 40%, depending on technology. If by 2050, CCS can be ramped up to 1 GtC (~3.7 GtCO2 ), the net reduction in COPENHAGEN CONSENSUS ON CLIMATE 13 energy-related emissions (emissions from electricity generation net of the added energy needed to capture emissions) would be about 0.7 GtC. 5. Biomass. Although biomass has been counted on as major carbon neutral source, recent experience has greatly lowered expectations - at least from “first generation” biofuels such as corn ethanol and soybean based biodiesel. There are several reasons why biomass, at least in its current forms, is unlikely to produce in the future the large amounts of (net) carbon neutral energy expected just a few years ago. These reasons include: (a) the effect on food stocks and prices caused by devoting large amounts of cropable land to energy crops (Pimentel, 2009; Wise et al, 2009); (b) the enormous amounts of water that large scale biomass production will require (Bernedes, 2002; Gerbens-Leenes, et al, 2009); (c) evidence that on a life cycle basis the net energy from biofuels output is not much greater - and in some cases may be less - than the energy inputs into producing the biofuels (Farrell, et al, 2006; Pimentel and Patzek, 2005); (d) indications that converting land from pasture to energy crops may release carbon from the soils in amounts that substantially outweigh any prospective reductions in emissions that conversion from fossil to biofuels is expected to produce (Searchinger et al, 2008, Fargione, et al, 2008). 6. The realization that “first generation” biofuels may do little or nothing to reduce emissions (or energy use) has led in two directions: (i) to focus on biomass as a solid energy source for generation of electricity rather than as a liquid biofuel for use in vehicles; (ii) R&D into the possibility of “second generation” biofuels from cellulosic by-products of primary feedstocks, to switchgrass, to algae. Each has potentially important limitations. In the case of solid biomass, finding sufficient forest that can be dedicated to electricity production may be limited to a few places in the world. In the case of “second generation” biofuels, these will require technological breakthroughs and even then their scalability is in doubt. We will be hard put to produce enough net energy from biomass by 2050 to reduce emissions by an estimated 0.3 GtC. 7. Solar and wind. Currently, these two potentially substantial sources of energy supply only a tiny fraction (less than 1 %) of the world’s energy. The reasons go far beyond their higher costs (Love, 2003; Love et al, 2003; Denholm and Margolis, 2007a, b)). Beyond reducing production costs, three big hurdles need to be overcome (in ascending order of difficulty and importance). (1) Direct current lines need to be constructed to carry solar and wind energy from the areas of highest insolation and wind speeds to the populous areas where most consumers are located - often a 1000 km or more distant. (2) More flexible, “smarter” grids will be needed to cope with the variability inherent in wind and solar power. (3) Because of their intermittency and variability, even with “smart grids”, solar and wind power are unlikely to be able to supply much more than 10-15% of gridbased electricity (net of energy used in “spinning reserve” back-up) without the development of utility-scale storage. To overcome scalability barriers, scientific and technological breakthroughs will be needed (Lewis, 2007a). Assuming that in the next couple of decades sufficient investment is put into the electric grid infrastructure and into researching and developing large scale storage for solar and wind-powered electricity generation, it is possible/conceivable that by 2050 these two renewable sources could together supply 500-700 GWe, and displace up to 1.5GtC. 14 COPENHAGEN CONSENSUS ON CLIMATE 8. Geothermal. Geothermal power is an excellent source of power in those few areas (such as Iceland) where hot springs are abundant. Not surprisingly, it is currently a very limited source of power. With technological changes it is possible to increase the availability of geothermal for generation of electricity. Moreover, if new buildings are fitted with proper piping at time of construction, geothermal could eventually become a widespread means of space-conditioning, moderating, to a degree, the growth of demand for electricity. By 2050, it may be conceivable that geothermal could displace .5 to 1 GtC 9. Ocean Wave Energy. There is growing interest in harvesting electric power from ocean waves. The amount of energy in the oceans’ waves is large, but it is very dilute, and only a fraction is economically viable - assuming many technological problems can be overcome. One estimate of the viable resource in the US is equal to about 6% of current electricity demand. Because wave energy is concentrated at low frequencies, efficient conversion and transmission to a grid is difficult (Scruggs and Jacobs, 2009). The marine environment creates other problems including seawater corrosion, marine organism fouling, and large loads imposed by big storms on wave energy converters. Ocean wave energy might displace 0.1 GtC. Taken altogether, current energy technologies, if hugely scaled up, might get us halfway toward a stabilization path by 2050 - but only a fraction of the way toward achieving stabilization by 2100. One way to see why this so is to refer back to Table 1 and note there the large amount of carbon-free energy built into the B2 emission scenario. That the B2 scenario is not atypical is evident from Figure 2. Unfortunately, perceptions differ. One reason is that many analysts assume rates of energy efficiency improvement and energy intensity decline much greater than can be sustained globally over an extended period of time. As Hoffert et al (1998) demonstrate, there is a trade-off between the amount of carbon-free energy required to stabilize climate and the rate of energy intensity decline. Figure 3, based on Hoffert et al (1998), indicates the relationship. (The trade-off in Figure 3 is based on an assumed global rate of GDP growth of a little over 2.4% (1990-2100) and atmospheric stabilization of CO2 at 550 ppm.)<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Tech supply is limited now—innovation is needed to fight climate change</h4><p><u><strong>Galina and Green, Lecturer and professor at Department of Economic at McGill School of Environment, 9</u></strong>(Galiana, Isabel, and Christopher Green. "An Analysis of a Technology-led Climate Policy as a Response to Climate Change." (2009): n. pag. COPENHAGEN CONSENSUS ON CLIMATE. Web. 12 July 2017. <https://thebreakthrough.org/blog/AP_Technology_Galiana_Green_v.6.0.pdf>. SL)</p><p><u><strong>Technological readiness implies deployable (on-the-shelf) technologies that are scalable and as cost competitive as possible. Assessments of “technological readiness” require comparing the magnitude of the technology challenge (section I) with the capabilities of current carbon emission-free (or “carbon neutral”) energy technologies. On this basis <mark>we are nowhere near ready to reduce global emissions substantially by mid centur</mark>y, much less achieve climate stabilization by the end of the century. </u></strong>Let us <u><strong>look at several energy technologies/sources and their potential contributions by 2050</u></strong>. (An excellent complement to the technology readiness assessment below is Barrett, 2009) 1<u><strong>. <mark>Hydroelectricity</u></strong>.</mark> Sites for hydroelectric <u><strong><mark>power are limited</mark>.</u></strong> A doubling of the present capacity is probably the best we can do. <u><strong>Doubling capacity would add about 340 GWe</u></strong> and eliminate the need for construction of about seven hundred 500 MWe coal fired plants with total emissions of 2.4 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide (or about .65 GtC). The addition of time-of-day pricing, thereby raising the capacity factor of hydro from around 50% to 75%, might eliminate another .65 GtC 2. Nuclear electric<u><strong>. <mark>Nuclear energy</u></strong></mark> has been and <u><strong><mark>will l</mark>ikely <mark>be</mark> an <mark>important</mark> contributor <mark>to non-carbon </mark>emitting electric <mark>power generation. But</mark> in its <mark>current</mark> technological form there are <mark>resource and storage limits</mark> to its scalability</u></strong> (MIT, 2003). <u><strong>There are currently 439 nuclear reactors in the world producing an estimated 390 GWe. Many existing plants are approaching the end of their useful life. Assuming all the existing reactors are replaced when they wear out, it would require adding 15 reactors every year from 2010 to 2050 to raise nuclear generating capacity to 1TW</u></strong>. The additional 600 GWe of nuclear capacity would replace coal-fired electric capacity emitting 1.1 GtC a year. (MIT, 2003) 3. Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). <u><strong>Currently <mark>a lot of weight (hope) is</mark> being placed <mark>on the CCS</mark> option. There is little choice given the huge amount of coal-fired electric capacity now churning about a substantial fraction of global emissions</u></strong> (MIT, 2007). <u><strong>Moreover, the slow ramp up of nuclear capacity and huge hurdles to large scale, baseload energy from solar and wind</u></strong> (see below<u><strong>) suggest continued heavy reliance on coal to meet the rapid growth in electricity demand in many parts of the world, especially the developing world and parts of the developed world too</u></strong>. 4. <u><strong>But <mark>ramping up CCS will be slow</u></strong></mark> (Edmonds et al, 2007) for several reasons: (a) <u><strong>CCS has not yet been applied to a coal-fired electricity generating plant; (b) the only examples of operational CCS involve relatively small scale operations</u></strong>, the best known being the Sleipner field project that stores about 1 Mt of CO2 (or 270,000 tonnes of carbon) each year from Norway’s North Sea natural gas operations: (c) it would take the equivalent of 3500 Sleipner fields (Pacala and Socolow, 2004) to store 1 GtC each year, and that means a large amount of geological investigation to assure the existence, safety and security of the required geologic sites; (d) pipelines would have to be built from the source of CO2 to the designated geologic sequestration sites; (e) <u><strong><mark>capture technologies have not yet been perfected</mark>, and those that are operational at a test site level would not only increase plant capital costs, but would exact an energy penalty of 20 to 40%, depending on technology. <mark>If by 2050, CCS can be ramped</mark> up to 1 GtC</u></strong> (~3.7 GtCO2 ), <u><strong><mark>the net reduction in</u></strong></mark> COPENHAGEN CONSENSUS ON CLIMATE 13 <u><strong><mark>energy-related emissions</mark> (</u></strong>emissions from electricity generation net of the added energy needed to capture emissions) <u><strong><mark>would be</mark> about <mark>0.7 GtC</mark>.</u></strong> 5. Biomass. Although <u><strong>biomass has been counted on as major carbon neutral source, recent experience has greatly lowered expectations - at least from “first generation” biofuels such as corn ethanol and soybean based biodiesel. There are several reasons why biomass, at least in its current forms, is unlikely to produce in the future the large amounts of (net) carbon neutral energy expected just a few years ago</u></strong>. These reasons include: (a) <u><strong>the effect on food stocks and prices caused by devoting large amounts of cropable land to energy crops</u></strong> (Pimentel, 2009; Wise et al, 2009); (b) <u><strong>the enormous amounts of water that large scale biomass production will require</u></strong> (Bernedes, 2002; Gerbens-Leenes, et al, 2009); (c) <u><strong>evidence that on a life cycle basis the net energy from biofuels output is not much greater - and in some cases may be less - than the energy inputs into producing the biofuel</u></strong>s (Farrell, et al, 2006; Pimentel and Patzek, 2005); (d) indications that converting land from pasture to energy crops may release carbon from the soils in amounts that substantially outweigh any prospective reductions in emissions that conversion from fossil to biofuels is expected to produce (Searchinger et al, 2008, Fargione, et al, 2008). 6. The realization that “first generation” biofuels may do little or nothing to reduce emissions (or energy use) has led in two directions: (i) to focus on biomass as a solid energy source for generation of electricity rather than as a liquid biofuel for use in vehicles; (ii) R&D into the possibility of “second generation” biofuels from cellulosic by-products of primary feedstocks, to switchgrass, to algae. Each has potentially important limitations. In the case of solid biomass, finding sufficient forest that can be dedicated to electricity production may be limited to a few places in the world. In the case of “second generation” biofuels, these will require technological breakthroughs and even then their scalability is in doubt. We will be hard put to produce enough net energy from biomass by 2050 to reduce emissions by an estimated 0.3 GtC. 7. <u><strong><mark>Solar and wind</mark>.</u></strong> Currently, these two potentially substantial <u><strong>sources of energy <mark>supply only a tiny fraction</u></strong></mark> (less than 1 %) <u><strong>of the world’s energy. The reasons go far beyond their higher costs </u></strong>(Love, 2003; Love et al, 2003; Denholm and Margolis, 2007a, b)). <u><strong>Beyond reducing production costs</u></strong>, three big hurdles need to be overcome (in ascending order of difficulty and importance). (1) Direct current lines need to be constructed to carry solar and wind energy from the areas of highest insolation and wind speeds to the populous areas where most consumers are located - often a 1000 km or more distant. (2) <u><strong><mark>More flexible, “smarter” grids will be needed to cope with the variability inherent in wind and solar power</mark>.</u></strong> (3) Because of their intermittency and variability, even with “smart grids”, solar and wind power are unlikely to be able to supply much more than 10-15% of gridbased electricity (net of energy used in “spinning reserve” back-up) without the development of utility-scale storage. <u><strong><mark>To overcome</mark> scalability <mark>barriers, scientific and technological breakthroughs will be needed</u></strong></mark> (Lewis, 2007a). <u><strong>Assuming that in the next couple of decades sufficient investment is put into the electric grid infrastructure and into researching and developing large scale storage for solar and wind-powered electricity generation, <mark>it is possible</mark>/conceivable that <mark>by 2050 </mark>these two renewable sources could together supply 500-700 GWe, and displace up to 1.5GtC</u></strong>. 14 COPENHAGEN CONSENSUS ON CLIMATE 8. Geothermal. <u><strong><mark>Geothermal power</mark> is an excellent source of power in those few areas (such as Iceland) where hot springs are abundant. Not surprisingly, it <mark>is currently a very limited source of power. With technological changes it is possible to increase</mark> the availability of <mark>geothermal for generation</mark> of electricity</u></strong>. Moreover, if new buildings are fitted with proper piping at time of construction, geothermal could eventually become a widespread means of space-conditioning, moderating, to a degree, the growth of demand for electricity. <u><strong>By 2050, it may be conceivable that geothermal could displace .5 to 1 GtC</u></strong> 9. Ocean Wave Energy. There is growing interest in harvesting electric power from ocean waves. <u><strong>The <mark>amount of energy in the oceans’ waves is large, but it is very dilute</mark>, and only a fraction is economically viable - assuming many technological problems can be overcome. One estimate of the viable resource in the US is equal to about 6% of current electricity demand. Because wave energy is concentrated at low frequencies, efficient conversion and transmission to a grid is difficult</u></strong> (Scruggs and Jacobs, 2009). The marine environment creates other problems including seawater corrosion, marine organism fouling, and large loads imposed by big storms on wave energy converters. Ocean wave energy might displace 0.1 GtC. <u><strong>Taken altogether, <mark>current energy technologies</mark>, if hugely scaled up, <mark>might get us halfway toward a stabilization path by 2050</mark> - but only a fraction of the way toward achieving stabilization by 2100. </u></strong>One way to see why this so is to refer back to Table 1 and note there the large amount of carbon-free energy built into the B2 emission scenario. That the B2 scenario is not atypical is evident from Figure 2. Unfortunately, perceptions differ. One reason is that many analysts assume rates of energy efficiency improvement and energy intensity decline much greater than can be sustained globally over an extended period of time. As Hoffert et al (1998) demonstrate, there is a trade-off between the amount of carbon-free energy required to stabilize climate and the rate of energy intensity decline. Figure 3, based on Hoffert et al (1998), indicates the relationship. (The trade-off in Figure 3 is based on an assumed global rate of GDP growth of a little over 2.4% (1990-2100) and atmospheric stabilization of CO2 at 550 ppm.) </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Rühle 18 - Hans Rühle headed the Policy Planning Staff of the German Ministry of Defense from 1982-1988 and is a frequent commentator on German and international security issues. The New U.S. Nuclear Posture Review: Return to Realism, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/02/08/the_new_us_nuclear_posture_review_return_to_realism_113035.html) fulltext: It has become a tradition that every new Administration wants to make its mark on nuclear policy by writing a “Nuclear Posture Review” (NPR). Rarely, however, has a policy document been as eagerly awaited as the NPR initiated by President Donald Trump.[1] Trump’s propensity for Tweets, even on delicate nuclear matters, as well as some of his statements when he was Presidential candidate, made some observers, including in Europe, fear for the worst. These fears should now be put to rest. The Trump Administration’s new NPR is a remarkably coherent document. Unlike the 2010 NPR initiated by President Obama, which was characterised by a rather optimistic worldview, the 2018 NPR reflects the reality of a different political climate. The world has become a more dangerous place again. Accordingly, the authors of the new NPR make an unabashed case for nuclear deterrence: for the protection of the United States, but also for the protection of U.S. allies. That the new NPR would draw criticism was to be expected. For anti-nuclear activists and arms control enthusiasts, the 2018 NPR does indeed provide little comfort. The 2010 document had put nuclear arms reductions and non-proliferation at the top of the U.S. nuclear security agenda. Accordingly, it advocated as a first priority reducing the salience of nuclear weapons and the continuing reduction of U.S. nuclear forces, while also attempting to maintain the credibility of the United States as a deterrence provider. The result was an uneasy, and sometimes visibly strained, co-existence of different strands of thinking that sent mixed messages and thus left even many supporters dissatisfied. However, it seemed at least to mark a departure from what critics of U.S. nuclear policy had long regarded as an over-emphasis on the nuclear dimension of security. By contrast, the new NPR assigns the lead role to deterrence, while making non-proliferation and arms control supporting actors. This new hierarchy of priorities was bound to invite charges that the new NPR was reversing previous U.S.’ policy, thereby triggering a needless nuclear build-up and provoking a dangerous arms race.[2] Five areas in particular have attracted the scorn of the critics: First, the NPR implies that the United States could envisage a nuclear response in case of a “strategic” attack with non-nuclear means, for example on key components of U.S. nuclear infrastructure. This is not inconsistent with past declaratory policy, but is a real clarification of what non-nuclear attacks might elicit a U.S. nuclear response. It has invited sharp criticism of extending the role of nuclear weapons to new, non-nuclear scenarios rather than reducing their importance, as demanded by the logic of non-proliferation. Instead, critics argue, this nuclear emphasis will only increase the appetite of other states for acquiring nuclear weapons of their own.[3] Whether a determined opponent would find a nuclear threat credible enough to refrain from, say, a massive cyberattack against the United States, is impossible to know. A look at other states’ nuclear declarations, however, makes the NPR look much more mainstream than some critics would have it. For example, French declaratory nuclear policy includes the possibility of using nuclear weapons against states sponsoring terrorism.[4] Russia’s doctrine is somewhat ambiguous.[5] Moreover, one should recall that even the 2010 NPR rejected a “sole-purpose declaration,” according to which the only purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of other nuclear weapons. At the time, the Obama Administration referred to the further role of nuclear weapons as deterring the threat of chemical and in particular biological weapons. With cyberattacks growing in terms of both frequency and destructiveness, the new NPR simply carries this logic further. Since the document also notes that nuclear weapons will be used only in existential circumstances, the notion of a trigger-happy United States that threatens nuclear retaliation for any unwelcome behaviour remains a caricature. Finally, as the NPR notes, the idea that U.S. nuclear restraint could induce other countries to exert restraint as well has proven to be an illusion. Second, the NPR strongly rejects the adoption of a “no-first-use” policy. Arguing in favour of such a policy has been a persistent feature of the nuclear debate for several decades, and the NPR will no doubt be attacked for clinging to what some may consider outdated nuclear orthodoxy. However, all U.S. Administrations have consistently refused a “no-first-use” pledge – and for the right reasons. In the Cold War, it was primarily the fear of having to wage a conventional war on Moscow’s terms, which would have made the adoption of a no-first-use policy by the U.S. and its NATO allies appear outright foolish. After all, a “no-first-use” pledge would have signalled to the Soviet Union that NATO would rather accept conventional defeat than to escalate to the nuclear level. While Russia today is not posing the same kind of threat as the Soviet Union, it still appears advisable to keep Moscow guessing as to NATO’s response in case of a conventional attack. Similarly, since nuclear weapons may also be required to deter the use of biological and chemical weapons, retaining the option of using nuclear weapons first makes eminent deterrence sense—as the NPR emphasizes. That some critics, either intentionally or unintentionally, confuse “first use” (a nuclear response) with “first strike” (a nuclear attack) makes arguing the issue in public rather difficult. Still, the “no first use pledge” remains a red herring – and the NPR thankfully treats it as such. Third, the NPR makes a strong case for maintaining nuclear flexibility. This is nothing new. Even though the political rhetoric of many U.S. Administrations focused on “minimal deterrence,” real U.S. nuclear planning for decades has been based on flexible response options. A nuclear posture that was geared to minimum deterrence would not offer the political and military leadership any graduated options and thus could lead to self-deterrence. This would be detrimental to U.S. security, and even more so to the security of allies. As British Defence Secretary Denis Healy used to quip during the Cold War, it may only take five percent credibility to deter Moscow, but 95 percent to assure the allies.[6] A superpower that is in the extended deterrence business must not be caught in a choice between suicide and surrender. Moreover, given that the United States will have to deter very different actors, the authors of the NPR correctly do not believe in a “one-size-fits-all” deterrent. Unlike “minimal deterrence” schemes, however, which may not require large numbers, the quest for flexibility leads to a larger force posture, inviting charges that the Trump Administration was adhering to a strategy of “flawed overkill”[7]. The list of hardware in the NPR is indeed long and expensive, yet nuclear weaponry only eats up a small fraction of the U.S. defense budget. Moreover, some of these expenses are the result of previously delayed nuclear modernization efforts. Finally, as the NPR puts it cogently, deterrence is not as expensive as the conflicts we could not deter. Fourth, the NPR makes the case for nuclear weapons with variable yield. For much of the European media, this element of the NPR has been the only one worth reporting. After all, a lower yield, so the argument goes, makes nuclear weapons more “useable” and thus lowers the nuclear threshold. This argument has been around for ages, yet it remains the classic “straw man” argument. Nuclear weapons with low yields have existed for decades, yet this fact has not changed the view of nuclear weapons as a unique category of weapons that change the nature of war. Trivialized as “mini-nukes,” some critics have taken aim notably at the B-61, a gravity bomb deployed, inter alia, in Europe as part of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements. Why a modernised B-61 should make nuclear war more likely, as some critics assert, remains a mystery, given that these aircraft-delivered weapons have no characteristics that would make them suitable for an offensive nuclear strike. They simply remind any potential adversary that the U.S. and its allies do not only have conventional response options, but also nuclear ones. This will make it harder for an adversary to escalate its way out of a failed conventional campaign. For nuclear weapons as for any other weapons, credibility dictates that there must be at least a somewhat plausible chance that they might be used in order to ensure that they deter, e.g. that they will not be used. This is a fundamental paradox of deterrence, to be sure, yet it is not too intellectually demanding. That some critics nevertheless fail to comprehend it, is not the fault of the NPR. Fifth: arms control and non-proliferation. The NPR retains the U.S. commitment to the objectives of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to a world free of weapons of mass destruction, and to further arms control negotiations. However, these commitments are strongly caveated: the United States will only engage in such endeavours if there is a realistic prospect of success. In this context, the document refers to Russia’s violation of the INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Unsurprisingly, the conditions under which arms control and non-proliferation can yield successful outcomes are viewed with considerable pessimism. This is a truthful reflection of a political reality that is shaped by renewed great power competition. For the critics, this commitment must appear as much too half-hearted. However, the authors of the NPR can argue that they have learned from experience. After all, the Obama Administration’s 2010 NPR was quite elaborate on questions of a new global drive to eliminate nuclear weapons, yet ultimately failed to reach its objectives. Hence, the new NPR does not see itself as a means to transform the global nuclear landscape by enticing a worldwide audience. Rather, it sets out some ground rules for the United States and its allies to safeguard their security in a nuclear world. We find these arguments are, at best, overstated. It is unclear how NFU would lower the risks of war if AFU were unnecessary as well. After all, weaker adversaries already have good reasons to fear US conventional military power. The threat of the United States bringing to bear this capability can provoke the same crisis dynamics as the threat of nuclear first use itself. Whether the United States switches to NFU does not matter for crisis stability unless the adversary can adopt sufficient countermeasures against conventional military power and not nuclear power. Failing this condition, a major argument in favor of NFU loses its persuasiveness.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The NPR bolsters deterrence now---contains <u>revisionist powers</u> and deters <u>CBW attacks</u>.</h4><p><strong>Rühle 18</strong> - Hans Rühle headed the Policy Planning Staff of the German Ministry of Defense from 1982-1988 and is a frequent commentator on German and international security issues. The New U.S. Nuclear Posture Review: Return to Realism, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/02/08/the_new_us_nuclear_posture_review_return_to_realism_113035.html)</p><p>It has become a tradition that <u>every</u> new <u>Administration</u> <u>wants to</u> <u>make its mark on nuclear policy by writing</u> a “Nuclear Posture Review” (<u>NPR</u>). Rarely, however, has a policy document been as eagerly awaited as the NPR initiated by President Donald Trump.[1] <u>Trump’s propensity for Tweets, even on delicate nuclear matters, </u>as well as some of his statements when he was Presidential candidate, <u>made some observers,</u> including in Europe, <u><strong>fear for the worst</u></strong>. <u><strong>These fears should now be put to rest</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> Trump Administration’s new <mark>NPR is a remarkably coherent document</u></strong></mark>. Unlike the 2010 NPR initiated by President Obama, which was characterised by a rather optimistic worldview, <u>the 2018 NPR <mark>reflects</mark> the reality of a different political climate.</u> The world has become a more dangerous place again. Accordingly, <u>the authors of the new NPR make an unabashed case for nuclear deterrence: for the protection of the United States, but also for the <strong><mark>protection of</mark> U.S. <mark>allies</u></strong></mark>. That the new NPR would draw criticism was to be expected. For anti-nuclear activists and arms control enthusiasts, the 2018 NPR does indeed provide little comfort. The 2010 document had put nuclear arms reductions and non-proliferation at the top of the U.S. nuclear security agenda. Accordingly, <u>it advocated as a first priority reducing the salience of <mark>nuclear weapons</mark> and the continuing reduction of U.S. nuclear forces, while</u> also <u>attempting to <mark>maintain</mark> the credibility of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u><strong>as a <mark>deterrence</mark> provider. </u></strong>The result was an uneasy, and sometimes visibly strained, co-existence of different strands of thinking that sent mixed messages and thus left even many supporters dissatisfied. However, it seemed at least to mark a departure from what critics of U.S. nuclear policy had long regarded as an over-emphasis on the nuclear dimension of security. By contrast, <u><strong>the new NPR assigns the lead role to deterrence</u></strong>, while making non-proliferation and arms control supporting actors. This new hierarchy of priorities was bound to invite charges that the new NPR was reversing previous U.S.’ policy, thereby triggering a needless nuclear build-up and provoking a dangerous arms race.[2] Five areas in particular have attracted the scorn of the critics: First, the NPR implies that the United States could envisage a nuclear response in case of a “strategic” attack with non-nuclear means, for example on key components of U.S. nuclear infrastructure. This is not inconsistent with past declaratory policy, but is a real clarification of what non-nuclear attacks might elicit a U.S. nuclear response. It has invited sharp criticism of extending the role of nuclear weapons to new, non-nuclear scenarios rather than reducing their importance, as demanded by the logic of non-proliferation. Instead, critics argue, this nuclear emphasis will only increase the appetite of other states for acquiring nuclear weapons of their own.[3] Whether a determined opponent would find a nuclear threat credible enough to refrain from, say, a massive cyberattack against the United States, is impossible to know. A look at other states’ nuclear declarations, however, makes the NPR look much more mainstream than some critics would have it. For example, French declaratory nuclear policy includes the possibility of using nuclear weapons against states sponsoring terrorism.[4] Russia’s doctrine is somewhat ambiguous.[5] Moreover, one should recall that even the 2010 NPR rejected a “sole-purpose declaration,” according to which the only purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of other nuclear weapons. At the time, the Obama Administration referred to the further role of nuclear weapons as deterring the threat of chemical and in particular biological weapons. With cyberattacks growing in terms of both frequency and destructiveness, the new NPR simply carries this logic further. Since <u>the document</u> also <u>notes that nuclear weapons will be used only in existential circumstances</u>, the notion of a trigger-happy United States that threatens nuclear retaliation for any unwelcome behaviour remains a caricature. Finally, as the NPR notes, the idea that U.S. nuclear restraint could induce other countries to exert restraint as well has proven to be an illusion. Second, <u><strong><mark>the NPR strongly rejects</mark> the adoption of a “<mark>n</u></strong></mark>o-<u><strong><mark>f</u></strong></mark>irst-<u><strong><mark>u</u></strong></mark>se” policy. Arguing in favour of such a policy has been a persistent feature of the nuclear debate for several decades, and the NPR will no doubt be attacked for clinging to what some may consider outdated nuclear orthodoxy. However, <u>all</u> U.S. <u>Administrations have consistently refused a “no-first-use” pledge – and for the right reasons</u>. In the Cold War, it was primarily the fear of having to wage a conventional war on Moscow’s terms, which would have made the adoption of a no-first-use policy by the U.S. and its NATO allies appear outright foolish. After all, <u>a</u> “<u><strong>n</u></strong>o-<u><strong>f</u></strong>irst-<u><strong>u</u></strong>se” <u>pledge would have <strong>signal</u></strong>led <u>to the Soviet Union that NATO would rather accept conventional defeat than to escalate to the nuclear level.</u> <u>While Russia today is not posing the same kind of threat as the Soviet Union, <mark>it</mark> still <mark>appears advisable to <strong>keep Moscow guessing</strong> as to</mark> NATO’s <mark>response <strong>in</mark> case of <mark>a conventional attack</u></strong></mark>. Similarly, since <u><strong><mark>nuclear weapons</strong></mark> <mark>may</u></mark> also <u><mark>be required to deter</mark> the use of <strong><mark>bio</mark>logical <mark>and chemical weapons</strong></mark>, retaining the option of using nuclear weapons first makes eminent deterrence sense</u>—as the NPR emphasizes. That some critics, either intentionally or unintentionally, confuse “first use” (a nuclear response) with “first strike” (a nuclear attack) makes arguing the issue in public rather difficult. Still, the “no first use pledge” remains a red herring – and the NPR thankfully treats it as such. Third, the NPR makes a strong case for maintaining nuclear flexibility. This is nothing new. Even though the political rhetoric of many U.S. Administrations focused on “minimal deterrence,” real U.S. nuclear planning for decades has been based on flexible response options. <u><strong><mark>A</mark> nuclear <mark>posture</mark> that was <mark>geared to minimum deterrence would not offer</mark> the political and military leadership <mark>any graduated options and</mark> thus could <mark>lead to self-deterrence</u></strong></mark>. This would be <u>detrimental to U.S. security, and</u> even more so <u>to the security of allies</u>. As British Defence Secretary Denis Healy used to quip during the Cold War, it may only take five percent credibility to deter Moscow, but 95 percent to assure the allies.[6] A superpower that is in the extended deterrence business must not be caught in a choice between suicide and surrender. Moreover, given that the United States will have to deter very different actors, the authors of the NPR correctly do not believe in a “one-size-fits-all” deterrent. <u>Unlike “minimal deterrence” schemes, however, which may not require large numbers, the quest for flexibility leads to a larger force posture, inviting charges that the Trump Administration was adhering to a strategy of “flawed overkill”</u>[7]. The list of hardware in the NPR is indeed long and expensive, yet nuclear weaponry only eats up a small fraction of the U.S. defense budget. Moreover, some of these expenses are the result of previously delayed nuclear modernization efforts. Finally, as the NPR puts it cogently, deterrence is not as expensive as the conflicts we could not deter. Fourth, the NPR makes the case for nuclear weapons with variable yield. For much of the European media, this element of the NPR has been the only one worth reporting. After all, a lower yield, so the argument goes, makes nuclear weapons more “useable” and thus lowers the nuclear threshold. This argument has been around for ages, yet it remains the classic “straw man” argument. <u>Nuclear weapons with low yields have existed for decades</u>, yet this fact has not changed the view of nuclear weapons as a unique category of weapons that change the nature of war. Trivialized as “mini-nukes,” some critics have taken aim notably at the B-61, a gravity bomb deployed, inter alia, in Europe as part of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements. Why a modernised B-61 should make nuclear war more likely, as some critics assert, remains a mystery, given that these aircraft-delivered weapons have no characteristics that would make them suitable for an offensive nuclear strike. They simply remind any potential adversary that the U.S. and its allies do not only have conventional response options, but also nuclear ones. <u>This will make it harder for an adversary to escalate its way out of a failed conventional campaign</u>. <u><strong><mark>For nuclear weapons</mark> as for any other weapons, <mark>credibility dictates</mark> that <mark>there must be</mark> at least <mark>a</mark> somewhat plausible <mark>chance</mark> that <mark>they might be used</mark> in order to ensure that they deter</u></strong>, e.g. that they will not be used. This is a fundamental paradox of deterrence, to be sure, yet it is not too intellectually demanding. That some critics nevertheless fail to comprehend it, is not the fault of the NPR. Fifth: arms control and non-proliferation. The NPR retains the U.S. commitment to the objectives of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to a world free of weapons of mass destruction, and to further arms control negotiations. However, these commitments are strongly caveated: the United States will only engage in such endeavours if there is a realistic prospect of success. In this context, the document refers to Russia’s violation of the INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Unsurprisingly, the conditions under which arms control and non-proliferation can yield successful outcomes are viewed with considerable pessimism. <u>This is a truthful reflection of a political reality that is shaped by renewed great power competition.</u> For the critics, this commitment must appear as much too half-hearted. However, the authors of the NPR can argue that they have learned from experience. After all, the Obama Administration’s 2010 NPR was quite elaborate on questions of a new global drive to eliminate nuclear weapons, yet ultimately failed to reach its objectives. Hence, the new NPR does not see itself as a means to transform the global nuclear landscape by enticing a worldwide audience. Rather, it sets out some ground rules for the United States and its allies to safeguard their security in a nuclear world. We find these arguments are, at best, overstated. <u>It is unclear how NFU would lower the risks of war if AFU were unnecessary as well</u>. After all, <u>weaker adversaries already have good reasons to fear US conventional military power</u>. <u>The threat of the</u> <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>bringing to bear this capability can provoke the same crisis dynamics as the threat of nuclear first use itself</u>. Whether the United States switches to NFU does not matter for crisis stability unless the adversary can adopt sufficient countermeasures against conventional military power and not nuclear power. Failing this condition, <u>a major argument in favor of NFU loses its persuasiveness<strong>.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Fitzpatrick 19 [Mark Fitzpatrick; Associate Fellow and former Executive Director of IISS–Americas, responsible for representing the Institute in the Western Hemisphere. Expertise: Non-proliferation and disarmament, US foreign policy and nuclear issues; 4-26-2019 "Artificial intelligence and nuclear command and control," https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival-blog/2019/04/artificial-intelligence-nuclear-strategic-stability SM fulltext: Skewed early-warning assessments Deep fakes by third parties can be magnified by AI capabilities that fall into the wrong hands and are used to generate false positives. In our scenario, three months before the crisis and start of play, US Cyber Command’s ‘Unified Platform’ for managing and coordinating integrated cyber-, electronic- and information-warfare operations was providing statistically anomalous outputs regarding situational-awareness assessments related to the early warning of selected advanced-persistent-threat datasets linked to Russian cyber actors. The questionable reports appeared to be skewed by mathematical coefficients derived from large-scale metadata analysis during the beta-testing training phase of the Unified Platform’s software. A workshop background paper noted that AI programmes are driven by the data that they receive – the digital equivalent of the adages ‘you are what you eat’ and ‘garbage in, garbage out’. This is also true of the process by which such programmes initially formulate their pattern-recognition models and evaluative procedures for use in future contexts. The malign manipulation of input data can not only pervert the output of AI functions in specific instances, but also undermine the reliability of an entire algorithm if accomplished during the ‘training’ phase for such programmes. Our scenario showed vividly how this could play out. Non-malign, human-design factors can also corrupt AI assessments. Because human beings define an AI system’s algorithms and curate its training data, they can unintentionally insert their own biases into the system. This can cause the system to behave in unintended ways that may be undetectable to its operators due to the feedback loop created by those very biases. In addition, nuclear command-and-control personnel also faced a black-box problem in determining how, or why, a system came to a certain conclusion. While system inputs and outputs can be observed, the speed and scale of system processes make it difficult for personnel to isolate the logic behind any particular prediction. Once the operation of AI systems is triggered, humans are unable to monitor the systems’ decision calculus in real time. In the exercise, the US team was aware of this range of potential problems with respect to AI-driven assessments provided by Cyber Command’s Unified Platform. They worried that Russian strategic-warning systems might be similarly skewed. In particular, the Americans realised that the false positives produced by Russia’s strategic-warning system need not have been caused by a malign actor, as they could also have resulted from a problem intrinsic to the algorithm. To preclude Russia from perceiving any US effort to investigate as an attempt to manipulate Russia’s early-warning and command-and-control systems, the US team decided not to conduct any reconnaissance. In turn, the scenario in round two had Kremlin officials learning of a prior intelligence operation by the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU), Russia’s military intelligence agency, injecting skewed training data into AI-driven situational-awareness algorithms of the US military during their developmental phase. The objective was to prevent American AI systems from being able to recognise Russia as an aggressor. The background papers for the exercise noted how data-poisoning attacks introducing skewed inputs into the training dataset for an AI machine-learning process can distort an AI system’s output, with such attacks degrading its ability to distinguish between good data and bad data. These types of operations are usually carried out through techniques known as content-generation, feedback weaponisation, perturbation injection and man-in-the-middle attacks. However, an attacker usually will not have direct access to the actual training data. To overcome this obstacle, the attacker will target the actors or methods used to collect and store machine-learning training data, such as cloud graphics-processing units, web-based repositories, and contractors or third-party service providers. Understanding that early-warning assessments from its own AI-driven software could be skewed, the Russian team chose largely to ignore the AI algorithms that were producing results so disparate from the reality they otherwise perceived, while also deciding not to reveal any analytic problems they were encountering to its adversaries. Unaware that the Russians had, in effect, pulled the plug on the AI-driven early-warning system, the US team spent considerable time trying to persuade their counterparts to investigate its flaws. The US team also considered offering to work with Russia to neutralise any malicious third-party-introduced software problems. They recognised, however, that any such effort might itself be seen as an attempt to compromise the Russian command-and-control system. Indeed, the Russians reacted defensively. With team members playing to stereotype, trilateral meetings and a session of the United Nations Security Council ended inconclusively amid mutual recriminations. False-positive safety alerts In the notional ten months leading up to our crisis scenario, four civilian nuclear power plants operating in densely populated Chinese provinces began registering false-positive safety alerts by their AI-driven management software. In each case, sensors reported structural concerns in the facility that led supervising authorities to enact emergency-management procedures that stopped operations, although engineering tests revealed that no structural damage or harm to humans had actually occurred. Even so, the repeated stoppages in electricity production by these important power plants were having adverse economic effects. The operating authorities accordingly requested that the AI software provider, named GaiaForce, adjust the sensing functions to require a much higher threshold of structural-integrity damage before triggering automatic shutdown protocols. This allowed all of the power plants in question to operate at or near full capacity. GaiaForce was unable to find any defects in the functionality of its code. Left unclear during the initial rounds was whether the false-positives resulted from malicious activities. The workshop background paper explained how ‘raising the noise floor’ – launching a cyber attack perpetrated via digital noise and extraneous inputs containing minor elements of an actual threat – can cause an AI system to generate a stream of false positives. These false positives can lead operators to reconfigure the AI’s machine-learning algorithm to avoid this error in the future. At that point, the adversary can launch an attack through the same method that the system was reconfigured to ignore. This type of attack involves social engineering in that, unlike other technical intelligence operations, it targets the human operators and induces them to effect a change that favours the offensive adversary. While the AI system faithfully does what it has been re-instructed to do, the parameters no longer successfully serve their original defensive purposes. Thus, in round two, a nuclear power plant in Hubei province suffered structural damage as a result of operating beyond engineering parameters due to the loosening of the security indicators contained in the GaiaForce management software. Although the situation was contained in time, safety experts claimed that they were ‘minutes away from the next Chernobyl or Fukushima’. In round three, China provided detailed technical data of operational anomalies to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), along with portions of the GaiaForce source code. After obtaining this information, the US National Security Agency (NSA) assessed that the GaiaForce source code identified the potential for additional ‘remote administration features’ that could arise if that software were run on systems that were also infected by a malware exploit that the NSA determined was devised by the GRU. The NSA further judged that the GRU had created the GaiaForce source code and used it in its most sensitive cyber operations. According to the NSA director, the combination of GaiaForce and the malware could be used to ‘weaponise’ civilian nuclear reactors. That this did not occur in the exercise was down to a combination of luck and Chinese willingness to cooperate with other concerned actors.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>2] AI is inevitably unreliable – black box spikes risk of escalation, but human control solves.</h4><p>Fitzpatrick 19 </strong>[Mark Fitzpatrick; Associate Fellow and former Executive Director of IISS–Americas, responsible for representing the Institute in the Western Hemisphere. Expertise: Non-proliferation and disarmament, US foreign policy and nuclear issues; 4-26-2019 "Artificial intelligence and nuclear command and control," https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival-blog/2019/04/artificial-intelligence-nuclear-strategic-stability SM</p><p>Skewed early-warning assessments <u><strong><mark>Deep fakes by third parties can be magnified by AI capabilities</mark> that fall into the wrong hands and are used to generate false positives</u></strong>. In our scenario, three months before the crisis and start of play, US Cyber Command’s ‘Unified Platform’ for managing and coordinating integrated cyber-, electronic- and information-warfare operations was providing statistically anomalous outputs regarding situational-awareness assessments related to the early warning of selected advanced-persistent-threat datasets linked to Russian cyber actors. The questionable reports appeared to be skewed by mathematical coefficients derived from large-scale metadata analysis during the beta-testing training phase of the Unified Platform’s software. A workshop background paper noted that <u><strong>AI programmes are driven by the data that they receive – the digital equivalent of the adages ‘you are what you eat’ and ‘<mark>garbage in, garbage out’</mark>. This is also true of the process by which such programmes initially formulate their pattern-recognition models and evaluative procedures for use in future contexts. The <mark>malign manipulation of input data can</mark> not only pervert the output of AI functions in specific instances, but also <mark>undermine</mark> the reliability of <mark>an entire algorithm</mark> if accomplished during the ‘training’ phase for such programmes</u></strong>. Our scenario showed vividly how this could play out. Non-malign, human-design factors can also corrupt AI assessments. <u><strong>Because <mark>human beings</mark> define an AI system’s algorithms and curate its training data, they can unintentionally <mark>insert their own biases</mark> into the system. This can cause the system to behave in unintended ways <mark>that may be undetectable </mark>to its operators <mark>due to the feedback loop </mark>created by those very biases. In addition, <mark>nuclear command-and-control personnel </mark>also <mark>faced a black-box problem in determining how</mark>, or why, <mark>a system came to a</mark> certain <mark>conclusion</mark>. While system inputs and outputs can be observed, the speed and scale of system processes make it difficult for personnel to isolate the logic behind any particular prediction.</u></strong> Once the operation of AI systems is triggered, humans are unable to monitor the systems’ decision calculus in real time. In the exercise, the US team was aware of this range of potential problems with respect to AI-driven assessments provided by Cyber Command’s Unified Platform. They worried <u><strong>that Russian strategic-warning systems might be similarly skewed. In particular, the Americans realised that <mark>the false positives</mark> produced by Russia’s strategic-warning system need not have been caused by a malign actor, as they <mark>could also</mark> have <mark>result</mark>ed <mark>from</mark> a problem intrinsic to <mark>the algorithm</u></strong></mark>. To preclude Russia from perceiving any US effort to investigate as an attempt to manipulate Russia’s early-warning and command-and-control systems, the US team decided not to conduct any reconnaissance. In turn, the scenario in round two had Kremlin officials learning of a prior intelligence operation by the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU), Russia’s military intelligence agency, injecting skewed training data into AI-driven situational-awareness algorithms of the US military during their developmental phase. The objective was to prevent American AI systems from being able to recognise Russia as an aggressor. The background papers for the exercise noted how <u><strong><mark>data-poisoning attacks introducing </mark>skewed <mark>inputs into the training dataset</mark> for an AI machine-learning process can distort an AI system’s output, with such attacks degrading its ability to distinguish between good data and bad data. These types of operations are usually carried out through techniques known as content-generation, feedback weaponisation, perturbation injection and man-in-the-middle attacks.</u></strong> However, an attacker usually will not have direct access to the actual training data. To overcome this obstacle, <u><strong><mark>the attacker will target</mark> the actors or methods used to collect and store machine-learning training data, such as cloud <mark>graphics-processing units</mark>, web-based <mark>repositories, and contractors</mark> or third-party service providers. <mark>Understanding that</mark> early-warning <mark>assessments from</mark> its own <mark>AI</mark>-driven software <mark>could be skewed, the</mark> Russian <mark>team chose</mark> largely <mark>to ignore the AI</mark> algorithms that were producing results so disparate from the reality they otherwise perceived</u></strong>, while also deciding not to reveal any analytic problems they were encountering to its adversaries. Unaware that the Russians had, in effect, pulled the plug on the AI-driven early-warning system, the US team spent considerable time trying to persuade their counterparts to investigate its flaws. The US team also considered offering to work with Russia to neutralise any malicious third-party-introduced software problems. They recognised, however, that any such effort might itself be seen as an attempt to compromise the Russian command-and-control system. Indeed, the Russians reacted defensively. With team members playing to stereotype, trilateral meetings and a session of the United Nations Security Council ended inconclusively amid mutual recriminations. False-positive safety alerts In the notional ten months leading up to our crisis scenario, four civilian nuclear power plants operating in densely populated Chinese provinces began registering false-positive safety alerts by their AI-driven management software. In each case, sensors reported structural concerns in the facility that led supervising authorities to enact emergency-management procedures that stopped operations, although engineering tests revealed that no structural damage or harm to humans had actually occurred. Even so, the repeated stoppages in electricity production by these important power plants were having adverse economic effects. The operating authorities accordingly requested that the AI software provider, named GaiaForce, adjust the sensing functions to require a much higher threshold of structural-integrity damage before triggering automatic shutdown protocols. This allowed all of the power plants in question to operate at or near full capacity. GaiaForce was unable to find any defects in the functionality of its code. Left unclear during the initial rounds was whether the false-positives resulted from malicious activities. The workshop background paper explained <u><strong>how ‘raising the noise floor’ – launching a cyber attack perpetrated via digital noise and extraneous inputs containing minor elements of an actual threat – can cause an AI system to generate a stream of false positives. These <mark>false positives can lead operators to reconfigure the</mark> AI’s machine-learning <mark>algorithm</mark> to avoid this error in the future. At that point, the adversary can launch an attack through the same method that the system was reconfigured to ignore</u></strong>. This type of attack involves social engineering in that, unlike other technical intelligence operations, it targets the human operators and induces them to effect a change that favours the offensive adversary. While the AI system faithfully does what it has been re-instructed to do, the parameters no longer successfully serve their original defensive purposes. Thus, in round two, a nuclear power plant in Hubei province suffered structural damage as a result of operating beyond engineering parameters due to the loosening of the security indicators contained in the GaiaForce management software. Although the situation was contained in time, safety experts claimed that they were ‘minutes away from the next Chernobyl or Fukushima’. In round three, China provided detailed technical data of operational anomalies to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), along with portions of the GaiaForce source code. After obtaining this information, the US National Security Agency (NSA) assessed that the GaiaForce source code identified the potential for additional ‘remote administration features’ that could arise if that software were run on systems that were also infected by a malware exploit that the NSA determined was devised by the GRU. The NSA further judged that the GRU had created the GaiaForce source code and used it in its most sensitive cyber operations. According to the NSA director, the combination of GaiaForce and the malware could be used to ‘weaponise’ civilian nuclear reactors. That this did not occur in the exercise was down to a combination of luck and Chinese willingness to cooperate with other concerned actors.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Nicholas Burns 19, Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at Harvard Kennedy School, MA in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and Douglas Lute, Senior Fellow at the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, Former United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, Holds Degrees from the United States Military Academy at West Point and from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School Report, February 2019, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nato-seventy-alliance-crisis fulltext: NATO needs to take a hard look at itself. Across twenty-five indicators of democracy rated by Freedom House, the downward trend among NATO allies over the past decade is stark.35 Especially in Central Europe but not exclusively, there are setbacks in the media, the judiciary and the functioning of national democratic institutions. The rate at which democracy is declining in Poland, Hungary and Turkey is particularly alarming. In 2017 and 2018, these three states’ scores represented some of the largest one-year declines in political rights and civil liberties of all 195 countries ranked by Freedom House.36 Poland—with the largest category declines in the forty-year history of the survey—is close to leaving the “consolidated democracy” category.37 Hungary is no longer rated a consolidated democracy. Turkey, whose decline in freedom over the last ten years represents the largest of any country in the world, crossed the threshold from “free” to “not free.”38 While less severe today, nationalist populism movements in other allies represent a broader, more diffuse threat to NATO and can amplify other challenges facing the Alliance. The United States is not immune, with its Freedom House rating declining in 2018 due to “Russian interference in the 2016 election, violations of basic ethical standards by the new administration and a reduction in government transparency.”39 While this slippage in the U.S. is relatively recent and still minor in scale, it nonetheless diminishes America’s standing as a standard-bearer for democracy and further erodes its leadership position within the Alliance. Further, anti-democratic policies among allies open vulnerabilities for interference by competitors outside the Alliance, especially Russia that seeks to divide NATO and the EU politically using hybrid tactics.40 The question for allies is what must the role of the Alliance be in reinforcing its core values when they are under assault from within. NATO is both a political and a military alliance. It is not enough to be bound together by a commitment only to Article 5 collective defense. The values in the Treaty and the adherence of NATO allies to those values is fundamental for Alliance cohesion. That shared commitment to values in turn makes credible the Article 5 commitment. The Washington Treaty is binding for both its political and military commitments.41 Allies cannot ignore the failure to abide by political commitments including values and expect military commitments to be unaffected. In short, NATO allies should not expect that they could violate democratic values without consequences, while resting assured that NATO cohesion is intact and other commitments in the Treaty will be upheld. The Treaty is not a menu of options from which allies can select some obligations while ignoring others. The NATO Treaty has no provision for policing members that drift from common political values, unlike the European Union Treaty’s Chapter 7 that has been invoked recently toward several EU member states with some success.42 While it would be impossible to achieve consensus to impose penalties on wayward allies, given that the ally in question could veto any penalties, a range of escalating political initiatives on the part of the Secretary General and a coalition of the other allies could assert pressure. As a start, the Secretary General should express concern in his bilateral meetings with the anti-democratic governments, with the support of key allies and in partnership with the European Union. To increase awareness within the Alliance and among the public, foreign ministers could review annually indicators of democracy for all twenty-nine allies, perhaps prepared by an informal high-level group of experts drawing on Freedom House data. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly and coalitions of allies can amplify the message.43 To increase pressure, NATO could suspend hosting of visits, official meetings and even military exercises with these nations. In severe cases, NATO infrastructure spending and even access to military schools and information sharing could be affected. An indirect way to express concern among allies is to increase the prominence of core democratic values when considering NATO enlargement decisions in the future.44 None of these steps is without political cost and risk, even if calibrated carefully. But the costs and risks of the gradual erosion of Alliance cohesion as member states drift from the founding values are even greater. NATO cannot expect to remain coherent and relevant and able to address the full range of challenges it faces, if it ignores the internal drift from democracy within some member states. This drift is a fundamental issue for the Alliance.45 Streamlining NATO Decision-Making Finally, the challenges facing NATO today demand more flexibility in executive decision-making. As a core principle in preserving NATO cohesion, consensus decision-making must remain the basis for major NATO actions.46 The Treaty requirements for consensus on collective defense decisions (Article 5) and enlargement decisions (Article 10) remain sensible. Major policy decisions like the Defense Investment Pledge or the creation of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force rapid reaction capabilities require consensus. But today with NATO enlarged to twenty-nine members and facing increasingly diverse and complex challenges, it is time to consider how other, more routine, administrative decisions can be taken more efficiently. But this should be a management function, not derogation from the consensus principle. We recommend strengthening the Secretary General’s role as the chief executive of the Alliance with broader authority to carry out routine business without seeking consensus among the twenty-nine members. For example, the Secretary General should consult allies on matters such as agendas and timings of Ministerial Council meetings, but not be required to seek consensus agreement. Today the agenda and even the dates of a Foreign Minister meeting or a NATO-Russia Council meeting can consume hours of formal Council time seeking consensus at the ambassadorial level, consuming headquarters’ bandwidth and crowding out more substantive and urgent topics, including many outlined in this paper. Further, the Secretary General’s flexibility on international staff personnel changes and NATO budget matters should be increased. Today, for example, the Secretary General is severely constrained from adapting the Alliance to emerging challenges by making meaningful shifts in personnel and budgetary resources.47 While nations will continue to want a critical role in all these decisions, criteria should be developed that will provide for more flexibility while ensuring that all allies gain a fair share of opportunities and allocation of resources. A related problem is the tendency of some allies to bring into the Alliance bilateral issues that impede progress on collective issues of the Alliance. As an example, an ally might hold up agreement on the entire NATO military exercise program because of an unrelated bilateral dispute with a NATO partner who wishes to participate in an exercise.48 This practice erodes Alliance cohesion and should not be permitted. After appropriate consultation, we recommend the Secretary General should have the authority to exclude such external issues from consideration in the Alliance, even if it means moving forward without full consensus.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>UNILATERALISM. Negotiations force unrelated disputes to the top.</h4><p>Nicholas <strong>Burns 19</strong>, Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at Harvard Kennedy School, MA in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and Douglas Lute, Senior Fellow at the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, Former United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, Holds Degrees from the United States Military Academy at West Point and from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School Report, February 2019, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nato-seventy-alliance-crisis</p><p><u>NATO needs to take a <strong>hard look</strong> at itself</u>. Across twenty-five indicators of <u>democracy</u> rated by Freedom House, the <u><strong>downward trend</u></strong> among NATO allies over the past decade <u>is <strong>stark</u></strong>.35 <u>Especially in <strong>Central Europe</u></strong> but not exclusively, there are setbacks in the media, the judiciary and the functioning of national democratic institutions. The rate at which <u>democracy is declining in <strong>Poland</strong>, <strong>Hungary</strong> and <strong>Turkey</u></strong> is particularly alarming. In 2017 and 2018, these three states’ scores represented some of the largest one-year declines in political rights and civil liberties of all 195 countries ranked by Freedom House.36 Poland—with the largest category declines in the forty-year history of the survey—is close to leaving the “consolidated democracy” category.37 Hungary is no longer rated a consolidated democracy. Turkey, whose decline in freedom over the last ten years represents the largest of any country in the world, crossed the threshold from “free” to “not free.”38</p><p>While less severe today, <u>nationalist <strong>populism</strong> movements</u> in other allies <u>represent a broader, more diffuse threat to NATO and can <strong>amplify other challenges</strong> facing the Alliance</u>. The United States is not immune, with its Freedom House rating declining in 2018 due to “Russian interference in the 2016 election, violations of basic ethical standards by the new administration and a reduction in government transparency.”39 While this slippage in the U.S. is relatively recent and still minor in scale, it nonetheless diminishes America’s standing as a standard-bearer for democracy and further erodes its leadership position within the Alliance. Further, anti-democratic policies among allies open vulnerabilities for interference by competitors outside the Alliance, especially Russia that seeks to divide NATO and the EU politically using hybrid tactics.40</p><p>The question for allies is what must the role of the Alliance be in reinforcing its core values when they are under assault from within. NATO is both a political and a military alliance. It is not enough to be bound together by a commitment only to Article 5 collective defense. The values in the Treaty and the adherence of NATO allies to those values is fundamental for Alliance cohesion. That shared commitment to values in turn makes credible the Article 5 commitment. The Washington Treaty is binding for both its political and military commitments.41 Allies cannot ignore the failure to abide by political commitments including values and expect military commitments to be unaffected. In short, NATO allies should not expect that they could violate democratic values without consequences, while resting assured that NATO cohesion is intact and other commitments in the Treaty will be upheld. The Treaty is not a menu of options from which allies can select some obligations while ignoring others.</p><p>The NATO Treaty has no provision for policing members that drift from common political values, unlike the European Union Treaty’s Chapter 7 that has been invoked recently toward several EU member states with some success.42 While it would be impossible to achieve consensus to impose penalties on wayward allies, given that the ally in question could veto any penalties, a range of escalating political initiatives on the part of the Secretary General and a coalition of the other allies could assert pressure. As a start, the Secretary General should express concern in his bilateral meetings with the anti-democratic governments, with the support of key allies and in partnership with the European Union. To increase awareness within the Alliance and among the public, foreign ministers could review annually indicators of democracy for all twenty-nine allies, perhaps prepared by an informal high-level group of experts drawing on Freedom House data. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly and coalitions of allies can amplify the message.43 To increase pressure, NATO could suspend hosting of visits, official meetings and even military exercises with these nations. In severe cases, NATO infrastructure spending and even access to military schools and information sharing could be affected. An indirect way to express concern among allies is to increase the prominence of core democratic values when considering NATO enlargement decisions in the future.44 None of these steps is without political cost and risk, even if calibrated carefully. But the costs and risks of the gradual erosion of Alliance cohesion as member states drift from the founding values are even greater. NATO cannot expect to remain coherent and relevant and able to address the full range of challenges it faces, if it ignores the internal drift from democracy within some member states. This drift is a fundamental issue for the Alliance.45</p><p>Streamlining NATO Decision-Making</p><p>Finally, the challenges facing NATO today demand more flexibility in executive decision-making. As a core principle in preserving NATO cohesion, consensus decision-making must remain the basis for major NATO actions.46 <u>The Treaty requirements for <strong>consensus</strong> on</u> collective defense decisions <u>(Article 5)</u> and enlargement decisions (Article 10) <u>remain sensible</u>. Major policy decisions like the Defense Investment Pledge or the creation of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force rapid reaction capabilities require consensus. <u>But today with NATO <strong>enlarged</strong> to <strong>twenty-nine</strong> members and facing increasingly <strong>diverse</strong> and <strong>complex</strong> challenges, it is time to <strong>consider</u></strong> how other, more routine, administrative decisions can be taken more efficiently. But this should be a management function, not derogation from the consensus principle.</p><p>We recommend strengthening the Secretary General’s role as the chief executive of the Alliance with broader authority to carry out routine business without seeking consensus among the twenty-nine members. For example, the Secretary General should consult allies on matters such as agendas and timings of Ministerial Council meetings, but not be required to seek consensus agreement. Today the agenda and even the dates of a Foreign Minister meeting or a NATO-Russia Council meeting can consume hours of formal Council time seeking consensus at the ambassadorial level, consuming headquarters’ bandwidth and crowding out more substantive and urgent topics, including many outlined in this paper. Further, the Secretary General’s flexibility on international staff personnel changes and NATO budget matters should be increased. Today, for example, the Secretary General is severely constrained from adapting the Alliance to emerging challenges by making meaningful shifts in personnel and budgetary resources.47 While nations will continue to want a critical role in all these decisions, criteria should be developed that will provide for more flexibility while ensuring that all allies gain a fair share of opportunities and allocation of resources.</p><p><u>A related problem is the tendency of</u> some <u>allies to <strong>bring into</strong> the Alliance <strong>bilateral issues</strong> that <strong>impede progress</strong> on collective issues of the Alliance. As an example, an ally might <strong>hold up agreement</strong> on the <strong>entire</strong> NATO</u> military exercise <u>program because of an <strong>unrelated bilateral dispute</strong> with a <strong>NATO partner</u></strong> who wishes to participate in an exercise.48 <u>This practice <strong>erodes Alliance cohesion</u></strong> and should not be permitted. After appropriate consultation, we recommend the Secretary General should have the authority to exclude such external issues from consideration in the Alliance, even if it means moving forward without full consensus.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Dorschner 16 (Jon P. Dorschner earned a PhD. in South Asian studies from the University of Arizona. He currently teaches South Asian Studies and International Relations at his alma mater. American Diplomacy, May 2016. http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2016/05/are-south-asian-arms-sales-in-the-u-s-national-interest-the-foreign-policy-implications/)tjf fulltext: In 1989 I wrote an article urging the United States to stop selling weapons in South Asia.1 It took a liberal stance, arguing that such a step would enable the U.S. to occupy the moral high ground. The U.S. should not sell expensive weapons systems to some of the poorest countries on earth. The U.S. sells weapons to both India and Pakistan, which they then use in senseless wars against each other. The U.S. reduces its credibility as an honest broker by selling weapons to both protagonists, and cannot honestly mediate the Indo/Pakistan conflict. In his latest book Indian security analyst Bharat Karnad2 approaches this issue from a very different perspective. Karnad is a hardcore realist. He wants India to assume its rightful place among the world’s “great powers” and become a formidable military power. However, he sees Indian dependence on weapons systems imported from the United States and other developed nations as a drag on Indian potential. He calls for India to eschew imports and embark on a radical indigenization program to replace imported arms with those made by an expanded Indian arms industry that includes both the public and private sectors. At first glance it appear there is considerable light between the liberal take and Karnad’s realist stance. In actuality, there is considerable overlap. Arms imports drain the Indian national exchequer. They consume valuable resources better spent on economic development and poverty alleviation. India’s number one problem is poverty. Unless and until India makes sufficient inroads into its excruciatingly high poverty rate, it will never become a world power. Karnad correctly asserts that India could produce practically everything needed by its armed forces if it took the necessary steps to mobilize its potential. Such a development would have a profound positive impact on India’s economic development. Instead of spending valuable hard currency abroad, India would use its funds to put its own people to work. Indigenous weapons systems would be considerably cheaper than imported ones, freeing up funding for investment in Indian infrastructure and social programs. India could change from an arms importer to an arms exporter, further boosting the Indian economy. As a realist, Karnad insists all foreign policy decisions must benefit India’s national interest. The same holds true for American foreign policy decisions. The overwhelming majority of American policy makers shares Karnad’s realist orientation and utilizes the same national interest test when making decisions for the United States. There are plenty of liberal arguments for the United States to get out of the arms business in South Asia. By selling high-ticket weapons systems, the United States is an accomplice to South Asian policy makers who place weapons purchases above poverty reduction. Taking a moral stance against such policies increases American soft power by increasing American credibility. Imagine if the U.S. announced that instead of competing for billions of dollars in weapons contracts, it would market alternative energy systems to India, or work with the Indian public health sector to help improve the country’s medical infrastructure. American companies would reap enormous economic benefits from such projects. While the American arms industry is a powerful player in the American economy, it is only one sector. Must arms sales drive U.S. policy even when they do not benefit U.S. national interest? But realist arguments can be used to advocate the same policy. Karnad and American realists share the same security concerns. They are worried about the balance of power in Asia. They see a rising China as a potential security threat, and believe China is seeking to become the Asian hegemon. Both Indian and American policy makers do not want to see this happen. They are determined to ensure India’s future security and prevent Chinese hegemony in Asia. India must devise and implement a military policy aimed at ensuring its security from its principal threat. The principal threat is China, not Pakistan. While India and Pakistan have fought repeated military conflicts, no one seriously argues that Pakistan poses an existential threat to India. To the contrary, realists agree that it is in the national interest of both India and Pakistan to end their military confrontation and begin cooperation to ensure economic development of the region. South Asia’s inability to establish a credible free trade zone holds all South Asian countries back and prevents economic development. All the ingredients have long been in place for a rapprochement between India and Pakistan based not on mutual affection but mutual interests. Realists are the first to argue that sentimentality plays no role in foreign policy formulation. States cooperate not out of affection but national interest. Eventually, Indian and Pakistani policymakers will agree on this fact and find the courage to take the necessary steps to make this happen. The terrorist threat in Pakistan may prove to be the necessary catalyst. There is a growing realization in the Pakistani military that it needs peace with India to free up military resources to tackle the existential threat posed by Islamic militancy. Pakistan has diverted military forces from the Indian border to counter-terrorist operations. This has not reduced Pakistani security. While India hopes to “manage” its relationship with China through diplomatic engagement, the Chinese threat will always be present and will only grow as China increases its military and economic power and becomes more assertive. The China/India border is not properly demarcated and protracted India/China border talks have made no progress. China continues to claim large tracts of Indian territory. To meet this security challenge, India must extricate itself from the India/Pakistan dispute and recalibrate its military. Ending its reliance on arms imports will make India stronger and its military more credible. It will provide India with the infrastructure to defend itself in a protracted conflict without worrying about potential arms embargos by foreign arms suppliers. American policy makers should realize that the indigenization of the Indian arms procurement process in in the national interest of both countries. A stronger and more credible Indian military provides India with more options. This is because it can defend itself without relying on foreign patrons. This client/patron relationship has long been a source of humiliation for India that has prevented genuine close relations. Its removal would make it easier for the United States and India to cooperate on a more equal basis to help provide security in Asia. This would have a big impact on nuclear weapons in South Asia. India’s growing superiority in conventional military capability compels Pakistan to rely more and more on nuclear weapons. If India took concrete steps to convince Pakistan it has no designs on Pakistani sovereignty, it would remove Pakistan’s sense of insecurity and allow the two countries could begin to stand back from the brink. An India militarily self-sufficient in conventional military hardware is more capable of providing its own security and less reliant on nuclear weapons, making it easier for India and Pakistan to negotiate credible limits on their nuclear arsenals. Nuclear weapons programs are incredibly expensive and serious economic drains. As both countries build more nuclear weapons and integrate them into their defense plans, the danger of nuclear war (either intentional or accidental) increases exponentially. Pakistan cannot continue to keep spending valuable resources on a massive nuclear arsenal aimed only at intimidating India<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>That augments strategy <u>away from Pakistan</u> and reduces focus on <u>nuclear arsenals</h4><p></u><strong>Dorschner 16</strong> (Jon P. Dorschner earned a PhD. in South Asian studies from the University of Arizona. He currently teaches South Asian Studies and International Relations at his alma mater. American Diplomacy, May 2016. http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2016/05/are-south-asian-arms-sales-in-the-u-s-national-interest-the-foreign-policy-implications/<u>)tjf</p><p></u>In 1989 I wrote an article urging the United States to stop selling weapons in South Asia.1 It took a liberal stance, arguing that such a step would enable the U.S. to occupy the moral high ground. The U.S. should not sell expensive weapons systems to some of the poorest countries on earth. The U.S. sells weapons to both India and Pakistan, which they then use in senseless wars against each other. The U.S. reduces its credibility as an honest broker by selling weapons to both protagonists, and cannot honestly mediate the Indo/Pakistan conflict. In his latest book Indian security analyst Bharat Karnad2 approaches this issue from a very different perspective. Karnad is a hardcore realist. He wants India to assume its rightful place among the world’s “great powers” and become a formidable military power. However, he sees Indian dependence on weapons systems imported from the United States and other developed nations as a drag on Indian potential. He calls for India to eschew imports and embark on a radical indigenization program to replace imported arms with those made by an expanded Indian arms industry that includes both the public and private sectors. At first glance it appear there is considerable light between the liberal take and Karnad’s realist stance. In actuality, there is considerable overlap. Arms imports drain the Indian national exchequer. They consume valuable resources better spent on economic development and poverty alleviation. India’s number one problem is poverty. Unless and until India makes sufficient inroads into its excruciatingly high poverty rate, it will never become a world power. Karnad correctly asserts that India could produce practically everything needed by its armed forces if it took the necessary steps to mobilize its potential. Such a development would have a profound positive impact on India’s economic development. Instead of spending valuable hard currency abroad, India would use its funds to put its own people to work. Indigenous weapons systems would be considerably cheaper than imported ones, freeing up funding for investment in Indian infrastructure and social programs. India could change from an arms importer to an arms exporter, further boosting the Indian economy. As a realist, Karnad insists all foreign policy decisions must benefit India’s national interest. The same holds true for American foreign policy decisions. The overwhelming majority of American policy makers shares Karnad’s realist orientation and utilizes the same national interest test when making decisions for the United States. There are plenty of liberal arguments for the United States to get out of the arms business in South Asia. By selling high-ticket weapons systems, the United States is an accomplice to South Asian policy makers who place weapons purchases above poverty reduction. Taking a moral stance against such policies increases American soft power by increasing American credibility. Imagine if the U.S. announced that instead of competing for billions of dollars in weapons contracts, it would market alternative energy systems to India, or work with the Indian public health sector to help improve the country’s medical infrastructure. American companies would reap enormous economic benefits from such projects. While the American arms industry is a powerful player in the American economy, it is only one sector. Must arms sales drive U.S. policy even when they do not benefit U.S. national interest? But realist arguments can be used to advocate the same policy. Karnad and American realists share the same security concerns. They are worried about the balance of power in Asia. They see a rising China as a potential security threat, and believe China is seeking to become the Asian hegemon. Both Indian and American policy makers do not want to see this happen. They are determined to ensure India’s future security and prevent Chinese hegemony in Asia. India must devise and implement a military policy aimed at ensuring its security from its principal threat. The principal threat is China, not Pakistan. While India and Pakistan have fought repeated military conflicts, no one seriously argues that Pakistan poses an existential threat to India. To the contrary, realists agree that it is in the national interest of both India and Pakistan to end their military confrontation and begin cooperation to ensure economic development of the region. South Asia’s inability to establish a credible free trade zone holds all South Asian countries back and prevents economic development. All the ingredients have long been in place for a rapprochement between India and Pakistan based not on mutual affection but mutual interests. Realists are the first to argue that sentimentality plays no role in foreign policy formulation. States cooperate not out of affection but national interest. Eventually, Indian and Pakistani policymakers will agree on this fact and find the courage to take the necessary steps to make this happen. The terrorist threat in Pakistan may prove to be the necessary catalyst. There is a growing realization in the Pakistani military that it needs peace with India to free up military resources to tackle the existential threat posed by Islamic militancy. Pakistan has diverted military forces from the Indian border to counter-terrorist operations. This has not reduced Pakistani security. While India hopes to “manage” its relationship with China through diplomatic engagement, the Chinese threat will always be present and will only grow as China increases its military and economic power and becomes more assertive. The China/India border is not properly demarcated and protracted India/China border talks have made no progress. China continues to claim large tracts of Indian territory. To meet this security challenge, <u><mark>India must </mark>extricate itself from the India/Pakistan dispute and <mark>recalibrate its military.</mark> <mark>Ending</mark> its reliance on <mark>arms imports will</mark> make India stronger and its military more credible. It will <mark>provide India with the infrastructure to defend itself</mark> in a protracted conflict without worrying about potential arms embargos by foreign arms suppliers. </u>American policy makers should realize that the indigenization of the Indian arms procurement process in in the national interest of both countries<u>. A stronger and more credible Indian military provides India with more options. This is because it can defend itself without relying on foreign patrons. <mark>This client</mark>/patron <mark>relationship has</mark> long been a source of humiliation for India that has <mark>prevented</mark> genuine close <mark>relations</mark>. <mark>Its removal would make it easier </mark>for the United States and India <mark>to cooperate on </mark>a more equal basis to help provide <mark>security </mark>in Asia. <mark>This would</mark> have a big <mark>impact</mark> on <strong><mark>nuclear weapons in South Asia</strong></mark>. <mark>India’s</mark> growing <mark>superiority in conventional</mark> military <mark>capability compels Pakistan to rely</mark> more and more <mark>on nuclear weapons</mark>. <mark>If India took</mark> concrete <mark>steps to convince Pakistan it has no designs on Pakistani sovereignty, </mark>it would remove Pakistan’s sense of insecurity and allow <mark>the</mark> two <mark>countries could</mark> begin to <mark>stand back from the brink</mark>. <mark>An India militarily self-sufficient in</mark> conventional military <mark>hardware is</mark> more capable of providing its own security and <mark>less reliant on nuclear weapons, making it easier</mark> for India and Pakistan <mark>to negotiate</mark> credible <mark>limits on</mark> their <mark>nuclear arsenals</mark>. Nuclear weapons programs are incredibly expensive and serious economic drains. <mark>As</mark> both <mark>countries build</mark> more <mark>nuclear weapons</mark> and integrate them into their defense plans, <mark>the danger of nuclear war</mark> (either <mark>intentional or accidental) increases exponentially</mark>. Pakistan cannot continue to keep spending valuable resources on a massive nuclear arsenal aimed only at intimidating India</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Liang 10 - University of Chicago, J.D.: with honors; John M. Olin Fellowship in Law and Economics; Executive Editor, The Chicago Journal of International Law [Mark, Summer, 11 Chi. J. Int'l L. 285, “COMMENT: A Three-Pronged Approach: How the United States Can Use WTO Disclosure Requirements to Curb Intellectual Property Infringement in China”, Lexis] fulltext: C. Execute a Bilateral Agreement To Encourage Joint Ventures The US should enter into a bilateral agreement with China that encourages US firms seeking to do business in China to do so via joint venture with a Chinese partner firm. 151 Through joint ventures, Chinese partner firms will have a stake in the economic success of the venture. 152 Chinese partner firms will then also have an interest in obtaining and protecting IPRs, which are vital to the profitability of the joint venture. The proposal will help cut China's "IP trade deficit" discussed in Part II. 153 While Part II classified China's IP trade deficit as a long-term cause of China's poor IPR enforcement record, an increase in joint ventures should present short-term improvement in IPR enforcement. The discussion in Part II of China's net importation of IP assumed that balancing the IP deficit would take decades, requiring a maturation of Chinese industry and technological capabilities before Chinese businesses can begin to create and take ownership of substantial amounts of IP. However, joint ventures should accelerate that process. Chinese firms would immediately take partial ownership and an economic interest in the IPRs held by their US partner firm. Further, with the help of the technical and creative expertise of their US partner, Chinese firms may increasingly develop their own IPRs. Joint ventures may also combat local protectionism. 154 Greater domestic ownership of IPRs means local firms and industries will shift their operations from production of knockoff goods and towards production of legitimate copies as part of their joint venture. Local Chinese governments will then shift their economic reliance on black market companies towards reliance on joint ventures who own IPRs. As a result, local governments will develop an interest in protecting and enforcing IPRs. Both sides of the joint venture may also aid each other in enforcement of their jointly held IPRs. The US firm, with its experience in the US judicial system, may be more accustomed to filing patent applications and trademarks and copyright registrations and pursuing infringement actions aggressively. The Chinese firm may be more accustomed with the workings and tendencies of the Chinese judiciary and agencies. Joint ventures will make Chinese businesses more familiar with IP ownership and assertion of their IPRs against infringers. With a greater domestic stake in IPRs, IPR enforcement may become a national priority, one in which the Chinese government begins investing to meet international standards. Market forces have already provided some incentive for joint ventures between US and Chinese companies. General Motors (GM) currently has entered partnerships with Chinese manufacturers to produce GM vehicles in China, with Chinese manufacturers taking 66 percent ownership in the combined venture. 155 The joint venture presents business benefits for both sides. GM can outsource its manufacturing operations (which may be costly and time-consuming to establish and operate) and Chinese manufacturers may operate more cheaply thereby saving GM expenses. 156 Chinese manufacturers benefit from technological transfer and sharing in the profits derived from the joint venture. 157 Microsoft has also gotten into the act. Starting in 2002, the US software giant has invested $ 750 million in joint ventures with China's software industry and $ 24 million per year over three years to develop research programs with Chinese universities. 158 While Microsoft's agreements do not address IPRs, Microsoft has stated that the agreement endeavors to foster Chinese development and creation of IP-protected goods. That in turn will lead to improvements in China's IPR regime. 159 The purpose of the bilateral agreement between the US and Chinese governments is to further promote joint ventures, providing incentives for their formation beyond those already bestowed by market forces. The bilateral agreement will contain provisions that provide comparative advantages for US and Chinese companies that form joint ventures, particularly as those advantages relate to IPRs. Hypothetical provisions include: (1) tax breaks or subsidies for joint ventures; (2) giving the Chinese firm in the joint venture at least 50 percent ownership in any IPRs held by the joint venture, at least in China; (3) exempting joint ventures from filing fees associated with applications for IP (for example, patent applications, trademark registration) and enforcement procedures (court and administrative agency filing fees); (4) any IPRs already registered with the PTO by the US half of the joint venture is automatically entitled to registration with SIPO in China; and (5) special fee-shifting or burden-shifting provisions which favor the joint venture in judicial proceedings in which a joint venture alleges IP infringement. The aims of these provisions are to increase the economic appeal of joint ventures, give the Chinese half of the joint venture a stake in the IPRs held by the venture, and to facilitate IPR ownership and [*317] enforcement by lowering the costs of IPR ownership and enforcement actions. These provisions will provide incentives, in addition to profit motive and market forces, for Chinese firms to assert their IPRs actively. This will reduce China's IP trade deficit and familiarize Chinese firms with the legal rights and economic benefits conferred by IPRs. Chinese businesses and the government may then come to recognize IPRs as a national priority and develop the political will to bolster their IPR enforcement efforts. This proposal faces three objections. First, it is unclear whether many of the bilateral agreement's provisions for joint ventures are actually acceptable under WTO rules and regulations. Providing subsidies and lowering the costs of IPR ownership and enforcement for joint US-China ventures may violate the national treatment principle of the GATT, 160 the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) 161 and TRIPS. 162 Overcoming this objection could involve turning the bilateral agreement into a multilateral one, extending its incentives for joint ventures to companies from all nations seeking to do business in China. However, extending the agreement in such a manner would require the consent and support of all other nations. Some nations may find it undesirable to place foreign companies that seek to "go it alone" in China at a comparative disadvantage. Second, it is unclear whether China would consent to such a bilateral (or multilateral) agreement encouraging joint ventures. Such an agreement would place purely domestic Chinese firms at an economic disadvantage relative to joint ventures. It would also result in lost government revenue due to subsidies, tax breaks, and waiver of fees. China would weigh these sacrifices against the benefits to Chinese industry from joint ventures such as technology transfer, increased economic output, and job creation. Third, the US may find it objectionable that in order for US companies to do business in China, US companies are compelled by the bilateral agreement to form partnerships with Chinese firms. This reduces the autonomy of US companies to dictate how they want to do business in China. It also forces US companies to share profits and ownership with their Chinese partners. The bilateral agreement's provisions, however, are intended to make joint ventures economically appealing, through subsidies, tax breaks, and facilitation of IPR ownership and enforcement. These incentives, in addition to those inherent to joint partnerships, may provide advantages that outweigh a US company's concerns over joint ventures. Further, US companies may find that "going it [*318] alone" is problematic, in light of lack of familiarity with the Chinese market, business regulations, government corruption, and rampant IP infringement. Forming partnerships with domestic Chinese firms may alleviate these problems. The Chinese firm will have greater understanding and experience with the Chinese market and regulations. Forming partnerships with Chinese firms may curry favor with Chinese government regulators and officials. The bilateral agreement's provisions also help joint ventures enforce their IPRs against infringement. Overall, most US companies are likely to welcome the bilateral agreement as assisting opportunities to do business in China.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Additionally, the plan’s bilateral inventive get <u>knocked down</u> by the WTO and forces it to become <u>multilateral</u> and <u>available</u> to ALL nations</h4><p><strong>Liang 10</strong> - University of Chicago, J.D.: with honors; John M. Olin Fellowship in Law and Economics; Executive Editor, The Chicago Journal of International Law [Mark, Summer, 11 Chi. J. Int'l L. 285, “COMMENT: A Three-Pronged Approach: How the United States Can Use WTO Disclosure Requirements to Curb Intellectual Property Infringement in China”, Lexis]</p><p>C. Execute a Bilateral Agreement To Encourage Joint Ventures</p><p><u><mark>The US should enter into a bilateral agreement with China that encourages</u></mark> US <u><mark>firms</mark> seeking <mark>to do business</mark> in China to <strong>do so <mark>via joint venture</strong></mark> </u>with a Chinese partner firm. 151 <u>Through joint ventures</u>, <u>Chinese partner firms will have a stake in the economic success of the venture</u>. 152 Chinese partner firms will then also have an interest in obtaining and protecting IPRs, which are vital to the profitability of the joint venture. The proposal will help cut China's "IP trade deficit" discussed in Part II. 153 While Part II classified China's IP trade deficit as a long-term cause of China's poor IPR enforcement record, an increase in joint ventures should present short-term improvement in IPR enforcement. The discussion in Part II of China's net importation of IP assumed that balancing the IP deficit would take decades, requiring a maturation of Chinese industry and technological capabilities before Chinese <u>businesses can</u> begin to <u>create and take ownership of substantial amounts of IP</u>. However, <u><strong>joint ventures should accelerate that process</u></strong>. Chinese firms would immediately take partial ownership and an economic interest in the IPRs held by their US partner firm. Further, <u>with the help of the technical and creative expertise of their US partner</u>, Chinese <u>firms may increasingly develop their own IPR</u>s. Joint ventures may also combat local protectionism. 154 Greater domestic ownership of IPRs means local firms and industries will shift their operations from production of knockoff goods and towards production of legitimate copies as part of their joint venture. Local Chinese governments will then shift their economic reliance on black market companies towards reliance on joint ventures who own IPRs. As a result, local governments will develop an interest in protecting and enforcing IPRs.</p><p><u>Both sides of the joint venture</u> <u>may</u> also <u>aid each other in enforcement of</u> their jointly held <u>IPRs</u>. The US firm, with its experience in the US judicial system, may be more accustomed to filing patent applications and trademarks and copyright registrations and pursuing infringement actions aggressively. The Chinese firm may be more accustomed with the workings and tendencies of the Chinese judiciary and agencies. Joint ventures will make Chinese businesses more familiar with IP ownership and assertion of their IPRs against infringers. With a greater domestic stake in IPRs, IPR enforcement may become a national priority, one in which the Chinese government begins investing to meet international standards.</p><p><u>Market forces have already provided some incentive for joint ventures</u> <u>between US and Chinese companies.</u> General Motors (GM) currently has entered partnerships with Chinese manufacturers to produce GM vehicles in China, with Chinese manufacturers taking 66 percent ownership in the combined venture. 155 <u><strong>The joint venture presents business benefits for both sides</u></strong>. GM can outsource its manufacturing operations (which may be costly and time-consuming to establish and operate) and Chinese manufacturers may operate more cheaply thereby saving GM expenses. 156 Chinese manufacturers benefit from technological transfer and sharing in the profits derived from the joint venture. 157 Microsoft has also gotten into the act. Starting in 2002, the US software giant has invested $ 750 million in joint ventures with China's software industry and $ 24 million per year over three years to develop research programs with Chinese universities. 158 While Microsoft's agreements do not address IPRs, Microsoft has stated that the agreement endeavors to foster Chinese development and creation of IP-protected goods. That in turn will lead to improvements in China's IPR regime. 159</p><p><u><mark>The purpose</mark> of the</u> bilateral <u>agreement</u> between the US and Chinese governments <u><mark>is to</u></mark> further <u><strong><mark>promote joint ventures</u></strong></mark>, <u>providing incentives for their formation <strong><mark>beyond</strong> those</u> a</mark>lready <u><mark>bestowed by market forces</mark>.</u> The bilateral agreement will contain provisions that provide comparative advantages for US and Chinese companies that form joint ventures, particularly as those advantages relate to IPRs. <u>Hypothetical <mark>provisions</mark> <mark>include</u></mark>: (1) <u><strong><mark>tax breaks or subsidies</u></strong></mark> for joint ventures; (2) <u><strong>giving the Chinese firm</u></strong> in the joint venture <u><strong>at least <mark>50 percent ownership</u></strong></mark> in any IPRs held by the joint venture, at least in China; (3) <u>exempting joint ventures from filing fees</u> associated with applications for IP (for example, patent applications, trademark registration) and enforcement procedures (court and administrative agency filing fees); (4) any IPRs already registered with the PTO by the US half of the joint venture is automatically entitled to registration with SIPO in China; and (5) special fee-shifting or burden-shifting provisions which favor the joint venture in judicial proceedings in which a joint venture alleges IP infringement. The aims of these <u>provisions</u> are to <u><strong>increase the economic appeal</u></strong> of joint ventures, give the Chinese half of the joint venture a stake in the IPRs held by the venture, and to facilitate IPR ownership and [*317] enforcement by lowering the costs of IPR ownership and enforcement actions. These provisions will provide incentives, in addition to profit motive and market forces, for Chinese firms to assert their IPRs actively. This will reduce China's IP trade deficit and familiarize Chinese firms with the legal rights and economic benefits conferred by IPRs. Chinese businesses and the government may then come to recognize IPRs as a national priority and develop the political will to bolster their IPR enforcement efforts.</p><p>This proposal faces three objections. First, <u><mark>it is unclear whether</u></mark> many of the <u><mark>bilateral agreement's</u></mark> provisions for joint ventures <u><strong><mark>are</mark> actually <mark>acceptable</u></strong> <u><strong>under WTO rules</u></strong></mark> and regulations. <u>Providing subsidies and lowering the costs of IPR ownership and enforcement for <mark>joint</mark> US-China <mark>ventures may violate</u></mark> the national treatment principle of the <u><strong><mark>GATT</u></strong></mark>, 160 the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (<u><strong><mark>SCM</u></strong>)</mark> 161 <u><strong><mark>and TRIPS</u></strong></mark>. 162 <u><mark>Overcoming this objection could involve turning the</mark> <mark>bilateral agreement into a <strong>multilateral one</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>extending</mark> its <mark>incentives</mark> for joint ventures <mark>to companies <strong>from all nations</u></strong></mark> seeking to do business in China. However, extending the agreement in such a manner would require the consent and support of all other nations. Some nations may find it undesirable to place foreign companies that seek to "go it alone" in China at a comparative disadvantage.</p><p>Second, it is unclear whether China would consent to such a bilateral (or multilateral) agreement encouraging joint ventures. Such an agreement would place purely domestic Chinese firms at an economic disadvantage relative to joint ventures. It would also result in lost government revenue due to subsidies, tax breaks, and waiver of fees. China would weigh these sacrifices against the benefits to Chinese industry from joint ventures such as technology transfer, increased economic output, and job creation.</p><p>Third, the US may find it objectionable that in order for US companies to do business in China, US companies are compelled by the bilateral agreement to form partnerships with Chinese firms. This reduces the autonomy of US companies to dictate how they want to do business in China. It also forces US companies to share profits and ownership with their Chinese partners. The bilateral agreement's provisions, however, are intended to make joint ventures economically appealing, through subsidies, tax breaks, and facilitation of IPR ownership and enforcement. These incentives, in addition to those inherent to joint partnerships, may provide advantages that outweigh a US company's concerns over joint ventures. Further, US companies may find that "going it [*318] alone" is problematic, in light of lack of familiarity with the Chinese market, business regulations, government corruption, and rampant IP infringement. Forming partnerships with domestic Chinese firms may alleviate these problems. The Chinese firm will have greater understanding and experience with the Chinese market and regulations. <u>Forming partnerships with Chinese firms may curry favor with Chinese government regulators and officials.</u> The bilateral agreement's provisions also help joint ventures enforce their IPRs against infringement. Overall, <u>most</u> US <u><strong>companies are likely to welcome the bilateral agreement</u></strong> as assisting opportunities to do business in China.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Pollack 15 —Ph.D., M.P.P., M.A. Helen Ross Professor at the University of Chicago School of Social Service Administration, affiliate professor in the Department of Public Health Sciences, nonresident fellow of the Century Foundation, and codirector of the University of Chicago Crime Lab (Harold, “Medicare for All — If It Were Politically Possible — Would Necessarily Replicate the Defects of Our Current System,” Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law, Vol. 40, No. 4, June 29, 2015, accessed through Duke journals online) fulltext: Medicare for All, ideally implemented, could offer powerful advantages over our current health care financial system. Unfortunately, the political obstacles to such a system are formidable and are likely to remain so for decades. More to the point, a politically viable single-payer system would not replace our currently dysfunctional health care politics. It would be a product of that same legislative process and political economy and thus be disfigured by the same interest group politics, path dependence, and fragmentation that Laurence Seidman rightly laments. Laurence Seidman's brief for single payer will be congenial to many JHPPL readers, and for good reasons. As someone who has spent the past seven years advocating for the Affordable Care Act (ACA), I must concede that a well-conceived, well-implemented Medicare for All system would offer powerful advantages over our current health care financing system. Facing the imperative of an overall budget, armed with the pricing power of public monopsony, Medicare for All is indeed more likely to control costs than any market-based approach is that relies on fragmented private payers. Although insurer competition is proving helpful to restrain prices on the new marketplaces, there is little evidence that such completion can fundamentally reduce costs. Perhaps the opposite is true when these many payers bargain with concentrated groups of providers and prestigious academic medical centers that command vastly greater public legitimacy. Government price pressures are never painless or administered without at least some toxic side effects. As we have seen in Medicaid, such policies can push too hard. They remain valuable tools in the mix. Medicare for All also offers one path to escape the pathologies and regressive impact of employer-based health coverage. Employer-based coverage imposes the singular defect that losing your job simultaneously disrupts your health insurance coverage. The ACA provides a valuable safety net through subsidized coverage on the new marketplaces, though this remains personally and sometimes financially disruptive for many individuals and families. As Seidman rightly notes, employer-sponsored insurance forces firms to waste valuable managerial attention on the complexities of health insurance coverage. Across the political spectrum, policy experts hunger for alternatives. Tax expenditures for employer-sponsored insurance now total roughly $250 billion annually (CBO 2013). These subsidies benefit only the employed and actively insured. Because these subsidies are most generous to those with high marginal tax rates who buy the most generous plans, they are among the most regressive in the American tax code. The ACA's “Cadillac tax” provisions chip away at these tax expenditures. It would be better to do more, though the broad popularity of current policies limits what can be done. Medicare for All may be better for population health. If every American had reliable (and similar) health insurance coverage, big-city emergency departments would be less Dickensian places than they currently are. Medicare for All would also relieve state governments of many Medicaid safety net responsibilities. Right now, many states carry out these responsibilities unenthusiastically, and not well. Though Medicare for All is ideologically radical, it holds at least the promise of simplicity to voters, consumers, policy makers, and employers. As Seidman observes, Medicare has a five-decade track record of basic administrative competence and broad public support. Assuming the Can Opener For all of these reasons, my argument with Seidman comes from someone who shares the goals of universal coverage and inclusive social insurance but who wonders whether Medicare for All is really the best fix. My point is not (merely) that Medicare for All seems politically out of reach for the foreseeable future. More to the point, if Medicare for All actually were enacted, it would necessarily replicate many of the defects its proponents associate with both the ACA and our pre-reform financing system. Seidman writes what must be called one of the great assume-the-can-opener openings I've seen: “It is striking how many problems facing the Affordable Care Act … would disappear if the nation were instead implementing Medicare for All.” To state the obvious, the short-term political obstacles (where short-term is defined in units of decades rather than years) make this a distant proposition. If our current problems vanish, they will do so only through one of the most prolonged vanishing acts in American history. During the 1970s and 1980s, a broad liberal-left coalition, including many single-payer advocates, came to recognize that Medicare for All was unlikely to get through the US Congress within our lifetimes. Our political system demanded a more incremental model, one less disruptive to the status quo, less frightening to the myriad of “protected publics” — veterans, senior citizens, and others who hold implicit political veto power over what can be done (Starr 2013). After the Clinton health care debacle, alliances exemplified by Health Care for America Now (HCAN) (Kirsch 2012) negotiated the ambitious but incremental reform that became the ACA. It is therefore ironic that the ACA goes by the moniker of Obamacare. Its key features were negotiated long before anyone thought that Barack Obama would be a serious presidential contender. Then in 2008, as Mark A. Peterson (2011) has detailed in the pages of this journal, Democrats won a great electoral victory that yielded the largest and most cohesive liberal legislative majority in fifty years. By March 2010, the ACA became law. It was (and remains) an incredibly close thing. The public option — the one element of the ACA most dear to its progressive advocates — proved to be a bridge too far. Although Senator Joseph Lieberman was the most vocal Democratic opponent, the public option faced quiet and powerful opposition from much of the supply side of the medical care economy. Then there is the minor matter of raising taxes by perhaps 8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) as we move health care spending more fully onto public budgets. To Seidman's credit, he acknowledges the need for a large tax increase to bring health care onto the public budget. This is a subject that often attracts embarrassed hand-waving among single-payer advocates. Seidman identifies important elements that should be in the mix: a payroll tax, a valued-added tax, an income tax surcharge. That is a heavy lift. It may be an even heavier lift. Seidman's essay claims that we might reduce health care spending from 18 percent to 15 percent of GDP. I find this politically implausible. We're not going to wring nearly one-fifth out of our health care economy while we simultaneously impose radical changes to health care financing. Such contraction is the precise opposite of what we did in establishing Medicare. It will be a miracle if we hold medical spending steady at 18 percent given our aging population. In one 2013 analysis, Michael E. Chernew (2013: 861) calculates that “if the gap between inflation-adjusted per beneficiary Medicare spending and GDP growth per capita drops to zero — a level never sustained for a significant period — Medicare spending will rise from 3.7 percent of GDP to 5.1 percent in 2035.” Under any financing system, we will probably require substantially greater revenue to prevent health care from deeply damaging the federal budget. Neither political party has acknowledged this reality. Although the electorate and its congressional representatives like to believe that they support fiscal discipline, the evidence to back up these protestations is thin. The ACA's most unpopular elements are those concerned with cost control or deficit reduction: the Independent Payment Advisory Board, the Cadillac tax, the employer mandate, reduced subsidies to Medicare Advantage plans, the medical device tax, reduced Medicare reimbursement rates to hospitals, the individual mandate. At least the first five of these items are unlikely, politically, to survive in current form. The Inherent Complexity of Medicare for All Medicare for All would prove to be a more complex policy than many of its proponents fully consider or admit. Because the ultimate source of policy complexity is political, I wonder how different our policy dilemmas would really be if we were to somehow enact a single-payer system. The initial sales pitch would be admirably simple: we will mail a Medicare card to every American. Yet because single payer upends so many things the ACA seeks to leave intact, Medicare for All would raise intricate and divisive transitional issues. The ACA's major sales pitch to the healthy and insured was, “If you like your insurance, you can keep it.” This pledge proved politically damaging when it could not be fully kept for a very small proportion of Americans who do not receive marketplace subsidies and who had previously purchased rather minimal or risk-selected plans. Medicare for All would be fundamentally more disruptive for tens of millions of people. As a matter of basic accounting, a huge reform that creates millions of winners creates millions of losers, too: affluent workers receiving generous tax expenditures, too many constituencies to count across the supply side of the medical economy who are likely to be squeezed in a new system, individuals subject to small or large tax increases, to name a few. This list includes some of the most powerful and organized constituencies in American politics. They would have to be accommodated in complex, sometimes unappetizing, ways. It is in the writing of detailed legislation that one confronts the specific issues that must be addressed. To my knowledge, no fully articulated single-payer proposal was ever drafted. This is telling. Medicare for All would require a serious rewrite of state-federal relations, radical surgery to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the digestion of various Medicaid functions now performed by state governments, and a myriad of other granular details. Then there are the legal and constitutional challenges. Some would argue that Medicare for All avoids the ACA's constitutional minefields exemplified by the individual mandate. It doesn't. The basic issues in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), went beyond whether a mandate is a tax or other niceties. The real fight concerned the constitutional propriety of a post–New Deal expansive federal government that seeks to regulate and humanize our national health care market. Medicare for All would stake an even greater claim to contested views of federalism and the reach of national government. At this writing, one awkward sentence of the ACA has produced a specious but dangerous Supreme Court challenge in King v. Burwell (759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S.Ct. 475 (2014)). I'm confident that constitutional-conservative advocates and judges would identify more plausible concerns and glitches in any single-payer plan.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Circumvention kills the aff – political dilution and legal challenges make their single payer utopia impossible</h4><p><strong>Pollack 15</strong> —Ph.D., M.P.P., M.A. Helen Ross Professor at the University of Chicago School of Social Service Administration, affiliate professor in the Department of Public Health Sciences, nonresident fellow of the Century Foundation, and codirector of the University of Chicago Crime Lab (Harold, “Medicare for All — If It Were Politically Possible — <u>Would Necessarily Replicate the Defects of Our Current System,” Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law, Vol. 40, No. 4, June 29, 2015, accessed through Duke journals online)</p><p><mark>Medicare for All, ideally implemented, could offer</u></mark> powerful <u><mark>advantages</mark> over our current health care financial system. <mark>Unfortunately, the</mark> political <mark>obstacles to such a system are formidable</u></mark> and are likely to remain so for decades. More to the point,<u> a </u>politically<u> viable <mark>single-payer system would not replac</mark>e our currently <mark>dysfunctional health care politics<strong>. It would be a product of that same</mark> legislative process and <mark>political economy and thus</mark> be <mark>disfigured by the same interest group</mark> politics, path dependence, <mark>and fragmentation</u></strong></mark> that Laurence Seidman rightly laments.</p><p>Laurence Seidman's brief for single payer will be congenial to many JHPPL readers, and for good reasons. As someone who has spent the past seven years advocating for the Affordable Care Act (ACA), I must concede that <u>a well-conceived, well-implemented Medicare for All system would offer powerful advantages</u> over our current health care financing system.</p><p>Facing the imperative of an overall budget, armed with the pricing power of public monopsony, Medicare for All is indeed more likely to control costs than any market-based approach is that relies on fragmented private payers. Although insurer competition is proving helpful to restrain prices on the new marketplaces, there is little evidence that such completion can fundamentally reduce costs. Perhaps the opposite is true when these many payers bargain with concentrated groups of providers and prestigious academic medical centers that command vastly greater public legitimacy. Government price pressures are never painless or administered without at least some toxic side effects. As we have seen in Medicaid, such policies can push too hard. They remain valuable tools in the mix.</p><p>Medicare for All also offers one path to escape the pathologies and regressive impact of employer-based health coverage. Employer-based coverage imposes the singular defect that losing your job simultaneously disrupts your health insurance coverage. The ACA provides a valuable safety net through subsidized coverage on the new marketplaces, though this remains personally and sometimes financially disruptive for many individuals and families. As Seidman rightly notes, employer-sponsored insurance forces firms to waste valuable managerial attention on the complexities of health insurance coverage.</p><p>Across the political spectrum, policy experts hunger for alternatives. Tax expenditures for employer-sponsored insurance now total roughly $250 billion annually (CBO 2013). These subsidies benefit only the employed and actively insured. Because these subsidies are most generous to those with high marginal tax rates who buy the most generous plans, they are among the most regressive in the American tax code. The ACA's “Cadillac tax” provisions chip away at these tax expenditures. It would be better to do more, though the broad popularity of current policies limits what can be done.</p><p>Medicare for All may be better for population health. If every American had reliable (and similar) health insurance coverage, big-city emergency departments would be less Dickensian places than they currently are. Medicare for All would also relieve state governments of many Medicaid safety net responsibilities. Right now, many states carry out these responsibilities unenthusiastically, and not well.</p><p><u>Though Medicare for All is ideologically radical, it holds at least the promise of simplicity to voters, consumers, policy makers, and employers. As Seidman observes, Medicare has a five-decade track record of basic administrative competence and broad public support.</p><p><strong>Assuming the Can Opener</p><p></strong>For all of these reasons, my argument</u> with Seidman <u>comes from someone who shares the goals of universal coverage and inclusive social insurance but who wonders whether Medicare for All is really the best fix. My point is not (merely) that Medicare for All seems politically out of reach</u> for the foreseeable future<u>. More to the point<strong>, if <mark>Medicare for All </mark>actually were enacted, it <mark>would necessarily replicate</mark> many of <mark>the defects</mark> its <mark>proponents associate with both the ACA and our pre-reform</mark> financing <mark>system</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>Seidman writes what must be called one of the great assume-the-can-opener openings I've seen: “It is striking how many problems facing the Affordable Care Act … would disappear if the nation were instead implementing Medicare for All.” <u>To state the obvious, the short-term political obstacles (where short-term is defined in units of decades</u> rather than years) make this a distant proposition. If our current problems vanish, they will do so only through one of the most prolonged vanishing acts in American history.</p><p><u>During the</u> 1970s and <u>1980s, a broad liberal-left coalition, including many single-payer advocates, came to recognize that Medicare for All was unlikely to get through the US Congress within our lifetimes. Our political system demanded a more incremental model,</u> one less disruptive to the status quo, less frightening to the myriad of “protected publics” — veterans, senior citizens, and others who hold implicit political veto power over what can be done (Starr 2013). After the Clinton health care debacle, alliances exemplified by Health Care for America Now (HCAN) (Kirsch 2012) negotiated the ambitious but incremental reform that became the ACA.</p><p><u>It is</u> therefore ironic that the ACA goes by the moniker of Obamacare. Its key features were negotiated long before anyone thought that Barack Obama would be a serious presidential contender. Then in 2008, as Mark A. Peterson (2011) has detailed in the pages of this journal, Democrats won a great electoral victory that yielded the largest and most cohesive liberal legislative majority in fifty years.</p><p>By March 2010, the ACA became law. It was (and remains) an incredibly close thing. <u>The public option — the one element of the ACA most dear to its progressive advocates — proved to be a bridge too far. Although Senator Joseph Lieberman was the most vocal Democratic opponent, the public option faced quiet and powerful opposition from much of the supply side of the medical care economy.</p><p></u>Then <u>there is the minor matter of <mark>raising taxes </mark>by perhaps 8 percent of gross domestic product</u> (<u>GDP</u>) <u>as we move health care spending more fully onto public budgets.</u> To Seidman's credit, he acknowledges the need for a large tax increase to bring health care onto the public budget. <u>This</u> is a <u>subject</u> that <u>often <mark>attracts</mark> embarrassed <mark>hand-waving among single-payer advocates</u></mark>. Seidman identifies <u>important elements that should be in the mix: a payroll tax, a valued-added tax, an income tax surcharge. That is a heavy lift.</p><p><strong>It may be an even heavier lift</strong>. <mark>Seidman</u>'s</mark> essay <u><mark>claims</u></mark> that <u><mark>we might reduce health care spending</mark> from 18 percent to 15 percent of GDP<strong>. <mark>I find this politically implausible</strong></mark>. We're not going to wring nearly one-fifth out of our health care economy while we simultaneously impose radical changes to health care financing<strong>. <mark>Such contraction is the </mark>precise <mark>opposite of what we did in establishing Medicare</strong>. It will be a miracle if we hold</mark> medical <mark>spending steady</mark> at 18 percent g</u>iven our aging population. In one 2013 analysis, Michael E. Chernew (2013: 861) calculates that “if <u>the gap between inflation-adjusted per beneficiary Medicare spending and GDP growth per capita drops to zero — a level never sustained for a significant period — Medicare spending will rise</u> from 3.7 percent of GDP <u>to 5.1 percent in 2035</u>.” <u>Under any financing system, we will probably require substantially greater revenue to prevent health care from deeply damaging the federal budget. Neither political party has acknowledged this reality.</p><p><mark>Although the electorate</mark> and its congressional representatives like to <mark>believe that they support fiscal discipline</u></mark>, the evidence to back up these protestations is thin<u>. <mark>The ACA's most unpopular elements are those concerned with cost control</u></mark> or deficit reduction: <u>the Independent Payment Advisory Board, the Cadillac tax, the employer mandate, reduced subsidies to Medicare Advantage plans, the medical device tax, reduced Medicare reimbursement rates to hospitals, the individual mandate. At least the first five of these items are unlikely, politically, to survive in current form.</p><p>The Inherent Complexity of Medicare for All</p><p><strong>Medicare for All would prove to be a more complex policy than many of its proponents fully consider or admit</u></strong>. Because <u>the ultimate source of policy complexity is political</u>, I wonder how different our policy dilemmas would really be if we were to somehow enact a single-payer system.</p><p><u><mark>The initial</mark> sales <mark>pitch would be</mark> admirably <mark>simple</u></mark>: we will mail a Medicare card to every American. <u><mark>Yet because single payer upends so many things </mark>the ACA seeks to leave intact, <mark>Medicare for All would raise</mark> intricate and <mark>divisive</mark> transitional <mark>issues</mark>. The ACA's major sales </u>pitch to the healthy and insured <u>was, “If you like your insurance, you can keep it.” This pledge proved politically damaging when it could not be fully kept for a very small proportion of Americans who do not receive marketplace subsidies and who had previously purchased rather minimal or risk-selected plans.</p><p><strong><mark>Medicare for All would be fundamentally </mark>more <mark>disruptive</mark> for tens of millions of people.</strong> As a matter of basic accounting, <mark>a </mark>huge <mark>reform that creates millions of winners creates millions of losers, too:</mark> affluent workers receiving generous tax expenditures, too many constituencies to count across the supply side of the medical economy </u>who are likely to be squeezed in a new system, <u>individuals subject to small or large tax increases, to name a few. <mark>This </mark>list <mark>includes</mark> some of <mark>the most powerful</mark> and organized <mark>constituencies in American politics.</u> <u>They would have to be</mark> <mark>accommodated in</mark> complex</u>, sometimes <u>unappetizing, ways.</p><p><strong>It is <mark>in the writing of detailed legislation </mark>that <mark>one confronts </mark>the <mark>specific issues that must be addressed</u></strong></mark>. To my knowledge, <u><mark>no fully articulated single-payer proposal was ever drafted. <strong>This is telling.</u></strong> <u>Medicare for All would require a serious rewrite of state-</mark>federal<mark> relations, </mark>radical <mark>surgery to the</mark> </u>Employee Retirement Income Security Act <u>(<mark>ERISA),</mark> the <mark>digestion of</mark> various <mark>Medicaid</mark> functions now performed by state governments, <mark>and a myriad of other granular details.</p><p></u></mark>Then <u><mark>there are the legal</mark> and constitutional <mark>challenges</mark>. Some would argue that Medicare</u> for All <u>avoids the ACA's constitutional minefields</u> exemplified by the individual mandate. <u><strong>It doesn't.</u></strong> <u>The basic issues in</u> National Federation of Independent Business v. <u>Sebelius</u>, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), <u>went beyond whether a mandate is a tax or other niceties. The real fight concerned the constitutional propriety of a post–New Deal expansive federal government that seeks to regulate</u> and humanize <u>our national health care market.</p><p>Medicare for All would stake an even greater claim to contested views of federalism and the reach of national government</u>. At this writing, one awkward sentence of the ACA has produced a specious but dangerous Supreme Court challenge in King v. Burwell (759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S.Ct. 475 (2014)). I'm confident that <u><mark>constitutional-conservative </mark>advocates and <mark>judges would identify </mark>more plausible concerns and <mark>glitches in any single-payer plan.</p></u></mark><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Kusari et al 14—Department of Biochemical and Chemical Engineering, TU Dortmund fulltext: (Parijat, with Michael Spiteller, Oliver Kayser and Souvik Kusari, “Recent Advances in Research on Cannabis sativa L. Endophytes and Their Prospect for the Pharmaceutical Industry”, R. N. Kharwar et al. (eds.), Microbial Diversity and Biotechnology in Food Security, Springer, dml) In the last decade, discovery and intensive in- vestigation of plant-associated microorganisms, termed endophytic microorganisms (or endophytes) have led to the possibility of exploring the potential benefits of these promising organ- isms in agriculture, medicinal, and pharmaceuti- cal sectors. Endophytes can be defined, in a gen- eralist manner, as a group of microorganisms that infect the internal tissues of plant without caus- ing any immediate symptom of infection and/or visible manifestation of disease, and live in mu- tualistic association with plants for at least a part of their life cycle (Bacon and White 2000; Kusari and Spiteller 2011, 2012; Kusari et al. 2012c). Endophytes are ubiquitously existent in almost every plant tissue examined till date (Guerin 1898; Redecker et al. 2000; Strobel 2002; Stan- iek et al. 2008). With the increasing enormity of global health problems, and the incidence of drug- resistant microorganisms and new diseases, it has become clear that faster and effective pursuits for drug discovery and sustainable production must be made. This cumulative crisis has already led to the discovery and characterization of potent endophytes which can produce bioactive natural products, occasionally mimetic to their associ- ated host plants (Puri et al. 2005, 2006; Eyberger et al. 2006; Kour et al. 2008; Kusari et al. 2008, 2009a, b, c, 2011, 2012b; Shweta et al. 2010). Endophytes are also known to produce a diverse range of biologically active secondary metabo- lites (Strobel and Daisy 2003; Strobel et al. 2004; Zhang et al. 2006; Gunatilaka 2006; Staniek et al. 2008; Suryanarayanana et al. 2009; Aly et al. 2010; Kharwar et al. 2011) that are known to contribute to host plant tolerance against vari- ous environmental stress herbivory, heat, salt, disease, and drought (Stone et al. 2000; Redman et al. 2002; Arnold et al. 2003; Rodriguez et al. 2004, 2008; Waller et al. 2005; Márquez et al. 2007; Rodriguez and Redman 2008; Porras-Alfa- ro and Bayman 2011). Even with such colossal amounts and breadth of successful discoveries of potentially beneficial endophytes, it has still not been possible to utilize them commercially for the “sustained production” of the desired phar- maceutically valuable compounds (Kusari et al. 2012c, 2013b). Therefore, understanding of the multitude of endophyte relationships with host plants needs more attention and investigation in various related aspects such as the endophyte– plant interactions, multispecies crosstalk, and links with herbivores and predators. Endophytic Microorganisms Associated with C. sativa L. Our work on the investigation of endophytic mi- crobial community harbored in C. sativa L. was based on the recent advancements made in devis- ing various strategies of discovering endophytes based on the rationale of their cost–benefit rela- tionship with their hosts in order to exploit their potential beneficial efficacies. Since this plant is protected by national and international legisla- tions and regulations, we sampled and imported the C. sativa L. plants from the legal farmer Bedrocan BV Medicinal Cannabis (The Neth- erlands) with the permission of the Federal In- stitute for Drugs and Medical Devices (Bundes- institutfür Arzneimittel und Medizinprodukte, BfArM), Germany under the license number 458 49 89. Plant specimens have been depos- ited at the Bedrocan BV with voucher numbers (A1)05.41.050710. We then isolated a plethora of endophytes (Fig. 1.2) and subjected them to various culture conditions and parameters and even challenged them (dual-culture antagonis- tic assays of the fungal isolates) with two major phytopahogens of the Cannabis plant, namely B. cinerea and T. roseum, which are potent green- house threats for the cultivars and known to cause disasters at epidemic scales (Barloy and Pelhate 1962; Bush Doctor 1985). Our target was to evaluate the endophytes within the ecological and biochemical contexts, especially focusing on their biocontrol potential to thwart the host- specific phytopathogens. This led us towards the identification of potent endophytes that not only proved to be promising biocontrol agents against the specific phytopathogens, but also demonstrat- ed qualities of being a natural reservoir of bioac- tive secondary metabolites (Kusari et al. 2013a). To the best of our knowledge, this work was the first to report the incidence, diversity analysis, and qualitative biocontrol potential of endophyt- ic fungi harbored in C. sativa L. plants. Eleven different kinds of antagonistic interactions are observed when the endophytes were challenged with the phytopathogens in five different media, namely Sabouraud agar (SA), nutrient agar (NA), potato dextrose agar (PDA), malt extract agar (MEA), and water agar (WA), respectively. This highlights the fact that endophytes are ca- pable of producing different compounds under varying conditions which are otherwise “cryptic” metabolites. All the endophyte isolates showed antagonistic potency to some extent against ei- ther one or both of the phytopathogens in vary- ing the media, but three of the isolates proved to exhibit prominent complete inhibition (Kusari et al. 2013a). Many endophytes started sporulat- ing in NA, as expected, revealing their response to the unfavorable condition while countering the confronting pathogen. Interestingly, the same en- dophyte isolates showed various other interesting inhibition patterns such as formation of a clear halo (inhibition zone), release of exudates with- out even physical contact of mycelia, and change of mycelia color among others, which accompa- nied the inhibitions. Plant–fungal associations are always accom- panied by various physical and chemical inter- actions thereby establishing them either in a localized and/or systemic manner (Kusari et al. 2012c). The varying assortment of antagonisms demonstrated by the endophytes against the host phytopathogens indicates that their efficacies are either due to the production of secondary metabolites or the immediate intermediates in the biosynthetic pathway of those metabolites, triggered upon pathogen challenge. The interac- tions were in complete agreement with the well- known “one strain many compounds (OSMAC)” approach (Kusari et al. 2012c), thereby revealing that endophytes are capable of producing cryptic metabolites when elicited under certain selec- tive interacting conditions apart from the normal metabolites produced under normal fermentation conditions. Our work not only reports endophytic fungi as potent biocontrol agents under suitable conditions but also provides a platform to com- pare the endophytes of the same plant from dif- ferent wild populations and collection centers (if accessible) for global-scale diversity analysis and the production of successive bioactive secondary metabolites (target and/or nontarget) with strong therapeutic potential. Outlook The potential of inimitable fungal endophytes adept in biosynthesizing bioactive metabolites, occasionally those imitative to their host plants, has irrefutably been recognized. Endophytes can be accepted as new sources for gene- and drug discovery in medical sciences and will provide, by distinct genomic blueprints, new insights in gene assembly and expression control. Nonethe- less, there is still no known breakthrough in the biotechnological production of these bioactive natural products using endophytes. It is imperious to expound the metabolome in endophytes corre- lating to their host plants on a case-by-case basis to comprehend how the biogenetic gene clusters are regulated and their expression is affected in planta and ex planta (i.e., by environmental changes and axenic culture conditions). Only a deeper understanding of the host–endophyte re- lationship at the molecular level might help to in- duce and optimize secondary metabolite produc- tion under laboratory conditions to yield desired metabolites in a sustained manner using endo- phytes. This can be achieved by challenging the endophytes by specific and nonspecific patho- gens, especially those attacking their host plants, by devising suitable coculture and dual-culture setups (qualitative, followed by suitable quanti- tative experiments). The pathogens encountered can serve as an inducer that might trigger the pro- duction of defense secondary metabolites with prodrug-like properties. Once the production of a target or nontarget natural product with a desired biological activity has been achieved, techniques such as genome mining, metabolic engineering, and metagenomics could be utilized to influence the manipulation of secondary metabolite pro- duction by endophytic fungi or the plant itself by directed infection with beneficial endophytes (Kusari et al. 2012c, d). Such directed investiga- tion with the scientific rationale of mimicking the natural plant–endophyte–pathogen interactions should be pursued to warrant a virtually incessant discovery and sustained supply of bioactive pro- drugs against the current and emerging diseases.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Specifically cannabis solves drug-resistant diseases</h4><p><strong>Kusari et al 14</strong>—Department of Biochemical and Chemical Engineering, TU Dortmund</p><p>(Parijat, with Michael Spiteller, Oliver Kayser and Souvik Kusari, “Recent Advances in Research on <u><mark>Cannabis</mark> sativa L. <mark>Endophytes</u></mark> and Their Prospect for the Pharmaceutical Industry”, R. N. Kharwar et al. (eds.), Microbial Diversity and Biotechnology in Food Security, Springer, dml)</p><p>In the last decade, <u><mark>discovery </mark>and intensive in- vestigation of plant-associated microorganisms</u>, termed endophytic microorganisms (or <u>endophytes</u>) <u><mark>have </mark>led to the possibility of exploring the <mark>potential benefits</mark> of these promising organ- isms <mark>in</mark> agriculture, medicinal, and <mark>pharma</mark>ceuti- cal sectors</u>. Endophytes can be defined, in a gen- eralist manner, as a group of microorganisms that infect the internal tissues of plant without caus- ing any immediate symptom of infection and/or visible manifestation of disease, and live in mu- tualistic association with plants for at least a part of their life cycle (Bacon and White 2000; Kusari and Spiteller 2011, 2012; Kusari et al. 2012c). Endophytes are ubiquitously existent in almost every plant tissue examined till date (Guerin 1898; Redecker et al. 2000; Strobel 2002; Stan- iek et al. 2008). <u><mark>With</mark> the <strong><mark>increasing</mark> enormity</strong> of <mark>global health problems, and</mark> the incidence of <strong><mark>drug- resistant</mark> micro<mark>organisms</strong> and <strong>new diseases</strong></mark>, it has become clear that <mark>faster and effective pursuits for drug discovery</mark> and sustainable production <mark>must be made.</mark> This cumulative crisis has already led to the discovery and characterization of potent endophytes</u> which can produce bioactive natural products, occasionally mimetic to their associ- ated host plants (Puri et al. 2005, 2006; Eyberger et al. 2006; Kour et al. 2008; Kusari et al. 2008, 2009a, b, c, 2011, 2012b; Shweta et al. 2010). Endophytes are also known to produce a diverse range of biologically active secondary metabo- lites (Strobel and Daisy 2003; Strobel et al. 2004; Zhang et al. 2006; Gunatilaka 2006; Staniek et al. 2008; Suryanarayanana et al. 2009; Aly et al. 2010; Kharwar et al. 2011) that are known to contribute to host plant tolerance against vari- ous environmental stress herbivory, heat, salt, disease, and drought (Stone et al. 2000; Redman et al. 2002; Arnold et al. 2003; Rodriguez et al. 2004, 2008; Waller et al. 2005; Márquez et al. 2007; Rodriguez and Redman 2008; Porras-Alfa- ro and Bayman 2011).<u> Even with such colossal amounts and breadth of successful discoveries of potentially beneficial endophytes, it has still not been possible to utilize them commercially for the “sustained production” of the desired phar- maceutically valuable compounds</u> (Kusari et al. 2012c, 2013b). Therefore, understanding of the multitude of endophyte relationships with host plants needs more attention and investigation in various related aspects such as the endophyte– plant interactions, multispecies crosstalk, and links with herbivores and predators.</p><p>Endophytic Microorganisms Associated with C. sativa L.</p><p><u>Our work on the <mark>investigation of</mark> endophytic mi- crobial community harbored in <mark>C. sativa</mark> L. was based on the recent advancements made in devis- ing various strategies of discovering endophytes</u> based on the rationale of their cost–benefit rela- tionship with their hosts in order to exploit their potential beneficial efficacies. Since <u>this plant <mark>is protected by national</mark> and international <mark>legisla- tions and regulations</u></mark>, we sampled and imported the C. sativa L. plants from the legal farmer Bedrocan BV Medicinal Cannabis (The Neth- erlands) with the permission of the Federal In- stitute for Drugs and Medical Devices (Bundes- institutfür Arzneimittel und Medizinprodukte, BfArM), Germany under the license number 458 49 89. Plant specimens have been depos- ited at the Bedrocan BV with voucher numbers (A1)05.41.050710. <u>We then isolated a plethora of endophytes</u> (Fig. 1.2) <u>and subjected them to various culture conditions and parameters and even challenged them</u> (dual-culture antagonis- tic assays of the fungal isolates) with two major phytopahogens of <u>the <mark>Cannabis </mark>plant</u>, namely B. cinerea and T. roseum, which are potent green- house threats for the cultivars and known to cause disasters at epidemic scales (Barloy and Pelhate 1962; Bush Doctor 1985). <u>Our target was to evaluate the endophytes within the ecological and biochemical contexts, especially focusing on their biocontrol potential to thwart the host- specific phytopathogens. This led us towards the identification of potent endophytes that not only <mark>proved</mark> to be promising biocontrol agents against the specific phytopathogens, but also demonstrat- ed qualities of being <mark>a <strong>natural reservoir</strong></mark> of bioac- tive secondary metabolites</u> (Kusari et al. 2013a). To the best of our knowledge, <u>this work was the first to report the incidence, diversity analysis, and qualitative biocontrol potential of endophyt- ic fungi harbored in C. sativa L. plants</u>. Eleven different kinds of antagonistic interactions are observed when the endophytes were challenged with the phytopathogens in five different media, namely Sabouraud agar (SA), nutrient agar (NA), potato dextrose agar (PDA), malt extract agar (MEA), and water agar (WA), respectively. This highlights the fact that <u>endophytes are ca- pable of producing different compounds under varying conditions which are otherwise “cryptic” metabolites</u>. All the endophyte isolates showed antagonistic potency to some extent against ei- ther one or both of the phytopathogens in vary- ing the media, but three of the isolates proved to exhibit prominent complete inhibition (Kusari et al. 2013a). Many endophytes started sporulat- ing in NA, as expected, revealing their response to the unfavorable condition while countering the confronting pathogen. Interestingly, the same en- dophyte isolates showed various other interesting inhibition patterns such as formation of a clear halo (inhibition zone), release of exudates with- out even physical contact of mycelia, and change of mycelia color among others, which accompa- nied the inhibitions.</p><p>Plant–fungal associations are always accom- panied by various physical and chemical inter- actions thereby establishing them either in a localized and/or systemic manner (Kusari et al. 2012c). The varying assortment of antagonisms demonstrated by the endophytes against the host phytopathogens indicates that their efficacies are either due to the production of secondary metabolites or the immediate intermediates in the biosynthetic pathway of those metabolites, triggered upon pathogen challenge. The interac- tions were in complete agreement with the well- known “one strain many compounds (OSMAC)” approach (Kusari et al. 2012c), thereby revealing that endophytes are capable of producing cryptic metabolites when elicited under certain selec- tive interacting conditions apart from the normal metabolites produced under normal fermentation conditions. <u><mark>Our work</mark> not only <mark>reports</mark> endophytic fungi as potent biocontrol agents under suitable conditions but also provides a platform to com- pare the endophytes of the same plant from dif- ferent wild populations and collection centers</u> (if accessible) <u>for <mark>global-scale diversity analysis and</mark> the production of <mark>successive</mark> bioactive secondary <mark>metabolites</u></mark> (target and/or nontarget) <u><mark>with <strong></mark>strong <mark>therapeutic potential</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>Outlook</p><p><mark>The potential of</u></mark> inimitable fungal <u><mark>endophytes</mark> adept in biosynthesizing bioactive metabolites</u>, occasionally those imitative to their host plants, <u><mark>has <strong>irrefutably been recognized</strong></mark>. Endophytes can be accepted <mark>as <strong>new sources</strong> for</mark> gene- and <mark>drug discovery </mark>in medical sciences and will provide</u>, by distinct genomic blueprints, <u>new insights in gene assembly and expression control</u>. Nonethe- less, <u>there is still no known breakthrough in the biotechnological production of these bioactive natural products using endophytes</u>. It is imperious to expound the metabolome in endophytes corre- lating to their host plants on a case-by-case basis to comprehend how the biogenetic gene clusters are regulated and their expression is affected in planta and ex planta (i.e., by environmental changes and axenic culture conditions). <u>Only a deeper understanding</u> of the host–endophyte re- lationship at the molecular level <u>might help to in- duce and optimize secondary metabolite produc- tion under laboratory conditions to yield desired metabolites in a sustained manner using endo- phytes</u>. This can be achieved by challenging the endophytes by specific and nonspecific patho- gens, especially those attacking their host plants, by devising suitable coculture and dual-culture setups (qualitative, followed by suitable quanti- tative experiments). The pathogens encountered can serve as an inducer that might trigger the pro- duction of defense secondary metabolites with prodrug-like properties. <u>Once the production of a</u> target or nontarget natural <u>product with a desired biological activity has been achieved, techniques such as genome mining, metabolic engineering, and metagenomics could be utilized to influence the manipulation of secondary metabolite pro- duction by endophytic fungi or the plant itself</u> by directed infection with beneficial endophytes (Kusari et al. 2012c, d). <u>Such directed <mark>investiga- tion</mark> with the scientific rationale of mimicking the natural plant–endophyte–pathogen interactions <mark>should be pursued to warrant</mark> a virtually <strong><mark>incessant discovery</strong> and <strong>sustained supply</strong> of</mark> bioactive pro- <mark>drugs against the <strong>current</strong> and <strong>emerging diseases</u></mark>.</p></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Brown, 18 (James D. J, associate professor in political science at Temple University Japan and a specialist on Russo-Japanese relations, The Case Against Aegis Ashore, Shingetsu News Agency, http://shingetsunewsagency.com/2018/08/20/the-case-against-aegis-ashore/) fulltext: SNA (Tokyo) — While the Abe administration presents Aegis Ashore as an essential and relatively uncontroversial contribution to the defense of Japan from the North Korean threat, in reality the deployment of this missile defense system risks further destabilizing the security situation in Northeast Asia, especially with regard to Russia. In December 2017, the Japanese government formally decided to purchase Aegis Ashore, the US-made ground-based ballistic missile defense system. It is anticipated that two units will be installed, with Akita and Yamaguchi prefectures identified as the candidate sites. The first of these deployments is planned to be completed during fiscal 2023. The Abe administration has justified the purchase of this system as a necessary response to the growth in the missile threat from North Korea. Japan has two existing missile defense systems, but each has limitations. The first of these is the Patriot PAC-3, which can intercept incoming missiles during their terminal phase. The units are mobile but provide limited coverage, meaning that they can offer protection to specific sites, such as central Tokyo or military installations, but not to the country as a whole. The PAC-3 system is therefore combined with Aegis-equipped destroyers, whose interceptors can eliminate missiles during their mid-course phase. This system can theoretically provide cover for all of Japan, but it is dependent on keeping the Aegis-equipped ships on a continual cycle of deployment in specific areas, something that places an enormous burden on Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces. As such, there is an apparent logic in purchasing a third system that can provide constant protection for all of Japanese territory. Additionally, the Aegis Ashore system has superior capabilities and range than the existing Aegis-equipped destroyers. In particular, it is claimed that it is better at dealing with simultaneous launches as well as missiles on a lofted trajectory, both things that North Korea has simulated in recent missile tests. Presented this way, it appears hard to argue with the decision to adopt Aegis Ashore. Yet, as time has passed, the chorus of opposition has grown louder. Voices of Opposition One criticism is that the introduction of the missile defense system runs counter to the current trend of reduced tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Indeed, some may argue that Aegis Ashore is now superfluous following the meeting between President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-Un in Singapore in June at which the North Korean leader agreed “to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” This is, however, a weak argument since it is far from certain that the North Korean commitment in Singapore was sincere. Furthermore, even if denuclearization were to proceed smoothly, Pyongyang would still retain a dangerous arsenal of non-nuclear missiles that are capable of reaching Japan. A more convincing criticism is of the cost of the system. It was always known that Aegis Ashore would be expensive, but the extent is only now becoming clear. At the end of July, sources in the Ministry of Defense revealed that the estimated cost of the two Aegis Ashore units had been revised up by around 70%. With the inclusion of other elements, such as the interceptor missiles, the total cost of the project is now expected to exceed 600 billion yen (US$5.4 billion). This is an extraordinary spending commitment in a country where government debt was equivalent to 253% of GDP in 2017, and where the Abe administration pretends to be pursuing the goal of a fiscal surplus by 2025. Separately, there are concerns within the local communities near where the Aegis Ashore batteries are set to be located. These center on the extent to which the presence of the missile defense units will make their area a target for foreign military planners. Additionally, there are worries about the health effects of the powerful, but largely unproven, Lockheed Martin Solid State Radar that the Japanese government has selected for use with the Aegis Ashore units. A Destabilizing Factor in Northeast Asia Both the expense of the system and its potential health implications are genuine concerns, but perhaps the most serious worry about Aegis Ashore is the destabilizing effect it could have on Northeast Asian security. The Japanese government insists that it is a purely defensive system, which will be under Japan’s exclusive control. This is not, however, the view of Japan’s neighbors. Tokyo’s decision to invest further in US missile defense has been criticized by both China and North Korea. However, the most strident and sustained condemnation of Aegis Ashore has come from Russia. Russia is the only peer of the United States when it comes to nuclear weapons, and it has come to rely ever more on its vast strategic arsenal since it lost the conventional superiority that the Soviet Union enjoyed over the West in Europe. Moreover, as the United States has demonstrated its willingness to use military force internationally since the 1990s, Russia has come to regard its nuclear capabilities as a vital means of deterring US interventionism. This has become all the more important following the recent increase in tensions between Russia and the West, and Washington’s explicit identification of Russia as an adversary. For this reason, Russian strategists regard US missile defense systems as a leading threat to national security. From Moscow’s perspective, the United States is engaged in a long-term project to undermine Russia’s strategic deterrent and thereby give itself a free hand to act without fear of Russian retaliation. The crucial step in this regard was the decision of President George W. Bush in 2002 to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Signed in 1972, this agreement had barred Washington and Moscow from deploying nationwide defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. The treaty’s preamble described this as a “substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms.” During the years since this withdrawal, Moscow believes that the United States has worked assiduously to surround Russia with elements of its expanding missile defense system. Some of these units have been installed within the United States itself, while others have been planned for deployment on the territory of US allies. The Russian authorities claim that the US justifies these deployments by using the excuse that the missile defense systems are needed to protect allies from the threat of rogue states. In Europe, Iran is the supposed threat; in East Asia, it is North Korea. In each case, Russia believes that it is the real target. Aegis Ashore is therefore seen as just the latest link in the United States’ expanding network of missile defense systems, and Moscow is dismissive of Tokyo’s claim that it will be an independent Japanese system. This view was expressed by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in January 2018, when he told journalists that, “We don’t know any cases anywhere in this world where the United States, having deployed its weapons systems, would hand the control over them to a host country. I have strong doubts that they will make an exception in this case.” This view will only have strengthened when Isao Iijima, a special advisor to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, told the media in June that the decision to purchase Aegis Ashore was pushed upon Japan by the United States. Prior to the final decision being taken, Russia intensively lobbied the Abe administration not to agree to purchase further US missile defense systems. This included the warning by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in March 2017 that the deployment of such systems “will destroy the balance in the Pacific region.” Having ignored these words of caution, Japan must expect some consequences. This was made clear immediately after the announcement of Japan’s decision to purchase the system when Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated that Aegis Ashore will create “a new situation, which we logically must take account of in our military planning.” At the same time, Maria Zakharova, chief spokeswoman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, warned that the decision “will have a negative impact on the overall atmosphere of bilateral relations, including negotiations on the issue of a peace treaty.” Although no explicit link has been made, it is likely that the recent intensification of the Russian military presence on the disputed Southern Kuriles is connected with the Aegis Ashore decision. In particular, in January 2018, the Russian government issued a directive which designates the airport on the island of Iturup (Etorofu in Japanese) as dual-use. This opens the way for it to be used for military jets and, sure enough, Su-35S fighters were deployed to the island in July. Similarly, it is possible that Russia’s foot-dragging on the implementation of joint economic activities with Japan on the disputed islands is also a response to Aegis Ashore. This may be seen as an effective way of punishing the Japanese government since Prime Minister Abe has made the joint projects a prominent feature of his foreign policy and has presented them as a stepping stone to the resolution of the territorial dispute. Causing a setback to bilateral relations with Russia might be a price worth paying if Aegis Ashore were to radically improve Japan’s security situation. In reality, however, it will not. No Lasting Gain in Security Although Aegis Ashore would undoubtedly enhance the technical capabilities of Japanese missile defense, the system can still only deal with a limited number of missiles and is not 100% reliable. As such, just as Japan’s sense of security did not meaningfully change after the billions that were spent on PAC-3 and the Aegis-equipped destroyers, so it will be with Aegis Ashore. Indeed, any small gain in security is certain to be swiftly eroded as those countries that feel threatened by Aegis Ashore adapt their behavior or introduce more sophisticated weapons systems to overcome Japan’s additional layer of missile defense. In no time at all, the military experts will be arguing that Japan needs to spend yet more billions on some other new system that also offers no more than a fleeting illusion of security. In other words, Japan will simply have contributed to an emerging arms race and to the intensification of nuclear tensions between the United States and Russia. There is no question that Japan is genuinely facing a threatening security environment. However, there is no technical fix to this problem. Instead, lasting security can only be achieved through diplomacy, confidence building, and mutual threat reduction. Ultimately, Aegis Ashore is an enormously expensive means of creating insecurity for others while generating little added security for Japan itself. There remains time for Japan to reconsider this decision. It should do so as a matter of urgency.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Aegis Ashore decks Japan-Russia bilateral relations.</h4><p><strong>Brown,</strong> <strong>18</strong> (James D. J, associate professor in political science at Temple University Japan and a specialist on Russo-Japanese relations, The Case Against Aegis Ashore, Shingetsu News Agency, http://shingetsunewsagency.com/2018/08/20/the-case-against-aegis-ashore/)<u> </p><p></u>SNA (Tokyo) — While the Abe administration presents Aegis Ashore as an essential and relatively uncontroversial contribution to the defense of Japan from the North Korean threat, in reality <u>the deployment of <mark>this missile defense system risks </mark>further<mark> destabilizing the security situation </mark>in Northeast Asia, especially <mark>with regard to Russia</mark>.</p><p>In December 2017, the Japanese government formally decided to purchase Aegis Ashore</u>, the US-made ground-based ballistic missile defense system. It is anticipated that two units will be installed, with Akita and Yamaguchi prefectures identified as the candidate sites. <u>The first of these deployments is planned to be completed during fiscal 2023.</p><p></u>The Abe administration has justified the purchase of this system as a necessary response to the growth in the missile threat from North Korea. Japan has two existing missile defense systems, but each has limitations.</p><p>The first of these is the Patriot PAC-3, which can intercept incoming missiles during their terminal phase. The units are mobile but provide limited coverage, meaning that they can offer protection to specific sites, such as central Tokyo or military installations, but not to the country as a whole.</p><p>The PAC-3 system is therefore combined with Aegis-equipped destroyers, whose interceptors can eliminate missiles during their mid-course phase. This system can theoretically provide cover for all of Japan, but it is dependent on keeping the Aegis-equipped ships on a continual cycle of deployment in specific areas, something that places an enormous burden on Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces.</p><p>As such, <u>there is an apparent logic in purchasing a third system that can provide constant protection for all of Japanese territory</u>. Additionally<u>, the Aegis Ashore system has superior capabilities and range than the existing Aegis-equipped destroyers</u>. In particular, it is claimed that it is better at dealing with simultaneous launches as well as missiles on a lofted trajectory, both things that North Korea has simulated in recent missile tests.</p><p>Presented this way, it appears hard to argue with the decision to adopt Aegis Ashore.</p><p>Yet, as time has passed, the chorus of opposition has grown louder.</p><p>Voices of Opposition</p><p>One criticism is that the introduction of the missile defense system runs counter to the current trend of reduced tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Indeed, some may argue that Aegis Ashore is now superfluous following the meeting between President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-Un in Singapore in June at which the North Korean leader agreed “to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”</p><p>This is, however, a weak argument since it is far from certain that the North Korean commitment in Singapore was sincere. Furthermore, even if denuclearization were to proceed smoothly, Pyongyang would still retain a dangerous arsenal of non-nuclear missiles that are capable of reaching Japan.</p><p>A more convincing criticism is of the cost of the system. It was always known that Aegis Ashore would be expensive, but the extent is only now becoming clear.</p><p>At the end of July, sources in the Ministry of Defense revealed that the estimated cost of the two Aegis Ashore units had been revised up by around 70%. With the inclusion of other elements, such as the interceptor missiles, the total cost of the project is now expected to exceed 600 billion yen (US$5.4 billion).</p><p>This is an extraordinary spending commitment in a country where government debt was equivalent to 253% of GDP in 2017, and where the Abe administration pretends to be pursuing the goal of a fiscal surplus by 2025.</p><p>Separately, there are concerns within the local communities near where the Aegis Ashore batteries are set to be located. These center on the extent to which the presence of the missile defense units will make their area a target for foreign military planners. Additionally, there are worries about the health effects of the powerful, but largely unproven, Lockheed Martin Solid State Radar that the Japanese government has selected for use with the Aegis Ashore units.</p><p>A Destabilizing Factor in Northeast Asia</p><p><u>Both the expense of the system and its potential health implications are genuine concerns, but perhaps the most serious worry about Aegis Ashore is the destabilizing effect it could have on Northeast Asian security. The Japanese government insists that it is a purely defensive system, which will be under Japan’s exclusive control. This is not, however, the view of Japan’s neighbors.</p><p>Tokyo’s decision to invest further in US missile defense has been criticized by both China and North Korea. However, <mark>the most strident and sustained condemnation of Aegis Ashore has come from Russia</mark>.</p><p>Russia is the only peer of the United States when it comes to nuclear weapons, and it has come to rely ever more on its vast strategic arsenal since it lost the conventional superiority that the Soviet Union enjoyed over the West in Europe</u>. Moreover, <u>as the United States has demonstrated its willingness to use military force internationally since the 1990s, Russia has come to regard its nuclear capabilities as a vital means of deterring US interventionism.</u> <u>This has become</u> all the <u>more important following the recent increase in tensions between Russia and the West, and Washington’s explicit identification of Russia as an adversary.</p><p></u>For this reason, <u><mark>Russian strategists regard US missile defense systems as a leading threat to national security</u></mark>.<mark> <u>From Moscow’s perspective, the U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates<mark> is engaged in a long-term project to undermine Russia’s strategic deterrent</mark> <mark>and</mark> thereby <mark>give itself a free hand to act without fear of Russian retaliation</mark>.</p><p>The crucial step in this regard was the decision of President George W. Bush in 2002 to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty</u>. Signed in 1972, this agreement had barred Washington and Moscow from deploying nationwide defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. <u>The treaty’s preamble described this as a “substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms.”</p><p></u>During the years since this withdrawal, <u>Moscow believes that the United States has worked assiduously to surround Russia with elements of its expanding missile defense system. Some of these units have been installed within the United States itself, while others have been planned for deployment on the territory of US allies.</p><p>The Russian authorities claim that the US justifies these deployments by using the excuse that the missile defense systems are needed to protect allies from the threat of rogue states.</u> In Europe, Iran is the supposed threat; in East Asia, it is North Korea. In each case, Russia believes that it is the real target.</p><p><u><mark>Aegis Ashore is</mark> therefore <mark>seen as </mark>just <mark>the latest link in the U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates’<mark> expanding network of missile defense systems, </mark>and <mark>Moscow is dismissive of Tokyo’s claim that it will be an independent Japanese system</u></mark>. This view was expressed <u>by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov</u> in January 2018, when he <u>told journalists that, “We don’t know any cases anywhere in this world where the United States, having deployed its weapons systems, would hand the control over them to a host country. I have strong doubts that they will make an exception in this case.”</p><p></u>This view will only have strengthened when <u>Isao Iijima,</u> a special advisor to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, <u>told the media in June that the decision to purchase Aegis Ashore was pushed upon Japan by the United States.</p><p>Prior to the final decision being taken, Russia intensively lobbied the Abe administration not to agree to purchase further US missile defense systems</u>. This included the warning by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in March 2017 that the deployment of such systems “will destroy the balance in the Pacific region.” <u>Having ignored these words of caution, <mark>Japan must expect </mark>some <mark>consequences</mark>.</p><p>This was made clear immediately after the announcement of Japan’s decision to purchase the system when</u> Russian Deputy Foreign Minister <u>Sergei Ryabkov stated that Aegis Ashore will create “a new situation, which we logically must take account of in our military planning.</u>” At the same time, <u>Maria Zakharova</u>, chief spokeswoman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <u>warned that <mark>the decision “will have a negative impact on </mark>the overall atmosphere of <mark>bilateral relations</mark>, including negotiations on the issue of a peace treaty.”</p><p></u>Although no explicit link has been made, <u>it is likely that the recent intensification of the <mark>Russian military presence on the</mark> disputed Southern <mark>Kuriles is connected with </mark>the<mark> Aegis Ashore</mark> decision</u>. <u>In particular</u>, in January 2018, <u>the Russian government issued a directive which designates the airport on the island of Iturup</u> (Etorofu in Japanese<u>) as dual-use.</u> This opens the way for it to be used for military jets and, sure enough<u>, Su-35S fighters were deployed to the island in July.</p><p></u>Similarly<u>, it is possible that Russia’s foot-dragging on the implementation of joint economic activities with Japan on the disputed islands is also a response to Aegis Ashore. This may be seen as an effective way of punishing the Japanese government since Prime Minister Abe has made the joint projects a prominent feature of his foreign policy and has presented them as a stepping stone to the resolution of the territorial dispute.</p><p></u>Causing a setback to bilateral relations with Russia might be a price worth paying if Aegis Ashore were to radically improve Japan’s security situation. In reality, however, it will not.</p><p>No Lasting Gain in Security</p><p>Although Aegis Ashore would undoubtedly enhance the technical capabilities of Japanese missile defense<u>, the system can still only deal with a limited number of missiles and is not 100% reliable. As such, just as Japan’s sense of security did not meaningfully change after the billions that were spent on PAC-3 and the Aegis-equipped destroyers, so it will be with Aegis Ashore.</p><p></u>Indeed, <u>any small gain in security is certain to be swiftly eroded as those <mark>countries that feel threatened by Aegis Ashore adapt their behavior or introduce more sophisticated weapons systems to overcome Japan’s additional layer of missile defense</mark>.</u> In no time at all, the military experts will be arguing that Japan needs to spend yet more billions on some other new system that also offers no more than a fleeting illusion of security. <u>In other words, <mark>Japan will </mark>simply have<mark> contribute</mark>d <mark>to an emerging arms race and </mark>to<mark> the intensification of nuclear tensions between the U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates<mark> and Russia</mark>.</p><p>There is no question that Japan is genuinely facing a threatening security environment</u>. However, there is no technical fix to this problem. Instead, lasting security can only be achieved through diplomacy, confidence building, and mutual threat reduction.</p><p><u>Ultimately, Aegis Ashore is an enormously expensive means of creating insecurity for others while generating little added security for Japan itself.</u> There remains time for Japan to reconsider this decision. It should do so as a matter of urgency.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Shively 2K – Professor of Political Science, Texas A & M fulltext: (Ruth, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 181-2) The requirements thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say “no” to—they must reject and limit—some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say “yes” to some things. In particular, they must say “yes” to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no agreement except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one’s target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Registers, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator’s audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.∂ The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must be shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need of the subversive for an order to subvert.∂ But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox should tell us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and some ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest. It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implications, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic, but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion.∂ Yet difficulties remain. For agreement is not simply the initial condition, but the continuing ground, for contest. If we are to successfully communicate our disagreements, we cannot simply agree on basic terms and then proceed to debate without attention to further agreements. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements.∂ Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At the very least, the two discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested, and so on. They must also agree—and they do so simply by entering into debate—that they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.',∂ Imagine, then, that our two discussants have the following kind of exchange:∂ Mary Cuns don't kill people; people kill people.∂ Tom: Yes, but guns make it a lot easier for people to kill one another.∂ Mary: That's not necessarily true. There are lots of other murder weapons—knives or rat poison, for instance—that may be just as handy and lethal.∂ At this point, the argument reaches an impasse. Tom has presented i claim that Mary does not accept. Thus, if the argument is to continue, Tom must either find a way to convince Mary oi this claim or he must go on to a different line of argument. Let us say that, in this case, lorn backs up his initial claim with further evidence. Perhaps he has some evidence to show that people are less apt to survive a gunshot wound than they are to survive being stabbed or poisoned. Mary then relents on this point:∂ ∂ Mary: All right, I'll grant you that gun shot wounds an? more apt to kill people. But that's exactly the reason I want lo own a gun—so I can effectively protect myself and my family.∂ Tom: Well I sympathize with that motive, but 1 don't think owning a gun is the best way to protect yourself. In fact, I've heard that people who own guns are more apt to get injured or killed them¬selves than to protect themselves against an intruder.∂ Mary: What?! I find that very difficult to believe.∂ Here, again, our discussants reach an impasse. If the argument is to go further, they must either find a way to agree on the disputed claim, or move on to another claim (if there is one). Thus, if Tom has some further evidence that Mary will find convincing, they can continue this line of reasoning; if he does not, then they must move on to something else or give up the argument completely.∂ This is the ordinary ebb and flow of debate. Argument continues .is long as there is some hope of progress in coming to agreement or as long as there are other lines of argument to be explored. But if there∂ ∂ comes a point a I which the two sides run out of new claims or cannot igree about the facts supporting claims already made, the argument is effectively over. The participants may continue to shout at one an¬other, as they often do, but there is no longer anything positive or informative that can come from their interaction. There is nothing more to be learned and nothing that either side will find convincing.∂ The point here is that in arguing—and the point holds equally for other forms of contest—we assume that it is possible to educate or persuade one another. We assume that it is possible to come to more mutual understandings of an issue and that the participants in an argument are open to this possibility. Otherwise, there is no point to the exercise; we are simply talking at or past one another.∂ At this point, the ambiguists might respond that, even if there are such rules of argument, they do not apply to the more subversive or radical activities they have in mind. Subversion is, after all, about questioning and undermining such seemingly "necessary" or universal rules of behavior.∂ But, again, the response to the ambiguist must be that the practice of questioning and undermining rules, like all other social practices, needs a certain order. The subversive needs rules to protect subversion. And when we look more closely at the rules protective of subversion, we find that they are roughly the rules of argument discussed above. In fact, the rules of argument are roughly the rules of democracy or civility: the delineation of boundaries necessary to protect speech and action from violence, manipulation and other forms of tyranny.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>Shively 2K</h4><p>Shively 2K </strong>– Professor of Political Science, Texas A & M</p><p>(Ruth, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 181-2)</p><p>The requirements thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say “no” to—they must reject and limit—some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say “yes” to some things. In particular, <u>they must say “yes” to the idea of rational persuasion. This means</u>, first, <u>that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord</u>. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And <u>this kind of limited agreement is the <strong>starting condition</strong> of contest and debate</u>. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. <u>There can be no agreement except on the premise</u>, and within a context, <u>of agreement</u>. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, <u>we <strong>cannot argue</strong> about something </u>if we are not communicating: <u>if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument </u>or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. <u>At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it</u>. For instance, <u>one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group</u>. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one’s target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. <u>Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested.</u> Registers, demonstrators, <u><strong>and debaters must have</u></strong> some <u>shared ideas about the <strong>subject and</u></strong>/or <u><strong>terms</strong> of their disagreements</u>. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator’s audience must know what is being resisted. In short, <u>the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it</u>. In other words, <u>contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony</u>.∂ The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must be shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need of the subversive for an order to subvert.∂ But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox should tell us is that <u>some kinds of</u> harmonies or <u>orders are, in fact, good for resistance</u>; and some ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly some <u>basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for <strong>all</strong> further contest. It may be that if the ambiguists</u> <u>wish to remain full-fledged</u> ambiguists, <u>they cannot admit to these implications, for to open the door to some agreements</u> or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, <u>is to open the door to </u>some sort of <u>rationalism</u>. Perhaps <u>they might just continue to insist</u> that this initial condition is ironic, but <u>that</u> the irony <u>should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion</u>.∂ <u>Yet difficulties remain</u>. For <u>agreement is not simply the initial condition, but the continuing ground, for contest</u>. If we are to successfully communicate our disagreements, we cannot simply agree on basic terms and then proceed to debate without attention to further agreements. <u>For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements</u>.∂ <u>Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control</u>. As noted earlier, in any argument, <u><strong>certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion</u></strong>. At the very least, <u>the two discussants must agree on <strong>basic terms</strong>: for example, they must have some shared sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested</u>, and so on. They must also agree—and they do so simply by entering into debate—that they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.',∂<u> </u>Imagine, then, that our two discussants have the following kind of exchange:∂ Mary Cuns don't kill people; people kill people.∂ Tom: Yes, but guns make it a lot easier for people to kill one another.∂ Mary: That's not necessarily true. There are lots of other murder weapons—knives or rat poison, for instance—that may be just as handy and lethal.∂ At this point, the argument reaches an impasse. Tom has presented i claim that Mary does not accept. Thus, if the argument is to continue, Tom must either find a way to convince Mary oi this claim or he must go on to a different line of argument. Let us say that, in this case, lorn backs up his initial claim with further evidence. Perhaps he has some evidence to show that people are less apt to survive a gunshot wound than they are to survive being stabbed or poisoned. Mary then relents on this point:∂ ∂ Mary: All right, I'll grant you that gun shot wounds an? more apt to kill people. But that's exactly the reason I want lo own a gun—so I can effectively protect myself and my family.∂ Tom: Well I sympathize with that motive, but 1 don't think owning a gun is the best way to protect yourself. In fact, I've heard that people who own guns are more apt to get injured or killed them¬selves than to protect themselves against an intruder.∂ Mary: What?! I find that very difficult to believe.∂ Here, again, our discussants reach an impasse. If the argument is to go further, they must either find a way to agree on the disputed claim, or move on to another claim (if there is one). Thus, if Tom has some further evidence that Mary will find convincing, they can continue this line of reasoning; if he does not, then they must move on to something else or give up the argument completely.∂ This is the ordinary ebb and flow of debate. Argument continues .is long as there is some hope of progress in coming to agreement or as long as there are other lines of argument to be explored. But if there∂ ∂ comes a point a I which the two sides run out of new claims or cannot igree about the facts supporting claims already made, the argument is effectively over. The participants may continue to shout at one an¬other, as they often do, but there is no longer anything positive or informative that can come from their interaction. There is nothing more to be learned and nothing that either side will find convincing.∂ The point here is that in arguing—and the point holds equally for other forms of contest—we assume that it is possible to educate or persuade one another. We assume that it is possible to come to more mutual understandings of an issue and that the participants in an argument are open to this possibility. <u>Otherwise, there is <strong>no</strong> <strong>point</strong> to the exercise; we are <strong>simply talking at or past one another</u></strong>.∂ <u>At this point,</u> the <u>ambiguists might respond that, even if there are such rules of argument, they do not apply to </u>the more <u>subversive or radical activities</u> they have in mind. Subversion is, after all, about questioning and undermining such seemingly "necessary" or universal rules of behavior.∂ <u><strong>But</u></strong>, again, the response to the ambiguist must be that <u>the practice of questioning</u> and undermining <u>rules</u>, like all other social practices, <u><strong>needs a certain order</strong>. The subversive <strong>needs rules</strong> to protect subversion. And when we look more closely at the rules protective of subversion, we find that they are roughly the rules of argument</u> discussed above. In fact, the rules of argument are roughly the rules of democracy or civility: the delineation of boundaries necessary to protect speech and action from violence, manipulation and other forms of tyranny.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Erickson and Collins 21 [Andrew S. Erickson, the research director in the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, and Gabriel B. Collins, the Baker Botts fellow in energy and environmental regulatory affairs at Rice University’s James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, 10-18-2021, A Dangerous Decade of Chinese Power Is Here, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/18/china-danger-military-missile-taiwan/ HKR-MK] Within the next five years, China’s leaders are likely to conclude that its deteriorating demographic profile, structural economic problems, and technological estrangement from global innovation centers are eroding its leverage to annex Taiwan and achieve other major strategic objectives. As Xi internalizes these challenges, his foreign policy is likely to become even more accepting of risk, feeding on his nearly decadelong track record of successful revisionist action against the rules-based order. Notable examples include China occupying and militarizing sub-tidal features in the South China Sea, ramping up air and maritime incursions against Japan and Taiwan, pushing border challenges against India, occupying Bhutanese and Tibetan lands, perpetrating crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, and coercively enveloping Hong Kong. fulltext: The relatively low-hanging fruit is plucked, but Beijing is emboldened to grasp the biggest single revisionist prize: Taiwan. Beijing’s actions over the last decade have triggered backlash, such as with the so-called AUKUS deal, but concrete constraints on China’s strategic freedom of action may not fully manifest until after 2030. It’s remarkable and dangerous that China has paid few costs for its actions over the last 10 years, even as its military capacities have rapidly grown. Beijing will likely conclude that under current diplomatic, economic, and force postures for both “gray zone” and high-end scenarios, the 2021 to late 2020s timeframe still favors China—and is attractive for its 68-year-old leader, who seeks a historical achievement at the zenith of his career. U.S. planners must mobilize resources, effort, and risk acceptance to maximize power and thereby deter Chinese aggression in the coming decade—literally starting now—and innovatively employ assets that currently exist or can be operationally assembled and scaled within the next several years. That will be the first step to pushing back against China during the 2020s—a decade of danger—before what will likely be a waning of Chinese power. As Beijing aggressively seeks to undermine the international order and promotes a narrative of inevitable Chinese strategic domination in Asia and beyond, it creates a dangerous contradiction between its goals and its medium-term capacity to achieve them. China is, in fact, likely nearing the apogee of its relative power; and by 2030 to 2035, it will cross a tipping point from which it may never recover strategically. Growing headwinds constraining Chinese growth, while not publicly acknowledged by Beijing, help explain Xi’s high and apparently increasing risk tolerance. Beijing’s window of strategic opportunity is sliding shut. China’s skyrocketing household debt levels exemplify structural economic constraints that are emerging much earlier than they did for the United States when it had similar per capita GDP and income levels. Debt is often a wet blanket on consumption growth. A 2017 analysis published by the Bank for International Settlements found that once the household debt-to-GDP ratio in a sample of 54 countries exceeded 60 percent, “the negative long-run effects on consumption tend to intensify.” China’s household debt-to-GDP ratio surpassed that empirical danger threshold in late 2020. Rising debt service burdens thus threaten Chinese consumers’ capacity to sustain the domestic consumption-focused “dual circulation” economic model that Xi and his advisors seek to build. China’s growth record during the past 30 years has been remarkable, but past exceptionalism does not confer future immunity from fundamental demographic and economic headwinds. As debt levels continue to rise at an absolute level that has accelerated almost continuously for the past decade, China also faces a hollowing out of its working-age population. This critical segment peaked in 2010 and has since declined, with the rate from 2015 to 2020 nearing 0.6 percent annually—nearly twice the respective pace in the United States. While the United States faces demographic challenges of its own, the disparity between the respective paces of decline highlights its relative advantage compared to its chief geopolitical competitor. Moreover, the United States can choose to access a global demographic and talent dividend via immigration in a way China simply will not be able to do. Atop surging debt and worsening demographics, China also faces resource insecurity. China’s dependence on imported food and energy has grown steadily over the past two decades. Projections from Tsinghua University make a compelling case that China’s oil and gas imports will peak between 2030 and 2035. As China grapples with power shortages, Beijing has been reminded that supply shortfalls equal to even a few percentage points of total demand can have outsized negative impacts. Domestic resource insufficiency by itself does not hinder economic growth—as the Four Asian Tigers’ multi-decade boom attests. But China is in a different position. Japan and South Korea never had to worry about the U.S. Navy interdicting inbound tankers or grain ships. In fact, the United States was avowedly willing to use military force to protect energy flows from the Persian Gulf region to its allies. Now, as an increasingly energy-secure United States pivots away from the Middle East toward the Indo-Pacific, there is a substantial probability that energy shipping route protection could be viewed in much more differentiated terms—with oil and liquefied natural gas cargoes sailing under the Chinese flag viewed very differently than cargoes headed to buyers in other regional countries. Each of these dynamics—demographic downshifts, rising debts, resource supply insecurity—either imminently threatens or is already actively interfering with the CCP’s long-cherished goal of achieving a “moderately prosperous society.” Electricity blackouts, real estate sector travails (like those of Evergrande) that show just how many Chinese investors’ financial eggs now sit in an unstable $52 trillion basket, and a solidifying alignment of countries abroad concerned by aggressive Chinese behavior all raise questions about Xi’s ability to deliver. With this confluence of adverse events only a year before the next party congress, where personal ambition and survival imperatives will almost drive him to seek anointment as the only Chinese “leader for life” aside from former leader Mao Zedong, the timing only fuels his sense of insecurity. Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns and ruthless removal of potential rivals and their supporters solidified his power but likely also created a quiet corps of opponents who may prove willing to move against him if events create the perception he’s lost the “mandate of heaven.” Accordingly, the baseline assumption should be that Xi’s crown sits heavy and the insecurity induced is thereby intense enough to drive high-stake, high-consequence posturing and action. While Xi is under pressure to act, the external risks are magnified because so far, he has suffered few consequences from taking actions on issues his predecessors would likely never have gambled on. Reactions to party predations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong have been restricted to diplomatic-signaling pinpricks, such as sanctioning responsible Chinese officials and entities, most of whom lack substantial economic ties to the United States. Whether U.S. restraint results from a fear of losing market access or a belief that China’s goals are ultimately limited is not clear at this time. While the CCP issues retaliatory sanctions against U.S. officials and proclaims a triumphant outcome to its hostage diplomacy, these tactical public actions mask a growing private awareness that China’s latitude for irredentist action is poised to shrink. Not knowing exactly when domestic and external constraints will come to bite—but knowing that when Beijing sees the tipping point in its rearview mirror, major rivals will recognize it too—amplifies Xi and the party’s anxiety to act on a shorter timeline. Hence the dramatic acceleration of the last few years.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>Chinese slow growth incentivizes risk-taking, high-stakes action, and annexation of Taiwan </h4><p>Erickson and Collins 21</strong> [Andrew S. Erickson, the research director in the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, and Gabriel B. Collins, the Baker Botts fellow in energy and environmental regulatory affairs at Rice University’s James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy<u><strong>, 10-18-2021, A Dangerous Decade of Chinese Power Is Here, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/18/china-danger-military-missile-taiwan/ HKR-MK]</p><p></strong>Within the next five years, China’s leaders are likely to conclude that its deteriorating demographic profile, <mark>structural economic problems</mark>, and technological estrangement from global innovation centers are <mark>erod</u></mark>ing <u>its <mark>leverage to <strong>annex Taiwan</strong></mark> and achieve other major strategic objectives. <mark>As Xi internalizes </mark>these <mark>challenges, </mark>his <mark>for</u></mark>eign <u><mark>po</u></mark>licy<u> is likely to <mark>become</mark> even more <strong><mark>accepting of risk</strong>, feeding </mark>on his nearly decadelong track record of successful <mark>revisionist action</u></mark> against the rules-based order. Notable examples include China occupying and <u><mark>militarizing</u></mark> sub-tidal features in <u><mark>the <strong>S</mark>outh <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>S</mark>ea</u></strong>, ramping up <u>air and maritime <mark>incursions against <strong>Japan</strong></mark> and <strong>Taiwan</u></strong>, pushing <u>border challenges against <strong><mark>India</strong>,</u> <u></mark>occupying <strong>Bhutanese</strong> and <strong>Tibetan</strong> lands, perpetrating <strong>crimes against humanity</strong> in Xinjiang, and coercively enveloping Hong Kong.</p><p></u>The relatively low-hanging fruit is plucked, but <u>Beijing is emboldened to grasp the biggest single revisionist prize: Taiwan.</p><p></u>Beijing’s actions over the last decade have triggered backlash, such as with the so-called AUKUS deal, <u>but <strong><mark>concrete constraints</strong> </mark>on China’s strategic freedom of action may not fully <mark>manifest </mark>until <strong><mark>after 2030.</u></strong></mark> It’s remarkable and dangerous that <u>China has paid few costs for its actions over the last 10 years, even as its military capacities have rapidly grown.</p><p><strong><mark>Beijing will</mark> likely <mark>conclude</strong></mark> that under current diplomatic, economic, and force postures</u> for both <u><strong>“gray zone”</strong> and <strong>high-end</strong> scenarios</u>, the 2021 to late <u>20<strong><mark>20s timeframe</mark> still <mark>favors China</strong></mark>—and is attractive for its</u> 68-year-old <u><strong>leader, who seeks a historical achievement at the zenith of his career.</p><p></strong>U.S. planners must mobilize resources, effort, and risk acceptance to maximize power and thereby deter Chinese aggression in the coming decade—<strong>literally starting now</strong>—and innovatively employ assets</u> that currently exist or can be operationally assembled and scaled within the next several years. <u>That will </u>be the first step to <u>pushing back against China during the 2020s—<strong><mark>a decade of danger</strong></mark>—<mark>before </mark>what will likely be a <strong><mark>waning </mark>of </strong>Chinese power.</p><p>As Beijing aggressively seeks to undermine the international order and promotes a narrative of inevitable Chinese strategic domination</u> in Asia and beyond, <u>it creates a dangerous contradiction between its goals and its medium-term capacity</u> to achieve them. <u>China is</u>, in fact, likely <u>nearing the <strong>apogee of its relative power</u></strong>; and <u>by <mark>2030</u></mark> to 2035, <u>it will cross <mark>a</mark> <strong><mark>tipping point</strong> from which it</mark> may <strong><mark>never recover</strong></mark> strategically.</u> Growing <u>headwinds constraining Chinese growth</u>, while not publicly acknowledged by Beijing, <u>help explain Xi’s</u> high and apparently <u><strong>increasing risk tolerance. </strong>Beijing’s window of strategic opportunity is sliding shut.</p><p>China’s <strong><mark>skyrocketing </mark>household <mark>debt</strong></mark> levels exemplify <mark>structural <strong>economic constraints</strong></mark> that are <mark>emerging </mark>much earlier than they did for the United States</u> when it had similar per capita GDP and income levels. <u>Debt is often a wet blanket on consumption growth.</u> A 2017 analysis published by the Bank for International Settlements found that <u>once the household debt-to-GDP ratio in a sample of 54 countries exceeded 60 percent, “the negative long-run effects on consumption tend to intensify.” China’s household debt-to-GDP ratio surpassed that empirical danger threshold in late 2020. Rising debt service burdens thus threaten Chinese consumers’ capacity to sustain the domestic consumption-focused “dual circulation” economic model that Xi and his advisors seek to build. China’s growth record during the past 30 years has been remarkable, but past exceptionalism does not confer future immunity from fundamental demographic and economic headwinds.</p><p></u>As debt levels continue to rise at an absolute level that has accelerated almost continuously for the past decade, <u>China also faces a <strong><mark>hollowing out of </mark>its working-age <mark>population.</strong></mark> This critical segment peaked in 2010 and has since declined</u>, with the rate from 2015 to 2020 nearing 0.6 percent annually—nearly twice the respective pace in the United States. <u>While the United States faces demographic challenges of its own, the disparity between the respective paces of decline highlights its relative advantage compared to its chief geopolitical competitor.</u> Moreover, <u>the United States can choose to access a global demographic and talent dividend via immigration in a way China simply will not be able to do.</p><p></u>Atop surging debt and worsening demographics, <u><strong>China also <mark>faces resource insecurity.</strong></mark> China’s dependence on imported <mark>food</mark> and energy has grown steadily over the past two decades. Projections</u> from Tsinghua University <u>make a compelling case that China’s <mark>oil and gas </mark>imports <mark>will peak</mark> between 2030</u> and 2035<u>. As China grapples with power shortages, Beijing has been reminded that supply shortfalls</u> equal to even a few percentage points of total demand can <u>have outsized negative impacts.</p><p></u>Domestic resource insufficiency by itself does not hinder economic growth—as the Four Asian Tigers’ multi-decade boom attests. But China is in a different position. Japan and South Korea never had to worry about the U.S. Navy interdicting inbound tankers or grain ships. In fact, <u>the United States was avowedly willing to use military force to protect energy flows from the Persian Gulf region to its allies. Now, as an increasingly energy-secure United States pivots away from the Middle East toward the Indo-Pacific, there is a substantial probability that energy shipping route protection could be viewed in much more differentiated terms—with oil and liquefied natural gas cargoes sailing under the Chinese flag viewed very differently than cargoes headed to buyers in other regional countries.</p><p>Each of <mark>these</mark> dynamics</u>—demographic downshifts, rising debts, resource supply insecurity—either imminently threatens or is already actively interfering with the CCP’s long-cherished goal of achieving a “moderately prosperous society.” Electricity blackouts, real estate sector travails (like those of Evergrande) that show just how many Chinese investors’ financial eggs now sit in an unstable $52 trillion basket, and a solidifying alignment of countries abroad concerned by aggressive Chinese behavior all <u><strong><mark>raise questions about Xi’s ability to deliver.</u></strong></mark> With this confluence of adverse events only a year before the next party congress, where personal ambition and survival imperatives will almost drive him to seek anointment as the only Chinese “leader for life” aside from former leader Mao Zedong, the timing only fuels his sense of insecurity. Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns and ruthless removal of potential rivals and their supporters solidified his power but likely also created a quiet corps of opponents who may prove willing to move against him if events create the perception he’s lost the “mandate of heaven.” Accordingly, the baseline assumption should be that <u>Xi’s crown sits heavy and the <mark>insecurity</mark> induced is thereby intense enough to <mark>drive <strong>high-stake</strong></mark>, high-consequence posturing and <mark>action.</p><p></u></mark>While Xi is under pressure to act, the external risks are magnified because so far, he has suffered few consequences from taking actions on issues his predecessors would likely never have gambled on. Reactions to party predations in Xinjiang and <u>Hong Kong</u> have been restricted to diplomatic-signaling pinpricks, such as sanctioning responsible Chinese officials and entities, most of whom lack substantial economic ties to the United States. Whether U.S. restraint results from a fear of losing market access or a belief that China’s goals are ultimately limited is not clear at this time.</p><p>While the CCP issues retaliatory sanctions against U.S. officials and proclaims a triumphant outcome to its hostage diplomacy, these tactical public actions mask a growing private awareness that <u>China’s latitude for irredentist action is poised to shrink. Not knowing exactly when domestic and external constraints will come to bite</u>—but knowing that when Beijing sees the tipping point in its rearview mirror, major rivals will recognize it too—<u><strong>amplifies Xi and the party’s anxiety to act <mark>on a shorter timeline</mark>.</u></strong> Hence the dramatic acceleration of the last few years.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Ansell 10 [Megan — second year graduate student in the Master in International Science and Technology Policy at the George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs, where she focuses on space policy, “Active Space Debris Removal: Needs, Implications, and Recommendations for Today’s Geopolitical Environment,” 2010, https://jpia.princeton.edu/sites/jpia/files/space-debris-removal.pdf] KS fulltext: Need to Initiate Unilateral Action International cooperation in space has rarely resulted in cost-effective or expedient solutions, especially in politically-charged areas of uncertain technological feasibility. The International Space Station, because of both political and technical setbacks, has taken over two decades to deploy and cost many billions of dollars—far more time and money than was originally intended. Space debris mitigation has also encountered aversion in international forums. The topic was brought up in COPUOS as early as 1980, yet a policy failed to develop despite a steady flow of documents on the increasing danger of space debris (Perek 1991). In fact, COPUOS did not adopt debris mitigation guidelines until 2007 and, even then, they were legally non-binding. Space debris removal systems could take decades to develop and deploy through international partnerships due to the many interdisciplinary challenges they face. Given the need to start actively removing space debris sooner rather than later to ensure the continued benefits of satellite services, international cooperation may not be the most appropriate mechanism for instigating the first space debris removal system. Instead, IG one country should take a leadership role by establishing a national space debris removal program. This would accelerate technology development and demonstration, which would, in turn, build-up trust and hasten international participation in space debris removal. Possibilities of Leadership As previously discussed, a recent NASA study found that annually removing as little as five massive pieces of debris in critical orbits could significantly stabilize the long-term space debris environment (Liou and Johnson 2007). This suggests that it is feasible for one nation to unilaterally develop and deploy an effective debris removal system. As the United States is responsible for creating much of the debris in Earth’s orbit, it is a candidate for taking a leadership role in removing it, along with other heavy polluters of the space environment such as China and Russia. There are several reasons why the United States should take this leadership role, rather than China or Russia. First and foremost, the United States would be hardest hit by the loss of satellites services. It owns about half of the roughly 800 operating satellites in orbit and its military is significantly more dependent upon them than any other entity (Moore 2008). For example, GPS precision-guided munitions are a key component of the “new American way of war” (Dolman 2006, 163-165), which allows the United States to remain a globally dominant military power while also waging war in accordance with its political and ethical values by enabling faster, less costly war fighting with minimal collateral damage (Sheldon 2005). The U.S. Department of Defense recognized the need to protect U.S. satellite systems over ten years ago when it stated in its 1999 Space Policy that, “the ability to access and utilize space is a vital national interest because many of the activities conducted in the medium are critical to U.S. national security and economic well-being” (U.S. Department of Defense 1999, 6). Clearly, the United States has a vested interest in keeping the near-Earth space environment free from threats like space debris and thus assuring U.S. access to space. Moreover, current U.S. National Space Policy asserts that the United States will take a “leadership role” in space debris minimization. This could include the development, deployment, and demonstration of an effective space debris removal system to remove U.S. debris as well as that of other nations, upon their request. There could also be international political and economic advantages associated with being the first country to develop this revolutionary technology. However, there is always the danger of other nations simply benefiting from U.S. investment of its resources in IH this area. Thus, mechanisms should also be created to avoid a classic “free rider” situation. For example, techniques could be employed to ensure other countries either join in the effort later on or pay appropriate fees to the United States for removal services. Recommendations for Leadership in Space Debris Removal Going forward, the U.S. government should engage the commercial sector in space debris removal. Government contracts with several commercial firms would create a competitive environment, encouraging innovation and cost minimization. Having several companies working on the problem at the same time would also accelerate remediation as several critical orbits could be addressed at once. Furthermore, early investments in a domestic space debris removal industry would give the United States a head start in what may become a critical industry over the coming decades. The aforementioned 2009 International Conference on Orbital Debris Removal, co-hosted by DARPA and NASA, suggests that these two agencies could lead U.S. government efforts in space debris removal. However, it is important to recognize that DARPA and NASA are driven by very different motives: one is a civilian space agency, while the other is a defense research agency. Failure to appreciate these differences when establishing mission requirements could lead to a situation like that of the National Polar Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), where the attempt to combine civil and military requirements into a single satellite resulted in doubling project costs, a launch delay of five years, and ultimately splitting the project into two separate programs (Clark 2010). Furthermore, any system developed through a joint NASA-DARPA partnership would need to be transferred to an operational agency, as both NASA and DARPA are research and development entities. The U.S. Air Force, as it is the primary agency responsible for national security space operations, is a possible option. Funding the development of a national space debris removal system carries risks because, due to the nascent state of the field, detailed cost-benefit estimates have not yet been carried out. The Space Frontier Foundation, however, proposes that the government should establish special funds at the expense of parties who generate debris (Dunstan and Werb 2009). Suggested mechanisms for raising the funds include charging fees for U.S. launches based on the debris potential of the mission, with the size of the fee determined by relevant factors such as the mass of the anticipated debris resulting from the mission and the congestion of the orbit into which the space object is being launched. Satellite manufacturers, operators, and KJ service providers could all share responsibility for payment into such funds. Once debris removal systems are in operation, additional funds could also come from service fees. For example, entities that created debris could pay a specified amount to removal providers in return for the service rendered. Any national space debris removal program must also be kept transparent with ongoing international dialogue in forums such as COPUOS so that other nations can build-up trust in the effectiveness and efficiency of the program. A proven debris removal program will result in more productive discussions in these international forums. Conclusion If the United States and other powerful governments do not take steps now to avert the potentially devastating effects of space debris, the issue risks becoming stalemated in a manner similar to climate change. Given the past hesitation of international forums in addressing the space debris issue, unilateral action is the most appropriate means of instigating space debris removal within the needed timeframe. The United States is well poised for a leadership role in space debris removal. Going forward, the U.S. government should work closely with the commercial sector in this endeavor, focusing on removing pieces of U.S. debris with the greatest potential to contribute to future collisions. It should also keep its space debris removal system as open and transparent as possible to allow for future international cooperation in this field. Although leadership in space debris removal will entail certain risks, investing early in preserving the near-Earth space environment is necessary to protect the satellite technology that is so vital to the U.S. military and day-to-day operations of the global economy. By instituting global space debris removal measures, a critical opportunity exists to mitigate and minimize the potential damage of space debris and ensure the sustainable development of the near-Earth space environment<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Solves <u>collisions</u>. </h4><p><strong>Ansell 10</strong> [Megan — second year graduate student in the Master in International Science and Technology Policy at the George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs, where she focuses on space policy, “Active Space Debris Removal: Needs, Implications, and Recommendations for Today’s Geopolitical Environment,” 2010, https://jpia.princeton.edu/sites/jpia/files/space-debris-removal.pdf] KS </p><p>Need to Initiate Unilateral Action</p><p>International cooperation in space has rarely resulted in cost-effective or expedient solutions, especially in politically-charged areas of uncertain technological feasibility. The International Space Station, because of both political and technical setbacks, has taken over two decades to deploy and cost many billions of dollars—far more time and money than was originally intended. Space debris mitigation has also encountered aversion in international forums. The topic was brought up in COPUOS as early as 1980, yet a policy failed to develop despite a steady flow of documents on the increasing danger of space debris (Perek 1991). In fact, COPUOS did not adopt debris mitigation guidelines until 2007 and, even then, they were legally non-binding.</p><p>Space debris removal systems could take decades to develop and deploy through international partnerships due to the many interdisciplinary challenges they face. <u>Given the need to start</u> actively <u>removing</u> space <u>debris sooner rather than later to ensure</u> the <u>continued benefits</u> of satellite services, <u><strong>international cooperation may not be</u></strong> the most <u><strong>appropriate mechanism for</u></strong> instigating the first space <u><strong>debris removal</u></strong> system. Instead, IG <u><strong><mark>one country should take a leadership role</u></strong></mark> by <u><strong><mark>establishing</u></strong></mark> a national space <u><strong><mark>debris removal program.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>This would</mark> accelerate</u> technology <u>development and demonstration, which would,</u> in turn, <u><strong><mark>build-</mark>up <mark>trust</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>hasten international participation</u></strong></mark> <u>in</u> space <u>debris removal.</p><p></u>Possibilities of Leadership</p><p>As previously discussed, a recent NASA study found that <u>annually removing as little as five massive pieces of debris</u> in critical orbits <u>could</u> significantly <u>stabilize the long-term</u> space <u>debris environment</u> (Liou and Johnson 2007). This suggests that <u>it is feasible</u> for one nation <u>to unilaterally develop and deploy</u> an effective <u>debris removal system. As the United States is responsible for creating</u> much of the <u>debris</u> in Earth’s orbit, <u>it is a candidate for taking a leadership role in removing it,</u> along with other heavy polluters of the space environment such as China and Russia.</p><p>There are several reasons why the United States should take this leadership role, rather than China or Russia. First and foremost, the United States would be hardest hit by the loss of satellites services. It owns about half of the roughly 800 operating satellites in orbit and its military is significantly more dependent upon them than any other entity (Moore 2008). For example, GPS precision-guided munitions are a key component of the “new American way of war” (Dolman 2006, 163-165), which allows the United States to remain a globally dominant military power while also waging war in accordance with its political and ethical values by enabling faster, less costly war fighting with minimal collateral damage (Sheldon 2005). The U.S. Department of Defense recognized the need to protect U.S. satellite systems over ten years ago when it stated in its 1999 Space Policy that, “the ability to access and utilize space is a vital national interest because many of the activities conducted in the medium are critical to U.S. national security and economic well-being” (U.S. Department of Defense 1999, 6). Clearly, the United States has a vested interest in keeping the near-Earth space environment free from threats like space debris and thus assuring U.S. access to space.</p><p>Moreover, current U.S. National Space Policy asserts that the <u><mark>United States will take a <strong>“leadership role”</strong> in</u></mark> space <u><strong><mark>debris minimization.</u></strong> <u>This could include</mark> the <mark>development, deployment, and demonstration of</mark> an effective space debris removal <mark>system</mark> to remove U.S. debris as well as that of other nations,</u> upon their request. <u>There could also be international political and economic advantages</u> associated with being the first country to develop this revolutionary technology. However, there is always the danger of other nations simply benefiting from U.S. investment of its resources in IH this area. Thus, mechanisms should also be created to avoid a classic “free rider” situation. For example, techniques could be employed to ensure other countries either join in the effort later on or pay appropriate fees to the United States for removal services.</p><p>Recommendations for Leadership in Space Debris Removal</p><p><u>Going forward, the U.S. government should <mark>engage</u></mark> the <u><mark>commercial sector</u></mark> in space debris removal. <u>Government <mark>contracts</mark> with several commercial firms would <mark>create a competitive environment, encouraging innovation and</u></mark> cost <u><mark>minimization</mark>.</u> Having several companies working on the problem at the same time would also accelerate remediation as several critical orbits could be addressed at once. Furthermore, <u>early investments</u> in a domestic space debris removal industry <u>would give the United States a head start</u> in what may become a critical industry over the coming decades.</p><p>The aforementioned 2009 International Conference on Orbital Debris Removal, co-hosted by DARPA and NASA, suggests that these two agencies could lead U.S. government efforts in space debris removal. However, it is important to recognize that DARPA and NASA are driven by very different motives: one is a civilian space agency, while the other is a defense research agency. Failure to appreciate these differences when establishing mission requirements could lead to a situation like that of the National Polar Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), where the attempt to combine civil and military requirements into a single satellite resulted in doubling project costs, a launch delay of five years, and ultimately splitting the project into two separate programs (Clark 2010). Furthermore, any system developed through a joint NASA-DARPA partnership would need to be transferred to an operational agency, as both NASA and DARPA are research and development entities. The U.S. Air Force, as it is the primary agency responsible for national security space operations, is a possible option.</p><p>Funding the development of a national space debris removal system carries risks because, due to the nascent state of the field, detailed cost-benefit estimates have not yet been carried out. The Space Frontier Foundation, however, proposes that the government should establish special funds at the expense of parties who generate debris (Dunstan and Werb 2009). Suggested mechanisms for raising the funds include charging fees for U.S. launches based on the debris potential of the mission, with the size of the fee determined by relevant factors such as the mass of the anticipated debris resulting from the mission and the congestion of the orbit into which the space object is being launched. Satellite manufacturers, operators, and KJ service providers could all share responsibility for payment into such funds. Once debris removal systems are in operation, additional funds could also come from service fees. For example, entities that created debris could pay a specified amount to removal providers in return for the service rendered.</p><p><u>Any</u> national space <u>debris removal <mark>program must </mark>also <mark>be</mark> kept <strong><mark>transparent</strong></mark> with <strong>ongoing international dialogue</u></strong> in forums such as COPUOS <u>so that other nations can build-up trust in the effectiveness and efficiency</u> of the program. A proven debris removal program will result in more productive discussions in these international forums.</p><p>Conclusion</p><p><u>If the United States and other powerful governments do not take steps now</u> to avert the potentially devastating effects of space debris, <u>the issue risks becoming stalemated</u> in a manner similar to climate change. Given the past hesitation of international forums in addressing the space debris issue, unilateral action is the most appropriate means of instigating space debris removal within the needed timeframe. The United States is well poised for a leadership role in space debris removal.</p><p>Going forward, <u>the U.S. government should work closely with the commercial sector</u> in this endeavor, <u>focusing on removing pieces of U.S. debris with</u> the greatest potential to contribute to future collisions. <u>It should</u> also <u>keep</u> its space <u>debris removal system</u> as open and <u>transparent<strong> as possible to allow for future international cooperation in this field. </p><p></u></strong>Although leadership in space debris removal will entail certain risks, investing early in preserving the near-Earth space environment is necessary to protect the satellite technology that is so vital to the U.S. military and day-to-day operations of the global economy. <u>By instituting</u> global space <u>debris removal measures, a critical opportunity exists to <strong><mark>mitigate</strong> and <strong>minimize</strong></mark> the</u> potential <u><strong><mark>damage</strong></mark> of space debris <strong>and ensure</strong> the sustainable <strong>development of</u></strong> the near-Earth space <u><strong>environment</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Hickel and Kirk ‘17 (Dr. Jason - Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, taught at the London School of Economics, the University of Virginia, and Goldsmiths, University of London (convenes the MA in Anthropology and Cultural Politics there), serves on the Labour Party task force on international development, works as Policy Director for /The Rules collective, sits on the Executive Board of Academics Stand Against Poverty (ASAP), joined the International Editorial Advisory Board of Third World Quarterly. Martin is Head of Strategy for /The Rules, a global network of activists, organizers, designers, researchers and writers dedicated to changing the rules that create inequality and poverty around the world. “Don’t Be Scared About The End Of Capitalism—Be Excited To Build What Comes Next.” Fast Company. 09.11.17. https://www.fastcompany.com/40454254/dont-be-scared-about-the-end-of-capitalism-be-excited-to-build-what-comes-next)-JN fulltext: These are fast-changing times. Old certainties are collapsing around us and people are scrambling for new ways of being in the world. As we pointed out in a recent article, 51% of young people in the United States no longer support the system of capitalism. And a solid 55% of Americans of all ages believe that capitalism is fundamentally unfair. But question capitalism in public and you’re likely to get some angry responses. People immediately assume that you want to see socialism or communism instead. They tell you to go and live in Venezuela, the current flogging-horse for socialism, or they hit you with dreary images of Soviet Russia with all its violence, dysfunction, and grey conformity. They don’t consider that you might want something beyond caricatures and old dogmas. These old ‘isms’ lurk in the shadows of any discussion on capitalism. The cyber-punk author William Gibson has a term for this effect: “semiotic ghosts”; one concept that haunts another, regardless of any useful or intended connection. There’s no good reason to remain captive to these old ghosts. All they do is stop us having a clear-headed conversation about the future. Soviet Russia was an unmitigated social and economic disaster; that’s easy to dispel. But, of course, not all experiments with socialist principles have gone so horribly wrong. Take the social democracies of Sweden and Finland, for example, or even post-war Britain and the New Deal in the U.S. There are many systems that have effectively harnessed the economy to deliver shared prosperity. But here’s the thing. While these systems clearly produce more positive social outcomes than laissez-faire systems do (think about the record high levels of health, education and well-being in Scandinavian countries, for example), even the best of them don’t offer the solutions we so urgently need right now, in an era of climate change and ecological collapse. Right now we are overshooting Earth’s carrying capacity by a crushing 64% each year, in terms of our resource use and greenhouse gas emissions. The socialism that exists in the world today, on its own, has nothing much to say about this. Just like capitalism, it relies on endless, indeed exponential GDP growth, ever-increasing levels of extraction and production and consumption. The two systems may disagree about how best to distribute the yields of a plundered earth, but they do not question the process of plunder itself. Fortunately, there is already a wealth of language and ideas out there that stretch well beyond these dusty old binaries. They are driven by a hugely diverse community of thinkers, innovators, and practitioners. There are organizations like the P2P (Peer to Peer) Foundation, Evonomics, The Next System Project, and the Institute for New Economic Thinking reimagining the global economy. The proposed models are even more varied: from complexity, to post-growth, de-growth, land-based, regenerative, circular, and even the deliciously named donut economics. Then, there are the many communities of practice, from the Zapatistas in Mexico to the barter economies of Detroit, from the global Transition Network, to Bhutan, with its Gross National Happiness index. There are even serious economists and writers, from Jeremy Rifkin to David Fleming to Paul Mason, making a spirited case that the evolution beyond capitalism is well underway and unstoppable, thanks to already active ecological feedback loops and/or the arrival of the near zero-marginal cost products and services.This list barely scratches the surface. The thinking is rich and varied, but all of these approaches share the virtue of being informed by up-to-date science and the reality of today’s big problems. They move beyond the reductionist dogmas of orthodox economics and embrace complexity; they focus on regenerating rather than simply using-up our planet’s resources; they think more holistically about how to live well within ecological boundaries; some of them draw on indigenous knowledge and lore about how to stay in balance with nature; others confront the contradictions of endless growth head on. Not all would necessarily describe themselves as anti- or even post-capitalist, but they are all, in one way or another, breaking through the dry seals of neoclassical economic theory upon which capitalism rests. Still, resistance to innovation is strong. One reason is surely that our culture has been stewed in capitalist logic for so long that it feels impregnable. Our instinct is now to see it as natural; some even go so far as to deem it divine. The notion that we should prioritize the production of capital over all other things has become a kind of common sense; the way humans must organize. Another reason, clearly linked, is the blindness of much of the academic world. Take, for example, the University of Manchester, where a group of economics students asked for their syllabus to be upgraded to account for the realities of a post-crash world. Joe Earle, one of the organizers of what The Guardian described as a “quiet revolution against orthodox free-market teaching” told the newspaper: “[Neoclassical economics] is given such a dominant position in our modules that many students aren’t even aware that there are other distinct theories out there that question the assumptions, methodologies and conclusions of the economics we are taught.” In much the same way as House minority leader, Nancy Pelosi, rebuffed college student Trevor Hill when he asked whether the Democratic Party would consider any alternatives to capitalism, Manchester University’s response was a flat no. Their economics course, they said, “focuses on mainstream approaches, reflecting the current state of the discipline”. Mainstream, current, anything but fresh. Such attitudes have spawned a global student movement, Rethinking Economics, with chapters as far afield as Ecuador, Uganda, and China. Capitalism has become a dogma, and dogmas die very slowly and very reluctantly. It is a system that has co-evolved with modernity, so it has the full force of social and institutional norms behind it. Its essential logic is even woven into most of our worldviews, which is to say, our brains. To question it can trigger a visceral reaction; it can feel like an attack not just on common sense but on our personal identities. But even if you believe it was once the best system ever, you can still see that today it has become necrotic and dangerous. This is demonstrated most starkly by two facts: The first is that the system is doing little now to improve the lives of the majority of humans: by some estimates, 4.3 billion of us are living in poverty, and that number has risen significantly over the past few decades. The ghostly responses to this tend to be either unimaginative–“If you think it’s bad, try living in Zimbabwe”–or zealous: “Well, that’s because there’s not enough capitalism. Let it loose with more deregulation, or give it time and it will raise their incomes too.” One of the many problems with this last argument is the second fact: with just half of us living above the poverty line, capitalism’s endless need for resources is already driving us over the cliff-edge of climate change and ecological collapse. This ranges from those that are both finite and dangerous to use, like fossil fuels, to those that are being used so fast that they don’t have time to regenerate, like fish stocks and the soil in which we grow our food. Those 4.3 billion more people living ‘successful’ hyper-consumption lifestyles? The laws of physics would need to change. Even Elon Musk can’t do that. It would be a sad and defeated world that simply accepted the prebaked assumption that capitalism (or socialism, or communism) represents the last stage of human thought; our ingenuity exhausted. Capitalism’s fundamental rules–like the necessity for endless GDP growth, which requires treating our planet as an infinite pit of value and damage to it as an “externality”– can be upgraded. Of course they can. There are plenty of options on the table. When have we humans ever accepted the idea that change for the better is a thing of the past? Of course, transcending capitalism might feel impossible right now. The political mainstream has its feet firmly planted and deeply rooted in that soil. But with the pace of events today, the unimaginable can become the possible, and even the inevitable with remarkable speed. The path to a better future will be cut by regular people being curious and open enough to challenge the wisdom received from our schools, our parents, and our governments, and look at the world with fresh eyes. We can let the ghosts go. We can allow ourselves the freedom to do what humans do best: innovate.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Cap collapsing now - expanding past planetary boundaries and ecological collapse – only transition saves us.</h4><p><strong>Hickel and Kirk ‘17</strong> (Dr. Jason - Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, taught at the London School of Economics, the University of Virginia, and Goldsmiths, University of London (convenes the MA in Anthropology and Cultural Politics there), serves on the Labour Party task force on international development, works as Policy Director for /The Rules collective, sits on the Executive Board of Academics Stand Against Poverty (ASAP), joined the International Editorial Advisory Board of Third World Quarterly. Martin is Head of Strategy for /The Rules, a global network of activists, organizers, designers, researchers and writers dedicated to changing the rules that create inequality and poverty around the world. “<u>Don’t Be Scared About The End Of Cap</u>italism—<u>Be Excited To Build What Comes Next</u>.” Fast Company. 09.11.17. https://www.fastcompany.com/40454254/dont-be-scared-about-the-end-of-capitalism-be-excited-to-build-what-comes-next)-JN</p><p>These are fast-changing times. <u>Old certainties are collapsing</u> around us and people are scrambling for new ways of being in the world. As we pointed out in a recent article, <u>51% of young people in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>no longer support </u>the system of <u>cap</u>italism. And a solid<u> 55% of Americans of all ages believe</u> that <u>cap</u>italism <u>is</u> <u>fundamentally unfair. But question cap</u>italism <u>in public and you</u>’re likely to <u>get</u> some <u>angry responses</u>. <u>People</u> immediately <u>assume</u> that <u>you want</u> to see <u>socialism or communism</u> instead. They tell you to go and live in Venezuela, the current flogging-horse for socialism, or they hit you with dreary images of Soviet Russia with all its violence, dysfunction, and grey conformity. They don’t consider that you might want something beyond caricatures and old dogmas. These old ‘isms’ lurk in the shadows of any discussion on capitalism. The cyber-punk author William Gibson has a term for this effect: “semiotic ghosts”; one concept that haunts another, regardless of any useful or intended connection. <u>There’s no </u>good <u>reason to remain captive to these old ghosts.</u> All they do is stop us having a clear-headed conversation about the future. Soviet Russia was an unmitigated social and economic disaster; that’s easy to dispel. But, of course, not all experiments with socialist principles have gone so horribly wrong. Take the social democracies of Sweden and Finland, for example, or even post-war Britain and the New Deal in the U.S. There are many systems that have effectively harnessed the economy to deliver shared prosperity. But here’s the thing. While these systems clearly produce more positive social outcomes than laissez-faire systems do (think about the record high levels of health, education and well-being in Scandinavian countries, for example), <u>even the best of them don’t offer</u> the <u>solutions we</u> so urgently <u>need</u> right now, <u>in</u> an era of <u>climate change </u>and ecological collapse. Right now <u>we are overshooting Earth’s carrying capacity by</u> a crushing <u>64% each year, in terms of</u> our <u>resource use and gr</u>een<u>h</u>ouse <u>g</u>as <u>emissions</u>. The socialism that exists in the world today, on its own, has nothing much to say about this. Just like capitalism, it relies on endless, indeed exponential GDP growth, ever-increasing levels of extraction and production and consumption. The two systems may disagree about how best to distribute the yields of a plundered earth, but they do not question the process of plunder itself. Fortunately, <u>there is already a wealth of </u>language and <u>ideas out there that stretch well beyond these dusty old binaries</u>. They are driven by a hugely diverse community of thinkers, innovators, and practitioners. There are organizations like the P2P (Peer to Peer) Foundation, Evonomics, The Next System Project, and the Institute for New Economic Thinking reimagining the global economy. The proposed models are even more varied: from complexity, to post-growth, de-growth, land-based, regenerative, circular, and even the deliciously named donut economics. Then, there are the many communities of practice, from the Zapatistas in Mexico to the barter economies of Detroit, from the global Transition Network, to Bhutan, with its Gross National Happiness index. There are even serious economists and writers, from Jeremy Rifkin to David Fleming to Paul Mason, making a spirited case that the evolution beyond capitalism is well underway and unstoppable, thanks to already active ecological feedback loops and/or the arrival of the near zero-marginal cost products and services.This list barely scratches the surface. The thinking is rich and varied, but <u>all</u> of these <u>approaches share the virtue of being informed by up-to-date science and </u>the <u>reality of today’s big problems.</u> <u>They</u> move beyond the reductionist dogmas of orthodox economics and embrace complexity; they focus on <u>regenerat</u>ing <u>rather than simply us</u>ing-<u>up</u> our planet’s <u>resources</u>; they <u>think</u> more holistically <u>about how to live well</u> with<u>in ecological boundarie</u>s; some of them <u>draw on indigenous knowledge</u> and lore about how to stay in balance with nature; others <u>confront</u> the <u>contradictions of </u>endless<u> growth</u> head on. Not all would necessarily describe themselves as anti- or even post-capitalist, but they are all, in one way or another, breaking through the dry seals of neoclassical economic theory upon which capitalism rests. Still, resistance to innovation is strong. One reason is surely that our culture has been stewed in capitalist logic for so long that it feels impregnable. Our instinct is now to see it as natural; some even go so far as to deem it divine. The notion <u>that we should prioritize</u> the production of <u>capital over all</u> other things <u>has become</u> a kind of <u>common sense</u>; the way humans must organize. Another reason, clearly linked, is the blindness of much of the academic world. Take, for example, the University of Manchester, where a group of economics students asked for their syllabus to be upgraded to account for the realities of a post-crash world. Joe Earle, one of the organizers of what The Guardian described as a “quiet revolution against orthodox free-market teaching” told the newspaper: “[Neoclassical economics] is given such a dominant position in our modules that many students aren’t even aware that there are other distinct theories out there that question the assumptions, methodologies and conclusions of the economics we are taught.” In much the same way as House minority leader, Nancy Pelosi, rebuffed college student Trevor Hill when he asked whether the Democratic Party would consider any alternatives to capitalism, Manchester University’s response was a flat no. Their economics course, they said, “focuses on mainstream approaches, reflecting the current state of the discipline”. Mainstream, current, anything but fresh. Such attitudes have spawned a global student movement, Rethinking Economics, with chapters as far afield as Ecuador, Uganda, and China. <u>Cap</u>italism has become a dogma, and dogmas die very slowly and very reluctantly. It is a system that has co-evolved with modernity, so it has the full force of social and institutional norms behind it. Its essential logic is even woven into most of our worldviews, which is to say, our brains. To question it can trigger a visceral reaction; it can feel like an attack not just on common sense but on our personal identities. But even if you believe it was once the best system ever, you can still see that today it has become necrotic and dangerous. This is demonstrated most starkly by two facts: The first is that the system <u>is doing little</u> now <u>to improve</u> the lives of the majority of humans: by some estimates, <u>4.3 billion</u> of us are<u> liv</u>ing <u>in poverty</u>, and <u>that number has risen significantly</u> over the past few decades. The ghostly responses to this tend to be either unimaginative–“If you think it’s bad, try living in Zimbabwe”–or zealous: “Well, that’s because there’s not enough capitalism. Let it loose with more deregulation, or give it time and it will raise their incomes too.” One of the many problems with this last argument is the second fact: <u>with just half of us living above the poverty line, cap</u>italism<u>’s endless need for resources is </u>already <u>driving us over the cliff-edge of climate change and ecological collapse. This ranges from</u> those that are both <u>finite and dangerous</u> to use, like fossil fuels, <u>to those</u> that are <u>being used so fast</u> that <u>they don’t have time to regenerate</u>, like fish stocks and the soil in which we grow our food. Those 4.3 billion more people living ‘successful’ hyper-consumption lifestyles? The laws of physics would need to change. Even Elon Musk can’t do that. <u>It would be a sad</u> and defeated <u>world that</u> simply <u>accepted</u> the prebaked <u>assumption</u> that <u>cap</u>italism (or socialism, or communism) <u>represents the last stage of human thought</u>; our ingenuity exhausted. Capitalism’s fundamental rules–like the necessity for endless GDP growth, which requires treating our planet as an infinite pit of value and damage to it as an “externality”– can be upgraded. Of course they can. There are plenty of options on the table. When have we humans ever accepted the idea that change for the better is a thing of the past? Of course, <u>transcending cap</u>italism <u>might feel impossible </u>right now. The <u>political mainstream has its feet </u>firmly <u>planted</u> and deeply rooted <u>in</u> that <u>soil</u>. But with the pace of events today, the unimaginable can become the possible, and even the inevitable with remarkable speed. The path to a better future will be cut by regular people being curious and open enough to challenge the wisdom received from our schools, our parents, and our governments, and look at the world with fresh eyes. We can let the ghosts go. We can allow ourselves the freedom to do what humans do best: innovate.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Celeste A. Wallander 2, President and CEO of the U.S. Russia Foundation and Senior Adviser at WestExec Advisors, served from May 2009 - July 2012 as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy*. Wallander was an adviser to Barack Obama during the 2008 Democratic primary campaign, B.A. summa cum laude in political science from Northwestern University in 1983. She received her M.A. (1985), M.Phil. (1986) and Ph.D. (1990) degrees in political science from Yale University, “NATO's Price: Shape up or Ship Out,” Foreign Affairs , Nov. - Dec., 2002, Vol. 81, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 2002), pp. 2-8. Published by: Council on Foreign Relations. fulltext: NATO members must therefore agree to amend the North Atlantic Treaty to allow for sanction, suspension, or even expulsion of backsliding members. The objective of such a revision would be to sharpen members' incentive to perform and live up to political standards so that the alliance can continue to work. Right now, NATO operates like a soccer team that holds tryouts to select players but then can never cut delinquent ones from the roster if they break training and lose their skills and conditioning. If NATO is to remain a successftil team, it needs a credible mechanism to bench, and ulti mately drop, flabby members. EARNING ONE'S KEEP There are two reasons why NATO members need to get tough on their own. First, it is generally accepted that one of NATO'S most important contributions to trans atlantic security has been the incentive that the prospect of membership creates for former Soviet bloc countries to engage in costly and controversial reforms. Assert to a NATO official that the alliance has lost its purpose with the end of the Cold War, and she will explain how Poland achieved important improvements in civilian control of its defense forces because it was made clear to the country's leadership that without such changes Poland would not become a member. If challenged on the notion that NATO today prevents cycles of mistrust and diffuses threats that led to centuries of war in Europe, she will point out that Hungary agreed to peaceftilly resolve historical terri torial claims against neighbors who often count substantial Hungarian minorities as citizens. When questioned on the wisdom of the next round of enlargement, she will talk about how membership incentives contribute to Lithuania's acknowledgment of the country's antisemitic past and its role in the Holocaust. Because NATO membership is not freely given and must be earned, aspirants have strong incentive to leave behind their nationalist and nondemocratic past for a Western orientation. In fact, this incentive effect is one of the main arguments for the future importance of the alliance. If it is true that countries' adherence to NATO standards advances U.S. security, then the question of holding members to those standards is not only legitimate but vital to American interests. The second argument for taking NATO'S political standards seriously should concern even those who care only about its military effectiveness. American defense officials know that what makes NATO work as an effective military alliance is the daily participation of its members in its com mittees, military planning, and exercises. The integrated military command and NATO military interoperability-the un precedented hallmarks of NATO's capability and effectiveness-work only because of the alliance's practical problem-solving and consensus principles that allow it to pursue a unified, and thereby stronger, policy. Willingness to operate by consen sus rests on trust and confidence among the members. These traits, in turn, a rooted in the common purposes, values, and institutions of NATO'S members. Furthermore, policies achieved by consensus in NATO, unlike those similarly achieved in most international institutions, are actually meaningful. Getting agree ment in the huge and diverse United Nations often means promoting weak policies to which no country would object. In contrast, as one NATO official recently said, although NATO positions are the lowest common denominator on whatever issue is at hand, that lowest common denominator is often highly meaningful because NATO members share interests, objectives, and values. If that were not the case, the consensus process would likely yield meaningless policies hardly worth implementing, especially in the military arena. Ultimately, then, NATO works as a military alliance because its members share a common heritage of transparent and just government and military professionalism in the service of civilian authority. The alliance's effectiveness is unavoidably rooted in the qualities of its members, primarily their democratic values and institutions. A NATO with a member or two ruled by xenophobic, authoritarian, or corrupt leaderships would be not merely an embar rassment but an ultimate failure. Like a team, NATO iS only as good as its members. What would happen to this effective institution if one of its members could no longer be trusted? How could NATO committees function if one of the organi zation's members could not be relied on to sustain democratic procedures, root out corruption, or ensure that civilian authorities exercise control of military actions? How could its military commands plan operations if they had to include officers from countries with smoldering irredentist claims against their neighbors? The answer is, they could not. Under those circumstances, NATO would lose not only its political coherence, but also its capacity for joint military action in support of consensus-based alliance policy. Whatever NATO s military future, it must be based on a common political commitment. A HAZARDOUS CONDITION Even worse, membership standards with out teeth actually create incentives for delinquency. NATO is a highly valued security institution; many countries seek to join it to be more secure. Without some mechanism to ensure that they contribute to upholding its standards, the lure of membership will itself become the poison pill that will destroy NATO'S effectiveness. This problem of "moral hazard," a condition in which one does not have to pay the price for risk-taking or rule-breaking behavior, is well known in financial and economic circles. Consider the case of a lender who extends credit to a prospective debtor country knowing that the Inter national Monetary Fund will not allow the debtor country to default. Normally extending loans is risky, and, when market works properly, bad risks will not be accepted, and bad loans will not be made. When a loan is guaranteed by some outside agency, however, the market fails. Moral hazard alters otherwise prudent calculations, breaks down the system, and actually encourages risky and irresponsible behavior. The problem of moral hazard drove the European Union to require member countries adopting its common currency, the euro, to sign on to its Stability Pact as well. Under the Stability Pact, members have to commit to preventing government deficits or risk facing sanctions. If this safeguard were not in place, countries with weak economies and large deficits would be eager to join to benefit from the prosperity and responsible budget policies of others; these irresponsible members would reap the rewards of low inflation and sound policy in other EU member countries without having to pay the costs or reduce their own deficits. The project of a strong common Euro pean currency would be doomed before it had even begun. Similarly, NATO must take its own political membership stan dards seriously to escape the disastrous downward cycle that moral hazard can generate. If no penalty is put in place for those who violate NATO'S membership criteria, rule breakers are apt to become the alliance's most eager applicants. All this reasoning may sound abstract and academic. But just take the word of the former Hungarian defense minister Gyoergy Keleti, who admitted on Hun garian radio in June 2002 that in order to achieve NATO membership the country had made commitments it was not pre pared to keep. "If a country is not a NATO member yet," Keleti said, "it can-to put it bluntly-say many things about which it is hardly called into account." Obviously, given the pressure to achieve membership in NATO's exclusive club in the late l99os, Hungary made its own moral hazard calculations. Unless NATo establishes some way to hold members accountable for their com mitments, it cannot escape the inherent threat of weakened membership standards, incentives for pathological and destructive behavior, and ultimately its own decline into irrelevance. For NATO to remain strong and effective-an asset to American security interests rather than a liability membership criteria have to be maintained, not only for aspirant countries but for members themselves.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The plan revitalizes NATO’s democratic credentials </h4><p>Celeste A. <strong>Wallander 2</strong>, President and CEO of the U.S. Russia Foundation and Senior Adviser at WestExec Advisors, served from May 2009 - July 2012 as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy*. Wallander was an adviser to Barack Obama during the 2008 Democratic primary campaign, B.A. summa cum laude in political science from Northwestern University in 1983. She received her M.A. (1985), M.Phil. (1986) and Ph.D. (1990) degrees in political science from Yale University, “NATO's Price: Shape up or Ship Out,” Foreign Affairs , Nov. - Dec., 2002, Vol. 81, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 2002), pp. 2-8. Published by: Council on Foreign Relations.</p><p><u><mark>NATO </mark>members must therefore agree to amend the North Atlantic Treaty <mark>to allow for</mark> sanction, suspension, or even <strong><mark>expulsion of backsliding members</strong></mark>. The objective of such <mark>a revision would</mark> be to <strong><mark>sharpen members' incentive</strong></mark> to perform and live up to political standards so that the alliance can continue to work</u>. Right now, NATO operates like a soccer team that holds tryouts to select players but then can never cut delinquent ones from the roster if they break training and lose their skills and conditioning. If NATO is to remain a successftil team, it needs a credible mechanism to bench, and ulti mately drop, flabby members. EARNING ONE'S KEEP There are two reasons why NATO members need to get tough on their own. <u>First, it is generally accepted that one of <mark>NATO'S <strong>most important</strong> contribution</mark>s to trans atlantic security has been the <mark>incentive</mark> that the prospect of membership creates for former Soviet bloc countries <mark>to engage in</mark> costly and controversial <strong><mark>reforms</strong></mark>.</u> Assert to a NATO official that the alliance has lost its purpose with the end of the Cold War, and she will explain how Poland achieved important improvements in civilian control of its defense forces because it was made clear to the country's leadership that without such changes Poland would not become a member. If challenged on the notion that NATO today prevents cycles of mistrust and diffuses threats that led to centuries of war in Europe, she will point out that Hungary agreed to peaceftilly resolve historical terri torial claims against neighbors who often count substantial Hungarian minorities as citizens. When questioned on the wisdom of the next round of enlargement, she will talk about how membership incentives contribute to Lithuania's acknowledgment of the country's antisemitic past and its role in the Holocaust. <u>Because NATO membership is not freely given and must be earned, aspirants <mark>have strong incentive to leave</mark> behind their <strong><mark>nationalist and nondemocratic past</strong></mark> for a Western orientation. In fact, this incentive effect is one of the <strong>main argument</strong>s for the <strong>future importance</strong> of the alliance</u>. If it is true that countries' adherence to NATO standards advances U.S. security, then the question of holding members to those standards is not only legitimate but vital to American interests. The second argument for taking NATO'S political standards seriously should concern even those who care only about its military effectiveness. <u>American defense officials know that <mark>what makes NATO work as a</mark>n <strong>effective</strong> <strong><mark>military alliance</strong> is the</mark> daily <strong><mark>participation</strong> of its members</mark> in its com mittees, military planning, and exercises. The integrated <mark>military command and</mark> NATO military <mark>interoperability</mark>-the un precedented hallmarks of NATO's capability and effectiveness-<strong><mark>work only because</strong></mark> of the alliance's practical problem-solving and <strong><mark>consensus principles</strong></mark> that allow it to pursue a unified, and thereby stronger, policy. <mark>Willingness</mark> to operate by consen sus <mark>rests on <strong>trust</strong></mark> and confidence among the members</u>. These traits, in turn, a rooted in the common purposes, values, and institutions of NATO'S members. Furthermore, policies achieved by consensus in NATO, unlike those similarly achieved in most international institutions, are actually meaningful. Getting agree ment in the huge and diverse United Nations often means promoting weak policies to which no country would object. In contrast, as one NATO official recently said, although NATO positions are the lowest common denominator on whatever issue is at hand, that lowest common denominator is often highly meaningful because NATO members share interests, objectives, and values. If that were not the case, the consensus process would likely yield meaningless policies hardly worth implementing, especially in the military arena. <u>Ultimately, then, <mark>NATO works as a <strong>military alliance</strong> because</mark> its members share a <mark>common</mark> heritage of transparent and just <strong><mark>government</strong></mark> and military professionalism in the service of civilian authority. The <mark>alliance's effectiveness</mark> is unavoidably <strong><mark>rooted in</strong></mark> the qualities of its members, primarily their <mark>democratic values</mark> and institutions</u>. A NATO with a member or two ruled by xenophobic, authoritarian, or corrupt leaderships would be not merely an embar rassment but an ultimate failure. Like a team, NATO iS only as good as its members. What would happen to this effective institution if one of its members could no longer be trusted? How could NATO committees function if one of the organi zation's members could not be relied on to sustain democratic procedures, root out corruption, or ensure that civilian authorities exercise control of military actions? How could its military commands plan operations if they had to include officers from countries with smoldering irredentist claims against their neighbors? The answer is, they could not. <u>Under those circumstances, <mark>NATO would lose</mark> not only its <strong><mark>political coherence</strong></mark>, but also its <mark>capacity for <strong>joint military action</strong></mark> in support of consensus-based alliance policy</u>. Whatever NATO s military future, it must be based on a common political commitment. A HAZARDOUS CONDITION <u>Even worse, <mark>membership standards with out teeth</mark> actually <strong><mark>create incentives for delinquency</u></strong></mark>. NATO is a highly valued security institution; many countries seek to join it to be more secure. <u>Without some mechanism to ensure that they contribute to upholding its standards, the <mark>lure of membership</mark> will itself <mark>become the <strong>poison pill</strong></mark> that will destroy NATO'S effectiveness. This <mark>problem of "<strong>moral hazard</strong></mark>," a condition in which one does not have to pay the price for risk-taking or rule-breaking behavior, is well known in financial and economic circles.</u> Consider the case of a lender who extends credit to a prospective debtor country knowing that the Inter national Monetary Fund will not allow the debtor country to default. Normally extending loans is risky, and, when market works properly, bad risks will not be accepted, and bad loans will not be made. When a loan is guaranteed by some outside agency, however, the market fails. Moral hazard alters otherwise prudent calculations, breaks down the system, and actually encourages risky and irresponsible behavior. The problem of moral hazard drove the European Union to require member countries adopting its common currency, the euro, to sign on to its Stability Pact as well. Under the Stability Pact, members have to commit to preventing government deficits or risk facing sanctions. If this safeguard were not in place, countries with weak economies and large deficits would be eager to join to benefit from the prosperity and responsible budget policies of others; these irresponsible members would reap the rewards of low inflation and sound policy in other EU member countries without having to pay the costs or reduce their own deficits. The project of a strong common Euro pean currency would be doomed before it had even begun. <u>Similarly, NATO must take its own political membership stan dards seriously <mark>to escape the <strong>disastrous downward cycle</strong></mark> that moral hazard can generate. <mark>If no penalty is</mark> put <mark>in place</mark> for those who violate NATO'S membership criteria, <strong><mark>rule breakers</strong></mark> are apt to <mark>become the alliance's</mark> most eager <strong><mark>applicants</strong></mark>.</u> All this reasoning may sound abstract and academic. But just take the word of the former Hungarian defense minister Gyoergy Keleti, who admitted on Hun garian radio in June 2002 that in order to achieve NATO membership the country had made commitments it was not pre pared to keep. "If a country is not a NATO member yet," Keleti said, "it can-to put it bluntly-say many things about which it is hardly called into account." Obviously, given the pressure to achieve membership in NATO's exclusive club in the late l99os, Hungary made its own moral hazard calculations. <u><mark>Unless NATo</mark> establishes some way to <strong><mark>hold members accountable</strong></mark> for their com mitments, it cannot escape the inherent threat of weakened membership standards, <mark>incentives for</mark> pathological and <strong><mark>destructive behavior, and</strong></mark> ultimately its own <strong><mark>decline into irrelevance</strong></mark>. <mark>For NATO to <strong>remain strong</strong> and <strong>effective</strong></mark>-an asset to American security interests rather than a liability <mark>membership criteria <strong>have to be maintained</strong></mark>, not only for aspirant countries but for members themselves</u>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Brooks and Wohlforth, PhDs, 16 fulltext: (Stephen, William, both PoliSci@Yale, ProfGov@Dartmouth, America Abroad, 107-110, Oxford University Press) General empirical findings thus lend support to the proposition that security alliances impede nuclear proliferation. But is this a net contributor to global security? Most practitioners and policy analysts would probably not even bring this up as a question and would automatically answer yes if it were raised. Yet a small but very prominent group of theorists within the academy reach a different answer: some of the same realist precepts that generate the theoretical prediction that retrenchment would increase demand for nuclear weapons also suggest that proliferation might increase security such that the net effect of retrenchment could be neutral. Most notably, “nuclear optimists” like Kenneth Waltz contend that deterrence essentially solves the security problem for all nuclear- armed states, largely eliminating the direct use of force among them.21 It follows that US retrenchment might generate an initial decrease in security followed by an increase as insecure states acquire nuclear capabilities, ultimately leaving no net effect on international security. This perspective is countered by “nuclear pessimists” such as Scott Sagan. Reaching outside realism to organization theory and other bodies of social science research, they see major security downsides from new nuclear states. Copious research produced by Sagan and others casts doubt on the expectation that governments can be relied upon to create secure and controlled nuclear forces.22 The more nuclear states there are, the higher the probability that the organizational, psychological, and civil- military pathologies Sagan identifies will turn an episode like one of the numerous “near misses” he uncovers into actual nuclear use. As Campbell Craig warns, “One day a warning system will fail, or an official will panic, or a terrorist attack will be misconstrued, and the missiles will fly.”23 Looking beyond these kinds of factors, it is notable that powerful reasons to question the assessment of proliferation optimists also emerge even if one assumes, as they do, that states are rational and seek only to maximize their security. First, nuclear deterrence can only work by raising the risk of nuclear war. For deterrence to be credible, there has to be a nonzero chance of nuclear use.24 If nuclear use is impossible, deterrence cannot be credible. It follows that every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability of nuclear use. The more such relationships there are, the greater the risk of nuclear war.i Proliferation therefore increases the chances of nuclear war even in a perfectly rationalist world. Proliferation optimists cannot logically deny that nuclear spread increases the risk of nuclear war. Their argument must be that the security gains of nuclear spread outweigh this enhanced risk. Estimating that risk is not simply a matter of pondering the conditions under which leaders will choose to unleash nuclear war. Rather, as Schelling established, the question is whether states will run the risk of using nuclear weapons. Nuclear crisis bargaining is about a “competition in risk taking.”25 Kroenig counts some twenty cases in which states—including prominently the United States—ran real risks of nuclear war in order to prevail in crises.26 As Kroenig notes, “By asking whether states can be deterred or not … proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis?”27 The more nuclear- armed states there are, the more the opportunities for such risk- taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use. It is also the case that for nuclear weapons to deter a given level of conflict, there must be a real probability of their use at that level of conflict. For nuclear weapons to deter conventional attack, they must be configured in such a way as to make their use credible in response to a conventional attack. Highly controlled and reliable assured- retaliation postures might well be credible in response to a conventional attack that threatens a state’s existence. But as newer research shows, the farther the issue in question is from a state’s existential security, the harder it is to make nuclear threats credible with the type of ideally stable nuclear posture whose existence proliferation optimism presupposes.28 If a state wishes, for example, to deter a conventionally stronger neighbor from seizing a disputed piece of territory, it may face great challenges fashioning a nuclear force that is credible. Following Schelling’s logic about the “threat that leaves something to chance,” it may face incentives to create a quasi- doomsday nuclear posture that virtually locks in escalation in response to its rival’s attempt to seize the territory conventionally. Key here is that nuclear spread cannot be treated as binary: “You have ‘em or you don’t.” States can choose the kind of nuclear postures they build. Some states may choose to build dangerous and vulnerable nuclear postures. And because they lack the money or the technological capacity or both, many states may not be able to create truly survivable forces (that is, forces that can survive a nuclear first strike by a rival power) even if they wanted to. The links between nuclear possession and conflict are hard to assess empirically. Still, there are relevant findings that are probative for this debate: • Nuclear weapons are most credible at deterring the kind of conflict— threats to a state’s core territorial security— that is least relevant to the actual security concerns of most states most of the time. Both quantitative and case study research validates the claim that territorial conquest is rarely an issue in armed conflicts in the present era. Yet states that are bullish on their prospects for territorial survival as sovereign units still have plenty of security concerns and also often find plenty of reasons to use force and plenty of ways to use force other than by conquering other states.29 • Robust, secure nuclear postures do not stop states from engaging in intense security competition. Though the United States and Soviet Union did not fight each other during the Cold War, their nuclear arsenals did not prevent them from engaging in one of history’s most costly rivalries, complete with intense arms racing and dangerous crises that raised the specter of nuclear war. • Though they built massive arsenals, at various junctures the two superpowers adopted dangerously escalatory postures to attempt to deter various levels of conflict.30 • The mere possession of nuclear weapons does not deter conventional attack, as both India and Israel discovered. • In both statistical and case study tests, Vipin Narang finds that the only nuclear posture that has any effect on conventional conflict initiation and escalation is a destabilizing “asymmetrical escalatory” force, a doomsday posture designed to create intense incentives for early use, such as that constructed by Pakistan in the 1990s.31 In short, nuclear spread is a Hobson’s choice: it will inevitably increase the chances of nuclear use, and it will either not deter conventional war or will do so only by raising the risks of nuclear war even more. Add to this the risk that states in the real world may not behave in ways consistent with the assumptions underlying proliferation optimism. That is, some subset of new nuclear- armed states may not be led by rational leaders, may not prove able to overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, may not pursue security as the only major state preference, and may not be risk- averse. The scale of these risks rises as the world moves from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation— including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces (making them susceptible to a first- strike attack and thus creating incentives for early first use)— are prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. Moreover, the risk of unforeseen crisis dynamics that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage to dangerous, undeterrable nonstate actors, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. And all of these concerns emerge independently of other reasons the United States is generally better off in a world with fewer nuclear states, notably increased US freedom of action.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>Prolif causes war – best research.</h4><p>Brooks and Wohlforth, PhDs, 16</p><p></strong>(Stephen, William, both PoliSci@Yale, ProfGov@Dartmouth, <u><strong>America Abroad</u></strong>, 107-110, Oxford University Press)</p><p>General empirical findings thus lend support <u><strong>to</u></strong> the proposition that security alliances <u><strong>impede nuclear proliferation</u></strong>. But <u><strong>is</u></strong> this <u><strong>a net contributor to global security</u></strong>? <u><strong>Most practitioners and policy analysts</u></strong> would probably not even bring this up as a question and would <u><strong>automatically answer yes if it were raised.</u></strong> Yet a small but very prominent group of theorists within the academy reach a different answer: some of the same realist precepts that generate the theoretical prediction that retrenchment would increase demand for nuclear weapons also suggest that proliferation might increase security such that the net effect of retrenchment could be neutral. Most notably, “nuclear optimists” like Kenneth Waltz contend that deterrence essentially solves the security problem for all nuclear- armed states, largely eliminating the direct use of force among them.21 It follows that US retrenchment might generate an initial decrease in security followed by an increase as insecure states acquire nuclear capabilities, ultimately leaving no net effect on international security. This perspective is countered by “nuclear pessimists” such as Scott Sagan. <u><strong>Reaching outside realism to organization theory and other</u></strong> bodies of <u><strong>social science <mark>research</mark>,</u></strong> they <u><strong><mark>see major security downsides from new nuclear states</u></strong></mark>. Copious <u><strong>research</u></strong> produced by Sagan and others <u><strong>casts doubt on the expectation that governments can be relied upon to create secure and controlled nuclear forces.</u></strong>22 <u><strong>The more nuclear states there are, the higher the probability that the organizational, psychological, and civil- military <mark>pathologies</mark> </u></strong>Sagan identifies <u><strong>will <mark>turn</mark> an episode like one of the numerous “<mark>near misses</mark>” he uncovers <mark>into actual nuclear use</u></strong></mark>. As Campbell Craig warns, “<u><strong>One day a warning system will fail, or an official will panic, or a terrorist attack will be misconstrued, and the missiles will fly</u></strong>.”23 Looking beyond these kinds of factors, it is notable that <u><strong>powerful reasons to question the assessment of proliferation optimists also emerge even if one assumes</u></strong>, as they do, that <u><strong>states are rational and seek only to maximize their security</u></strong>. First, nuclear deterrence can only work by raising the risk of nuclear war. <u><strong>For deterrence to be credible, there has to be a nonzero chance of nuclear use.</u></strong>24 <u><strong>If nuclear use is impossible, deterrence cannot be credible</u></strong>. It follows that <u><strong>every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability of nuclear use.</u></strong> <u><strong>The more such relationships there are, the greater the risk of nuclear war</u></strong>.i <u><strong>Proliferation therefore increases the chances of nuclear war <mark>even in a perfectly rationalist world</mark>.</u></strong> Proliferation <u><strong>optimists cannot logically deny that nuclear spread increases the risk of nuclear war.</u></strong> Their argument must be that the security gains of nuclear spread outweigh this enhanced risk. Estimating that risk is not simply a matter of pondering the conditions under which leaders will choose to unleash nuclear war. Rather, as Schelling established, the question is whether states will run the risk of using nuclear weapons. <u><strong>Nuclear crisis bargaining is about a “competition in risk taking</u></strong>.”25 <u><strong>Kroenig counts some twenty cases in which states—including prominently the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates—<u><strong>ran real risks of nuclear war in order to prevail in crises.</u></strong>26 As Kroenig notes, “<u><strong>By asking whether states can be deterred or not … proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question</u></strong>. <u><strong>The right question</u></strong> to ask <u><strong>is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis?</u></strong>”27 <u><strong>The more nuclear- armed states there are, the more the opportunities for such risk- taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use. </u></strong>It is also the case that for nuclear weapons to deter a given level of conflict, there must be a real probability of their use at that level of conflict<u><strong>. For nuclear weapons to deter conventional attack, they must be configured in such a way as to make their use credible</u></strong> in response to a conventional attack. Highly controlled and reliable assured- retaliation postures might well be credible in response to a conventional attack that threatens a state’s existence. But as <u><strong>newer research shows, the farther the issue in question is from a state’s existential security, the harder it is to make nuclear threats credible</u></strong> with the type of ideally stable nuclear posture whose existence proliferation optimism presupposes.28 If a state wishes, for example, to deter a conventionally stronger neighbor from seizing a disputed piece of territory, it may face great challenges fashioning a nuclear force that is credible. Following Schelling’s logic about the “threat that leaves something to chance<u><strong>,” it may face incentives to create a quasi- doomsday nuclear posture that virtually locks in escalation in response to its rival’s attempt to seize the territory conventionally</u></strong>. Key here is that nuclear spread cannot be treated as binary: “You have ‘em or you don’t.” States can choose the kind of nuclear postures they build. Some <u><strong><mark>states</mark> may choose to <mark>build dangerous</mark> and vulnerable <mark>nuclear postures</mark>. </u></strong>And because they lack the money or the technological capacity or both, many states may not be able to create truly survivable forces (that is, forces that can survive a nuclear first strike by a rival power) even if they wanted to. The links between nuclear possession and conflict are hard to assess empirically. Still, <u><strong>there are relevant findings that are probative for this debate: </u></strong>• Nuclear weapons are most credible at deterring the kind of conflict— threats to a state’s core territorial security— that is least relevant to the actual security concerns of most states most of the time. Both quantitative and case study research validates the claim that territorial conquest is rarely an issue in armed conflicts in the present era. Yet states that are bullish on their prospects for territorial survival as sovereign units still have plenty of security concerns and also often find plenty of reasons to use force and plenty of ways to use force other than by conquering other states.29 • <u><strong>Robust, secure nuclear postures do not stop states from engaging in intense security competition</u></strong>. Though <u><strong>the</u></strong> United States and Soviet Union did not fight each other during the <u><strong>Cold War, their nuclear arsenals did not prevent them from engaging in one of history’s most costly rivalries, complete with intense arms racing and dangerous crises that raised the specter of nuclear war. </u></strong>• Though they built massive arsenals, at various junctures the two superpowers adopted dangerously escalatory postures to attempt to deter various levels of conflict.30 • <u><strong>The mere <mark>possession of nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s does not deter</mark> conventional attack,</u></strong> <u><strong>as both India and Israel discovered.</u></strong> • <u><strong>In both statistical and case study tests</u></strong>, Vipin <u><strong>Narang finds that <mark>the only nuclear posture that has any effect</mark> on conventional conflict initiation and escalation <mark>is</mark> a <mark>destabilizing</mark> “asymmetrical escalatory” force, a doomsday posture designed to create intense incentives for early use</u></strong>, such as that constructed by Pakistan in the 1990s.31 In short, <u><strong>nuclear spread</u></strong> is a Hobson’s choice: it <u><strong>will inevitably increase the chances of nuclear use, and it will either not deter conventional war or will do so only by raising the risks of nuclear war even more</u></strong>. Add to this the risk that <u><strong>states in the real world may not behave in ways consistent with the assumptions underlying proliferation optimism</u></strong>. That is, some subset of new <u><strong>nuclear- armed <mark>states may not be</mark> led by <mark>rational</mark> leaders, may not</u></strong> prove able to <u><strong>overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, may not pursue security as the only major state preference, and may not be risk- averse</u></strong>. <u><strong>The scale of these risks rises as the world moves from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states</u></strong>. In addition, <u><strong>many of the other dangers noted by analysts</u></strong> who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation— <u><strong>including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces (making them susceptible to a first- strike attack and thus creating incentives for early first use)— are prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows.</u></strong> Moreover, <u><strong><mark>the risk of unforeseen crisis dynamics</mark> that could spin out of control <mark>is</mark> also <mark>higher</mark> as the number of nuclear powers increases</u></strong>. Finally, <u><strong>add to these concerns the enhanced danger of <mark>nuclear leakage to</mark> dangerous, undeterrable <mark>nonstate actors</mark>, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition <mark>becomes</mark> yet more <mark>worrisome</u></strong></mark>. And all of these concerns emerge independently of other reasons the United States is generally better off in a world with fewer nuclear states, notably increased US freedom of action. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Hunt 17 (Edward Hunt, PhD in American Studies from the College of William & Mary, “The American Empire Isn’t in Decline,” March 13, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/03/obama-trump-mattis-united-states-empire/) fulltext: The warning signs seem to be everywhere. A resurgent Russia is exerting its power in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. A rising China is extending its reach across its periphery. ISIS has taken control of large parts of Iraq and Syria. Establishment Democrats and Republicans couldn’t even stop Donald Trump from becoming the president of the United States. For the foreign policy establishment in Washington, it all raises a very troubling question: is the United States an empire in decline? Some insist that the answer is yes — that the period of US global dominance that has reigned since the end of the Cold War is coming to an end. As things now stand, “the post–Cold War, unipolar moment has passed,” the National Intelligence Council reported earlier this year. Former CIA officials John E. McLaughlin and Gen. David H. Petraeus made a similar assessment before the House Armed Services Committee this past February. In the years ahead, McLaughlin argued, “the world will be without a hegemonic power — that is, without a country so powerful as to exert dominant influence and advance policy with little reference to others.” Petraeus agreed, saying that the post–Cold War era of “US domination of the world” is ending. Still, there are some reasons to think otherwise. As former US diplomat R. Nicholas Burns recently observed, the United States maintains “alliances in Europe and Asia, and the Russians and Chinese do not.” In addition, the American military has begun to wipe out ISIS, killing more than sixty thousand fighters over the past two and a half years. So do a resurgent Russia, an ascendant China, and the emergence of the Islamic State suggest that US power is ebbing, or are these challenges exaggerated? What do US officials really think about these matters? If we take stock of their public statements as a whole, the foreign policy establishment certainly appears concerned about the latest challenges to US empire, especially the uncertainty that Trump’s election has introduced. But they also remain quite confident in their power to shape the world and steer the United States into a new age of global hegemony. The World’s Superpower Over the past few years, a number of high-level officials have expressed great confidence in the durability of US hegemony. Not only have they insisted that the declinist thesis is wrong, but they have argued that the United States will remain the world’s dominant power well into the future. In May 2016, two former high-level officials laid out the more confident view for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. In a statement to the panel, former Secretary of State James Baker said that the United States would continue to lead the international system. Certainly, “much of the rest of the world — countries like China, Brazil and India — are catching up with us,” Baker conceded. “Still, we should remain the world’s preeminent leader for the foreseeable future.” Former National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon agreed. As long as the United States takes the proper precautions, he said, it “will continue to be the world’s leading and most powerful nation for a long time to come.” Donilon also rejected the declinist thesis, calling it a “myth” that should not be taken seriously: “The idea that America is in decline does not stand up to a rigorous analysis of our national balance sheet of strategic assets and liabilities,” Donilon asserted. “The truth is that no nation can match our comprehensive set of enduring strengths.” Other Obama administration officials offered similar views. Last October, for example, Secretary of State John Kerry noted that the United States maintains tremendous economic advantages. “We’re the richest country on the face of the planet,” Kerry said. In fact, the Obama administration made great strides in expanding US economic power across the globe. President Obama, who acknowledged during his final months in office that he had “made it a priority to open up new markets overseas,” boasted that his administration had “increased US exports to the world by more than 40 percent — to record levels.” At the same time, administration officials also pointed to their other great advantage in world affairs: American military power. As Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter noted in April 2015, “it will take decades — and let me repeat that: decades — for anyone to build the kind of military capability the United States possesses today.” Obama expressed similar sentiments during his farewell tour. The United States possesses “the greatest military in the history of the world,” Obama declared. “Make no mistake,” he continued, “even with the challenges of recent years — and there have been challenges — our allies and adversaries alike understand America’s military remains, by far, the most capable fighting force on the face of the Earth.” In short, contrary to those who warn of waning US hegemony, high-ranking officials insist that the United States remains the most powerful country in the world. “We are, without a doubt, the world’s superpower,” CIA Director John Brennan said this past September. The Challenges Of course, every great power faces challengers. Not even the mighty United States is immune from pushback. As Carter noted last November, the United States faces enemies that are “extremely competitive,” ranging from terrorists to “high-end opponents.” Facing such a broad range of adversaries, foreign policy elites have tried to assess how seriously to treat each, weighing whether current and potential enemies can significantly weaken the United States’ hold over the world. For the most part, they agree on the issue of terrorism. Although American leaders regularly denounce terrorism as the modern world’s greatest plague, most don’t see it as a major challenge. Last November, former State Department official Daniel Serwer warned, “We shouldn’t blow up terrorism into an existential threat. It’s not.” A month later, Obama agreed that ISIS and other groups stand no real chance of defeating the United States. “Today’s terrorists can kill innocent people,” Obama stated, “but they don’t pose an existential threat to our nation.” Instead, officials have grown more concerned about other challenges. Taking a more traditional view of the world, they have largely concluded that rising powers in the international system now pose the most serious threat to US hegemony. Early last year, Carter articulated this basic rationale, describing the latest trends as “a return, in some ways, to great power competition.” Without diminishing the US’s capacity to fight terrorism, he contended that the nation should prepare for new confrontations with Russia and China. These countries, he argued, “are our most stressing competitors, as they’ve both developed and are continuing to advance military systems that threaten our advantages in specific areas.” Throughout Washington, many officials are worried that China will replace the United States as the dominant power in the Pacific. Last June, Brennan delivered this warning: “China is a growing power of great economic, political, and increasingly military influence and presence.” China, he noted, has continued expanding its presence in the South China Sea, an area American officials have identified as a strategically important transit route. “There is a reason for the United States to pay attention to what China is doing on a number of fronts, which we are,” Brennan said. A few months later, two high-level officials put the matter more directly. Appearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Secretary of Defense Carter and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford claimed that the United States and China are now arrayed against each other. Alabama senator Tom Cotton asked, “Gen. Dunford, are we in great-power competition with China?” “We are, senator,” Dunford replied. Carter agreed, saying, “absolutely right.” In early January, Secretary of State John Kerry even suggested that China would eventually surpass the United States as the world’s leading economic power. “We’re the most powerful country on the planet, yes, and we’re the biggest economy in the world, yes,” Kerry stated. “But China will be eventually just by virtue of its size.” Nevertheless, US officials have also expressed certitude about their ability to deal with China. While they may identify China as a great-power competitor that is destined to grow more powerful, they have also argued the US maintains the upper hand in bilateral relations. In July 2016, Vice President Joe Biden provided one example. He recounted that after the Chinese government had tried to create an air defense identification zone over disputed territory in the East China Sea, the United States had asserted its dominance. According to Biden, President Xi had asked him, “What do you expect me to do?” In response, Biden had said, “I don’t expect you to do much, but just so you know, we’re flying B-52s through it. We’re coming.” In other words, Biden told the Chinese president that regardless of any newly declared air rights, the United States would continue to use that area. Since then, officials have only grown more confident in their capacity to manage China. Kerry himself bragged last September that China has not been able to alter the strategic calculus in the South China Sea. “In the South China Sea, we have been able to make it clear, freedom of navigation,” Kerry commented. “We’ve been able to deal with China.” In fact, the United States has maintained the dominant position throughout the entire Asia Pacific area. The United States “is the strongest military and the power of the region and will remain so for a long time,” Carter said last December. Officials in the Trump administration have indicated they may use that military power to confront China. In January, Rex Tillerson said during his confirmation hearing for secretary of state that the US will no longer tolerate China’s attempts to gain control of the South China Sea. “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that first, the island-building stops, and second, your access to those islands is also not going to be allowed,” Tillerson said. In short, US officials are relatively unperturbed by China’s power. Although they still fear that China may one day emerge to challenge American hegemony, they have largely ensured that China will remain a secondary power in the region for the immediate future. Russia: A Closer Look Meanwhile, state officials face another significant challenge to their plans: Russia. Last June, Brennan captured their trepidation in a statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: “Russia is threatening its neighbors and aggressively reasserting itself on the global stage,” he stated. The following month, diplomat Alexander Vershbow provided a more direct assessment, explaining that the United States and Russia are once again competing for influence in Europe. “We now sadly recognize that we’re in a long — what I’d call a long-term strategic competition with Russia,” Vershbow said. Earlier this year, Mattis issued the strongest warning, saying that Russia represented the main hazard to the world order. “I would consider the principal threats to start with Russia,” Mattis said. At the same time, US officials assert that the rivalry with Russia remains largely one-sided. While they see Russia as a competitor, they simultaneously insist that the country has much less power than the United States. In April 2016, US ambassador to NATO Douglas Lute argued that Russia — not the United States — has entered a period of declension. “There’s a sense that, yes, there’s a new, more assertive, maybe even more aggressive Russia,” he explained, “but fundamentally Russia is a state in decline.” A few months later, Defense Department official Elissa Slotkin made a similar argument. The Russians are “acting from a position of weakness,” she stated, before going on to note that the Kremlin faces many constraints. “I think the combination of the economic sanctions after Crimea and Eastern Ukraine plus the low price of oil has really hurt them,” she said. The United States should not “overestimate the competitor,” she continued, suggesting that her predecessors had done just that with the Soviet Union. The Russians “are not unbeatable,” she insisted. “They are not operating from a position of strength.” The highest ranking officials in the Obama administration shared her view. This past October, Secretary of State John Kerry said that very little about Russia scared him. “I don’t sit around quaking about Russia,” Kerry commented. Obama also waved away the notion that Russia posed a serious challenge, even after allegations of election interference surfaced. “The Russians can’t change us or significantly weaken us,” he stated. “They are a smaller country. They are a weaker country.” Essentially, foreign policy elites seem content in the knowledge that while Russia has emerged as a competitor on a variety of issues, it is acting from a position of weakness. As former US ambassador to Russia William Burns noted earlier this year, “I’ve learned that we have a much better hand to play with Mr. Putin than he does with us.”<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>US hegemony is <u>resilient</u> </h4><p><u><strong>Hunt 17</u></strong> (Edward Hunt, PhD in American Studies from the College of William & Mary, “The American Empire Isn’t in Decline,” March 13, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/03/obama-trump-mattis-united-states-empire/)</p><p>The warning signs seem to be everywhere. A resurgent Russia is exerting its power in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. A rising China is extending its reach across its periphery. ISIS has taken control of large parts of Iraq and Syria. Establishment Democrats and Republicans couldn’t even stop Donald Trump from becoming the president of the United States. For the foreign policy establishment in Washington, it all raises a very troubling question: is the United States an <u><strong><mark>empire in decline</u></strong></mark>? Some insist that the answer is yes — that the period of US global dominance that has reigned since the end of the Cold War is coming to an end. As things now stand, “the post–Cold War, unipolar moment has passed,” the National Intelligence Council reported earlier this year. Former CIA officials John E. McLaughlin and Gen. David H. Petraeus made a similar assessment before the House Armed Services Committee this past February. In the years ahead, McLaughlin argued, “the world will be without a hegemonic power — that is, without a country so powerful as to exert dominant influence and advance policy with little reference to others.” Petraeus agreed, saying that the post–Cold War era of “US domination of the world” is ending. Still, there are some reasons to <u><strong><mark>think otherwise</u></strong></mark>. As former US diplomat R. Nicholas Burns recently observed, <u><strong><mark>the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>maintains </u></strong>“<u><strong>alliances</mark> in Europe and Asia</u></strong>, and the Russians and Chinese do not.” In addition, <u><strong>the American military has begun to wipe out ISIS</u></strong>, killing more than sixty thousand fighters over the past two and a half years. So do a resurgent Russia, an ascendant China, and the emergence of the Islamic State suggest that US power is ebbing, or are these challenges exaggerated? What do US officials really think about these matters? If we take stock of their public statements as a whole, <u><strong>the foreign policy establishment</u></strong> certainly appears concerned about the latest challenges to US empire, especially the uncertainty that Trump’s election has introduced. But they also <u><strong>remain quite confident in their power to shape the world and steer</u></strong> the United States into <u><strong>a new age of global hegemony</u></strong>. The World’s Superpower Over the past few years, a number of <u><strong>high-level <mark>officials have expressed</u></strong></mark> great <u><strong><mark>confidence in the durability of US hegemony</u></strong></mark>. Not only have they insisted that the declinist thesis is wrong, but they have argued that <u><strong>the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>will remain the world’s dominant power well into the future</u></strong>. In May 2016, two former high-level officials laid out the more confident view for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. In a statement to the panel, former Secretary of State James Baker said that the United States would continue to lead the international system. Certainly, “much of <u><strong>the rest of the world </u></strong>— countries like China, Brazil and India — are <u><strong>catching up</u></strong> with us,” Baker conceded. “<u><strong>Still, we should remain the world’s preeminent leader for the foreseeable future</u></strong>.” Former National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon agreed. As long as the United States takes the proper precautions, he said, it “will continue to be the world’s leading and most powerful nation for a long time to come.” Donilon also rejected the declinist thesis, calling it a “myth” that should not be taken seriously: “The idea that America is in decline does not stand up to a rigorous analysis of our national balance sheet of strategic assets and liabilities,” Donilon asserted. “The truth is that <u><strong><mark>no nation can match our comprehensive set of enduring strengths</u></strong></mark>.” Other Obama administration officials offered similar views. Last October, for example, Secretary of State John Kerry noted that <u><strong><mark>the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>maintains tremendous economic advantages</u></strong></mark>. “We’re the richest country on the face of the planet,” Kerry said. In fact, the Obama administration made great strides in expanding US economic power across the globe. President <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark>, who acknowledged during his final months in office that he had “made it a priority to open up new markets overseas,” boasted that his <u><strong>administration</u></strong> had “<u><strong><mark>increased</mark> US <mark>exports</u></strong></mark> to the world <u><strong>by more than <mark>40 percent</u></strong> — <u><strong>to record levels</u></strong></mark>.” At the same time, administration officials also pointed to their other great advantage in world affairs: <u><strong>American <mark>military power</u></strong></mark>. As Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter noted in April 2015, “<u><strong><mark>it will take decades</u></strong></mark> — and let me repeat that: decades — <u><strong><mark>for anyone to build the kind of</mark> military <mark>capability the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>possesses</u></strong></mark> today.” Obama expressed similar sentiments during his farewell tour. The United States possesses “the greatest military in the history of the world,” Obama declared. “Make no mistake,” he continued, “even with the challenges of recent years — and there have been challenges — our allies and adversaries alike understand America’s military remains, by far, the most capable fighting force on the face of the Earth.” In short, contrary to those who warn of waning US hegemony, high-ranking officials insist that <u><strong>the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>remains the most powerful country in the world</u></strong>. “<u><strong>We are, without a doubt, the world’s superpower</u></strong>,” CIA Director John Brennan said this past September. The Challenges Of course, every great power faces challengers. Not even the mighty United States is immune from pushback. As Carter noted last November, the United States faces enemies that are “extremely competitive,” ranging from terrorists to “high-end opponents.” Facing such a broad range of adversaries, foreign policy elites have tried to assess how seriously to treat each, weighing whether current and potential enemies can significantly weaken the United States’ hold over the world. For the most part, they agree on the issue of terrorism. Although American leaders regularly denounce terrorism as the modern world’s greatest plague, most don’t see it as a major challenge. Last November, former State Department official Daniel Serwer warned, “We shouldn’t blow up terrorism into an existential threat. It’s not.” A month later, Obama agreed that ISIS and other groups stand no real chance of defeating the United States. “Today’s terrorists can kill innocent people,” Obama stated, “but they don’t pose an existential threat to our nation.” Instead, officials have grown more concerned about other challenges. Taking a more traditional view of the world, they have largely concluded that rising powers in the international system now pose the most serious threat to US hegemony. Early last year, Carter articulated this basic rationale, describing the latest trends as “a return, in some ways, to great power competition.” Without diminishing the US’s capacity to fight terrorism, he contended that the nation should prepare for new confrontations with Russia and China. These countries, he argued, “are our most stressing competitors, as they’ve both developed and are continuing to advance military systems that threaten our advantages in specific areas.” Throughout Washington, many officials are worried that China will replace the United States as the dominant power in the Pacific. Last June, Brennan delivered this warning: “China is a growing power of great economic, political, and increasingly military influence and presence.” China, he noted, has continued expanding its presence in the South China Sea, an area American officials have identified as a strategically important transit route. “There is a reason for the United States to pay attention to what China is doing on a number of fronts, which we are,” Brennan said. A few months later, two high-level officials put the matter more directly. Appearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Secretary of Defense Carter and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford claimed that the United States and China are now arrayed against each other. Alabama senator Tom Cotton asked, “Gen. Dunford, are we in great-power competition with China?” “We are, senator,” Dunford replied. Carter agreed, saying, “absolutely right.” In early January, Secretary of State John Kerry even suggested that China would eventually surpass the United States as the world’s leading economic power. “We’re the most powerful country on the planet, yes, and we’re the biggest economy in the world, yes,” Kerry stated. “But China will be eventually just by virtue of its size.” Nevertheless, <u><strong>US officials have</u></strong> also <u><strong>expressed certitude about their ability to deal with China</u></strong>. While they may identify China as a great-power competitor that is destined to grow more powerful, they have also argued <u><strong>the US maintains the upper hand in bilateral relations</u></strong>. In July 2016, Vice President Joe Biden provided one example. He recounted that after the Chinese government had tried to create an air defense identification zone over disputed territory in the East China Sea, the United States had asserted its dominance. According to Biden, President Xi had asked him, “What do you expect me to do?” In response, Biden had said, “I don’t expect you to do much, but just so you know, we’re flying B-52s through it. We’re coming.” In other words, Biden told the Chinese president that regardless of any newly declared air rights, the United States would continue to use that area. Since then, officials have only grown more confident in their capacity to manage China. Kerry himself bragged last September that <u><strong><mark>China has not been able to alter</mark> the <mark>strategic calculus</mark> in the S</u></strong>outh <u><strong>C</u></strong>hina <u><strong>S</u></strong>ea. “In the South China Sea, we have been able to make it clear, freedom of navigation,” Kerry commented. “We’ve been able to deal with China.” In fact, <u><strong><mark>the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>has maintained</mark> the <mark>dominant position</mark> throughout the</u></strong> entire <u><strong>Asia Pacific</u></strong> area. The United States “is the strongest military and the power of the region and will remain so for a long time,” Carter said last December. Officials in the Trump administration have indicated they may use that military power to confront China. In January, Rex Tillerson said during his confirmation hearing for secretary of state that the US will no longer tolerate China’s attempts to gain control of the South China Sea. “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that first, the island-building stops, and second, your access to those islands is also not going to be allowed,” Tillerson said. In short, US officials are relatively unperturbed by China’s power. Although they still fear that China may one day emerge to challenge American hegemony, they have largely ensured that <u><strong>China will remain a secondary power</u></strong> in the region <u><strong>for the immediate future</u></strong>. Russia: A Closer Look Meanwhile, state officials face another significant challenge to their plans: Russia. Last June, Brennan captured their trepidation in a statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: “Russia is threatening its neighbors and aggressively reasserting itself on the global stage,” he stated. The following month, diplomat Alexander Vershbow provided a more direct assessment, explaining that the United States and Russia are once again competing for influence in Europe. “We now sadly recognize that we’re in a long — what I’d call a long-term strategic competition with Russia,” Vershbow said. Earlier this year, Mattis issued the strongest warning, saying that Russia represented the main hazard to the world order. “I would consider the principal threats to start with Russia,” Mattis said. At the same time, US officials assert that the rivalry with <u><strong>Russia</u></strong> remains largely one-sided. While they see Russia as a competitor, they simultaneously insist that the country <u><strong>has much less power than the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates. In April 2016, US ambassador to NATO Douglas Lute argued that <u><strong><mark>Russia</u></strong></mark> — not the United States — <u><strong><mark>has entered a period of declension</u></strong></mark>. “There’s a sense that, <u><strong>yes, there’s a </u></strong>new, <u><strong>more assertive</u></strong>, maybe even more aggressive <u><strong>Russia</u></strong>,” he explained, “<u><strong>but fundamentally Russia is</u></strong> a state <u><strong>in decline</u></strong>.” A few months later, Defense Department official Elissa Slotkin made a similar argument. The Russians are “acting from a position of weakness,” she stated, before going on to note that the Kremlin faces many constraints. “I think the combination of the economic sanctions after Crimea and Eastern Ukraine plus the low price of oil has really hurt them,” she said. The United States should not “overestimate the competitor,” she continued, suggesting that her predecessors had done just that with the Soviet Union. The Russians “are not unbeatable,” she insisted. “They are not operating from a position of strength.” The highest ranking officials in the Obama administration shared her view. This past October, Secretary of State John Kerry said that very little about Russia scared him. “I don’t sit around quaking about Russia,” Kerry commented. Obama also waved away the notion that Russia posed a serious challenge, even after allegations of election interference surfaced. “<u><strong><mark>The Russians can’t</mark> change us or</u></strong> significantly <u><strong><mark>weaken us</u></strong></mark>,” he stated. “They are a smaller country. They are a weaker country.” Essentially, foreign policy elites seem content in the knowledge that while Russia has emerged as a competitor on a variety of issues, it is acting from a position of weakness. As former US ambassador to Russia William Burns noted earlier this year, “I’ve learned that we have a much better hand to play with Mr. Putin than he does with us.”</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Freier ’15 (Associate Professor of National Security Studies with the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), 6-17-15 (Nate, CSIS International Security Program senior associate, 20 year U.S. Army career, last military assignment was as director of national security affairs at SSI, “Does Anyone Really Know What's Going On? Likely Not.,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles//Does-Anyone-Really-Know-Whats-Going-On/2015/06/17, accessed 8-12-15, CMM) fulltext: National security elites have fallen into a funk over the recent course of U.S. policy. At first glance, it seems the mythical Midas Touch of the United States as indispensable to solving the world’s most compelling challenges is just that . . . myth. Even a cursory examination of current events betrays a veritable dog’s breakfast of U.S. policy gone or going substantially wrong. Indeed, on the heels of widely perceived disappointments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States appears persistently plagued by serial misfortune. Making matters worse, each individual letdown seems to arrive via unforced error; and, all seem to bring with them their own catalog of unanticipated costs and hazards. Let us review the bidding. In spite of some substantial American commitment to reverse Islamic State gains in Iraq and Syria, more territory falls victim to its predations by the day. Further, the U.S.-enabled liberation of Libya from decades of dictatorship has become instead a clinic in unintended consequences. Further, Yemen, once heralded as an American counterterrorism success, has devolved into a new round of lethal civil conflict. The Gulf States, too, are suddenly vulnerable, as they find themselves hemmed in by violent disorder on three fronts and Iranian provocation on a fourth. A more traditional state-based set of challenges appears to be emerging somewhat unchecked—or, at a minimum, undeterred—as well. In East Asia, the pivot has not slowed Chinese adventurism, as China continues to press on multiple fronts for substantial change in the international status quo. Likewise, in Europe, the U.S. reset with Russia is now a footnote—maybe worse, a punch line, as hope for rapprochement has yielded to despair over Russia’s re-emergence as a manipulative spoiler and subversive regional contender. The list goes on, and with the U.S. election season heating up, a predictable and unsophisticated blame game threatens to all but swallow competent debate about the pathology of our most recent policy disappointments. Hyperpoliticized chatter will follow, decrying indecisive and feckless policymakers recklessly putting U.S. interests at risk. The case will be simple: the United States is currently neither faithful enough to its friends nor aggressive or assertive enough with its foes and is, as a consequence, reaping the whirlwind. The remedy, according to those holding this view, is impulsive and visceral, relying on heavier, more unqualified doses of good faith and guts to roll back our perceived losses. I say, Not so fast! There is merit in all thoughtful criticisms of contemporary U.S. policy. For example, let us stipulate to some mishandling of U.S. foreign and security affairs over the last 15 years. However, there is also more to the story than meets the eye. In this case, failure is not, as the saying goes, an orphan, but, rather, born of innumerable conventional perspectives wedded more to what was or is preferred than what actually is or is likely to be. Indeed, the real failure of contemporary policy is more elemental, frightening, and collective in origin than a simple shortage of good faith and guts. In reality, we (and I really mean all of us) no longer understand the system within which we are operating well enough to make rational national security decisions that have a prayer of even modest durability over time. We live in complex and uncertain times where there are frankly more “known unknowns” than we are all comfortable admitting. Further, the speed of both system-level change and threat generation are quantum leaps ahead of a national security bureaucracy that fully matured during the predictable, binary competition of the Cold War. Thus, in fairness to those in office and as a caution to those hoping to succeed them, healthy acknowledgement of our fundamental fallibility is good place to start for future national security strategy. The rules governing international security and the context within which those rules are applied change so fast now that no one is intellectually well-postured yet to chart reasonable, effective, and sufficiently adaptable courses of action for U.S. policy going forward. The number and diversity of consequential actors, competing priorities and interests, and sources of hazard make new-age statecraft a complex and ambiguous business to be sure; clear definitions of success or failure are illusive, and the margin of error separating the two is razor thin regardless. There, I said it. Alarming as it may sound, no one has a lock on wisdom anymore in national security. We will, for a time, all drive blind through a thicket of modern challenges that, in reality, present serial discontinuities from our collective past. Perhaps as early as November 9, 1989—and the fall of the Berlin Wall—American officials have been on an extended course of discovery, learning a great deal about the definition, extent, and limits of 21st-century power. All too often, they rushed to the old playbook for answers when new challenges arose. It had some residual value through the 1990s. However, it was exposed as grossly unsophisticated with the September 11, 2001, attacks and their aftermath. Nonetheless, the old playbook lingers as the world changes fundamentally around us. Until there is a new, more sophisticated appreciation of the strategic context within which the United States is operating, there will not be an effective replacement for those in the game to reference. Further, without keen sensitivity to what is actually afoot in international relations, the more impulsive remedies of the good faith and guts crowd may prove more harmful than doing nothing at all. Thus, patience just may be the new currency of risk-informed national security decisionmaking. Those in power and those who want it need a more nuanced, holistic, and systemic understanding of why events are unfolding as they are. Getting to that understanding will require substantial courage, temperance, honesty, and endurance among the policy elite. After all, the road to real understanding is likely to be littered with new rounds of perceived failure. In military terms, it will be less a well-planned deliberate attack on the future and more a movement to contact. There will be policy objectives and a general path to achieve them. However, the number, form, and aggregate hazard of the threats and challenges that emerge along the way will not be fully appreciated (if they ever are) until fully upon us. That, in a nutshell, is the burden of 21st century decisionmaking. I suggest all parties should hold fire with their criticism until they have thoughtfully reimagined contemporary security conditions together in a more sophisticated manner. They will not, of course. There is no media bounce in patience. However, truth be told, most of the adversity U.S. policymaking has experienced lately springs from widespread systemic volatility lying largely beyond the proximate control of American authorities. Without adequate preparation, tomorrow’s leaders will be as ill-equipped for it as their predecessors have been; and thus, today’s critic will be tomorrow’s scapegoat.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>Epistemology is <u>prior</u> in context of the Aff – debating <u>policy proposals</u> creates <u>terrible decision-making skills</u> since our <u>theoretical understanding</u> of IR are so thin focusing <u>debate on assumptions</u> first solves their offence.</h4><p>Freier ’15</strong> (Associate Professor of National Security Studies with the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), 6-17-15<strong> </strong>(Nate, CSIS International Security Program senior associate, 20 year U.S. Army career, last military assignment was as director of national security affairs at SSI, “Does Anyone Really Know What's Going On? Likely Not.,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles//Does-Anyone-Really-Know-Whats-Going-On/2015/06/17<u>, accessed 8-12-15, CMM)</p><p>National security elites have fallen into a funk over the recent course of U.S. policy</u>. At first glance, <u><strong>it seems the mythical <mark>Midas Touch of the</mark> <mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong>t</mark>ates <u><strong>as indispensable to solving the world’s most compelling challenges <mark>is</mark> just that . . . <mark>myth.</mark> </strong>Even a cursory examination of current events betrays a veritable dog’s breakfast of U.S. policy gone or going substantially wrong</u>. Indeed, <u>on the heels of widely perceived disappointments in Iraq and Afghanistan, <mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>appears</mark> persistently <mark>plagued by serial misfortune.</mark> Making matters worse, each individual letdown seems to arrive via unforced error;</u> and, all seem to bring with them their own catalog of unanticipated costs and hazards. Let us review the bidding. <u>In spite of</u> some <u>substantial American commitment to reverse Islamic State gains in Iraq and Syria, more territory falls victim to its predations by the day</u>. Further, <u>the U.S.-enabled liberation of Libya from decades of dictatorship has become instead a clinic in unintended consequences</u>. Further, <u><mark>Yemen</mark>, once heralded as an American counterterrorism success, <mark>has devolved into</mark> a new round of lethal civil <mark>conflict</u></mark>. <u>The <mark>Gulf States</u></mark>, too, <u><mark>are</mark> suddenly <mark>vulnerable</u></mark>, as they find themselves hemmed in by violent disorder on three fronts and Iranian provocation on a fourth. <u>A</u> more <u>traditional state-based set of challenges appears to be emerging somewhat unchecked</u>—or, at a minimum, undeterred—as well. <u><mark>In East Asia, the pivot has not slowed</mark> Chinese <mark>adventurism</u></mark>, as China continues to press on multiple fronts for substantial change in the international status quo. Likewise, <u><mark>in Europe, the</mark> U.S. <mark>reset</mark> with Russia <mark>is now a footnote</u></mark>—maybe worse, a punch line, as hope for rapprochement <u>has yielded to despair over Russia’s re-emergence as a manipulative spoiler and subversive regional contender. </u>The list goes on, and <u>with the U.S. election season heating up, a predictable and unsophisticated blame game threatens to all but swallow competent debate about the pathology of our most recent policy disappointments. </u>Hyperpoliticized chatter will follow, decrying indecisive and feckless policymakers recklessly putting U.S. interests at risk. <u>The case will be simple: the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>is currently neither faithful enough to its friends nor aggressive or assertive enough with its foes and is, as a consequence, reaping the whirlwind. The <mark>re</mark>medy</u>, according to those holding this view, <u>is impulsive and visceral, relying on heavier, more unqualified doses of good faith and guts to roll back our perceived losses. </u>I say, Not so fast! There is merit in all thoughtful criticisms of contemporary U.S. policy. For example, let us stipulate to some mishandling of U.S. foreign and security affairs over the last 15 years. However, <u>there is</u> also <u>more to the story than meets the eye.</u> In this case, <u>failure is not</u>, as the saying goes, <u>an orphan, but, rather, born of innumerable conventional perspectives wedded more to what was or is preferred than what actually is or is likely to be</u>. Indeed, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> real <mark>failure of contemporary policy is</mark> more <mark>elemental</mark>, frightening, and collective in origin than a simple shortage of good faith and guts</u></strong>. In reality, <u><strong><mark>we</mark> (and I really mean all of us) <mark>no longer understand the system within which we are operating </mark>well enough <mark>to make rational</mark> national security <mark>decisions</mark> that have a prayer of even modest durability over time.</u></strong> <u>We live in complex and uncertain times where there are frankly more “known unknowns” than we are all comfortable admitting</u>. Further, <u><strong><mark>the speed of</mark> both <mark>system-level change and threat generation</mark> <mark>are quantum leaps ahead of a</mark> national security <mark>bureaucracy </mark>that fully matured during the predictable, binary competition of the Cold War</u></strong>. Thus, in fairness to those in office and as a caution to those hoping to succeed them, <u>healthy acknowledgement of our fundamental fallibility is good place to start for future national security strategy. The rules governing international security and the context within which those rules are applied change so fast now that</u> <u><strong><mark>no one is intellectually well-postured </mark>yet <mark>to chart reasonable</mark>, effective, and sufficiently adaptable <mark>courses of action for</mark> U.S. <mark>policy</mark> going forward</u></strong>. <u>The number and diversity of consequential actors, competing priorities and interests, and sources of hazard make new-age statecraft a complex and ambiguous business to be sure; clear definitions of success or failure are illusive, and the margin of error separating the two is razor thin regardless. </u>There, I said it. Alarming as it may sound, <u><strong>no one has a lock on wisdom anymore in national security</u></strong>. <u>We will</u>, for a time, <u>all drive blind through a thicket of modern challenges that, in reality, present serial discontinuities from our collective past.</u> Perhaps as early as November 9, 1989—and the fall of the Berlin Wall—<u>American officials have been on an extended course of discovery, learning a great deal about the definition, extent, and limits of 21st-century power. All too often, they rushed to the old playbook for answers when new challenges arose.</u> It had some residual value through the 1990s. However, <u>it was exposed as grossly unsophisticated with the September 11, 2001, attacks and their aftermath.</u> Nonetheless, <u>the old playbook lingers as the world changes fundamentally around us. <strong><mark>Until there is a</mark> new, <mark>more sophisticated appreciation of the strategic context</u></strong></mark> <u>within which the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>is operating</u>, <u><strong><mark>there will not be an effective replacement</mark> for those in the game to reference</u></strong>. Further, <u><strong><mark>without</mark> keen <mark>sensitivity to what is actually afoot</mark> in international relations, the more <mark>impulsive remedies of</mark> the good <mark>faith and guts</mark> crowd <mark>may prove more harmful than doing nothing</mark> at all. </u></strong>Thus, patience just may be the new currency of risk-informed national security decisionmaking. <u><strong>Those in power and those who want it need a more nuanced, holistic, and systemic understanding of why events are unfolding as they are</u></strong>. Getting to that understanding will require substantial courage, temperance, honesty, and endurance among the policy elite. After all, the road to real understanding is likely to be littered with new rounds of perceived failure. In military terms, it will be less a well-planned deliberate attack on the future and more a movement to contact. <u>There will be policy objectives and a general path to achieve them. However, the number, form, and aggregate hazard of the threats and challenges that emerge along the way will not be fully appreciated</u> (if they ever are) <u>until fully upon us</u>. That, in a nutshell, is the burden of 21st century decisionmaking. <u><strong>I suggest all <mark>parties should hold fire with</mark> their <mark>criticism until they have </mark>thoughtfully <mark>reimagined contemporary security</mark> conditions together in a more sophisticated manner</u></strong>. <u>They will not, of course. There is no media bounce in patience</u>. However, truth be told, <u><strong>most of the adversity U.S. policymaking has experienced lately springs from widespread systemic volatility lying largely beyond the proximate control of American authorities. <mark>Without adequate preparation, </mark>tomorrow’s <mark>leaders will </mark>be <mark>as ill-equipped </mark>for it <mark>as</mark> their <mark>predecessors</mark> have been</u></strong><mark>;</mark> <u>and</u> thus, <u>today’s critic will be tomorrow’s scapegoat.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: John Mearsheimer, 22 (3/19/22; PhD in Government, specializing in international relations from Cornell; R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor in the Political Science Department at the University of Chicago; “John Mearsheimer on why the West is principally responsible for the Ukrainian Crisis”; The Economist https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/03/11/john-mearsheimer-on-why-the-west-is-principally-responsible-for-the-ukrainian-crisis )//LVL fulltext: THE WAR in Ukraine is the most dangerous international conflict since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Understanding its root causes is essential if we are to prevent it from getting worse and, instead, to find a way to bring it to a close. There is no question that Vladimir Putin started the war and is responsible for how it is being waged. But why he did so is another matter. The mainstream view in the West is that he is an irrational, out-of-touch aggressor bent on creating a greater Russia in the mould of the former Soviet Union. Thus, he alone bears full responsibility for the Ukraine crisis. But that story is wrong. The West, and especially America, is principally responsible for the crisis which began in February 2014. It has now turned into a war that not only threatens to destroy Ukraine, but also has the potential to escalate into a nuclear war between Russia and NATO. The trouble over Ukraine actually started at NATO’s Bucharest summit in April 2008, when George W. Bush’s administration pushed the alliance to announce that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members”. Russian leaders responded immediately with outrage, characterising this decision as an existential threat to Russia and vowing to thwart it. According to a respected Russian journalist, Mr Putin “flew into a rage” and warned that “if Ukraine joins NATO, it will do so without Crimea and the eastern regions. It will simply fall apart.” America ignored Moscow’s red line, however, and pushed forward to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border. That strategy included two other elements: bringing Ukraine closer to the eu and making it a pro-American democracy. These efforts eventually sparked hostilities in February 2014, after an uprising (which was supported by America) caused Ukraine’s pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, to flee the country. In response, Russia took Crimea from Ukraine and helped fuel a civil war that broke out in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. The next major confrontation came in December 2021 and led directly to the current war. The main cause was that Ukraine was becoming a de facto member of NATO. The process started in December 2017, when the Trump administration decided to sell Kyiv “defensive weapons”. What counts as “defensive” is hardly clear-cut, however, and these weapons certainly looked offensive to Moscow and its allies in the Donbas region. Other NATO countries got in on the act, shipping weapons to Ukraine, training its armed forces and allowing it to participate in joint air and naval exercises. In July 2021, Ukraine and America co-hosted a major naval exercise in the Black Sea region involving navies from 32 countries. Operation Sea Breeze almost provoked Russia to fire at a British naval destroyer that deliberately entered what Russia considers its territorial waters. The links between Ukraine and America continued growing under the Biden administration. This commitment is reflected throughout an important document—the “us-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership”—that was signed in November by Antony Blinken, America’s secretary of state, and Dmytro Kuleba, his Ukrainian counterpart. The aim was to “underscore … a commitment to Ukraine’s implementation of the deep and comprehensive reforms necessary for full integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.” The document explicitly builds on “the commitments made to strengthen the Ukraine-u.s. strategic partnership by Presidents Zelensky and Biden,” and also emphasises that the two countries will be guided by the “2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration.” Unsurprisingly, Moscow found this evolving situation intolerable and began mobilising its army on Ukraine’s border last spring to signal its resolve to Washington. But it had no effect, as the Biden administration continued to move closer to Ukraine. This led Russia to precipitate a full-blown diplomatic stand-off in December. As Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, put it: “We reached our boiling point.” Russia demanded a written guarantee that Ukraine would never become a part of NATO and that the alliance remove the military assets it had deployed in eastern Europe since 1997. The subsequent negotiations failed, as Mr Blinken made clear: “There is no change. There will be no change.” A month later Mr Putin launched an invasion of Ukraine to eliminate the threat he saw from NATO. This interpretation of events is at odds with the prevailing mantra in the West, which portrays NATO expansion as irrelevant to the Ukraine crisis, blaming instead Mr Putin’s expansionist goals. According to a recent NATO document sent to Russian leaders, “NATO is a defensive Alliance and poses no threat to Russia.” The available evidence contradicts these claims. For starters, the issue at hand is not what Western leaders say NATO’s purpose or intentions are; it is how Moscow sees NATO’s actions. Mr Putin surely knows that the costs of conquering and occupying large amounts of territory in eastern Europe would be prohibitive for Russia. As he once put it, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart. Whoever wants it back has no brain.” His beliefs about the tight bonds between Russia and Ukraine notwithstanding, trying to take back all of Ukraine would be like trying to swallow a porcupine. Furthermore, Russian policymakers—including Mr Putin—have said hardly anything about conquering new territory to recreate the Soviet Union or build a greater Russia. Rather, since the 2008 Bucharest summit Russian leaders have repeatedly said that they view Ukraine joining NATO as an existential threat that must be prevented. As Mr Lavrov noted in January, “the key to everything is the guarantee that NATO will not expand eastward.” Tellingly, Western leaders rarely described Russia as a military threat to Europe before 2014. As America’s former ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul notes, Mr Putin’s seizure of Crimea was not planned for long; it was an impulsive move in response to the coup that overthrew Ukraine’s pro-Russian leader. In fact, until then, NATO expansion was aimed at turning all of Europe into a giant zone of peace, not containing a dangerous Russia. Once the crisis started, however, American and European policymakers could not admit they had provoked it by trying to integrate Ukraine into the West. They declared the real source of the problem was Russia’s revanchism and its desire to dominate if not conquer Ukraine. My story about the conflict’s causes should not be controversial, given that many prominent American foreign-policy experts have warned against NATO expansion since the late 1990s. America’s secretary of defence at the time of the Bucharest summit, Robert Gates, recognised that “trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO was truly overreaching”. Indeed, at that summit, both the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, and the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, were opposed to moving forward on NATO membership for Ukraine because they feared it would infuriate Russia. The upshot of my interpretation is that we are in an extremely dangerous situation, and Western policy is exacerbating these risks. For Russia’s leaders, what happens in Ukraine has little to do with their imperial ambitions being thwarted; it is about dealing with what they regard as a direct threat to Russia’s future. Mr Putin may have misjudged Russia’s military capabilities, the effectiveness of the Ukrainian resistance and the scope and speed of the Western response, but one should never underestimate how ruthless great powers can be when they believe they are in dire straits. America and its allies, however, are doubling down, hoping to inflict a humiliating defeat on Mr Putin and to maybe even trigger his removal. They are increasing aid to Ukraine while using economic sanctions to inflict massive punishment on Russia, a step that Putin now sees as “akin to a declaration of war”. America and its allies may be able to prevent a Russian victory in Ukraine, but the country will be gravely damaged, if not dismembered. Moreover, there is a serious threat of escalation beyond Ukraine, not to mention the danger of nuclear war. If the West not only thwarts Moscow on Ukraine’s battlefields, but also does serious, lasting damage to Russia’s economy, it is in effect pushing a great power to the brink. Mr Putin might then turn to nuclear weapons. At this point it is impossible to know the terms on which this conflict will be settled. But, if we do not understand its deep cause, we will be unable to end it before Ukraine is wrecked and NATO ends up in a war with Russia.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Russia’s acting defensively – US and NATO attempts to contain them backfire.</h4><p>John <strong>Mearsheimer, 22 </strong>(3/19/22; PhD in Government, specializing in international relations from Cornell; R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor in the Political Science Department at the University of Chicago; “John Mearsheimer on why the West is principally responsible for the Ukrainian Crisis”; The Economist https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/03/11/john-mearsheimer-on-why-the-west-is-principally-responsible-for-the-ukrainian-crisis )//LVL</p><p>THE WAR in <u>Ukraine is the most dangerous international conflict since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.</u> Understanding its root causes is essential if we are to prevent it from getting worse and, instead, to find a way to bring it to a close. There is no question that Vladimir Putin started the war and is responsible for how it is being waged. But why he did so is another matter. T<u>he mainstream view in the West is that he is an irrational, out-of-touch aggressor</u> bent on creating a greater Russia in the mould of the former Soviet Union. Thus, he alone bears full responsibility for the Ukraine crisis. <u>But that story is wrong. The West, and especially <mark>America, is</mark> principally <mark>responsible</mark> for the crisis which began in February 2014. It has now turned into a war that not only <mark>threatens </mark>to destroy Ukraine, but also has the potential to <mark>escalate into a <strong>nuclear war</strong> </mark>between Russia and NATO. </u>The trouble over Ukraine actually started at NATO’s Bucharest summit in April 2008, when George W. <u><mark>Bush</u></mark>’s <u>administration <mark>pushed</mark> the <mark>alliance to announce</mark> that <mark>Ukraine and Georgia</mark> “will become members”</u>. <u><mark>Russian leaders</mark> responded immediately with<mark> outrage</mark>, characterising this decision as an <mark>existential threat to Russia</mark> and vowing to thwart it</u>. According to a respected Russian journalist, Mr Putin “flew into a rage” and warned that “if Ukraine joins NATO, it will do so without Crimea and the eastern regions. It will simply fall apart.” <u><mark>America ignored </mark>Moscow’s<mark> red line</mark>, however, and pushed forward to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border</u>. That strategy included two other elements: bringing Ukraine closer to the eu and making it a pro-American democracy. <u>These efforts eventually <mark>sparked </mark>hostilities in February 2014, after <mark>an uprising</mark> (which was supported by America) caused Ukraine’s pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, to flee the country. <mark>In response, Russia took Crimea </mark>from Ukraine and helped fuel a civil war that broke out in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. </u>The next major confrontation came in December 2021 and led directly to <u>the current war.</u> <u>The main cause was that Ukraine was becoming a <mark>de facto member of NATO</u>.</mark> The process started in December 2017, when the <u><mark>Trump</mark> administration decided to <mark>sell</mark> Kyiv “defensive<mark> weapons</mark>”.</u> What counts as “defensive” is hardly clear-cut, however, and <u>these weapons certainly <mark>looked offensive </mark>to Moscow and its allies in the Donbas region</u>. <u>Other<mark> NATO countries</mark> got in on the act, <mark>shipping weapons to Ukraine, training </mark>its armed forces and <mark>allowing </mark>it to participate in <mark>joint </mark>air and naval <mark>exercises</u></mark>. <u>In July 2021, Ukraine and America co-hosted a major naval exercise in the Black Sea region involving navies from 32 countries.</u> Operation Sea Breeze almost provoked Russia to fire at a British naval destroyer that deliberately entered what Russia considers its territorial waters. The <u><mark>links between Ukraine</mark> and America continued <mark>growing under</mark> the <mark>Biden</mark> administration</u>. This commitment is reflected throughout an important document—the “us-<u>Ukraine</u> Charter on Strategic Partnership”—that was <u><mark>signed</u></mark> in November by Antony Blinken, America’s secretary of state, and Dmytro Kuleba, his Ukrainian counterpart. The aim was to “underscore … a commitment to Ukraine’s implementation of the deep and comprehensive reforms necessary for <u>full <mark>integration into European</mark> and Euro-Atlantic <mark>institutions</u></mark>.” The document explicitly builds on “the commitments made to strengthen the Ukraine-u.s. strategic partnership by Presidents Zelensky and Biden,” and also emphasises that the two countries will be guided by the “2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration.” <u>Unsurprisingly, Moscow found this evolving<mark> situation intolerable </mark>and began <mark>mobilising its army</mark> on Ukraine’s border </u>last spring to signal its resolve to Washington. But it had no effect, as the Biden administration continued to move closer to Ukraine. This led Russia to precipitate a full-blown diplomatic stand-off in December. As Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, put it: “We reached our boiling point.” <u><mark>Russia demanded </mark>a written <mark>guarantee </mark>that<mark> Ukraine </mark>would<mark> never </mark>become a <mark>part of NATO </mark>and that the <mark>alliance remove </mark>the <mark>military assets</mark> it had deployed in eastern Europe since 1997</u>. The subsequent negotiations failed, as Mr Blinken made clear: “There is no change. There will be no change.” A month later Mr Putin launched <u>an invasion of Ukraine to eliminate the threat he saw from NATO</u>. This interpretation of events is at odds with the prevailing mantra in the West, which portrays NATO expansion as irrelevant to the Ukraine crisis, blaming instead Mr Putin’s expansionist goals. According to a recent NATO document sent to Russian leaders, “NATO is a defensive Alliance and poses no threat to Russia.” The available evidence contradicts these claims. For starters<u>, the <mark>issue </mark>at hand <mark>is </mark>not what Western leaders say NATO’s purpose or intentions are; it is how Moscow sees <mark>NATO’</mark>s actions. </u>Mr <u><mark>Putin</mark> surely <mark>knows</mark> that the <mark>costs of conquering and occupying </mark>large amounts of territory in eastern Europe would be prohibitive for Russia</u>. As he once put it, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart. Whoever wants it back has no brain.” His beliefs about the tight bonds between Russia and Ukraine notwithstanding, trying to take back all of Ukraine would be like trying to swallow a porcupine. Furthermore, Russian policymakers—including Mr Putin—have said hardly anything about conquering new territory to recreate the Soviet Union or build a greater Russia. Rather, since the 2008 Bucharest summit <u>Russian leaders have repeatedly said that they view Ukraine joining NATO as an existential threat that must be prevented</u>. As Mr Lavrov noted in January, “the key to everything is the guarantee that NATO will not expand eastward.” Tellingly, Western leaders rarely described Russia as a military threat to Europe before 2014. As America’s former ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul notes, Mr Putin’s seizure of Crimea was not planned for long; it was an impulsive move in response to the coup that overthrew Ukraine’s pro-Russian leader. In fact, until then, NATO expansion was aimed at turning all of Europe into a giant zone of peace, not containing a dangerous Russia. Once the crisis started, however, American and European policymakers could not admit they had provoked it by trying to integrate Ukraine into the West. They declared the real source of the problem was Russia’s revanchism and its desire to dominate if not conquer Ukraine. My story about the conflict’s causes should not be controversial, given that many <u>prominent American foreign-policy experts have warned against NATO expansion since the late 1990s.</u> America’s secretary of defence at the time of the Bucharest summit, Robert Gates, recognised that “<u>trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO was truly overreaching</u>”. Indeed, at that summit, both the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, and the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, were opposed to moving forward on NATO membership for Ukraine because they feared it would infuriate Russia. The upshot of my interpretation is that <u>we are in an extremely dangerous situation, and <mark>Western policy</mark> is <mark>exacerbating </mark>these <mark>risks.</u></mark> For Russia’s leaders, what happens in <u>Ukraine</u> has little to do with their imperial ambitions being thwarted; it is about dealing with what <u>they regard as a direct threat to Russia’s future.</u> Mr Putin may have misjudged Russia’s military capabilities, the effectiveness of the Ukrainian resistance and the scope and speed of the Western response, but one should never underestimate how ruthless great powers can be when they believe they are in dire straits. America and its allies, however, are doubling down, hoping to inflict a humiliating defeat on Mr Putin and to maybe even trigger his removal. They are increasing aid to Ukraine while using economic sanctions to inflict massive punishment on Russia, a step that Putin now sees as “akin to a declaration of war”. <u>America and its allies may be able to prevent a Russian victory in Ukraine, but the country will be gravely damaged, if not dismembered.</u> <u>Moreover, there is a serious <strong>threat of escalation</strong> beyond Ukraine, not to mention the danger of nuclear war.</u> If the West not only thwarts Moscow on Ukraine’s battlefields, but also does serious, <u><mark>lasting damage to Russia’s </mark>economy, it is in effect pushing a great power to the brink. Mr <mark>Putin</mark> might then <mark>turn to nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s.</mark> </u>At this point it is impossible to know the terms on which this conflict will be settled. But, if we do not understand its deep cause, we will be unable to end it before Ukraine is wrecked and NATO ends up in a war with Russia.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: WARD CHURCHILL, FORMER PROFESSOR OF ETHNIC STUDIES AT UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, BOULDER 1996 “I AM INDIGENIST,” FROM A NATIVE SON PGS 520-30 fulltext: To frame things clearly in this regard, let's hypothesize for a moment that all of the various non-Indian movements concentrating on each of these issues were suddenly successful in accomplishing I AM INDIGENIST 5 2 1 their objectives. Let's imagine that the United States as a whole were somehow transformed into an entity defined by the parity of its race, class, and gender relations, its embrace of unrestricted sexual preference, its rejection of militarism in all forms, and its abiding concern with environmental protection (I know, I know, this is a sheer impossibility, but that's my point). When all is said and done, the society resulting from this scenario is still, first and foremost, a colonialist society, an imperialist society in the most fundamental sense possible and with all that this implies. This is true because the scenario does nothing at all to address the fact that whatever is happening happens on someone else's land, not only without their consent, but through an adamant disregard for their rights to the land. Hence, all it means is that the immigrant or invading population has rearranged its affairs in such a way as to make itself more comfortable at the continuing expense of indigenous people. The colonial equation remains intact and may even be reinforced by a greater degree of participation and vested interest in maintenance of the colonial order among the settler population at large.37 The dynamic here is not very different from that evident in the American Revolution of the late 18th century, is it? And we all know very well where that led, don't we? Should we therefore begin to refer to socialist imperialism, feminist imperialism, gay and lesbian imperialism, environmentalist imperialism, African American, and la Raza imperialism? I would hope not.38 I would hope this is all just a matter of confusion, of muddled priorities among people who really do mean well and who'd like to do better. If so, then all that is necessary to correct the situation is a basic rethinking of what must be done, and in what order. Here, I'd advance the straightforward premise that the land rights of "First Americans" should serve as a first priority for everyone seriously committed to accomplishing positive change in North America. But before I suggest everyone jum 522 FROM A NATIVE SON true? I'll state unequivocally that it does not. There is no indication whatsoever that a restoration of indigenous sovereignty in Indian Country would foster class stratification anywhere, least of all in Indian Country. In fact, all indications are that when left to their own devices, indigenous peoples have consistently organized their societies in the most class-free manners. Look to the example of the Haudenosaunee (Six Nations Iroquois Confederacy). Look to the Muscogee (Creek) Confederacy. Look to the confederations of the Yaqui and the Lakota, and those pursued and nearly perfected by Pontiac and Tecumseh. They represent the very essence of enlightened egalitarianism and democracy. Every imagined example to the contrary brought forth by even the most arcane anthropologist can be readily offset by a couple of dozen other illustrations along the lines of those I just mentioned. 39 Would sexism be perpetuated? Ask one of the Haudenosaunee clan mothers, who continue to assert political leadership in their societies through the present day. Ask Wilma Mankiller, current head of the Cherokee nation, a people that traditionally led by what were called "Beloved Women." Ask a Lakota woman-or man, for that matter-about who it was that owned all real property in traditional society, and what that meant in terms of parity in gender relations. Ask a traditional Navajo grandmother about her social and political role among her people. Women in most traditional native societies not only enjoyed political, social, and economic parity with men, they often held a preponderance of power in one or more of these spheres. Homophobia? Homosexuals of both genders were (and in many settings still are) deeply revered as special or extraordinary, and therefore spiritually significant, within most indigenous North American cultures. The extent to which these realities do not now pertain in native societies is exactly the extent to which Indians have been subordinated to the mores of the invading, dominating culture. Insofar as restoration of Indian land rights is tied directly to reconstitution of traditional indigenous social, political, and economic modes, you can see where this leads: the relations of sex and sexuality accord rather well with the aspirations of feminist and gay rights activism. 4o I AM INDIGENIST 523 How about a restoration of native land rights precipitating some sort of "environmental holocaust"? Let's get at least a little bit real here. If you're not addicted to the fabrications of Smithsonian anthropologists about how Indians lived/ l or George Weurthner 's Eurosupremacist Earth First! fantasies about how we beat all the wooly mammoths and mastodons and saber-toothed cats to death with sticks,42 then this question isn't even on the board. I know it's become fashionable among Washington Post editorialists to make snide references to native people "strewing refuse in their wake" as they "wandered nomadically" about the "prehistoric" North American landscape.43 What is that supposed to imply? That we, who were mostly "sedentary agriculturalists" in any event, were dropping plastic and aluminum cans as we went? Like I said, let's get real. Read the accounts of early European invaders about what they encountered: North America was invariably described as being a "pristine wilderness" at the point of European arrival, despite the fact that it had been occupied by 15 or 20 million people enjoying a remarkably high standard of living for nobody knows how long: 40,000 years? 50,000 years? longer?44 Now contrast that reality to what's been done to this continent over the past couple of hundred years by the culture Weurthner, the Smithsonian, and the Post represent, and you tell me about environmental devastation.45 That leaves militarism and racism. Taking the last first, there really is no indication of racism in traditional Indian societies. To the contrary, the record reveals that Indians habitually intermarried between groups, and frequently adopted both children and adults from other groups. This occurred in pre-contact times between Indians, and the practice was broadened to include those o 5 24 FROM A NATIVE SON construction if there ever was one. Unfortunately, a lot of Indians have been conned into buying into this anti-Indian absurdity, and that's something to be overcome. But there's also solid indication that quite a number of native people continue to strongly resist such things as the quantum system.47 As to militarism, no one will deny that Indians fought wars among themselves both before and after the European invasion began. Probably half of all indigenous peoples in North America maintained permanent warrior societies. This could perhaps be reasonably construed as "militarism," but not, I think, with the sense the term conveys within the European/Euroamerican tradition. There were never, so far as anyone can demonstrate, wars of annihilation fought in this hemisphere prior to the Columbian arrival. None. In fact, it seems that it was a more or less firm principle of indigenous warfare not to kill, the object being to demonstrate personal bravery, something that could be done only against a live opponent. There's no honor to be had in killing another person, because a dead person can't hurt you. There's no risk. This is not to say that nobody ever died or was seriously injured in the fighting. They were, just as they are in full contact contemporary sports like football and boxing. Actually, these kinds of Euroamerican games are what I would take to be the closest modern parallels to traditional inter-Indian warfare. For Indians, it was a way of burning excess testosterone out of young males, and not much more. So, militarism in the way the term is used today is as alien to native tradition as smallpox and atomic bombs.48 Not only is it perfectly reasonable to assert that a restoration of Indian control over unceded lands within the United States would do nothing to perpetuate such problems as sexism and classism, but the reconstitution of indigenous societies this would entail stands to free the affected portions of North America from such maladies altogether. Moreover, it can be said that the process should have a tangible impact in terms of diminishing such oppressions elsewhere. The principle is this: sexism, racism, and all the rest arose here as a concomitant to the emergence and consolidation of the Eurocentric nation-state form of sociopolitical and economic organization. Everything the state does, everything it can do, is entirely contingent on its maintaining its I AM INDIGENIST 525 internal cohesion, a cohesion signified above all by its pretended territorial integrity, its ongoing domination of Indian Country. Given this, it seems obvious that the literal dismemberment of the nationstate inherent to Indian land recovery correspondingly reduces the ability of the state to sustain the imposition of objectionable relations within itself. It follows that realization of indigenous land rights serves to undermine or destroy the ability of the status quo to continue imposing a racist, sexist, classist, homophobic, militaristic order on non-Indians. A brief aside: Anyone with doubts as to whether it's possible to bring about the dismemberment from within of a superpower state in this day and age ought to sit down and have a long talk with a guy named Mikhail Gorbachev. It would be better yet if you could chew the fat with Leonid Brezhnev, a man who we can be sure would have replied in all sincerity-only a decade ago-that this was the most outlandish idea he'd ever heard. Well, look on a map today, and see if you can find the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It ain't there, my friends. Instead, you're seeing, and you're seeing it more and more, the reemergence of the very nations LeonTrotsky and his colleagues consigned to the "dustbin of history" clear back at the beginning of the century. These mega-states are not immutable. They can be taken apart. They can be destroyed. But first we have to decide that we can do it, and that we will do it. So, all things considered, when indigenist movements like AIM advance slogans like "United States Out of North America," non-Indian radicals shouldn't react defensively. They should cheer. They should see what they might do to help. When they respond defensively to sentiments like those expressed by AIM, what they are ultimately defending is the very government, the very order they claim to oppose so resolutely. And if they manifest this contradiction often enough, consistently enough, pathologically enough, then we have no alternative but to take them at their word, that they really are at some deep level or another aligned-all protest to the contrarywith the mentality that endorses our permanent dispossession and disenfranchisement, our continuing oppression, and our ultimate genocidal obliteration as self-defining and self-determining peoples.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The root cause from problems of class, sexism, and more on non-indians stems from settler colonialism– a model that has obstructed modern day view upon the indigenous. Churchill ‘96</h4><p>WARD CHURCHILL, FORMER PROFESSOR OF ETHNIC STUDIES AT UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, BOULDER 1996 “I AM INDIGENIST,” FROM A NATIVE SON PGS 520-30</p><p>To frame things clearly in this regard, let's hypothesize for a moment that all of the various non-Indian movements concentrating on each of these issues were suddenly successful in accomplishing I AM INDIGENIST 5 2 1 their objectives. <u><strong>Let's imagine that <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates as a whole were somehow transformed into an entity defined by the parity of its race, class, and gender relations, its embrace of unrestricted sexual preference, its rejection of militarism in all forms, and its abiding concern with environmental protection (I know, I know, this is a sheer impossibility, but that's my point). When all is said and done, the society resulting from this scenario <mark>is </mark>still, first and foremost, <mark>a colonialist society, </mark>an imperialist society in the most fundamental sense possible and with all that this implies. This is true because the scenario does nothing at all to address the fact that whatever is happening happens on someone else's land, not only without their consent, but through an adamant disregard for their rights to the land. Hence, all it means is that <mark>the immigrant</mark> or invading <mark>population has rearranged its affairs in</mark> such <mark>a way</mark> as <mark>to make itself more comfortable at the</mark> continuing <mark>expense of indigenous people.</mark> The colonial equation remains intact and may even be reinforced by a greater degree of participation and vested interest in maintenance of the colonial order among the settler population at large.</u></strong>37 The dynamic here is not very different from that evident in the American Revolution of the late 18th century, is it? And we all know very well where that led, don't we? Should we therefore begin to refer to socialist imperialism, feminist imperialism, gay and lesbian imperialism, environmentalist imperialism, African American, and la Raza imperialism? I would hope not.38 I would hope this is all just a matter of confusion, of muddled priorities among people who really do mean well and who'd like to do better. If so, then all that is necessary to correct the situation is a basic rethinking of what must be done, and in what order<u><strong>. Here, I'd advance the straightforward premise that the land rights of "First Americans" should serve as a first priority for everyone seriously committed to accomplishing positive change in North America.</u></strong> But before I suggest everyone jum 522 FROM A NATIVE SON true? I'll state unequivocally that it does not. There is no indication whatsoever that a restoration of indigenous sovereignty in Indian Country would foster class stratification anywhere, least of all in Indian Country<u><strong>. In fact, all indications are that when left to their own devices, <mark>indigenous peoples have</mark> consistently <mark>organized their societies in the</mark> most <mark>class-free manners.</u></strong></mark> Look to the example of the Haudenosaunee (Six Nations Iroquois Confederacy). Look to the Muscogee (Creek) Confederacy. Look to the confederations of the Yaqui and the Lakota, and those pursued and nearly perfected by Pontiac and Tecumseh. They represent the very essence of enlightened egalitarianism and democracy. Every imagined example to the contrary brought forth by even the most arcane anthropologist can be readily offset by a couple of dozen other illustrations along the lines of those I just mentioned. 39 <u><strong>Would sexism be perpetuated</u></strong>? Ask one of the Haudenosaunee clan mothers, who continue to assert political leadership in their societies through the present day. Ask Wilma Mankiller, current head of the Cherokee nation, a people that traditionally led by what were called "Beloved Women." Ask a Lakota woman-or man, for that matter-about who it was that owned all real property in traditional society, and what that meant in terms of parity in gender relations. Ask a traditional Navajo grandmother about her social and political role among her people. <u><strong>Women in most traditional native societies not only enjoyed political, social, and economic parity with men, they often held a preponderance of power in one or more of these spheres. Homophobia</u></strong>? <u><strong>Homosexuals of both genders were (and in many settings still are) deeply revered as special or extraordinary, and therefore spiritually significant, within most indigenous North American cultures. </u></strong>The extent to which these realities do not now pertain in native societies is exactly the extent to which Indians have been subordinated to the mores of the invading, dominating culture. <u><strong>Insofar as restoration of Indian land rights is tied directly to reconstitution of traditional indigenous social, political, and economic modes, you can see where this leads: the relations of sex and sexuality accord rather well with the aspirations of feminist and gay rights activism.</u></strong> 4o I AM INDIGENIST 523 <u><strong>How about a restoration of native land rights precipitating some sort of "environmental holocaust</u></strong>"? Let's get at least a little bit real here. If you're not addicted to the fabrications of Smithsonian anthropologists about how Indians lived/ l or George Weurthner 's Eurosupremacist Earth First! fantasies about how we beat all the wooly mammoths and mastodons and saber-toothed cats to death with sticks,42 then this question isn't even on the board. I know it's become fashionable among Washington Post editorialists to make snide references to native people "strewing refuse in their wake" as they "wandered nomadically" about the "prehistoric" North American landscape.43 What is that supposed to imply? That we, who were mostly "sedentary agriculturalists" in any event, were dropping plastic and aluminum cans as we went? Like I said, let's get real. Read the accounts of early European invaders about what they encountered: North America was invariably described as being a "pristine wilderness" at the point of European arrival, despite the fact that it had been occupied by 15 or 20 million people enjoying a remarkably high standard of living for nobody knows how long: 40,000 years? 50,000 years? longer?44 <u><strong>Now contrast that reality to what's been done to this continent over the past couple of hundred years by the culture Weurthner, the Smithsonian, and the Post represent, and you tell me about environmental devastation.</u></strong>45 <u><strong>That leaves militarism and racism. Taking the last first, there really is no indication of racism in traditional Indian societies. To the contrary, the record reveals that Indians habitually intermarried between groups, and frequently adopted both children and adults from other groups.</u></strong> This occurred in pre-contact times between Indians, and the practice was broadened to include those o 5 24 FROM A NATIVE SON construction if there ever was one. Unfortunately, a lot of Indians have been conned into buying into this anti-Indian absurdity, and that's something to be overcome. But there's also solid indication that quite a number of native people continue to strongly resist such things as the quantum system.47 <u><strong>As to militarism, no one will deny that Indians fought wars among themselves both before and after the European invasion began. Probably half of all indigenous peoples in North America maintained permanent warrior societies. This could perhaps be reasonably construed as "militarism," but not, I think, with the sense the term conveys within the European/Euroamerican tradition. There were never, so far as anyone can demonstrate, wars of annihilation fought in this hemisphere prior to the Columbian arrival</u></strong>. None. In fact, it seems that it was a more or less firm principle of indigenous warfare not to kill, the object being to demonstrate personal bravery, something that could be done only against a live opponent. There's no honor to be had in killing another person, because a dead person can't hurt you. There's no risk. This is not to say that nobody ever died or was seriously injured in the fighting. They were, just as they are in full contact contemporary sports like football and boxing. Actually, these kinds of Euroamerican games are what I would take to be the closest modern parallels to traditional inter-Indian warfare. For Indians, it was a way of burning excess testosterone out of young males, and not much more. <u><strong>So, militarism in the way the term is used today is as alien to native tradition as smallpox and atomic bombs.48 Not only is it perfectly reasonable to assert that a restoration of Indian control over unceded lands within the United States would do nothing to perpetuate such problems as sexism and classism, but the reconstitution of indigenous societies this would entail stands to free the affected portions of North America from such maladies altogether.</u></strong> Moreover, it can be said that the process should have a tangible impact in terms of diminishing such oppressions elsewhere. <u><strong>The principle is this: <mark>sexism, racism, and</mark> all <mark>the rest arose</mark> here <mark>as</mark> a concomitant to <mark>the emergence</mark> and consolidation <mark>of the Eurocentric nation-state</mark> form of sociopolitical and economic organization. Everything the state does, everything it can do, is entirely contingent on its maintaining its I AM INDIGENIST 525 internal cohesion, a cohesion signified above all by its pretended territorial integrity, its ongoing domination of Indian Country. Given this, it seems obvious that the literal dismemberment of the nationstate inherent to Indian land recovery correspondingly reduces the ability of the state to sustain the imposition of objectionable relations within itself. It follows that realization of <mark>indigenous</mark> land <mark>rights</mark> serves to undermine or <mark>destroy the ability of the s</mark>tatus <mark>quo to continue imposing a racist, sexist, classist, homophobic, militaristic order on non-Indians.</u></strong></mark> A brief aside: Anyone with doubts as to whether it's possible to bring about the dismemberment from within of a superpower state in this day and age ought to sit down and have a long talk with a guy named Mikhail Gorbachev. It would be better yet if you could chew the fat with Leonid Brezhnev, a man who we can be sure would have replied in all sincerity-only a decade ago-that this was the most outlandish idea he'd ever heard. Well, look on a map today, and see if you can find the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It ain't there, my friends. Instead, you're seeing, and you're seeing it more and more, the reemergence of the very nations LeonTrotsky and his colleagues consigned to the "dustbin of history" clear back at the beginning of the century. These mega-states are not immutable. They can be taken apart. They can be destroyed. But first we have to decide that we can do it, and that we will do it. So, all things considered, when indigenist movements like AIM advance slogans like "United States Out of North America," non-Indian radicals shouldn't react defensively. They should cheer. They should see what they might do to help. When they respond defensively to sentiments like those expressed by AIM, what they are ultimately defending is the very government, the very order they claim to oppose so resolutely. And if they manifest this contradiction often enough, consistently enough, pathologically enough, then we have no alternative but to take them at their word, that they really are at some deep level or another aligned-all protest to the contrarywith the mentality that endorses our permanent dispossession and disenfranchisement, our continuing oppression, and our ultimate genocidal obliteration as self-defining and self-determining peoples.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Glover 11 – University of Bradford, UK fulltext: Nicholas, “Does Security exist outside of the speech act?,” http://www.e-ir.info/2011/10/09/does-security-exist-outside-of-the-speech-act/ Significant to this theory is Waver’s notion of societal security, which invokes community and identity as key analytical tenets. This concept refers to the presentation of community identity being threatened by dynamics such as population movements (Williams, 2003: 513). The emphasis on threat and societal identity—its’ sense of we-ness—reflects the Copenhagen School’s focus on a particular type of speech act and thus a specific security—one which understands the politics of enmity. The essence of security in this understanding is existential threats and the production of the “other” as a political enemy. Hence, the speech act is a security act and securitisation relies on a specific rhetorical structure which identifies threats, proposes emergency action and effects interunit relations by breaking free of rules (Williams, 2003: 514). Securitisation is structured by the differential capacity of actors to make socially effective claims about threats and accepted as convincing by an audience and by the empirical factors or situation to which these actors can make reference (Williams, 2003: 514). A successful securitising speech act depends on an adherence to the internal linguistic rules of the act and the legitimate positionality of the actor uttering the act. This narrow reading of the construction of security as a designation of threatening ‘others’ and the legitimation of emergency measures (military) by an elite actor, serves to reify the meaning of security and marginalises inclusive and non-statist definitions of values of security understood in particular contexts (McDonald, 2009: 579). For the Copenhagen School, security rests upon a symbiotic relationship between actor and audience. Hence, an issue is securitised when an audience accepts it as such. The significance of the audience in the process of securitisation is neatly encapsulated in the concept of intersubjectivity. A successful securitisation is decided by the audience of the speech act; it is they who must accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value (Buzan et al, 1998: 31). Speaking security does not guarantee success; therefore security rests among the subjects and their willingness to accept legitimacy of the discourse. The central problematic of the speech act theory relates to its’ casting of securitisation merely in terms of this discourse-legitimation-action sequence. Problematically, the classic application of the securitisation framework privileges the role of political leaders in the articulation and designation of threat and locates the logic of security among strategic actors imbued with intentionality. Such an image of strategic actors seeking to label threats as security and therefore justify emergency responses provides a narrow state-centric conception of the construction of security which fails to contextualise the processes involved and tackle the meaning of security. Hence, the Copenhagen School’s framework of securitisation focus overwhelmingly on the performative role of the speech act rather than the conditions in which securitisation itself becomes possible (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 72). Whilst alluding to the intersubjective nature of security, the focus on the speech act as performing security defines security less as a site of negotiation than one of articulation (McDonald, 2009: 572). The social construction of security cannot be comprehensively understood in isolation from the role of the audience and the social, political and historical contexts in which particular discourses of security become possible. Thierry Balzacq (2005) supports this essay’s view that the securitisation cannot merely be understood as a speech act, inasmuch as he contends that the articulation of security is one part of the securitisation process: it relies upon the acquiescence, consent or support of particular constituencies. Security then involves stages of identification and mobilisation (Paul Roe, 2009: 616), in which the securityness of a threat and the appropriate response to it are negotiated within an interactive process between actors and audiences. Hence security is contextual; different threats are privileged by different communities, particular securitisations are legitimated across time and space according to narratives of history, culture and identity and different voices are empowered or marginalised to define security and threat. Waever (1995: 57) argues that security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites. This state-centricism serves to marginalise the experiences and articulations of the powerless in global politics. Hansen (2000: 306) postulates that “a focus on speech acts means contributing to the silencing of women, whose suffering and engagement with security discourses is neglected in a framework that focuses on the articulation of the powerful”. This focus on dominant voices renders the speech act framework impotent in terms of grappling with the plight of the most vulnerable in world politics—and their experiences of and engagement with security and threat. This paper’s proclivity to a hermeneutic approach to security problematises the decisionistic (Williams, 2003: 521) approach to the ‘moment’ at which threats are designated. Securitisation does not occur only at particular instances; issues can become institutionalised as security issues or threats without dramatic moments of intervention (Bigo, 2002). Looking ‘beyond the moment’ of intervention allows one to assess more comprehensively why an actor represents an issue as a threat in a particular context and why a specific constituency accepts it as such. Hence security is not merely that which fulfils the criteria of securitisation (Ciuta, 2009: 303), it does not have an unchanging essence—but rather is the product of historical structures and processes of struggles for power (Lipschutz, 1995: 8) between societal groups with competing interests. Immigration as a security threat in Europe for example, was the product of long-term processes of institutionalisation and related heavily to the incorporation of immigration within the jurisdiction of security professionals such as the police (Bigo 2000). Moreover, there is no simple dichotomy between the political and security. Such a dichotomy is problematic in that suggests an either/or approach, whereby an issue is either a security threat or a political issue. Immigration in the UK is not seen by all constituencies as a threat to security. For some it is a risk and for others the casting of immigration as a threat is a wholly disputable discourse. Thus, the meaning of security is not fixed within the speech act of an elite group, but rather is open to argumentation and can be questioned on the grounds of truth, rightness and sincerity (Wyn-Jones, 1999: 110). Security as a speech act frames the concept within communicative action and legitimation— involving a presentation of evidence and a commitment to convincing others of the validity of one’s position in a process of justification. A theory so reliant on speech for its’ explanatory position fails to address the dynamics of security in a world where political communication is increasingly bound with images and in which televisual communication is an essential communicative medium. The construction of the terrorist for example in the Bush and Blair discourse post 9/11 is inextricable from the image dominated context in which it takes place and through which meaning is communicated. The nexus between the discursive construction of the terrorist as a deadly threat and televisual imagery working to the same end is emblemised by the construction of the terrorist attacks on 9/11 as “acts of war”. Hence one cannot understand Bush’s rhetorical move to construct the attacks as unprecedented and new forms of warfare thereby invoking the nation’s right to self-defence (Jackson, 2007: 356), without assessing the impact that the extraordinary and repeated images of that act had on reactions to it. Here in lies the fundamental merit and pitfall of the speech act theory. On the one hand it provides us with an innovative understanding of the metaphorical constitution of terrorism in discourse and on the other it remains closed to the impact different mediums of communication have on the securitisation process. Thus, language is only one means through which meaning is communicated (Moller, 2007: 180). Drawing on Michel Foucault, this essay problematises the reduction by the speech act theory, of securitisation to a purely linguistic rhetoric. The meaning we attach to security and our knowledge of what constitutes security exists within both the material and textual realms, for they are not mutually exclusive. Foucault (1980: 63) holds that once a discursive utterance is considered an action or as a practice, this then begins to verge on the territory of materiality and becomes more easily linked to the array of physical activities through which the diagnosis may be made initially. To illuminate his concept of discursive practices, Foucault invokes the notion of extra-discursive—which relates to the idea that similar discursive acts can occur in a multitude of ways and various different forms that stretch from the textual to material level of discursive practice. The speech act theory defines security as language—thus language becomes security. Such an over-concentration on language signals a myopia of text, an over-evaluation of the linguistic and representational powers of language in isolation from the material arrangements of power in which they are entrenched and that they in turn extend (Foucault Journal, 2001: 540). The over-evaluation by the speech act theory of the linguistic powers of language in isolation from the material context of power, in which they are intermeshed, is problematised by the Didier Bigo (2002). Bigo (2002: 65) holds that “security is constructed and applied to different issues and areas through a range of often routinised practices rather than only through speech acts that enable emergency measures”. Accordingly, practices of surveillance and border controls for example, can be central to the process of securitisation and are not simply those actions enabled by preceding speech acts (McDonald, 2009: 570). Recognising the role of physical systems in the construction of security, that is, the generation of meaning and the productive power of such systems—demands an acceptance that security exists outside of the speech act. Hence, the speech act framework of security problematically neglects physical action which can serve to communicate ideas about security in their own right (Hansen, 2000: 300-1). In summation, security is constructed through processes of social interaction, but cannot be defined narrowly as existing only within the speech act. Hence, the definition of security in terms of a discourse-action sequence is problematic, inasmuch as it fails to recognise the complexity of the construction of security in global politics. Assuming that security merely resides within the discursive positioning of threats, neglects the historical and social contexts in which security becomes possible. Thus, discourses of security are bound by the historical and social structures in which they are produced. The speech act then is just one dynamic of the securitisation process, the role of audiences, visual communication and physical practices must all be examined in order to understand how security is experienced in different contexts. Security exists within the interplay between self-identity and the construction of meaning, thus the feeling of threat and being secured is produced within all social structures. Security is what we make of it, different worldviews and discourses bound by social structures and communicated in diverse ways, deliver different discourses about security. Security can be constructed physically through bureaucratic systems, through the discourses of the state and within marginalised groups whose experience of threat and security may not be known or heard. Security therefore is not just a speech act.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Particular forms of securitization are legitimate – their links don’t disprove our solvency claims and the K doesn’t turn case.</h4><p><u><strong>Glover 11</u></strong> – University of Bradford, UK</p><p>Nicholas, “Does Security exist outside of the speech act?,” http://www.e-ir.info/2011/10/09/does-security-exist-outside-of-the-speech-act/</p><p>Significant to this theory is Waver’s notion of societal security, which invokes community and identity as key analytical tenets. This concept refers to the presentation of community identity being threatened by dynamics such as population movements (Williams, 2003: 513). <u><strong>The <mark>emphasis on threat</u></strong></mark> and societal identity—its’ sense of we-ness<mark>—<u><strong>reflects the</u></strong></mark> Copenhagen School’s <u><strong><mark>focus on a</u></strong></mark> particular type of <u><strong><mark>speech act</mark> </u></strong>and thus a specific security—one which understands the politics of enmity. The essence of security in this understanding is existential threats and the production of the “other” as a political enemy. Hence, the speech act is a security act and securitisation relies on a specific rhetorical structure which identifies threats, proposes emergency action and effects interunit relations by breaking free of rules (Williams, 2003: 514). Securitisation is structured by the differential capacity of actors to make socially effective claims about threats and accepted as convincing by an audience and by the empirical factors or situation to which these actors can make reference (Williams, 2003: 514). A successful securitising speech act depends on an adherence to the internal linguistic rules of the act and the legitimate positionality of the actor uttering the act. This narrow reading of the construction of security as a designation of threatening ‘others’ and the legitimation of emergency measures (military) by an elite actor, serves to reify the meaning of security and marginalises inclusive and non-statist definitions of values of security understood in particular contexts (McDonald, 2009: 579). For the Copenhagen School, security rests upon a symbiotic relationship between actor and audience. Hence, an issue is securitised when an audience accepts it as such. The significance of the audience in the process of securitisation is neatly encapsulated in the concept of intersubjectivity. A successful securitisation is decided by the audience of the speech act; it is they who must accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value (Buzan et al, 1998: 31). Speaking security does not guarantee success; therefore security rests among the subjects and their willingness to accept legitimacy of the discourse. <u><strong>The central problematic of the speech act theory relates to its’ casting of securitisation merely in terms of</u></strong> this <u><strong>discourse</u></strong>-legitimation-action sequence. Problematically, the classic application of the securitisation framework privileges the role of political leaders in the articulation and designation of threat and locates the logic of security among strategic actors imbued with intentionality. Such an image of strategic actors seeking to label threats as security and therefore justify emergency responses provides a narrow state-centric conception of the construction of security which fails to contextualise the processes involved and tackle the meaning of security. Hence<mark>, <u><strong>the</u></strong></mark> Copenhagen School’s <u><strong><mark>framework of securitisation focus overwhelmingly on the performative role of the speech act rather than the conditions in which securitisation itself becomes possible</u></strong></mark> (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 72). Whilst alluding to the intersubjective nature of security, the focus on the speech act as performing security defines security less as a site of negotiation than one of articulation (McDonald, 2009: 572). <u><strong>The s<mark>ocial construction of security cannot be</u></strong></mark> comprehensively <u><strong><mark>understood in isolation from</u></strong></mark> the role of the audience and the social, political and historical <u><strong><mark>context</u></strong></mark>s in which particular discourses of security become possible. Thierry Balzacq (2005) supports this essay’s view that the <u><strong><mark>securitisation cannot merely be understood as a speech act</u></strong>,</mark> inasmuch as he contends that the articulation of security is one part of the securitisation process: it relies upon the acquiescence, consent or support of particular constituencies. Security then involves stages of identification and mobilisation (Paul Roe, 2009: 616), in which the securityness of a threat and the appropriate response to it are negotiated within an interactive process between actors and audiences. Hence security is contextual; different threats are privileged by different communities, <u><strong><mark>particular securitisations are legitimate</u></strong></mark>d across time and space according to narratives of history, culture and identity and different voices are empowered or marginalised to define security and threat. Waever (1995: 57) argues that security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites. This state-centricism serves to marginalise the experiences and articulations of the powerless in global politics. Hansen (2000: 306) postulates that “a focus on speech acts means contributing to the silencing of women, whose suffering and engagement with security discourses is neglected in a framework that focuses on the articulation of the powerful”. This focus on dominant voices renders the speech act framework impotent in terms of grappling with the plight of the most vulnerable in world politics—and their experiences of and engagement with security and threat. This paper’s proclivity to a hermeneutic approach to security problematises the decisionistic (Williams, 2003: 521) approach to the ‘moment’ at which threats are designated. Securitisation does not occur only at particular instances; issues can become institutionalised as security issues or threats without dramatic moments of intervention (Bigo, 2002). Looking ‘beyond the moment’ of intervention allows one to assess more comprehensively why an actor represents an issue as a threat in a particular context and why a specific constituency accepts it as such. Hence security is not merely that which fulfils the criteria of securitisation (Ciuta, 2009: 303), it does not have an unchanging essence—but rather is the product of historical structures and processes of struggles for power (Lipschutz, 1995: 8) between societal groups with competing interests. Immigration as a security threat in Europe for example, was the product of long-term processes of institutionalisation and related heavily to the incorporation of immigration within the jurisdiction of security professionals such as the police (Bigo 2000). Moreover, there is no simple dichotomy between the political and security. Such a dichotomy is problematic in that suggests an either/or approach, whereby an issue is either a security threat or a political issue. Immigration in the UK is not seen by all constituencies as a threat to security. For some it is a risk and for others the casting of immigration as a threat is a wholly disputable discourse. Thus, the meaning of security is not fixed within the speech act of an elite group, but rather is open to argumentation and can be questioned on the grounds of truth, rightness and sincerity (Wyn-Jones, 1999: 110). Security as a speech act frames the concept within communicative action and legitimation— involving a presentation of evidence and a commitment to convincing others of the validity of one’s position in a process of justification. <u><strong><mark>A theory so reliant on speech for its’ explanatory position fails to address</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>dynamics of security</u></strong></mark> in a world where political communication is increasingly bound with images and in which televisual communication is an essential communicative medium. The construction of the terrorist for example in the Bush and Blair discourse post 9/11 is inextricable from the image dominated context in which it takes place and through which meaning is communicated. The nexus between the discursive construction of the terrorist as a deadly threat and televisual imagery working to the same end is emblemised by the construction of the terrorist attacks on 9/11 as “acts of war”. Hence one cannot understand Bush’s rhetorical move to construct the attacks as unprecedented and new forms of warfare thereby invoking the nation’s right to self-defence (Jackson, 2007: 356), without assessing the impact that the extraordinary and repeated images of that act had on reactions to it. Here in lies the fundamental merit and pitfall of the speech act theory. On the one hand it provides us with an innovative understanding of the metaphorical constitution of terrorism in discourse and on the other it remains closed to the impact different mediums of communication have on the securitisation process. Thus, language is only one means through which meaning is communicated (Moller, 2007: 180). Drawing on Michel Foucault, this essay problematises the reduction by the speech act theory, of securitisation to a purely linguistic rhetoric. The meaning we attach to security and our knowledge of what constitutes security exists within both the material and textual realms, for they are not mutually exclusive. Foucault (1980: 63) holds that once a discursive utterance is considered an action or as a practice, this then begins to verge on the territory of materiality and becomes more easily linked to the array of physical activities through which the diagnosis may be made initially. To illuminate his concept of discursive practices, Foucault invokes the notion of extra-discursive—which relates to the idea that similar discursive acts can occur in a multitude of ways and various different forms that stretch from the textual to material level of discursive practice. <u><strong>The speech act theory defines security as language</u></strong>—thus language becomes security. <u><strong>Such an ov<mark>er-concentration on language signals a myopia of text, an over-evaluation of</u></strong></mark> the linguistic and <u><strong><mark>representational powers of language in isolation from</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>material arrangements</u></strong></mark> of power in which they are entrenched and that they in turn extend (Foucault Journal, 2001: 540). The over-evaluation by the speech act theory of the linguistic powers of language in isolation from the material context of power, in which they are intermeshed, is problematised by the Didier Bigo (2002). Bigo (2002: 65) holds that “security is constructed and applied to different issues and areas through a range of often routinised practices rather than only through speech acts that enable emergency measures”. Accordingly, practices of surveillance and border controls for example, can be central to the process of securitisation and are not simply those actions enabled by preceding speech acts (McDonald, 2009: 570). Recognising the role of physical systems in the construction of security, that is, the generation of meaning and the productive power of such systems—demands an acceptance that security exists outside of the speech act. Hence, <u><strong>the speech act framework of security</u></strong> problematically <u><strong><mark>neglects physical action</u></strong></mark> which can serve to communicate ideas about security in their own right (Hansen, 2000: 300-1). In summation, <u><strong>security</u></strong> is constructed through processes of social interaction, but <u><strong>cannot be defined narrowly as existing only within the speech act</u></strong>. Hence, <u><strong>the <mark>definition of security in terms of a discourse</u></strong>-</mark>action sequence <u><strong><mark>is problematic</u></strong>,</mark> inasmuch as <u><strong>it <mark>fails to recognise the complexity of </mark>the construction</u></strong> of security <u><strong>in <mark>global politics.</mark> Assuming that security merely resides within the discursive positioning of threats, neglects</u></strong> the historical and social <u><strong>context</u></strong>s in which security becomes possible. Thus, discourses of security are bound by the historical and social structures in which they are produced. The speech act then is just one dynamic of the securitisation process, the role of audiences, visual communication and physical practices must all be examined in order to understand how security is experienced in different contexts. Security exists within the interplay between self-identity and the construction of meaning, thus the feeling of threat and being secured is produced within all social structures. Security is what we make of it, different worldviews and discourses bound by social structures and communicated in diverse ways, deliver different discourses about security. Security can be constructed physically through bureaucratic systems, through the discourses of the state and within marginalised groups whose experience of threat and security may not be known or heard. <u><strong>Security</u></strong> therefore <u><strong>is not just a speech act</u></strong>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Futter, 2018 (Andrew Futter; Andrew Futter is an associate professor in the School of History, Politics, and International Relations at the University of Leicester. He is the author of The Politics of Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy, the editor of The United Kingdom and the Future of Nuclear Weapons, and co-editor of Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs; Hacking the Bomb: Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons; 2-15-2018; accessed 12-1-2019;) fulltext: What, then, might this cyber-enabled conflict, or warfare involving cyber operations, look like? And how might these pressures involve thinking about nuclear weapons? The first thing to note is that even if nuclear systems are not targeted directly or are successfully guarded against malicious hackers, it seems very likely that the use—or even the threat of use—of cyber capabilities against an opponent during a crisis will raise tensions, concerns, and perceived vulnerabilities, and that this will make nuclear crisis resolution more complicated and perhaps more dangerous." The second thing to note is that the use of cyber capabilities is likely to obfuscate and complicate the escalation ladder, and possibly lead to an inadvertent deepening of a crisis, perhaps even up to the nuclear level. It is likely to do this in different ways from those theorized in the past, and probably at a much greater speed. It could also, for example, include attacks in both civilian and military domains. Taken together, new cyber dynamics—both operations and context might even necessitate a rethinking of these established nuclear concepts altogether. Perhaps the most important thing to note about cyber operations in future crises and warfare is that they are likely to be offense-dominant. That is, in cyberspace the advantage will be held by the attackers rather than the defenders. Although this forecast is challenged by some, and is contingent on several variables—particularly the target and intention of the attack—it does have rather significant implications for the broader security dilemma, and especially for strategic stability.51 Along with creating pressures for arms racing, this also makes cyber capabilities more likely to be employed early in a crisis, particularly given the policy of active defense mentioned above.52 The result could potentially be greater insecurity for all, and possibly unintended, and in the worst-case scenario perhaps even unmanageable escalation. By way of an example, an Israeli war game conducted in 2013 demonstrated how the use and threat of cyberattacks might very quickly escalate a crisis, in this case bringing the United States and Russia to the brink of conflict in a possible Middle East war.53 Such conflicts might begin and play out in a number of different ways, but all will likely create new pressures for crisis management. First, during a crisis hackers could potentially disrupt or destroy communications channels, making it difficult to manage forces, including nuclear forces, and reducing commanders' confidence in their weapons systems and the ability of officials to communicate. Even a relatively small-scale attack could create considerable doubt about the security and reliability of communications, and particularly about the veracity of the information flowing from their computers.54 Moreover, despite often-held beliefs to the contrary, many military communications systems—including even some used for nuclear command and control—utilize commercial infrastructure or are based on networks that could be vulnerable to an attack or disruption.55 It must therefore be assumed that the linkages required for nuclear second-strike capabilities could also be unreliable, and possibly vulnerable to an opponents cyber operations.56 Aggressors might also employ distributed denial-of-service attacks to prevent communication, of-service attacks to prevent communication, hamper battle management systems, magnify confusion, and make it more difficult to identify what is happening and perhaps to conduct a coordinated response. Such attacks might be particularly acute for nuclear dyads that are in close geographical proximity—and therefore face limited decision-making time—such as India and Pakistan." Second, the use of cyberattack capabilities might inadvertently escalate a crisis—very much building on the model of "inadvertent nuclear escalation" developed by Barry Posen back in the early 1990s.58 This might be due either to deliberate interference from a third-party actor—such as a terrorist group—or from an unauthorized insider, or by another state seeking to deepen the crisis through false flag operations (that is, operations conducted to look like they were carried out by someone else). Alternatively, it might involve accidentally targeting the wrong systems. This risk is amplified considerably in the cyber context because it is increasingly difficult to know which computer systems support which weapons and operations. For example, as Lawrence Cavaiola and his colleagues explain, "an attack [by the United States] on a Chinese system that is used to increase the readiness of tactical forces might also inadvertently degrade the readiness of Chinese strategic nuclear forces, with grave risks of misinterpretation and escalation, up to and including launch on warning."59 Thus, a cyberattack on computer systems thought to control conventional weapons might be mistaken (and interpreted) as a direct attack on an adversary's ability to use its nuclear forces. Moreover, even if enemy cyberattacks are detected and mitigated, this could still lead to a "spiral of mistrust" and worst-case scenario thinking.' Third, cyberattacks might reduce the ability to signal, causing flawed images of intentions and capabilities, or be used to "spoof early warning systems"—again, a particular concern given the possibility of false flag cyber interference by third parties. It is perfectly possible that the ability to clearly signal intentions could be one of the biggest challenges created by cyber operations for nuclear crisis management. The concern here is twofold. First, the cyber context will make communicating with an adversary (and your own forces) much more complicated. Second, it is far from clear that cyberattacks themselves offer a very useful way of signaling, and may in fact be worse than traditional methods. As Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay explain, this is because cyber operations "are complex, esoteric, and hard for commanders and policymakers to understand."6' Previous methods of signaling—such as seeking to indicate intentions or red lines to an adversary through limited conventional action, already a complicated and delicate endeavor—will probably be even more difficult to implement when cyberattacks are also involved.62 Moreover, given the difficulties of attribution—particularly when time is short, decision makers are under pressure, and third-party cyber activities abound—it may not be straightforward to ascertain when a conflict has actually stopped.63 In this way, cyber operations are likely to further complicate and "muddy" signaling between adversaries during a crisis or conflict, either deliberately or inadvertently." This would also, therefore, make the functioning of leadership far more complicated in any future nuclear crisis too. Fourth, the use of cyberattacks might reduce the search for viable alternatives, thereby compressing—or at least muddying —the escalation ladder, particularly the steps between conventional and nuclear use. Once hostilities begin, leaders may not feel confident that the information they are receiving is genuine; the same might also be true for commanders in the field. Each decision would be underpinned by an uneasiness about the veracity of the information and data being used, possibly leading to different types of calculations and actions.65 In addition to this, leaders would fear that cyber operations would be used early in a crisis to disable or retard their most important weapons systems and to prevent them from being used against an adversary. Unfortunately, this might create a spiral effect, and more pressure to "use them or lose them," when it comes to a state's most important military capabilities.66 In a worst-case scenario, these concerns might increase perceived time pressures to act or respond, and the option to act preemptively. Stephen Cimbala has even gone as far as to warn that a nuclear-armed state bombarded with cyberattacks—particularly on its command, control, communications, and early warning networks—might feel so vulnerable that it would opt for preemption, in the worst case with nuclear weapons.° This exacerbates the feeling that cyber operations could undermine the ability to threaten retaliation, and therefore to strike second, because cyber capabilities appear to augment conventional first-strike possibilities against key enemy systems and forces, including their nuclear weapons.68 Taken together, these dynamics raise the likelihood of unintended and potentially uncontrollable escalation and make the management of such crises more complicated and dangerous.69<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Nuclear weapons are <u>sitting ducks</u> in cyberattacks – causes <u>unmanageable</u> escalation and guts deterrence.</h4><p><strong>Futter, 2018</strong> (Andrew Futter; Andrew Futter is an associate professor in the School of History, Politics, and International Relations at the University of Leicester. He is the author of The Politics of Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy, the editor of The United Kingdom and the Future of Nuclear Weapons, and co-editor of Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs; Hacking the Bomb: Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons; 2-15-2018; accessed 12-1-2019;) </p><p>What, then, might this cyber-enabled conflict, or warfare involving cyber operations, look like? And how might these pressures involve thinking about nuclear weapons? The first thing to note is that <u><strong><mark>even if</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>nuclear <mark>systems</mark> <mark>are</u></strong></mark> not targeted directly or are <u><strong>successfully <mark>guarded</mark> against malicious hackers</u></strong>, it seems very likely that <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> use—or even the <u><strong><mark>threat of</mark> use</u></strong>—<u><strong>of <mark>cyber</mark> capabilities</u></strong> against an opponent during a crisis <u><strong>will raise </u></strong>tensions, concerns, and<u><strong> perceived vulnerabilities</u></strong>, and that this will make nuclear crisis resolution more complicated and perhaps more dangerous." The second thing to note is that the use of <u><strong>cyber capabilities </u></strong>is likely to obfuscate and complicate the escalation ladder, and possibly <u><strong>lead to an inadvertent <mark>deepen</mark>ing of <mark>a crisis</u></strong></mark>, perhaps even <u><strong>up <mark>to the nuclear level</u></strong></mark>. It is likely to do this in different ways from those theorized in the past, and probably at a much greater speed. It could also, for example, include attacks in both civilian and military domains. Taken together, new cyber dynamics—both operations and context might even necessitate a rethinking of these established nuclear concepts altogether. Perhaps the most important thing to note about <u><strong><mark>cyber operations</mark> </u></strong>in future crises and warfare is that they <u><strong><mark>are</u></strong></mark> likely to be <u><strong><mark>offense-dominant</mark>. </u></strong>That is, in cyberspace the advantage will be held by the attackers rather than the defenders. Although this forecast is challenged by some, and is contingent on several variables—particularly the target and intention of the attack—it does have rather significant implications for the broader security dilemma, and especially for strategic stability.51 <u><strong>Along with </u></strong>creating pressures for <u><strong>arms racing</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>this</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>makes</mark> cyber <mark>capabilities </mark>more <mark>likely to be</mark> employed <mark>early in a crisis</u></strong></mark>, particularly given the policy of active defense mentioned above.52 <u><strong>The result could </u></strong>potentially <u><strong>be</u></strong> greater insecurity for all, and possibly unintended, and in the worst-case scenario perhaps even <u><strong><mark>unmanageable escalation</u></strong></mark>. By way of an example, an Israeli war game conducted in 2013 demonstrated how the use and threat of cyberattacks might very quickly escalate a crisis, in this case bringing the United States and Russia to the brink of conflict in a possible Middle East war.53 Such conflicts might begin and play out in a number of different ways, but all will likely create new pressures for crisis management. First, <u><strong>during a crisis <mark>hackers</mark> could</u></strong> potentially disrupt or <u><strong><mark>destroy communications</mark> channels</u></strong>, making it difficult to manage forces, including nuclear forces, and reducing commanders' confidence in their weapons systems and the ability of officials to communicate. Even a relatively small-scale attack could create considerable doubt about the security and reliability of communications, and particularly about <u><strong>the veracity of the information flowing from their computers</u></strong>.54 Moreover, despite often-held beliefs to the contrary, many military communications systems—<u><strong><mark>including</u></strong></mark> even some used for nuclear <u><strong><mark>command and control</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>utilize commercial infrastructure</u></strong> or are based on networks <u><strong>that could be vulnerable to an attack</u></strong> or disruption.55 It must therefore be assumed that the <u><strong><mark>linkages</mark> required <mark>for</mark> nuclear <mark>second-strike</mark> capabilities <mark>could</mark> also <mark>be unreliable</u></strong></mark>, and possibly vulnerable to an opponents cyber operations.56 <u><strong>Aggressors </u></strong>might also employ distributed denial-of-service attacks to <u><strong>prevent communication</u></strong>, of-service attacks to prevent communication, <u><strong>hamper</u></strong> battle <u><strong>management systems, <mark>magnify confusion</mark>, and make it more difficult to identify what is happening </u></strong>and perhaps to conduct a coordinated response. Such <u><strong><mark>attacks</mark> might be particularly acute for nuclear <mark>dyads</mark> that are <mark>in close geographical proximity</u></strong></mark>—and therefore face limited decision-making time—such as India and Pakistan." Second, the use of cyberattack capabilities might inadvertently escalate a crisis—very much building on the model of "inadvertent nuclear escalation" developed by Barry Posen back in the early 1990s.58 This might be due either to <u><strong>deliberate interference <mark>from a third-party acto</mark>r</u></strong>—such as a terrorist group—<u><strong><mark>or</u></strong></mark> from an <u><strong>unauthorized <mark>insider</u></strong></mark>, or by another state seeking to <u><strong>deepen the crisis through false flag operations</u></strong> (that is, operations conducted to look like they were carried out by someone else). Alternatively, it might involve accidentally targeting the wrong systems. This risk is amplified considerably in the cyber context because <u><strong>it is </u></strong>increasingly<u><strong> difficult to know which computer systems support which weapons and operations</u></strong>. For example, as Lawrence Cavaiola and his colleagues explain, "an attack [by the United States] on a Chinese system that is used to increase the readiness of tactical forces might also inadvertently degrade the readiness of Chinese strategic nuclear forces, with grave risks of misinterpretation and escalation, up to and including launch on warning."59 Thus, a cyberattack on computer systems thought to control conventional weapons might be mistaken (and interpreted) as a direct attack on an adversary's ability to use its nuclear forces. Moreover, even if enemy cyberattacks are detected and mitigated, this could still lead to a "spiral of mistrust" and worst-case scenario thinking.' Third, <u><strong><mark>cyberattacks</mark> might <mark>reduce the ability to signal</mark>, causing flawed images of intentions and capabilities</u></strong>, or be <u><strong>used to "spoof early warning systems"</u></strong>—again, a particular concern given the possibility of false flag cyber interference by third parties. It is perfectly possible that the ability to clearly signal intentions could be one of the biggest challenges created by cyber operations for nuclear crisis management. The concern here is twofold. <u><strong>First, </u></strong>the<u><strong> cyber </u></strong>context will <u><strong>make communicating with an adversary</u></strong> (and your own forces) much more <u><strong>complicated</u></strong>. <u><strong>Second</u></strong>, it is far from clear that <u><strong>cyberattacks</u></strong> themselves offer a very useful way of signaling, and <u><strong>may</u></strong> in fact <u><strong>be worse than traditional methods. </u></strong>As Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay explain, this is because cyber <u><strong>operations</u></strong> "<u><strong>are</u></strong> complex, esoteric, and <u><strong>hard for commanders and policymakers to understand</u></strong>."6' Previous methods of signaling—such as seeking to indicate intentions or red lines to an adversary through limited conventional action, already a complicated and delicate endeavor—will probably be even more difficult to implement when cyberattacks are also involved.62 Moreover, <u><strong>given the difficulties of attribution</u></strong>—particularly when time is short<u><strong>, decision makers are under pressure,</u></strong> and third-party cyber activities abound—it may not be straightforward to ascertain when a conflict has actually stopped.63 In this way, cyber operations are likely to further complicate and "muddy" signaling between adversaries during a crisis or conflict, either deliberately or inadvertently." This would also, therefore, make the functioning of leadership far more complicated in any future nuclear crisis too. Fourth, <u><strong>the use of cyberattacks</u></strong> might reduce the search for viable alternatives, <u><strong><mark>thereby compressing</u></strong></mark>—or at least muddying —<u><strong><mark>the escalation ladder</u></strong></mark>, particularly <u><strong>the steps <mark>between conventional and nuclear</mark> use.</u></strong> Once hostilities begin, leaders may not feel confident that the information they are receiving is genuine; the same might also be true for commanders in the field. Each decision would be underpinned by an uneasiness about the veracity of the information and data being used, possibly leading to different types of calculations and actions.65 In addition to this, leaders would fear that cyber operations would be used early in a crisis to disable or retard their most important weapons systems and to prevent them from being used against an adversary. Unfortunately, this might create a spiral effect, and more pressure to "use them or lose them," when it comes to a state's most important military capabilities.66 In a worst-case scenario, these concerns might increase perceived time pressures to act or respond, and the option to act preemptively. Stephen Cimbala has even gone as far as to warn that <u><strong><mark>a</mark> nuclear-armed <mark>state</mark> bombarded with cyberattacks</u></strong>—particularly on its command, control, communications, and early warning networks—<u><strong><mark>might</u></strong></mark> feel so vulnerable that it would <u><strong>opt for <mark>preempt</mark>ion</u></strong>, <u><strong>in the worst case with nuclear weapons</u></strong>.° This exacerbates the feeling that cyber operations could undermine the ability to threaten retaliation, and therefore to strike second, because <u><strong>cyber capabilities appear to augment conventional first-strike possibilities</u></strong> against key enemy systems and forces, including their nuclear weapons.68 Taken together, these <u><strong>dynamics</u></strong> <u><strong>raise the likelihood of</u></strong> unintended and potentially <u><strong>uncontrollable escalation</u></strong> and make the management of such crises more complicated and dangerous.69</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Roberts 19 — Dorothy E. Roberts, George A. Weiss University Professor of Law and Sociology and Raymond Pace and Sadie Tanner Mossell Alexander Professor of Civil Rights at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, holds a J.D. from Harvard University, 2019 (“Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism,” Harvard Law Review, Volume 133, Number 1, November, Available Online at https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/1-122_Online.pdf, Accessed 07-30-2020, p. 120-122) fulltext: B. Imagining a Freedom Constitutionalism Abolitionists always have their eyes set on a future they are in the process of creating. At the very same time they are deconstructing structures inherited from the past, they are constructing new ones to support the future society they envision. Abolitionists are engaged in a collective project of radical speculative imagination — what Rodríguez calls “[i]nsurgent abolitionist futurity.”743 If anything, it is the innovative rather than the destructive that marks abolitionist thinking. We should understand abolition not as the “elimination of anything but . . . as the founding of a new society.”744 The relationship between prison abolition and the Constitution, then, should be seen less as the condemnation of our existing abolition constitutionalism and more as the genesis of a new one. A new abolition constitutionalism could seek to abolish historical forms of oppression beyond slavery, including settler colonialism, patriarchy, heteronormativity, ableism, and capitalism, and strive to dismantle systems beyond police and prisons, including foster care, regulation of pregnancy, and poverty.745 It could extend beyond the United States’ borders to challenge U.S. deportation policies and U.S. imperialism and to connect to freedom struggles around the world.746 The purpose of a [end page 120] new abolition constitutionalism would not be to improve the U.S. state but to guide and govern a future society where prisons are unimaginable. Its objective could extend beyond abolishing particular systems to establishing freedom for all — a new freedom constitutionalism. As antebellum abolitionists and civil rights activists showed, constitutional meaning is shaped by social and political action outside of traditional forums and separate from Supreme Court decisions.747 Prison abolitionist praxis emphasizes the need to decentralize power currently residing in privileged institutions in order to empower communities most vulnerable to state violence to make change in nontraditional forums and spaces.748 How that vision will be made real — as a transformed interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, as an amendment [end page 121] to the existing text,749 or as an alternative charter for freedom that extends beyond the bounds of the U.S. state750 — is yet to be seen. —— Footnotes —— 743. Rodríguez, supra note 29, at 1607. 744. Moten & Harney, supra note 258, at 114. 745. See, e.g., DAVIS, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 41 (linking the growing female incarceration rate to the “disestablishment of the welfare system”); Dorothy Roberts & Lisa Sangoi, Black Families Matter: How the Child Welfare System Punishes Poor Families of Color, THE APPEAL (Mar. 26, 2018), https://theappeal.org/black-families-matter-how-the-child-welfare- system-punishes-poor-families-of-color-33ad20e2882e [https://perma.cc/VP2F-AEF3] (discussing foster care abolition). 746. See BEYOND WALLS AND CAGES: PRISONS, BORDERS, AND GLOBAL CRISIS 1–15 (Jenna M. Loyd et al. eds., 2012) (highlighting the connections between immigration and penal policies); MARTHA D. ESCOBAR, CAPTIVITY BEYOND PRISONS: CRIMINALIZATION EXPERIENCES OF LATINA (IM)MIGRANTS 4 (2016) (describing the “expansion of the carceral society beyond the territorial boundaries of the U.S. nation-state”); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Abolishing Immigration Prisons, 97 B.U. L. REV. 245, 246 (2017) (arguing that immigration imprisonment should be abolished); Wolff, supra note 181, at 1008–21 (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits U.S. firms from exploiting slave labor in the global economy). I have argued that prison abolition will envision a radically different relationship between technology and politics, one that ends prediction as a way of foreclosing social change by collapsing the future into past inequality. See Roberts, Digitizing, supra note 78, at 1727 (“Abolitionist forecasting technologies must facilitate envisioning a future that doesn’t replicate the past.”). 747. See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 667, at 1620 (noting that the “Fight for $15” movement “high- lights the centrality of social and political action to constitutional law”); see also JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 1–16 (2011); TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 7 (2011) (“What would the story of the mid-twentieth-century struggle for civil rights look like if legal historians de-centered the U.S. Supreme Court . . . and instead considered the movement from the bottom up? The answer . . . [is] a picture . . . in which local black community members acted as agents of change — law shapers, law interpreters, and even law makers.”); MARK ENGLER & PAUL ENGLER, THIS IS AN UPRISING: HOW NONVIO- LENT REVOLT IS SHAPING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY xvii (2016) (explaining the potential power of nonviolence “as a method of political conflict, disruption, and escalation”); JONES, supra note 327, at 12 (describing how free black people in Baltimore “secured [constitutional] rights through their performance”); Mark Tushnet, Social Movements and the Constitution, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 241, 241 (Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 2015) (examining how “social movements have affected the Constitution’s development and interpretation”). 748. See Joy James, Preface: American Archipelago, in WARFARE IN THE AMERICAN HOMELAND: POLICING AND PRISON IN A PENAL DEMOCRACY xii (Joy James ed., 2007) (referring to the search for “‘home’ — a democratic enclave, communities of resistance, a maroon camp”); James, 7 Lessons, supra note 42 (criticizing reforms that “do not decentralize power or custodial care” and instead rely on “privileged structures[] that historically create, manage, tabulate, or ameliorate crises”); see also Blackhawk, supra note 290, at 1798 (noting that “public law scholars have begun to identify non-rights-based or structural forms of protection for minorities like federalism, unions, and petitioning”); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286, 1291 (2012) (defining structural forms of representation to include “not just ballots but also any form of representation or direct participation in processes of collective decisionmaking”). 749. See, e.g., Goodwin, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 174, at 982–83 (discussing an amendment which would strike the Punishment Clause from the Thirteenth Amendment); Jeannie Alexander, Abolition Statement, ABOLITION (June 18, 2015), https://abolitionjournal.org/jeannie- alexander-abolition-statement [https://perma.cc/UFJ5-P28F] (proposing that the Thirteenth Amendment should be amended to read: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, shall exist within the United States . . . .”). 750. Black radicals have already directly engaged in constructing an alternative constitutionalism. See Akbar, supra note 662, at 421–22, 426–27 (discussing the Movement for Black Lives’ “A Vision for Black Lives: Policy Demands for Black Power, Freedom, and Justice,” including demands for “economic justice, community control, and political power,” id. at 427 (footnotes omitted)); Rana, supra note 343, at 284–85 (describing the Revolutionary People’s Constitutional Convention, organized by the Black Panther Party and held in Philadelphia in 1970 with the goal of devising a “competing constitution” that included expanded socioeconomic rights, reparations, wealth transfers, and changes in police power, id. at 284); Freedom Papers, DREAM DEFENDERS, https://www.dreamdefenders.org/freedompapers [https://perma.cc/E5PK-7KYJ] (outlining a set of rights and freedoms not explicitly established in the Constitution).<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><u>Aff and Perm Solve; Alt Doesn’t</u> — the impact is <u>interlocking systems of oppression</u>. </h4><p><strong>Roberts 19</strong> — Dorothy E. Roberts, George A. Weiss University Professor of Law and Sociology and Raymond Pace and Sadie Tanner Mossell Alexander Professor of Civil Rights at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, holds a J.D. from Harvard University, 2019 (“Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism,” Harvard Law Review, Volume 133, Number 1, November, Available Online at https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/1-122_Online.pdf, Accessed 07-30-2020, p. 120-122)</p><p>B. Imagining a Freedom Constitutionalism</p><p><u><strong>Abolitionists always have their eyes set on a future they are in the process of creating. At the very same time they are deconstructing structures inherited from the past, they are constructing new ones to support the future society they envision. Abolitionists are engaged in a collective project of radical speculative imagination — what Rodríguez calls “[i]nsurgent abolitionist futurity.”</u></strong>743 <u><strong>If anything, it is the innovative rather than the destructive that marks abolitionist thinking. We should understand abolition not as the “elimination of anything but . . . as the founding of a new society.”</u></strong>744 <u><strong>The relationship between prison abolition and the Constitution</u></strong>, <u><strong>then</u></strong>, <u><strong>should be seen less as the condemnation of our existing abolition constitutionalism and more as the genesis of a new one.</p><p>A new abolition constitutionalism could seek to abolish historical forms of oppression beyond slavery, including settler colonialism, patriarchy, heteronormativity, ableism, and capitalism, and strive to dismantle systems beyond police and prisons, including foster care, regulation of pregnancy, and poverty</u></strong>.745 <u><strong>It could extend beyond the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates<u><strong>’ borders to challenge U.S. deportation policies and U.S. imperialism and to connect to freedom struggles around the world</u></strong>.746 <u><strong>The purpose of a</u></strong> [end page 120] <u><strong>new abolition constitutionalism would not be to improve the U.S. state but to guide and govern a future society where prisons are unimaginable. Its objective could extend beyond abolishing particular systems to establishing freedom for all — a new freedom constitutionalism</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong>As antebellum abolitionists and civil rights activists showed, constitutional meaning is shaped by social and political action outside of traditional forums and separate from Supreme Court decisions</u></strong>.747 <u><strong>Prison abolitionist praxis emphasizes the need to decentralize power currently residing in privileged institutions in order to empower communities most vulnerable to state violence to make change in nontraditional forums and spaces</u></strong>.748 <u><strong>How that vision will be made real</u></strong> — as a transformed interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, as an amendment [end page 121] to the existing text,749 or as an alternative charter for freedom that extends beyond the bounds of the U.S. state750 — <u><strong>is yet to be seen</u>.</p><p>—— Footnotes ——</p><p></strong>743. Rodríguez, supra note 29, at 1607.</p><p>744. Moten & Harney, supra note 258, at 114.</p><p>745. See, e.g., DAVIS, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 41 (linking the growing female incarceration rate to the “disestablishment of the welfare system”); Dorothy Roberts & Lisa Sangoi, Black Families Matter: How the Child Welfare System Punishes Poor Families of Color, THE APPEAL (Mar. 26, 2018), https://theappeal.org/black-families-matter-how-the-child-welfare- system-punishes-poor-families-of-color-33ad20e2882e [https://perma.cc/VP2F-AEF3] (discussing foster care abolition).</p><p>746. See BEYOND WALLS AND CAGES: PRISONS, BORDERS, AND GLOBAL CRISIS 1–15 (Jenna M. Loyd et al. eds., 2012) (highlighting the connections between immigration and penal policies); MARTHA D. ESCOBAR, CAPTIVITY BEYOND PRISONS: CRIMINALIZATION EXPERIENCES OF LATINA (IM)MIGRANTS 4 (2016) (describing the “expansion of the carceral society beyond the territorial boundaries of the U.S. nation-state”); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Abolishing Immigration Prisons, 97 B.U. L. REV. 245, 246 (2017) (arguing that immigration imprisonment should be abolished); Wolff, supra note 181, at 1008–21 (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits U.S. firms from exploiting slave labor in the global economy). I have argued that prison abolition will envision a radically different relationship between technology and politics, one that ends prediction as a way of foreclosing social change by collapsing the future into past inequality. See Roberts, Digitizing, supra note 78, at 1727 (“Abolitionist forecasting technologies must facilitate envisioning a future that doesn’t replicate the past.”).</p><p>747. See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 667, at 1620 (noting that the “Fight for $15” movement “high- lights the centrality of social and political action to constitutional law”); see also JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 1–16 (2011); TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 7 (2011) (“What would the story of the mid-twentieth-century struggle for civil rights look like if legal historians de-centered the U.S. Supreme Court . . . and instead considered the movement from the bottom up? The answer . . . [is] a picture . . . in which local black community members acted as agents of change — law shapers, law interpreters, and even law makers.”); MARK ENGLER & PAUL ENGLER, THIS IS AN UPRISING: HOW NONVIO- LENT REVOLT IS SHAPING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY xvii (2016) (explaining the potential power of nonviolence “as a method of political conflict, disruption, and escalation”); JONES, supra note 327, at 12 (describing how free black people in Baltimore “secured [constitutional] rights through their performance”); Mark Tushnet, Social Movements and the Constitution, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 241, 241 (Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 2015) (examining how “social movements have affected the Constitution’s development and interpretation”).</p><p>748. See Joy James, Preface: American Archipelago, in WARFARE IN THE AMERICAN HOMELAND: POLICING AND PRISON IN A PENAL DEMOCRACY xii (Joy James ed., 2007) (referring to the search for “‘home’ — a democratic enclave, communities of resistance, a maroon camp”); James, 7 Lessons, supra note 42 (criticizing reforms that “do not decentralize power or custodial care” and instead rely on “privileged structures[] that historically create, manage, tabulate, or ameliorate crises”); see also Blackhawk, supra note 290, at 1798 (noting that “public law scholars have begun to identify non-rights-based or structural forms of protection for minorities like federalism, unions, and petitioning”); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286, 1291 (2012) (defining structural forms of representation to include “not just ballots but also any form of representation or direct participation in processes of collective decisionmaking”).</p><p>749. See, e.g., Goodwin, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 174, at 982–83 (discussing an amendment which would strike the Punishment Clause from the Thirteenth Amendment); Jeannie Alexander, Abolition Statement, ABOLITION (June 18, 2015), https://abolitionjournal.org/jeannie- alexander-abolition-statement [https://perma.cc/UFJ5-P28F] (proposing that the Thirteenth Amendment should be amended to read: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, shall exist within the United States . . . .”).</p><p>750. Black radicals have already directly engaged in constructing an alternative constitutionalism. See Akbar, supra note 662, at 421–22, 426–27 (discussing the Movement for Black Lives’ “A Vision for Black Lives: Policy Demands for Black Power, Freedom, and Justice,” including demands for “economic justice, community control, and political power,” id. at 427 (footnotes omitted)); Rana, supra note 343, at 284–85 (describing the Revolutionary People’s Constitutional Convention, organized by the Black Panther Party and held in Philadelphia in 1970 with the goal of devising a “competing constitution” that included expanded socioeconomic rights, reparations, wealth transfers, and changes in police power, id. at 284); Freedom Papers, DREAM DEFENDERS, https://www.dreamdefenders.org/freedompapers [https://perma.cc/E5PK-7KYJ] (outlining a set of rights and freedoms not explicitly established in the Constitution).</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Salem 99 (Tania, "Physician-Assisted Suicide: Promoting Autonomy—Or Medicalizing Suicide?" Hastings Center Report, 29: 30–36. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/3528193/full-http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/3528193/full, nk) fulltext: As a legitimate domain of professional practice, then, physician-assisted suicide necessarily involves medicalizing the moral questions surrounding suicide. Physician-assisted suicide presupposes, and ultimately is, a medical judgment about death or suicide; it is a medical evaluation of the fairness and legitimacy of a person's (not simply a patient's) desire or choice to end his or her life. With some few exceptions, even the most radical advocates of physician-assisted suicide recognize the need to establish protocols and guidelines to prevent abuses, protect the vulnerable, guarantee public accountability, and even to assure the autonomous character of the patient's choice. Surely these aims are respectable and the setting up of criteria just and reasonable. Yet establishing medical guidelines also introduces tensions into the value of autonomy in several ways. The requisites for physician-assisted suicide (must the patient be terminally ill? which medical specialists are best qualified as consultants?) are still being debated. There is, however, agreement about the moral attributes that the patient and his or her request must evince: the decision to die must be “informed,” “rational,” “stable,” and “fully free” or “voluntary.”22 And there is broad agreement that to ensure that these conditions are fulfilled the patient must submit to screening by a team of doctors (the treating physician, a consulting physician, and a psychiatrist) who would evaluate the request for aid in dying. This requirement assumes that besides undue external influences, some impulses or dispositions emanating from the patient herself or himself—such as depression or guilt—may threaten “pure choice.” “Voluntariness” in this sense must be safeguarded from undue influence stemming not only from outside, but also from within. Ultimately, this is to assume that the inner world may be obscure to the individual, that she or he may be half blind to her or his own choice, desire, or personal truth. The presumption that the inner world is or may be opaque to the individual suggests a second underlying presupposition: someone other than the person requesting aid in dying has greater expertise in judging the appropriateness of that request. Medical authority, that is, is assumed to have the proper ability to unveil the “real truth” behind the request to die. The patient's treating physician, along with psychiatric and/or palliative care consultants, is charged to distinguish authentic from distorted choices; that is, to discern whether the request is pertinent or pathological (and if so, whether it is “curable” by medical means). Both these premises obviously collide with the principles of autonomy and self-determination. Both displace the final decision concerning suicide from the patient to the physician's judgment that the request is appropriate and free from “undue influence.” The insult to autonomy is not exerted through repression, as was the criminalization of suicide. Rather, it is exercised through what Foucault would call the “normalization” of suicide, the subordination to medical scrutiny of this event and the person making the request.23 The “patient” is subjected to observation, examination, and inquiry to confirm the “rationality” and “voluntariness” of his or her request. Thus medicalizing (assisted) suicide jeopardizes autonomy not only when the patient's request is denied for one reason or another. Requiring that the patient submit to medical surveillance is, in itself, an outrage to autonomy as this value is classically defined.24 To illustrate how complex is the apparatus through which suicide is normalized, consider guidelines suggested by Frank Miller, Howard Brody, and Timothy Quill, for example. To ensure public accountability for physician-assisted suicide, to guarantee that the procedure is used only as a “last resort,” and to assure that the patient's decision is genuinely voluntary, the authors suggest palliative care consultants and regional palliative care committees as the core of a whole supervising system.25 Thus the primary physician would be prohibited from providing lethal drugs without prior consultation with a palliative care expert who, based on “examination of medical records and interviews with the treating physician, the patient and the interested members of the patient's family” (p. 121), would assess the authenticity of the request to die. Patients and their physicians would have the right to appeal the consultant's denial of requests for assisted suicide to regional palliative care committees. The bureaucratization of suicide built into such proposals entails serious constraints on patients’ self-determination. Subjecting individuals who request aid in dying to this kind of scrutiny further affronts their dignity in putting all such requests under suspicion. In the name of protecting individuals from irreversible self-harm all are in principle treated as moral patients rather than moral agents and are presumed to be mentally incompetent. The capacity to make autonomous decisions, which is presumed in all other cases unless demonstrated otherwise, is stood on its head in physician-assisted suicide. Patients must prove their decisionmaking capacity from the outset. One of the most dramatic aspects of medicine's extended power over contemporary sensibilities has been precisely medicine's ability to mold our conceptions about dying. Subjecting the individual to medical norms in this way also introduces a tension for one of the central questions of liberal philosophers. If, as the liberal argument claims, the morality or immorality of decisions at the end of life rests on the competent patient's wishes rather than on a distinction between killing and allowing to die,26 protocols that may ultimately deny a patient's request for assistance in dying assert, in effect, that moral authority resides outside the patient's choice. And if medicine may, morally, reject patients’ autonomous requests for aid, in the context of physician-assisted suicide the value of patient autonomy becomes more rhetorical than real. Admittedly, even liberal theorists emphasize that there are limits to autonomy, and that like other important rights, the right to physician-assisted suicide is not absolute and can properly be restricted under certain circumstances. Indeed, Ronald Dworkin and others argue precisely that because autonomy must be protected and preserved physician-assisted suicide must be regulated. Under certain conditions the state has the power to override individual rights to protect patients from undue pressures, even internal ones.The tension remains, however. In the context of assisted suicide, how is it possible to reconcile the assertion that paternalistic influences are unacceptable with the concept that in some situations the state (or the medical establishment) may deny assistance in suicide in the name of “what it reasonably judges to be the best interest of the potential suicide”?27 Alexander Capron has argued that decisions on behalf of others should rest on a best interest standard of what the “‘average reasonable person’ would do under the given circumstances.”28 Doesn't this permit the tyranny of the majority over the individual? Doesn't this menace the right, so praised by liberal theorists, to exercise our singularities in a radical way? As Yale Kamisar has asked, “[I]f self-determination and autonomy is the major force driving the right to assisted suicide, why should a competent person's firm conclusion that life has become unendurable for her have to be ‘objectively reasonable’? Why should not a competent person's own evaluation of her situation suffice?”29 To phrase this in terms of the argument I make here, is it ever possible to reconcile medicalizing suicide with autonomy?<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>Tying it to a physians medicalizes and turns case — places hands in power of doctor instead of person</h4><p>Salem 99</strong> (Tania, "Physician-Assisted Suicide: Promoting Autonomy—Or Medicalizing Suicide?" Hastings Center Report, 29: 30–36. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/3528193/full-http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/3528193/full, nk)</p><p>As a legitimate domain of professional practice, then, <u><mark>physician-assisted suicide</u></mark> necessarily <u><mark>involves medicalizing</u></mark> <u><mark>the moral questions surrounding</u></mark> <u><mark>suicide</u></mark>. <u><mark>Physician-assisted suicide</u></mark> presupposes, and ultimately <u><mark>is</u></mark>, <u><mark>a</u></mark> <u><mark>medical judgment about death</u></mark> or suicide; it is <u><mark>a medical evaluation</u></mark> <u><mark>of the fairness</u></mark> and legitimacy <u><mark>of a person's</u></mark> (not simply a patient's) <u><mark>desire</u></mark> or choice <u><mark>to end his or her life</u></mark>. With some few exceptions, even the most radical advocates of physician-assisted suicide recognize the need to establish protocols and guidelines to prevent abuses, protect the vulnerable, guarantee public accountability, and even to assure the autonomous character of the patient's choice. Surely these aims are respectable and the setting up of criteria just and reasonable. Yet establishing medical guidelines also introduces tensions into the value of autonomy in several ways. The requisites for physician-assisted suicide (must the patient be terminally ill? which medical specialists are best qualified as consultants?) are still being debated. There is, however, agreement about the moral attributes that the patient and his or her request must evince: the decision to die must be “informed,” “rational,” “stable,” and “fully free” or “voluntary.”22 And there is broad agreement that <u><mark>to ensure</u></mark> that these <u><mark>conditions are fulfilled the patient must</u></mark> <u><mark>submit to screening by a team of doctors</u></mark> (the treating physician, a consulting physician, and a psychiatrist) who would evaluate the request for aid in dying. <u><mark>This requirement assumes</u></mark> <u><mark>that besides undue external influences</u></mark>, some <u><mark>impulses</u></mark> or dispositions emanating from the patient herself or himself—such as depression or guilt—<u><mark>may threaten “pure choice.”</u></mark> “<u><mark>Voluntariness</u></mark>” in this sense <u><mark>must be safeguarded</u></mark> <u><mark>from undue influence</u></mark> stemming not only from <u><mark>outside</u></mark>, <u><mark>but also from within</u></mark>. Ultimately, this is to assume that the inner world may be obscure to the individual, that she or he may be half blind to her or his own choice, desire, or personal truth. The presumption that the inner world is or may be opaque to the individual suggests a second underlying presupposition: <u><mark>someone other than</u></mark> <u><mark>the person requesting aid</u></mark> in dying <u><mark>has greater expertise</u></mark> <u><mark>in judging the appropriateness</u></mark> <u><mark>of that reques</u></mark>t. <u><mark>Medical authority</u></mark>, that is, <u><mark>is assumed to have</u></mark> <u><mark>the</u></mark> proper <u><mark>ability to unveil</u></mark> <u><mark>the “real truth</u></mark>” behind the request to die. <u><mark>The patient's</u></mark> treating <u><mark>physician</u></mark>, along with psychiatric and/or palliative care consultants, <u><mark>is charged to</u></mark> distinguish authentic from distorted choices; that is, to <u><mark>discern</u></mark> <u><mark>whether the request is pertinent or pathological</u></mark> (<u><mark>and</u></mark> if so, <u><mark>whether it is “curable</u></mark>” by medical means). Both these premises obviously collide with the principles of autonomy and self-determination. <u><mark>Both</u></mark> <u><mark>displace</u></mark> <u><mark>the</u></mark> final <u><mark>decision</u></mark> <u><mark>concerning suicide from the patient to the physician</u></mark>'s</p><p> judgment that the request is appropriate and free from “undue influence.” <u><mark>The insult to autonomy is not exerted through repression</u></mark>, as was the criminalization of suicide. <u><mark>Rather</u></mark>, it is exercised <u><mark>through</u></mark> what Foucault would call <u><mark>the “normalization” of suicide</u></mark>, the <u><mark>subordination</u></mark> <u><mark>to medical scrutiny</u></mark> of this event and the person making the request.23 <u><mark>The “patient</u></mark>” <u><mark>is subjected</u></mark> <u><mark>to</u></mark> observation, examination, and inquiry to <u><mark>confirm the “rationality</u></mark>” and “voluntariness” of his or her request. Thus <u><mark>medicalizing</u></mark> (assisted) suicide <u><mark>jeopardizes autonomy</u></mark> not only <u><mark>when the</u></mark> patient's <u><mark>request is denied</u></mark> for one reason or another. <u><mark>Requiring</u></mark> that the patient submit to <u><mark>medical surveillance</u></mark> <u><mark>is, in itself, an outrage to autonomy</u></mark> as this value is classically defined.24 To illustrate how complex is the apparatus through which suicide is normalized, consider guidelines suggested by Frank Miller, Howard Brody, and Timothy Quill, for example. To ensure public accountability for physician-assisted suicide, to guarantee that the procedure is used only as a “last resort,” and to assure that the patient's decision is genuinely voluntary, the authors suggest palliative care consultants and regional palliative care committees as the core of a whole supervising system.25 Thus the primary physician would be prohibited from providing lethal drugs without prior consultation with a palliative care expert who, based on “examination of medical records and interviews with the treating physician, the patient and the interested members of the patient's family” (p. 121), would assess the authenticity of the request to die. Patients and their physicians would have the right to appeal the consultant's denial of requests for assisted suicide to regional palliative care committees. <u><mark>The bureaucratization of suicide</u></mark> built into such proposals <u><mark>entails serious constraints on patients’ self-determination</u></mark>. Subjecting individuals who request aid in dying to this kind of scrutiny further affronts their dignity in putting all such requests under suspicion. In the name of protecting individuals from irreversible self-harm all are in principle treated as moral patients rather than moral agents and are presumed to be mentally incompetent. The capacity to make autonomous decisions, which is presumed in all other cases unless demonstrated otherwise, is stood on its head in physician-assisted suicide. Patients must prove their decisionmaking capacity from the outset. One of the most dramatic aspects of medicine's extended power over contemporary sensibilities has been precisely medicine's ability to mold our conceptions about dying. <u><mark>Subjecting the individual to medical</u></mark> <u><mark>norms</u></mark> in this way also <u><mark>introduces a tension</u></mark> for one of the central questions of liberal philosophers. If, as the liberal argument claims, the morality or immorality of decisions at the end of life rests on the competent patient's wishes rather than on a distinction between killing and allowing to die,26 protocols that may ultimately deny a patient's request for assistance in dying assert, in effect, that <u><mark>moral authority resides outside the patient's choice</u></mark>. And if medicine may, morally, reject patients’ autonomous requests for aid, in the context of physician-assisted suicide the <u><mark>value of patient autonomy becomes more rhetorical than real</u></mark>. Admittedly, even liberal theorists emphasize that there are limits to autonomy, and that like other important rights, the right to physician-assisted suicide is not absolute and can properly be restricted under certain circumstances. Indeed, Ronald Dworkin and others argue precisely that because autonomy must be protected and preserved physician-assisted suicide must be regulated. Under certain conditions the state has the power to override individual rights to protect patients from undue pressures, even internal ones.The tension remains, however. In the context of assisted suicide<u><mark>, how is it possible to reconcile the assertion that paternalistic influences are unacceptable </u></mark>with the concept <u><mark>that in</u></mark> <u><mark>some situations</u></mark> <u><mark>the state</u></mark> (or the medical establishment) <u><mark>may deny assistance in suicide</u></mark> in the name of “what it reasonably judges to be the best interest of the potential suicide”?27 Alexander Capron has argued that decisions on behalf of others should rest on a best interest standard of what the “‘average reasonable person’ would do under the given circumstances.”28 <u><mark>Doesn't this permit the tyranny of the majority over the individual</u></mark>? Doesn't this menace the right, so praised by liberal theorists, to exercise our singularities in a radical way? As Yale Kamisar has asked, “[I]f self-determination and autonomy is the major force driving the right to assisted suicide, why should a competent person's firm conclusion that life has become unendurable for her have to be ‘objectively reasonable’? <u><mark>Why should not a competent person's own evaluation of her situation suffice</u></mark>?”29 To phrase this in terms of the argument I make here, is it ever possible to reconcile medicalizing suicide with autonomy?</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Warren 15 (Calvin L. Warren, Assistant Professor of American Studies at Columbian College of Arts and Sciences, “Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope” p. 4-5) fulltext: The American dream, then, is realized through black suffering. It is the humiliated, incarcerated, mutilated, and terrorized black body that serves as the vestibule for the Democracy that is to come. In fact, it almost becomes impossible to think the Political without black suffering. According to this logic, corporeal fracture engenders ontological coherence, in a political arithmetic saturated with violence. Thus, nonviolence is a misnomer, or somewhat of a ruse. Black-sacrifice is necessary to achieve the American dream and its promise of coherence, progress, and equality. We find similar logic in the contemporary moment. Renisha McBride, Jordon Davis, Kody Ingham, Amadou Diallo, Aiyana Stanley-Jones, Frederick Jermain Carter, Chavis Carter, Timothy Stansbury, Hadiya Pendleton, Oscar Grant, Sean Bell, Kendrec McDade,Trayvon Martin, and Mike Brown, among others, constitute a fatal rupture of the Political; these signifiers, stained in blood, refuse the closure that the Political promises. They haunt political discourses of progress, betterment, equality, citizenship, and justice—the metaphysical organization of social existence. We are witnessing a shocking accumulation of injured and mutilated black bodies, particularly young black bodies, which place what seems to be an unanswerable question mark in the political field: if we are truly progressing toward this “society-that-is-to-come (maybe),” why is black suffering increasing at such alarming rates? In response to this inquiry, we are told to keep struggling, keep “hope” alive, and keep the faith. After George Zimmerman was acquitted for murdering Trayvon Martin, President Obama addressed the nation and importuned us to keep fighting for change because “each successive generation seems to be making progress in changing attitudes toward race” and, if we work hard enough, we will move closer to “becoming a more perfect union.” Despite Martin’s corpse lingering in the minds of young people and Zimmerman’s smile of relief after the verdict, we are told that things are actually getting better. Supposedly, the generation that murdered Trayvon Martin and Renisha McBride is much better than the generation that murdered Emmett Till. Black suffering, here, is instrumentalized to accomplish pedagogical, cathartic, and redemptive objectives and, somehow, the growing number of dead black bodies in the twenty-first century is an indication of our progress toward “perfection.” Is perfection predicated on black death? How many more black bodies must be lynched, mutilated, burned, castrated, raped, dismembered, shot, and disabled before we achieve this “more perfect union”? In many ways, black suffering and death become the premiere vehicles of political perfection and social maturation. This essay argues that the logic of the Political—linear temporality, biopolitical futurity, perfection, betterment, and redress—sustains black suffering. Progress and perfection are worked through the pained black body and any recourse to the Political and its discourse of hope will ultimately reproduce the very metaphysical structures of violence that pulverize black being. We are the fields of flesh, the wasted, the black sites until we return to darkness the black geographies Racial dumping becomes a synonym for black community McKittrick 14 The connection between geography and blackness is crucial to identifying some of the conditions under which race/racism are necessary to the production of space. The interplay between black experiences in the diaspora, past and present, and spatial organization, are tightly bound in two interconnected ways: black historical and contemporary su bjects have not only contributed to the strenuous physical production of space and place in the diaspora (through slave labor, indentured labor, and racially and sexually differentiated labor economies), they also have an investment in the meanings and makings of place due to racial displacement, forced exile, homelessness, rented and owned dwellings, poverty, integration, segregation, political sites, professionalization, community gatherings and locales, nationalism(s), activism, and globalization. The material physicality of the diaspora—I am thinking of plantations, houses, churches, streets, fields, factories, shops, museums, offices, and so forth—and the negotiation of racialized spaces within the diaspora advance the key ways black subjects have contributed to physical and imaginary geographic projects. Black women, men, and children have been, forcefully and not, implicated in the uneven development of space because overarching traditional geographic projects require that they be placed and displaced. That is, black subjects have to “go” and inhabit somewhere. Empirical analyses in particular illuminate the ways in which racial differences are reflected through material conditions and the impact of this upon geographic opportunities in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.27 Empirical studies, while differing in subject matter and method, show how patterns of racial domination are fundamentally geographic. Race becomes attached to place in detrimental ways because local conditions reify and naturalize identity-difference: black women live in “bad”/black neighborhoods, have unhealthy children, employment opportunities and resources, longer work days, and so on. Or: polluted + inexpensive regions = unhealthy/black dwellings = subhuman/sub-woman/bad-mother.28 Indeed, some (not all) empirical geographic studies tend to environmentally determine particular “races” in particular “places.” As critical geographer Don Mitchell notes, environmental determinism was one of the key ways some European and U.S. human geographers “scientifically” documented human differences and justified imperialist ambitions in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.29 And some current empirical studies, at least to me, evince and endorse this ongoing imperial project—albeit on subtler, sometimes less obvious “imperial” terms—by nodding to and reifying the overwhelming power of the naturalization of identity and place, the knowability of “different” bodies and their “different” attendant geographies. Importantly, how we know, write, and document space and place can contribute to processes of discriminatory, class-based racialization—again, ideas are turned into spaces: phenotype can reflect place and place can reflect phenotype. Or, why are all the black people living in that particular neighborhood? The socioeconomic mapping of blackness, the unjust and economically driven naturalization of difference, shows the material base of race/racism, the conditions under which many subaltern populations live and have lived, and the spatial constitution of socially produced categories. As mentioned, this mapping of blackness is also limiting and deterministic, in that it de-emphasizes other spatial experiences and imaginations that intersect with geographic materiality, affordability, and geometry. Black geographic togetherness and community ties also identify, for example, the sociocultural pull away from what bell hooks describes as terrifying and deathly representations of whiteness, or, the sociocultural pull into black spaces, such as familial-based migrations, cultural commitments, safe spaces, and the locations of churches, entertainment venues, and community and political organizations.30 But where “they” are, as indicative of who “they” are, continues to be powerfully connected to practices of subjugation. If systems of domination keep transparency operative and conceal other nontransparent activities (such as sites of resistance, geographies of human pain or love, locations of subversion, the place of the black everyday, or diasporic geographies), black subjects are bound up in the patterns that relegate and naturalize difference. The racialized and gendered subject—particularly those who occupy what Sylvia Wynter calls “poverty archipelagos” 13 (the underdeveloped, the jobless, the homeless, the throwaways), those who laboriously build, work, maintain, clean, protect, re-imagine, and resist landscapes of racial differentiation and denial—are also those who are at stake in the production of space and who have paradoxically been missing from several geographic analyses.31 A strong disciplinary synthesis asks that we think across and beyond the mapping of “man’s inhumanity to man” by noting the geographic outcome of expressing, living, and representing, together, “black geographies”—as they are intimately tied to geographic domination and as they are re-presenting space.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Stranded are those children of darkness, who don’t have the opportunity to engage this level of black knowledge or can ever wish to understand the sub community that debate already is these methodology is creating a pseudo-community within a sub community without thinking about the survivability of the black community as a whole </h4><p><strong>Warren 15 </strong>(Calvin L. Warren, Assistant Professor of American Studies at Columbian College of Arts and Sciences, “Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope” p. 4-5) </p><p><u><strong><mark>The American dream</mark>, then, <mark>is realized through black suffering. It is the humiliated, incarcerated, mutilated, and terrorized black body that serves as the vestibule for the Democracy that is to come</u></strong>.</mark> In fact, <u><strong>it almost becomes impossible to think the Political without black suffering.</u></strong> According to this logic, corporeal fracture engenders ontological coherence, in a political arithmetic saturated with violence. Thus, nonviolence is a misnomer, or somewhat of a ruse. <u><strong><mark>Black-sacrifice is necessary to achieve the American dream and its promise of coherence, progress, and equality</u></strong></mark>. We find similar logic in the contemporary moment. <u><strong><mark>Renisha McBride, Jordon Davis, Kody Ingham, Amadou Diallo, Aiyana Stanley-Jones, Frederick Jermain Carter, Chavis Carter, Timothy Stansbury, Hadiya Pendleton, Oscar Grant, Sean Bell, Kendrec McDade,Trayvon Martin, and Mike Brown</u></strong></mark>, among others, <u><strong><mark>constitute a fatal rupture of the Political; these signifiers, stained in blood, refuse the closure that the Political promises. They haunt political discourses of progress, </mark>betterment, equality, citizenship, and justice</u></strong>—the metaphysical organization of social existence. We are witnessing a shocking accumulation of injured and mutilated black bodies, particularly young black bodies, which place what seems to be an unanswerable question mark in the political field: <u><strong>if we are truly progressing toward this “society-that-is-to-come (</u></strong>maybe),” <u><strong>why is black suffering increasing at such alarming rates</u></strong>? In response to this inquiry, we are told to keep struggling, keep “hope” alive, and keep the faith. After George Zimmerman was acquitted for murdering Trayvon Martin, President Obama addressed the nation and importuned us to keep fighting for change because “each successive generation seems to be making progress in changing attitudes toward race” and, if we work hard enough, we will move closer to “becoming a more perfect union.” <u><strong>Despite Martin’s corpse lingering in the minds of young people and Zimmerman’s smile of relief after the verdict, <mark>we are told that things are actually getting better</u></strong>. <u><strong>Supposedly, the generation that murdered Trayvon Martin and Renisha McBride is much better than the generation that murdered Emmett Till</u></strong></mark>. Black suffering, here, is instrumentalized to accomplish pedagogical, cathartic, and redemptive objectives and, somehow, the growing number of dead black bodies in the twenty-first century is an indication of our progress toward “perfection.” Is perfection predicated on black death? How many more black bodies must be lynched, mutilated, burned, castrated, raped, dismembered, shot, and disabled before we achieve this “more perfect union”? In many ways<u><strong>, black <mark>suffering and death become the premiere vehicles of political perfection and </mark>social maturation</u></strong>. This essay argues that <u><strong>the logic of the Political—<mark>linear temporality, biopolitical futurity, perfection, betterment, and redress—sustains black suffering</mark>.</u></strong> Progress and perfection are worked through the pained black body and any recourse to the Political and <u><strong><mark>its discourse of hope will ultimately reproduce the very metaphysical structures of violence that pulverize black being</mark>.</p><p>We are the fields of flesh, the wasted, the<mark> black sites until we return to darkness the black geographies Racial dumping becomes a synonym for black community </p><p></mark>McKittrick 14</p><p><mark>The connection between geography and blackness is crucial</u></strong></mark> to identifying some of the conditions <u><strong>under which <mark>race/racism are necessary to the production of space</u></strong></mark>. The interplay between black experiences in the diaspora, past and present, and spatial organization, are tightly bound in two interconnected ways: <u><strong><mark>black</mark> historical and contemporary <mark>su bjects have</mark> not only <mark>contributed to</mark> the strenuous physical <mark>production of space and place</u></strong></mark> in the diaspora (<u><strong><mark>through slave labor</u></strong></mark>, indentured labor, <u><strong>and racially and sexually differentiated labor economies</u></strong>), they also have an investment in <u><strong>the meanings and makings of place due to <mark>racial displacement</u></strong>,</mark> forced exile<u><strong><mark>, homelessness</u></strong></mark>, rented and owned dwellings, <u><strong><mark>poverty</mark>, integration, <mark>segregation, political sites</u></strong></mark>, professionalization, <u><strong><mark>community gatherings</mark> and locales</u></strong>, nationalism(s), activism, and globalization. The material physicality of the diaspora—<u><strong>I am thinking of plantations, houses, churches, streets, fields, factories, shops, museums, offices, and so forth</u></strong>—and the negotiation of racialized spaces within the diaspora advance the key ways <u><strong><mark>black subjects</u></strong></mark> have <u><strong>contributed to physical and imaginary geographic projects. <mark>Black women, men, and children have been, forcefully</mark> </u></strong>and not, <u><strong><mark>implicated in</u></strong></mark> the uneven <u><strong><mark>development of space because</u></strong></mark> overarching traditional geographic projects require that they be placed and displaced. That is, <u><strong><mark>black subjects have to “go” and inhabit somewhere</mark>.</u></strong> Empirical analyses in particular illuminate the ways in which racial differences are reflected through material conditions and the impact of this upon geographic opportunities in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.27 Empirical studies, while differing in subject matter and method, show how patterns of racial domination are fundamentally geographic. <u><strong><mark>Race becomes attached to place</mark> in detrimental ways because local conditions reify and naturalize identity-difference: <mark>black women live in “bad”/black neighborhoods, have unhealthy children</u></strong></mark>, employment opportunities and resources, longer work days, and so on. Or: polluted + inexpensive regions = unhealthy/black dwellings = subhuman/sub-woman/bad-mother.28 Indeed, some (not all) <u><strong>empirical geographic studies</u></strong> tend to environmentally <u><strong>determine particular “races” in particular “places.”</u></strong> As critical geographer Don Mitchell notes, environmental determinism was one of the key ways some European and U.S. human geographers “scientifically” documented human differences and justified imperialist ambitions in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.29 And some <u><strong><mark>current empirical studies</mark>, at least to me, <mark>evince and endorse this ongoing imperial project</u></strong></mark>—albeit on subtler, sometimes less obvious “imperial” terms—by nodding to and reifying the <u><strong><mark>overwhelming power of the naturalization of identity and place, the knowability of “different” bodies</u></strong></mark> and their “different” attendant geographies. Importantly, <u><strong><mark>how we know, write, and document space and place can contribute to processes of</u></strong></mark> discriminatory, class-based <u><strong><mark>racialization</u></strong></mark>—again, <u><strong><mark>ideas are turned into spaces</mark>: phenotype can reflect place </u></strong>and place can reflect phenotype. Or, why are all the <u><strong>black people living in that </u></strong>particular <u><strong>neighborhood</u></strong>? The <u><strong><mark>socioeconomic mapping of blackness</u></strong></mark>, the unjust and economically driven naturalization of difference, shows the material base of race/racism, the conditions under which many subaltern populations live and have lived, and the spatial constitution of socially produced categories. As mentioned, <u><strong>this mapping of blackness is </u></strong>also <u><strong>limiting</u></strong> and deterministic, in that <u><strong>it <mark>de-emphasizes other spatial experiences and imaginations</u></strong></mark> that intersect with geographic materiality, affordability, and geometry<mark>. <u><strong>Black geographic togetherness and community ties also identify</u></strong></mark>, for example, <u><strong><mark>the sociocultural pull away</u></strong> <u><strong>from</u></strong></mark> what bell hooks describes as <u><strong><mark>terrifying and deathly representations of whiteness</mark>, or, <mark>the</mark> sociocultural <mark>pull into black spaces</mark>,</u></strong> such as familial-based migrations, cultural commitments, safe spaces, and the locations of churches, entertainment venues, and community and political organizations.30 But <u><strong>where “they” are, as indicative of who “they” are, continues to be powerfully connected to practices of subjugation</u></strong>. If systems of domination keep transparency operative and conceal other nontransparent activities (such as <u><strong><mark>sites of resistance, geographies of human pain or love, locations of subversion, the place of the black everyday</u></strong></mark>, or diasporic geographies), black subjects are bound up in the patterns that relegate and naturalize difference. The racialized and gendered subject—particularly those who occupy what Sylvia Wynter calls “poverty archipelagos” 13 (<u><strong><mark>the underdeveloped, the jobless, the homeless, the throwaways</u></strong>)</mark>, those who laboriously build, work, maintain, clean, protect, re-imagine, and <u><strong>resist landscapes of racial differentiation and denial—are also <mark>those who are at stake in the production of space and who have paradoxically been missing from several geographic analyses</u></strong></mark>.31 A strong disciplinary synthesis asks that we think across and beyond the mapping of “man’s inhumanity to man” by noting the geographic outcome of expressing, living, and representing, together, <u><strong><mark>“black geographies”</u></strong></mark>—as they <u><strong><mark>are</mark> intimately <mark>tied to</u></strong></mark> geographic <u><strong><mark>domination and as they are re-presenting space</u></strong>.</p></mark><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Nate Cohn 13, covers elections, polling and demographics for The Upshot, a Times politics and policy site. Previously, he was a staff writer for The New Republic. Before entering journalism, he was a research assistant and Scoville Fellow at the Stimson Center “Improving the Norms and Practices of Policy Debate,” Nov 24, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php/topic,5416.0.html fulltext: So let me offer another possibility: the problem isn’t the topic, but modern policy debate. The unrealistic scenarios, exclusive focus on policy scholarship, inability to engage systemic impacts and philosophical questions. And so long as these problems characterize modern policy debate, teams will feel compelled to avoid it.¶ It might be tempting to assign the blame to “USFG should.” But these are bugs, not features of plan-focused, USFG-based, active voice topics. These bugs result from practices and norms that were initially and independently reasonable, but ultimately and collectively problematic. I also believe that these norms can and should be contested. I believe it would be possible for me to have a realistic, accessible, and inclusive discussion about the merits of a federal policy with, say, Amber Kelsie. Or put differently, I’m not sure I agree with Jonah that changing the topic is the only way to avoid being “a bunch of white folks talking about nuke war.”¶ The fact that policy debate is wildly out of touch—the fact that we are “a bunch of white folks talking about nuclear war”—is a damning indictment of nearly every coach in this activity. It’s a serious indictment of the successful policy debate coaches, who have been content to continue a pedagogically unsound game, so long as they keep winning. It’s a serious indictment of policy debate’s discontents who chose to disengage. ¶ That’s not to say there hasn’t been any effort to challenge modern policy debate on its own terms—just that they’ve mainly come from the middle of the bracket and weren’t very successful, focusing on morality arguments and various “predictions bad” claims to outweigh. ¶ Judges were receptive to the sentiment that disads were unrealistic, but negative claims to specificity always triumphed over generic epistemological questions or arguments about why “predictions fail.” The affirmative rarely introduced substantive responses to the disadvantage, rarely read impact defense. All considered, the negative generally won a significant risk that the plan resulted in nuclear war. Once that was true, it was basically impossible to win that some moral obligation outweighed the (dare I say?) obligation to avoid a meaningful risk of extinction.¶ There were other problems. Many of the small affirmatives were unstrategic—teams rarely had solvency deficits to generic counterplans. It was already basically impossible to win that some morality argument outweighed extinction; it was totally untenable to win that a moral obligation outweighed a meaningful risk of extinction; it made even less sense if the counterplan solved most of the morality argument. The combined effect was devastating: As these debates are currently argued and judged, I suspect that the negative would win my ballot more than 95 percent of the time in a debate between two teams of equal ability.¶ But even if a “soft left” team did better—especially by making solvency deficits and responding to the specifics of the disadvantage—I still think they would struggle. They could compete at the highest levels, but, in most debates, judges would still assess a small, but meaningful risk of a large scale conflict, including nuclear war and extinction. The risk would be small, but the “magnitude” of the impact would often be enough to outweigh a higher probability, smaller impact. Or put differently: policy debate still wouldn’t be replicating a real world policy assessment, teams reading small affirmatives would still be at a real disadvantage with respect to reality. . ¶ Why? Oddly, this is the unreasonable result of a reasonable part of debate: the burden of refutation or rejoinder, the responsibility of debaters to “beat” arguments. If I introduce an argument, it starts out at 100 percent—you then have to disprove it. That sounds like a pretty good idea in principle, right? Well, I think so too. But it’s really tough to refute something down to “zero” percent—a team would need to completely and totally refute an argument. That’s obviously tough to do, especially since the other team is usually going to have some decent arguments and pretty good cards defending each component of their disadvantage—even the ridiculous parts. So one of the most fundamental assumptions about debate all but ensures a meaningful risk of nearly any argument—even extremely low-probability, high magnitude impacts, sufficient to outweigh systemic impacts. ¶ There’s another even more subtle element of debate practice at play. Traditionally, the 2AC might introduce 8 or 9 cards against a disadvantage, like “non-unique, no-link, no-impact,” and then go for one and two. Yet in reality, disadvantages are underpinned by dozens or perhaps hundreds of discrete assumptions, each of which could be contested. By the end of the 2AR, only a handful are under scrutiny; the majority of the disadvantage is conceded, and it’s tough to bring the one or two scrutinized components down to “zero.”¶ And then there’s a bad understanding of probability. If the affirmative questions four or five elements of the disadvantage, but the negative was still “clearly ahead” on all five elements, most judges would assess that the negative was “clearly ahead” on the disadvantage. In reality, the risk of the disadvantage has been reduced considerably. If there was, say, an 80 percent chance that immigration reform would pass, an 80 percent chance that political capital was key, an 80 percent chance that the plan drained a sufficient amount of capital, an 80 percent chance that immigration reform was necessary to prevent another recession, and an 80 percent chance that another recession would cause a nuclear war (lol), then there’s a 32 percent chance that the disadvantage caused nuclear war. ¶ I think these issues can be overcome. First, I think teams can deal with the “burden of refutation” by focusing on the “burden of proof,” which allows a team to mitigate an argument before directly contradicting its content. ¶ Here’s how I’d look at it: modern policy debate has assumed that arguments start out at “100 percent” until directly refuted. But few, if any, arguments are supported by evidence consistent with “100 percent.” Most cards don’t make definitive claims. Even when they do, they’re not supported by definitive evidence—and any reasonable person should assume there’s at least some uncertainty on matters other than few true facts, like 2+2=4.¶ Take Georgetown’s immigration uniqueness evidence from Harvard. It says there “may be a window” for immigration. So, based on the negative’s evidence, what are the odds that immigration reform will pass? Far less than 50 percent, if you ask me. That’s not always true for every card in the 1NC, but sometimes it’s even worse—like the impact card, which is usually a long string of “coulds.” If you apply this very basic level of analysis to each element of a disadvantage, and correctly explain math (.4*.4*.4*.4*.4=.01024), the risk of the disadvantage starts at a very low level, even before the affirmative offers a direct response. ¶ Debaters should also argue that the negative hasn’t introduced any evidence at all to defend a long list of unmentioned elements in the “internal link chain.” The absence of evidence to defend the argument that, say, “recession causes depression,” may not eliminate the disadvantage, but it does raise uncertainty—and it doesn’t take too many additional sources of uncertainty to reduce the probability of the disadvantage to effectively zero—sort of the static, background noise of prediction.¶ Now, I do think it would be nice if a good debate team would actually do the work—talk about what the cards say, talk about the unmentioned steps—but I think debaters can make these observations at a meta-level (your evidence isn’t certain, lots of undefended elements) and successfully reduce the risk of a nuclear war or extinction to something indistinguishable from zero. It would not be a factor in my decision.¶ Based on my conversations with other policy judges, it may be possible to pull it off with even less work. They might be willing to summarily disregard “absurd” arguments, like politics disadvantages, on the grounds that it’s patently unrealistic, that we know the typical burden of rejoinder yields unrealistic scenarios, and that judges should assess debates in ways that produce realistic assessments. I don’t think this is too different from elements of Jonah Feldman’s old philosophy, where he basically said “when I assessed 40 percent last year, it’s 10 percent now.”¶ Honestly, I was surprised that the few judges I talked to were so amenable to this argument. For me, just saying “it’s absurd, and you know it” wouldn’t be enough against an argument in which the other team invested considerable time. The more developed argument about accurate risk assessment would be more convincing, but I still think it would be vulnerable to a typical defense of the burden of rejoinder. ¶ To be blunt: I want debaters to learn why a disadvantage is absurd, not just make assertions that conform to their preexisting notions of what’s realistic and what’s not. And perhaps more importantly for this discussion, I could not coach a team to rely exclusively on this argument—I’m not convinced that enough judges are willing to discount a disadvantage on “it’s absurd.” Nonetheless, I think this is a useful “frame” that should preface a following, more robust explanation of why the risk of the disadvantage is basically zero—even before a substantive response is offered.¶ There are other, broad genres of argument that can contest the substance of the negative’s argument. There are serious methodological indictments of the various forms of knowledge production, from journalistic reporting to think tanks to quantitative social science. Many of our most strongly worded cards come from people giving opinions, for which they offer very little data or evidence. And even when “qualified” people are giving predictions, there’s a great case to be extremely skeptical without real evidence backing it up. The world is a complicated place, predictions are hard, and most people are wrong. And again, this is before contesting the substance of the negative’s argument(!)—if deemed necessary.¶ So, in my view, the low probability scenario is waiting to be eliminated from debate, basically as soon as a capable team tries to do it.¶ That would open to the door to all of the arguments, previously excluded, de facto, by the prevalence of nuclear war impacts. It’s been tough to talk about racism or gender violence, since modest measures to mitigate these impacts have a difficult time outweighing a nuclear war. It’s been tough to discuss ethical policy making, since it’s hard to argue that any commitment to philosophical or ethical purity should apply in the face of an existential risk. It’s been tough to introduce unconventional forms of evidence, since they can’t really address the probability of nuclear war.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Current debate reverses the logical burden of proof by assuming 100% risk of an argument once it is presented instead of requiring the DA to be built from a presumption of zero risk. This distorts debate’s potential to meaningfully speak on issues like <u>ableism</u> that never appears in the neg decision calculus.</h4><p>Nate <strong>Cohn 13</strong>, covers elections, polling and demographics for The Upshot, a Times politics and policy site. Previously, he was a staff writer for The New Republic. Before entering journalism, he was a research assistant and Scoville Fellow at the Stimson Center “Improving the Norms and Practices of Policy Debate,” Nov 24, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php/topic,5416.0.html </p><p>So let me offer another possibility: <u>the problem is</u>n’t the topic, but <u>modern policy debate</u>. <u>The <mark>unrealistic scenarios</mark>,</u> exclusive focus on policy scholarship, <u><mark>inability to engage systemic impacts</mark> and philosophical questions</u>. And so long as these problems characterize modern policy debate, teams will feel compelled to avoid it.¶ It might be tempting to assign the blame to “USFG should.” But these are bugs, not features of plan-focused, USFG-based, active voice topics. These bugs result from practices and norms that were initially and independently reasonable, but ultimately and collectively problematic. I also believe that these norms can and should be contested. I believe it would be possible for me to have a realistic, accessible, and inclusive discussion about the merits of a federal policy with, say, Amber Kelsie. Or put differently, I’m not sure I agree with Jonah that changing the topic is the only way to avoid being “a bunch of white folks talking about nuke war.”¶ The fact that policy debate is wildly out of touch—<u>the fact that we are “a bunch of white folks talking about nuclear war”—is </u>a damning indictment of nearly every coach in this activity. It’s <u>a serious indictment of the successful policy debate</u> coaches, who have been content to continue a pedagogically unsound game, so long as they keep winning. It’s a serious indictment of policy debate’s discontents who chose to disengage. ¶ That’s not to say there hasn’t been any effort to challenge modern policy debate on its own terms—just that they’ve mainly come from the middle of the bracket and weren’t very successful, focusing on morality arguments and various “predictions bad” claims to outweigh. ¶ <u>Judges were receptive to the sentiment that disads were unrealistic, but negative claims to specificity always triumphed over generic epistemological questions or arguments about why “predictions fail</u>.” The affirmative rarely introduced substantive responses to the disadvantage, rarely read impact defense. <u>All considered, the negative generally won a significant risk that the plan resulted in nuclear war. Once that was true, it was basically impossible to win that some moral obligation outweighed the (dare I say?) obligation to avoid a meaningful risk of extinction</u>.¶ There were other problems. Many of the small affirmatives were unstrategic—teams rarely had solvency deficits to generic counterplans. It was already basically impossible to win that some morality argument outweighed extinction; <u><mark>it was totally untenable to win that</mark> a moral <mark>obligation outweighed </mark>a meaningful risk of <mark>extinction; it made even less sense if the counterplan solved</mark> most of the morality argument. The combined effect was devastating:</u> As these debates are currently argued and judged, <u>I suspect that the negative would win my ballot more than 95 percent of the time in a debate between two teams of equal ability.</u>¶ But even if a “soft left” team did better—especially by making solvency deficits and responding to the specifics of the disadvantage—I still think they would struggle. They could compete at the highest levels, but, <u>in most debates, judges would still assess a small, but meaningful risk of a large scale conflict, including nuclear war and extinction</u>. <u>The risk would be small, but the “magnitude” of the impact would often be enough to outweigh a higher probability, smaller impact</u>. <u>Or put differently: <strong><mark>policy debate still wouldn’t be replicating</mark> a <mark>real world policy assessment</u></strong></mark>, teams reading small affirmatives would still be at a real disadvantage with respect to reality. . ¶ Why? Oddly<u>, this is the unreasonable result of a reasonable part of debate: the burden of refutation or rejoinder, the responsibility of debaters to “beat” arguments.</u> <u><mark>If I introduce an argument, it starts out at 100 percent</mark>—you then have to disprove it. That sounds like a pretty good idea in principle, right?</u> Well, I think so too. <u>But <mark>it’s really tough to refute something down to “zero”</mark> percent</u>—<u>a team would need to completely and totally refute an argument. That’s obviously tough to do</u>, especially since the other team is usually going to have some decent arguments and pretty good cards defending each component of their disadvantage—even the ridiculous parts<u>. So one of the most fundamental assumptions about debate all but ensures a meaningful risk of nearly any argument—even extremely low-probability, high magnitude impacts, sufficient to outweigh systemic impacts. </u>¶ <u>There’s another even more subtle element of debate practice at play. </u>Traditionally, <u>the 2AC might introduce 8 or 9 cards against a disadvantage, like “non-unique, no-link, no-impact,” and then go for one and two</u>. <u>Yet in reality, <mark>disadvantages are <strong>underpinned by</mark> dozens or perhaps <mark>hundreds of discrete assumptions</strong></mark>,</u> <u>each of which could be contested</u>. <u><mark>By the end of the 2AR, only a handful are under scrutiny</mark>; the majority of the disadvantage is conceded, <mark>and it’s tough to bring</mark> the one or two scrutinized <mark>components <strong>down to “zero</mark>.”</u></strong>¶ And <u><strong>then <mark>there’s a bad understanding of probability</u></strong></mark>. <u>If the affirmative questions four or five elements of the disadvantage, but the negative was still “clearly ahead” on all five elements, most judges would assess that the negative was “clearly ahead” on the disadvantage</u>. <u><strong>In reality</u></strong>, <u>the risk of the disadvantage has been reduced considerably</u>. <u><mark>If there was</mark>, say, an <mark>80 percent chance that</mark> immigration <mark>reform would pass</mark>, an <mark>80 percent chance</mark> that political <mark>capital was key</mark>, an <mark>80 percent chance</mark> that <mark>the plan drained</mark> a sufficient amount of <mark>capital</mark>, an 80 percent chance that immigration reform was necessary to prevent another recession, and an 80 percent chance that another recession would cause a nuclear war (lol),</u> <u><strong><mark>then there’s a 32 percent chance that the disad</mark>vantage <mark>caused nuc</mark>lear <mark>war</mark>. </u></strong>¶ I think <u>these issues can be overcome</u>. First, I think <u>teams can deal with the “burden of refutation” by focusing on the “burden of proof,” which allows a team to mitigate an argument before directly contradicting its content</u>. ¶ Here’s how I’d look at it<u>: modern policy debate has assumed that arguments start out at “100 percent” until directly refuted. But few, if any, arguments are supported by evidence consistent with “100 percent.”</u> <u><mark>Most cards don’t make definitive claims</mark>. Even when they do, they’re not supported by definitive evidence—and any reasonable person should assume there’s at least some uncertainty on matters other than few true facts, like 2+2=4.</u>¶ <u>Take Georgetown’s immigration uniqueness evidence</u> from Harvard<u>. It says there “may be a window” for immigration. So, based on the negative’s evidence, what are the odds that immigration reform will pass? Far less than 50 percent, if you ask me. That’s not always true for every card in the 1NC, but sometimes it’s even worse—like the impact card, which is usually a long string of “coulds.”</u> <u>If you apply this very basic level of analysis to each element of a disadvantage, and <strong>correctly explain math</u></strong> (.4*.4*.4*.4*.4<u>=.<strong>01024),</strong> <mark>the risk of the disadvantage starts at a very low level, <strong>even before the affirmative offers a direct response.</mark> ¶</u></strong> Debaters should also argue that the negative hasn’t introduced any evidence at all to defend a long list of unmentioned elements in the “internal link chain<u>.” <mark>The absence of evidence</mark> to defend the argument that, say, “recession causes depression,” may not eliminate the disadvantage, but it <mark>does raise uncertainty</u></mark>—<u><mark>and<strong> it doesn’t take too many additional sources of uncertainty to reduce the probability </mark>of the disadvantage <mark>to effectively zero</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>sort of the static, background noise of prediction.¶</u></strong> Now, I do think it would be nice if a good debate team would actually do the work—talk about what the cards say, talk about the unmentioned steps—but I think <u><mark>debaters can make these observations </mark>at a meta-level</u> (your evidence isn’t certain, lots of undefended elements) <u><mark>and <strong>successfully reduce the risk of a nuclear war or extinction to something indistinguishable from zero</u></strong></mark>. It would not be a factor in my decision.¶ <u>Based on my conversations with other policy judges</u>, it may be possible to pull it off with even less work. <u>They might be willing to summarily disregard “absurd” arguments, like politics disadvantages, on the grounds that it’s patently unrealistic, that we know the typical burden of rejoinder yields unrealistic scenarios, and that <mark>judges should assess debates in ways that produce realistic assessments</u></mark>. I don’t think this is too different from elements of Jonah Feldman’s old philosophy, where he basically said “when I assessed 40 percent last year, it’s 10 percent now.”¶ Honestly, I was surprised that <u>the few judges I talked to were so amenable to this argument</u>. For me, just saying “it’s absurd, and you know it” wouldn’t be enough against an argument in which the other team invested considerable time. The more developed argument about accurate risk assessment would be more convincing, but I still think it would be vulnerable to a typical defense of the burden of rejoinder. ¶ To be blunt: I want debaters to learn why a disadvantage is absurd, not just make assertions that conform to their preexisting notions of what’s realistic and what’s not. And perhaps more importantly for this discussion, I could not coach a team to rely exclusively on this argument—I’m not convinced that enough judges are willing to discount a disadvantage on “it’s absurd.” Nonetheless, I think <u>this is a useful “frame” that should preface a following, more robust explanation of why the risk of the disadvantage is basically zero</u>—even before a substantive response is offered.¶ There are other, broad genres of argument that can contest the substance of the negative’s argument. <u>There are serious methodological indictments of the various forms of knowledge production, from journalistic reporting to think tanks to quantitative social science. Many of our most strongly worded cards come from people giving opinions, for which they offer very little data or evidence. And even when “qualified” people are giving predictions, there’s a great case to be extremely skeptical without real evidence backing it up.</u> <u><strong><mark>The world is</mark> a <mark>complicated</mark> place, <mark>predictions are hard, and most people are wrong</strong></mark>. And again, this is before contesting the substance of the negative’s argument(!</u>)—if deemed necessary.¶ So, in my view, <u><mark>the low probability scenario is waiting to be eliminated from debate</u></mark>, <u><strong>basically <mark>as soon as a capable team tries to do it</mark>.¶</u></strong> <u><mark>That would open to the door to all of the arguments, previously excluded, de facto, by</mark> the prevalence of <mark>nuclear war</mark> impacts. It’s been tough to talk about racism or gender violence, since modest measures to mitigate these impacts have a difficult time outweighing a nuclear war.</u> <u><strong><mark>It’s been tough to discuss ethical policy making</u></strong>, <u>since it’s hard to argue that any commitment</mark> to philosophical or ethical purity <mark>should apply in the face of an existential risk</u></mark>. It’s been tough to introduce unconventional forms of evidence, since they can’t really address the probability of nuclear war. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Brandon K. Yoder, 2019, Ph.D. in political science from the University of Virginia, is currently a research fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore specializing in international security and politics of China and East Asia, “Uncertainty, Shifting Power and Credible Signals in US-China Relations: Why the “Thucydides Trap” Is Real, but Limited”, Journal of Chinese Political Science, pgs. 16-19 fulltext: In recent years, a radical overcorrection appears to have taken place among many American scholars and policymakers, exemplified by Allison (2017), who have expressed increasingly confident beliefs that China’s intentions are hostile to the US (e.g., Shambaugh 2017; Friedberg 2018; Campbell and Ratner 2018; Landler 2018; Feigenbaum 2018). These beliefs are especially pronounced within the Trump administration but have now also been expressed many foreign policymakers from previous administrations and more traditional experts on US-China relations. This increasing pessimism has two sources, neither of which is well-founded. The first is categorical assumptions about the behavior of rising states or authoritarian states in general. Many realist scholars assume that China’s intentions are hostile to US interests because the anarchic nature of the international system engenders inexorable zero-sum competition for power (e.g., Layne 2008; Mearsheimer 2010), a logically-untenable claim that has been roundly refuted.4 Others assume that divergences in American and Chinese political values and regime types necessarily imply incompatible preferences for the international order at the systemic level (Friedberg 2011; Navarro and Autry 2011; Pillsbury 2014; Allison 2017). Yet as has been widely recognized, these particular variables are themselves indeterminate, and interact with many other domestic-level factors to determine China’s aggregate national preferences for the international order (Edelstein 2002; Legro 2007:521; Steinberg and O’Hanlon 2015:44). Indeed, China may very well (though not necessarily) prefer to maintain the status quo order from which it has so overwhelmingly benefitted (e.g., Christensen 2006, 2015:xix; Shambaugh 2005; Ikenberry 2008; Schweller and Pu 2011). Secondly, other observers have extrapolated from China’s increased "assertiveness" on regional territorial issues since 2009 to conclude that China’s intentions are broadly revisionist across all issue areas (e.g., Deudney and Ikenberry 2018; Campbell and Ratner 2018; Economist 2018). The apparent rationale is that because China had previously exhibited cooperative behavior regarding the SCS and restraint toward Taiwan that its cooperation with the international economic order must similarly be misrepresenting its true goals (Mastro 2014; Friedberg 2014; Pei 2014). As such, an increasingly common conclusion is that China’s initiation of new regional institutions such as the AIIB and BRI and its state-led industrial policies, large current-account surplus, sovereign lending, and expanding FDI are evidence of its preference for a less liberalized international economic order.5 This conclusion is unwarranted, however. Although the scholarly consensus now holds that China was previously misrepresenting its true goals on certain narrow issues, China has yet to exhibit clearly revisionist behavior regarding the rules and norms of the liberal international order more generally, even as it has become more powerful (Swaine 2011; Nathan and Scobell 2012; Schweller and Pu 2012; Shambaugh 2013; Steinberg and O’Hanlon 2014; Christensen 2015). As Alastair Iain Johnston has convincingly argued, China’s "assertive turn" is almost entirely limited to the South China Sea, and does not extend to the broader international order: "one should be cautious about generalizing from these maritime disputes to Chinese foreign policy writ large...it is possible for a state to be newly assertive on some limited range of issues while leaving other major policies unchanged" (Johnston 2013:46). Furthermore, Christensen points out that even when China’s actions are noncooperative — e.g., by gaining advantageous financing from Chinese state-owned banks for foreign energy deals, stealing intellectual property, computer hacking, or "dumping" exports to gain market share — this does not constitute rewriting the existing rules of the international order. "It simply constitutes free-riding on existing rules, an entirely different kettle of fish" (Christensen 2015:57). Particularly in the economic realm, China has sustained and even increased its support for the rules and institutions that define the status quo order, continuing to champion economic liberalization even as American leadership has wavered under President Donald Trump. China’s institutional initiatives, such as the AIIB and BRI, as well as its increased influence in existing institutions, have so far served to augment the existing rules and norms of the U.S.- led order rather than challenge them. Furthermore, China has continued to pursue domestic economic reforms that would increase its cooperation regarding trade imbalances, intellectual property and cybersecurity (Dollar 2015; Parameswaran 2016; Chan 2016; Drezner 2017). Disturbingly, the Trump administration has overtly drawn on the flawed assumptions characterized above and expressed confident beliefs that China’s intentions are hostile. According to the 2017 US National Security Strategy, China is a "revisionist power" that "want[s] to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests...seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor" and is "attempting to erode American security and prosperity" (Trump 2017).6 Several of Trump’s most prominent foreign policy and economic advisers have written extensively on China’s hostility, cast China as the primary threat to US national security and economic wellbeing, and characterized war with China as inevitable and perhaps even desirable (Navarro and Autry 2011; Reilly and Heath 2017; Landler 2018). Correspondingly, the administration has begun to implement policies of economic containment toward China, levelling over 200 billion dollars of tariffs on Chinese imports (and counting), blocking Chinese FDI in the United States, and demanding that China increase imports of US goods to reduce the bilateral trade imbalance to specific thresholds. Ironically, the Trump administration’s hedging strategy now lends considerable credibility to China’s sustained economic and institutional cooperation. Yet that very hedging strategy is likely driven by unjustified and inflexible pessimism about China’s intentions, making it unlikely that the current leadership will draw the right lessons from China’s subsequent behavioral signals. To the extent that China continues to defend and advocate a rules-based liberal economic order in the face of Trump’s economic hedging, this constitutes a much more credible signal of China’s benign intentions than did its previous cooperation under unconditional US accommodation. Unfortunately, the Trump administration’s apparent confidence about China’s hostility, based on seriously flawed assumptions, does not portend that the current leadership is likely positively update its beliefs should China continue its general cooperation within the existing international order. Nor does Trump’s narcissistic psychological profile or the track record of his administration’s policymaking process, which has consistently twisted evidence to support preconceived beliefs and suppressed contrary opinions (McDermott 2018). Thus, current US foreign policy turns the logic of hedging on its head: rather than hedging due to uncertainty, policymakers have assumed China’s hostility and adopted policies of containment in response. This implies that if the Thucydides trap produces war between the US and a truly benign China, it will not be due to rational uncertainty, but rather because American leaders fail to rationally update their beliefs in response to China’s cooperative signals and instead falsely assume China’s intentions to be hostile.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>4. Not revisionist—their assumptions cause US-China war</h4><p>Brandon K. <strong>Yoder</strong>, <strong>2019</strong>, Ph.D. in political science from the University of Virginia, is currently a research fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore specializing in international security and politics of China and East Asia, “Uncertainty, Shifting Power and Credible Signals in US-China Relations: Why the “Thucydides Trap” Is Real, but Limited”, Journal of Chinese Political Science, pgs. 16-19</p><p><u><strong>In recent years, a radical overcorrection appears to have taken place among <mark>many</mark> American <mark>scholars </mark>and policymakers</u></strong>, exemplified by Allison (2017), who have <u><strong><mark>express</mark>ed increasingly confident <mark>beliefs that China’s intentions are hostile</mark> to the US</u></strong> (e.g., Shambaugh 2017; Friedberg 2018; Campbell and Ratner 2018; Landler 2018; Feigenbaum 2018). <u><strong>These beliefs are especially pronounced within the Trump administration</u></strong> but have now also been expressed many foreign policymakers from previous administrations and more traditional experts on US-China relations. <u><strong>This increasing pessimism has two sources, neither of which is well-founded.</u></strong> <u><strong>The first is categorical assumptions about the behavior of rising states or authoritarian states in general</u></strong>. <u><strong>Many realist scholars <mark>assume</mark> that China’s intentions are hostile to US interests because the anarchic nature of the international system engenders <mark>inexorable zero-sum competition</mark> for power</u></strong> (e.g., Layne 2008; Mearsheimer 2010), <u><strong><mark>a logically-untenable claim </mark>that has been roundly refuted</u></strong>.4 <u><strong>Others assume that <mark>divergences in</mark> American and Chinese <mark>political values and regime types</mark> necessarily imply incompatible preferences for the international order at the systemic level</u></strong> (Friedberg 2011; Navarro and Autry 2011; Pillsbury 2014; Allison 2017). Yet <u><strong>as has been widely recognized, these particular variables are themselves indeterminate, and interact with many other domestic-level factors to determine China’s aggregate national preferences for the international order</u></strong> (Edelstein 2002; Legro 2007:521; Steinberg and O’Hanlon 2015:44). Indeed, China may very well (though not necessarily) prefer to maintain the status quo order from which it has so overwhelmingly benefitted (e.g., Christensen 2006, 2015:xix; Shambaugh 2005; Ikenberry 2008; Schweller and Pu 2011). Secondly, <u><strong>other observers have extrapolated from China’s increased "assertiveness" on regional territorial issues since 2009 to conclude that China’s intentions are broadly revisionist across all issue areas</u></strong> (e.g., Deudney and Ikenberry 2018; Campbell and Ratner 2018; Economist 2018). The apparent rationale is that because China had previously exhibited cooperative behavior regarding the SCS and restraint toward Taiwan that its cooperation with the international economic order must similarly be misrepresenting its true goals (Mastro 2014; Friedberg 2014; Pei 2014). As such, an increasingly common conclusion is that China’s initiation of new regional institutions such as the AIIB and BRI and its state-led industrial policies, large current-account surplus, sovereign lending, and expanding FDI are evidence of its preference for a less liberalized international economic order.5 This conclusion is unwarranted, however. Although the scholarly consensus now holds that China was previously misrepresenting its true goals on certain narrow issues, <u><strong><mark>China has yet to exhibit </mark>clearly <mark>revisionist behavior regarding the </mark>rules and norms of the liberal <mark>international order</mark> more generally, even as it has become more powerful</u></strong> (Swaine 2011; Nathan and Scobell 2012; Schweller and Pu 2012; Shambaugh 2013; Steinberg and O’Hanlon 2014; Christensen 2015). As Alastair Iain Johnston has convincingly argued, China’s "assertive turn" is almost entirely limited to the South China Sea, and does not extend to the broader international order: "one should be cautious about generalizing from these maritime disputes to Chinese foreign policy writ large...it is possible for a state to be newly assertive on some limited range of issues while leaving other major policies unchanged" (Johnston 2013:46).<u><strong> Furthermore, Christensen points out that even when China’s actions are noncooperative</u></strong> — e.g., by gaining advantageous financing from Chinese state-owned banks for foreign energy deals, stealing intellectual property, computer hacking, or "dumping" exports to gain market share — <u><strong>this does not constitute rewriting the existing rules of the international order</u></strong>. "It simply constitutes free-riding on existing rules, an entirely different kettle of fish" (Christensen 2015:57). Particularly in the economic realm, China has sustained and even increased its support for the rules and institutions that define the status quo order, continuing to champion economic liberalization even as American leadership has wavered under President Donald Trump. China’s institutional initiatives, such as the AIIB and BRI, as well as its increased influence in existing institutions, have so far served to augment the existing rules and norms of the U.S.- led order rather than challenge them. <u><strong>Furthermore, <mark>China has continued</mark> to pursue <mark>domestic</mark> economic <mark>reforms that would increase</mark> its <mark>cooperation</mark> regarding trade imbalances, intellectual property and cybersecurity</u></strong> (Dollar 2015; Parameswaran 2016; Chan 2016; Drezner 2017). <u><strong>Disturbingly, the <mark>Trump </mark>administration <mark>has </mark>overtly <mark>drawn on </mark>the <mark>flawed assumptions</mark> characterized above and expressed confident beliefs that China’s intentions are hostile.</u></strong> According to the 2017 US National Security Strategy<u><strong>, China is a "revisionist power" that "want[s] to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests...seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region</u></strong>, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, <u><strong>and reorder the region in its favor</u></strong>" and is "attempting to erode American security and prosperity" (Trump 2017).6 <u><strong><mark>Several</mark> of Trump’s most prominent <mark>foreign policy </mark>and economic <mark>advisers</u></strong></mark> have written extensively on China’s hostility, <u><strong><mark>cast China as the primary threat</mark> to US national security and economic wellbeing, and <mark>characterized war</mark> with China <mark>as inevitable </mark>and perhaps even desirable</u></strong> (Navarro and Autry 2011; Reilly and Heath 2017; Landler 2018). Correspondingly, the administration has begun to implement policies of economic containment toward China, levelling over 200 billion dollars of tariffs on Chinese imports (and counting), blocking Chinese FDI in the United States, and demanding that China increase imports of US goods to reduce the bilateral trade imbalance to specific thresholds<u><strong>. Ironically, the Trump administration’s hedging strategy now lends considerable credibility to China’s sustained economic and institutional cooperation</u></strong>. Yet <u><strong>that very <mark>hedging strategy is</mark> likely <mark>driven by</mark> unjustified and <mark>inflexible pessimism</mark> about China’s intentions, <mark>making it unlikely that </mark>the current <mark>leaders</mark>hip<mark> will draw the right lessons from China’s </mark>subsequent <mark>behavior</mark>al signals</u></strong>. To the extent that China continues to defend and advocate a rules-based liberal economic order in the face of Trump’s economic hedging, this constitutes a much more credible signal of China’s benign intentions than did its previous cooperation under unconditional US accommodation. Unfortunately, <u><strong>the Trump administration’s apparent confidence about China’s hostility, based on seriously flawed assumptions, does not portend that the current leadership is likely positively update its beliefs should China continue its general cooperation within the existing international order</u></strong>. Nor does Trump’s narcissistic psychological profile or the track record of his administration’s policymaking process, which has consistently twisted evidence to support preconceived beliefs and suppressed contrary opinions (McDermott 2018). Thus, <u><strong>current US foreign policy turns the logic of hedging on its head: rather than hedging due to uncertainty, <mark>policymakers have assumed China’s hostility and adopted policies of containment</mark> in response. This implies that <mark>if the Thucydides trap produces war</mark> between the US and a truly benign China, <mark>it will not be due to rational uncertainty, but</mark> rather because <mark>American leaders fail to</mark> rationally <mark>update their beliefs</mark> in response <mark>to China’s cooperative signals</mark> and instead falsely assume China’s intentions to be hostile.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Jonathan Lea [specialist corporate and commercial solicitor who has over 11 years of experience at both large international City firms and smaller practices]. “Why Foreign Aid Is Harmful.” March 19, 2015. https://www.jonathanlea.net/2015/why-foreign-aid-is-harmful/ fulltext: Increased Corruption One of the most frequent criticisms of foreign aid is how it fuels rampant corruption in the countries that receive it. Money that the UK government markets to the gullible electorate as being destined to help the destitute in the third world actually ends up creating and supporting inorganic, bloated and unnecessary bureaucracies in the form of both the recipient country governments and the donor-funded NGOs. The net result of this is to make it all too easy for the funds to be used for anything, save for what their developmental purpose should be, or what products and services would otherwise be supplied in an open market. Increased Bureaucracy The economic environment that created aid bureaucracies has therefore built unproductive organisations that define their output as money disbursed rather than service delivered, produce many low-return observable outputs like glossy reports and “frameworks” that can be used to justify their spending and put enormous demands on those with scarce administrative skills in poor countries who could otherwise be engaged in doing something useful. This growing phalanx of corrupt, meddling, unaccountable and overpaid bureaucrats imposed on countries thus makes it very hard for local businesses and wealth creating activities to develop as the imposition of these parasitical alien administrations not only hoover up and corrupt the brightest and most dynamic of the host population but also spin a suffocating web of rules and regulations devoid from any local business context. Increased Debt The significant debt burdens of less developed countries have often been incurred as a result of the foreign aid packages pushed by wealthier countries and Western institutions and pursued by corrupt and greedy politicians and businessmen in recipient countries. ‘Foreign aid’ is quite a comprehensive and encompassing term. Most people don’t realise that loans are usually embedded in aid packages, either directly or as a condition of foreign aid donations being given in the first place. An overload of debt combined with punishing interest rates creates the condition of economic subservience to the creditor nations and institutions and ties down, in a perpetual manner, most of the Third World Countries to underdevelopment, dependency and poverty. In his seminal autobiographical book ‘Confessions of an Economic Hitman’ John Perkins describes his job as the Chief Economist for the US international consulting firm Chas T. Main as to implement policies that promoted the interests of the U.S. corporatocracy (a coalition of government, banks, and corporations) while professing to alleviate poverty. He did this by convincing strategic countries to accept enormous loans for infrastructure development and to ensure that U.S. corporations got the projects (and the money) as a result. Upon default of the loans, the United States Government, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other U.S. dominated aid agencies then have access to the countries’ resources (especially oil) and strategic land (and are also able to instal military bases). Perkins says that international economists are in essence highly paid “Economic Hit Men” hired by international corporations to hide the U.S. government’s involvement. In an interview with Lew Rockwell, the well known US libertarian advocate of Austrian economics, Perkins says as follows: “Yeah. To think of USAID, the Agency of International Development, as a charitable organization is, yeah, that’s certainly totally erroneous. For the most part, our foreign aid, U.S. foreign aid, like that of most countries, is out there to serve the interest of U.S. corporations and now multi-national corporations. There are small amounts of aid that really go to helping people, particularly when there are times of catastrophe, to send tents and food and water to help people that are, you know, destroyed — their lives have been destroyed by earthquakes or by tsunamis or something, but that’s pretty miniscule and only lasts for a very, very short time. And then after that, the aid that we send in to help these countries is primarily there to help the corporations. That’s the job of USAID and the Export-Import Bank and the World Bank and other similar organizations.” Anti-Democratic As aid flows in, citizens of the recipient countries effectively become dis-enfranchised as increasingly all their governments need to do to stay in power is to court and cater to foreign donors. Such governments have less of a need to raise taxes, and as long as they pay their army and security apparatus well, they can be relatively relaxed about the views and opinions of their disgruntled people. Its stated that across Africa, over 70% of government income comes from foreign aid, meaning that such administrations are seriously compromised and unlikely to act in accordance with the interests of their populations. Similarly, in donor countries, for all the billions of dollars of foreign aid money appropriated from their taxpayers over the years, no clear, effective system has ever been put in place to hold aid recipients and governments accountable for how the money is spent. Such spending serves to increase the power and unaccountability of governments and lessen the influence of otherwise free thinking and responsible individuals who would be able to trade and produce wealth through voluntary exchange. This anti-democratic system has reinforced social inequities and perpetuated cycles of political abuse that lead to an entrenched and pernicious from of authoritarianism that empowers the elite few, while keeping a majority of people in abject poverty. The West stands by duplicitously and watches as a succession of wily autocrats in recipient countries hone their skills to beat back any democratic challenge and carry out the bidding of their overseas masters. Growing Dependence The dependence on foreign aid means that it becomes the opiate of the Third World. In a similar way to how the development of the welfare state in the UK and other developed countries has completely undermined and destroyed society by removing the need for communities to develop themselves through cooperation and exchange and by instead supporting and facilitating anti-social and irresponsible behaviour, foreign aid has largely encouraged Third World governments and their populations to rely on hand-outs instead of on themselves for development. I came across this interesting anecdote on Quora from the poster’s time as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Mali: “One of the examples I offer in this regard is from a village in western Mali. This small town had a market garden built for them by an international NGO, with several wells that had been constructed by another NGO. When a fellow volunteer started her service in this village, two of the three wells had collapsed and needed to be rebuilt. My colleague asked why the village council didn’t organize an effort to get the wells repaired, and her neighbors said that they were waiting for an NGO to come along and do it for them. The wells had been built by somebody else and the village felt no ownership of them. The people knew someone would come and fix them, and sure enough, some NGO came along and fixed them after a year or two.” Local Farming & Business Bankruptcy An example of this phenomenon is the US ‘Food for Peace’ program that was created in 1954 to help the Eisenhower administration get rid of embarrassingly large farm surpluses. In the 1950s and 1960s, massive U.S. wheat dumping in India disrupted that country’s agricultural market and helped bankrupt thousands of Indian farmers. George Dunlop, chief of staff of the Senate Agriculture Committee, speculated that such food aid may have been responsible for millions of Indians starving. Food Aid Although food aid programs may sometimes alleviate hunger in the short run, the overall effect of them appears to be the disruption of local agricultural markets, making it harder for poor countries to develop their own resources and feed themselves in the long run. Similarly, as this story demonstrates, flooding third world markets with free non-agricultural goods can also bankrupt the people who already sell them. Donating clothing is a sensitive topic in Africa because many countries’ textile industries collapsed under the weight of secondhand-clothing imports that were introduced in the 1970s and ’80s. “First you have destroyed these villages’ ability to be industrious and produce cotton products, and then you’re saying, ‘Can I give you a T-shirt?’ and celebrating about it?” says James Shikwati, director of the Nairobi-based Inter Region Economic Network, a think tank. “It’s really like offering poison coated with sugar.” Less Trade & Wealth Creation Foreign aid creates poverty through economic institutions that systematically block the incentives and opportunities of poor people to make things better for themselves, their neighbours and their country. Malik Fal states that “Aid tends to delay the development of business in Africa. It has kept Africa behind, or Africans behind in terms of getting the confidence they need, the experience they need to take a full part in the global economy, create businesses that compete globally and succeed globally. Aid has distorted markets in Africa. So the sooner, Africa can “graduate” from its dependence on aid, the better.” The Poverty Cure website highlights well the failure of foreign aid to stimulate trade and wealth creation. Instead it calls for the focus of foreign assistance to shift from aid to enterprise, from poverty alleviation to wealth creation, from paternalism to partnerships, from handouts to investments, from seeing the poor as consumers or burdens to seeing them as creators and from encouraging dependency to integrating the poor into networks of productivity and exchange.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Foreign aid increase corruption, economic instability, decreases government accountability, and creates cycles of dependence on the benefactor. Lea 15</h4><p>Jonathan Lea [specialist corporate and commercial solicitor who has over 11 years of experience at both large international City firms and smaller practices]. “Why Foreign Aid Is Harmful.” March 19, 2015. https://www.jonathanlea.net/2015/why-foreign-aid-is-harmful/</p><p>Increased Corruption <u><strong>One of the most frequent criticisms of <mark>foreign aid </mark>is how it <mark>fuels rampant corruption </mark>in the countries that receive it</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Money </mark>that the UK government markets to the gullible electorate as being <mark>destined to help the destitute </mark>in the third world <mark>actually ends up creating </mark>and supporting inorganic, bloated and <mark>unnecessary bureaucracies </mark>in the form of both the recipient country governments and the donor-funded NGOs</u></strong>. The net result of this is to make it all too easy for the funds to be used for anything, save for what their developmental purpose should be, or what products and services would otherwise be supplied in an open market. Increased Bureaucracy <u><strong>The economic environment that created <mark>aid bureaucracies has </mark>therefore <mark>built unproductive organisations that define their output as money disbursed rather than service delivered</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>produce many low-return observable outputs like glossy reports</u></strong> and “frameworks<u><strong>” that can be used to justify their spending and put enormous demands on those with scarce administrative skills in poor countries who could otherwise be engaged in doing something useful.</u></strong> This growing phalanx of <u><strong><mark>corrupt</u></strong></mark>, meddling, unaccountable and <u><strong><mark>overpaid bureaucrats imposed on countries thus makes it very hard for local businesses </mark>and wealth creating activities <mark>to develop </mark>as the imposition of these parasitical alien administrations not only hoover up and corrupt the brightest and most dynamic of the host population but also spin a suffocating web of rules and regulations devoid from any local business context</u></strong>. Increased Debt <u><strong><mark>The significant debt burdens of less developed countries have </mark>often <mark>been incurred as a result of </mark>the foreign <mark>aid packages </mark>pushed by wealthier countries and Western institutions and pursued by corrupt and greedy politicians and businessmen in recipient countries</u></strong>. ‘Foreign aid’ is quite a comprehensive and encompassing term. <u><strong>Most people don’t realise that <mark>loans are usually embedded in aid packages</mark>, either directly or as a condition of foreign aid donations being given in the first place. An <mark>overload of debt combined with</mark> punishing <mark>interest rates creates </mark>the condition of <mark>economic subservience </mark>to the creditor nations and institutions and ties down, in a perpetual manner, most of the Third World Countries to underdevelopment, dependency and poverty</u></strong>. In his seminal autobiographical book ‘Confessions of an Economic Hitman’ John Perkins describes his job as the Chief Economist for the US international consulting firm Chas T. Main as to implement policies that promoted the interests of the U.S. corporatocracy (a coalition of government, banks, and corporations) while professing to alleviate poverty. He did this by convincing strategic countries to accept enormous loans for infrastructure development and to ensure that U.S. corporations got the projects (and the money) as a result. <u><strong>Upon default of the loans, the United States Government, World Bank,</u></strong> International Monetary Fund, and other U.S. dominated aid agencies <u><strong>then have access to the countries’ resources</u></strong> (especially oil) <u><strong>and strategic land</u></strong> (and are also able to instal military bases). Perkins says that international economists are in essence highly paid “Economic Hit Men” hired by international corporations to hide the U.S. government’s involvement. In an interview with Lew Rockwell, the well known US libertarian advocate of Austrian economics, Perkins says as follows: “Yeah. To think of USAID, the Agency of International Development, as a charitable organization is, yeah, that’s certainly totally erroneous. For the most part, <u><strong>our <mark>foreign aid,</u></strong> U</mark>.S. foreign aid, like that of most countries, <u><strong><mark>is </mark>out there <mark>to serve the interest of U.S. corporations </mark>and now multi-national corporations. There are <mark>small amounts of aid that really go to helping people,</mark> particularly when there are times of catastrophe</u></strong>, to send tents and food and water to help people that are, you know, destroyed — their lives have been destroyed by earthquakes or by tsunamis or something, but that’s pretty miniscule and only lasts for a very, very short time. <u><strong>And then after that, the aid that we send in to help these countries is primarily there to help the corporations</u></strong>. That’s the job of USAID and the Export-Import Bank and the World Bank and other similar organizations.” <u><strong>Anti-Democratic As aid flows in, <mark>citizens of the recipient countries effectively become dis-enfranchised </mark>as increasingly all their governments need to do to stay in power is to court</u></strong> and cater to <u><strong>foreign donors</u></strong>. Such governments have less of a need to raise taxes, and as long as they pay their army and security apparatus well, <u><strong><mark>they can be</mark> relatively <mark>relaxed about the views </mark>and opinions <mark>of their </mark>disgruntled <mark>people</mark>. Its stated that across Africa, over 70% of government income comes from foreign aid,</u></strong> meaning that such administrations are seriously compromised and unlikely to act in accordance with the interests of their populations. Similarly, in donor countries, for all the billions of dollars of foreign aid money appropriated from their taxpayers over the years, <u><strong><mark>no clear, effective system has ever been put in place to hold aid recipients </mark>and governments <mark>accountable </mark>for how the money is spent</u></strong>. <u><strong>Such spending serves to increase the power and unaccountability of governments</u></strong> and lessen the influence of otherwise free thinking and responsible individuals who would be able to trade and produce wealth through voluntary exchange. <u><strong>This <mark>anti-democratic system has reinforced social inequities and perpetuated cycles of political abus</u></strong>e <u><strong></mark>that lead to an entrenched and pernicious from of authoritarianism that empowers the elite few</u></strong>, while keeping a majority of people in abject poverty. The West stands by duplicitously and watches as a succession of wily autocrats in recipient countries hone their skills to beat back any democratic challenge and carry out the bidding of their overseas masters. Growing Dependence <u><strong>The <mark>dependence on foreign aid means that it becomes the opiate of the Third World.</u></strong> </mark>In a similar way to how the <u><strong><mark>development</u></strong> </mark>of the welfare state in the UK and other developed countries <u><strong><mark>has </mark>completely <mark>undermined </mark>and destroyed <mark>society by removing the need for communities to develop themselves </mark>through cooperation and exchange and by instead supporting and facilitating anti-social and irresponsible behaviour, foreign aid has largely encouraged Third World governments and their populations to rely on hand-outs instead of on themselves</u></strong> for development. I came across this interesting anecdote on Quora from the poster’s time as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Mali: “One of the examples I offer in this regard is from a village in western Mali. This small town had a market garden built for them by an international NGO, with several wells that had been constructed by another NGO. When a fellow volunteer started her service in this village, two of the three wells had collapsed and needed to be rebuilt. My colleague asked why the village council didn’t organize an effort to get the wells repaired, and her neighbors said that they were waiting for an NGO to come along and do it for them. The wells had been built by somebody else and the village felt no ownership of them. The people knew someone would come and fix them, and sure enough, some NGO came along and fixed them after a year or two.” Local Farming & Business Bankruptcy An example of this phenomenon is the US ‘Food for Peace’ program that was created in 1954 to help the Eisenhower administration get rid of embarrassingly large farm surpluses. In the 1950s and 1960s, <u><strong><mark>massive U.S. wheat dumping in India disrupted that country’s agricultural market </mark>and helped <mark>bankrupt thousands of Indian farmers</u></strong></mark>. George Dunlop, chief of staff of the Senate Agriculture Committee, speculated that such food aid may have been responsible for millions of Indians starving. <u><strong>Food Aid <mark>Although food aid programs may sometimes alleviate hunger in the short run, the overall effect</mark> of them appears to be the disruption of local agricultural markets, <mark>making it harder for poor countries to develop their own resources </mark>and feed themselves in the long run</u></strong>. Similarly, as this story demonstrates, flooding third world markets with free non-agricultural goods can also bankrupt the people who already sell them. <u><strong>Donating clothing is a sensitive topic in Africa because many <mark>countries’ textile industries collapsed under the weight of secondhand-clothing import</mark>s</u></strong> that were introduced in the 1970s and ’80s. “First you have destroyed these villages’ ability to be industrious and produce cotton products, and then you’re saying, ‘Can I give you a T-shirt?’ and celebrating about it?” says James Shikwati, director of the Nairobi-based Inter Region Economic Network, a think tank. “<u><strong>It’s really like offering poison coated with sugar.” </u></strong>Less Trade & Wealth Creation <u><strong>Foreign aid creates poverty through economic institutions that systematically block the incentives and opportunities of poor people to make things better for themselves, their neighbours and their country.</u></strong> Malik Fal states that “<u><strong>Aid tends to delay the development of business in Africa. It has kept Africa behind, or Africans behind in terms of getting the confidence they need, the experience they need to take a full part in the global economy</u></strong>, create businesses that compete globally and succeed globally. <u><strong>Aid has distorted markets in Africa</u></strong>. So the sooner, Africa can “graduate” from its dependence on aid, the better.” The Poverty Cure website highlights well the failure of foreign aid to stimulate trade and wealth creation. Instead it calls for the focus of foreign assistance to shift from aid to enterprise, from poverty alleviation to wealth creation, from paternalism to partnerships, from handouts to investments, from seeing the poor as consumers or burdens to seeing them as creators and from encouraging dependency to integrating the poor into networks of productivity and exchange.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Bruce Sterling, 6-1-2018, "When Nick Bostrom says “Bang”," WIRED, https://www.wired.com/beyond-the-beyond/2018/06/nick-bostrom-says-bang/ fulltext: 4.1 Deliberate misuse of nanotechnology In a mature form, molecular nanotechnology will enable the construction of bacterium-scale self-replicating mechanical robots that can feed on dirt or other organic matter [22-25]. Such replicators could eat up the biosphere or destroy it by other means such as by poisoning it, burning it, or blocking out sunlight. A person of malicious intent in possession of this technology might cause the extinction of intelligent life on Earth by releasing such nanobots into the environment.[9] The technology to produce a destructive nanobot seems considerably easier to develop than the technology to create an effective defense against such an attack (a global nanotech immune system, an “active shield” [23]). It is therefore likely that there will be a period of vulnerability during which this technology must be prevented from coming into the wrong hands. Yet the technology could prove hard to regulate, since it doesn’t require rare radioactive isotopes or large, easily identifiable manufacturing plants, as does production of nuclear weapons [23]. Even if effective defenses against a limited nanotech attack are developed before dangerous replicators are designed and acquired by suicidal regimes or terrorists, there will still be the danger of an arms race between states possessing nanotechnology. It has been argued [26] that molecular manufacturing would lead to both arms race instability and crisis instability, to a higher degree than was the case with nuclear weapons. Arms race instability means that there would be dominant incentives for each competitor to escalate its armaments, leading to a runaway arms race. Crisis instability means that there would be dominant incentives for striking first. Two roughly balanced rivals acquiring nanotechnology would, on this view, begin a massive buildup of armaments and weapons development programs that would continue until a crisis occurs and war breaks out, potentially causing global terminal destruction. That the arms race could have been predicted is no guarantee that an international security system will be created ahead of time to prevent this disaster from happening. The nuclear arms race between the US and the USSR was predicted but occurred nevertheless. 4.2 Nuclear holocaust[winter] The US and Russia still have huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons. But would an all-out nuclear war really exterminate humankind? Note that: (i) For there to be an existential risk it suffices that we can’t be sure that it wouldn’t. (ii) The climatic effects of a large nuclear war are not well known (there is the possibility of a nuclear winter). (iii) Future arms races between other nations cannot be ruled out and these could lead to even greater arsenals than those present at the height of the Cold War. The world’s supply of plutonium has been increasing steadily to about two thousand tons, some ten times as much as remains tied up in warheads ([9], p. 26). (iv) Even if some humans survive the short-term effects of a nuclear war, it could lead to the collapse of civilization. A human race living under stone-age conditions may or may not be more resilient to extinction than other animal species. 4.3 We’re living in a simulation and it gets shut down A case can be made that the hypothesis that we are living in a computer simulation should be given a significant probability [27]. The basic idea behind this so-called “Simulation argument” is that vast amounts of computing power may become available in the future (see e.g. [28,29]), and that it could be used, among other things, to run large numbers of fine-grained simulations of past human civilizations. Under some not-too-implausible assumptions, the result can be that almost all minds like ours are simulated minds, and that we should therefore assign a significant probability to being such computer-emulated minds rather than the (subjectively indistinguishable) minds of originally evolved creatures. And if we are, we suffer the risk that the simulation may be shut down at any time. A decision to terminate our simulation may be prompted by our actions or by exogenous factors. While to some it may seem frivolous to list such a radical or “philosophical” hypothesis next the concrete threat of nuclear holocaust, we must seek to base these evaluations on reasons rather than untutored intuition. Until a refutation appears of the argument presented in [27], it would intellectually dishonest to neglect to mention simulation-shutdown as a potential extinction mode. 4.4 Badly programmed superintelligence When we create the first superintelligent entity [28-34], we might make a mistake and give it goals that lead it to annihilate humankind, assuming its enormous intellectual advantage gives it the power to do so. For example, we could mistakenly elevate a subgoal to the status of a supergoal. We tell it to solve a mathematical problem, and it complies by turning all the matter in the solar system into a giant calculating device, in the process killing the person who asked the question. (For further analysis of this, see [35].) 4.5 Genetically engineered biological agent With the fabulous advances in genetic technology currently taking place, it may become possible for a tyrant, terrorist, or lunatic to create a doomsday virus, an organism that combines long latency with high virulence and mortality [36]. Dangerous viruses can even be spawned unintentionally, as Australian researchers recently demonstrated when they created a modified mousepox virus with 100% mortality while trying to design a contraceptive virus for mice for use in pest control [37]. While this particular virus doesn’t affect humans, it is suspected that an analogous alteration would increase the mortality of the human smallpox virus. What underscores the future hazard here is that the research was quickly published in the open scientific literature [38]. It is hard to see how information generated in open biotech research programs could be contained no matter how grave the potential danger that it poses; and the same holds for research in nanotechnology. Genetic medicine will also lead to better cures and vaccines, but there is no guarantee that defense will always keep pace with offense. (Even the accidentally created mousepox virus had a 50% mortality rate on vaccinated mice.) Eventually, worry about biological weapons may be put to rest through the development of nanomedicine, but while nanotechnology has enormous long-term potential for medicine [39] it carries its own hazards. 4.6 Accidental misuse of nanotechnology (“gray goo”) The possibility of accidents can never be completely ruled out. However, there are many ways of making sure, through responsible engineering practices, that species-destroying accidents do not occur. One could avoid using self-replication; one could make nanobots dependent on some rare feedstock chemical that doesn’t exist in the wild; one could confine them to sealed environments; one could design them in such a way that any mutation was overwhelmingly likely to cause a nanobot to completely cease to function [40]. Accidental misuse is therefore a smaller concern than malicious misuse [23,25,41]. However, the distinction between the accidental and the deliberate can become blurred. While “in principle” it seems possible to make terminal nanotechnological accidents extremely improbable, the actual circumstances may not permit this ideal level of security to be realized. Compare nanotechnology with nuclear technology. From an engineering perspective, it is of course perfectly possible to use nuclear technology only for peaceful purposes such as nuclear reactors, which have a zero chance of destroying the whole planet. Yet in practice it may be very hard to avoid nuclear technology also being used to build nuclear weapons, leading to an arms race. With large nuclear arsenals on hair-trigger alert, there is inevitably a significant risk of accidental war. The same can happen with nanotechnology: it may be pressed into serving military objectives in a way that carries unavoidable risks of serious accidents. In some situations it can even be strategically advantageous to deliberately make one’s technology or control systems risky, for example in order to make a “threat that leaves something to chance” [42]. 4.7 Something unforeseen We need a catch-all category. It would be foolish to be confident that we have already imagined and anticipated all significant risks. Future technological or scientific developments may very well reveal novel ways of destroying the world. Some foreseen hazards (hence not members of the current category) which have been excluded from the list of bangs on grounds that they seem too unlikely to cause a global terminal disaster are: solar flares, supernovae, black hole explosions or mergers, gamma-ray bursts, galactic center outbursts, supervolcanos, loss of biodiversity, buildup of air pollution, gradual loss of human fertility, and various religious doomsday scenarios. The hypothesis that we will one day become “illuminated” and commit collective suicide or stop reproducing, as supporters of VHEMT (The Voluntary Human Extinction Movement) hope [43], appears unlikely. If it really were better not to exist (as Silenus told king Midas in the Greek myth, and as Arthur Schopenhauer argued [44] although for reasons specific to his philosophical system he didn’t advocate suicide), then we should not count this scenario as an existential disaster. The assumption that it is not worse to be alive should be regarded as an implicit assumption in the definition of Bangs. Erroneous collective suicide is an existential risk albeit one whose probability seems extremely slight. (For more on the ethics of human extinction, see chapter 4 of [9].) 4.8 Physics disasters The Manhattan Project bomb-builders’ concern about an A-bomb-derived atmospheric conflagration has contemporary analogues. There have been speculations that future high-energy particle accelerator experiments may cause a breakdown of a metastable vacuum state that our part of the cosmos might be in, converting it into a “true” vacuum of lower energy density [45]. This would result in an expanding bubble of total destruction that would sweep through the galaxy and beyond at the speed of light, tearing all matter apart as it proceeds. Another conceivability is that accelerator experiments might produce negatively charged stable “strangelets” (a hypothetical form of nuclear matter) or create a mini black hole that would sink to the center of the Earth and start accreting the rest of the planet [46]. These outcomes seem to be impossible given our best current physical theories. But the reason we do the experiments is precisely that we don’t really know what will happen. A more reassuring argument is that the energy densities attained in present day accelerators are far lower than those that occur naturally in collisions between cosmic rays [46,47]. It’s possible, however, that factors other than energy density are relevant for these hypothetical processes, and that those factors will be brought together in novel ways in future experiments. The main reason for concern in the “physics disasters” category is the meta-level observation that discoveries of all sorts of weird physical phenomena are made all the time, so even if right now all the particular physics disasters we have conceived of were absurdly improbable or impossible, there could be other more realistic failure-modes waiting to be uncovered. The ones listed here are merely illustrations of the general case.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Extinction is inevitable from future technology — nanotech, our simulation gets shut down, AI, biotech, particle accelerators, and black swans</h4><p>Bruce <strong>Sterling</strong>, 6-1-20<strong>18</strong>, "When Nick Bostrom says “Bang”," WIRED, https://www.wired.com/beyond-the-beyond/2018/06/nick-bostrom-says-bang/</p><p>4.1 <u>Deliberate <strong><mark>misuse of nanotech</mark>nology</u></strong> <u>In a mature form, molecular nanotechnology will <mark>enable the construction of</mark> bacterium-scale <mark>self-replicating</mark> mechanical <mark>robots</mark> that</u> can <u>feed on dirt or other organic matter</u> [22-25]. <u>Such replicators could <strong><mark>eat up the biosphere</strong></mark> or destroy it</u> by other means such <u>as by poisoning it, burning it, or blocking out sunlight. A person of malicious intent in possession of this technology</u> might <u><mark>cause </mark>the <mark>extinction </mark>of</u> intelligent <u>life on Earth</u> by releasing such nanobots into the environment.[9] <u>The <mark>tech</mark>nology <mark>to produce a destructive nanobot</mark> seems considerably <mark>easier</mark> to develop <mark>than</mark> the technology to create an effective <mark>defense</mark> against such an attack</u> (a global nanotech immune system, an “active shield” [23]). It is therefore likely that <u><mark>there will be a period of vulnerability</u></mark> during which this technology must be prevented from coming into the wrong hands. Yet <u>the technology</u> could <u>prove <mark>hard to regulate</mark>, since it doesn’t require rare radioactive isotopes or large, easily identifiable manufacturing plants</u>, as does production of nuclear weapons [23]. <u>Even if effective defenses against a limited nanotech attack are developed</u> before dangerous replicators are designed and acquired by suicidal regimes or terrorists, <u>there will still be the danger of an arms race between states possessing <mark>nanotech</mark>nology</u>. It has been argued [26] that <u>molecular manufacturing would <mark>lead to</mark> both <mark>arms race instability</mark> and crisis instability</u>, to a higher degree than was the case with nuclear weapons. Arms race instability means that <u>there would be dominant <mark>incentives</mark> for each competitor <mark>to escalate its armaments</mark>, leading to a runaway arms race. Crisis instability means that there would be dominant incentives for striking first. Two</u> roughly balanced <u>rivals acquiring nanotechnology would</u>, on this view, <u>begin a massive buildup of armaments and weapons development programs that would continue until a crisis occurs and war breaks out</u>, potentially <u><mark>causing global terminal destruction</u></mark>. That the arms race could have been predicted is no guarantee that an international security system will be created ahead of time to prevent this disaster from happening. The nuclear arms race between the US and the USSR was predicted but occurred nevertheless. 4.2 Nuclear holocaust[winter] The US and Russia still have huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons. But would an all-out nuclear war really exterminate humankind? Note that: (i) For there to be an existential risk it suffices that we can’t be sure that it wouldn’t. (ii) The climatic effects of a large nuclear war are not well known (there is the possibility of a nuclear winter). (iii) Future arms races between other nations cannot be ruled out and these could lead to even greater arsenals than those present at the height of the Cold War. The world’s supply of plutonium has been increasing steadily to about two thousand tons, some ten times as much as remains tied up in warheads ([9], p. 26). (iv) Even if some humans survive the short-term effects of a nuclear war, it could lead to the collapse of civilization. A human race living under stone-age conditions may or may not be more resilient to extinction than other animal species. 4.3 <u><strong><mark>We’re living in a simulation and it gets shut down</u></strong></mark> A case can be made that <u>the <mark>hypothesis</mark> that <mark>we are living in a</mark> computer <mark>simulation should be given</mark> a <mark>significant probability</u></mark> [27]. The basic idea behind this so-called “Simulation argument” is that <u>vast amounts of computing power may become available in the future</u> (see e.g. [28,29]), <u>and that it could be used</u>, among other things, <u>to run large numbers of fine-grained simulations of past human civilizations</u>. Under some not-too-implausible assumptions, <u>the result can be that <mark>almost all minds</mark> like ours <mark>are simulated</mark> minds, and that we should therefore assign a significant probability to being such computer-emulated minds rather than the</u> (subjectively indistinguishable) <u>minds of originally evolved creatures. And if we are, we suffer the risk that the simulation may be shut down at any time. A <mark>decision to terminate our simulation</u></mark> may <u>be <strong><mark>prompted by our actions</u></strong></mark> or by exogenous factors. While to some it may seem frivolous to list such a radical or “philosophical” hypothesis next the concrete threat of nuclear holocaust, we must seek to base these evaluations on reasons rather than untutored intuition. Until a refutation appears of the argument presented in [27], it would intellectually dishonest to neglect to mention simulation-shutdown as a potential extinction mode. 4.4 <u><strong><mark>Badly programmed superintelligence</u></strong></mark> <u>When we create the first superintelligent entity</u> [28-34], <u>we might make a mistake and give it goals that lead it to annihilate humankind</u>, assuming its <u>enormous intellectual advantage gives it the power to do so</u>. For example, <u>we could <mark>mistakenly elevate a subgoal to</mark> the status of <mark>a supergoal</mark>. We tell it to <mark>solve a</mark> mathematical <mark>problem</mark>, and it complies by <mark>turning all the matter</mark> in the solar system <mark>into a giant calculating device</u></mark>, in the process killing the person who asked the question. (For further analysis of this, see [35].) 4.5 Genetically engineered biological agent With the fabulous advances in genetic technology currently taking place, it may become possible for a tyrant, terrorist, or lunatic to create a doomsday virus, an organism that combines long latency with high virulence and mortality [36]. Dangerous viruses can even be spawned unintentionally, as Australian researchers recently demonstrated when they created a modified mousepox virus with 100% mortality while trying to design a contraceptive virus for mice for use in pest control [37]. While this particular virus doesn’t affect humans, it is suspected that an analogous alteration would increase the mortality of the human smallpox virus. What underscores the future hazard here is that the research was quickly published in the open scientific literature [38]. It is hard to see how information generated in open biotech research programs could be contained no matter how grave the potential danger that it poses; and the same holds for research in nanotechnology. Genetic medicine will also lead to better cures and vaccines, but there is no guarantee that defense will always keep pace with<u><mark> offense</u></mark>. (Even the accidentally created mousepox virus had a 50% mortality rate on vaccinated mice.) Eventually, worry about biological weapons may be put to rest through the development of nanomedicine, but while nanotechnology has enormous long-term potential for medicine [39] it carries its own hazards. 4.6 Accidental misuse of nanotechnology (“gray goo”) The possibility of accidents can never be completely ruled out. However, there are many ways of making sure, through responsible engineering practices, that species-destroying accidents do not occur. One could avoid using self-replication; one could make nanobots dependent on some rare feedstock chemical that doesn’t exist in the wild; one could confine them to sealed environments; one could design them in such a way that any mutation was overwhelmingly likely to cause a nanobot to completely cease to function [40]. Accidental misuse is therefore a smaller concern than malicious misuse [23,25,41]. However, the distinction between the accidental and the deliberate can become blurred. While “in principle” it seems possible to make terminal nanotechnological accidents extremely improbable, the actual circumstances may not permit this ideal level of security to be realized. Compare nanotechnology with nuclear technology. From an engineering perspective, it is of course perfectly possible to use nuclear technology only for peaceful purposes such as nuclear reactors, which have a zero chance of destroying the whole planet. Yet in practice it may be very hard to avoid nuclear technology also being used to build nuclear weapons, leading to an arms race. With large nuclear arsenals on hair-trigger alert, there is inevitably a significant risk of accidental war. The same can happen with nanotechnology: it may be pressed into serving military objectives in a way that carries unavoidable risks of serious accidents. In some situations it can even be strategically advantageous to deliberately make one’s technology or control systems risky, for example in order to make a “threat that leaves something to chance” [42]. 4.7 Something unforeseen We need a catch-all category. It would be foolish to be confident that we have already imagined and anticipated all significant risks. Future technological or scientific developments may very well reveal novel ways of destroying the world. Some foreseen hazards (hence not members of the current category) which have been excluded from the list of bangs on grounds that they seem too unlikely to cause a global terminal disaster are: solar flares, supernovae, black hole explosions or mergers, gamma-ray bursts, galactic center outbursts, supervolcanos, loss of biodiversity, buildup of air pollution, gradual loss of human fertility, and various religious doomsday scenarios. The hypothesis that we will one day become “illuminated” and commit collective suicide or stop reproducing, as supporters of VHEMT (The Voluntary Human Extinction Movement) hope [43], appears unlikely. If it really were better not to exist (as Silenus told king Midas in the Greek myth, and as Arthur Schopenhauer argued [44] although for reasons specific to his philosophical system he didn’t advocate suicide), then we should not count this scenario as an existential disaster. The assumption that it is not worse to be alive should be regarded as an implicit assumption in the definition of Bangs. Erroneous collective suicide is an existential risk albeit one whose probability seems extremely slight. (For more on the ethics of human extinction, see chapter 4 of [9].) 4.8 <u><strong><mark>Physics disasters</u></strong></mark> The Manhattan Project bomb-builders’ concern about an A-bomb-derived atmospheric conflagration has contemporary analogues. There have been speculations that <u>future high-energy <mark>particle accelerator experiments</mark> may <mark>cause a breakdown of</mark> a <mark>metastable vacuum state</mark> that our part of the cosmos might be in, <mark>converting it into a “true” vacuum of lower energy density</u></mark> [45]. <u>This would result in an <mark>expanding bubble of</mark> total <mark>destruction</mark> that would <mark>sweep through the galaxy</mark> and beyond at the speed of light, tearing all matter apart as it proceeds</u>. Another conceivability is that <u>accelerator <mark>experiments</mark> might <mark>produce</mark> negatively charged stable “<mark>strangelets</mark>”</u> (a hypothetical form of nuclear matter<u>) <mark>or</mark> create <mark>a mini black hole that would</mark> sink to the center of the Earth and start <mark>accret</mark>ing<mark> the</mark> rest of the <mark>planet</u></mark> [46]. These outcomes seem to be impossible given our best current physical theories. But the reason we do the experiments is precisely that <u>we don’t really know what will happen</u>. A more reassuring argument is that the energy densities attained in present day accelerators are far lower than those that occur naturally in collisions between cosmic rays [46,47]. <u>It’s possible</u>, however, <u>that factors other than energy density are relevant for these hypothetical processes, and that those factors will be brought together in novel ways in future experiments</u>. The main reason for concern in the “physics disasters” category is the meta-level observation that <u>discoveries of all sorts of weird physical phenomena are made all the time, so <mark>even if</mark> right now <mark>all</mark> the particular <mark>physics disasters</mark> we have conceived of were absurdly improbable or <mark>impossible</mark>, there <mark>could be other</mark> more realistic failure-modes <mark>waiting to be uncovered</u></mark>. The ones listed here are merely illustrations of the general case.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Fergusson 19 Douglas Fergusson, submitting this article as his Political Science Master’s thesis at Carleton University, honors political science bachelor’s from the University of Manitoba. [Hypersonic Glide Vehicles: Implications for Strategic Stability in the Coming Hypersonic Era, https://curve.carleton.ca/system/files/etd/da8f23af-05a9-47cf-b1e8-0133feb628c5/etd_pdf/848feb7fcbada363e031834c3ff05c90/fergusson-hypersonicglidevehiclesimplicationsforstrategic.pdf]//BPS fulltext: If one concedes the modest assumptions associated to the technological theory, then it is clear that hypersonic glide vehicles are a technology that will in all likelihood stabilize the strategic relationship between those who have them into the near future. If one concedes that the purpose of nuclear deterrence since the 1960s is based not upon avoiding and deterring a limited nuclear war per se, but rather a general nuclear exchange then it becomes increasingly obvious that hypersonic glide vehicles are stabilizing. If one concedes that no matter the current technological gap between the United States, and Russia and China that the current strategic relationship is one of MAD, and premised upon MAD, then it is clear that hypersonics are stabilizing. If one concedes that it is plausible that strategic escalation offers decision makers the ability to refocus their interests and avoid escalation into general nuclear war, then hypersonics are stabilizing. The question remains, however, as it does with most strategic literature, what exactly should decision makers do knowing this information. Studies on strategic stability were born during the Cold War, and the aim of these studies was to describe what a strategically stable relationship looked like, and what to do if particular technologies, doctrines, or postures undermined this strategic stability. Thus it was also tied intimately towards arms control and its associated literature. Since the goal of deterrence is to avoid nuclear war than states should pursue strategies and their related technologies that foment the most strategically stable relationship; because stability relates to the state in which general nuclear war is least likely to occur- not that cannot occur for a variety of political and other reasons in a stable relationship, but that a stable relationship has less risk of war than an unstable relationship. This is also the period when MAD became intimately tied81 to strategic stability between great powers. Although much has changed since the Cold War, the fundamental strategic relationship between the great powers today is one of deterrence premised upon MAD. Moreover, technological development in one way or another can never truly be stopped it seems; and thus it is still the responsibility of the strategic studies discipline to examine the effects of new technologies, doctrines, and postures of the great powers; and from those studies make educated prescriptions about policy direction. The spectre of a general nuclear war still haunts the modern world, even if most have forgotten it. Much has been made in the past 30 years describing a new international security relationship, one in which MAD had receded into the background of international peace and security. Understandably, developments such as 9/11 and other security concerns shifted the focus of strategic studies. Still, if one looks closely the threat of nuclear conflict remained prescient in the strategic maneuverings of states since the end of the Cold War. Much of Russian and Chinese aggression in their respective spheres of influence is still guaranteed by nuclear weapons. Although counterfactual, it is not hard to imagine the United States acting differently with these countries had not both had nuclear weapons-i.e. Ukraine, Syria, South China sea etc. Still, the old strategic study of nuclear and strategic deterrence is coming into view and as such the revival of the study of strategic stability is natural in this sense. Indeed, the development of hypersonic weapons in general, and hypersonic glide vehicles in particular, represents the first major technological development of these weapons since the Cold War. As with technologies in the Cold War such as ABM and MIRV, each new technology must be studied so that educated policy decisions can be82 made by the great powers moving forward. Thus the implications of whether or not hypersonic glide vehicles are stabilizing or not is directly relevant to whether the states that have or will have them in the near future, should either unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally control them; or conversely, adopt and implement them on mass. Under comprehensive examination of all the factors that relate to strategic stability, it becomes evident that hypersonic glide vehicles will stabilize the relationship between the three great powers. Similar to their MIRV counterparts during the Cold War hypersonic glide vehicles are a particular response by states to increase the parity of their strategic relationships, and make their threats of assured destruction credible. Hyperglides offset ballistic missile defences and offer the ability for increased restraint when compared to their ICBM counterparts in their utilization as escalatory devices. They are better placed to escalate for the purposes of de-escalation and thus induce increased stability to a strategic relationship. The theoretical matrix indicates that it is highly plausible that moving forward these weapons will stabilize rather than de-stabilize the strategic relationships between the three great powers. Theoretically, and historically- if MIRVs are indeed a similar case- then it is plausible that hyperglides will only serve to stabilize the strategic balance between the great powers. Interestingly, this paper argues contrary to the majority of current strategic opinion concerning hypersonic glide vehicles. It is likely that the discrepancy arises from the recognition that there are two ways to interpret the goal of modern strategic deterrence. Most of the community, at least implicitly, seems to reflect the belief that strategic deterrence is directed toward avoiding any strategic exchange. Similar to their historic counterparts during the Cold War, they overvalue the weight of counterforce83 against the other dimensions of stability. Ultimately, American, Russian, and probably Chinese deterrence is not in fact directed towards avoiding any strategic exchange but rather directed toward avoiding a general war, and the civilizational costs associated. American strategy since the 1960s is an implicit proponent of the notion that escalation can be utilized to de-escalate before falling into a general war. So too, modern Russian strategy has adopted an escalate to de-escalate strategy for the purposes of not falling into an general war.159 Deterrence deals with perception and psychology, indicating that if the United States, and Russia believe that credible deterrence is one that allows for escalation then both implicitly believe in the ability for escalatory strategies to de-escalate a conflict. This means inherently that counterforce weapons have a positive impact on credibility, and through credibility to MAD and stability. A theory that does not take into account the strategic doctrines and beliefs at least generally of the parties involved would fail to provide decision makers with policy decisions that will be enacted. Thus policy prescriptions should seek to understand the strategic balance as it is and provide the best advice it can regarding policy to positively impact the perceived stability of the relationship. Deterrence is unique psychologically, because it relates to the recognition that if states believe a relationship is stable it is more stable. In this sense counterforce targeting is stabilizing because the great powers believe it to be stabilizing. In any case it is the failure of the majority of hyperglide literature to properly understand the goal of modern deterrence and thus they accidentally claim that weapons systems, such as hyperglides, de-stabilize the relationship when in fact they stabilize it. Recognizing then that hyperglides positively affect strategic stability, it is the position of this paper that this technology should be readily adopted by all the great powers. Indeed, they should not be controlled until their strategic aim has been met, and increased forces would overrun on costs. If that becomes the case, states should seek to control them on the back end laying out as they did with SALT I and the Vladivostok Accords, the strategic limits and boundaries of the relationship once all three parties are satisfied with their forces. In this regard, after full deployment the parties can engage one another and add increased stability by setting the upper limits of what the relationship will look like; and in so doing more readily cement the strategic stability between them. This should not be confused with the actual control of the weapons; as any control before great power strategic parity has been achieved would a) not be possible because the Chinese and Russians would not agree to being so inferior and b) cementing disparity as it exists now would potentially over time begin to shift the relationship from parity to supremacy and in said shift the relationship would be de-stabilized. At its heart, arms control should not be about refusing technological innovations. Rather, it should be directed toward controlling the affects that arms have on strategic relationships; meaning both that if a technology undermines the relationship it should be limited and controlled, and if a technology seeks to create a more stable relationship it should be adopted fully to each party’s extent and then have boundaries set, once all parties are convinced of the stability of the relationship vis-à-vis that technology. Hyperglide vehicles will stabilize the relationship, which over the past 30 years has become neglected; bringing increased85 stability to the relationship and decreasing the likelihood of war. As such the great powers should welcome this technology and its beneficial effects on strategic stability.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Hypersonics breed <u>parity</u> – prolif prevents <u>nuke war</u>.</h4><p><strong>Fergusson 19</strong> Douglas Fergusson, submitting this article as his Political Science Master’s thesis at Carleton University, honors political science bachelor’s from the University of Manitoba. [Hypersonic Glide Vehicles: Implications for Strategic Stability in the Coming Hypersonic Era, https://curve.carleton.ca/system/files/etd/da8f23af-05a9-47cf-b1e8-0133feb628c5/etd_pdf/848feb7fcbada363e031834c3ff05c90/fergusson-hypersonicglidevehiclesimplicationsforstrategic.pdf]//BPS</p><p><u>If one concedes <strong>the modest assumptions</strong> associated to the technological theory, then it is <strong>clear</u></strong> that <u>hypersonic</u> glide vehicles are a technology that <u>will</u> in all likelihood <u><strong>stabilize</u></strong> the strategic relationship between those who have them into the near future. <u>If one concedes</u> that <u><mark>the purpose of</u></mark> nuclear <u><mark>deterrence</mark> since the 1960s <mark>is</u></mark> based <u><mark>not</u></mark> upon avoiding and <u><mark>deterring</mark> a <mark>limited</mark> nuclear <mark>war</u></mark> per se, <u><mark>but</mark> rather <strong>a general <mark>nuclear exchange</strong></mark> then it becomes <strong>increasingly obvious</u></strong> that <u>hypersonic</u> glide vehicles <u>are <strong>stabilizing</strong>. If one concedes that <mark>no matter <strong>the</mark> current technological <mark>gap</strong></mark> between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, <u>and Russia and China that <strong><mark>the</mark> current strategic <mark>relationship</strong> is</u></mark> one of MAD, and <u><mark>premised</u></mark> up<u><mark>on MAD</mark>, then it is clear</u> that <u>hypersonics are stabilizing. If one concedes</u> that <u>it is plausible that <strong>strategic <mark>escalation</strong> offers</mark> decision makers the <mark>ability to refocus</u></mark> their interests <u><mark>and avoid</mark> escalation into <strong>general <mark>nuclear war</strong></mark>, then <mark>hypersonics are stabilizing</u></mark>. The question remains, however, as it does with most strategic literature, what exactly should decision makers do knowing this information. Studies on strategic stability were born during the Cold War, and the aim of these studies was to describe what a strategically stable relationship looked like, and what to do if particular technologies, doctrines, or postures undermined this strategic stability. Thus it was also tied intimately towards arms control and its associated literature. Since the goal of deterrence is to avoid nuclear war than states should pursue strategies and their related technologies that foment the most strategically stable relationship; because stability relates to the state in which general nuclear war is least likely to occur- not that cannot occur for a variety of political and other reasons in a stable relationship, but that a stable relationship has less risk of war than an unstable relationship. This is also the period when MAD became intimately tied81 to strategic stability between great powers. Although much has changed since the Cold War, the fundamental strategic relationship between the great powers today is one of deterrence premised upon MAD. Moreover, <u><mark>tech</mark>nological development</u> in one way or another <u><mark>can <strong>never</mark> truly</strong> <mark>be stopped</u></mark> it seems; and thus it is still the responsibility of the strategic studies discipline to examine the effects of new technologies, doctrines, and postures of the great powers; and from those studies make educated prescriptions about policy direction. <u><strong>The spectre of a general nuclear war</u></strong> still <u>haunts the modern world</u>, even if most have forgotten it. Much has been made in the past 30 years describing a new international security relationship, one in which MAD had receded into the background of international peace and security. Understandably, developments such as 9/11 and other security concerns shifted the focus of strategic studies. Still, if one looks closely the threat of nuclear conflict remained prescient in the strategic maneuverings of states since the end of the Cold War. Much of <u>Russian and Chinese aggression</u> in their respective spheres of influence <u>is</u> still <u>guaranteed by nuclear weapons</u>. Although counterfactual, it is not hard to imagine the United States acting differently with these countries had not both had nuclear weapons-i.e. Ukraine, Syria, South China sea etc. Still, the old strategic study of nuclear and strategic deterrence is coming into view and as such the revival of the study of strategic stability is natural in this sense. Indeed, the development of <u>hypersonic</u> weapons in general, and hypersonic glide vehicles in particular, <u>represents <strong>the first major technological development</u></strong> of these weapons <u>since the Cold War</u>. As with technologies in the Cold War such as ABM and MIRV, each new technology must be studied so that educated policy decisions can be82 made by the great powers moving forward. Thus the implications of whether or not hypersonic glide vehicles are stabilizing or not is directly relevant to whether the states that have or will have them in the near future, should either unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally control them; or conversely, adopt and implement them on mass. <u><mark>Under <strong></mark>comprehensive <mark>examination</mark> of all the factors</strong> that relate to</u> strategic <u>stability, it becomes <strong>evident</u></strong> that <u>hypersonic</u> glide vehicles <u>will stabilize the relationship between the three great powers. Similar to</u> their <u>MIRV</u> counterparts <u>during the Cold War <mark>hypersonic</u></mark> glide vehicles are a particular response by states to <u><mark>increase</mark> <strong>the <mark>parity</mark> of their strategic relationships</strong>, and <mark>make</mark> <strong>their <mark>threats</mark> of assured destruction</strong> <mark>credible</mark>. Hyperglides <mark>offset</mark> <strong><mark>b</u></strong></mark>allistic <u><strong><mark>m</u></strong></mark>issile <u><strong><mark>d</u></strong></mark>efences <u><mark>and offer</u></mark> the ability for <u><strong>increased <mark>restraint</strong> when compared to</mark> <strong>their <mark>ICBM</mark> counterparts</u></strong> in their utilization as escalatory devices. <u><mark>They are <strong>better</mark> placed</u></strong> to escalate <u><mark>for</u></mark> the purposes of <u><mark>de-escalation and</u></mark> thus <u><mark>induce</mark> <strong>increased <mark>stability</u></strong></mark> to a strategic relationship. <u><strong>The theoretical <mark>matrix</strong></mark> <mark>indicates</u></mark> that it is highly plausible that moving forward <u>these <mark>weapons will <strong>stabilize</mark> rather than de-stabilize</strong> the strategic relationships between <strong>the three great powers</u></strong>. Theoretically, and historically- if MIRVs are indeed a similar case- then it is plausible that hyperglides will only serve to stabilize the strategic balance between the great powers. Interestingly, this paper argues contrary to the <u><mark>majority</u></mark> of current strategic <u>opinion</u> concerning hypersonic glide vehicles. It is likely that the discrepancy arises from the recognition that there are two ways to interpret the goal of modern strategic deterrence. Most of the community, at least implicitly, seems to reflect the belief that strategic deterrence is directed toward avoiding any strategic exchange. Similar to their historic counterparts during the Cold War, they <u><strong><mark>overvalue</strong></mark> the weight of <mark>counterforce</u></mark>83 <u><mark>against</mark> <strong>the <mark>other dimensions</mark> of stability</u></strong>. Ultimately, <u>American, Russian, and</u> probably <u>Chinese deterrence is not</u> in fact <u>directed towards avoiding any strategic exchange but rather</u> directed <u>toward avoiding <strong>a general war</strong>, and <strong>the civilizational costs associated</u></strong>. American strategy since the 1960s is an implicit proponent of the notion that escalation can be utilized to de-escalate before falling into a general war. So too, modern Russian strategy has adopted an escalate to de-escalate strategy for the purposes of not falling into an general war.159 Deterrence deals with perception and psychology, indicating that if the United States, and Russia believe that credible deterrence is one that allows for escalation then both implicitly believe in the ability for escalatory strategies to de-escalate a conflict. This means <u>inherently</u> that <u><mark>counterforce</mark> weapons <mark>have</mark> a <mark>positive impact on</u></mark> credibility, and through credibility to <u><strong><mark>MAD</mark> and stability</u></strong>. A theory that does not take into account the strategic doctrines and beliefs at least generally of the parties involved would fail to provide decision makers with policy decisions that will be enacted. Thus policy prescriptions should seek to understand the strategic balance as it is and provide the best advice it can regarding policy to positively impact the perceived stability of the relationship. <u>Deterrence is <strong>unique psychologically</strong>, because it relates to the recognition that <mark>if states <strong>believe</strong> a relationship is stable it <strong>is</mark> more stable</u></strong>. In this sense <u><mark>counterforce</u></mark> targeting <u><mark>is stabilizing because</mark> the great <mark>powers believe it</mark> to be</u> stabilizing. In any case <u><mark>it is</mark> <strong>the <mark>failure</strong> of</mark> <strong>the majority of hyperglide <mark>lit</mark>erature</strong> <mark>to</mark> <strong>properly <mark>understand</strong></mark> the goal o<mark>f</mark> modern <mark>deterrence</mark> and</u> thus they <u>accidentally claim</u> that weapons systems, such as <u>hyperglides, de-stabilize the relationship when in fact they stabilize it</u>. Recognizing then that hyperglides positively affect strategic stability, it is the position of this paper that this technology should be readily adopted by all the great powers. Indeed, they should not be controlled until their strategic aim has been met, and increased forces would overrun on costs. If that becomes the case, states should seek to control them on the back end laying out as they did with SALT I and the Vladivostok Accords, the strategic limits and boundaries of the relationship once all three parties are satisfied with their forces. In this regard, after full deployment the parties can engage one another and add increased stability by setting the upper limits of what the relationship will look like; and in so doing more readily cement the strategic stability between them. This should not be confused with the actual control of the weapons; as <u><mark>any control before</mark> <strong>great power strategic <mark>parity</strong></mark> has been achieved <mark>would</mark> a) <mark>not be possible</mark> because the <mark>Chinese and Russians would not agree to being</mark> <strong>so <mark>inferior</strong> and</mark> b) <strong><mark>cementing disparity</strong></mark> as it exists now <mark>would</u></mark> potentially over time begin to <u><mark>shift</mark> the relationship <mark>from parity to supremacy and</u></mark> in said <u>shift the relationship would be <mark>de-stabilized</u></mark>. At its heart, arms control should not be about refusing technological innovations. Rather, it should be directed toward controlling the affects that arms have on strategic relationships; meaning both that if a technology undermines the relationship it should be limited and controlled, and if a technology seeks to create a more stable relationship it should be adopted fully to each party’s extent and then have boundaries set, once all parties are convinced of the stability of the relationship vis-à-vis that technology. Hyperglide vehicles will stabilize the relationship, which over the past 30 years has become neglected; bringing increased85 stability to the relationship and decreasing the likelihood of war. As such <u><strong>the great <mark>powers</strong> should welcome this</mark> technology and <strong>its beneficial effects</strong> on strategic stability</u>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: CCB 21, a collective of researchers and writers working between technology and culture, computer science and information theory, aesthetics and politics. The members—Luciana Parisi, Ezekiel Dixon-Román, Tiziana Terranova, Oana Pârvan, and Brian D’Aquino—are situated in the US, the UK, and Southern Italy, and engage with networks spanning several continents to intervene in the techno-politics of racial capitalism and its recursive regeneration. (Critical Computation Bureau, “Editorial—“Dialogues on Recursive Colonialisms, Speculative Computation, and the Techno-social””, e-flux Journal, issue 123, https://www.e-flux.com/journal/123/438467/editorial-dialogues-on-recursive-colonialisms-speculative-computation-and-the-techno-social/) fulltext: Working in the strange attraction between speculative approaches, critical theorizations, and imaginary practices, this issue also asks how a technology or machine epistemology constituted by the entanglement between racial capitalism, recursive colonialisms, and computation can still overcome the overrepresentation of Man or Promethean cosmogonies. How does machine epistemology also allow for futures that run counter to a mere feeding into and from techno-social networks? In this procedure of abstraction, which could be called socio-technical or techno-sociogenic, the iterability of techno-signs through the flesh discloses the possibilities of otherwise languages, otherwise worlds, otherwise cognitions. If machine epistemology depended only on the cognitive extension or prosthetics of the brain’s neural networks, it would be just another version of the Promethean project of the mastery of tools. Machine epistemology does not articulate cognition in terms of embodiment in an environment, but rather in terms of a form of cognition. This entails a possibility for a techno-semiosis whereby the flesh at once remains and becomes the medium of the world and as such becomes a techno-sign of cultural formations. We have thus become aware of how the socio-technical or techno-sociogenic can inherit existing cosmogonies, not in a deterministic or imitative way, but through its iterability. But if techno-sociogenic flesh is shaped by repetition with alterity, it also takes on a mix of cosmogonies to make something else. What we call “cosmo-computation” entails a fully automated recursive system for which there is supposed to be no human-in-the-loop. This term applies Yuk Hui’s concept of cosmotechnics (which calls for a technical mediation between metaphysics and cultures that do not conform to the universal standardization of knowledge) to the cognitive paradigm of technology by asking what it would mean to experiment with auto-imaging multiple ontologies and multiple metaphysics through computation. But cosmo-computation still maintains the specter of whiteness and intensified legacies of racial capital within itself. These are legacies whereby computational schema cannot erase anti-blackness or the brutalities and techno-semiotic hieroglyphics marked in flesh. In other words, cosmo-computation must also work on the cyber-mechanics of the machine in relation to slavery, to take on and step outside the dialectic of the human and the thing. But how to run with cosmo-computational epistemologies without risking a reinforced universal logic or another plea to techno-cultural difference in the name of multiculturalism? What critical space is left to counter-actualize the recursivity of this double pincer that simply conceals the monologic discourse of self-determination through a proliferation of dualities? How can cosmo-computation—as a procedure of existing as techno-flesh—become a way to construct worlds from the heretical rules of what Denise Ferreira da Silva calls “difference without separability”? Cosmo-computation does not coincide with any reclamation of the modern history of technology that starts from the local, the periphery, or the colonies of the West. Its critical possibility lies in exposing the operative power of the universalism-multiculturalism double pincer in preserving the overrepresentation of Man. This critical moment is undoubtedly haunted by the “continuous present” (Fred Moten) of the brutalities of racial capitalism, colonialisms, and slavery. Thus, it must also become surrounded by practices of fugitivity, by speculative moments, methods, and activities that spring out of the negative negation (da Silva) of the slave, the refugee, the woman, the immigrant, the trans through the existence of otherwise techno-flesh that refuses the saving promise of Promethean Man. Our proposition is that machine epistemology, as a cosmo-computational affair, must not only challenge the view of techno-capital but also the human form. Within the history of machine epistemology, industrial capital took on the prototype of automation, replacing the archetype of enslaved labor. With the invention of the robot, the enslaved became enfleshed in machines as much as machines became the hosts of already brutally wounded flesh. Even if this modern form of recursive epistemology extended colonial mentalities into the model of global ecologies of extraction and commodity exchange, it had already voraciously incorporated into techno-capital an irreversible contagion that infiltrated the cosmogony of Man and his belief in the bio-economic myth of evolution. From this standpoint, it seems essential today to not separate the critical from the speculative moment. Speculation is not the opposite of critique, but rather the whirlwind, the spiral, the vortex, the invaginations of critique inside-out. In the critical there is always the possibility of the speculative. As such, cosmo-computation can also be a space of transversal epistemological possibility whereby otherwise cosmogonies are not originated by, from, or against Promethean Man, but are rather ante-universal patterns, fractal algorithms that come before and run beneath, alongside of, and break across the pattern. The dialogues in this issue are both critical and speculative interventions into practicing cosmo-computation as thinking with “difference without separability” and venturing into how AI—from expert systems to machine learning to interactive computational languages—contributes to defining what computational epistemologies can do. As much as recursivity preserves the iterability of functions and constitutes the structural parts of an overrepresentational whole, it also maintains a rhythm that is out of sync with itself, an atonality or dissonance in the beats. This out-of-sync rhythm and computational dissonance are the reverberations of a haunting that is not a trace of what was and no longer is, but rather tells us of the rhythm that stands apart. It tells us what exists within its elemental functions of counting infinities and of assembling together what falls out of patterns of recognition. What recursivity therefore entails is how the complexity of critique and speculation cannot be separated into two forms—into models or paradigms that are in contradiction or that fall into a linear order. Recursivity tells us that critique and speculation can happen at once—multiple times in space and multiple spaces in time. But this simultaneity also demarcates the interlayering of techno-flesh in the ongoing project of Promethean cosmogonies that have returned across and within the computational forms of colonialisms and racial capitalism. Speculation therefore works from within critique through the iterative moments exposing the continuous performance of anti-blackness and the renewed conjunctures of auto-poiesis that obliterate difference. From the techno-surrogacy of intelligent flesh to the necropower of planetary computation to the biopolitics of debilitation and the modulations of slow life/death, modes of haunting return to expose the 0 value of blackness across stateless and dispossessed realities of techno-social practices around the globe. What the enfleshed machine can do is to explode within r<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>The alternative is to embrace speculation through a machine epistemology. As computation becomes intermingled with whiteness, the response is to create moments of dissonance -- ruptures in planetary computation.</h4><p>CCB 21, </strong>a collective of researchers and writers working between technology and culture, computer science and information theory, aesthetics and politics. The members—Luciana Parisi, Ezekiel Dixon-Román, Tiziana Terranova, Oana Pârvan, and Brian D’Aquino—are situated in the US, the UK, and Southern Italy, and engage with networks spanning several continents to intervene in the techno-politics of racial capitalism and its recursive regeneration. (Critical Computation Bureau, “Editorial—“Dialogues on Recursive Colonialisms, Speculative Computation, and the Techno-social””, e-flux Journal, issue 123, https://www.e-flux.com/journal/123/438467/editorial-dialogues-on-recursive-colonialisms-speculative-computation-and-the-techno-social/)</p><p>Working in the strange attraction between speculative approaches, critical theorizations, and imaginary practices, this issue also asks how a technology or machine epistemology constituted by the entanglement between racial capitalism, recursive colonialisms, and computation can still overcome the overrepresentation of Man or Promethean cosmogonies. <u>How does machine epistemology also allow for futures that run counter to a mere feeding into and from techno-social networks</u>? In this procedure of abstraction, which could be called socio-technical or techno-sociogenic, the iterability of techno-signs through the flesh discloses the possibilities of otherwise languages, otherwise worlds, otherwise cognitions. <u>If machine epistemology depended only on the cognitive extension or prosthetics of the brain’s neural networks, it would be just another version of the Promethean project of the mastery of tools. <mark>Machine epistemology</mark> does not articulate cognition in terms of embodiment in an environment, but rather in terms of a form of cognition</u>. <u><strong>This <mark>entails a possibility for </mark>a <mark>techno-semiosis</u></strong></mark> whereby <u><strong><mark>the flesh </mark>at once remains and <mark>becomes the medium of the world and </mark>as such <mark>becomes a techno-sign of cultural formations</u></strong></mark>. <u>We have thus become aware of how the socio-technical or techno-sociogenic can inherit existing cosmogonies, not in a deterministic or imitative way, but <strong><mark>through</mark> its <mark>iterability</strong></mark>. But if techno-sociogenic flesh is shaped by repetition with alterity, it also takes on a mix of cosmogonies to make something else.</p><p>What we call “<mark>cosmo-computation” entails a</mark> <mark>fully automated recursive system f</mark>or which <strong>there is supposed to be no human-in-the-loop.</u></strong> This term applies Yuk Hui’s concept of cosmotechnics (which calls for a technical mediation between metaphysics and cultures that do not conform to the universal standardization of knowledge) to the cognitive paradigm of technology by asking what it would mean to experiment with auto-imaging multiple ontologies and multiple metaphysics through computation. <u>But <strong>cosmo-computation still <mark>maintains the specter of whiteness and </mark>intensified legacies of <mark>racial capital</mark> within itself</strong>. These are legacies whereby <strong><mark>computational schema cannot erase anti-blackness or the brutalities and techno-semiotic hieroglyphics</strong> marked in flesh</mark>. In other words, <strong>cosmo-computation must also work on the cyber-mechanics of the machine in relation to slavery, to take on and step outside the dialectic of the human and the thing</strong>.</p><p></u>But how to run with cosmo-computational epistemologies without risking a reinforced universal logic or another plea to techno-cultural difference in the name of multiculturalism? What critical space is left to counter-actualize the recursivity of this double pincer that simply conceals the monologic discourse of self-determination through a proliferation of dualities? How can cosmo<u><strong>-computation—as a procedure of existing as techno-flesh—become a way to construct worlds from the heretical rules of what Denise Ferreira da Silva calls “difference without separability”?</p><p></strong><mark>Cosmo-computation</mark> does not coincide with any reclamation of the modern history of technology that starts from the local, the periphery, or the colonies of the West. Its <mark>critical possibility lies in exposing the operative power of </mark>the <mark>universalism-multiculturalism</mark> double pincer in preserving the overrepresentation of Man</u>. This critical moment is undoubtedly haunted by the “continuous present” (Fred Moten) of the brutalities of racial capitalism, colonialisms, and slavery. <u><strong>Thus, <mark>it must</mark> also <mark>become surrounded by</mark> practices of <mark>fugitivity</mark>, by <mark>speculative moments, methods, and activities that spring out of the negative negation</mark> (da Silva) of the slave, the refugee, the woman, the immigrant, the trans <mark>through </mark>the existence of <mark>otherwise techno-flesh</mark> that refuses the saving promise of Promethean Man.</p><p></u></strong>Our proposition is that <u><strong><mark>machine epistemology</strong></mark>, as a cosmo-computational affair, <strong><mark>must</strong></mark> not only <strong><mark>challenge</mark> the view of techno-capital but also <mark>the human form</strong></mark>. Within the history of machine epistemology, <strong><mark>industrial capital took on</mark> the prototype of <mark>automation</mark>, <mark>replacing</mark> the archetype of <mark>enslaved labor</mark>. </strong>With the invention of the robot, <strong><mark>the enslaved became enfleshed in machines </mark>as much as machines became the hosts of already brutally wounded flesh</strong>. Even if this modern form of recursive epistemology extended <mark>colonial mentalities</mark> into the model of global ecologies of extraction and commodity exchange, it had already <mark>voraciously incorporated into techno-capital a</mark>n irreversible <mark>contagion that infiltrated the cosmogony of Man and his belief in the bio-economic myth of evolution</mark>.</p><p></u>From this standpoint, <u>it seems essential today to not separate the critical from the speculative moment. Speculation is not the opposite of critique, but rather the whirlwind, the spiral, the vortex, the invaginations of critique inside-out. <strong><mark>In the critical there is always the possibility of the speculative</mark>.</strong> As such, <strong><mark>cosmo-computation can also be a space of transversal epistemological possibility</strong></mark> whereby otherwise <mark>cosmogonies are not originated by, from, or against Promethean Man, but are rather <strong>ante-universal patterns, fractal algorithms that </mark>come before and run beneath, alongside of, and </strong>break across the pattern.</p><p></u>The dialogues in this issue are both critical and speculative interventions into practicing cosmo-computation as thinking with “difference without separability” and venturing into how AI—from expert systems to machine learning to interactive computational languages—contributes to defining what computational epistemologies can do. As much as recursivity preserves the iterability of functions and constitutes the structural parts of an overrepresentational whole, it also maintains a rhythm that is out of sync with itself, an atonality or dissonance in the <u>beats. This out-of-sync rhythm and <mark>computational dissonance</mark> are the reverberations of a haunting that is not a trace of what was and no longer is, but rather <mark>tells us of the rhythm that stands apart</mark>. It tells us what exists within its elemental functions of counting infinities <mark>and of assembling together what falls out of patterns </mark>of recognition.</p><p>What <mark>recursivity</mark> therefore <mark>entails</mark> is how the <mark>complexity of critique and speculation cannot be separated into two forms</mark>—into models or paradigms that are in contradiction or that fall into a linear order. Recursivity tells us that critique and speculation can happen at once—multiple times in space and multiple spaces in time</u>. <u><strong>But <mark>this</mark> simultaneity also <mark>demarcates the interlayering of techno-flesh </mark>in the ongoing project of Promethean cosmogonies <mark>that have returned across </mark>and within the <mark>computational forms of colonialisms and racial capitalism</strong></mark>.</p><p><mark>Speculation</mark> therefore <mark>works</mark> from <mark>within critique through</mark> the <strong><mark>iterative moments exposing the continuous performance of anti-blackness and the renewed conjunctures of auto-poiesis that obliterate difference</strong>.</mark> <mark>From</mark> the <mark>techno-surrogacy of intelligent flesh to </mark>the <mark>necropower of planetary computation </mark>to the biopolitics of debilitation and the modulations of slow life/death, <mark>modes of haunting return to expose the 0 value of blackness </mark>across stateless and dispossessed realities of <mark>techno-social practices </mark>around the globe. What <mark>the enfleshed machine can </mark>do is to <mark>explode within r</p></u></mark><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Green et al 18 (Bruce, Louis Stein Chair, Fordham University School of Law. Rebecca Roiphe, Professor of Law, New York Law School. 10-17-18 “Can the President Control the Department of Justice?” https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1931&context=faculty_scholarship JO) fulltext: In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court held that federal criminal prosecution is an executive function under Article II of the Constitution, not a legislative or judicial function or a function that the Executive Branch shares with another government branch.17 But designating criminal prosecution an “executive” function does not necessarily determine who within the Executive Branch has authority to make particular prosecutorial decisions. Criminal prosecution is not among the presidential powers enumerated in Article II.18 Federal legislation creates a Department of Justice with subordinate prosecutors headed by the Attorney General who collectively have authority to conduct federal criminal prosecutions.19 The question remains whether the President’s authority as chief executive,20 which includes a constitutional responsibility to “take care” that subordinate officers faithfully carry out their law enforcement responsibilities,21 implies that the President has authority, if he chooses to exercise it, to make prosecutorial decisions within the bounds of the law. Even if the Constitution does not itself commit control of criminal prosecutions to the President, is this authority implicit in the statutory establishment of the DOJ headed by an Attorney General who serves at the President’s will? The President—as chief executive—clearly possesses some authority, including policymaking authority, with respect to federal criminal justice.22 As President Obama recently described,23 the President may establish priorities for federal criminal law enforcement, and need not leave this responsibility entirely to the Attorney General.24 The President’s policy priorities—for instance, a decision to defer to state laws legalizing marijuana—may have implications for individual criminal cases, at least indirectly. The President’s only explicit constitutional role in individual criminal cases is to issue pardons,25 a power used not only to grant clemency to convicted criminal defendants,26 but also to forestall federal criminal prosecutions.27 Congress has also granted the President authority to appoint and to discharge the Attorney General who heads the DOJ,28 and this authority presumably has constitutional origins as well.29 However, the power to hire and fire does not necessarily imply the power to instruct subordinate officials how to do their jobs.30 The Court’s characterization of criminal prosecution as an executive function does not mean that the Executive has exclusive authority in this area. In our system of checks and balances, the powers of individual branches are not always exclusive.31 In the criminal context, in particular, Congress and the Judiciary exercise significant authority to circumscribe and influence federal prosecutors’ decision-making through procedural rules and statutes.32 Congress can also inquire into prosecutors’ decisionmaking in individual cases.33 Courts regulate prosecutors not only by interpreting and enforcing limits imposed by the Constitution, statutes, and rules, but by adopting rules of professional conduct and court rules governing the conduct of lawyers in criminal cases.34 To be sure, federal courts hesitate to interfere with prosecutors’ charging decisions unless prosecutors have clearly violated a constitutional provision.35 But, even in making charging and plea bargaining decisions, federal prosecutors act under some legislative and judicial constraints.36 Congress and the Judiciary can, directly or indirectly, determine not only how prosecutors, as executive officials, make prosecutorial decisions, such as whether to bring or dismiss criminal charges, but also who within the Executive Branch can serve as a prosecutor and make prosecutorial decisions in a given case. For example, having vested prosecutorial authority in a law department, Congress might expressly or implicitly determine that prosecutorial authority must be exercised exclusively by the Attorney General and subordinates in that department and not by others within the Executive Branch. Likewise, pursuant to its inherent authority over judicial proceedings, the federal Judiciary might establish restrictions on the exercise of prosecutorial authority that have the effect of excluding the President from certain decision-making. For example, courts might rely on their supervisory powers or the Due Process clause of the Constitution to require prosecutorial discretion to be exercised by lawyers who are free of political influences.37 At present, no federal law or court rule explicitly calls for federal prosecutors’ independence from the President.38 The concept might be so embedded in our understanding of criminal justice that both the Executive and Judiciary have implicitly accepted it in the way that they exercise their powers. Even if not, professional independence may be implicit in the work of contemporary prosecutors, as the courts and Congress—if not the DOJ— have come to understand it. The courts and Congress may have constructed the law around the premise of prosecutorial independence. Is this premise effectively woven into the fabric of the law, and if so, is it consistent with the President’s Article II power?3. Necessity As previously described, Roger Taney considered it necessary for the President to be able to control criminal prosecutions because some criminal cases implicate foreign affairs, the war power, or other federal policy on which the President has ultimate constitutional authority.138 Further, as discussed, the early instances in which presidents intervened in individual criminal cases, in fact, for the most part implicated international considerations. Especially with the expansion of federal criminal law, few federal cases implicate international or military concerns. It does not follow that the Constitution authorizes the President to control all federal criminal cases because there is a plausible presidential interest in a few. Even when a president might legitimately take an interest, there is no constitutional necessity for him to make the ultimate call. The alternative is for the President to make his views known to the Attorney General. In a case involving foreign affairs, for example, the Attorney General might consult with the President, others in the Administration, or both, and consider the broader implications of a criminal case and others’ preferences. But the Attorney General might still have the last word to ensure that decision-making is consistent with criminal justice policy and not only with foreign or other national policy. Lonnie Brown has discussed an example from Lyndon Johnson’s administration.139 President Johnson and his cabinet pressured Attorney General Ramsay Clark to prosecute black activists for conspiring to incite urban riots, based on their public addresses. Clark resisted, apparently believing that pursuing a prosecution would be a misuse of prosecutorial discretion in light of DOJ policies and traditions. It is doubtful that the President and the rest of the cabinet would be equally faithful to the DOJ’s policies and traditions. Clark’s assertion of ultimate decision-making responsibility ensured that, while other policy considerations would be weighed, criminal-justice considerations would have their due. The necessity argument also overlooks that the Constitution reserves most criminal enforcement power to the states, with the result that most criminal cases are, and always have been, brought in state court. State criminal cases, over which the President has no power, are as likely as federal ones to implicate foreign policy and other national policy.140 If presidential control is not a constitutional necessity in state criminal cases, there is no reason why it would be in federal cases. Finally, the necessity argument ignores countervailing policy considerations, addressed in Part III.If the division of authority between the Attorney General and subordinate DOJ lawyers is relatively settled, particularly to the satisfaction of the DOJ and its lawyers, the division of authority between the President and the Attorney General with regard to criminal prosecutions is not. The law is silent. On one hand, legislation does not explicitly make the Attorney General and the DOJ independent of the President, as it has done with some other executive agencies and officials.180 As a cabinet officer and presidential advisor, the Attorney General plainly answers to the President as to certain matters, and one might assume that absent an express limitation on presidential power, the President may control the Attorney General as to all matters. On the other hand, federal legislation has never explicitly authorized the President to make decisions in criminal investigations and prosecutions or to direct the decisions of the Attorney General, United States Attorneys, or other prosecutors. Statutes leave it uncertain whether there is a particular aspect of the Attorney General’s work—criminal investigation and prosecution—as to which the Attorney General, and through him, subordinate government lawyers, have ultimate decision-making authority and must answer to the law, not the President. In situations such as this one, where legislation is silent, courts look to Congress’s implicit intent. Implicit legislative intent regarding the division or allocation of power may be reflected not only in the structure and purpose of legislation but in conduct, and attendant understandings, over time—in other words, historical practice. Just as historical practice plays a role in constitutional interpretation,181 courses of conduct and understandings developed over time help answer statutory interpretation questions about the scope of presidential power.182 Congressional silence in response to sustained or repeated conduct may express congressional acquiescence in the exercise of authority.183 In particular, implied under standings reflected in a course of conduct may inform questions about the allocation of authority within the Executive Branch itself. As noted, the Supreme Court’s earliest understanding regarding the allocation of power between the Attorney General and district attorneys was not derived from statutory language but from the course of dealings within the Executive Branch.184 The next part of this Article shows that prosecutorial independence is so clearly a part of our democratic system that Congress’s failure to authorize presidential control shows acquiescence or implicit endorsement. While the concept of congressional acquiescence has been challenged when it comes to questions about the allocation of power between Congress and the President,185 the concept should be far less controversial with regard to the division of authority within the Executive Branch. Congress meant for someone within the Executive Branch to have the last word on the conduct of criminal cases—either the President or the Attorney General. If the law is uncertain, there is no reason to presume which should possess this authority. Congressional intent must be sought wherever it can be found. Whether or not historic practice is dispositive, it can surely weigh heavily in the balance. Because the Constitution, while providing pardon power, does not otherwise authorize the President to act in criminal cases, the President’s authority would be “at its lowest ebb” in the criminal context unless, in a particular case, one could argue that an enumerated presidential power was implicated.186<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Criminal justice enforcement falls <u>exclusively</u><strong> under the executive AND is intrinsic to war powers authority – Congressional oversteps spill over</h4><p>Green et al 18 </strong>(Bruce, Louis Stein Chair, Fordham University School of Law. Rebecca Roiphe, Professor of Law, New York Law School. 10-17-18 “Can the President Control the Department of Justice?” https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1931&context=faculty_scholarship JO)</p><p>In Morrison v. Olson, the <u>Supreme Court held that federal criminal prosecution is an executive function under Article II of the Constitution, not a legislative or judicial function or a function that the Executive Branch shares with another government branch.</u>17 But designating criminal prosecution an “executive” function does not necessarily determine who within the Executive Branch has authority to make particular prosecutorial decisions. Criminal prosecution is not among the presidential powers enumerated in Article II.18 Federal legislation creates a Department of Justice with subordinate prosecutors headed by the Attorney General who collectively have authority to conduct federal criminal prosecutions.19 The question remains whether the <u><mark>President’s authority</mark> as chief executive,20 which <mark>includes</mark> a constitutional <mark>responsibility to “take care”</mark> <mark>that</mark> subordinate <mark>officers</mark> faithfully <mark>carry out</mark> their <mark>law enforcement</mark> responsibilities</u>,21 <u>implies that the President has authority, if he chooses to exercise it, to make prosecutorial decisions within the bounds of the law</u>. Even if the Constitution does not itself commit control of criminal prosecutions to the President, is this authority implicit in the statutory establishment of the DOJ headed by an Attorney General who serves at the President’s will? <u><strong>The <mark>President</mark>—as chief executive—<mark>clearly possesses</mark> some <mark>authority, </mark>including policymaking authority, <mark>with respect to federal criminal justice</mark>.</u></strong>22 As President Obama recently described,23 <u>the President may establish priorities for federal criminal law enforcement, and need not leave this responsibility entirely to the Attorney General.</u>24 The President’s policy priorities—for instance, a decision to defer to state laws legalizing marijuana—may have implications for individual criminal cases, at least indirectly. The President’s only explicit constitutional role in individual criminal cases is to issue pardons,25 a power used not only to grant clemency to convicted criminal defendants,26 but also to forestall federal criminal prosecutions.27 <u>Congress has also granted the President authority to appoint and to discharge the Attorney General who heads the DOJ,28 and this authority presumably has constitutional origins as well</u>.29 However, the power to hire and fire does not necessarily imply the power to instruct subordinate officials how to do their jobs.30 The Court’s characterization of criminal prosecution as an executive function does not mean that the Executive has exclusive authority in this area. In our system of checks and balances, the powers of individual branches are not always exclusive.31 In the criminal context, in particular, Congress and the Judiciary exercise significant authority to circumscribe and influence federal prosecutors’ decision-making through procedural rules and statutes.32 Congress can also inquire into prosecutors’ decisionmaking in individual cases.33 Courts regulate prosecutors not only by interpreting and enforcing limits imposed by the Constitution, statutes, and rules, but by adopting rules of professional conduct and court rules governing the conduct of lawyers in criminal cases.34 To be sure, <u>federal courts hesitate to interfere with prosecutors’ charging decisions </u>unless prosecutors have clearly violated a constitutional provision.35 But, even in making charging and plea bargaining decisions, federal prosecutors act under some legislative and judicial constraints.36 Congress and the Judiciary can, directly or indirectly, determine not only how prosecutors, as executive officials, make prosecutorial decisions, such as whether to bring or dismiss criminal charges, but also who within the Executive Branch can serve as a prosecutor and make prosecutorial decisions in a given case. For example, having vested prosecutorial authority in a law department, <u><mark>Congress might expressly</mark> or implicitly <mark>determine</mark> that <mark>prosecutorial authority</mark> must <mark>be</mark> <mark>exercised exclusively</mark> <mark>by</mark> the <mark>A</mark>ttorney <mark>G</mark>eneral and subordinates in that department and not by others within the Executive Branch. </u>Likewise, pursuant to its inherent authority over judicial proceedings, the federal Judiciary might establish restrictions on the exercise of prosecutorial authority that have the effect of excluding the President from certain decision-making. For example, <u>courts might rely on their supervisory powers or the Due Process clause of the Constitution to require prosecutorial discretion to be exercised by lawyers who are free of political influences.</u>37 <u><strong>At present<mark>, no federal law</mark> or court rule <mark>explicitly calls for</mark> federal <mark>prosecutors’ independence</mark> from the President.</u></strong>38 The concept might be so embedded in our understanding of criminal justice that both the Executive and Judiciary have implicitly accepted it in the way that they exercise their powers. Even if not, professional independence may be implicit in the work of contemporary prosecutors, as the courts and Congress—if not the DOJ— have come to understand it. The courts and Congress may have constructed the law around the premise of prosecutorial independence. Is this premise effectively woven into the fabric of the law, and if so, is it consistent with the President’s Article II power?3. Necessity As previously described, Roger Taney considered it <u><strong><mark>necessary for</mark> the <mark>President to</mark> be able to <mark>control criminal</mark> <mark>prosecutions</mark> </u></strong>because some criminal cases<u><strong> <mark>implicate foreign affairs</mark>, <mark>the war power</mark>, or other federal policy on which the President has ultimate constitutional authority</u></strong>.138 Further, as discussed, the early instances in which presidents intervened in individual criminal cases, in fact, for the most part implicated international considerations. Especially with the expansion of federal criminal law, few federal cases implicate international or military concerns. It does not follow that the Constitution authorizes the President to control all federal criminal cases because there is a plausible presidential interest in a few. Even when a president might legitimately take an interest, there is no constitutional necessity for him to make the ultimate call. The alternative is for the President to make his views known to the Attorney General. In a case involving foreign affairs, for example, the Attorney General might consult with the President, others in the Administration, or both, and consider the broader implications of a criminal case and others’ preferences. But the Attorney General might still have the last word to ensure that decision-making is consistent with criminal justice policy and not only with foreign or other national policy. Lonnie Brown has discussed an example from Lyndon Johnson’s administration.139 President Johnson and his cabinet pressured Attorney General Ramsay Clark to prosecute black activists for conspiring to incite urban riots, based on their public addresses. Clark resisted, apparently believing that pursuing a prosecution would be a misuse of prosecutorial discretion in light of DOJ policies and traditions. It is doubtful that the President and the rest of the cabinet would be equally faithful to the DOJ’s policies and traditions. Clark’s assertion of ultimate decision-making responsibility ensured that, while other policy considerations would be weighed, criminal-justice considerations would have their due. The necessity argument also overlooks that the Constitution reserves most criminal enforcement power to the states, with the result that most criminal cases are, and always have been, brought in state court. State criminal cases, over which the President has no power, are as likely as federal ones to implicate foreign policy and other national policy.140 If presidential control is not a constitutional necessity in state criminal cases, there is no reason why it would be in federal cases. Finally, the necessity argument ignores countervailing policy considerations, addressed in Part III.If the division of authority between the Attorney General and subordinate DOJ lawyers is relatively settled, particularly to the satisfaction of the DOJ and its lawyers, the division of authority between the President and the Attorney General with regard to criminal prosecutions is not. The law is silent. On one hand, legislation does not explicitly make the Attorney General and the DOJ independent of the President, as it has done with some other executive agencies and officials.180 As a cabinet officer and presidential advisor, the Attorney General plainly answers to the President as to certain matters, and one might assume that absent an express limitation on presidential power, the President may control the Attorney General as to all matters. On the other hand, federal legislation has never explicitly authorized the President to make decisions in criminal investigations and prosecutions or to direct the decisions of the Attorney General, United States Attorneys, or other prosecutors. Statutes leave it uncertain whether there is a particular aspect of the Attorney General’s work—criminal investigation and prosecution—as to which the Attorney General, and through him, subordinate government lawyers, have ultimate decision-making authority and must answer to the law, not the President. In situations such as this one, where legislation is silent, courts look to Congress’s implicit intent. Implicit legislative intent regarding the division or allocation of power may be reflected not only in the structure and purpose of legislation but in conduct, and attendant understandings, over time—in other words, historical practice. Just as historical practice plays a role in constitutional interpretation,181 <u>courses of conduct and understandings developed over time help answer statutory interpretation questions about the scope of presidential power.</u>182 <u><strong><mark>Congres</mark>sional <mark>silence</mark> in response to sustained or repeated conduct may <mark>express</mark> congressional <mark>acquiescence in the exercise of authority</mark>.</u></strong>183 In particular, <u>implied under standings reflected in a course of conduct may inform questions about the allocation of authority within the Executive Branch itself.</u> As noted, the Supreme Court’s earliest understanding regarding the allocation of power between the Attorney General and district attorneys was not derived from statutory language but from the course of dealings within the Executive Branch.184 The next part of this Article shows that prosecutorial independence is so clearly a part of our democratic system that Congress’s failure to authorize presidential control shows acquiescence or implicit endorsement. While the concept of congressional acquiescence has been challenged when it comes to questions about the allocation of power between Congress and the President,185 the concept should be far less controversial with regard to the division of authority within the Executive Branch. Congress meant for someone within the Executive Branch to have the last word on the conduct of criminal cases—either the President or the Attorney General. If the law is uncertain, there is no reason to presume which should possess this authority. Congressional intent must be sought wherever it can be found. Whether or not historic practice is dispositive, it can surely weigh heavily in the balance. Because the Constitution, while providing pardon power, does not otherwise authorize the President to act in criminal cases, the President’s authority would be “at its lowest ebb” in the criminal context unless, in a particular case, one could argue that an enumerated presidential power was implicated.186</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Labalme 2 fulltext: (“Activism: Peace: NVCD: Discrimination”, http://www.activism.net/peace/nvcdh/discrimination.shtml; Jacob) In this action, our struggle is not only against missiles and bombs, but against the system of power they defend: a system based on domination, on the belief that some people have more value than others, and therefore have the right to control others, to exploit them so that they can lead better lives than those they oppress.¶ We say that all people have value. No person, no group, has the right to wield power over the decisions and resources of others. The structure of our organizations and the processes we use among ourselves are our best attempt to live our belief in self-determination. Besides working against discrimination of all kinds among ourselves, we must try to understand how such discrimination supports the system which produces nuclear weapons.¶ For some people who come to this action, the overriding issue is the struggle to prevent nuclear destruction. For others, that struggle is not separate from the struggles against racism, sexism, classism, and the oppression of groups of people because of their sexual orientation, religion, age, physical (dis)ability, appearance, or life history. Understood this way, it is clear that nuclear weapons are already killing people, forcing them to lead lives of difficulty and struggle. Nuclear war has already begun, and it claims its victims disproportionately from native peoples, the Third World, women, and those who are economically vulnerable because of the history of oppression.¶ All oppressions are interlocking. We separate racism, classism, etc. in order to discuss them, not to imply that any form of oppression works in isolation. We know that to work against any one of these is not just to try to stop something negative, but to build a positive vision. Many in the movement call this larger goal feminism. Calling our process "feminist process" does not mean that women dominate or exclude men; on the contrary, it challenges all systems of domination. The term recognizes the historical importance of the feminist movement in insisting that nonviolence begins at home, in the ways we treat each other.¶ Confronting the issues that divide us is often painful. People may feel guilty, or hurt, or react defensively when we begin to speak of these things, as if they were being personally accused. But working through this pain together, taking responsibility for our oppressive behavior, is part of our struggle to end the nuclear arms race. Asking members of oppressed groups to be the catalyst for this change is avoiding our own responsibility for discrimination. Most of us benefit from some form of privilege due to our sex, or class, or skin color, or sexual orientation, but that privilege is limited. None of us alone has the power to end institutions of discrimination. Only when we struggle together can we hope to do so -- and when pain and hurt arise in that struggle, we can see it as a measure of the depth to which discrimination hurts us all, keeping us separated and divided in our strength.¶ Racism, Classism, Sexism, Heterosexism and Militarism¶ Part of struggling against nuclear weapons involves understanding the ways in which the oppression of particular groups of people supports militarism, makes the institutionalized system of war and violence appear "natural" and "inevitable." For instance, heterosexism, or the assumption that sexual relations are only permissible, desirable, and normal between opposite sexes, justifies a system of rigid sex roles, in which men and women are expected to behave and look in particular ways, and in which qualities attributed to women are devalued. Thus, men who are not willing to be violent are not virile -- they are threatened with the real sanctions placed on homosexuality (physical violence, housing and economic discrimination) unless they behave like "real men." The military relies upon homophobia (the fear of homosexuality) to provide it with willing enlistees, with soldiers who are trained to kill others to prove their masculinity.¶ Sexism, or the systematic devaluation of women, is clearly related to this. Women have traditionally opposed war because women bear the next generation and feel a responsiblity to protect it. But feminists are not content to speak only from traditional roles as mothers and nurturers. Many activists see a feminist analysis as crucial to effectively challenging militarism. The system of patriarchy, under which men benefit from the oppression of women, supports and thrives on war. In a sexist or patriarchal society, women are relegated to limited roles and valued primarily for their sexual and reproductive functions, while men are seen as the central makers of culture, the primary actors in history. Patriarchy is enforced by the language and images of our culture; by keeping women in the lowest paying and lowest status jobs, and by violence against women in the home and on the streets. Women are portrayed by the media as objects to be violated; 50% of women are battered by men in their lives, 75% are sexually assaulted.¶ The sexist splitting of humanity which turns women into others, lesser beings whose purpose is to serve men, is the same split which allows us to see our enemies as non-human, fair game for any means of destruction or cruelty. In war, the victors frequently rape the women of the conquered peoples. Our country's foreign policy often seems directed by teenage boys desparately trying to live up to stereotypes of male toughness, with no regard for the humanity or land of their "enemy." Men are socialized to repress emotions, to ignore their needs to nurture and cherish other people and the earth. Emotions, tender feelings, care for the living, and for those to come are not seen as appropriate concerns of public policy. This makes it possible for policymakers to conceive of nuclear war as "winnable."¶ Similarly, racism, or the institutionalized devaluation of darker peoples, supports both the idea and the practice of the military and the production of nuclear weapons. Racism operates as a system of divide and conquer. It helps to perpetuate a system in which some people consistently are "haves" and others are "have nots." Racism tries to make white people forget that all people need and are entitled to self-determination, good health care, and challenging work. Racism limits our horizons to what presently exists; it makes us suppose that current injustices are "natural," or it makes those injustices invisible. For example, most of the uranium used in making nuclear weapons is mined under incredibly hazardous conditions by people of color: Native Americans and black South Africans. Similarly, most radioactive and hazardous waste dumps are located on lands owned or occupied by people of color. If all those people suffering right now from exposure to nuclear materials were white, would nuclear production remain acceptable to the white-dominated power structure?¶ Racism also underlies the concept of "national security": that the U.S. must protect its "interests" in Third World countries through the exercise of military force and economic manipulation. In this world-view, the darker peoples of the world are incapable of managing their own affairs and do not have the right to self-determination. Their struggles to democratize their countries and become independent of U.S. military and economic institutions are portrayed as "fanatic," "terrorist," or "Communist." The greatest danger of nuclear war today lies in the likelihood of superpower intervention in Third World countries, fueled by government appeals to nationalistic and racist interests.¶ All forms of discrimination are interrelated with economic discrimination, or classism. Classism justifies a system in which competition is the norm, and profit is believed to be a universal motivation. Thus, poor and working class people lack access to education, leisure time and frequently basic things like food and shelter. But a classist society blames them for their poverty, or devalues their particular way of living. Classism values certain kinds of work over others, and sets up a system of unequal rewards. Our society threatens the majority of our members with economic insecurity, forcing us to accept things the way they are for fear of losing the few things we've gained through hard work. Since most poor people are women, children and people of color, classism and other forms of discrimination work together to hide the injustice of our economic system.¶ Poor and working class people feel the effects of the military directly, profoundly, and brutally. Vital social services have been cut to feed the Pentagon. Inflation, aggravated by the military budget, chews away at what is left after disproportionately high taxes are deducted from our pay. Poor people are prime military recruits, with historically little access to draft deferments or information about conscientious objection, forced by unemployment to think of the military as a "career opportunity." Our militarized society does not support cooperative and socially productive work, but counts on unequal competition and economic deprivation to provide workers in defense industries, miners in uranium mines, and soldiers in the armed forces.¶ No human being is born with discriminatory attitudes and beliefs. Physical and cultural attitudes are not the causes of oppression; these differences are used to justify oppression. Racist, classist, sexist, heterosexist, and all other forms of discriminatory attitudes are a mixture of misinformation and ignorance which have to be imposed on young people through a painful process of social conditioning. These processes are left unchallenged partially because people feel powerless to do anything about them. But the situation is not hopeless. People can grow and change. Many successful struggles have taken place against structures of exploitation and discrimination. We are not condemned to repeat the past. Discriminatory conditioning can be analyzed and unlearned.¶ All people come from traditions which have a history of resistance to injustice, and every person has their own individual history of resistance to discriminatory conditioning. This history needs to be recalled and celebrated, and people need to listen to and learn from other people's histories. When people act from a sense of informed pride in themselves and their own traditions, they will be more effective in all struggles for justice and peace.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>Militarism is tied with racism, sexism, heteronormativity, and every other form of oppression – it creates structural trends that ensure ongoing slow violence</h4><p>Labalme 2</p><p></strong>(“Activism: Peace: NVCD: Discrimination”, http://www.activism.net/peace/nvcdh/discrimination.shtml; Jacob)</p><p>In this action, <u><mark>our struggle is not</u></mark> only <u><mark>against</mark> missiles and <mark>bombs, but against the system</mark> of power they defend: a system <mark>based on domination</mark>, on the belief that some people have</u> more value than others, and therefore have <u>the right to control others, to exploit them</u> so that they can lead better lives than those they oppress.¶ We say that all people have value. <u>No person, no group, has the right to wield power over the decisions and resources of others.</u> The structure of our organizations and the processes we use among ourselves are our best attempt to live our belief in self-determination. <u>Besides working against discrimination of all kinds among ourselves, we must try to understand how such discrimination supports the system which produces</u> nuclear <u>weapons.</u>¶ <u>For some people</u> who come to this action, <u>the overriding issue is the struggle to prevent nuclear destruction.</u> For others, <u>that struggle is not separate from the struggles against racism, sexism, classism, and the oppression of groups of people because of their sexual orientation, religion, age, physical (dis)ability, appearance, or life history.</u> Understood this way, it is clear that <u><strong><mark>nuclear weapons are already killing people</strong>, forcing them to lead lives of difficulty and struggle. <strong>Nuclear war has already begun</strong></mark>, and it claims its victims disproportionately from native peoples, the Third World, women, and those who are economically vulnerable because of the history of oppression.</u>¶ <u><strong><mark>All oppressions are interlocking.</u></strong></mark> <u>We separate racism, classism, etc. in order to discuss them, not to imply that any form of oppression works in isolation.</u> We know that <u>to work against</u> any one of <u>these is not just to try to stop something negative, but to build a positive vision.</u> Many in the movement call this larger goal feminism. Calling our process "feminist process" does not mean that women dominate or exclude men; on the contrary, it challenges all systems of domination. The term recognizes the historical importance of the feminist movement in insisting that <u><strong><mark>nonviolence begins at home, in the ways we treat each other.</u></strong></mark>¶ Confronting the issues that divide us is often painful. People may feel guilty, or hurt, or react defensively when we begin to speak of these things, as if they were being personally accused. But working through this pain together, <u><mark>taking responsibility for our oppressive behavior, is part of our struggle to end the nuclear arms race.</mark> Asking members of oppressed groups to be the catalyst for this change is avoiding our own responsibility for discrimination. Most of us benefit from some form of privilege</u> due to our sex, or class, or skin color, or sexual orientation, but that privilege is limited. None of us alone has the power to end institutions of discrimination. Only when we struggle together can we hope to do so -- and when pain and hurt arise in that struggle, we can see it as a measure of the depth to which discrimination hurts us all, keeping us separated and divided in our strength.¶ <u>Racism, Classism, Sexism, Heterosexism and Militarism</u>¶ <u>Part of struggling against nuclear weapons involves understanding the ways in which</u> the <u>oppression</u> of particular groups of people <u>supports militarism, makes the institutionalized system of war and violence appear "natural" and "inevitable."</u> For instance, <u>heterosexism</u>, or the assumption that sexual relations are only permissible, desirable, and normal between opposite sexes, <u>justifies a system of rigid sex roles</u>, in which men and women are expected to behave and look in particular ways, and <u>in which qualities attributed to women are devalued. Thus, men who are not willing to be violent are</u> not virile -- they are <u>threatened</u> with the real sanctions placed on homosexuality (physical violence, housing and economic discrimination) <u>unless they behave like "real men." The military relies upon homophobia</u> (the fear of homosexuality) to provide it with willing enlistees, with soldiers who are trained to kill others to prove their masculinity.¶ <u>Sexism</u>, or the systematic devaluation of women, <u>is clearly related to this.</u> Women have traditionally opposed war because women bear the next generation and feel a responsiblity to protect it. But feminists are not content to speak only from traditional roles as mothers and nurturers. <u>Many activists see a feminist analysis as crucial to effectively challenging militarism.</u> The system of <u>patriarchy</u>, under which men benefit from the oppression of women, <u>supports and thrives on war. In a</u> sexist or <u>patriarchal society, women are relegated to</u> limited roles and valued primarily for their <u>sexual and reproductive functions, while men are seen as the</u> central makers of culture, the <u>primary actors in history.</u> Patriarchy is enforced by the language and images of our culture; by keeping women in the lowest paying and lowest status jobs, and by violence against women in the home and on the streets. Women are portrayed by the media as objects to be violated; 50% of women are battered by men in their lives, 75% are sexually assaulted.¶ <u>The sexist splitting of humanity which turns women into others</u>, lesser beings whose purpose is to serve men, <u>is the same split which allows us to see our enemies as non-human</u>, fair game for any means of destruction or cruelty. <u>In war, the victors frequently rape the women of the conquered peoples.</u> Our country's foreign policy often seems directed by teenage boys desparately trying to live up to stereotypes of male toughness, with no regard for the humanity or land of their "enemy." Men are socialized to repress emotions, to ignore their needs to nurture and cherish other people and the earth. <u>Emotions, tender feelings, care for the living</u>, and for those to come <u>are not seen as appropriate concerns of public policy. This makes it possible for policymakers to conceive of nuclear war as "winnable."</u>¶ <u>Similarly, racism</u>, or the institutionalized devaluation of darker peoples, <u>supports</u> both <u>the idea and the practice of the military</u> and the production of nuclear weapons. <u>Racism operates as a system of divide and conquer.</u> It helps to perpetuate a system in which some people consistently are "haves" and others are "have nots." <u>Racism tries to make white people forget that all people need and are entitled to self-determination, good health care, and challenging work. Racism</u> limits our horizons to what presently exists; it <u>makes us suppose that current injustices are "natural," or it makes those injustices invisible.</u> For example, <u>most</u> of the <u>uranium</u> used <u>in</u> making <u>nuclear weapons is mined under incredibly hazardous conditions by people of color: Native Americans and black South Africans. Similarly, most radioactive and hazardous waste dumps are located on lands owned or occupied by people of color. If all those people suffering right now from exposure to nuclear materials were white, would nuclear production remain acceptable to the white-dominated power structure?</u>¶ <u>Racism</u> also <u>underlies the concept of "national security": that the U.S. must protect its "interests" in Third World countries through the exercise of military force</u> and economic manipulation. <u>In this world-view, the darker peoples of the world are incapable of managing their own affairs and do not have the right to self-determination.</u> Their struggles to democratize their countries and become independent of U.S. military and economic institutions are portrayed as "fanatic," "terrorist," or "Communist." <u>The greatest danger of nuclear war today lies in the likelihood of superpower intervention in Third World countries, fueled by government appeals to nationalistic and racist interests.</u>¶ <u>All forms of discrimination are interrelated with economic discrimination</u>, or classism. Classism justifies a system in which competition is the norm, and profit is believed to be a universal motivation. Thus, poor and working class people lack access to education, leisure time and frequently basic things like food and shelter. But a classist society blames them for their poverty, or devalues their particular way of living. Classism values certain kinds of work over others, and sets up a system of unequal rewards<u>. Our society threatens the majority of our members with economic insecurity, forcing us to accept things the way they are for fear of losing</u> the few things we've gained through hard <u>work.</u> Since most poor people are women, children and people of color, classism and other forms of discrimination work together to hide the injustice of our economic system.¶ <u>Poor and working class people feel the effects of the military directly, profoundly, and brutally. Vital social services have been cut to feed the Pentagon.</u> Inflation, aggravated by the military budget, chews away at what is left after disproportionately high taxes are deducted from our pay. <u>Poor people are prime military recruits</u>, with historically little access to draft deferments or information about conscientious objection, <u>forced by unemployment to think of the military as a "career opportunity." Our militarized society</u> does not support cooperative and socially productive work, but <u>counts on</u> unequal competition and <u>economic deprivation to provide workers in defense industries, miners in uranium mines, and soldiers in the armed forces.</u>¶ <u>No human being is born with discriminatory attitudes and beliefs. Physical and cultural attitudes are not the causes of oppression; these differences are used to justify oppression. Racist, classist, sexist, heterosexist, and all other forms of discriminatory attitudes are a mixture of misinformation and ignorance which have to be imposed on young people through a painful process of social conditioning. These processes are left unchallenged partially because people feel powerless to do anything about them. But the situation is not hopeless. People can grow and change. Many successful struggles have taken place against structures of exploitation and discrimination. We are not condemned to repeat the past.</u> Discriminatory conditioning can be analyzed and unlearned.¶ All people come from traditions which have a history of resistance to injustice, and every person has their own individual history of resistance to discriminatory conditioning. This history needs to be recalled and celebrated, and people need to listen to and learn from other people's histories. When people act from a sense of informed pride in themselves and their own traditions, they will be more effective in all struggles for justice and peace.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Barr ’17 (Michael S. Barr – Professor of Law, Faculty Director of Finance, and Professor of Public Policy @ the University of Michigan, nonresident senior fellow at the Center for American Profess, JD @ Yale, “Financial Reform: Making the System Safer and Fairer,” 4 January 2017, http://www.rsfjournal.org/doi/full/10.7758/RSF.2017.3.1.01) fulltext: OVERVIEW OF REFORMS Today, major financial firms are subject to higher prudential standards, including higher capital and liquidity requirements, stress tests, and resolution planning through “living wills.” By forcing firms to internalize more of the costs that they impose on the system, they will be incentivized to shrink and reduce their complexity, leverage, and interconnections. Should such a firm fail, there will be a bigger capital buffer to absorb losses. To stem a panic, the Dodd-Frank Act permits the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to resolve the largest and most interconnected financial companies without exposing the system to a sudden, disorderly failure that puts the economy at risk. On the global level, the international community has put forward new rules on capital, so that there are bigger buffers in the system in the event of failures. Capital will be measured in a more conservative way, and capital levels are going up significantly. Systemically important firms will hold even higher levels of capital. There are new rules on liquidity and a global leverage limit. Derivatives reforms are proceeding, as are new approaches to dealing with the risks from repo and securities financing transactions. Yet much more work remains to be done, and the financial sector did not leave the battlefield after their defeats in 2010. Far from it. The brutal fight over financial reform rages on, and there is serious risk that a collective amnesia about the causes and consequences of the financial crisis appears to be descending on global financial capitals that will further weaken the resolve for reform (See, for example, Coffee 2011, 2012). COMPARING U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATION PRE-CRISIS AND POST-REFORM Many readers may be skeptical regarding the efficacy of the reforms that have taken place thus far, either because they think they did not change the system enough, or because they think that they went too far. The following section takes the time to chart the path of reform so far, before turning to the difficulties and dangers on the road ahead. First, before Dodd-Frank, if an entity was a bank, it had tougher regulations, more stringent capital requirements, and more robust supervision; but if an entity was an investment bank engaged in the same kind of maturity transformation, it had to abide by different rules (see Scott 2010). When U.S. investment banks needed to find a “consolidated holding company regulator” in order to meet European Union standards for doing business in Europe, the Securities and Exchange Commission set up a voluntary Consolidated Supervised Entity program which had little oversight. The SEC was not established as a prudential regulator, did not have clear supervisory power, and had little experience and few trained examiners. Moreover, the leverage ratio that served as a backstop for bank capital requirements was not applied to investment banks. The Federal Reserve was too lax in supervising firms where it did have authority and it did not have any authority to set and enforce capital requirements on the major institutions that operated businesses outside of bank holding companies. That meant it had no supervision over investment banks, diversified financial institutions such as AIG, or the nonbank financial companies competing with banks in the mortgage, consumer credit, and business lending markets. The Office of Thrift Supervision viewed its role as supervising thrifts, not their holding companies (such as AIG). Banks and thrifts freely engaged in risky mortgage lending, and regulators did not step in until it was too late. Today, Dodd-Frank has provided authority for clear, strong and consolidated supervision and regulation by the Federal Reserve of any financial firm—regardless of legal form—whose failure could pose a threat to financial stability. The largest investment banks that survived the financial crisis merged into or became bank holding companies subject to Fed oversight. AIG, GE Capital, Prudential, and MetLife have now been brought under Fed supervision through the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) designation. As a result of Dodd-Frank changes, thrift holding companies (including those with large insurance operations) are now supervised by the Fed. The Office of Thrift Supervision and the SEC’s investment bank regime have been abolished. Thus, all bank and thrift holding companies, as well as systemically important nonbank firms, regardless of corporate form, are supervised by the Federal Reserve. We will have a single point of accountability for tougher and more consistent supervision of the largest and most interconnected financial firms. Although the regulatory infrastructure is, to put it mildly, far from ideal, with too many divided responsibilities and too many opportunities for turf battles or regulatory gaps, Dodd-Frank created the FSOC, which is responsible for identifying threats to financial stability and dealing with them. The FSOC can recommend stricter regulatory action, and regulators must either implement such changes or explain publicly why they are not acting (see Gerson 2013). Already, this process has led the SEC to impose stricter regulation of money market funds than would otherwise have occurred (Barr 2015a). The FSOC has the potential to get information across the financial services marketplace through the Office of Financial Research (OFR), which Dodd-Frank established and empowered to collect data from any financial firm, and to develop and enforce standardization for data collection. The OFR has begun to use this authority by developing a “legal entity identifier” for financial transactions. The OFR is charged with independently assessing risks in the financial system, and can potentially serve as a counterweight to the Fed by providing independent assessments of whether the Fed is adequately supervising the largest firms and dealing with the critical issues in systemic risk. A strong OFR can serve as a check and balance for regulatory agencies, ensuring that they improve their own performance or risk being criticized (Ludwig 2012; Barr 2015a). Dodd-Frank provides for more stringent prudential standards and higher capital and liquidity standards for the largest bank and nonbank firms. In addition to the heightened capital requirements applicable to all firms, the largest firms are subject to a capital surcharge, a leverage ratio, a toughened supplemental leverage ratio, a more stringent liquidity requirement, and capital required to pass stress tests. Already, capital levels in the banking system have doubled, and banks’ use of short-term nondeposit funding has plummeted. The annual stress tests are evaluating a firm’s ability to withstand deep market contractions. There are enhanced rules on affiliate transactions and lending limits, and much stricter proposed limits on counterparty credit exposures. Deposit insurance premiums are going up on the very largest firms. The Volcker Rule prohibits banking entities from engaging in certain proprietary trading or running internal hedge funds, subject to a number of exceptions, and also helps to simplify the task of winding down major firms that are at risk of failure. Moreover, the Fed is using macro-prudential supervision as it increases its capacity to understand and mitigate risks to the financial system as a whole. There is a healthy debate about breaking up or limiting the size of financial firms. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, major firms are subject to a concentration limit that generally prohibits a financial company from engaging in mergers or acquisitions that would result in the firm’s liabilities—including wholesale funding and off-balance sheet exposures—exceeding 10 percent of the liabilities of financial companies as a whole. Dodd-Frank provides regulators with the authority to require financial institutions to restructure their activities to make it credible that they can be resolved if they are in danger of collapse; the resolution planning process has already forced firms to begin to simplify their organization form, develop “clean” holding companies, and place large amounts of capital and long-term debt in the holding company to assist with the resolution. The act also permits regulators to force firms to be broken up if they fail to submit a credible plan and thereafter fail to meet regulators’ requirements to restructure themselves to make resolution credible. Such firms can also be broken up if they are found to pose a grave threat to financial stability. These enhanced prudential measures for major financial firms are likely to reduce risk in the financial system, constrain further concentration, and reduce “too big to fail” distortions. Second, before Dodd-Frank, shadow banking markets grew dramatically with little oversight and in the absence of even regulatory or marketwide knowledge about the nature of the markets they were serving. For example, the OTC derivatives market—with a notional amount of $700 trillion at its peak—grew up in the shadows, with little oversight. Credit derivatives, which were supposed to diffuse risk, instead concentrated it. Synthetic securitization with embedded derivatives magnified failures in the real securitization market. Major financial firms used derivatives to increase their credit exposure to each other, rather than decrease it. We should never again face a situation—such as AIG’s $2 trillion derivatives portfolio—where the potential failure of a virtually unregulated, capital-deficient major player in the derivatives market can impose devastating risks on the entire system. Insufficient capital meant that major participants in the system could not reliably pay out on their obligations, and insufficient margin meant that counterparties on every transaction were more exposed to the risk of nonpayment. When the crisis began, regulators, financial firms, and investors had an insufficient understanding of the degree to which trouble at one firm spelled trouble for another, because of the opacity of the market. This lack of information magnified the contagion as the crisis intensified, causing a damaging wave of margin increases, deleveraging, and credit market breakdowns. Lack of transparency, insufficient supervision, and inadequate capital and margin left our financial system vulnerable to concentrations of risk, and to abuse. Today, under Dodd-Frank, regulators are putting in place the tools comprehensively to regulate the OTC derivatives market for the first time. The act requires all standardized derivatives to be centrally cleared, which will substantially reduce the buildup of bilateral counterparty credit risk<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Financialization is heavily regulated now – <u>capital limits</u>, <u>derivatives regulation</u>, and <u>stress-tests</u> insulate the financial sector from the wholesale economy</h4><p><strong>Barr ’17</strong> (Michael S. Barr – Professor of Law, Faculty Director of Finance, and Professor of Public Policy @ the University of Michigan, nonresident senior fellow at the Center for American Profess, JD @ Yale, “Financial Reform: Making the System Safer and Fairer,” 4 January 2017, http://www.rsfjournal.org/doi/full/10.7758/RSF.2017.3.1.01)</p><p><u>OVERVIEW OF REFORMS</p><p>Today</u>, <u><mark>major financial firms are subject to</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>higher prudential standards</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>including</mark> <mark>higher</mark> capital and <mark>liquidity requirements</mark>,</u> <u><strong><mark>stress tests</u></strong></mark>, <u>and</u> <u>resolution planning through “living wills.” <mark>By forcing firms to</mark> <strong><mark>internalize more of the costs</strong></mark> that they impose on the system, <mark>they will be</mark> <strong><mark>incentivized to shrink and reduce their complexity</u></strong></mark>, <u>leverage, and interconnections</u>. <u><mark>Should such a firm fail</mark>, <mark>there will be a</mark> <strong><mark>bigger capital buffer to absorb losses</u></strong></mark>. <u>To stem a panic, the Dodd-Frank Act permits the</u> Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (<u>FDIC</u>) <u>to resolve the largest and most interconnected financial companies <strong>without exposing the system</strong> to a sudden, disorderly failure that puts the economy at risk.</p><p>On the global level</u>, <u><mark>the international community has put forward new rules on capital</mark>, <mark>so that there are</mark> <strong><mark>bigger buffers in the system</strong></mark> in the event of failures</u>. <u>Capital will be measured in a <strong>more conservative way</u></strong>, <u>and capital levels are going up significantly</u>. <u>Systemically important firms will hold even higher levels of capital</u>. There are new rules on liquidity and a global leverage limit. <u><strong><mark>Derivatives reforms are proceeding</u></strong></mark>, <u>as are new approaches to dealing with the risks from repo and securities financing transactions</u>.</p><p>Yet much more work remains to be done, and the financial sector did not leave the battlefield after their defeats in 2010. Far from it. The brutal fight over financial reform rages on, and there is serious risk that a collective amnesia about the causes and consequences of the financial crisis appears to be descending on global financial capitals that will further weaken the resolve for reform (See, for example, Coffee 2011, 2012).</p><p>COMPARING U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATION PRE-CRISIS AND POST-REFORM</p><p><u><strong><mark>Many readers may be skeptical</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>regarding the efficacy of the reforms</mark> that have taken place thus far, either <mark>because they think they did not change the system enough</mark>, or because they think that they went too far.</u> The following section takes the time to chart the path of reform so far, before turning to the difficulties and dangers on the road ahead.</p><p>First, before Dodd-Frank, if an entity was a bank, it had tougher regulations, more stringent capital requirements, and more robust supervision; but if an entity was an investment bank engaged in the same kind of maturity transformation, it had to abide by different rules (see Scott 2010). When U.S. investment banks needed to find a “consolidated holding company regulator” in order to meet European Union standards for doing business in Europe, the Securities and Exchange Commission set up a voluntary Consolidated Supervised Entity program which had little oversight. The SEC was not established as a prudential regulator, did not have clear supervisory power, and had little experience and few trained examiners. Moreover, the leverage ratio that served as a backstop for bank capital requirements was not applied to investment banks.</p><p><u>The Federal Reserve was too lax in supervising firms where it did have authority and it did not have any authority to set and enforce capital requirements on the major institutions that operated businesses outside of bank holding companies. That meant it had no supervision over investment banks, diversified financial institutions such as AIG, or the nonbank financial companies competing with banks in the mortgage, consumer credit, and business lending markets. The Office of Thrift Supervision viewed its role as supervising thrifts, not their holding companies (such as AIG). Banks and thrifts freely engaged in risky mortgage lending, and regulators did not step in until it was too late.</p><p>Today, <mark>Dodd-Frank</mark> has <mark>provided authority for</mark> <strong><mark>clear</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>strong</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>consolidated supervision</u></strong></mark> <u>and regulation by the Federal Reserve <mark>of any financial firm</u></mark>—regardless of legal form—<u><mark>whose failure could pose a threat to financial stability</u></mark>. The largest investment banks that survived the financial crisis merged into or became bank holding companies subject to Fed oversight. AIG, GE Capital, Prudential, and MetLife have now been brought under Fed supervision through the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) designation. <u>As a result of Dodd-Frank changes, thrift holding companies</u> (including those with large insurance operations) <u>are now supervised by the Fed</u>. The Office of Thrift Supervision and the SEC’s investment bank regime have been abolished. <u>Thus, all bank and thrift holding companies, as well as <strong>systemically important nonbank firms</u></strong>, <u><strong>regardless of corporate form</u></strong>, <u>are supervised by the Federal Reserve</u>. <u>We will have a single point of accountability for tougher and more consistent supervision of the largest and most interconnected financial firms.</p><p></u>Although the regulatory infrastructure is, to put it mildly, far from ideal, with too many divided responsibilities and too many opportunities for turf battles or regulatory gaps, <u>Dodd-Frank created the FSOC, which is responsible for identifying threats to financial stability and dealing with them. The FSOC can recommend stricter regulatory action, and regulators must either implement such changes or explain publicly why they are not acting</u> (see Gerson 2013). <u>Already, this process has led the SEC to impose <strong>stricter regulation of money market funds</u></strong> <u>than would otherwise have occurred</u> (Barr 2015a). The FSOC has the potential to get information across the financial services marketplace through the Office of Financial Research (OFR), which Dodd-Frank established and empowered to collect data from any financial firm, and to develop and enforce standardization for data collection. The OFR has begun to use this authority by developing a “legal entity identifier” for financial transactions. The OFR is charged with independently assessing risks in the financial system, and can potentially serve as a counterweight to the Fed by providing independent assessments of whether the Fed is adequately supervising the largest firms and dealing with the critical issues in systemic risk. <u><mark>A strong OFR can serve as a</mark> <strong><mark>check and balance</strong></mark> for regulatory agencies, ensuring that they improve their own performance or risk being criticized (Ludwig 2012; Barr 2015a).</p><p>Dodd-Frank provides for more stringent prudential standards and higher capital and liquidity standards for the largest bank and nonbank firms</u>. In addition to the heightened capital requirements applicable to all firms, <u>the largest firms are subject to a capital surcharge, a leverage ratio, a toughened supplemental leverage ratio, a more stringent liquidity requirement, and capital required to pass stress tests.</p><p>Already, capital levels in the banking system have doubled, and banks’ use of short-term nondeposit funding has plummeted</u>. <u>The <strong><mark>annual stress tests</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>are evaluating a firm’s ability to withstand <strong>deep market contractions</u></strong></mark>. <u>There are enhanced rules on affiliate transactions and lending limits, and much stricter proposed limits on counterparty credit exposures</u>. Deposit insurance premiums are going up on the very largest firms. The Volcker Rule prohibits banking entities from engaging in certain proprietary trading or running internal hedge funds, subject to a number of exceptions, and also helps to simplify the task of winding down major firms that are at risk of failure. <u>Moreover, <mark>the Fed is using macro-prudential supervision</mark> as it increases its capacity <mark>to understand and</mark> <strong><mark>mitigate risks to the financial system as a whole</strong></mark>.</p><p></u>There is a healthy debate about breaking up or limiting the size of financial firms. <u>Under the Dodd-Frank Act, major firms are subject to a <strong>concentration limit</strong> that generally prohibits a financial company from engaging in mergers or acquisitions that would result in the firm’s liabilities</u>—including wholesale funding and off-balance sheet exposures—exceeding 10 percent of the liabilities of financial companies as a whole. Dodd-Frank provides regulators with the authority to require financial institutions to restructure their activities to make it credible that they can be resolved if they are in danger of collapse; the resolution planning process has already forced firms to begin to simplify their organization form, develop “clean” holding companies, and place large amounts of capital and long-term debt in the holding company to assist with the resolution. The act also permits regulators to force firms to be broken up if they fail to submit a credible plan and thereafter fail to meet regulators’ requirements to restructure themselves to make resolution credible. Such <u>firms can also be broken up if they are found to pose a grave threat to financial stability</u>. <u>These <mark>enhanced prudential measures</mark> for major financial firms are likely to reduce risk in the financial system, constrain further concentration, and <strong><mark>reduce “too big to fail” distortions</strong></mark>.</p><p></u>Second, <u>before Dodd-Frank, shadow banking markets grew dramatically with little oversight and in the absence of even regulatory or marketwide knowledge about the nature of the markets they were serving. For example, the OTC derivatives market—with a notional amount of $700 trillion at its peak—grew up in the shadows, with little oversight. Credit derivatives, which were supposed to diffuse risk, instead concentrated it.</u> Synthetic securitization with embedded derivatives magnified failures in the real securitization market. Major financial firms used derivatives to increase their credit exposure to each other, rather than decrease it.</p><p><u><strong><mark>We should never again face a situation</u></strong></mark>—<u><mark>such as AIG’s $2 trillion derivatives portfolio</u></mark>—<u><mark>where the potential failure of a</mark> virtually unregulated, capital-deficient major player in the <mark>derivatives market can impose devastating risks on the entire system</mark>. Insufficient capital meant that major participants in the system could not reliably pay out on their obligations, and insufficient margin meant that counterparties on every transaction were more exposed to the risk of nonpayment. When the crisis began, regulators, financial firms, and investors had an insufficient understanding of the degree to which trouble at one firm spelled trouble for another, because of the opacity of the market. This lack of information magnified the contagion as the crisis intensified, causing a damaging wave of margin increases, deleveraging, and credit market breakdowns. Lack of transparency, insufficient supervision, and inadequate capital and margin left our financial system vulnerable to concentrations of risk, and to abuse.</p><p></u>Today, under Dodd-Frank, regulators are putting in place the tools comprehensively to regulate the OTC derivatives market for the first time.<u> <mark>The act requires</mark> all <mark>standardized derivatives to be centrally cleared</mark>, <mark>which wil</mark>l substantially <mark>reduce the buildup of</mark> bilateral <mark>counterparty credit risk</p></u></mark><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Stanley 21 – Associate Professor in the Department of Gender and Women’s Studies at the University of California, Berkeley (Eric A., “Introduction: River of Sorrow”, Chapter in “Atmospheres of Violence: Structuring Antagonism and the Trans/Queer Ungovernable”, pp. 1-20, Duke University Press, 2021) fulltext: Thus, I work to apprehend, as might be expected, direct attacks—the personal or group acts committed against specific people where consistency and similarity build a frequency of shared destruction that undoes the assumed singularity of their actors. Through an attention to the phenomenology of these murders, we are able to push against the narrative that argues these are random acts that express nothing beyond the will of their instigators. However, in tandem with these direct attacks is a paradigmatic neglect, perhaps akin to Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s “organized abandonment,” where rhythms of restriction that might not reveal themselves as such forcefully reduce one’s capacity toward the world.18 This includes the anti-Black distribution of hiv/aids, imprisonment, houselessness, and other practices that do not simply impact populations but forge such a totalizing power that they radically constrict not only life chances but life itself. This structuring antagonism offers a method for considering violence as a generalized field of knowledge that maintains this collective undoing, lived as personal tragedy, of those lost to modernity. Yet violence also remains a tactic of communal interdiction, anticolonial struggle, and trans/queer flourishing against an otherwise deadly world.19 On Divinity Written in the ashes of the devastation that was the First World War and before its hyper-intensification in the second, Walter Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” remains a place to think the connections among violence, the law, and the question of justice. For Benjamin, the task is to address how one might disaggregate those spheres, or by what criteria one might conclude whether the means or ends of violence are just. Benjamin elucidates: “One might perhaps consider the surprising possibility that the law’s interest in a monopoly of violence vis-à-vis individuals is not explained by the intention of preserving legal ends but, rather, by that of preserving the law itself; that violence, when not in the hands of the law, threatens it not by the ends that it may pursue but by its mere existence outside the law.”20 For Benjamin, law produces violence while also adjudicating its own production. It thus resides as a limit mechanism outside/in the very jurisdiction it prescribes. It is impossible, then, to think of violence outside of law, because the law (either lawmaking or law preserving) is entangled with and constituted through force. This, for Benjamin, produces a feedback loop, a repetition where there seems to be no outside—mythic violence. This reading prohibits the juridical common sense that proclaims that law is aimed toward, or even capable of, ceasing violence in the name of justice. Indeed, here the law appears as the instantiation and compulsory replication of the founding violence of its own necessity.21 In Jacques Derrida’s extended reading of Benjamin’s text, he suggests that “law tends to prohibit individual violence and condemn it not because it poses a threat to this or that law but because it threatens the judicial order itself.”22 Derrida goes on: “The State is afraid of fundamental, founding violence, that is violence able to justify, to legitimate, or to transform the relation of the law, and so to present itself as having a right to law.”23 For Derrida, this founding violence is that which is able to denaturalize the law’s inevitability as well as our relation to it. The state, then, is both fearful of and produced by violence, and therefore its aim is to monopolize violence so that its monopolization cannot come under suspicion. As an example, Benjamin offers the modern police. The police under parliamentary or liberal democracy, and not monarchy, are both the limit and the sign of law as they simultaneously produce and then enforce this production. Through this structure, police become spectral, everywhere and nowhere—a phantom abstraction with deadly consequences. Derrida suggests this is because “in absolute monarchy, legislative and executive powers are united. In it violence is therefore normal, in keeping with its essence, its idea, its spirit. In democracy, on the other hand, violence is no longer according to the spirit of the police. Because of the supposed separations of powers, it is exercised illegitimately, especially when instead of enforcing the law the police make the law.”24 This leads Derrida to suggest that “democracy remains to come: engender or regenerate”25—avenir, yet-to-come. His declaration, when turned on itself, helps show that democracy might not be avenir but indeed is already here. The violence of sovereign rule is transformed in its distribution but not necessarily its impact. Perhaps reading Derrida beyond himself, democracy maintains the force of monarchical violence while concealing its own spirit. Tracing this weave of law, police, and democracy, but with radically different ends, this book argues that racialized anti-trans/queer violence is a necessary expression of the liberal state. This claim resides in a long genealogy of anticolonial feminist thought that sees the connections between settler colonialism, chattel slavery, and their legal and extralegal afterlives that form the celebration of unfreedom we call democracy.26 While both Benjamin and Derrida expand our vocabularies for reading violence and the law, Sylvia, Marsha, and other militants fill this analysis with the fleshiness of lived theory. That the law is the foundational excess of its own condition has always been known, yet differently articulated, by those held under its racial and gendered subjugation—fugitivity’s philosophy in action. For example, organizers fighting against the impunity with which police have and continue to murder Black people as the twin of the prison’s drive to capture Black flesh elucidates the ruse of justice within the system that bears its name. Or, this praxis collapses the law’s image as administrator and representation of justice, when that same system was built on and sustains itself through an anti-Blackness concretized in the U.S. through chattel slavery, whose abolition has yet to come. Growing such an analysis loosens our deep attachment to the idea that the legal system’s function is to end violence, while it also weakens the faith in the law as the sign of freedom’s recital. Going further, it is not that I’m arguing that the United States is a broken democracy, through which a change in leadership or a representational electorate would bring into being a more egalitarian civil society. Indeed, it is democracy in action, and not its attrition, that betrays the radical potential we so easily believe it to possess. This is not to say that the historic and ongoing obstructions of the democratic process, including racist poll taxes, felony disenfranchisement, and so on, are fictitious but that they are structured into democracy, as is a fatal belief that it could be otherwise. Given this, what we must confront, as it perpetually confronts us, is that the multiple prohibitions that reside under democracy’s watch are not its inconsistencies but its central logics. Following this abolitionist epistemology, and with an anticolonial anarchism that recognizes the state form (democratic or beyond) as the dreadful condition it has always been, I continue to ask, perhaps without the fantasy of a response: How do we dream the concept of justice through—which is to say against—the law? Or, if we know that the law is not the remedy to violence as promised, then we might look toward infrastructures of interdependency—aesthetic, organizational, and more—that attend to harm without reproducing its inevitability under a claim of its cessation. By extension, if the state, even as an experiment in democracy, is unable to offer us relief, then what forms of being together in difference might grow the world we want and need?27<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Stanley agrees with us – says our analytic of mythic violence is compatible with their explication of anti-trans violence </h4><p><strong>Stanley 21</strong> – Associate Professor in the Department of Gender and Women’s Studies at the University of California, Berkeley (Eric A., “Introduction: River of Sorrow”, Chapter in “Atmospheres of Violence: Structuring Antagonism and the Trans/Queer Ungovernable”, pp. 1-20, Duke University Press, 2021)</p><p>Thus, <u><strong>I work to apprehend</u></strong>, as might be expected, <u><strong>direct attacks—the personal or group acts committed against specific people</u></strong> where consistency and similarity build a frequency of shared destruction that undoes the assumed singularity of their actors. Through an attention to the phenomenology of these murders, we are able to push against the narrative that argues these are random acts that express nothing beyond the will of their instigators. However, in tandem with these direct attacks is a paradigmatic neglect, perhaps akin to Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s “organized abandonment,” where rhythms of restriction that might not reveal themselves as such forcefully reduce one’s capacity toward the world.18 This includes the anti-Black distribution of hiv/aids, imprisonment, houselessness, and other practices that do not simply impact populations but forge such a totalizing power that they radically constrict not only life chances but life itself. <u><strong>This structuring antagonism offers a method for considering violence as a generalized field of knowledge that maintains this collective undoing, lived as personal tragedy, of those lost to modernity</u></strong>. <u><strong>Yet violence also remains a tactic of communal interdiction, anticolonial struggle, and trans/queer flourishing against an otherwise deadly world</u></strong>.19 <u><strong>On Divinity</u></strong> Written in the ashes of the devastation that was the First World War and before its hyper-intensification in the second, <u><strong>Walter Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” remains a place to think the connections among violence, the law, and the question of justice</u></strong>. For Benjamin, the task is to address how one might disaggregate those spheres, or by what criteria one might conclude whether the means or ends of violence are just. Benjamin elucidates: <u><strong>“One might perhaps consider the surprising possibility that the law’s interest in a monopoly of violence vis-à-vis individuals is not explained by the intention of preserving legal ends but, rather, by that of preserving the law itself; that violence, when not in the hands of the law, threatens it not by the ends that it may pursue but by its mere existence outside the law.”</u></strong>20 <u><strong>For Benjamin, law produces violence while also adjudicating its own production</u></strong>. <u><strong>It thus resides as a limit mechanism outside/in the very jurisdiction it prescribes</u></strong>. It is impossible, then, to think of violence outside of law, because <u><strong>the law (either lawmaking or law preserving) is entangled with and constituted through force</u></strong>. <u><strong>This</u></strong>, for Benjamin, <u><strong>produces a feedback loop, a repetition where there seems to be no outside—mythic violence</u></strong>. This reading prohibits the juridical common sense that proclaims that law is aimed toward, or even capable of, ceasing violence in the name of justice. Indeed, here <u><strong>the law appears as the instantiation and compulsory replication of the founding violence of its own necessity</u></strong>.21 In Jacques Derrida’s extended reading of Benjamin’s text, he suggests that “law tends to prohibit individual violence and condemn it not because it poses a threat to this or that law but because it threatens the judicial order itself.”22 Derrida goes on: <u><strong>“The State is afraid of fundamental, founding violence, that is violence able to justify, to legitimate, or to transform the relation of the law, and so to present itself as having a right to law.”</u></strong>23 For Derrida, this founding violence is that which is able to denaturalize the law’s inevitability as well as our relation to it. The state, then, is both fearful of and produced by violence, and therefore its aim is to monopolize violence so that its monopolization cannot come under suspicion. As an example, Benjamin offers the modern police. <u><strong>The police under parliamentary or liberal democracy, and not monarchy, are both the limit and the sign of law as they simultaneously produce and then enforce this production</u></strong>. Through this structure, police become spectral, everywhere and nowhere—a phantom abstraction with deadly consequences. Derrida suggests this is because “in absolute monarchy, legislative and executive powers are united. In it violence is therefore normal, in keeping with its essence, its idea, its spirit. In democracy, on the other hand, violence is no longer according to the spirit of the police. Because of the supposed separations of powers, it is exercised illegitimately, especially when instead of enforcing the law the police make the law.”24 This leads Derrida to suggest that “democracy remains to come: engender or regenerate”25—avenir, yet-to-come. His declaration, when turned on itself, helps show that democracy might not be avenir but indeed is already here. The violence of sovereign rule is transformed in its distribution but not necessarily its impact. Perhaps reading Derrida beyond himself, democracy maintains the force of monarchical violence while concealing its own spirit. <u><strong>Tracing this weave of law, police, and democracy, but with radically different ends</u></strong>, this book argues that <u><strong>racialized anti-trans/queer violence is a necessary expression of the liberal state</u></strong>. <u><strong>This claim resides in a long genealogy of anticolonial feminist thought that sees the connections between settler colonialism, chattel slavery, and their legal and extralegal afterlives that form the celebration of unfreedom</u></strong> we call democracy.26 <u><strong>While both Benjamin and Derrida expand our vocabularies for reading violence and the law, Sylvia, Marsha, and other militants fill this analysis with the fleshiness of lived theory</u></strong>. That the law is the foundational excess of its own condition has always been known, yet differently articulated, by those held under its racial and gendered subjugation—fugitivity’s philosophy in action. For example, <u><strong>organizers fighting against the impunity with which police have and continue to murder Black people as the twin of the prison’s drive to capture Black flesh elucidates the ruse of justice within the system that bears its name</u></strong>. Or, <u><strong>this praxis collapses the law’s image as administrator and representation of justice, when that same system was built on and sustains itself through an anti-Blackness concretized in the U.S. through chattel slavery, whose abolition has yet to come</u></strong>. <u><strong>Growing such an analysis loosens our deep attachment to the idea that the legal system’s function is to end violence, while it also weakens the faith in the law as the sign of freedom’s recital</u></strong>. Going further, it is not that I’m arguing that the United States is a broken democracy, through which a change in leadership or a representational electorate would bring into being a more egalitarian civil society. Indeed, it is democracy in action, and not its attrition, that betrays the radical potential we so easily believe it to possess. This is not to say that the historic and ongoing obstructions of the democratic process, including racist poll taxes, felony disenfranchisement, and so on, are fictitious but that they are structured into democracy, as is a fatal belief that it could be otherwise. Given this, what we must confront, as it perpetually confronts us, is that the multiple prohibitions that reside under democracy’s watch are not its inconsistencies but its central logics. Following this abolitionist epistemology, and with an anticolonial anarchism that recognizes the state form (democratic or beyond) as the dreadful condition it has always been, I continue to ask, perhaps without the fantasy of a response: <u><strong>How do we dream the concept of justice through—which is to say against—the law?</u></strong> Or, if we know that the law is not the remedy to violence as promised, then <u><strong>we might look toward infrastructures of interdependency—aesthetic, organizational, and more—that attend to harm without reproducing its inevitability under a claim of its cessation</u></strong>. By extension, if the state, even as an experiment in democracy, is unable to offer us relief, then what forms of being together in difference might grow the world we want and need?27</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Remes et al 20 (https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/healthcare-systems-and-services/our-insights/ten-innovations-that-can-improve-global-health, McKinsey Global Institute Ten innovations that can improve global health July 15, 2020 | Article, Jaana Remes is a partner of the McKinsey Global Institute, where Jonathan Woetzel is a director and Sven Smit is co-chair and a director. Katherine Linzer is a partner in McKinsey’s Chicago office. Shubham Singhal is a senior partner in the Detroit office. Martin Dewhurst and Penelope Dash are senior partners in the London office, where Kristin-Anne Rutter is a partner. Matthias Evers is a senior partner in the Hamburg office. Matt Wilson is a senior partner in the New York office. Aditi Ramdorai is a consultant in the Berlin office.//lex AL) fulltext: By 2040, new technologies could reduce the total burden of disease by 6 to 10 percent. Today’s interventions are the innovations of the past. Without them, healthy lifespans would not be as long as they are. Innovation continues to be critical to tackle diseases without known cures and to help increase uptake and adherence to interventions that work. As part of the report Prioritizing health: A prescription for prosperity, the McKinsey Global Institute identified ten promising innovations, now in progress, that could have a material impact on health by 2040. Focusing on technologies that address the greatest unmet needs, we determined the impact of these innovations by interviewing experts and evaluating the current biological understanding of each disease, as well as the effort and excitement surrounding the new techniques as measured by funding. Identifying and sizing the potential scope of innovations now in the pipeline is inherently difficult, but we estimate that these technologies could reduce the burden of disease by a further 6 to 10 percent, assuming aspirational yet realistic adoption rates by 2040—on top of the 40 percent from known interventions. Some of these innovations could not only fully cure a number of diseases but also significantly extend healthy lifespans by tackling the underlying biology of aging and therefore postponing the onset of several age-related conditions. These possibilities make a sharp contrast with the innovations of the past 30 years, many of which reduced the symptoms or delayed the progression of diseases but rarely prevented or cured them. In addition, the innovations we have identified here are more digitally enabled than those of the past; for example, artificial intelligence (AI) systems make advances in omics and molecular technologies, such as gene editing, faster and more accurate. How can we improve health globally over the next two decades? Omics and molecular technologies These technologies—key components of the Bio Revolution—are therapeutics or diagnostics that harness the various types of molecules within cells (such as DNA, RNA, and proteins). Some omics and molecular technologies (for instance, genome editing) engineer these intracellular components or analyze them (such as proteomics and transcriptomics). Example: CRISPR and curbing malaria The current treatment includes antimalarial prophylactics and nonpharmaceutical measures (such as indoor residual spraying and insecticide-treated bed netting) and antimalarial medications. Genetically modifying malaria-carrying mosquitos by using gene-editing technologies, such as CRISPR, may significantly reduce disease levels by propagating the modified genes across the mosquito population. Next-generation pharmaceuticals Newer iterations of traditional chemical compounds (small molecules) and classes of molecules could be used as medicinal drugs, possibly with multiple and concurrent target structures. Example: Senolytics and the regulation of cellular aging Cellular aging (senescence) is considered an unavoidable physiological process that is not a viable field for drug development. But senolytics (a class of small molecules) may decrease or eliminate aging cells that can cause cellular inflammation, dysfunction, and tissue damage. This has implications for delaying age-related diseases. Cellular therapy and regenerative medicine Cellular therapy is a biological product, derived from living cells, used for therapeutic purposes to replace or repair damaged cells or tissues. Regenerative medicine has the power to restore diseased or injured tissues and organs, potentially decreasing reliance on transplantation. Example: CAR T-cell therapy and the treatment of solid tumors Today, treatment is based primarily on unspecific radiotherapy and chemotherapeutic agents, plus surgical interventions. In many cases, these approaches are ineffective. CAR T-cell therapy reprograms a patient’s T-cells (immune-system cells) to target tumor cells. When infused into the patient, the T-cells bind to an antigen on tumor cells, attacking and destroying them. Innovative vaccines Vaccines stimulate the immune system to respond to and destroy a bacterium or virus. Historically, they have eradicated or controlled the spread of infectious diseases around the world. In the future, vaccines may target noncommunicable diseases, such as cancer. Example: The AT04A vaccine and the lowering of cholesterol At present, patients take statins (lipid-lowering medicines) to control or lower high cholesterol levels in the blood. Patients with cardiovascular disease must take these daily, but adherence is often poor. AT04A is a vaccine made up of molecules that bind to blood cholesterol and degrade it. The vaccine would be required only once a year, potentially improving outcomes. Advanced surgical procedures These include treating injuries or disorders of the body with minimally invasive incisions or small instruments (including robotic surgery), as well as any technique that improves surgery-related processes outside the operating room. Example: Suspended animation for severe-trauma patients After patients suffer acute trauma (such as an accident) it may take time to get them to hospitals for surgery. That significantly decreases their chances of survival. Suspended animation for severe-trauma patients would involve, for example, injecting a cold saline solution into them on first contact to cool the body to 10–15ºC and stop its normal functions. This would give the surgeon time to operate before resuscitating the patient. Connected and cognitive devices Portable, wearable, ingestible, or implantable devices can monitor health and fitness information, engage patients and their communities of caregivers, and deliver self-regulated therapies autonomously. Example: E-tattoos for heart diagnostics Today’s technology relies on a Holter monitor (a battery-operated device) to monitor the heart continuously. The monitor’s batteries last for no more than 48 hours, and the procedure can cause immense discomfort for patients. Ultrathin e-tattoos can monitor hearts for longer periods and make patients more comfortable while providing a wider range of data to enhance clinical decision making. Electroceuticals Small therapeutic agents can target the neural circuits of organs. Such therapies map neural circuitry with neural impulses (administered by an implantable device) delivered to these specific targets. Example: Implantable microchips to mitigate chronic pain Today, managing chronic pain involves nonindividualized treatment with multiple drugs (including opioids) and relatively ineffective late-stage surgery. But one technique now under development—stimulating the spinal cord—can improve the patient’s quality of life by increasing mobility, enhancing sleep, and reducing the need for pain medication. Robotics and prosthetics A wide variety of programmable, self-controlled devices consisting of electronic, electrical, or mechanical units and of artificial substitutes or replacements for body parts are now under development. Example: Next-generation exoskeletons and mobility support Today’s mechanical mobility aids do not fully restore movement in the elderly, so they do not prevent a loss of independence and the risk of accidental injuries. Next-generation exoskeletons, powered by small motors that mimic human muscles, could allow older patients to recover their autonomy while reducing the likelihood of accidents and falls. Digital therapeutics These preventive and therapeutic evidence-based interventions, for a broad spectrum of physical, mental, and behavioral conditions, are controlled by software. Example: An AI-powered app to change behavior Apart from brief consultations, doctors now have few tools to help patients with chronic conditions adopt healthy lifestyles. In the future, digital therapeutics, powered by AI, patient data, and behavioral science, can use gamification and other forms of engagement to help patients adopt and sustain healthy behaviors. Tech-enabled care delivery These ways to deliver care incorporate new and larger data sets, use new analytics capabilities to generate insights, and help providers apply them to patients to improve the outcome, experience, and efficiency of care. Example: Multichannel care delivery Inefficient data management and poor communication among patients, payers, and providers hinder the continuity of care and therefore make treatment significantly less efficient. Innovative multichannel care delivery using online platforms may facilitate data sharing and make treatment more efficient. This is particularly relevant for chronic diseases, such as diabetes, because the glucose levels and other vital signs of patients are continuously shared with clinicians. Innovation—in the form of new medicines, procedures, medical devices, technologies, and delivery models—will clearly be critical to go on improving the health of the world’s population. Realizing these innovations, however, will require continual R&D investments by pharmaceutical companies, medical and other technology companies, and academia.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Medical innovations key to future</h4><p><strong>Remes et al 20</strong> (https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/healthcare-systems-and-services/our-insights/ten-innovations-that-can-improve-global-health, McKinsey Global Institute Ten innovations that can improve global health July 15, 2020 | Article, Jaana Remes is a partner of the McKinsey Global Institute, where Jonathan Woetzel is a director and Sven Smit is co-chair and a director. Katherine Linzer is a partner in McKinsey’s Chicago office. Shubham Singhal is a senior partner in the Detroit office. Martin Dewhurst and Penelope Dash are senior partners in the London office, where Kristin-Anne Rutter is a partner. Matthias Evers is a senior partner in the Hamburg office. Matt Wilson is a senior partner in the New York office. Aditi Ramdorai is a consultant in the Berlin office.//lex AL)</p><p><u><mark>By 2040, new tech</mark>nologies<mark> </mark>could <mark>reduce </mark>the total burden of <mark>disease by </mark>6 to <mark>10 percent</u></mark>. Today’s interventions are the innovations of the past. Without them, healthy lifespans would not be as long as they are. <u><mark>Innovation </mark>continues to be <mark>critical to tackle diseases</u></mark> without known cures and to help increase uptake and adherence to interventions that work. As part of the report Prioritizing health: A prescription for prosperity, the McKinsey Global Institute identified ten <u>promising innovations</u>, now in progress, that could have a <u><mark>material impact on health</u></mark> by 2040. Focusing on technologies that address the greatest unmet needs, we determined the impact of these innovations by interviewing experts and evaluating the current biological understanding of each disease, as well as the effort and excitement surrounding the new techniques as measured by funding. Identifying and sizing the potential scope of innovations now in the pipeline is inherently difficult, but we estimate that these technologies could reduce the burden of disease by a further 6 to 10 percent, assuming aspirational yet realistic adoption rates by 2040—on top of the 40 percent from known interventions. Some of these <u><mark>innovations</u></mark> <u>could</u> not only fully cure a number of diseases but also <u><mark>significantly extend </mark>healthy <mark>lifespans</u></mark> by tackling the underlying biology of aging and therefore postponing the onset of several age-related conditions. These possibilities make a sharp contrast with the innovations of the past 30 years, many of which reduced the symptoms or delayed the progression of diseases but rarely prevented or cured them. In addition, the innovations we have identified here are more digitally enabled than those of the past; for example, artificial intelligence (AI) systems make advances in omics and molecular technologies, such as gene editing, faster and more accurate. How can we improve health globally over the next two decades? <u><mark>Omics and molecular technologies</mark> </u>These technologies—key components of the Bio Revolution—are <u><mark>therapeutics</u></mark> or diagnostics that <u><mark>harness the </mark>various types of <mark>molecules </mark>within cells</u> (such as DNA, RNA, and proteins). Some omics and molecular technologies (for instance, genome editing) engineer these intracellular components or analyze them (such as proteomics and transcriptomics). Example: CRISPR and curbing malaria The current treatment includes antimalarial prophylactics and nonpharmaceutical measures (such as indoor residual spraying and insecticide-treated bed netting) and antimalarial medications. Genetically <u><strong><mark>modifying malaria-carrying mosquitos</u></strong></mark> by <u><strong><mark>using</u></strong></mark> gene-editing technologies, such as <u><strong><mark>CRISPR</u></strong></mark>, may <u><strong>significantly <mark>reduce disease levels</u></strong></mark> by propagating the modified genes across the mosquito population. Next-generation pharmaceuticals Newer iterations of traditional chemical compounds (small molecules) and classes of molecules could be used as medicinal drugs, possibly with multiple and concurrent target structures. Example: Senolytics and the regulation of cellular aging Cellular aging (senescence) is considered an unavoidable physiological process that is not a viable field for drug development. But senolytics (a class of small molecules) may decrease or eliminate aging cells that can cause cellular inflammation, dysfunction, and tissue damage. This has implications for delaying age-related diseases. Cellular therapy and regenerative medicine Cellular therapy is a biological product, derived from living cells, used for therapeutic purposes to replace or repair damaged cells or tissues. Regenerative medicine has the power to restore diseased or injured tissues and organs, potentially decreasing reliance on transplantation. Example: CAR T-cell therapy and the treatment of solid tumors Today, treatment is based primarily on unspecific radiotherapy and chemotherapeutic agents, plus surgical interventions. In many cases, these approaches are ineffective. CAR T-cell therapy reprograms a patient’s T-cells (immune-system cells) to target tumor cells. When infused into the patient, the T-cells bind to an antigen on tumor cells, attacking and destroying them. <u><mark>Innovative vaccines</mark> </u>Vaccines <u><mark>stimulate the immune system to </mark>respond to and <mark>destroy a </mark>bacterium or<mark> virus</u></mark>. Historically, they have <u><mark>eradicated </mark>or controlled <mark>the spread of </mark>infectious <mark>diseases</u></mark> around the world. In the future, vaccines may target noncommunicable diseases, such as cancer. Example: The AT04A vaccine and the lowering of cholesterol At present, patients take statins (lipid-lowering medicines) to control or lower high cholesterol levels in the blood. Patients with cardiovascular disease must take these daily, but adherence is often poor. AT04A is a vaccine made up of molecules that bind to blood cholesterol and degrade it. The vaccine would be required only once a year, potentially improving outcomes. Advanced surgical procedures These include treating injuries or disorders of the body with minimally invasive incisions or small instruments (including robotic surgery), as well as any technique that improves surgery-related processes outside the operating room. Example: Suspended animation for severe-trauma patients After patients suffer acute trauma (such as an accident) it may take time to get them to hospitals for surgery. That significantly decreases their chances of survival. Suspended animation for severe-trauma patients would involve, for example, injecting a cold saline solution into them on first contact to cool the body to 10–15ºC and stop its normal functions. This would give the surgeon time to operate before resuscitating the patient. Connected and cognitive devices Portable, wearable, ingestible, or implantable devices can monitor health and fitness information, engage patients and their communities of caregivers, and deliver self-regulated therapies autonomously. Example: E-tattoos for heart diagnostics Today’s technology relies on a Holter monitor (a battery-operated device) to monitor the heart continuously. The monitor’s batteries last for no more than 48 hours, and the procedure can cause immense discomfort for patients. Ultrathin e-tattoos can monitor hearts for longer periods and make patients more comfortable while providing a wider range of data to enhance clinical decision making. <u><mark>Electroceuticals</mark> </u>Small therapeutic agents can <u><mark>target </mark>the <mark>neural circuits of organs</u></mark>. Such therapies map neural circuitry with neural impulses (administered by an implantable device) delivered to these specific targets. Example: Implantable microchips to <u><mark>mitigate chronic pain</mark> </u>Today, managing chronic pain involves nonindividualized treatment with multiple drugs (including opioids) and relatively ineffective late-stage surgery. But one technique now under development—stimulating the spinal cord—can improve the patient’s quality of life by increasing mobility, enhancing sleep, and reducing the need for pain medication. Robotics and prosthetics A wide variety of programmable, self-controlled devices consisting of electronic, electrical, or mechanical units and of artificial substitutes or replacements for body parts are now under development. Example: Next-generation exoskeletons and mobility support Today’s mechanical mobility aids do not fully restore movement in the elderly, so they do not prevent a loss of independence and the risk of accidental injuries. Next-generation exoskeletons, powered by small motors that mimic human muscles, could allow older patients to recover their autonomy while reducing the likelihood of accidents and falls. Digital therapeutics These preventive and therapeutic evidence-based interventions, for a broad spectrum of physical, mental, and behavioral conditions, are controlled by software. Example: An AI-powered app to change behavior Apart from brief consultations, doctors now have few tools to help patients with chronic conditions adopt healthy lifestyles. In the future, digital therapeutics, powered by AI, patient data, and behavioral science, can use gamification and other forms of engagement to help patients adopt and sustain healthy behaviors. Tech-enabled care delivery These ways to deliver care incorporate new and larger data sets, use new analytics capabilities to generate insights, and help providers apply them to patients to improve the outcome, experience, and efficiency of care. Example: <u><mark>Multichannel care delivery</mark> </u>Inefficient data management and poor communication among patients, payers, and providers hinder the continuity of care and therefore make treatment significantly less efficient. Innovative multichannel care delivery using online platforms may <u><mark>facilitate data sharing </mark>and <mark>make treatment more efficient</u></mark>. This is particularly relevant for chronic diseases, such as diabetes, because the glucose levels and other vital signs of patients are continuously shared with clinicians. <u><mark>Innovation</u></mark>—in the form of <u>new medicines, procedures, medical devices, technologies, and delivery models</u>—<u><mark>will</u></mark> clearly <u><mark>be</u></mark> <u><mark>critical to </mark>go on<mark> improving the health of the world’s </mark>population</u>. Realizing these innovations, however, will require continual R&D investments by pharmaceutical companies, medical and other technology companies, and academia.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Svirsky 16 (Marcelo Svirsky, senior lecturer, International Studies in the School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, and Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, University of Wollongong, Ph.D., M.A. Political Science, University of Haifa, B.A. Physics, Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, “Resistance is a structure not an event,” Settler Colonial Studies, 7(1), 2016, DOI 10.1080/2201473X.2016.1141462, p.4-7)KMM fulltext: Wolfe’s position on the issue of resistance, I suspect, encompasses more preoccupations than how to respond to the white appropriation of indigenous discourses. According to Wolfe, ‘Indigenous resistance has been a constant feature of the entire settler-colonial era’, and therefore, ‘in generating its own resistance, settler-colonial power also contains it’.23 Wolfe conceives resistance, it seems, in a Newtonian fashion, as a necessarily reactive force that is always responding to the constraints of power and is thus quickly re-appropriated. In adopting this conception, we risk conceiving no outside to settler colonial power. Thus, oppression and domination in all their forms and shapes are given explanatory monopoly replicating their omnipresence in the shaping and managing of life. Yet, importantly, since Wolfe does not place an emphasis on the study of resistance, this position prompted a lively debate on the ways the strategies of resistance and survival of those subjected to settler colonial domination should be investigated. The implications this scholarly debate has for our understanding of reality in settler societies, and for potentially transformative political work, can hardly be overstated. As Macoun and Strakosch note, the critique of Wolfe’s paradigm centres on its ‘failure to take resistance seriously or to see subjects as sites of freedom and innovation’.24 And as they add: ‘By emphasizing continuities in colonial relationships between the past and the present, SCT [settler colonial theory] can depict colonization as structurally inevitable, and can be deployed in ways that re-inscribe settler colonialism’.25 This line of critique is not new and in fact joins the scholarship that preceded Wolfe’s publications. In this regard, Wolfe construed works such as Henry Reynolds’s The Other Side of the Frontier (1981) as his theoretical-other, since, as Altenbernd and Young explain, Reynolds ‘decisively recast the Australian frontier as a site of settler conquest and indigenous resistance’, and in so doing ‘transformed the content and conclusions of Australian frontier historiography by recuperating the suppressed history of the violence that subtended settlement, and the indigenous agency expressed through various forms of resistance’.26 This critique is not unprecedented. Replying to Wolfe’s 1994 article, Francesca Merlan stated that his position ‘seems to offer no prospect of a place and a future for indigenous peoples ‘within the modern order’, except perhaps a completely oppositional one, defined in terms of a binary logic of radical difference, Aborigine versus Other’, adding that in ‘centering the notion of a continuous “logic” of settler-colonialism, and regarding this as a “structure not an event”, Wolfe succumbs to the appealing closure of all structuralisms, and constitutes this logic as impervious to agency and event’.27 Looking into the dimension of settler subjecthood, Elizabeth Povinelli claimed that identifying ‘one’s procedure if not oneself as thoroughly other to an invasion logic, in no way comparable to or implicated in that invasion’, troubles the identity binary Wolfe flagged as essential to his project.28 In a recent edited book Lisa Ford and Tim Rowse bring together a collection of essays committed to analyses centred on contingency and complexity rather than on ‘notions that settler states were ever total institutions and that settler colonialism is a structure bent inexorably on dispossession, subordination, erasure or extinction’.29 The list does not end here. In the last two years, Settler Colonial Studies has published two special issues dedicated to transformative political work. In 2013 Tate A. LeFevre edited a special issue titled Difference, Representation, Resistance, highlighting – in LeFevre words – ‘a peculiar paradox: the eliminatory logics of settler colonialism are also generative. As the state settles, it produces the materials and possibilities of its own unsettlement’.30 A second special issue, edited by myself, tackles Wolfe’s paradigm from another perspective, that of ‘collaborative struggles’ – those arrangements whereby indigenous agency lead settlers and cooperatively find ways to transcend settler formations.31 These concerns in regards the role of resistance and of the anticolonial struggle in settler colonial theory have a particular relevance for the study of Palestine, perhaps epitomised in Veracini’s poignant question, ‘what can settler colonial studies offer to an interpretation of the conflict in Israel–Palestine?’32 Until recent years, analyses of Palestine have placed the focus majorly on the Zionist structures of domination, a trend that is still been adopted by the younger generations of scholars.33 Yet, as Ilan Pappé recently explained, as useful as the settler-colonial paradigm is, it is nonetheless insufficient to take account of settler constructions such as Israel-Palestine in a comprehensive fashion. For him, while the paradigm ‘challenge effectively the official Israeli, and mainstream scholarly approach […] it is unsatisfactory [because it] applies historical case studies with a known closure to an ongoing reality’.34 On the one hand, a rigid analysis of the history of the Zionist incursion since the late nineteenth century that excludes the study of Palestinian and other forms of struggle and survival would severely distort our empirical understanding of indigenous and settler subjectivities. On the other hand, it would be no less empirically erroneous, and also ethically obscene, to maintain that in Palestine the destructive logics of Zionist settlerism have surrendered to more toned-down axioms. That neither of these understandings should subdue the other is a strategy in the present study. But the reason for bringing these two perceptions together is motivated by a concern to recuperate not just a sense of urgency about the still oppositional and thus oppressive character of settler realties, nor indigenous agency per se, but a sensibility towards political work that reorients settler colonial studies to better communicate with the specificities of historical and ongoing anticolonial struggles. Structure, power, forces In what seems to be an attempt to soften Wolfe’s methodological position, Veracini explains that if ‘there is a plot in the “historiography of elimination” and more generally in settler-colonial studies it is that while the structure attempts to eliminate Indigenous peoples it fails to do so’. The ‘structure cannot be reduced to its intention’.35 That is to say, Wolfe’s logic of elimination should not be equated with elimination itself. As Veracini explains: Far from equating settler colonialism with elimination, Wolfe’s ‘structure’ refers to a continuing relationship of inequality between Indigenous and settler collectives. Beside ‘structure’ and ‘event’, it seems important to note that Wolfe refers to a logic of elimination, not to elimination itself. After all, were Indigenous elimination to become an accomplished and irretrievable fact, settler colonialism would lose its logic.36 Though the key for Wolfe is to shed light on the mechanisms of elimination, Veracini takes Wolfe’s position that ‘we should not view the logic of elimination as solely a drive to exterminate Native human beings’, and suggests that we should focus on what the structure actualising the logic fails to accomplish.37 The difference between the two highlights the incompleteness of the settler project. If settler colonialism is not a fait accompli but an incomplete project invested in a continuing structuration of life actualising the logic of elimination, then we may expect the settler colonial paradigm to take seriously phenomena of struggle, resistance and confrontation, and hence to align itself with the idea of power not just as coercion or repression but as a complex multiplicity. This is simply because the incompleteness of elimination must be explained, and it cannot be explained just in terms of the oppressor’s self-error or strategic deferment. The methodological imperative that derives then, is to trace the forces that cause the settler structure to fail and remain incomplete – forces that work either by compelling retreat in specific policy areas, or because of the ineffectiveness of the settler structure in territorialising its logic and imposing its discourse, codifications, and meanings in all areas of life. As Macoun and Strakosch note, ‘[e]xposing the settler colonial project as fundamentally incomplete – and unable to be completed in the face of Indigenous resistance – has the potential to be a profoundly liberating and destabilizing move’.38 This is because this move leads research to deal with liberatory forces. Some Palestinian scholars have taken the analysis of the Israeli settler state in this direction. Recently, Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian draws on Wolfe’s logic of elimination but not without combining her analysis of surveillance and fear with an account of practices of resistance.39 Similarly, Mazin Qumsiyeh notes that the brutal removal of villagers during Ottoman and later the British and, finally, Israeli rule over the past thirteen decades would have proceeded much faster and certainly would have resulted in a far more homogeneous Jewish state had it not been for Palestinian resistance.40 Explaining strategic and tactical changes in the continuing implementation of elimination only by means of the subject’s determination to eliminate appears as an act of theoretical cannibalism. The vicissitudes of elimination are the vicissitudes of the struggle, of resistance; or, as Veracini recently put it: the ‘settler colonial present is also an indigenous one’.41 Settler stability, in other words, needs to be explained not just by way of the discourse of settler inscription but by taking seriously Veracini’s insistence that the settler colonial situation is best described in terms of a ‘permanent movement’.42 Movement here needs to be conceived as a constantly changing composition of forces – those which seek to eliminate indigenous life together with those that either cause some of these attempts to fail, or that institute forms of life contiguous to settlerism – in both cases compelling settler colonialism to rework itself. The benefit of adopting the perspective of a field of forces lies, in the words of James Williams, in its questioning of ‘the evolution of things in order to sense how they have become what they are and how they may become something other’. This analytical sensibility, as he rightly adds, ‘sets things in movement above the secure foundation of an unchanging given’, enabling a view of political life which emphasises the variations occurring within a social order – though always in the making – claiming to be established.43 This logical development and contribution to the settler colonial paradigm is inspired mainly by the works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. However, the objections to their works among some scholars of settler colonialism, warrant a more extended response.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Their theory is bad faith and applying it as a reason to refuse <u>policy advocacy</u> <u>reifies</u> settler logics</h4><p><strong>Svirsky 16</strong> (Marcelo Svirsky, senior lecturer, International Studies in the School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, and Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, University of Wollongong, Ph.D., M.A. Political Science, University of Haifa, B.A. Physics, Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, “Resistance is a structure not an event,” Settler Colonial Studies, 7(1), 2016, DOI 10.1080/2201473X.2016.1141462, p.4-7)KMM</p><p>Wolfe’s position on the issue of resistance, I suspect, encompasses more preoccupations than how to respond to the white appropriation of indigenous discourses. According to Wolfe, ‘Indigenous resistance has been a constant feature of the entire settler-colonial era’, and therefore, ‘in generating its own resistance, settler-colonial power also contains it’.23 <u>Wolfe conceives resistance</u>, it seems, <u>in a Newtonian fashion, as a necessarily reactive force that is always responding to the constraints of power and is thus quickly re-appropriated. In adopting this conception, we risk conceiving no outside to settler colonial power. Thus, oppression and domination in all their forms and shapes are <strong>given explanatory monopoly replicating their omnipresence</strong> in the shaping and managing of life. Yet, importantly, since Wolfe does not place an emphasis on the study of resistance, this position prompted a lively debate on the ways the strategies of resistance and survival of those subjected to settler colonial domination should be investigated. The implications this scholarly debate has for our <strong>understanding of reality</strong> in settler societies, and for potentially <strong>transformative political work</strong>, can hardly be overstated</u>. As Macoun and Strakosch note, <u>the critique of Wolfe’s paradigm centres on its ‘<strong>failure to take resistance seriously</strong> or to see subjects as sites of freedom and innovation’</u>.24 And as they add: ‘<u>By <strong>emphasizing continuities in colonial relationships between the past and the present</strong>, SCT [settler colonial theory] can <strong>depict colonization as structurally inevitable</strong>, and can be deployed in ways that <strong>re-inscribe settler colonialism</strong>’</u>.25 This line of critique is not new and in fact joins the scholarship that preceded Wolfe’s publications. In this regard, Wolfe construed works such as Henry Reynolds’s The Other Side of the Frontier (1981) as his theoretical-other, since, as Altenbernd and Young explain, Reynolds ‘decisively recast the Australian frontier as a site of settler conquest and indigenous resistance’, and in so doing ‘transformed the content and conclusions of Australian frontier historiography by recuperating the suppressed history of the violence that subtended settlement, and the indigenous agency expressed through various forms of resistance’.26 This critique is not unprecedented. Replying to Wolfe’s 1994 article, Francesca <u>Merlan stated that his position ‘seems to <strong>offer no prospect of a place and a future for indigenous peoples ‘within the modern order’, except perhaps a completely oppositional one</strong>, defined in terms of a <strong>binary logic</strong> of radical difference</u>, Aborigine versus Other’, adding that <u>in ‘centering the notion of a <strong>continuous “logic” of settler-colonialism</strong>, and regarding this as <strong>a “structure not an event</strong>”, Wolfe succumbs to the appealing closure of all structuralisms, and <strong>constitutes this logic as impervious to agency and event</strong>’</u>.27 Looking into the dimension of <u>settler subjecthood</u>, Elizabeth Povinelli claimed that <u>identifying ‘one’s procedure if not oneself as thoroughly other to an invasion logic, in no way comparable to or implicated in that invasion’, troubles the identity binary Wolfe flagged as essential to his project</u>.28 In a recent edited book Lisa Ford and Tim Rowse bring together a collection of essays committed to <u><strong>analyses centred on contingency and complexity rather than on ‘notions that settler states were ever total institutions</strong> and that settler colonialism is a structure bent inexorably on dispossession, subordination, erasure or extinction’</u>.29 The list does not end here. In the last two years, Settler Colonial Studies has published two special issues dedicated to transformative political work. In 2013 Tate A. LeFevre edited a special issue titled Difference, Representation, Resistance, <u>highlighting</u> – in LeFevre words – <u>‘a peculiar <strong>paradox</strong>: the eliminatory logics of settler colonialism are also generative. <strong>As the state settles, it produces the materials and possibilities of its own unsettlement</strong>’</u>.30 A second special issue, edited by myself, tackles Wolfe’s paradigm from another perspective, that of <u>‘<strong>collaborative struggles</strong>’ – those arrangements whereby <strong>indigenous agency lead settlers</strong> and <strong>cooperatively find ways to transcend settler formations</u></strong>.31 These concerns in regards the role of resistance and of the anticolonial struggle in settler colonial theory have a particular relevance for the study of Palestine, perhaps epitomised in Veracini’s poignant question, ‘what can settler colonial studies offer to an interpretation of the conflict in Israel–Palestine?’32 Until recent years, analyses of Palestine have placed the focus majorly on the Zionist structures of domination, a trend that is still been adopted by the younger generations of scholars.33 Yet, as Ilan Pappé recently explained, as useful as the settler-colonial paradigm is, it is nonetheless insufficient to take account of settler constructions such as Israel-Palestine in a comprehensive fashion. For him, while the paradigm ‘challenge effectively the official Israeli, and mainstream scholarly approach […] it is unsatisfactory [because it] applies historical case studies with a known closure to an ongoing reality’.34 On the one hand, a rigid analysis of the history of the Zionist incursion since the late nineteenth century that excludes the study of Palestinian and other forms of struggle and survival would severely distort our empirical understanding of indigenous and settler subjectivities. On the other hand, it would be no less empirically erroneous, and also ethically obscene, to maintain that in Palestine the destructive logics of Zionist settlerism have surrendered to more toned-down axioms. That neither of these understandings should subdue the other is a strategy in the present study. But the reason for bringing these two perceptions together is motivated by a concern to recuperate not just a sense of urgency about the still oppositional and thus oppressive character of settler realties, nor indigenous agency per se, but a sensibility towards political work that reorients settler colonial studies to better communicate with the specificities of historical and ongoing anticolonial struggles. Structure, power, forces In what seems to be an attempt to soften Wolfe’s methodological position, Veracini explains that <u>if ‘there is a plot in the “historiography of elimination” and more generally in settler-colonial studies it is that while the structure <strong>attempts</strong> to eliminate Indigenous peoples it <strong>fails to do so</strong>’. The ‘structure cannot be reduced to its intention’</u>.35 That is to say, Wolfe’s logic of elimination should not be equated with elimination itself. As Veracini explains: Far from equating settler colonialism with elimination, Wolfe’s ‘structure’ refers to a continuing relationship of inequality between Indigenous and settler collectives. <u>Beside ‘structure’ and ‘event’, it seems important to note that Wolfe refers to a <strong>logic of elimination, not to elimination itself</u></strong>. After all, <u>were Indigenous elimination to become an accomplished and irretrievable fact, settler colonialism would lose its logic</u>.36 Though the key for Wolfe is to shed light on the mechanisms of elimination, Veracini takes Wolfe’s position that ‘<u><strong>we should not view the logic of elimination as solely a drive to exterminate Native human beings</u></strong>’, and suggests that we <u><strong>should focus on what the structure actualising the logic fails to accomplish</u></strong>.37 <u>The difference between the two highlights the incompleteness of the settler project. If settler colonialism is <strong>not a fait accompli but an incomplete project invested in a continuing structuration of life actualising the logic of elimination</strong>, then we may expect the settler colonial paradigm to take seriously phenomena of <strong>struggle, resistance and confrontation</strong>, and hence to align itself with the idea of power not just as coercion or repression but as a <strong>complex multiplicity</u></strong>. This is simply <u>because the <strong>incompleteness of elimination must be explained, and it cannot be explained just in terms of the oppressor’s self-error or strategic deferment</u></strong>. <u>The <strong>methodological imperative</strong> that derives then, is to <strong>trace the forces that cause the settler structure to fail and remain incomplete – forces that work</strong> either by <strong>compelling retreat in specific policy areas</strong>, or because of the ineffectiveness of the settler structure in territorialising its logic and imposing its discourse, codifications, and meanings in all areas of life</u>. As Macoun and Strakosch note, ‘[e]xposing the settler colonial project as fundamentally incomplete – and unable to be completed in the face of Indigenous resistance – has the potential to be a profoundly liberating and destabilizing move’.38 This is because this move leads research to deal with liberatory forces. Some Palestinian scholars have taken the analysis of the Israeli settler state in this direction. Recently, Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian draws on Wolfe’s logic of elimination but not without combining her analysis of surveillance and fear with an account of practices of resistance.39 Similarly, Mazin Qumsiyeh notes that the brutal removal of villagers during Ottoman and later the British and, finally, Israeli rule over the past thirteen decades would have proceeded much faster and certainly would have resulted in a far more homogeneous Jewish state had it not been for Palestinian resistance.40 <u>Explaining strategic and tactical changes in the continuing implementation of elimination only by means of the subject’s determination to eliminate appears as an act of theoretical cannibalism. The vicissitudes of elimination are the vicissitudes of the struggle, of resistance; or</u>, as Veracini recently put it: <u>the ‘settler colonial present is also an indigenous one’</u>.41 <u>Settler stability, in other words, needs to be explained not just by way of the discourse of settler inscription but by taking seriously Veracini’s insistence that <strong>the settler colonial situation is best described in terms of a ‘permanent movement’</u></strong>.42 <u>Movement here needs to be conceived as a <strong>constantly changing composition of forces</strong> – those which seek to eliminate indigenous life together with those that either cause some of these attempts to fail, or that institute forms of life contiguous to settlerism – in both cases <strong>compelling settler colonialism to rework itself</u></strong>. <u>The benefit of adopting the perspective of a field of forces lies</u>, in the words of James Williams, <u>in its questioning of ‘the evolution of things in order to sense how they have become what they are and how they may become something other</u>’. <u>This analytical sensibility</u>, as he rightly adds, <u>‘sets things in movement above the secure foundation of an unchanging given’, enabling a view of <strong>political life</strong> which emphasises the variations occurring within a social order – though <strong>always in the making</strong> – claiming to be established</u>.43 This logical development and contribution to the settler colonial paradigm is inspired mainly by the works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. However, the objections to their works among some scholars of settler colonialism, warrant a more extended response.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Edward Wong 18--(Edward Wong, Military Competition in Pacific Endures as Biggest Flash Point Between U.S. and China, No Publication, 11-14-2018 accessed 6-28-2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/world/asia/usa-china-trade-pacific.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FUnited%20States%20Politics%20and%20Government&amp;action=click&amp;contentCollection=timestopics%C2%AEion=stream&amp;module=stream_unit&amp;version=latest&amp;contentPlacement=31&amp;pgtype=collectionWASHINGTON)//ND fulltext: WASHINGTON — Trade disputes have for months been the focus of souring relations between the United States and China. But intractable problems in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait underscore that competition for dominance of the Pacific Ocean remains the most volatile source of conflict between the two nations — and the tensions are rising. That became clear in barbed comments during a meeting in Washington last week in which Mike Pompeo, the secretary of state, and Jim Mattis, the defense secretary, negotiated with their Chinese counterparts. And it is evident as Vice President Mike Pence is in Asia this week to talk to East Asian and Southeast Asian leaders to shore up support for American efforts to counterbalance China. Mr. Pence’s trip includes stops at two Asia-Pacific summit meetings, where he plans to speak about checking China’s influence and power projection. Since his broad speech last month on American competition with China, Mr. Pence has become the face of the administration’s aggressive approach to Beijing. Some Asia analysts say, though, that President Trump’s absence sends a signal that the United States is not committed to the region: President Xi Jinping of China and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia are each attending at least one of the gatherings. Strategy for the region, in Washington and Beijing, revolves around how each country can assert military dominance in the Pacific. For now, the most powerful military in the region is still that of the United States, which relies on the ability to have unfettered naval access to the South China Sea and the support of the self-governing island of Taiwan to bolster its standing. But China has become more aggressive in trying to assert dominance over both. And its state-owned companies are making inroads in the islands of Oceania — from Saipan to Vanuatu — with infrastructure projects. American officials say those could eventually become beachheads for the People’s Liberation Army, which would pose a challenge to the United States Navy’s operational command in the far island chains. Australia is also watching closely because the South Pacific has traditionally been its sphere of influence. Closer to home, China has continued to place military equipment and installations on rocks and reefs in the South China Sea, over which it claims sovereignty. And it is persuading some nations to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan while forcing foreign companies, including hotels and airlines, to drop any mention of Taiwan. There is a consensus in Washington that American officials need to find ways of pushing back. In the South China Sea, that has mainly taken the form of what are called freedom-of-navigation operations by the Navy, in which ships sail near the islands or features claimed by Beijing to establish that the waters are international — and not Chinese territory. On Sept. 30, American and Chinese warships nearly collided, coming within 45 yards of each other. On Tuesday, Mr. Pence’s plane flew over the South China Sea to Singapore, where he attended the annual summit meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Mr. Pence told a Washington Post columnist on the plane that the flight, which passed within 50 miles of the contested Spratly Islands, was a type of freedom-of-navigation operation. “We will not be intimidated,” he said. “We will not stand down. We will continue to exercise freedom of navigation.” Graham Allison, a Harvard Kennedy School professor who wrote a book on the potential for war between the United States and China, said most people in the region had thought it was “game over” on the South China Sea — too late to roll back China’s presence from rocks and reefs, as well as islands it created by dredging sand. But “the Trump administration now means to fight back vigorously on all fronts, including on the South China Sea — and perhaps even on Taiwan,” Mr. Allison said. Last Friday, at the close of the Washington meeting with their Chinese counterparts, Mr. Pompeo and Mr. Mattis made sharp comments on Pacific issues. “Regarding our strong ties with a democratic Taiwan, I reiterated the U.S. policy has not changed and that we are concerned about China’s increasing efforts to coerce others, constraining Taiwan’s international space,” Mr. Pompeo said, notably, in opening remarks to journalists. Later, Gen. Wei Fenghe, the Chinese defense minister, made his own assertive comments on Taiwan, referencing the American Civil War and the United States Pledge of Allegiance. “To achieve reunification is a mission for our party and our country,” General Wei said. “In the Pledge of Allegiance to the U.S., there is this sentence saying this is a nation under God, indivisible. So it is the same with Taiwan. It is an inalienable part of China.” If “this territorial integrity is under threat,” he said, China would move to maintain it “at any cost,” just as the United States had to do “in the Civil War.” Analysts in Washington took note of the remarks. “I believe it’s rare that the U.S. side raises Taiwan in a news conference with the Chinese in an opening statement,” said Bonnie S. Glaser, a senior adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Pompeo referred to ‘democratic Taiwan.’ That will surely rankle the Chinese. I expect China’s remarks in private regarding Taiwan were even sharper.” The United States has been more aggressive in defending Taiwanese interests since John R. Bolton became national security adviser in April. Last month, the Pentagon sailed two warships through the Taiwan Strait, which underscored the potential for conflict. The White House had initially considered sending an aircraft carrier through the strait — something the United States has not done since 2007. That most likely would have ignited a furious response from China. Instead, the Pentagon sent a cruiser and a destroyer. Defense Department officials had argued that the carrier would be too provocative at a time when Washington and Beijing are already at loggerheads over trade and other issues. That includes Communist Party repression of ethnic Uighur Muslims, which Mr. Pompeo regularly denounces. On Wednesday, American legislators introduced bills calling on the Trump administration to take actionto defend the Uighurs. Mr. Mattis and Mr. Wei have tried to lower the temperature on tensions in the Pacific. Before the Washington talks, the two met in Singapore last month on the sidelines of a conclave of Southeast Asian defense ministers. But one Defense Department official said that cordial talks were the limits of what the two nations could achieve for now. Both countries have dug into seemingly nonnegotiable positions on China’s militarization of disputed land features in the South China Sea — the issue that most bedevils the military relationship. The Chinese do not describe their actions as militarization; they accuse the United States of militarizing the sea with its freedom-of-navigation ship operations and overflights. Now, officials from Britain and France say their navies are also taking part in the operations, even though Southeast Asian nations contesting China’s claims have not publicly committed to participating. Yang Jiechi, the senior Chinese foreign policy official who attended the Washington meeting, said China was building what he described as civilian facilities and necessary defense facilities “on its own territory.”“The Chinese side made it clear to the United States that it should stop sending its vessels and military aircraft close to Chinese islands and reefs, and stop actions that undermine China’s sovereignty and security interest,” Mr. Yang said. Michael Pillsbury, an author on the Chinese military cited by Mr. Trump and Mr. Pence, said the Chinese would no doubt continue to see the actions in a hostile light. They are, he said, “interpreting these freedom-of-navigation exercises, even when they’re innocent passage, as something more — provocations, or a declining hegemon trying to maintain its power.”<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Collapse of US naval hegemony causes conflict over Taiwan and SCS</h4><p>Edward <strong>Wong 18</strong>--(Edward Wong, Military Competition in Pacific Endures as Biggest Flash Point Between U.S. and China, No Publication, 11-14-2018 accessed 6-28-2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/world/asia/usa-china-trade-pacific.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FUnited%20States%20Politics%20and%20Government&amp;action=click&amp;contentCollection=timestopics%C2%AEion=stream&amp;module=stream_unit&amp;version=latest&amp;contentPlacement=31&amp;pgtype=collectionWASHINGTON)//ND</p><p>WASHINGTON — <u>Trade disputes have for months been the focus of souring relations between the United States and China. But intractable problems in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait underscore that competition for dominance of the Pacific Ocean remains the most volatile source of conflict between the two nations — and the tensions are rising.</u> That became clear in barbed comments during a meeting in Washington last week in which Mike Pompeo, the secretary of state, and Jim Mattis, the defense secretary, negotiated with their Chinese counterparts. And it is evident as Vice President Mike <u>Pence is in Asia this week to talk to East Asian and Southeast Asian leaders to shore up support for American efforts to counterbalance China</u>. <u>Mr. Pence’s trip includes stops at two Asia-Pacific summit meetings, where he plans to speak about checking China’s influence and power projection. </u>Since his broad speech last month on American competition with China, Mr. <u>Pence has become the face of the administration’s aggressive approach to Beijing</u>. Some Asia analysts say, though, that President <u>Trump’s absence sends a signal that the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>is not committed to the region: President Xi</u> Jinping of China <u>and</u> President Vladimir V. <u>Putin </u>of Russia <u>are each attending at least one of the gatherings</u>. <u>Strategy for the region, in Washington and Beijing, revolves around how each country can assert military dominance in the Pacific.</u> For now, <u>the most powerful military in the region is still</u> that of <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, <u>which relies on the ability to have unfettered naval access to the South China Sea and the support of the self-governing island of Taiwan to bolster its standing.</u> <u>But China has become more aggressive in trying to assert dominance over both</u>. And its state-owned companies are making inroads in the islands of Oceania — from Saipan to Vanuatu — with infrastructure projects. American officials say those could eventually become beachheads for the People’s Liberation Army, which would pose a challenge to the United States Navy’s operational command in the far island chains. Australia is also watching closely because <u>the South Pacific has traditionally been its sphere of influence.</u> Closer to home, <u>China has continued to place military equipment and installations on rocks and reefs in the South China Sea, over which it claims sovereignty. </u>And <u>it is persuading some nations to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan while forcing foreign companies,</u> including hotels and airlines, <u>to drop any mention of Taiwan</u>. <u>There is a consensus in Washington that American officials need to find ways of pushing back. In the S</u>outh <u>C</u>hina <u>S</u>ea, <u>that has mainly taken the form of what are called freedom-of-navigation operations by the Navy,</u> <u>in which ships sail near the islands or features claimed by Beijing to establish that the waters are international</u> — and not Chinese territory. On Sept. 30, American and Chinese warships nearly collided, coming within 45 yards of each other. On Tuesday, Mr. Pence’s plane flew over the South China Sea to Singapore, where he attended the annual summit meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Mr. Pence told a Washington Post columnist on the plane that the flight, which passed within 50 miles of the contested Spratly Islands, was a type of freedom-of-navigation operation. “We will not be intimidated,” he said. “We will not stand down. We will continue to exercise freedom of navigation.” Graham Allison, a Harvard Kennedy School professor who wrote a book on the potential for war between the United States and China, said most people in the region had thought it was “game over” on the South China Sea — too late to roll back China’s presence from rocks and reefs, as well as islands it created by dredging sand. But “the Trump administration now means to fight back vigorously on all fronts, including on the South China Sea — and perhaps even on Taiwan,” Mr. Allison said. Last Friday, at the close of the Washington meeting with their Chinese counterparts, Mr. Pompeo and Mr. Mattis made sharp comments on Pacific issues. “Regarding our strong ties with a democratic Taiwan, I reiterated the U.S. policy has not changed and that we are concerned about China’s increasing efforts to coerce others, constraining Taiwan’s international space,” Mr. Pompeo said, notably, in opening remarks to journalists. Later, Gen. Wei Fenghe, the Chinese defense minister, made his own assertive comments on Taiwan, referencing the American Civil War and the United States Pledge of Allegiance. “To achieve reunification is a mission for our party and our country,” General Wei said. “In the Pledge of Allegiance to the U.S., there is this sentence saying this is a nation under God, indivisible. So it is the same with Taiwan. It is an inalienable part of China.” If “this territorial integrity is under threat,” he said, China would move to maintain it “at any cost,” just as the United States had to do “in the Civil War.” Analysts in Washington took note of the remarks. “I believe it’s rare that the U.S. side raises Taiwan in a news conference with the Chinese in an opening statement,” said Bonnie S. Glaser, a senior adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Pompeo referred to ‘democratic Taiwan.’ That will surely rankle the Chinese. I expect China’s remarks in private regarding Taiwan were even sharper.” The United States has been more aggressive in defending Taiwanese interests since John R. Bolton became national security adviser in April. Last month, the Pentagon sailed two warships through the Taiwan Strait, which underscored the potential for conflict. The White House had initially considered sending an aircraft carrier through the strait — something the United States has not done since 2007. That most likely would have ignited a furious response from China. Instead, the Pentagon sent a cruiser and a destroyer. Defense Department officials had argued that the carrier would be too provocative at a time when Washington and Beijing are already at loggerheads over trade and other issues. That includes Communist Party repression of ethnic Uighur Muslims, which Mr. Pompeo regularly denounces. On Wednesday, American legislators introduced bills calling on the Trump administration to take actionto defend the Uighurs. Mr. Mattis and Mr. Wei have tried to lower the temperature on tensions in the Pacific. Before the Washington talks, the two met in Singapore last month on the sidelines of a conclave of Southeast Asian defense ministers. But one Defense Department official said that cordial talks were the limits of what the two nations could achieve for now. Both countries have dug into seemingly nonnegotiable positions on China’s militarization of disputed land features in the South China Sea — the issue that most bedevils the military relationship. The Chinese do not describe their actions as militarization; they accuse the United States of militarizing the sea with its freedom-of-navigation ship operations and overflights. Now, officials from Britain and France say their navies are also taking part in the operations, even though Southeast Asian nations contesting China’s claims have not publicly committed to participating. Yang Jiechi, the senior Chinese foreign policy official who attended the Washington meeting, said China was building what he described as civilian facilities and necessary defense facilities “on its own territory.”“The Chinese side made it clear to the United States that it should stop sending its vessels and military aircraft close to Chinese islands and reefs, and stop actions that undermine China’s sovereignty and security interest,” Mr. Yang said. Michael Pillsbury, an author on the Chinese military cited by Mr. Trump and Mr. Pence, said the Chinese would no doubt continue to see the actions in a hostile light. They are, he said, “<u>interpreting these freedom-of-navigation exercises, even when they’re innocent passage, as something more — provocations, or a declining hegemon trying to maintain its power</u>.”</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Phillips ’19 [Erin; Winter 2019; University of New Mexico School of Law, drafted under the guidance of Professor Desiderio and Professor Boyd; New Mexico Law Review, “The Silent Problem: The Implicit Personhood Determination in State v. Montoya,” vol. 49] fulltext: Even though the Montoya Court adopted the rational link standard as a way to circumvent a literal application of the robbery statute, the New Mexico robbery statute still controls interpretation of the case. This means that by upholding the robbery conviction under the controlling statute, the Court determined the deceased victim to be a person. New Mexico’s robbery statute requires that the victim exercise immediate control over the subsequently taken property. Whether or not the Court literally applied the statute, by upholding a conviction of robbery the Court implicitly made the determination that the deceased victim was able to exercise control over the property ultimately taken by the defendant. In other words, the Court held, however implicitly, that the victim was a person even after death. Without some unambiguous statement that the Court did not hold personhood to be required in the rational link standard, or some other overt rejection of the deceased-victim-as-person notion, the Court implicitly conceded that the deceased victim is a person. Without overt rejection of that notion, there is no other interpretation of the implications set forth by the Court. The Court upheld a conviction under the robbery statute which criminalizes the theft of property from the immediate control of a person through the use of force. If the Court stated that the deceased victim was not a person, the Court could not have upheld the robbery conviction under the statute. But by not taking a stance, the Court still makes a statement, even in its silence, that the deceased victim was a person. The Court’s assertion—that a dead person is still a person—is a fallacy. The notion that a dead person can exercise control over possessions goes against prevalent scholarship citing the notion that personhood ceases upon the loss of cognitive function.64 Perhaps the Montoya Court recognized that fallacious territory it was entering into. Perhaps the desire to avoid having to make an overt determination of such legal fiction is exactly what drove the Court to adopt the rational link standard. No matter the motivation or the efforts to avoid doing so, the Montoya Court ultimately did make a de facto determination that the deceased victim was a person. Through this unrecognized or unintended determination of personhood, the future problems caused by Montoya’s holding become evident. VI. Background and Framework of Personhood Theory Although the issue of personhood ultimately centers on “the fundamental question of who counts for the purpose of the law,” there has been no judicial consensus as to how to apply or function within personhood theory.65 The theory of personhood, or the legal metaphor of personhood,66 is inherently problematic because although defined as an “entity ‘given certain legal rights and duties of a human being,’”67 it is often conflated to hold the same meaning as humanity.68 The most difficult questions in determining personhood center on “whether the entity in question can be regarded as human.”69 The answer to that question varies, as “[d]ifferent jurisdictions have created different thresholds for personhood and different distributions of rights, . . . such that the same individual or entity might be recognized as a person in one place and property in another.”70 Under the common law tradition, “legal personhood is disparate and diffuse,”71 and “[t]he meaning of legal personhood shifts significantly depending” on who is discussing the distinction, and under what theory of legal framework.72 The Federal Constitution does not offer a definition of person, nor does it “delineate who or what is included in the concept of ‘person’ for purposes of bestowing” constitutional rights and protections.73 Despite the inconsistent definition, interpretation, and application of personhood, the concept carries “normative, ethical and political force” and is both a legal fiction and a very tangible concept through which individuals access legal rights.74 The ability to bear and exercise those rights is a key feature of legal personhood.75 Although routinely equated with humanity, personhood is a distinct categorization in the eyes of the law. Arguably, most legal questions regarding a human being deal with that human being as a person, therefore, the concepts of humanity and personhood do not warrant distinction in those common scenarios.76 But broadly equating humanity and personhood ignores that the terms have fundamentally different definitions, as “‘[h]uman’ refers to a biological category and ‘person’ refers to an entity with a set of capabilities,”77 such as exercisable rights. Humanity and personhood, although often equated to hold the same meaning, ought not be treated as synonyms, given that distinction.78 But the judiciary often finds itself at the center of the tension between humanity and personhood, especially within the controversial realms of reproductive rights. The Personhood Movement, an encompassing term for the national trends among abortion opponents to establish the legal personhood of fetuses, is rooted in Justice Blackmun’s language in Roe v. Wade: “‘[i]f the suggestion of fetal personhood is established . . . the fetus’ right to life would be guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment.’”79 Leaning on this claim, the Personhood Movement consists of efforts within State Constitutions to add provisions asserting the rights of any human being starting at the moment of fertilization, as well as community-organizing efforts to affect political, legislative, and social change supporting the recognition of fetuses as persons.80 The ramifications of the Personhood Movement are easily seen: if fetuses were recognized as persons beginning at fertilization, the controlling law regarding a woman’s right to access healthcare affecting the fetus (including abortion) would be more heavily regulated and restricted. Although the Personhood Movement is based in the realm of reproductive rights, its influence can be seen in other legal realms, including the right to aid-indying and the rights of permanently comatose individuals. As within the controlling reproductive rights framework, wherein a fetus is not recognized as able to exercise rights or have interests in protection under the Constitution, adult humans who are permanently comatose and approaching their end of life are regarded as unable to exercise their rights.81 There is a clear distinction between the two realms, since permanently comatose adults are definitely considered humans, while fetuses have not been universally categorized as humans.82 Similarly, permanently comatose individuals are at the end of their life, versus fetuses that precede a human life.83 Despite these distinctions, however, a corollary exists between the two categorizations and the controversies they cause. For permanently comatose individuals, tensions typically arise when considering whether or not to terminate life support. In those situations, the comatose individual is literally unable to assert any rights or state any preferences.84 Without that ability, any caregivers must base their decisions off of the directives given by the individual prior to entering their comatose state.85 Likewise, a court would be left to infer that the personhood of that comatose individual stems from the fact that they were once active persons.86 The controversy regarding the rights of permanently comatose individuals typically revolves around determining whether the precomatose directives were valid, thus affecting subsequent decisions of life support termination. Analyzing Montoya through these personhood frameworks is relevant because, although the frameworks deal with distinct factual scenarios, the fundamental question is consistent throughout: when will a court recognize a human being as a person? Implicit in that question are moral tensions which may account for why the concept of personhood is so controversial. Because personhood and humanity are often conflated as synonymous terms, determinations of one’s personhood begs analysis of one’s most basic existence. The Federal Constitution may not provide a definition for “person,” but it has certainly upheld as paramount the individual interest associated in a human’s exercise of dignity, autonomy, and identity.87 The New Mexico Constitution has similarly recognized these rights as inherent to its citizens in its “Inalienable Rights” Clause, which protects “certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, among which are the rights of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of seeking and obtaining safety and happiness.”88 These expansive protections relate to countless aspects of a human being’s life and identity, protecting one’s ability to marry, to retain privacy, and to be free from intrusion. In other words, these rights have defined society’s guiding principles of human existence, and disruption of those principles causes rightful discomfort. In the context of Montoya, the Court would have been rightfully uncomfortable when faced with the daunting task of dealing with a question of personhood. Moreover, the Court may have seen the personhood question as irrelevant to the scope of their decision. But given the controversial position of personhood within the evolution of society, the Court’s apparent discomfort ought not outweigh the necessity of taking clear and definitive stances when issues of personhood are raised. It is objectively uncomfortable to ask whether a deceased victim is still a person, because to do so may deny significance or reverence for the victim’s life. Because the concepts of humanity and personhood are so closely related, even asking the question of whether a deceased victim can still retain rights is uncomfortable, as it tugs at society’s moral and ethical values. But even when faced with this discomfort, the Court cannot afford to be ambiguous on issues of personhood. What is being protected when we attempt to protect the rights of a deceased victim (or a fetus or permanently comatose individual)? A claim that a fetus, a permanently comatose individual, or a deceased victim retain the rights of personhood may be rooted in protecting society’s own interests, rather than the interest of those entities in question.89 That societal discomfort with addressing the rights or lack thereof was likely present in the Montoya Court’s decision. There, the Court determined that the deceased victim was a person, albeit implicitly. As aforementioned, the Court’s holding was significantly rooted in policy concerns to ensure that criminals could not receive lower convictions for theft by also taking the life of their victims. But the determination that the deceased victim was a person may have been based on a silent discomfort felt by the Court in explicitly saying the deceased victim, who suffered a violent death, would no longer be considered a person in the eyes of the law. Articulated as such, that would have been an unsavory stance for the Court to have taken.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><u>LEGALLY</u>---it’s shaped by <u>common law</u>, treated as <u>full</u> personhood absent <u>unambiguous denial</u>.</h4><p><strong>Phillips ’19 </strong>[Erin; Winter 2019; University of New Mexico School of Law, drafted under the guidance of Professor Desiderio and Professor Boyd; New Mexico Law Review, “The Silent Problem: The Implicit Personhood Determination in State v. Montoya,” vol. 49]</p><p>Even though the Montoya Court adopted the rational link standard as a way to circumvent a literal application of the robbery statute, the New Mexico robbery statute still controls interpretation of the case. This means that by upholding the robbery conviction under the controlling statute, the Court determined the deceased victim to be a person. New Mexico’s robbery statute requires that the victim exercise immediate control over the subsequently taken property. <u>Whether or not the Court <strong>literally</strong> applied the statute, by upholding</u> a conviction of robbery <u>the Court <strong>implicitly</strong> made the determination</u> that the deceased victim was able to exercise control over the property ultimately taken by the defendant. In other words, the Court held, however implicitly, <u>that the victim was a <strong>person</u></strong> even after death.</p><p><u><mark>Without</mark> some <strong><mark>unambiguous</strong> statement</mark> that the <mark>Court did <strong>not</strong> hold <strong>personhood</strong></mark> to be required</u> in the rational link standard, <u>or some other overt rejection</u> of the deceased-victim-as-person notion, <u>the <mark>Court</mark> <strong>implicitly <mark>conceded</strong> that</mark> the deceased victim <mark>is a <strong>person</strong></mark>. Without <strong>overt rejection</strong> of that notion, <mark>there is <strong>no other interp</strong></mark>retation of the implications set forth by the Court</u>. The Court upheld a conviction under the robbery statute which criminalizes the theft of property from the immediate control of a person through the use of force. If the Court stated that the deceased victim was not a person, the Court could not have upheld the robbery conviction under the statute. <u>But by <strong>not taking</strong> a stance, the Court <strong>still</strong> makes a statement, even in <strong>its silence</strong>, that the deceased victim was a person</u>.</p><p>The Court’s assertion—that a dead person is still a person—is a fallacy. The notion that a dead person can exercise control over possessions goes against prevalent scholarship citing the notion that personhood ceases upon the loss of cognitive function.64 Perhaps the Montoya Court recognized that fallacious territory it was entering into. Perhaps the desire to avoid having to make an overt determination of such legal fiction is exactly what drove the Court to adopt the rational link standard. <u><mark>No matter</mark> the <strong><mark>motivation</strong></mark> or the <strong>efforts <mark>to avoid</strong></mark> doing so, the Montoya <mark>Court</mark> ultimately did <mark>make</mark> a <strong><mark>de facto</mark> determination</u></strong> that the deceased victim was a person. <u>Through this <strong>unrecognized</strong> or <strong>unintended determination</strong> of <mark>personhood</mark>, the <strong>future problems</strong> caused by Montoya’s holding become evident</u>.</p><p>VI. Background and Framework of Personhood Theory</p><p>Although the issue of personhood ultimately centers on “the fundamental question of who counts for the purpose of the law,” there has been no judicial consensus as to how to apply or function within personhood theory.65 <u>The theory of personhood</u>, or the legal metaphor of personhood,66 <u>is inherently problematic because</u> although defined as <u>an “entity</u> ‘given certain legal rights and duties of a human being,’”67 it <u>is often <strong>conflated</strong> to hold the same meaning as humanity</u>.68 The most difficult questions in determining personhood center on <u>“whether the entity</u> in question <u>can be regarded as <strong>human</strong>.”</u>69 The answer to that question <u>varies, as “[d]ifferent <strong><mark>jurisdictions</strong></mark> have <mark>created</mark> <strong>different <mark>thresholds</strong> for</mark> <strong>personhood</strong> and different distributions of <mark>rights</u></mark>, . . . such that the same individual or entity might be recognized as a person in one place and property in another.”70 <u><mark>Under</mark> the <strong><mark>common law</strong></mark> tradition, “legal personhood</u> is disparate and diffuse,”71 and “[t]he meaning of legal personhood <u>shifts significantly depending” on</u> who is discussing the distinction, and under <u>what theory</u> of legal framework.72</p><p>The Federal Constitution does not offer a definition of person, nor does it “delineate who or what is included in the concept of ‘person’ for purposes of bestowing” constitutional rights and protections.73 Despite the inconsistent definition, interpretation, and application of <u>personhood</u>, the concept <u>carries “normative, ethical and political force” and is both a <strong>legal fiction</strong> and a very tangible concept</u> through which individuals access legal rights.74 <u>The <mark>ability to <strong>bear</strong></mark> and <strong>exercise those <mark>rights</strong> is</mark> a <strong>key feature</strong> of legal <mark>personhood</u></mark>.75</p><p>Although routinely equated with humanity, personhood is a distinct categorization in the eyes of the law. Arguably, most legal questions regarding a human being deal with that human being as a person, therefore, the concepts of humanity and personhood do not warrant distinction in those common scenarios.76 But broadly equating humanity and personhood ignores that the terms have fundamentally different definitions, as “‘[h]uman’ refers to a biological category and ‘person’ refers to an entity with a set of capabilities,”77 such as exercisable rights. Humanity and personhood, although often equated to hold the same meaning, ought not be treated as synonyms, given that distinction.78</p><p>But the judiciary often finds itself at the center of the tension between humanity and personhood, especially within the controversial realms of reproductive rights. The Personhood Movement, an encompassing term for the national trends among abortion opponents to establish the legal personhood of fetuses, is rooted in Justice Blackmun’s language in Roe v. Wade: “‘[i]f the suggestion of fetal personhood is established . . . the fetus’ right to life would be guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment.’”79 Leaning on this claim, the Personhood Movement consists of efforts within State Constitutions to add provisions asserting the rights of any human being starting at the moment of fertilization, as well as community-organizing efforts to affect political, legislative, and social change supporting the recognition of fetuses as persons.80 The ramifications of the Personhood Movement are easily seen: if fetuses were recognized as persons beginning at fertilization, the controlling law regarding a woman’s right to access healthcare affecting the fetus (including abortion) would be more heavily regulated and restricted.</p><p>Although the Personhood Movement is based in the realm of reproductive rights, its influence can be seen in other legal realms, including the right to aid-indying and the rights of permanently comatose individuals. As within the controlling reproductive rights framework, wherein a fetus is not recognized as able to exercise rights or have interests in protection under the Constitution, adult humans who are permanently comatose and approaching their end of life are regarded as unable to exercise their rights.81 There is a clear distinction between the two realms, since permanently comatose adults are definitely considered humans, while fetuses have not been universally categorized as humans.82 Similarly, permanently comatose individuals are at the end of their life, versus fetuses that precede a human life.83 Despite these distinctions, however, a corollary exists between the two categorizations and the controversies they cause.</p><p>For permanently comatose individuals, tensions typically arise when considering whether or not to terminate life support. In those situations, the comatose individual is literally unable to assert any rights or state any preferences.84 Without that ability, any caregivers must base their decisions off of the directives given by the individual prior to entering their comatose state.85 Likewise, a court would be left to infer that the personhood of that comatose individual stems from the fact that they were once active persons.86 The controversy regarding the rights of permanently comatose individuals typically revolves around determining whether the precomatose directives were valid, thus affecting subsequent decisions of life support termination.</p><p>Analyzing Montoya through these personhood frameworks is relevant because, although the frameworks deal with distinct factual scenarios, the fundamental question is consistent throughout: when will a court recognize a human being as a person? Implicit in that question are moral tensions which may account for why the concept of personhood is so controversial. Because personhood and humanity are often conflated as synonymous terms, determinations of one’s personhood begs analysis of one’s most basic existence. The Federal Constitution may not provide a definition for “person,” but it has certainly upheld as paramount the individual interest associated in a human’s exercise of dignity, autonomy, and identity.87 The New Mexico Constitution has similarly recognized these rights as inherent to its citizens in its “Inalienable Rights” Clause, which protects “certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, among which are the rights of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of seeking and obtaining safety and happiness.”88 These expansive protections relate to countless aspects of a human being’s life and identity, protecting one’s ability to marry, to retain privacy, and to be free from intrusion. In other words, these rights have defined society’s guiding principles of human existence, and disruption of those principles causes rightful discomfort.</p><p>In the context of Montoya, the Court would have been rightfully uncomfortable when faced with the daunting task of dealing with a question of personhood. Moreover, the Court may have seen the personhood question as irrelevant to the scope of their decision. But given the controversial position of personhood within the evolution of society, the Court’s apparent discomfort ought not outweigh the necessity of taking clear and definitive stances when issues of personhood are raised. It is objectively uncomfortable to ask whether a deceased victim is still a person, because to do so may deny significance or reverence for the victim’s life. Because the concepts of humanity and personhood are so closely related, even asking the question of whether a deceased victim can still retain rights is uncomfortable, as it tugs at society’s moral and ethical values. But even when faced with this discomfort, <u>the <mark>Court <strong>can</strong></mark>no<strong><mark>t</strong></mark> afford to <mark>be <strong>ambiguous</strong></mark> on issues of personhood</u>.</p><p>What is being protected when we attempt to protect the rights of a deceased victim (or a fetus or permanently comatose individual)? A claim that a fetus, a permanently comatose individual, or a deceased victim retain the rights of personhood may be rooted in protecting society’s own interests, rather than the interest of those entities in question.89 That societal discomfort with addressing the rights or lack thereof was likely present in the Montoya Court’s decision. <u>There, the Court determined that the deceased victim was a person, <strong>albeit implicitly</u></strong>. As aforementioned, <u>the Court’s holding was significantly <strong>rooted</strong> in <strong>policy concerns</u></strong> to ensure that criminals could not receive lower convictions for theft by also taking the life of their victims. But the determination that the deceased victim was a person may have been based on a silent discomfort felt by the Court in explicitly saying the deceased victim, who suffered a violent death, would no longer be considered a person in the eyes of the law. Articulated as such, that would have been an unsavory stance for the Court to have taken.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Akbar 18, Assistant Professor, Moritz College of Law (Amna Akbar, 7-25-2018, “Toward a Radical Imagination of Law,” Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 426 fulltext: Around the same time, I had begun teaching a law and social movements seminar. We studied the Black Panthers and Young Lords, Len Holt, Assata Shakur, and Ella Baker. I worried my students found the questions faced by these movements to be abstract and faraway. I wanted them to understand that contemporary movements struggled with questions similar to those in the texts we labored over. That’s how an organizer found himself surrounded by future lawyers. Hayes, along with his comrades in the contemporary Black liberation and immigrant justice movements, confronted many of the same strategic and tactical choices every day. As I had hoped, his presence transformed our conversation. Our intellectual distance from the texts vanished, and our lively conversation ended with a question: What is the proper role of lawyers within the movement? After a short pause, Hayes praised the technical chops and procedural expertise lawyers bring to the table. But that is not enough, he said. “Most lawyers see a problem and think, ‘How can I fix this law?’” This view is too narrow: it obscures the stakes and concedes to status quo arrangements. “The role of the law is to protect the state,” Hayes reasoned. “Lawyers must work with movements to imagine with us the kind of state we want to live in. Only from there can we work together to think about the laws we need.”2 In conversations with intellectuals and organizers around the country, I realized the Movement for Black Lives (M4BL or Movement)3—the larger movement configuration in which the chapter based Black Lives Matter network functions—was having a far richer and more imaginative conversation about law reform than lawyers and law faculty. The Movement for Black Lives was situating their critique in Black history and intellectual traditions, and their imagination of alternate futures in Black freedom movements. Their critique was more expansive at the same time as it was more grounded, and their imagination more radical.4 Legal scholars often assume the movement’s fight is over policing: indictments for police killings, independent prosecutors to investigate police shootings, better training and supervision for police, more diverse police forces, and so on.5 But, as Hayes suggested, the most imaginative voices within contemporary racial justice movements are fighting for much more than body cameras and police convictions.6 The movement is focused on shifting power into Black and other marginalized communities;7 shrinking the space of governance now reserved for policing, surveillance, and mass incarceration; and fundamentally transforming the relationship among state, market, and society.8 Movement actors have made policy proposals and engaged in law reform campaigns at the same time they have prominently contested law and politics as usual.9 In the few years after Ferguson police officer Darren Wilson’s killing of Michael Brown, there were shutdowns of bridges and highways; die-ins at courthouses and statehouses; occupations of police stations, police unions, and universities; arrests and curfews; tear gas and riot gear.10 But the movement’s highprofile campaigns have not been waged by lawyers or via litigation.11 Indeed, the movement has largely refrained from fighting to strengthen preexisting rights or demanding legal recognition of new ones.12 The focus is not on investing even-handedness to law or the police, not on restoring criminal justice to some imaginary constitutional or pre-raced status quo, and not on increasing resources for community policing.13 But it would be wrong to think the movement has given up on law. The movement is not attempting to operate outside of law, but rather to reimagine its possibilities within a broader attempt to reimagine the state. Law is fundamental to what movement actors are fighting against and for.14 To illustrate how the movement approach reorients traditional criminal law reform conversations, I examine the 2016 policy platform of the Movement for Black Lives, “A Vision for Black Lives: Policy Demands for Black Power, Freedom, and Justice” (the Vision).15 I put the Vision in conversation with the Ferguson and Baltimore reports by the Department of Justice16—which represent more traditional liberal approaches to criminal law reform. The Vision and the DOJ reports offer some of the most damning critiques of policing in recent memory, but differ fundamentally in their analysis and conclusions. The contrast reflects the limitations of liberal law reform at the same time that it opens up a more imaginative set of possibilities about reorganizing the very structure of our society. By studying the convergences and divergences between these texts, this Article highlights how radical social movements reimagine the very same social problems with which significant bodies of legal scholarship engage. The Vision and DOJ reports offer alternate conceptualizations of the problem of policing and the appropriate approach to law reform. Reflective of liberal law reform projects on police, the DOJ reports identify policing as a fundamental tool of law and order that serves the collective interests of society, and locate the problems of police in a failure to adhere to constitutional law. As a corrective, the DOJ reports advocate for investing more resources in police: more trainings, better supervision, community policing. In contrast, the Vision identifies policing as a historical and violent force in Black communities, underpinning a system of racial capitalism and limiting the possibilities of Black life. As such, policing as we now know it cannot be fixed. Thus, the Vision’s reimagination of policing—rooted in Black history and Black intellectual traditions—transforms mainstream approaches to reform. In forwarding a decarceral agenda rooted in an abolitionist imagination, the Vision demands shrinking the large footprint of policing, surveillance, and incarceration, and shifting resources into social programs in Black communities: housing, health care, jobs, and schools. The Vision focuses on building power in Black communities, and fundamentally transforming the relationships among state, market, and society. In so doing, the movement offers transformative, affirmative visions for change designed to address the structures of inequality—something legal scholarship has lacked for far too long. The DOJ reports document the problems endemic to policing. While presenting a critical view of Ferguson’s and Baltimore’s police departments, the reports are committed to the legal status quo, to a mode of governance that relies on criminal law enforcement to deal with a broad set of deep-seated social problems, and to rules and authorities that are historically and functionally oppressive. As a result, the reports double down on traditional reforms that reinvest in law and police.17 This approach cedes more legitimacy—not to mention more resources—to the police and the legal frameworks in which they operate without a meaningful consideration of alternatives. Of course, the reports emerge from a particular time and social location: a prosecutorial agency, the Civil Rights Division, embedded within the executive branch during the Obama administration.18 As with any social location, there are possibilities, pressures, and constraints on what the DOJ may say or do as a law enforcement agency under a particular administration. But framed in a different understanding, accountable to different constituencies, the DOJ could have taken an approach to reform more aligned with the Vision, suggesting a realignment of resources from policing to the underlying social problems stemming from structural inequality in Ferguson and Baltimore. The additional importance of the DOJ reports lies in how they reflect how legal institutions—and, in turn, law scholarship— approach long-standing structural problems while firmly committed to the status quo and restoring legitimacy thereto. In this way, the DOJ reports expose a central dilemma of liberal law reform projects, caught between a commitment to the rule of law and status quo arrangements on the one hand, and the desire for substantive justice and social, economic, and political transformation on the other.19 But our political moment is defined by crisis and polarization, with insurgencies on the left and right calling for reform, transformation, and even revolution.20 Amid the electoral triumph of Trump, protest and people-of-color-led anti-capitalist movements have surged in activity.21 These radical movements mark the revival of anti-capitalist racial justice politics in the United States in a way that we have not seen since the civil rights, Black power, and Chicano movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Contemporary racial justice movements are not simply arguing the state has created a fundamentally unequal criminal legal system. They are identifying policing, jail, and prison as the primary mode of governing Black, poor, and other communities of color in the United States, and pointing to law as the scaffolding. They are working to build another state—another world even—organized differently than the one we have inherited. They are aiming to use the law as a tool to build that alternative future. We can ignore their deep critiques and visionary alternatives, or we can embrace the possibilities of a more searching inquiry. This is a moment calling for a radical imagination, where the scale of deep critique is matched with a scale of grand vision.22 While many progressive and left legal scholars reach for meaningful change, most of us lack alternative frameworks.23 Like the DOJ reports, even when the scale of our critique is large, our visions for change are often too small. We have focused on a narrow picture of law and law reform while sidestepping questions about the structure of the society, the state, and the market. These movements make these questions central to their work.24 They do not have it all worked out. But they are making powerful sketches of much-needed alternative frameworks. Imagining with social movements seeking to transform the state would invest law scholarship in a project of reconstruction and transformation.25 For radical racial justice movements, the primary commitment is not to law, its legitimacy, rationality, or stability: It is to people.26 The motivations are to protest an enduring set of social structures rooted in European and settler colonialism and the Atlantic slave trade; to fight for transformative change, justice, and liberation; and to invest in a redistributive and transformative project, one demanding a more equal distribution of resources and life chances,27 with a focus on the most intersectionally marginalized people.28<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The state can be utilized for abolition of anti-blackness.</h4><p><strong>Akbar 18</strong>, Assistant Professor, Moritz College of Law (Amna Akbar, 7-25-20<u>18, “Toward a Radical Imagination of Law,” Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 426</p><p></u>Around the same time, I had begun teaching a law and social movements seminar. We studied the Black Panthers and Young Lords, Len Holt, Assata Shakur, and Ella Baker. I worried my students found the questions faced by these movements to be abstract and faraway. I wanted them to understand that contemporary movements struggled with questions similar to those in the texts we labored over. That’s how an organizer found himself surrounded by future lawyers. Hayes, along with his comrades in the contemporary <u>Black liberation and immigrant justice movements, <strong>confronted</u></strong> many of the same <u><strong>strategic and tactical choices every day</strong>.</u> As I had hoped, his presence transformed our conversation. Our intellectual distance from the texts vanished, and our lively conversation ended with a question: What is the proper role of lawyers within the movement? After a short pause, Hayes praised the technical chops and procedural expertise lawyers bring to the table. But that is not enough, he said. “<u>Most lawyers see a problem and think, <strong>‘How can I fix this law?</strong>’” This view is <strong>too narrow:</strong> it </u>obscures the stakes and <u><strong>concedes to status quo arrangements</strong>. “The role of the law is to protect the state,” Hayes reasoned. “<strong>Lawyers must work with movements to imagine with us the kind of state we want to live in.</strong> Only from there can we work together to think about the laws we need.”</u>2 In conversations with intellectuals and organizers around the country, I realized the Movement for Black Lives (<u><strong>M4BL</u></strong> or Movement)3—the larger movement configuration in which the chapter based Black Lives Matter network functions—<u>was having a far richer and more imaginative conversation about law reform than lawyers and law faculty. The Movement for Black Lives was situating their critique in <strong>Black history</strong> and intellectual traditions, and their <strong>imagination of alternate futures</strong> in Black freedom movements. Their critique was more expansive at the same time as it was more grounded, and their imagination more radical</u>.4 <u>Legal scholars often assume the movement’s fight is over policing: indictments for police killings</u>, independent prosecutors to investigate police shootings, better training and supervision for police, more diverse police forces, and so on.5 <u><strong>But</strong>,</u> as Hayes suggested, <u>the most imaginative voices within contemporary racial justice movements are fighting for much more than body cameras and police convictions</u>.6 <u>The movement is focused on shifting power into Black and other marginalized communities</u>;7 <u><strong>shrinking the space of governance now reserved for policing</strong>, <strong>surveillance, and mass incarceration</strong>;</u> and <u><strong>fundamentally transforming</strong> the relationship among state, market, and society</u>.8 <u>Movement actors have <strong>made policy proposals</strong> and <strong>engaged in law reform</strong> campaigns <strong>at the same time</strong> they have prominently contested law and politics as usual</u>.9 In the few years after Ferguson police officer Darren Wilson’s killing of Michael Brown, there were shutdowns of bridges and highways; die-ins at courthouses and statehouses; occupations of police stations, police unions, and universities; arrests and curfews; tear gas and riot gear.10 But the movement’s highprofile campaigns have not been waged by lawyers or via litigation.11 Indeed, <u>the movement has largely refrained from fighting to <strong>strengthen preexisting rights</strong> or demanding legal recognition of new ones</u>.12 <u><strong>The focus is not on investing even-handedness to law</u></strong> or the police, <u><strong>not on restoring criminal justice to some imaginary constitutional or pre-raced status quo</u></strong>, and not on increasing resources for community policing.13 <u>But <strong>it would be wrong to think the movement has given up on law</strong>. The movement is not attempting to operate outside of law, but rather to <strong>reimagine</strong> its possibilities within a broader attempt to <strong>reimagine the state.</strong> Law is fundamental to what movement actors are fighting <strong>against</strong> and <strong>for</u></strong>.14 To illustrate how the movement approach reorients traditional criminal law reform conversations, I examine the 2016 policy platform of the Movement for Black Lives, “A Vision for Black Lives: Policy Demands for Black Power, Freedom, and Justice” (the Vision).15 I put the Vision in conversation with the Ferguson and Baltimore reports by the Department of Justice16—which represent more traditional liberal approaches to criminal law reform. The Vision and the DOJ reports offer some of the most damning critiques of policing in recent memory, but differ fundamentally in their analysis and conclusions. The contrast reflects the limitations of liberal law reform at the same time that <u>it opens up a <strong>more imaginative</strong> set of possibilities about <strong>reorganizing the very structure of our society.</u></strong> By studying the convergences and divergences between these texts, this Article highlights how radical social movements reimagine the very same social problems with which significant bodies of legal scholarship engage. The Vision and DOJ reports offer alternate conceptualizations of the problem of policing and the appropriate approach to law reform. Reflective of <u>liberal law reform projects</u> on police, the DOJ reports <u>identify policing as a fundamental tool of law and order that serves the collective interests of society, and <strong>locate the problems</u></strong> of police <u><strong>in a failure to adhere to constitutional law</strong>.</u> As a corrective, the DOJ reports advocate for investing more resources in police: more trainings, better supervision, community policing. In contrast, <u><strong>the Vision</strong> identifies policing as a historical and <strong>violent force in Black communities</strong>, underpinning a system of racial capitalism and <strong>limiting the possibilities of Black life</strong>.</u> As such, <u><strong>policing as we now know it cannot be fixed</strong>.</u> Thus, the Vision’s reimagination of policing—rooted in Black history and Black intellectual traditions—transforms mainstream approaches to reform. <u>In forwarding a <strong>decarceral agenda</strong> rooted in an <strong>abolitionist imagination</strong>, the Vision demands shrinking the large footprint of</u> policing, <u>surveillance</u>, and incarceration, <u>and <strong>shifting resources into social programs in Black communities</strong>: housing, health care, jobs, and schools.</u> <u>The Vision focuses on building power in Black communities, and fundamentally transforming the relationships among state, market, and society.</u> In so doing, <u>the movement offers <strong>transformative</strong>, <strong>affirmative visions</strong> for change designed to address the structures of inequality</u>—something legal scholarship has lacked for far too long. The DOJ reports document the problems endemic to policing. While presenting a critical view of Ferguson’s and Baltimore’s police departments, the reports are committed to the legal status quo, to a mode of governance that relies on criminal law enforcement to deal with a broad set of deep-seated social problems, and to rules and authorities that are historically and functionally oppressive. As a result, the reports double down on <u>traditional reforms</u> that <u>reinvest in law</u> and police.17 <u>This approach cedes</u> more <u>legitimacy</u>—not to mention more resources—<u>to the police and the legal frameworks in which they operate without a meaningful consideration of alternatives.</u> Of course, the reports emerge from a particular time and social location: a prosecutorial agency, the Civil Rights Division, embedded within the executive branch during the Obama administration.18 As with any social location, there are possibilities, pressures, and constraints on what the DOJ may say or do as a law enforcement agency under a particular administration. But framed in a different understanding, accountable to different constituencies, <u>the DOJ could have taken an approach to reform more aligned with the Vision, suggesting a realignment of resources from policing to the underlying social problems stemming from structural inequality in Ferguson and Baltimore.</u> The additional importance of the DOJ reports lies in how they reflect how legal institutions—and, in turn, law scholarship— approach long-standing structural problems while firmly committed to the status quo and restoring legitimacy thereto. In this way, the DOJ reports expose a central dilemma of <u>liberal law reform projects, caught between a commitment to the rule of law and status quo arrangements on the one hand, and the desire for substantive justice and social, economic, and political transformation on the other.</u>19 But <u><strong>our political moment is defined by crisis and polarization</strong>, with insurgencies on the left and right calling for reform, transformation, and even revolution.</u>20 <u>Amid the electoral triumph of Trump, protest and <strong>people-of-color-led anti-capitalist movements</strong> have surged in activity</u>.21 <u>These radical movements mark the revival of anti-capitalist racial justice politics in the United States in a way that we have not seen since the civil rights, <strong>Black power</strong>, and <strong>Chicano movements</strong> of the 1960s and 1970s. Contemporary racial justice movements are not simply arguing the state has created a fundamentally unequal criminal legal system. They are <strong>identify</strong>ing policing, jail, and prison <strong>as the primary mode of governing</strong> Black, poor, and other communities of color in the United States</u>, and pointing to law as the scaffolding. <u>They are <strong>work</strong>ing to build another state—<strong>another world</strong> even—organized differently than the one we have inherited. They are aiming to <strong>use the law as a tool</strong> to build that alternative future. We can ignore their deep critiques and visionary alternatives, or we can embrace the possibilities of a more searching inquiry</u>. <u><strong>This is a moment calling for a radical imagination,</strong> where the scale of deep critique is matched with <strong>a scale of grand vision</u></strong>.22 While many progressive and left legal scholars reach for meaningful change, most of us lack alternative frameworks.23 Like the DOJ reports, even when the scale of our critique is large, our visions for change are often too small. We have focused on a narrow picture of law and law reform while sidestepping questions about the structure of the society, the state, and the market. These movements make these questions central to their work.24 They do not have it all worked out. But they are making powerful sketches of much-needed alternative frameworks. <u><strong>Imagining with social movements</strong> seeking to transform the state would invest <strong>law scholarship</strong> in a <strong>project of reconstruction</strong> and transformation</u>.25 For radical racial justice movements, the primary commitment is not to law, its legitimacy, rationality, or stability: It is to people.26 <u>The motivations are to protest an enduring set of social structures <strong>rooted in European and settler colonialism and the Atlantic slave trade</u></strong>; <u>to fight for transformative change, justice, and liberation; and to invest in a redistributive and transformative project, one <strong>demanding a more equal distribution of resources and life chances</u></strong>,27 <u>with a focus on the most intersectionally marginalized people.</u>28</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: EPA 18 (The Environmental Protection Agency is an independent agency of the United States federal government for environmental protection, “The Multiple Benefits of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy”, 2018, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-07/documents/mbg_1_multiplebenefits.pdf, accessed 9/26/19)//SC fulltext: *footnotes admitted left174307500Energy efficiency and renewable energy initiatives can provide a number of important economic benefits for people, communities, and entire state economies. For example, a study conducted for Efficiency Vermont, the nation’s first energy efficiency utility, found that every $1 million in efficiency program spending in Vermont creates a net gain of 43 job-years. Every $1 of program spending yields a net increase of nearly $5 in cumulative gross state product, an additional $2 in Vermonters’ incomes over 20 years, and more than $6 in gross energy savings (Optimal Energy and Synapse Energy, 2011). Energy efficiency and renewable energy initiatives affect the economy both directly and indirectly, by affecting individuals, businesses, or institutions directly involved in the investment as well as by having an effect on others who are less directly involved.9 This section provides an overview of the direct and indirect economic effects of energy efficiency and renewable energy initiatives that are used to quantify the economic benefits. They are briefly summarized in Table I-1. Direct Economic Effects Direct effects include changes in sales, income, or jobs associated with the immediate effects of an expenditure or change in demand. The direct effects of policies or programs that affect energy demand, such as those that stimulate investments in energy-efficient equipment by the commercial or residential sectors, will differ from the direct effects of initiatives that affect the supply of energy, such as RPSs. Direct Economic Effects of Demand-Side Initiatives Energy efficiency and renewable energy initiatives that affect the demand (or customer) side of energy services typically change the energy consumption patterns of business and residential consumers by reducing the quantity of energy required for a given level of production or service. Demand-side energy efficiency initiatives lead to direct costs and savings, including: Household and business costs: Costs for homeowners and businesses to purchase and install more energy efficient equipment. For policies supported by a surcharge on electric bills, the surcharge is an included cost. Program administrative costs: Dollars spent operating the efficiency initiative—including labor, materials, and paying incentives to participants. Energy cost savings: The money saved by businesses, households, and industries resulting from reduced energy costs (including electricity, natural gas, and oil cost savings), reduced repair and maintenance costs, deferred equipment replacement costs, and increased property values. Energy cost savings are typically reported in total dollars saved. Sector transfers: Both the increased flow of money to companies that design, manufacture, and install energy efficient equipment and the reduced flow of dollars to other energy companies, including electric utilities, as demand for electricity and less-efficient capital declines. These direct costs and savings shift economic activity among different players in the economy. For example, households may increase spending on products that improve energy efficiency, such as foam insulation, as a result of a particular energy efficiency program, increasing revenue for the companies that produce and install foam insulation. To pay for the cost of the insulation, they may reduce spending on other goods and activities, lowering revenue for those businesses that would have otherwise received it. The stream of energy cost savings that results from the insulation may increase disposable income that households can spend on other goods and services. The reduced demand for electricity, however, may decrease revenue for utilities unless the state’s utility revenue structures allow for program cost recovery or financial incentives for energy efficiency programs.10 Together, the shifts caused by demand-side initiatives may result in economy-wide macroeconomic impacts, such as effects on income, employment, and overall economic output. An analysis of the magnitude and direction of the impacts can help policy makers design policies that provide the greatest overall benefit to a state or locality Direct Economic Effects of Supply-Side Initiatives Supply-side energy efficiency and renewable energy policies and programs change the fuel and generation mix of energy resources or otherwise alter the operational characteristics of the energy supply system. Supply-side policy measures generally support the development of utility-scale renewable energy and combined heat and power (CHP) applications, and/or clean distributed generation (DG). The direct effects of supply-side initiatives arise from the costs of manufacturing, installing, and operating the renewable energy or CHP equipment supported by the initiative, as well as the energy savings and possible reduction of energy supply costs from fuel substitution among participants in the supply-side program and their customers. The direct costs and savings of renewable energy, CHP, and DG initiatives include: Construction costs: Money spent to purchase the renewable energy, CHP, and DG equipment; installation costs; costs of grid connection; and onsite infrastructure construction costs (such as buildings or roads) Operating costs: Money spent to operate and maintain the equipment during its operating lifetime and the cost of production surcharges applied to consumers Program administrative costs: Money spent operating the initiative—including labor, materials, and paying incentives to participants Displacement savings: Money saved by utilities from displacing traditional generation, including reducing purchases (either local or imports) of fossil fuels and lowering operation and maintenance costs from existing generation resources Waste heat savings: Savings accrued by utilities or other commercial/industrial businesses that use waste heat from CHP for both heating and cooling Together, the shifts caused by supply-side initiatives may affect income, employment, and economic output in the state through the following factors: Increased economic activity in the renewable energy industry for both in-state and export markets Reduced spending on fossil fuel imports (or increased inflow of dollars for fossil fuel exports, if a state is a net fossil fuel exporter), allowing those dollars to remain within the state Indirect Economic Effects Indirect effects include “upstream” or “downstream” changes in sales, income, or jobs resulting from changing input needs in affected sectors. Indirect effects start to emerge once the direct effects interact with the overall state, local, or regional economy. Upstream effects occur among businesses supplying goods and services to industries directly involved in the energy efficiency or renewable energy initiative. For example, the construction of roads and foundations for a wind farm requires purchases of asphalt and cement from other economic sectors, which in turn must make purchases to support operations. Downstream effects occur as the regional economy responds to lower energy costs, a more dependable energy supply, and a better economic environment that fosters expansion and attracts new business growth opportunities. Downstream indirect effects may include: Increased disposable income available for non-energy purchases11 Increased income, employment, and output by stimulating production and sales of renewable energy and energy-efficient equipment by existing businesses within the state Reduced cost of doing business and improved overall competitiveness for non-energy companies Decreased income, employment, and output for fossil fuel producers and their suppliers within the state Expanded in-state market for renewable energy and/or energy efficiency products and services, and attraction of new businesses and investment12 Both Direct and Indirect Economic Effects Some effects may be both direct and indirect, and apply to both demand and supply policies and programs. Examples of these types of benefits include: Health: Energy efficiency and renewable energy policies that reduce criteria air pollutants may improve air quality and avoid illnesses and deaths, as described above. Fewer illnesses mean fewer sick days taken by employees, better productivity, and fewer hospitalizations associated with respiratory illnesses and cardiac arrest. Fewer worker deaths can result in continued economic benefits to the state. Employment: Energy efficiency and renewable energy initiatives create jobs. These jobs can be temporary, short-term jobs as well as long-term jobs—created directly from the energy efficiency and renewable energy activities (e.g., in a company that expands due to increased demand for their products) and indirectly via economic multiplier effects (e.g., from restaurants and retail stores who get more customers because of new jobs). Output: Energy efficiency and renewable energy programs that stimulate new investments and spending within a state can increase output, which is defined as the total value of all goods and services produced in an economy, including all intermediate goods13 purchased and all value added. Higher sales for energy-efficient or renewable energy goods in the local economy, increased government spending, bigger investment levels, and higher exports of energy efficiency or renewable energy products by state industries will enhance output. Gross state product: Expansion of energy efficiency and renewable energy-related investments and businesses can increase the total market value of the goods and services produced by labor and property in a state (i.e., gross state product). The gross state product is analogous to the national concept of gross domestic product and represents the state’s economic output minus any intermediate inputs acquired from beyond the state. Income: A net increase in income associated with energy efficiency and renewable energy initiatives can occur due to increased employment or wages. Income effects from energy efficiency and renewable energy investments include changes in personal income or disposable income. Personal income is the sum of all income received. Disposable income is the income that is available for consumers to spend or save; that is, personal income minus taxes and social security contributions plus dividends, rents, and transfer payments.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Clean energy investment causes massive gdp and wage growth and boost short term demand – we’ve got a metanalysis AND graphs</h4><p><strong>EPA 18</strong> (The Environmental Protection Agency is an independent agency of the United States federal government for environmental protection, “The Multiple Benefits of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy”, 2018, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-07/documents/mbg_1_multiplebenefits.pdf, accessed 9/26/19)//SC</p><p>*footnotes admitted</p><p>left174307500Energy efficiency and <u>renewable energy initiatives can provide a number of important economic benefits for people, communities, and entire state economies. </u>For example, <u>a study conducted for Efficiency Vermont, the nation’s first energy efficiency utility, found that every $1 million in efficiency program spending in Vermont creates a net gain of 43 job-years. Every $1 of program spending yields a net increase of nearly $5 in cumulative gross state product</u>, an additional $2 in Vermonters’ incomes over 20 years, and <u>more than $6 in gross energy savings</u> (Optimal Energy and Synapse Energy, 2011). <u>Energy efficiency and renewable energy initiatives affect the economy both directly and indirectly, by affecting individuals, businesses, or institutions directly involved in the investment as well as by having an effect on others who are less directly involved.</u>9 This section provides an overview of the direct and indirect economic effects of energy efficiency and renewable energy initiatives that are used to quantify the economic benefits. They are briefly summarized in Table I-1. Direct Economic Effects <u>Direct effects include changes in sales, income, or jobs associated with the immediate effects of an expenditure or change in demand. </u>The direct effects of policies or programs that affect energy demand, such as those that stimulate investments in energy-efficient equipment by the commercial or residential sectors, will differ from the direct effects of initiatives that affect the supply of energy, such as RPSs. Direct Economic Effects of Demand-Side Initiatives Energy efficiency and renewable <u>energy initiatives that affect the demand (or customer) side of energy services typically change the energy consumption patterns of business and residential consumers by reducing the quantity of energy required for a given level of production or service.</u> Demand-side energy efficiency initiatives lead to direct costs and savings, <u>including: Household and business costs: Costs for homeowners and businesses to purchase and install more energy efficient equipment. </u>For policies supported by a surcharge on electric bills, the surcharge is an included cost. <u>Program administrative costs: Dollars spent operating the efficiency initiative</u>—including labor, materials, and paying incentives to participants. <u>Energy cost savings:</u> The money saved by businesses, households, and industries resulting from reduced energy costs (including electricity, natural gas, and oil cost savings), reduced repair and maintenance costs, deferred equipment replacement costs, and increased property values. Energy cost savings are typically reported in total dollars saved. <u>Sector transfers: Both the increased flow of money to companies that design, manufacture, and install energy efficient equipment and the reduced flow of dollars to other energy companies</u>, including electric utilities, as demand for electricity and less-efficient capital declines. <u>These direct costs and savings shift economic activity among different players in the economy. </u>For example, <u>households may increase spending on products that improve energy efficiency, such as foam insulation, as a result of a particular energy efficiency program, increasing revenue for the companies that produce and install foam insulation. </u>To pay for the cost of the insulation, they may reduce spending on other goods and activities, lowering revenue for those businesses that would have otherwise received it. The stream of energy cost savings that results from the insulation may increase disposable income that households can spend on other goods and services. The reduced demand for electricity, however, may decrease revenue for utilities unless the state’s utility revenue structures allow for program cost recovery or financial incentives for energy efficiency programs.10 Together, <u><strong>the shifts caused by demand-side initiatives may result in economy-wide macroeconomic impacts, such as effects on income, employment, and overall economic output. </u></strong>An analysis of the magnitude and direction of the impacts can help policy makers design policies that provide the greatest overall benefit to a state or locality Direct Economic Effects of Supply-Side Initiatives Supply-side energy efficiency and renewable energy policies and programs change the fuel and generation mix of energy resources or otherwise alter the operational characteristics of the energy supply system. Supply-side policy measures generally support the development of utility-scale renewable energy and combined heat and power (CHP) applications, and/or clean distributed generation (DG). <u>The direct effects of supply-side initiatives arise from the costs of manufacturing, installing, and operating the renewable energy or CHP equipment </u>supported by the initiative, <u>as well as the energy savings and possible reduction of energy supply costs</u> from fuel substitution among participants in the supply-side program and their customers. The <u>direct costs and savings</u> of renewable energy, CHP, and DG initiatives <u>include: Construction costs: </u>Money spent to purchase the renewable energy, CHP, and DG equipment; installation costs; costs of grid connection; and onsite infrastructure construction costs (such as buildings or roads) <u>Operating costs:</u> Money spent to operate and maintain the equipment during its operating lifetime and the cost of production surcharges applied to consumers <u>Program administrative costs:</u> Money spent operating the initiative—including labor, materials, and paying incentives to participants <u>Displacement savings:</u> Money saved by utilities from displacing traditional generation, including reducing purchases (either local or imports) of fossil fuels and lowering operation and maintenance costs from existing generation resources <u>Waste heat savings: </u>Savings accrued by utilities or other commercial/industrial businesses that use waste heat from CHP for both heating and cooling Together,<u> the shifts caused by supply-side initiatives may affect income, employment, and economic output in the state through the following factors:</u> <u><strong>Increased economic activity in the renewable energy industry for both in-state and export markets </strong>Reduced spending on fossil fuel imports</u> (or increased inflow of dollars for fossil fuel exports, if a state is a net fossil fuel exporter), allowing those dollars to remain within the state Indirect Economic Effects <u>Indirect effects include “upstream” or “downstream” changes in sales, income, or jobs resulting from changing input needs in affected sectors.</u> Indirect effects start to emerge once the direct effects interact with the overall state, local, or regional economy. Upstream effects occur among businesses supplying goods and services to industries directly involved in the energy efficiency or renewable energy initiative. For example, the construction of roads and foundations for a wind farm requires purchases of asphalt and cement from other economic sectors, which in turn must make purchases to support operations. <u>Downstream effects occur as</u> the regional economy responds to lower energy costs, a more dependable energy supply, and <u>a better economic environment that fosters expansion and attracts new business growth opportunities. </u>Downstream <u>indirect effects may include: <strong>Increased disposable income available for non-energy purchases</u></strong>11 <u><strong>Increased income</strong>, employment, and output by stimulating production and sales of renewable energy and energy-efficient equipment by existing businesses within the state Reduced cost of doing business and improved overall competitiveness for non-energy companies </u>Decreased income, employment, and output for fossil fuel producers and their suppliers within the state <u>Expanded in-state market for renewable energy </u>and/or energy efficiency products and <u>services, and <strong>attraction of new businesses and investment</u></strong>12 Both Direct and Indirect Economic Effects Some <u>effects may be both direct and indirect, and apply to both demand and supply</u> policies and programs. Examples of these types of <u>benefits include:</u> Health: Energy efficiency and renewable energy policies that reduce criteria air pollutants may improve air quality and avoid illnesses and deaths, as described above. Fewer illnesses mean fewer sick days taken by employees, better productivity, and fewer hospitalizations associated with respiratory illnesses and cardiac arrest. Fewer worker deaths can result in continued economic benefits to the state. <u>Employment: </u>Energy efficiency and <u>renewable energy initiatives create jobs. </u>These jobs can be temporary, short-term jobs as well as long-term jobs—created directly from the energy efficiency and renewable energy activities (e.g., in a company that expands due to increased demand for their products) and indirectly via economic multiplier effects (e.g., from restaurants and retail stores who get more customers because of new jobs). <u>Output: </u>Energy efficiency and <u>renewable energy programs that stimulate new investments and spending within a state can increase output, </u>which is defined as the total value of all goods and services produced in an economy, including all intermediate goods13 purchased and all value added. <u>Higher sales for energy-efficient or renewable energy goods in the local economy, increased government spending, bigger investment levels, and higher exports of energy efficiency or renewable energy products by state industries will enhance output. Gross state product: Expansion</u> of energy efficiency and renewable energy-related investments and businesses<u> can increase the total market value of the goods and services produced by labor and property in a state</u> (i.e., gross state product). The gross state product is analogous to the national concept of gross domestic product and represents the state’s economic output minus any intermediate inputs acquired from beyond the state. <u><strong>Income: A net increase in</u></strong> income associated with energy efficiency and renewable energy initiatives can occur due to increased employment or <u><strong>wages. Income effects from</u></strong> energy efficiency and <u><strong>renewable energy investments</strong> include changes in personal income or disposable income. </u>Personal income is the sum of all income received. Disposable income is the income that is available for consumers to spend or save; that is, personal income minus taxes and social security contributions plus dividends, rents, and transfer payments.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Mollow 15 Anna (2015): The Disability Drive, A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/Mollow_berkeley_0028E_15181.pdf //Jia fulltext: Much as the differentiation between the inseparable processes of primary and secondary narcissism rests on a distinction between building up and breaking down the ego, a similar heuristic distinction gives structure to my concepts of primary and secondary pity. To be clear, pity and narcissism are not the same thing: if narcissism can be understood as love of the self, pity involves a complex affective reaction to the suffering of someone else. Primary pity entails a response to the image of another person succumbing to what I have termed the “tragedy of disability.”121 Primary pity arises when one witnesses a fall of the self, a collapse of the ego; such falling is at once painful and pleasurable to observe. In other words, primary pity could be described as a vicarious experience of the tragedy of disability. A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is. When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman’s phrase, we purport to “feel for the other.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity. Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is provoked by the image of a suffering other who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one’s self. This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers’s formulation: one “cannot bear to look...but also cannot bear not to look.” Primary pity is difficult to bear because it involves a drive toward disability (one cannot bear not to look), which menaces the ego’s investments in health, pleasure, and control—because to contemplate another person’s suffering is to confront the question, “Could this happen to me?” Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud’s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body’s ‘normal’ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity’s self-rupturing effects by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, and at the same time to defend against that threat to the ego by aggrandizing oneself at someone else’s expense. Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” secondary pity encompasses our culture’s most clichéd reactions to disability: charity, tears, and calls for a cure. Correlatives of these commonplace manifestations of secondary pity are the obligatory claims that disabled people’s suffering is “inspiring.” Indeed, the speed with which conventional cultural representations of disability segue from overt expressions of pity to celebrations of “the triumph of the human spirit” highlights the ways in which secondary pity, as a defense against primary pity’s incursions, reinforces the ego’s fantasy of sovereignty. Secondary pity, in other words, can be seen as a variation of secondary narcissism: these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier or the narcissist at the expense of someone else. But primary pity is not the same as either primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, or secondary pity. Unlike primary narcissism, a feeling that emerges out of a relation to the world in which notions of “self” and “other” do not obtain, primary pity does depend upon the constructs of self and other, although these constructions are unstable and are continually threatening to come undone. Primary pity can thus be envisioned as a threshold category occupying a liminal position between the total denial of the other that is inherent to primary narcissism and the rigid structure of (superior) self and (inferior) other that constitutes secondary narcissism and secondary pity. My concept of primary versus secondary pity also differs from Freud’s primary- secondary narcissism distinction at the level of genealogy. Like Freud’s account of primary and secondary narcissisms, my model of primary and secondary pities involves a temporal transition; but whereas Freud imagines the movement from primary to secondary narcissism as a passage from an earlier to a later stage of an individual’s development, the temporal shift from primary to secondary pity happens much more quickly than this. It happens in an instant: that moment in which we feel primary pity and then, almost before we can blink, deny that we feel or have felt it. The denial is understandable: who wants to admit that one gets pleasure from the sight of another person’s suffering—or, to make matters worse, that this pleasure derives in part from the specter of disability’s transferability, the possibility that this suffering could be—and, fantasmatically, perhaps already is—an image of one’s own self undone? Indeed, the model of primary pity that I have been constructing may sound a bit too close to sadism for some people’s liking. Pity does come close to sadism, and at the same time, to masochism, which Freud theorizes as sadism’s obverse. In “Mourning and Melancholia,” an essay that can be read as a sequel to “On Narcissism,” Freud approaches a distinction between primary and secondary masochism, which accords with my primary-secondary pity heuristic.122 If the story that I traced in “On Narcissism” could be summarized as “child gets breast; child loses breast; child gets breast back, albeit in a secondary, adulterated form,” the tale that Freud tells about masochism takes much the same form. In this story, subject loves object; subject loses object; and subject tries to get object back by becoming object, that is, by identifying with the object in such a way that object starts to seem—and perhaps in some ways is—part of subject’s self. This last phase is a dysfunctional and disabling form of identification, Freud makes clear. Subject is still angry at object for having left it, and it takes out that anger on the object that is now part of itself. This is the reason that people suffering from melancholia are so hard on themselves, Freud says; the “diminution in…self-regard” that typically accompanies melancholia results from the subject’s attacks on the loved-and-lost object that the subject has incorporated into its ego (“Mourning” 246). Freud had not wanted there to be such a thing as primary masochism; for a long time, he had insisted that sadism, or “aggression,” was the primary instinct, and that masochism was only a turning-inward of this originary aggression. But in “Mourning and Melancholia,” although Freud does not yet use the term “primary masochism,” he nonetheless gets at this concept. The problem of suicide, Freud notes in this essay, raises the possibility that the ego “can treat itself as an object” that it wants to destroy (252). When it comes to such an extreme act as suicide, the possibility of carrying “such a purpose through to execution” must, Freud surmises, involve more than a sadistic wish to punish others. Perhaps, then, there is an innate desire to destroy one’s own self, Freud hypothesizes. If so, this self would not be a single thing: it would be “me” and at the same time, the lost object whose image “I” have internalized. Freud’s notion of a primary masochism is tied very closely to his conceptualization of the drive. Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the text in which Freud first used the term “death drive,” was published three years after “Mourning and Melancholia.” In the later text, Freud’s speculations about the death drive lead him to acknowledge that “there might be such a thing as primary masochism” (66). After all, Freud points out, the idea that either sadism or masochism definitively takes precedence over the other does not ultimately make much sense, as “there is no difference in principle between an instinct turning from the object to the ego and its turning from the ego to an object” (66). If sadism and masochism are ultimately indistinguishable obverses of each other, then pity, in both its primary and its secondary forms, would have to be both sadistic and masochistic. This is a deeply troubling possibility, but I suggest that trying to overcome pity will only make matters worse. There are many ways of trying to overcome primary pity, and each one ultimately aggravates the violence of primary pity. One way is the “pitiless” refusal of compassion that Edelman advocates (70). Another is the disability activist “No pity” injunction. xA third example is secondary pity, as in the query, commonly addressed to disabled people, “Have you ever thought of killing yourself?”123 In this question, disabled people correctly hear the wish, “I’d like to kill you.” Indeed, primary pity is so unsettling that our culture has been driven to “mercifully” kill people in the name of secondary pity. We have also been driven to lock people in institutions, to let them languish on the streets, to stare, to punish, and to sentimentalize—all, I would suggest, in the interest of not owning, not naming, not acknowledging that self-shattering, ego-dissolving, instantaneous and intolerable moment of primary pity. Because primary pity is tied up with the disability drive, it must, like the drive itself, be regarded as unrepresentable. However, I will quote at length from a passage of writing that comes close not only to representing primary pity but also perhaps to producing it. In his memoir, One More Theory About Happiness, Paul Guest describes an experience that he had in the hospital after sustaining a spinal cord injury when he was twelve years old: My stomach still roiled and it was hard to keep anything down. Late one night, a doctor came to my bedside, leaning over me, his hands knotted together. He seemed vexed, not quite ready to say anything. Used to the look, I waited. And then he began. “The acids in your stomach, Paul, because of everything you’re going through, it’s like your body, everything about it, is upset. That’s why you feel so nauseous all the time. We’re going to treat that by putting a tube into your nose and down into your stomach, so we can give you medicine, OK?” When he walked away, I felt something begin to give way inside me. Up until then, I’d faced more misery and indignity than I would have thought possible. I lay there, numb and sick in a diaper, helpless. It was too much to bear, too frightening, a last invasion I could experience and not break, utterly. When he returned with nurses, I was already sobbing. Anyone so limited could hardly fight, but I tried. I tried. The neck collar prevented much movement, and any was dangerous, but I turned my head side to side, just slightly, a pitiful, unacceptable range. Fat tears rolled down my face like marbles. I begged them all, no, no, no, please no. “Hold him, hold him still,” the doctor said. Nurses gripped my head on either side. From a sterile pack, the doctor fished out a long transparent tube and dabbed its head in a clear lubricant. He paused almost as if to warn me but then said nothing. 77 Then the tube entered one nostril, its gauge slight enough to pass through, down my throat and into my stomach. I couldn’t thrash or resist. I could only relent. To the pain, the discomfort, but most distressingly the feeling of powerlessness, of violation. It was in that moment, I think, that the weight of everything which had happened fell upon me, undeniably, and the knowledge of it crushed me. (23-24) “Too much to bear,” Guest writes. The word “unbearable” would indeed be an accurate descriptor of this passage: both the experience of violence that it narrates and also the retelling of that experience produce sensations that, as in Berlant and Edelman’s account of sexuality, one cannot bear but must nonetheless “struggle to bear” (back cover). Guest’s account of a nonconsensual administration of an unwanted medical treatment is especially difficult to bear because it gives the reader no recourse to secondary pity: the passage offers no “lesson” to be learned, no invitation to feel “inspired,” nothing to make one feel in any way okay about what has happened. The medical violence that Guest recounts seems particularly devastating because it is readable as sexual: it takes the form of forced penetration, and it results in a “feeling of powerlessness, of violation” that resonates with experiences recounted by survivors of sexual assault.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Ableism is seeded in a process constitutive of the disability drive – composing of primary pity, when one witnesses a fall of the ego and a recognition of the ability status as temporary, and secondary pity, which describes the egos attempt to overcompensate necessitating disabled violence.</h4><p><strong>Mollow 15</strong> Anna (2015): The Disability Drive, A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/Mollow_berkeley_0028E_15181.pdf //Jia</p><p>Much as the differentiation between the inseparable processes of primary and secondary narcissism rests on a distinction between building up and breaking down the ego, <u>a similar heuristic distinction gives structure to my concepts of primary and secondary pity</u>. To be clear, pity and narcissism are not the same thing: if narcissism can be understood as love of the self, pity involves a complex affective reaction to the suffering of someone else. <u><strong>Primary pity entails a response to the image of another person succumbing to what I have termed the “tragedy of disability.</u></strong>”121 <u><strong><mark>Primary pity</mark> arises when one witnesses <mark>a fall of the self</mark>, a collapse of the ego; such falling is at once painful and pleasurable to observe. In other words, primary pity could be described as a vicarious experience of the tragedy of disability.</u></strong> A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is. When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman’s phrase, <u><strong>we purport to “feel for the other</u></strong>.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” <u><strong>primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity.</u></strong> Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is <u><strong><mark>provoked by the image of a suffering other</u></strong></mark> who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one’s self. <u><strong>This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers’s formulation: one “cannot bear to look...but also cannot bear not to look.”</u></strong> Primary pity <u><strong>is difficult to bear because it involves a drive toward disability (one cannot bear not to look), which menaces the ego’s investments in health, pleasure, and control—</u></strong>because to contemplate another person’s suffering is to confront the <u><strong><mark>question, “Could this happen to me?”</u></strong></mark> Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud’s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body’s ‘normal’ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. <u><strong><mark>Secondary pity attempts to heal</mark> primary pity’s self-rupturing effects by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. </u></strong>As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity <u><strong>involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, and at the same time to defend against that threat to <mark>the ego</mark> by aggrandizing oneself <mark>at</mark> <mark>someone else’s expense.</mark> </u></strong>Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution<u>,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering</u>. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” secondary pity encompasses our culture’s most clichéd reactions to disability: <u><strong>charity, tears, <mark>and calls for a cure</mark>.</u></strong> Correlatives of these commonplace manifestations of secondary pity are the obligatory claims that disabled people’s suffering is “inspiring.” Indeed, the speed with which conventional cultural representations of disability segue from overt expressions of pity to celebrations of “the triumph of the human spirit” highlights the ways in which secondary pity, as a defense against primary pity’s incursions, reinforces the ego’s fantasy of sovereignty. Secondary pity, in other words, can be seen as a variation of secondary narcissism: these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier or the narcissist at the expense of someone else. But primary pity is not the same as either primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, or secondary pity. Unlike primary narcissism, a feeling that emerges out of a relation to the world in which notions of “self” and “other” do not obtain, primary pity does depend upon the constructs of self and other, although these constructions are unstable and are continually threatening to come undone. Primary pity can thus be envisioned as a threshold category occupying a liminal position between the total denial of the other that is inherent to primary narcissism and the rigid structure of (superior) self and (inferior) other that constitutes secondary narcissism and secondary pity. My concept of primary versus secondary pity also differs from Freud’s primary- secondary narcissism distinction at the level of genealogy. Like Freud’s account of primary and secondary narcissisms, my model of primary and secondary pities involves a temporal transition; but whereas Freud imagines the movement from primary to secondary narcissism as a passage from an earlier to a later stage of an individual’s development, the temporal shift from primary to secondary pity happens much more quickly than this. It happens in an instant: that moment in which we feel primary pity and then, almost before we can blink, deny that we feel or have felt it. The denial is understandable: who wants to admit that one gets pleasure from the sight of another person’s suffering—or, to make matters worse, that this pleasure derives in part from the specter of disability’s transferability, the possibility that this suffering could be—and, fantasmatically, perhaps already is—an image of one’s own self undone? Indeed, the model of primary pity that I have been constructing may sound a bit too close to sadism for some people’s liking. Pity does come close to sadism, and at the same time, to masochism, which Freud theorizes as sadism’s obverse. In “Mourning and Melancholia,” an essay that can be read as a sequel to “On Narcissism,” Freud approaches a distinction between primary and secondary masochism, which accords with my primary-secondary pity heuristic.122 If the story that I traced in “On Narcissism” could be summarized as “child gets breast; child loses breast; child gets breast back, albeit in a secondary, adulterated form,” <u><strong>the tale that Freud tells about masochism takes much the same form. In this story, subject loves object; subject loses object; and subject tries to get object back by becoming object, that is, by identifying with the object in such a way that object starts to seem—and perhaps in some ways is—part of subject’s self. This last phase is a dysfunctional and disabling form of identification, Freud makes clear. Subject is still angry at object for having left it, and it takes out that anger on the object that is now part of itself. This is the reason that people suffering from melancholia are so hard on themselves,</u></strong> Freud says; the “diminution in…self-regard” that typically accompanies melancholia results from the subject’s attacks on the loved-and-lost object that the subject has incorporated into its ego (“Mourning” 246). Freud had not wanted there to be such a thing as primary masochism; for a long time, he had insisted that sadism, or “aggression,” was the primary instinct, and that masochism was only a turning-inward of this originary aggression. But in “Mourning and Melancholia,” although Freud does not yet use the term “primary masochism,” he nonetheless gets at this concept. The problem of suicide, Freud notes in this essay, raises the possibility that the ego “can treat itself as an object” that it wants to destroy (252). When it comes to such an extreme act as suicide, the possibility of carrying “such a purpose through to execution” must, Freud surmises, involve more than a sadistic wish to punish others. Perhaps, then, there is an innate desire to destroy one’s own self, Freud hypothesizes. If so, this self would not be a single thing: it would be “me” and at the same time, the lost object whose image “I” have internalized. Freud’s notion of a primary masochism is tied very closely to his conceptualization of the drive. Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the text in which Freud first used the term “death drive,” was published three years after “Mourning and Melancholia.” In the later text, Freud’s speculations about the death drive lead him to acknowledge that “there might be such a thing as primary masochism” (66). After all, Freud points out, the idea that either sadism or masochism definitively takes precedence over the other does not ultimately make much sense, as “there is no difference in principle between an instinct turning from the object to the ego and its turning from the ego to an object” (66). <u><strong>If sadism and masochism are ultimately indistinguishable obverses of each other, then pity, in both its primary and its secondary forms, would have to be both sadistic and masochistic.</u></strong> This is a deeply troubling possibility, but I suggest that trying to overcome pity will only make matters worse. There are many ways of trying to overcome primary pity, and each one ultimately aggravates the violence of primary pity. One way is the “pitiless” refusal of compassion that Edelman advocates (70). Another is the disability activist “No pity” injunction. xA third example is secondary pity, as in the query, commonly addressed to disabled people, “Have you ever thought of killing yourself?”123 In this question, disabled people correctly hear the wish, “I’d like to kill you.” <u><strong>Indeed, primary<mark> pity is so unsettling</mark> that <mark>our culture</mark> has been driven to “<mark>mercifully” kill people</mark> <mark>in</mark> the name of <mark>secondary</mark> pity. We have also been driven to lock people in institutions, to let them languish on the streets, to stare, to punish, and to sentimentalize—all, I would suggest, in the interest of not owning, not naming, not acknowledging that self-shattering, ego-dissolving, instantaneous and intolerable moment of primary pity. Because primary pity is tied up with the disability drive, it must, like the drive itself, be regarded as unrepresentable.</u></strong> However, I will quote at length from a passage of writing that comes close not only to representing primary pity but also perhaps to producing it. In his memoir, One More Theory About Happiness, Paul Guest describes an experience that he had in the hospital after sustaining a spinal cord injury when he was twelve years old: My stomach still roiled and it was hard to keep anything down. Late one night, a doctor came to my bedside, leaning over me, his hands knotted together. He seemed vexed, not quite ready to say anything. Used to the look, I waited. And then he began. “The acids in your stomach, Paul, because of everything you’re going through, it’s like your body, everything about it, is upset. That’s why you feel so nauseous all the time. We’re going to treat that by putting a tube into your nose and down into your stomach, so we can give you medicine, OK?” When he walked away, I felt something begin to give way inside me. Up until then, I’d faced more misery and indignity than I would have thought possible. I lay there, numb and sick in a diaper, helpless. It was too much to bear, too frightening, a last invasion I could experience and not break, utterly. When he returned with nurses, I was already sobbing. Anyone so limited could hardly fight, but I tried. I tried. The neck collar prevented much movement, and any was dangerous, but I turned my head side to side, just slightly, a pitiful, unacceptable range. Fat tears rolled down my face like marbles. I begged them all, no, no, no, please no. “Hold him, hold him still,” the doctor said. Nurses gripped my head on either side. From a sterile pack, the doctor fished out a long transparent tube and dabbed its head in a clear lubricant. He paused almost as if to warn me but then said nothing. 77 Then the tube entered one nostril, its gauge slight enough to pass through, down my throat and into my stomach. I couldn’t thrash or resist. I could only relent. To the pain, the discomfort, but most distressingly the feeling of powerlessness, of violation. It was in that moment, I think, that the weight of everything which had happened fell upon me, undeniably, and the knowledge of it crushed me. (23-24) “Too much to bear,” Guest writes. The word “unbearable” would indeed be an accurate descriptor of this passage: both the experience of violence that it narrates and also the retelling of that experience produce sensations that, as in Berlant and Edelman’s account of sexuality, one cannot bear but must nonetheless “struggle to bear” (back cover). <u><strong>Guest’s account of a nonconsensual administration of an unwanted medical treatment is especially difficult to bear because it gives the reader no recourse to secondary pity: the passage offers no “lesson” to be learned, no invitation to feel “inspired,” nothing to make one feel in any way okay about what has happened. The medical violence that Guest recounts seems particularly devastating because it is readable as sexual: it takes the form of forced penetration, and it results in a “feeling of powerlessness, of violation”</u></strong><mark> that resonates with experiences recounted by survivors of sexual assault.</p></mark><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Patrick Schröder et al 20, Senior research fellow in the Energy, Environment and Resources department at Chatham House. With: Paul Dewick, Honorary Research Fellow at the Manchester Institute of Innovation Research in Alliance Manchester Business School; Maurie J. Cohen, Director Program in Science, Technology, and Society New Jersey Institute of Technology University Heights Newark; Joseph Sarkis, teaches operations and environmental management in the Graduate School of Management at at Clark University, “A brave new world: Lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic for transitioning to sustainable supply and production,” NIH, 4/17/2020, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7164912/, kyujin fulltext: 3. Sustainable supply and production in response to the COVID-19 pandemic Mandates imposed by governments and other responses to the COVID-19 pandemic provide some initial indications of longer-term actions on the part of policy makers, business managers, and others interested in sustainable supply and production as well as the prospects of sustainability transitions more generally. We initially discuss several behavioral changes that have been implemented such as sheltering in place, social distancing, and reductions in work-related travel in terms of both commuting and other forms of transportation. We also identify issues related to supply chains, social innovations, and technology resulting from the coronavirus outbreak. 3.1. Behavioral changes Current practices due to the COVID-19 pandemic such as sheltering in place and social distancing have profound implications. Public health directives have discouraged large groups from congregating and self-quarantines have been recommended to help “flatten the curve.” Workplaces have implemented new practices that reinforce this need for isolation and separation and some job tasks are being performed on a distributed—often at home–basis. At the same time, we have been seeing in recent weeks the emergence of opportunities for people to build new skills and to shift away from energy-intensive forms of transportation and to instead adopt telecommuting, virtual meetings, and online education. In the United States, on a typical (pre-COVID-19) workday over 200 million people commuted to work and thus released millions of metric tons of nitrous oxides, carbon dioxide, and particulate matter. If a modest number, let us say ten percent, find these new alternatives preferable from a cost and convenience perspective over the longer term, especially individuals who are new to this mode of work, the likely environmental benefits would be quite substantial. Such practices are likely to become more common over time as users develop higher levels of comfort with the relevant technologies and the communications platforms themselves become more proficient in simulating face-to-face interactions. As we write this perspective article, Zoom is ranked as the number one and number two videoconferencing app in the United States and UK, respectively. Service providers are learning a great deal about the operational features of their systems as they are put under stress due to the increasing traffic generated by simultaneous users. As quality and ease of use improves, we are apt to see less physical travel – especially by airplane – after teleconferencing becomes further normalized. Another crisis-motivated shift is likely to be modification in the number of working hours per week. Prior research has demonstrated that there may be advantages from fewer work days in terms of reduced demand for commuting and increased productivity (Knight et al., 2013; Kallis, 2013). However, the net benefit of these changes will ultimately be determined by how additional non-work time is allocated and whether new forms of recreational travel are induced by the change. General public gatherings may be less appealing in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Societal concern and sensitivity to airborne contagions are likely to persist into the indefinite future and this is especially likely to be the case with respect to public venues that encourage close interpersonal interactions involving sizeable groups. For instance, large-scale entertainment and sports activities will probably be less agreeable places for people to congregate. There is apt to be a steep decline in public forms of assembly as erstwhile attendees of such events eschew mass consumption activities and the travel associated with them. During the current public health emergency, various consumer goods are not as easily available as was previously the case. At the present time, indications are that most people have sufficient supplies of food and other essential products to survive, but demand at food banks is rapidly rising due to increasingly dire financial circumstances. Shortages appear to be the result of supply-chain inefficiencies and disruptions. Thus far, the indications are that individuals – similar to the Great Depression or during major wars of the last century – are learning to live simply and to adapt themselves to extended periods of quarantine. 3.2. Localization We can expect that the COVID-19 pandemic will prompt business managers and policy makers to re-examine prevailing globalized systems of production based on complex value chains and the international shipment of billions of components and likely prompt establishment of new relationships and supply configurations. The coronavirus outbreak exposes the vulnerability of overreliance on just-in-time (JIT) and lean delivery systems. Separate from current travails, there has been a long-running debate about whether JIT systems – which can be efficient in terms of resources and waste – are also environmentally sound (Baumer-Cardoso et al, 2020). We will likely see in their place implementation of smarter logistics systems, including reverse logistics for secondary materials and waste products and enabled by Internet-of-Things (IoT) technologies. For example, knowing the location of electronics and appliances and their components through such means makes local sourcing easier. Furthermore, replacement of extensive transportation of processed goods over long distances with intermediate storage, depots, and material reserves is prone to gain renewed attention as inventory-buffering strategies. In response to the need to build local resilience, supply and production systems (as well as associated consumption systems) will likely in the future need to become more localized. Trends toward “glocalization”–localization of the global network and consideration of both global and local aspects jointly– can be supported through additive manufacturing technologies (3D printing) and online sharing platforms and these processes can be further enabled and amplified by embracing current calls to establish a “right to repair” which has become an increasingly prominent feature in debates on the future of European consumer law (Terryn, 2019). Such legal guidelines would mean that users would not suffer adverse legal consequences when trying to repair products by, for example, fashioning replacement parts using 3D printing technologies. This shift would help to alleviate durability problems caused by the tendency of manufacturers to design products for premature obsolesce while encouraging greater reuse, recycling, and reclamation of products and components (Slade, 2006; Hernandez et al., 2020). With broader implementation of the right to repair there can be increases in the circular economy concept (Schröder et al., 2019). A circular economy can provide localized resources from materials and products at the end of life – no matter the sources of these supplies. Knowing what kinds of second-hand resources are available and where they are stored, especially those that are locally rare, can be beneficial for planning purposes. One popular example in the United States derives from the hoarding of toilet paper during the period of social distancing and lockdowns. Toilet paper is treated in local sewer systems and water-treatment plants. What if we had a technology that could separate materials such as cellulose from other parts of the waste stream? There are microorganisms such as bacteria that can be deployed to gather cellulose for recycling purposes (Römling, 2002). Related challenges are not unknown. For instance, two decades ago, the city of Santa Clarita in California launched a diaper-recycling program. Motivated by a desire to reduce this source of solid waste, the community over a six-month period established a collection system for soiled diapers and turned the discarded materials into useful products like shoe insoles, roof shingles, and wallpaper (The Economist, 2002). Such circular economy solutions can further reinforce localization capabilities. Not only is additive manufacturing advantageous in expanding opportunities for repair, but materials from local supplies will also result (Garmulewicz et al., 2018). For instance, recovered plastics and metals can be used as feedstocks for 3D printing and these applications can provide opportunities for locally recycled materials and other byproducts derived from local waste exchanges or eco-industrial parks (Jensen, 2016; Julianelli et al., 2020; Dev et al., 2020).<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>COVID generates <u>momentum</u> for the transition.</h4><p>Patrick <strong>Schröder et al 20</strong>, Senior research fellow in the Energy, Environment and Resources department at Chatham House. With: Paul Dewick, Honorary Research Fellow at the Manchester Institute of Innovation Research in Alliance Manchester Business School; Maurie J. Cohen, Director Program in Science, Technology, and Society New Jersey Institute of Technology University Heights Newark; Joseph Sarkis, teaches operations and environmental management in the Graduate School of Management at at Clark University, “A brave new world: Lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic for transitioning to sustainable supply and production,” NIH, 4/17/2020, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7164912/, kyujin</p><p>3. Sustainable supply and production in response to the COVID-19 pandemic</p><p><u>Mandates <strong>imposed</u></strong> <u>by governments</u> <u>and</u> other <u><mark>responses to</u></mark> the <u><mark>COVID</u></mark>-19 pandemic <u><mark>provide</u></mark> some <u><strong>initial <mark>indications</u></strong> <u>of</u> <u><strong>long</mark>er-<mark>term</mark> <mark>actions</u></strong></mark> <u>on</u> <u>the part of policy makers</u>, <u>business managers</u>, <u>and</u> <u>others interested in </u>sustainable supply and production as well as <u>the prospects of <strong>sustainability transitions</u></strong> more generally. We initially discuss several behavioral changes that have been implemented such as sheltering in place, social distancing, and reductions in work-related travel in terms of both commuting and other forms of transportation. We also identify issues related to supply chains, social innovations, and technology resulting from the coronavirus outbreak.</p><p>3.1. Behavioral changes</p><p><u>Current practices</u> due to the COVID-19 pandemic <u>such as <strong>sheltering</u></strong> in place <u>and</u> <u><strong>social distancing</u></strong> <u>have profound implications</u>. <u>Public health directives</u> have <u><strong>discouraged</u></strong> large <u>groups from <strong>congregating</u></strong> <u>and</u> self-<u>quarantines have been recommended to</u> help “<u>flatten the curve</u>.” <u>Workplaces</u> have <u>implemented <strong>new practices</u></strong> <u>that reinforce this need</u> <u>for isolation</u> <u>and separation</u> and some job tasks are being performed on a distributed—often at home–basis.</p><p>At the same time, <u><mark>we</mark> have been <mark>see</mark>ing</u> in recent weeks the emergence of <u><strong><mark>opportunities</u></strong></mark> <u>for people <mark>to <strong>build</u></strong></mark> new <u><strong><mark>skills</u></strong> <u>and</u></mark> to <u><strong><mark>shift</u></strong></mark> away <u><mark>from <strong>energy-intensive</strong></mark> forms</u> of <u><strong><mark>transport</strong></mark>ation</u> <u>and <mark>to</u></mark> instead <u>adopt <strong><mark>telecommuting</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>virtual meetings</u></strong>, <u>and <strong>online ed</strong>ucation</u>. In the United States, on <u><mark>a</u></mark> typical (<u><mark>pre-COVID</u></mark>-19) <u><mark>workday</u></mark> <u>over <strong><mark>200 million</u></strong></mark> people <u><mark>commuted</u></mark> to work <u><mark>and</u></mark> thus <u><mark>released <strong>millions of metric tons</u></strong> <u>of</u></mark> <u><mark>nitrous oxides</u></mark>, <u>carbon dioxide, and particulate matter</u>. <u><mark>If a <strong>modest number</u></strong></mark>, <u>let us say <strong>ten percent</u></strong>, <u><mark>find</u></mark> these new <u><mark>alternatives <strong>preferable</u></strong></mark> from a cost and convenience perspective over the longer term, especially individuals who are new to this mode of work, <u>the</u> likely <u>environmental <mark>benefits</u> <u>would be</u></mark> quite <u><strong><mark>substantial</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u><mark>Such practices are likely to become</u></mark> more <u><strong><mark>common</u></strong></mark> over time <u>as users develop</u> <u>higher levels of <strong>comfort</u></strong> <u>with</u> the relevant <u>technologies</u> <u>and</u> the <u>communications platforms</u> themselves <u>become more <strong>proficient</u></strong> <u>in <strong>simulating</u></strong> face-to-face <u><strong>interactions</u></strong>. As we write this perspective article, <u><strong>Zoom</strong> is</u> ranked as <u>the <strong>number one</u></strong> <u>and</u> number <u><strong>two</u></strong> <u>videoconferencing app</u> in the United States and UK, respectively. Service providers are learning a great deal about the operational features of their systems as they are put under stress due to the increasing traffic generated by simultaneous users. As quality and ease of use improves, <u>we are apt to see <strong><mark>less physical travel</u></strong></mark> – <u><mark>especially</u> <u>by <strong>airplane</u></strong></mark> – after teleconferencing becomes further normalized. <u><mark>Another</mark> crisis-motivated shift <mark>is</u></mark> likely to be <u><mark>modification</mark> <mark>in</mark> the number of <strong><mark>working hours</u></strong></mark> per week. Prior research has demonstrated that <u>there may be <strong>advantages</u></strong> <u>from fewer work days in</u> terms of <u><strong>reduced demand</u></strong> <u>for commuting and increased <strong>productivity</u></strong> (Knight et al., 2013; Kallis, 2013). However, the net benefit of these changes will ultimately be determined by how additional non-work time is allocated and whether new forms of recreational travel are induced by the change.</p><p>General <u>public <mark>gatherings may</u> <u>be <strong>less appealing</u></strong></mark> <u>in the wake of</u> the <u>COVID</u>-19 pandemic. <u>Societal concern and <mark>sensitivity</u> <u>to</u></mark> airborne <u><strong><mark>contagions</u></strong></mark> <u>are likely to <strong><mark>persist</u></strong></mark> into the indefinite future and <u>this is</u> especially <u>likely to be the case with respect to <strong>public venues</u></strong> <u>that encourage</u> close <u><strong>interpersonal interactions</u></strong> involving sizeable groups. For instance, large-scale entertainment and sports activities will probably be less agreeable places for people to congregate. There is apt to be a steep decline in public forms of assembly as erstwhile attendees of such events eschew mass consumption activities and the travel associated with them.</p><p>During the current public health emergency, <u>various</u> consumer <u><mark>goods are</u> <u><strong>not as</u></strong></mark> easily <u><strong><mark>available</u></strong></mark> as was previously the case. At the present time, indications are that <u>most people have <strong>sufficient supplies</u></strong> <u>of food</u> <u>and</u> other <u>essential products</u> to survive, <u>but <strong>demand</u></strong> at food banks <u>is</u> <u><strong>rapidly rising</u></strong> <u>due to</u> increasingly <u>dire <strong>financial circumstances</u></strong>. <u>Shortages appear to be the <strong>result</u></strong> <u>of</u> <u><strong>supply-chain inefficiencies</u></strong> <u>and <strong>disruptions</u></strong>. Thus far, the indications are that <u><strong><mark>individuals</u></strong></mark> – similar to the Great Depression or during major wars of the last century – <u><mark>are</mark> <mark>learning to <strong>live simply</u></strong> <u>and</u></mark> to <u><strong><mark>adapt</u></strong></mark> themselves <u><mark>to extended</mark> periods of <mark>quarantine</u></mark>.</p><p>3.2. Localization</p><p>We can expect that the <u><mark>COVID</u></mark>-19 pandemic <u><mark>will</mark> prompt <strong>business managers</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>policy makers</u></strong> <u>to <strong>re-examine</u></strong> <u>prevailing</u> globalized <u><strong>systems</u></strong> <u>of production based on <strong>complex</u></strong> <u><strong>value chains</u></strong> <u>and the</u> international <u>shipment of <strong>billions of components</u></strong> <u>and</u> likely <u><mark>prompt</mark> establishment of <mark>new relationships</u></mark> <u>and</u> supply <u>configurations</u>. The <u><mark>corona</mark>virus</u> outbreak <u><strong><mark>exposes</u></strong></mark> <u>the <strong>vulnerability</u></strong> <u>of <mark>overreliance on</u> <u>just-in-time</u></mark> (<u><strong>JIT</u></strong>) <u><mark>and</u> <u>lean delivery</u></mark> systems. Separate from current travails, there has been a long-running debate about whether JIT systems – which can be efficient in terms of resources and waste – are also environmentally sound (Baumer-Cardoso et al, 2020). We will likely see in their place implementation of smarter logistics systems, including reverse logistics for secondary materials and waste products and enabled by Internet-of-Things (IoT) technologies. For example, knowing the location of electronics and appliances and their components through such means makes local sourcing easier. Furthermore, replacement of extensive transportation of processed goods over long distances with intermediate storage, depots, and material reserves is prone to gain renewed attention as inventory-buffering strategies.</p><p>In response to the need to build local resilience, <u><mark>supply and production</mark> systems</u> (as well as associated consumption systems) <u><mark>will</u></mark> likely in the future need to <u><mark>become</mark> more <strong><mark>localized</u></strong></mark>. <u>Trends toward “<strong><mark>glocalization</u></strong></mark>”–localization of the global network and consideration of both global and local aspects jointly– <u>can be <strong><mark>supported</u></strong> <u>through</u></mark> additive manufacturing technologies (<u><strong><mark>3D printing</u></strong></mark>) <u><mark>and</u> <u><strong>online sharing</u></strong></mark> platforms <u>and these</u> processes <u>can be further enabled and <strong>amplified</u></strong> <u>by</u> <u>embracing</u> current <u>calls to establish a “<strong>right to repair</u></strong>” which has become an increasingly prominent feature in debates on the future of European consumer law (Terryn, 2019). Such legal guidelines would mean that users would not suffer adverse legal consequences when trying to repair products by, for example, fashioning replacement parts using 3D printing technologies. This shift would help to alleviate durability problems caused by the tendency of manufacturers to design products for premature obsolesce while encouraging greater reuse, recycling, and reclamation of products and components (Slade, 2006; Hernandez et al., 2020).</p><p><u>With</u> <u>broader</u> <u>implementation</u> of the right to repair <u>there can be increases in the</u> <u><strong>circular economy</u></strong> concept (Schröder et al., 2019). <u>A circular economy can provide localized resources</u> <u>from materials and products at the <strong>end of life</u></strong> – <u>no matter the sources</u> of these supplies. Knowing what kinds of second-hand resources are available and where they are stored, especially those that are locally rare, can be beneficial for planning purposes. One popular example in the United States derives from the hoarding of toilet paper during the period of social distancing and lockdowns. Toilet paper is treated in local sewer systems and water-treatment plants. What if we had a technology that could separate materials such as cellulose from other parts of the waste stream? There are microorganisms such as bacteria that can be deployed to gather cellulose for recycling purposes (Römling, 2002).</p><p>Related challenges are not unknown. For instance, two decades ago, the city of Santa Clarita in California launched a diaper-recycling program. Motivated by a desire to reduce this source of solid waste, the community over a six-month period established a collection system for soiled diapers and turned the discarded materials into useful products like shoe insoles, roof shingles, and wallpaper (The Economist, 2002).</p><p>Such <u>circular economy solutions can</u> <u><strong>further reinforce</u></strong> <u>localization</u> capabilities. Not only is additive manufacturing advantageous in expanding opportunities for repair, but <u>materials from <strong>local supplies</u></strong> <u>will</u> also <u>result</u> (Garmulewicz et al., 2018). For instance, recovered plastics and metals can be used as feedstocks for 3D printing and these applications can provide opportunities for locally recycled materials and other byproducts derived from local waste exchanges or eco-industrial parks (Jensen, 2016; Julianelli et al., 2020; Dev et al., 2020).</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Nathan Snaza 17, Snaza; Professor of English at the University of Richmond; and Jennifer A. Sandlin, Associate Professor of justice and social inquiry in the School of Social Transformation at Arizona State University, 02/28/2017, Educational Commons in Theory and Practice, “Chapter 7: #BlackLivesMatter: Racialization, the Human, and Critical Public Pedagogies of Race,” pp. 109-125 fulltext: The necessity of racial identification is the precise point of departure from whitestream biopolitical thought for Weheliye (2014), who recognizes that the dominant model of being human, the one developed in imperialist Europe and forcefully extended across the globe (Fanon, 1967), requires every human to be racialized. We must also note, following Judith Butler’s (1993) work, that every human must have a gender in order to perform being human. That we are all both raced and gendered is forgotten or ignored by biopolitical theories that are animated by some unmarked “human”—that is, there is no human without an ascribed race or gender because the same assemblages that produce humanity (via practices of humanization) produce racialization and gendering (along with other ways of structuring and hierarchizing humans). Indeed, the production of various marginal, non- or less-than-humans is inseparable from the production of “fully human” persons. Weheliye (2014) turns to Sylvia Wynter’s provocative re-conceptualization of the human in order to underscore this point, a re-conceptualization that takes as its point of departure Frantz Fanon’s notion (1967) of “sociogeny.” In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon (1967) writes: Reacting against the constitutionalist tendency of the late nineteenth century, Freud insisted that the individual factor be taken into account through psychoanalysis. He substituted for a phylogenetic theory the ontogenetic perspective. It will be seen that black man’s alienation is not an individual question: Beside phylogeny and ontogeny stand sociogeny. (p. 11) For Fanon, as for Wynter and Weheliye, race has its origins in social assemblages but it becomes real, material, ontological through sociogeny, a concept that signals the inescapably social emergence of (human) persons. Wynter (2001) glosses these as “states specific to the modes of subjective experience defining what it is like to be a human within the terms of our present culture’s conception of what it is to be human” (p. 46). Sociogeny, then, names the ways that particular concepts and narratives (such as a dominant version of “the human”) effectively become part of the origin or emergence of particular human beings. It pinpoints how social and political fictions can become naturalized and seemingly inescapable. To translate this back into the terms used above to pose racial formation, as much as we are all required to form an identity through identifications with existing racial and gendered categories, we also form our identities as human in relation to presently existing conceptions of that term. Indeed, it is only because of the functioning of a particular category of the human that we feel compelled to have a race or gender in the first place. Indeed, gender and sexuality are not only inescapably connected to the very existence of race as a political concept (Stoler, 1995), they also constitute linked but distinct axes of humanization and dehumanization. As Weheliye (2014) explains, “the sociogenic anchoring of racial difference in physiology and the banning of black subjects from the domain of the human occur in and through gender and sexuality” (p. 42, emphasis ours), a linkage also taken up within queer theory. As Dana Luciano and Mel Chen (2015) note, “Many of queer theory’s foundational texts interrogate, implicitly or explicitly, the nature of the ‘human’ in its relation to the queer, both in their attention to how sexual norms themselves constitute and regulate hierarchies of humanness, and as they work to unsettle those norms and the default forms of humanness they uphold” (p. 186). To put this in terms that may be more familiar, what black feminist theory calls “intersectionality” is an account of how the human emerges through differential humanization assemblages (Puar, 2012), producing full humans only by simultaneously producing nonhumans, inhumans, and less than fully human persons. A political response to the dehumanization of humanizing assemblages thus requires constant vigilance to the ways in which gender and sexuality are deployed both in racialized state violence as well as in political responses to that violence. As Treva B. Lindsey (2015) writes: The demand for recognition of the humanity of all Black people requires activists, allies, and the broader US public to critically consider the impact of state violence on individual Black people, Black families, and Black communities. To affirm the particular experiences of Black men and boys with state violence should not and cannot relegate the experiences of Black women and girls, queer people, and trans* people to the margins of our activism and our documentation of contemporary anti-Black racial terror. (p. 236) To conceptualize this differential humanization, or the ways that some become more human than others, we can follow Wynter’s project, which operates according to a founding distinction between “the human” and “Man”—the presently dominant form of being human, one forged in early modernity. We quote Wynter (2003) at length to explain this conceptualization of “Man” and its destructive impact on humanity: The argument proposes that the struggle of our new millennium will be one between the ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass (i.e., Western bourgeois) conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species itself/ourselves … The correlated hypothesis here is that all our present struggles with respect to race, class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, struggles over environment, global warming, severe climate change, the sharply unequal distribution of the earth resources (20 percent of the world’s peoples own 80 percent of its resources, consume two-thirds of its food, and are responsible for 75 percent of its ongoing pollution, with this leading to two billion of earth’s peoples living relatively affluent lives while four billion still live on the edge of hunger and immiseration, to the dynamic of overconsumption on the part of the rich techno-industrial North paralleled by that of overpopulation on the part of the dispossessed poor, still partly agrarian worlds of the South)—these are all differing facets of the central ethnoclass Man vs. Human struggle. (2003, pp. 260–261) Wynter sees a violent synecdochic logic underwriting modernity’s invention of the human: a particular genre of the human “overrepresents” itself as being the whole of humanity and uses considerable violence in order to draw the entire (human) world into its machinations and under its logics. Two things about Wynter’s formulation here are crucial for us. First, Wynter reveals how what appear to be disparate social justice-related struggles—for example, for racial, gender, and environmental justice—are actually very importantly linked, because they emerge as a reaction against very similar logics and coalesce into a demand for new ways of being human, ways that will not be yoked to Man and its violences. Second, Wynter’s highlighting of the conflict between “Man” and “humanity” reminds us that experiments with other ways of being human are all around us—in fact, those individuals and groups whose humanity has been in question during modernity provide living alternatives to being Man.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Race and gender exceed and precede the law where they become material through sociogenesis---sociogenesis articulates the way in which humans coalesce to demand for new ways of being human by locating dehumanization at the nexus of the ethnoclass Man vs. Human struggle</h4><p>Nathan <strong>Snaza 17</strong>, Snaza; Professor of English at the University of Richmond; and Jennifer A. Sandlin, Associate Professor of justice and social inquiry in the School of Social Transformation at Arizona State University, 02/28/2017, Educational Commons in Theory and Practice, “Chapter 7: #BlackLivesMatter: Racialization, the Human, and Critical Public Pedagogies of Race,” pp. 109-125</p><p><u>The necessity of <strong>racial identification</strong> is the precise point of departure from <strong>whitestream</strong> <strong>biopolitical thought</u></strong> for Weheliye (2014), <u>who recognizes that the <strong>dominant model of being human</strong>, the one developed in <strong>imperialist Europe</strong> and forcefully <strong>extended</strong> across the <strong>globe</u></strong> (Fanon, 1967), <u>requires every <strong>human</strong> to be <strong>racialized</u></strong>. We must also note, following Judith Butler’s (1993) work, that <u>every human must have a <strong>gender</strong> in order to <strong>perform</strong> being <strong>human</u></strong>. <u>That we are all both <strong>raced</strong> and <strong>gendered</strong> is <strong>forgotten</strong> or ignored by biopolitical theories that are animated by some <strong>unmarked “human”</u></strong>—that is, <u>there is <strong>no human without</strong> an ascribed <strong>race</strong> or <strong>gender</strong> because the same <strong>assemblages</strong> that <strong>produce humanity</u></strong> (via practices of humanization) <u>produce <strong>racialization</strong> and <strong>gendering</u></strong> (along with other ways of structuring and hierarchizing humans). Indeed, <u>the <strong>production</strong> of various <strong>marginal</strong>, non- or less-than-<strong>humans</strong> is <strong>inseparable</strong> from the production of “<strong>fully human</strong>” persons.</u> Weheliye (2014) turns to Sylvia Wynter’s provocative re-conceptualization of the human in order to underscore this point, a re-conceptualization that takes as its point of departure Frantz Fanon’s notion (1967) of “sociogeny.” In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon (1967) writes:</p><p>Reacting against the constitutionalist tendency of the late nineteenth century, Freud insisted that the individual factor be taken into account through psychoanalysis. He substituted for a phylogenetic theory the ontogenetic perspective. <u>It will be seen that black man’s <strong>alienation</strong> is <strong>not</strong> an <strong>individual question</strong>: Beside <strong>phylogeny</strong> and <strong>ontogeny</strong> stand <strong>sociogeny</strong>.</u> (p. 11)</p><p>For Fanon, as for Wynter and Weheliye, <u><strong>race</strong> has its <strong>origins</strong> in <strong>social assemblages</strong> but it becomes <strong>real</strong>, <strong>material</strong>, <strong>ontological</strong> through <strong>sociogeny</strong>, a concept that signals the <strong>inescapably</strong> social emergence of (<strong>human</strong>) <strong>persons</strong>.</u> <u>Wynter</u> (2001) <u>glosses these as “states specific to the modes of <strong>subjective experience</strong> defining what it is like to be a human within the terms of our <strong>present culture’s conception</strong> of what it is to be human”</u> (p. 46). <u><strong>Sociogeny</u></strong>, then, <u>names the ways that particular <strong>concepts</strong> and <strong>narratives</u></strong> (such as a dominant version of “the human”) <u>effectively become part of the <strong>origin</strong> or <strong>emergence</strong> of <strong>particular human beings</strong>.</u> <u>It pinpoints how <strong>social</strong> and <strong>political fictions</strong> can become <strong>naturalized</strong> and seemingly <strong>inescapable</strong>.</u> To translate this back into the terms used above to pose racial formation, <u>as much as we are all required to <strong>form</strong> an <strong>identity</strong> through <strong>identifications</strong> with <strong>existing</strong> racial and gendered <strong>categories</u></strong>, <u>we also <strong>form</strong> our <strong>identities</strong> as <strong>human</strong> in <strong>relation</strong> to <strong>presently existing conceptions</strong> of that term</u>. Indeed, <u>it is only because of the <strong>functioning</strong> of a <strong>particular category of the human</strong> that we feel <strong>compelled</strong> to have a <strong>race</strong> or <strong>gender</strong> in the first place</u>.</p><p>Indeed, <u><strong>gender and sexuality</strong> are not only inescapably connected to the very existence of race as a political concept</u> (Stoler, 1995), they also <u><strong>constitute</strong> linked but distinct <strong>axes of humanization</strong> and <strong>dehumanization</u></strong>. As Weheliye (2014) explains, “<u>the <strong>sociogenic</strong> anchoring of <strong>racial difference</strong> in physiology and the <strong>banning</strong> of <strong>black subjects</strong> from the <strong>domain of the human</strong> occur in and through <strong>gender and sexuality</u></strong>” (p. 42, emphasis ours), <u>a linkage also taken up within queer theory</u>. As Dana Luciano and Mel Chen (2015) note, “<u>Many of <strong>queer theory’s</strong> foundational texts <strong>interrogate</u></strong>, implicitly or explicitly, <u>the <strong>nature</strong> of the ‘<strong>human’</strong> in its relation to the <strong>queer</u></strong>, <u>both in their attention to how <strong>sexual norms</strong> themselves <strong>constitute</strong> and <strong>regulate</strong> <strong>hierarchies of humanness</strong>, and as they work to <strong>unsettle</strong> those <strong>norms</strong> and the <strong>default forms of humanness</strong> they <strong>uphold</u></strong>” (p. 186). To put this in terms that may be more familiar, <u>what black feminist theory calls “<strong>intersectionality</strong>” is an account of how the <strong>human</strong> <strong>emerges</strong> through <strong>differential humanization assemblages</u></strong> (Puar, 2012), <u><strong>producing full humans</strong> only by simultaneously <strong>producing nonhumans</strong>, <strong>inhumans</strong>, and <strong>less than fully human persons</strong>. A <strong>political response</strong> to the <strong>dehumanization of humanizing assemblages </strong>thus requires <strong>constant vigilance</strong> to the ways in which <strong>gender and sexuality</strong> are <strong>deployed</strong> both in <strong>racialized state violence</strong> as well as in <strong>political responses</strong> to that <strong>violence</strong>.</u> As Treva B. Lindsey (2015) writes:</p><p><u>The <strong>demand for recognition</strong> of the humanity of all Black people requires activists, allies, and the broader US public to critically <strong>consider</strong> the impact of <strong>state violence</strong> on individual Black people, Black families, and Black communities. To <strong>affirm</strong> the <strong>particular experiences</strong> of Black men and boys with state violence <strong>should not</strong> and <strong>cannot relegate</strong> the <strong>experiences</strong> of <strong>Black women</strong> and <strong>girls</strong>, <strong>queer people</strong>, and <strong>trans* people</strong> to the <strong>margins</strong> of our <strong>activism</strong> and our <strong>documentation</strong> of contemporary <strong>anti-Black racial terror</strong>.</u> (p. 236)</p><p><u>To conceptualize this <strong>differential humanization</u></strong>, or <u>the ways that some become more human than others</u>, <u>we can follow Wynter’s project</u>, <u>which operates according to a founding <strong>distinction</strong> between “<strong>the human</strong>” and “<strong>Man</strong>”—the presently <strong>dominant form of being human</u></strong>, one forged in early modernity. We quote Wynter (2003) at length to explain this conceptualization of “Man” and its destructive impact on humanity:</p><p>The argument proposes that the struggle of our new millennium will be one between the ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass (i.e., Western bourgeois) conception of <u><strong>the human, Man</strong>,</u> which <u><strong>overrepresents</strong> itself as if it were the human itself, and that of <strong>securing the well-being</strong>, and therefore the full <strong>cognitive</strong> and <strong>behavioral autonomy</strong> of the human species itself/ourselves</u> … <u>The correlated hypothesis here is that all our <strong>present struggles</strong> with respect to <strong>race</strong>, <strong>class</strong>, <strong>gender</strong>, <strong>sexual orientation</strong>, <strong>ethnicity</strong>, <strong>struggles over environment</strong>, <strong>global warming</strong>, severe <strong>climate change</strong>, the sharply <strong>unequal distribution of the earth resources</u></strong> (20 percent of the world’s peoples own 80 percent of its resources, consume two-thirds of its food, and are responsible for 75 percent of its ongoing pollution, with this leading to two billion of earth’s peoples living relatively affluent lives while four billion still live on the edge of hunger and immiseration, to the dynamic of overconsumption on the part of the rich techno-industrial North paralleled by that of overpopulation on the part of the dispossessed poor, still partly agrarian worlds of the South)—<u>these are all <strong>differing facets</strong> of the <strong>central ethnoclass</strong> Man vs. Human <strong>struggle</strong>. (2003, pp. 260–261)</p><p>Wynter sees a <strong>violent synecdochic logic</strong> underwriting modernity’s <strong>invention of the human</strong>: a <strong>particular genre</strong> of the <strong>human “overrepresents”</strong> itself as being the <strong>whole of humanity</strong> and <strong>uses</strong> considerable <strong>violence</strong> in order to <strong>draw</strong> the <strong>entire (human)</strong> world into its <strong>machinations</strong> and <strong>under its logics</strong>.</u> Two things about Wynter’s formulation here are crucial for us. First, <u><strong>Wynter</strong> reveals how what appear to be <strong>disparate</strong> <strong>social justice-related struggles</u></strong>—for example, for racial, gender, and environmental justice—<u>are actually very importantly <strong>linked</strong>, because they emerge as a <strong>reaction</strong> against very <strong>similar logics</strong> and <strong>coalesce</strong> into a <strong>demand</strong> for <strong>new ways of being human</strong>, ways that will not be yoked to Man and its violences.</u> Second, <u>Wynter’s <strong>highlighting</strong> of the <strong>conflict</strong> between “<strong>Man</strong>” and “<strong>humanity</strong>” reminds us that <strong>experiments</strong> with <strong>other ways of being human are all around us</strong>—in fact, those <strong>individuals</strong> and <strong>groups</strong> whose <strong>humanity</strong> has been in <strong>question</strong> during modernity provide <strong>living alternatives to being Man</strong>.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Hoare, Oriental Studies PhD, 17 (James Edward, Established the British Embassy in North Korea, Professor on East Asian Studies @ Queen Mary University of London, BA @ Queen Mary University of London, PhD in Oriental and African Studies, Senior Teaching Fellow in Korean Studies @ the University of London, Head of Chancery and HM Consul-General @ Beijing, Associate Fellow of the Asian Programme @ the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Interviewed by Yohann Koshy, Staff Writer @ Vice, “The Truth About the Brewing 'Nuclear War' Between North Korea and the US”, May 5th, 2017, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/the-truth-about-the-brewing-nuclear-war-between-north-korea-and-the-us) dlb fulltext: Relations between the two nations have been vexed since the Korean War in the 1950s, when the US Air Force "killed off"—to quote one general—20 percent of the North's population with 500,000 tons of conventional and chemical weapons. More recent history testifies to the fragile success of negotiations, which collapsed in the 2000s when George Bush declared North Korea part of his infamous "Axis of Evil," and Kim Jong-il responded by detonating a nuclear device. In recent years, things have only gotten worse. Obama's presidency saw the US lead a "strategic pivot" toward Asia-Pacific, which meant an intensification of US presence in the region to counter Chinese hegemony. As a result, the paranoia has intensified in Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, which sees itself as increasingly encircled by its old enemy. Trump's thick-skulled belligerence hasn't helped either. But while the media carelessly whips up hysteria with talk of "World War III," it's important to remember that these standoffs are a yearly occurrence—in the Korean Peninsula, they have the character of routine. To complicate our picture of two petulant princelings facing each other off and threatening to take the world down with them, we sought out some sober analysis from James Hoare, associate fellow in the Asia program at Chatham House in London and former head of the British embassy in North Korea. VICE: It's hard to keep track of what's going on. What's your survey of the situation? James Hoare: This is not something that just happened this year—it happens every year. It's a standard consequence of the US-South Korean military exercises that take place around March and April every year. They're very big. They're said to be "defensive exercises," but there's no such thing as defensive exercises: Exercises are exercises; they can go either way. And the North Koreans react: Their rhetoric and threats go up. But it doesn't actually alter anything on the ground. The North Koreans still have the same problems they've always had: If you attack the United States, you've got to be suicidal. If you don't have the means to attack the US—which I don't think they do, although they're working toward it—then you make a lot of noise instead. Equally, I think that they're clearly determined to carry on with the development of a feasible nuclear weapon, and that is going to lead to hostile Western reactions. So you've got these two patterns, which are quite well established, coming together. I suspect the rhetoric on both sides will die down once the exercises are over, but the underlying concern about North Korea's nuclear program will continue. So I don't think you're going to have World War III just yet. "Every March [when the North Korean military exercises happen], I stop watching television because I can't keep answering these silly questions about whether we're going to war now." Is hysterical media reporting to blame for the lack of proportion? I was just speaking to an American journalist who's been studying North Korea for quite a long time, and he said, "Look, every March [when the military exercises happen], I stop watching television, because I can't keep answering these silly questions, 'Are we going to war now?'" This is rhetoric. We know how the North Koreans use rhetoric—they hype it up. But that doesn't necessarily mean it's going anywhere. Part of the problem is the "madman" analysis we have of the North Korean leadership in the West—it stops us from having a clear-eyed assessment of how North Korea might be pursuing its perceived self-interest. The fact is that we don't really know very much about Kim Jong-un. We don't know how or what he thinks. He's different from his father and grandfather; he doesn't have the links they had with China. But, so far, he hasn't proved suicidal. He does hype up the rhetoric, but, so far, they've backed away—as always—from a really dangerous confrontation. In the past, there were really heavy exchanges of fire along the demilitarized zone [between North and South Korea]: Ships have been sunk; people have been killed in South Korea by raiding parties from North Korea; the South Korean Cabinet was blown up in Rangoon [in 1983]. There have been pretty serious and worrisome moments, and yet the armistice has held. People on both sides of the DMZ do seem to have the ability to scale down things—everybody seems to be able to judge when you can't push them much further. A few years ago, we had exactly the same sort of noise being made—the North Koreans saying, "Do this, or we'll wipe you out!" And they didn't—it all faded away. To what extent should we be seeing this as a symptom of a much wider standoff between US and China? I think there is a strong element of that. The Chinese are worried about the prospect of the US being established higher up the [Korean] peninsula than it is already. They don't like the North Korean nuclear program because it increases tension, and the role of the United States, so they put some pressure on the North Koreans—but they're careful they don't push them too far because then they'll go off and do something that really could be quite dangerous. Much of the US concern with North Korea is, in fact, related to China. When I worked in government, I used to say to my American CIA contacts, "We know how to spell Beijing: It's P-Y-O-N-G-Y-A-N-G!" They laughed. "The real uncertainty this time around is that we don't know what Trump's position is. He's the new unknown quantity." The history of North Korean and American relations shows that negotiations can work. Is there an appetite for them? That's true, but I don't know: The real uncertainty this time around is that we don't know what Trump's position is. He's the new unknown quantity. He has a State Department that is missing large chunks of people—there haven't been appointments for all sorts of levels—and he's notorious for... Well, it's a bit like Éamon de Valera [a prominent Irish politician in the early 20th century], who was asked how he knew what the Irish people wanted. He said, "I look into my heart." Well, I think Trump looks into his television. That has introduced an element of uncertainty, which you've seen in the last week. On the one hand, every option is on the table for the US, including the military, and then this week he says, "Oh, I could talk to Kim Jong-un!" As someone who led the British embassy in North Korea, how important do you think the country's self-image is during these moments of crisis? I think that's another factor that has to be taken into account. A lot of the posturing has to do with domestic considerations—it's phrased in terms of the US, but it's not aimed at them. The real need is to project yourself as the strong, capable leader, who's keeping our country independent. That sounds like British prime minister Theresa May. Well, in a sense, it's not dissimilar. Whether it's true, of course, is another matter. But, really, people often forget that there is a domestic side to all these things and much of the noise is playing back within North Korea. What have the soundings from the British government been? It seems like May has been echoing the American side quite willingly. Well, Britain does. There's no doubt that the US leads on the Korean issue. We don't really do anything very separate from what the United States does, nor does the rest of Europe, really. I've been asked whether we will close our embassy; I don't know, and I hope not. I don't see that closing the embassy actually does much, except further isolate North Korea. And even if we don't have much influence, it's better to talk with them and hear directly from them, rather than not. But I don't look to Mrs. May—particularly with an election coming up—to start intervening on the Korean Peninsula. Americans wouldn't want it anyway. Is it left to a third-party to generate the political will for negotiations, or will all this panic just dissipate after a while? I think this particular period of tension will probably calm down even as the underlying problem of North Korea and its nuclear weapons doesn't go away. But there are ways of trying to deal with that. The Chinese say to the US that you've got to try and talk to them. But the exercise-related tensions that we've been seeing over the last few months will fade away. I mean, keep your fingers crossed.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>4--- war won’t go nuclear.</h4><p><strong>Hoare, Oriental Studies PhD, 17</strong> (James Edward, Established the British Embassy in North Korea, Professor on East Asian Studies @ Queen Mary University of London, BA @ Queen Mary University of London, PhD in Oriental and African Studies, Senior Teaching Fellow in Korean Studies @ the University of London, Head of Chancery and HM Consul-General @ Beijing, Associate Fellow of the Asian Programme @ the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Interviewed by Yohann Koshy, Staff Writer @ Vice, “<u><mark>The <strong>Truth</strong> About the Brewing 'Nuclear War' Between No</mark>rth <mark>Ko</mark>rea <mark>and the US</u></mark>”, May 5th, 2017, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/the-truth-about-the-brewing-nuclear-war-between-north-korea-and-the-us) dlb</p><p><u>Relations between the two nations have been vexed since the Korean War</u> in the 1950s, when the US Air Force "killed off"—to quote one general—20 percent of the North's population with 500,000 tons of conventional and chemical weapons. More recent history testifies to the fragile success of negotiations, which collapsed in the 2000s when George Bush declared North Korea part of his infamous "Axis of Evil," and Kim Jong-il responded by detonating a nuclear device.</p><p>In recent years, things have only gotten worse. Obama's presidency saw the US lead a "strategic pivot" toward Asia-Pacific, which meant an intensification of US presence in the region to counter Chinese hegemony. As a result, the paranoia has intensified in Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, which sees itself as increasingly encircled by its old enemy. Trump's thick-skulled belligerence hasn't helped either.</p><p><u><strong>But</u></strong> <u><mark>while the media</mark> <strong>carelessly</strong> <mark>whips up <strong>hysteria</strong></mark> with talk <mark>of "World War III</u></mark>," <u>it's important to <mark>remember</mark> that <mark>these standoffs are a <strong>yearly occurrence</u></strong></mark>—in the Korean Peninsula, <u>they have the character of <strong>routine</u></strong>.</p><p>To complicate our picture of two petulant princelings facing each other off and threatening to take the world down with them, we sought out some sober analysis from James Hoare, associate fellow in the Asia program at Chatham House in London and former head of the British embassy in North Korea.</p><p>VICE: It's hard to keep track of what's going on. What's your survey of the situation?</p><p>James Hoare: <u>This</u> is not something that just happened this year—it <u>happens <strong>every year</u></strong>. It's a standard consequence of the US-South Korean military exercises that take place around March and April every year. They're very big. They're said to be "defensive exercises," but there's no such thing as defensive exercises: Exercises are exercises; they can go either way. And the North Koreans react: <u>Their <mark>rhetoric and threats go up</u></mark>.</p><p><u><strong><mark>But</u></strong> <u>it doesn't</mark> actually <mark>alter anything on the ground</u></mark>. The North Koreans still have the same problems they've always had: <u><strong><mark>If</strong> you attack</u></mark> the United States, <u><mark>you've got to be <strong>suicidal</u></strong></mark>. If you don't have the means to attack the US—which I don't think they do, although they're working toward it—then you make a lot of noise instead.</p><p>Equally, I think that they're clearly determined to carry on with the development of a feasible nuclear weapon, and that is going to lead to hostile Western reactions. So you've got these two patterns, which are quite well established, coming together. I suspect the rhetoric on both sides will die down once the exercises are over, but the underlying concern about North Korea's nuclear program will continue. So I don't think you're going to have World War III just yet.</p><p>"Every March [when the North Korean military exercises happen], I stop watching television because I can't keep answering these silly questions about whether we're going to war now."</p><p>Is hysterical media reporting to blame for the lack of proportion?</p><p>I was just speaking to an American journalist who's been studying North Korea for quite a long time, and he said, "Look, every March [when the military exercises happen], I stop watching television, because I can't keep answering these silly questions, 'Are we <u><strong>going to war</u></strong> now?'" This <u>is <strong>rhetoric</u></strong>. We know how the North Koreans use rhetoric—they hype it up. But <u>that doesn't</u> necessarily <u>mean it's going anywhere</u>.</p><p>Part of the problem is the "madman" analysis we have of the North Korean leadership in the West—it stops us from having a clear-eyed assessment of how North Korea might be pursuing its perceived self-interest.</p><p>The fact is that we don't really know very much about <u><mark>Kim</u></mark> Jong-un. We don't know how or what he thinks. He's different from his father and grandfather; he doesn't have the links they had with China. But, so far, he <u><strong><mark>hasn't proved suicidal</u></strong></mark>. He does hype up the rhetoric, but, so far, <u><mark>they've <strong>backed away</u></strong></mark>—as always—<u><mark>from</mark> a really <strong>dangerous <mark>confrontation</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u><mark>In the <strong>past</strong>, there were</mark> really <strong><mark>heavy exchanges</u></strong></mark> of fire <u><mark>along the</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>d</u></strong></mark>e<u><strong><mark>m</u></strong></mark>ilitarized <u><strong><mark>z</u></strong></mark>one [between North and South Korea]: <u><strong><mark>Ships</strong> have been sunk</u></mark>; <u><mark>people have been killed</u></mark> in South Korea by raiding parties from North Korea; <u>the South Korean Cabinet was blown up in Rangoon</u> [in 1983]. <u>There have been pretty serious and worrisome moments, and <mark>yet <strong>the armistice has held</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>People on <strong><mark>both sides</u></strong></mark> of the DMZ do seem to <u><mark>have the ability to <strong>scale down</mark> things</u></strong>—everybody seems to be able to judge when you can't push them much further. A few years ago, we had exactly the same sort of noise being made—the North Koreans saying, "Do this, or we'll wipe you out!" And they didn't—it all faded away.</p><p>To what extent should we be seeing this as a symptom of a much wider standoff between US and China?</p><p>I think there is a strong element of that. The Chinese are worried about the prospect of the US being established higher up the [Korean] peninsula than it is already. They don't like the North Korean nuclear program because it increases tension, and the role of the United States, so they put some pressure on the North Koreans—but they're careful they don't push them too far because then they'll go off and do something that really could be quite dangerous.</p><p>Much of the US concern with North Korea is, in fact, related to China. When I worked in government, I used to say to my American CIA contacts, "We know how to spell Beijing: It's P-Y-O-N-G-Y-A-N-G!" They laughed.</p><p>"The real uncertainty this time around is that we don't know what Trump's position is. He's the new unknown quantity."</p><p>The <u><strong><mark>history</u></strong></mark> of North Korean and American relations <u><mark>shows</mark> that <mark>negotiations can work</u></mark>. Is there an appetite for them?</p><p>That's true, but I don't know: The real uncertainty this time around is that we don't know what Trump's position is. He's the new unknown quantity. He has a State Department that is missing large chunks of people—there haven't been appointments for all sorts of levels—and he's notorious for... Well, it's a bit like Éamon de Valera [a prominent Irish politician in the early 20th century], who was asked how he knew what the Irish people wanted. He said, "I look into my heart." Well, I think Trump looks into his television.</p><p>That has introduced an element of uncertainty, which you've seen in the last week. On the one hand, every option is on the table for the US, including the military, and then this week he says, "Oh, I could talk to Kim Jong-un!"</p><p>As someone who led the British embassy in North Korea, how important do you think the country's self-image is during these moments of crisis?</p><p>I think that's another factor that has to be taken into account. A lot of the <u><mark>posturing has to do with <strong>domestic considerations</u></strong></mark>—it's phrased in terms of the US, but it's not aimed at them. The real need is to project yourself as the strong, capable leader, who's keeping our country independent.</p><p>That sounds like British prime minister Theresa May.</p><p>Well, in a sense, it's not dissimilar. Whether it's true, of course, is another matter. But, really, people often forget that there is a domestic side to all these things and much of the noise is playing back within North Korea.</p><p>What have the soundings from the British government been? It seems like May has been echoing the American side quite willingly.</p><p>Well, Britain does. There's no doubt that the US leads on the Korean issue. We don't really do anything very separate from what the United States does, nor does the rest of Europe, really.</p><p>I've been asked whether we will close our embassy; I don't know, and I hope not. I don't see that closing the embassy actually does much, except further isolate North Korea. And even if we don't have much influence, it's better to talk with them and hear directly from them, rather than not. But I don't look to Mrs. May—particularly with an election coming up—to start intervening on the Korean Peninsula. Americans wouldn't want it anyway.</p><p>Is it left to a third-party to generate the political will for negotiations, or will all this panic just dissipate after a while?</p><p>I think this particular period of <u><mark>tension will</u></mark> probably <u><strong><mark>calm down</u></strong> <u>even as</u></mark> the underlying problem of North Korea and its <u><mark>nuclear weapons do</u>es<u>n't</mark> <mark>go away</u></mark>. But there are ways of trying to deal with that. The Chinese say to the US that you've got to try and talk to them. But the exercise-related tensions that we've been seeing over the last few months will fade away. I mean, keep your fingers crossed.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Fabian ’19 (Christopher David; B.S. from the US Air Force Academy, M.S. from the University of North Dakota; January 2019; “A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy”; https://commons.und.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3456&context=theses; UND Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects; accessed 9/2/19; TV) fulltext: Fundamentally, cooperation between the U.S. and China is based on maintaining the status quo of free access to space in accordance with existing international treaties and customary law. The primary laws governing the peaceful use of outer space, for which China and the U.S. are both signatories, include the Outer Space Treaty (OST), Rescue Agreement, Liability Convention, and Registration Convention.107 Article IV of the OST prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit and forbids the placement of any weapons on a celestial body. Although the OST requires the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, it does not prohibit conventional weapons in space or provide a definition for what could be considered a space weapon. The vagueness of the OST, particularly article IV, amounts to a crisis in space law and will be covered at length in later sections.108 Despite the previously mentioned ambiguity, this analysis will assume that cooperation entails both the adherence to existing legal regimes and the limitation of the capability to wage war in and from the space domain.109 This includes limiting space control and on-orbit force application capabilities. Alternatively, defection between the U.S. and China involves preventing free access to space through the manipulation of international law, the building and maintaining of space control capabilities, or the building and maintaining of on-orbit force application capabilities. These broad definitions are essential for two reasons: first, they acknowledge that the Sino-U.S. space policy game is nested inside a larger game of Sino-U.S. geostrategic relations, given that space power is a fundamental element of national power. Second, it accounts for the practical limitations in foundational, codified space law. China is highly incentivized by the prospects of mutual cooperation in space. Maintaining free access to space is analogous to free sea lines of communication, which are primarily guaranteed by U.S. military power. 110 This guarantee has allowed China to become the world’s largest importer and exporter, accumulating $4.3T of total trade in 2014 and catalyzing a massive economic resurgence. 111 Similarly, there is evidence that China aims to take advantage of free access to space to continue its national rejuvenation into post-industrial future. In 2013, General Secretary Xi Jinping announced the “China Dream” to rejuvenate China by building national pride, engineering an economic revolution, and rebuilding China’s military.112 Xi has linked a “space dream” as a means of fulfilling the “China Dream”.113 After the launch of the manned Shenzhou-10 mission in 2013 he stated, “The space dream is part of the dream to make China stronger. With the development of space programs, the Chinese people will take bigger strides to explore further into space,” and went on to compare the Chinese manned space program to the Long March.114 Similarly, Lt. Gen. Zhang Yulin stated, “The earth-moon space will be strategically important for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”115 The connection between China’s space program and national rejuvenation touted by CCP leaders is particularly strong in relation to the manned space program, which has ambitious development milestones planned until 2045.1 Space power and manned space accomplishments serve to benefit China in five ways. First, success in space forms a nationalist narrative and creates a positive focal point for national pride, counter to the negative images of the Tianamen Square massacre and China’s consistently poor human rights record. 117 Maintaining an independent and self-reliant space program helps the CCP craft a narrative based on technological development, social progress, and sustainable development. This lends legitimacy to CCP leadership of China and stokes nationalism. 118 Additionally, the dissemination and control of satellite communication gives the CCP a medium by which to propagate its own political interpretation of world events.119 Second, the economic benefit gained from China’s space program is essential to upholding the informal social contract between the Chinese people and the CCP, one that is based on continued economic growth and an increase in quality of life. China seeks to make its space program a driver of economic and technological advancement in a variety of ways. Primarily, they believe that spin-off technologies from the space program could have up to a 1:10 cost to benefit ratio.120 This creates a cycle where the Chinese space program generates technology, technology spurs economic development, and economic development supports the space program.121 The export of commercial space services will be a driver of economic development as a producer of both jobs and hard currency. 122 Additionally, the space industry spurs the development of a high technology industry by creating a market for high-skill labor and products. 123 The industrial and academic base required for the development of a strong space program is projected to have multi-order effects across other key industries and inspire young Chinese to pursue a career in the sciences.124 Next, the use of satellite application technologies is critical to China’s economic development.125 The use of geological, weather, and positional data is essential to developing China’s limited resources and guarding her fragile environment.126 A multitrillion-dollar infrastructure project called the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI) was announced by Xi in 2013. The purpose of this project is to harness latent Chinese industrial capacity to enhance strategic connection between China and the rest of the Eurasian landmass.127 China’s space development has been specifically linked to BRI by the China National Space Administration’s (CNSA) director of international cooperation, Jiang Hui. In a brief to the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), Hui highlighted a long term plan focused on building the Chinese space industry and leveraging space capabilities (particularly geospatial, communication, and navigation systems) to build a spatial information corridor.128 Third, China is using spacepower as a way to develop prestige and reap soft power gains. The success of the Chinese space program infers significant leadership connotation in the region and is intended to establish Beijing at the forefront of Asia’s technology and economic development. 129 Orbital accomplishments and space technology development is seen as a herald for advancement in agriculture, resource management, communications, and disaster management as well as a symbol of national scientific and economic infrastructures. Therefore, they play a deeply symbolic role in Asia, with significant prestige to be gained by accomplishing space “firsts” within the region. 130 Beijing has made an effort to translate the success of its space program for the purposes of seizing regional leadership, boosting soft power, and incorporating space into BRI. 131 It created the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) in 2008, which consists of China, Iran, Mongolia, Peru, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, and Thailand.132 China has donated ground systems, personnel training, and remote sensing data to member countries.133 Two other major Asian space cooperation organizations exist: the Japanese created and led Asian-Pacific Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) and the Indian created and led Center for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP).134 The purpose of these organizations is to reduce the costs of expensive space programs through resource pooling and increasing diplomatic ties between partner nations. Unfortunately, member nation overlap is mostly limited to smaller countries, and the presence of three competing organizations in the same region, each with similar missions led by separate space powers, may result in factionalism rather than cooperation.135 In addition to strengthening China economically, the export of commercial space services and the use of satellite application technologies may also have far reaching diplomatic benefits. China has served as an eager provider of space services and technologies to international markets, particularly for developing countries.136 Providing low-cost, partially subsidized space services to developing nations is a powerful diplomatic initiative relating to resource extraction and basing rights. 137 China provided Brazil a low-cost alternative to the LANDSAT remote sensing data via a cooperative venture called Chinese-Brazilian Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS). The cost was split 70/30 by China and Brazil.138 China manufactured, launched, and operated communications and imaging satellites for oil rich Venezuela.139 Similarly, China generously subsidized Nigeria’s first communications satellite for $550M as part of the BRI, with Nigerian oil rights serving as collateral.140 Bolivia enjoyed a similar arrangement, as 85% of its first communications satellite was subsidized by loans from China and built by the Great Wall Industry Corporation.141 Likewise, China designed, launched, and heavily subsidized a Pakistani geosynchronous communication satellite under BRI in exchange for Beidou ground stations in Karachi and Lahore. 142 This was followed by the development and launch of a remote sensing satellite in 2018.143 These acts of space diplomacy are consistent with China’s larger foreign policy efforts to open international markets. 144<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>Xi deploys space cooperation to recuperate legitimacy. </h4><p><u>Fabian ’19</u></strong> (Christopher David; B.S. from the US Air Force Academy, M.S. from the University of North Dakota; January 2019; “A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy”; https://commons.und.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3456&context=theses; UND Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects; accessed 9/2/19; TV)</p><p>Fundamentally, <u><strong>cooperation between the U.S. and China</strong> is based on maintaining</u> the status quo of <u>free access to space in accordance with</u> existing international <u>treaties and customary law. The primary laws governing</u> the peaceful use of <u>outer space</u>, for which China and the U.S. are both signatories, <u>include the</u> Outer Space Treaty (<u>OST</u>), <u>Rescue Agreement, Liability Convention, and Registration Convention</u>.107 Article IV of the OST prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit and forbids the placement of any weapons on a celestial body. Although the OST requires the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, it does not prohibit conventional weapons in space or provide a definition for what could be considered a space weapon. The vagueness of the OST, particularly article IV, amounts to a crisis in space law and will be covered at length in later sections.108 Despite the previously mentioned ambiguity, this analysis will assume that <u>cooperation entails both</u> the <u>adherence to <strong>existing legal regimes</strong> and</u> the <u>limitation of the <strong>capability to wage war</strong> in and from</u> the <u>space</u> domain.109 This includes limiting space control and on-orbit force application capabilities. Alternatively, defection between the U.S. and China involves preventing free access to space through the manipulation of international law, the building and maintaining of space control capabilities, or the building and maintaining of on-orbit force application capabilities. These broad definitions are essential for two reasons: first, they acknowledge that the <u>Sino-U.S. space policy</u> game <u>is nested inside a larger game of Sino-U.S. geostrategic relations, given that <mark>space</u></mark> power <u><mark>is a <strong>fundamental element of national power</u></strong></mark>. Second, it accounts for the practical limitations in foundational, codified space law. </p><p><u><mark>China is <strong>highly incentivized</strong> by</u></mark> the prospects of <u><strong>mutual <mark>cooperation</strong> in space</u></mark>. Maintaining free access to space is analogous to free sea lines of communication, which are primarily guaranteed by U.S. military power. 110 This guarantee has allowed China to become the world’s largest importer and exporter, accumulating $4.3T of total trade in 2014 and catalyzing a massive economic resurgence. 111 Similarly, there is evidence that <u>China aims to take advantage of free access to space to continue</u> its <u><strong>national rejuvenation</u></strong> into post-industrial future. In 2013, General Secretary <u><strong><mark>Xi</u></strong></mark> Jinping <u><mark>announced the “<strong>China Dream</strong></mark>” to rejuvenate China <mark>by building <strong>national pride</u></strong></mark>, engineering <u><mark>an economic revolution, and rebuilding China’s military</u></mark>.112 <u><mark>Xi</mark> has <mark>linked</mark> a “<strong><mark>space</mark> dream</strong>” <mark>as a means</mark> of fulfilling the “China Dream”.</u>113 After the launch of the manned Shenzhou-10 mission in 2013 he stated, “<u>The space dream is</u> part of <u>the dream <mark>to <strong>make China stronger</strong>.</mark> With</u> the development of <u>space programs, the Chinese</u> people <u>will take</u> bigger <u>strides to explore further into space</u>,” and went on to compare the Chinese manned space program to the Long March.114 Similarly, Lt. Gen. Zhang Yulin stated, “The earth-moon <u><mark>space will be</mark> strategically <mark>important for the</u></mark> great <u><strong><mark>rejuvenation of the</mark> Chinese <mark>nation</u></strong></mark>.”115 The connection between China’s space program and national rejuvenation touted by CCP leaders is particularly strong in relation to the manned space program, which has ambitious development milestones planned until 2045.1</p><p>Space power and manned space accomplishments serve to benefit China in five ways. First, <u>success in <mark>space </mark>forms a <strong>nationalist narrative </strong>and <mark>creates a</mark> <strong>positive <mark>focal point </strong>for <strong>national pride</strong>, </mark>counter to the negative images o</u>f the <u>Tianamen</u> Square massacre <u>and China’s</u> consistently <u>poor human rights record</u>. 117 <u>Maintaining a</u>n independent and self-reliant <u><mark>space </mark>program <mark>helps</mark> the CCP <strong><mark>craft a narrative</strong> based on </mark>technological development, <mark>social progress, </mark>and sustainable development<mark>. This <strong>lends legitimacy to CCP leadership</u></strong></mark> of China <u><mark>and <strong>stokes nationalism</u></strong></mark>. 118 Additionally, the dissemination and <u>control of <strong>satellite communication</strong> gives the CCP a medium</u> by which <u>to propagate its</u> own political <u>interpretation of world events</u>.119</p><p>Second, <u>the <strong>economic benefit</u></strong> gained <u>from China’s space program is essential to upholding the</u> informal <u><strong>social contract</strong> between the Chinese</u> people <u>and the CCP</u>, one that is <u>based on continued economic growth and</u> an increase in <u>quality of life. China seeks to make</u> its <u>space</u> program<u> a <strong>driver of economic and technological advancement</u></strong> in a variety of ways. Primarily, they believe that <u>spin-off technologies</u> from the space program <u>could have</u> up to <u>a <strong>1:10 cost to benefit ratio</u></strong>.120 This creates a cycle where <u>the</u> Chinese <u>space program generates technology, technology spurs economic development, and economic development supports the space program</u>.121 The export of commercial space services will be a driver of economic development as a producer of both jobs and hard currency. 122 Additionally, <u>the space industry spurs</u> the development of <u>a <strong>high technology industry</strong> by creating a market for high-skill labor</u> and products. 123 <u>The industrial and academic base required for</u> the development of <u>a</u> strong <u>space program is projected to have <strong>multi-order effects</strong> across</u> other <u><strong>key industries</strong> and inspire young Chinese</u> to pursue a career in the sciences.124 Next, <u>the use of <strong>satellite</u></strong> application <u><strong>technologies</strong> is critical to China’s economic development</u>.125 The use of <u>geological, weather, and positional data is essential to developing China’s</u> limited <u>resources and guarding her fragile environment.</u>126 A multitrillion-dollar infrastructure project called the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI) was announced by Xi in 2013. The purpose of this project is to harness latent Chinese industrial capacity to enhance strategic connection between China and the rest of the Eurasian landmass.127 <u>China’s space development has been </u>specifically <u>linked to BRI </u>by the China National Space Administration’s (CNSA) director of international cooperation, Jiang Hui. In a brief to the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), Hui highlighted a long term plan focused on building the Chinese space industry and leveraging space capabilities (particularly geospatial, communication, and navigation systems) to build a spatial information corridor.128</p><p>Third, <u><mark>China is using space</mark>power</u> as a way <u><mark>to develop <strong>prestige</strong> and</mark> reap <strong><mark>soft power</strong></mark> gains. The success of the Chinese space program</u> infers significant leadership connotation in the region and <u>is intended to establish Beijing at the <strong>forefront of Asia’s technology</u></strong> and economic <u><strong>development</u></strong>. 129 Orbital accomplishments and <u><mark>space</mark> technology</u> development <u>is</u> seen as <u>a <strong>herald</strong> for</u> advancement in <u>agriculture, resource management, communications, and disaster management as well as a symbol of national</u> scientific and economic <u><mark>infrastructures</u></mark>. Therefore, <u>they <mark>play a <strong>deeply symbolic role</strong></mark> in Asia, <mark>with <strong>significant prestige</u></strong></mark> to be gained <u>by accomplishing space “firsts” within the region</u>. 130 <u>Beijing</u> has <u>made an effort to translate</u> the success of <u>its space program for the purposes of seizing <strong>regional leadership</strong>, boosting <strong>soft power</strong>, and incorporating space into BRI</u>. 131 <u>It created the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) </u>in 2008, which consists of China, Iran, Mongolia, Peru, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, and Thailand.132 China has donated ground systems, personnel training, and remote sensing data to member countries.133 Two other major Asian space cooperation organizations exist: the Japanese created and led Asian-Pacific Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) and the Indian created and led Center for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP).134 The purpose of these organizations is to reduce the costs of expensive space programs through resource pooling and increasing diplomatic ties between partner nations. Unfortunately, member nation overlap is mostly limited to smaller countries, and the presence of three competing organizations in the same region, each with similar missions led by separate space powers, may result in factionalism rather than cooperation.135</p><p>In addition to strengthening China economically, <u><mark>the export of</u></mark> commercial <u><mark>space services</mark> and</u> the use of <u>satellite</u> application <u>technologies</u> <u>may</u> also <u>have <strong>far reaching diplomatic benefits</strong>. China</u> has <u>served as an eager provider of space services</u> and technologies <u><mark>to <strong>international markets</u></strong></mark>, particularly <u>for developing countries</u>.136 <u>Providing</u> low-cost, <u>partially subsidized space services to developing nations <mark>is a <strong>powerful diplomatic initiative</u></strong></mark> relating to resource extraction and basing rights. 137 China provided Brazil a low-cost alternative to the LANDSAT remote sensing data via a cooperative venture called Chinese-Brazilian Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS). The cost was split 70/30 by China and Brazil.138 China manufactured, launched, and operated communications and imaging satellites for oil rich Venezuela.139 Similarly, China generously subsidized Nigeria’s first communications satellite for $550M as part of the BRI, with Nigerian oil rights serving as collateral.140 Bolivia enjoyed a similar arrangement, as 85% of its first communications satellite was subsidized by loans from China and built by the Great Wall Industry Corporation.141 Likewise, China designed, launched, and heavily subsidized a Pakistani geosynchronous communication satellite under BRI in exchange for Beidou ground stations in Karachi and Lahore. 142 This was followed by the development and launch of a remote sensing satellite in 2018.143 <u>These acts of space diplomacy are consistent with China’s</u> larger <u>foreign policy efforts to open international markets</u><strong>. 144</p></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Harter 2k [Philip J. Harter, A.B., Kenyon College; M.A., J.D., University of Michigan, “ARTICLE: ASSESSING THE ASSESSORS: THE ACTUAL PERFORMANCE OF NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING,” 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 32, 2000, lexis] fulltext: When the Goals are Understood, Reg-Neg is SignificantlyFaster As the Oil Spill example makes clear, the immediate goal of an agency in using reg-neg - or any other process for that matter - may well be something other than publishing a final rule. In those cases, Coglianese's methodology simply measures the wrong thing. Rulemaking is an inherently political activity. n63 It is in rulemaking, commonly known as the "legislative" side of agency action, where the agency has to make the difficult, value-laden choices among competing factions when applying statutes that often do not resolve the major issues in contention or that leave major contentions open for resolution by the agency. n64 Simply counting days between two events disregards all the dynamics of political activity. A strictly numerical methodology ignores the varying complexity of rules: the differing - and sometimes towering and debilitating - controversies over rules; n65 the actual, immediate goal the agency hoped to accomplish, which may differ significantly from what appears on the surface; what those who would be affected by the agency's action thought, and what power they might bring to bear on the agency to influence its actions. To understand a rulemaking, let alone to contrast several, one must [*46] fully appreciate each of these elements. To conduct an accurate empirical study of rulemaking, scholars must therefore understand what the process sought to achieve and its internal dynamics. Only then can one determine whether the process fits the need. Thus, if a study that counts days is to be meaningful in measuring whether an agency fulfilled its objective, it is essential to understand just what that objective is. Coglianese failed to do so. In his study, the ending dates of two of the rules do not accurately reflect either what the EPA was trying to accomplish or the history of the rule. As a result, his findings are significantly misleading. The first of the two rules is the "Equipment Leaks" rule. Chemical plants, like household sinks, can develop leaks. This is particularly problematic if the compounds in the systems are toxic or cause other adverse environmental problems. The EPA empaneled a negotiated rulemaking committee to address this problem of "fugitive emissions," or leaks of toxic chemicals, from chemical plants. The Notice of Intent to form the committee was issued on April 25, 1989. n66 The committee crafted a highly innovative rule. n67 For its own internal reasons, however, the EPA decided to include the Equipment Leaks rule as part of its broader rule covering Hazardous Organic Chemicals (known as the HON). n68 The results of the Equipment Leak negotiated rulemaking were announced in the Federal Register on March 6, 1991, n69 so industry could begin taking actions to comply. While the final rule was not issued for another three years, n70 the delay was not attributable to the Equipment Leaks portion, but rather to the parts of the HON that were not subject to reg-neg. The [*47] experience with the HON demonstrates that reg-neg is the significantly faster process, since the negotiated portion was done and waiting on the shelf while the rest of the rule was developed through traditional means. Because the negotiated rulemaking fulfilled the EPA's original goal by March 6, 1991, that is the date that should have been used to measure speed and efficiency. n71 The second rule that requires more careful examination than Coglianese gave it is the "Clean Fuels" negotiated rulemaking. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 n72 required the EPA to develop new standards for the formulation of gasoline that would substantially reduce smog in the most polluted cities. The new law imposed an impossibly short deadline on the EPA, requiring the agency to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking a scant six months after the statute was enacted. n73 The redesign of gasoline and all the attendant issues are a hugely complex affair with many billions of dollars at stake annually. Enormous dislocations could have resulted if for some reason the new gasoline could not be manufactured in sufficient quantities to meet the deadline for its mandatory use, which was January 1, 1995. n74 Precisely because of the short time available, the complexity of the rule, and the controversy surrounding it, William Rosenberg, EPA Assistant Administrator for Air, decided to use negotiated rulemaking to develop the rules. n75 The Notice of Intent to form a negotiated rulemaking committee was published on February 8, 1991. n76 The Committee reached full consensus on the outline of a proposed rule and formally signed an agreement on August 16, [*48] 1991. n77 A substantive agreement was therefore reached on an enormously complex rule in a mere six months. Some extraordinary things happened on the way to the final version of the rule, however. In particular, in the middle of the 1992 Presidential campaign, President Bush directed the EPA to change the proposal agreed to by the Committee. n78 Not surprisingly, significant controversy ensued, with many of the parties to the original negotiations opposing the unraveling of their work and seeking to re-establish the rule developed through the joint deliberative process. n79 A series of supplemental notices of proposed rulemaking and various workshops followed during which the ultimate requirements emerged. n80 The final rule was published on February 16, 1994. n81 Note that this was less than a year before the rule was to go into effect; after January 1, 1995 all gasoline sold in the affected cities would have to comply with the rule. n82 That was not enough time for the petroleum refiners to redesign their equipment, build or retrofit refineries, and manufacture sufficient quantities of gasoline to satisfy the demand. Instead, as the Federal Register notice indicated, the refiners and all other interested parties had been made fully aware of the rule's requirements through the workshops. n83 This activity culminated in the early summer of 1993, thereby giving ample notice of the requirements so that those affected could comply. The rule itself was important at this stage only for enforcement purposes. Thus, the EPA fulfilled its immediate goal of developing the standards for the reformulation of gasoline by the summer of 1993. The appropriate end date for the Clean Fuels negotiated rulemaking is therefore July 1, 1993, the date this took place. The dates Coglianese used for the Drinking Water Information Collection reg-neg similarly fail to take account of the complexities of the rule and hence misstate the dynamics of the negotiations. n84 For these purposes, however, the dates Coglianese used will be kept. Based on an analysis of what actually [*49] happened, Coglianese's findings should be modified as reflected in Table 1. Properly understood, therefore, the average length of the EPA's negotiated rulemakings - the time it took the EPA to fulfill its goal - was 751 days, or thirty-two percent faster than traditional rulemaking. n85 This knocks nearly a full year off the average time it takes the EPA to develop a rule by the traditional method. It must also be noted that these are highly complex and controversial rules and that one of them survived Presidential intervention. Thus, the dynamics surrounding these rules are by no means "average." This means that reg-neg's actual performance is much better than Coglianese's data suggest. Interestingly and consistent with the above, the average time for all of the EPA's reg-negs when viewed in context is virtually identical to that of the sample drawn by Kerwin and Furlong, n86 - differing by less than a month. Furthermore, if all of the reg-negs that were conducted by all the agencies that were included in Coglianese's table n87 were analyzed along the lines discussed here, n88 the average time for all negotiated rulemakings drops to less than 685 days. n89<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>3 – Counting days till implementation for delay doesn’t reconcile with reality.</h4><p><strong>Harter 2k</strong> [Philip J. Harter, A.B., Kenyon College; M.A., J.D., University of Michigan, “ARTICLE: ASSESSING THE ASSESSORS: THE ACTUAL PERFORMANCE OF NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING,” 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 32, 2000, lexis]</p><p>When the Goals are Understood, Reg-Neg is SignificantlyFaster</p><p>As the Oil Spill example makes clear, <u>the immediate goal of an agency in using reg-neg - or any other process for that matter - may well be something other than publishing a final rule</u>. In those cases, <u>Coglianese's methodology simply measures the wrong thing</u>. <u><strong><mark>Rulemaking is</mark> an <mark>inherently political</mark> activity</u></strong>. n63 <u>It is in rulemaking, commonly known as the "legislative</u>" <u>side of agency action, where the agency has to make the difficult, value-laden choices</u> among competing factions <u>when applying statutes</u> that often do not resolve the major issues in contention or that leave major contentions open for resolution by the agency. n64 <u><strong><mark>Simply counting days</u></strong></mark> between two events <u><strong><mark>disregards all the dynamics of political activity</u></strong></mark>. A strictly numerical methodology ignores the varying complexity of rules: the differing - and sometimes towering and debilitating - controversies over rules; n65 the actual, immediate goal the agency hoped to accomplish, which may differ significantly from what appears on the surface; what those who would be affected by the agency's action thought, and what power they might bring to bear on the agency to influence its actions. To understand a rulemaking, let alone to contrast several, one must [*46] fully appreciate each of these elements. To conduct an accurate empirical study of rulemaking, scholars must therefore understand what the process sought to achieve and its internal dynamics. Only then can one determine whether the process fits the need. Thus, <u>if a study that counts days is to be meaningful in measuring whether an agency fulfilled its objective, it is essential to understand just what that objective</u> is. Coglianese failed to do so. In his study, <u>the <mark>ending dates</mark> of two of the rules <mark>do not</mark> accurately <mark>reflect</mark> either <mark>what</mark> the <mark>EPA was trying to accomplish</mark> or the history of the rule. As a result, his findings are significantly misleading</u>. The first of the two rules is the "Equipment Leaks" rule. Chemical plants, like household sinks, can develop leaks. This is particularly problematic if the compounds in the systems are toxic or cause other adverse environmental problems. The EPA empaneled a negotiated rulemaking committee to address this problem of "fugitive emissions," or leaks of toxic chemicals, from chemical plants. The Notice of Intent to form the committee was issued on April 25, 1989. n66 The committee crafted a highly innovative rule. n67 For its own internal reasons, however, the EPA decided to include the Equipment Leaks rule as part of its broader rule covering Hazardous Organic Chemicals (known as the HON). n68 The results of the Equipment Leak negotiated rulemaking were announced in the Federal Register on March 6, 1991, n69 so industry could begin taking actions to comply. While the final rule was not issued for another three years, n70 the delay was not attributable to the Equipment Leaks portion, but rather to the parts of the HON that were not subject to reg-neg. The [*47] experience with the HON demonstrates that reg-neg is the significantly faster process, since the negotiated portion was done and waiting on the shelf while the rest of the rule was developed through traditional means. Because the negotiated rulemaking fulfilled the EPA's original goal by March 6, 1991, that is the date that should have been used to measure speed and efficiency. n71 The second rule that requires more careful examination than Coglianese gave it is the "Clean Fuels" negotiated rulemaking. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 n72 required the EPA to develop new standards for the formulation of gasoline that would substantially reduce smog in the most polluted cities. The new law imposed an impossibly short deadline on the EPA, requiring the agency to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking a scant six months after the statute was enacted. n73 The redesign of gasoline and all the attendant issues are a hugely complex affair with many billions of dollars at stake annually. Enormous dislocations could have resulted if for some reason the new gasoline could not be manufactured in sufficient quantities to meet the deadline for its mandatory use, which was January 1, 1995. n74 Precisely because of the short time available, the complexity of the rule, and the controversy surrounding it, William Rosenberg, EPA Assistant Administrator for Air, decided to use negotiated rulemaking to develop the rules. n75 The Notice of Intent to form a negotiated rulemaking committee was published on February 8, 1991. n76 The Committee reached full consensus on the outline of a proposed rule and formally signed an agreement on August 16, [*48] 1991. n77 A substantive agreement was therefore reached on an enormously complex rule in a mere six months. Some extraordinary things happened on the way to the final version of the rule, however. In particular, in the middle of the 1992 Presidential campaign, President Bush directed the EPA to change the proposal agreed to by the Committee. n78 Not surprisingly, significant controversy ensued, with many of the parties to the original negotiations opposing the unraveling of their work and seeking to re-establish the rule developed through the joint deliberative process. n79 A series of supplemental notices of proposed rulemaking and various workshops followed during which the ultimate requirements emerged. n80 The final rule was published on February 16, 1994. n81 Note that this was less than a year before the rule was to go into effect; after January 1, 1995 all gasoline sold in the affected cities would have to comply with the rule. n82 That was not enough time for the petroleum refiners to redesign their equipment, build or retrofit refineries, and manufacture sufficient quantities of gasoline to satisfy the demand. Instead, as the Federal Register notice indicated, the refiners and all other interested parties had been made fully aware of the rule's requirements through the workshops. n83 This activity culminated in the early summer of 1993, thereby giving ample notice of the requirements so that those affected could comply. The rule itself was important at this stage only for enforcement purposes. Thus, the EPA fulfilled its immediate goal of developing the standards for the reformulation of gasoline by the summer of 1993. The appropriate end date for the Clean Fuels negotiated rulemaking is therefore July 1, 1993, the date this took place. The dates Coglianese used for the Drinking Water Information Collection reg-neg similarly fail to take account of the complexities of the rule and hence misstate the dynamics of the negotiations. n84 For these purposes, however, the dates Coglianese used will be kept. Based on an analysis of what actually [*49] happened, Coglianese's findings should be modified as reflected in Table 1. Properly understood, therefore, the average length of the EPA's negotiated rulemakings - the time it took the EPA to fulfill its goal - was 751 days, or thirty-two percent faster than traditional rulemaking. n85 This knocks nearly a full year off the average time it takes the EPA to develop a rule by the traditional method. It must also be noted that these are highly complex and controversial rules and that one of them survived Presidential intervention. Thus, the dynamics surrounding these rules are by no means "average." This means that reg-neg's actual performance is much better than Coglianese's data suggest. <u>Interestingly and consistent with the above, the <mark>average time for all of the EPA's reg-negs</mark> when viewed in context is <mark>virtually identical</mark> to that of the sample drawn by</u> Kerwin and Furlong, n86 - <u>differing by less than a month</u>. Furthermore<u>, if all of the reg-negs that were conducted by all the agencies that were included in Coglianese's table</u> <u>n87 were analyzed along the lines discussed here</u>, n88 <u>the average time for all negotiated rulemakings drops to less than 685 days</u>. n89 </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Edward B. Foley 20, directs the Election Law program at the Ohio State University’s Moritz College of Law, where he also holds the Ebersold Chair in constitutional law., 4-7-2020, "Opinion," POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/04/07/danger-moving-vote-by-mail-168602 fulltext: But while absentee ballots can help keep people safe and expand voting access, they come with a drawback: a greater chance of litigation. Simply put, there are more things that can go wrong with vote-by-mail compared with in-precinct voting. And history shows that a major fight over an election’s outcome is more likely to come in the form of challenges to absentee ballots. This doesn’t mean states shouldn’t make the shift to vote-by-mail. But in addition to hiring and training enough staff to be able to handle new procedures and ordering enough supplies and equipment, states — and Congress — must prepare for the increased risk of disputes over the results of the November election. What can go so wrong with absentee voting? When you go to a neighborhood polling place, you meet face-to-face with a poll worker who signs you in and then lets you cast a ballot that immediately joins the pool of ballots to be counted after the polls close. True, there might be a problem when you interact with the poll worker: For example, a question about your signature compared with the one in the poll book. But those problems usually can be sorted out as part of the face-to-face interaction. Once you’ve satisfied the poll worker that you are qualified to vote and you get an ordinary ballot to cast, you no longer can become unqualified or your ballot left uncounted. By contrast, voting by mail requires additional steps, all of which are susceptible to problems that do not exist when voting in person. First, the voter needs to get the absentee ballot in time to send it back by the required deadline. Administrative delay at the local election office, or a postal problem, can cause the voter not to receive the ballot with enough time for its return. This has turned out to be a serious problem in Wisconsin’s current primary, prompting litigation in federal court. The same could easily happen in November. What’s more, although some states deem an absentee ballot eligible if it is postmarked by Election Day, other states require the absentee ballot to arrive at the local election office by then. In the latter states, there is a real risk that a voter who mails an absentee ballot will have it disqualified if it arrives too late. In 2018, more than a quarter — 27 percent — of absentee ballots that were rejected across the country were disqualified for this reason; in Florida, the rate was even higher, at least one-third. Even if an absentee ballot arrives on time, it can be rejected for a variety of other reasons. Every absentee ballot must be submitted inside a special envelope, and on that envelope, the voter must provide essential information: name, address, signature and often additional identification (like a driver’s license number). Absentee ballots are routinely invalidated because of innocent clerical errors voters make in filling out the envelopes. Sometimes the voter doesn’t even do anything wrong, but an employee in the local election office innocently misreads what the voter has written. In 2018, nationwide 91.8 percent of all absentee ballots sent in by voters to local election offices were counted, leaving 8.2 percent not counted — a significant disqualification rate. For the last presidential election, in 2016, states reported their numbers somewhat differently, but still the rates of disqualification are alarming. For example, Georgia reported counting 93.6 percent of absentee ballots returned, meaning that 6.4 percent were not counted. New York reported counting 90.7 percent of returned absentee ballots, with 9.3 percent uncounted. These ballots largely are rejected not because the voter is unqualified, but because of errors in the process of the voter’s submission. Especially when it is possible to argue that the process defect was not the voter’s fault, there can be a sympathetic argument for counting the valid voter’s ballot despite the process problem. In fact, that sympathetic argument can be dressed up with constitutional principles and judicial precedents. And in a situation where the voter did not want to vote absentee in the first place, but did so solely because of health reasons caused by Covid-19, the argument for counting a valid voter’s absentee ballot despite an innocent process defect might seem even more compelling — or, at the very least, worth pursuing in court if it might make the difference between winning and losing the election. The result: lawsuits. This heightened risk of litigation over absentee ballots is not just theoretical. Most of the most significant vote-counting disputes in recent decades involved fights over absentee votes. Consider just a few of many examples. The 1984 election for Indiana’s 8th Congressional District saw an ugly fight in court, and in Congress itself, over absentee ballots that arguably deserved to be counted even though they had not been properly “witnessed” as required by state law. In the 2008 U.S. Senate race in Minnesota, between incumbent Norm Coleman and challenger Al Franken, absentee ballots were disqualified for various procedural reasons — some improperly so, others in accordance with state law. Still others were counted even though they were comparable to ballots that had been rejected, thereby generating an equal protection issue that took courts eight months to resolve (while keeping the crucial seat vacant in the middle of the financial crisis). Finally, absentee ballots were the focus of disputes in the 2018 midterms, both in Florida, where they came close to putting another U.S. Senate seat in doubt, and in North Carolina, where a House seat was left vacant for nine months because of an improper “ballot harvesting” operation. Maybe you’re thinking: So what if we have a fight over counting absentee ballots in a few places this fall? We survived Bush v. Gore, after all. But a vote-counting dispute today could actually be much worse than that searing fight 20 years ago. For one thing, not only is the body politic far more polarized; the Supreme Court has become engulfed in this hyperpolarization. Since Bush v. Gore, the court has repeatedly divided 5-4 in election cases: Citizens United (campaign finance), Shelby County (the Voting Rights Act) and Rucho (gerrymanders). Rightly or wrongly, Democrats view these 5-4 rulings, with Republican appointees in the majority, as having tilted the electoral playing field in favor of Republican candidates. Again, in the pending Wisconsin election, the court split 5-4 along partisan lines over the rules for counting absentee ballots—an ominous sign for what might occur this fall. Moreover, since Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell kept a Supreme Court seat vacant after Justice Antonin Scalia’s death, depriving President Barack Obama of the opportunity to appoint a replacement, progressives have viewed the current 5-4 balance of power on the court as itself illegitimately stolen. If the current Supreme Court were to divide 5-4 in awarding the election to President Donald Trump, Democrats would see the presidency as well as the court as illegitimately stolen from them. Democrats reluctantly accepted Bush v. Gore as the product of a system that gave the court the power to do what it did. But if a “stolen” court were to steal the presidency, that combination could be too much to bear — a large proportion of the electorate might not see two of the three branches of government as legitimate. It is also possible that a vote-counting dispute would not stop at the Supreme Court, but would go all the way to Congress. Without going into the details of why the legislative branch is so unprepared for this situation, a topic I’ve delved into previously, suffice it to say that the country could face a full-blown constitutional crisis if a voting dispute held up the results of the presidential election and Congress were unable to settle it before the winner is supposed to be inaugurated for the new term, beginning at noon on January 20, 2021.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>That coupled with vote by mail causes a massive constitutional crisis. </h4><p>Edward B. <strong>Foley 20</strong>, directs the Election Law program at the Ohio State University’s Moritz College of Law, where he also holds the Ebersold<u> Chair in constitutional law., 4-7-2020, "Opinion," POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/04/07/danger-moving-vote-by-mail-168602</p><p>But while absentee ballots can help keep people safe and expand voting access, they come with a drawback: a greater chance of litigation</u>. <u>Simply put, there are more things that can go wrong with vote-by-mail compared with in-precinct votin</u>g. <u><strong>And history shows that a major fight over an election’s outcome is more likely to come in the form of challenges to absentee ballots</u></strong>. This doesn’t mean states shouldn’t make the shift to vote-by-mail. But in addition to hiring and training enough staff to be able to handle new procedures and ordering enough supplies and equipment, states — and Congress — must prepare for the increased risk of disputes over the results of the November election. What can go so wrong with absentee voting? When you go to a neighborhood polling place, you meet face-to-face with a poll worker who signs you in and then lets you cast a ballot that immediately joins the pool of ballots to be counted after the polls close. True, there might be a problem when you interact with the poll worker: For example, a question about your signature compared with the one in the poll book. But those problems usually can be sorted out as part of the face-to-face interaction. Once you’ve satisfied the poll worker that you are qualified to vote and you get an ordinary ballot to cast, you no longer can become unqualified or your ballot left uncounted. <u>By contrast, voting by mail requires additional steps, all of which are susceptible to problems that do not exist when voting in person. First, the voter needs to get the absentee ballot in time to send it back by the required deadline. Administrative delay at the local election office, or a postal problem, can cause the voter not to receive the ballot with enough time for its return. This has turned out to be a serious problem in Wisconsin’s current primary, prompting litigation in federal court. The same could easily happen in November. </u>What’s more, although some states deem an absentee ballot eligible if it is postmarked by Election Day, other states require the absentee ballot to arrive at the local election office by then. In the latter states, there is a real risk that a voter who mails an absentee ballot will have it disqualified if it arrives too late. In 2018, more than a quarter — 27 percent — of absentee ballots that were rejected across the country were disqualified for this reason; in Florida, the rate was even higher, at least one-third. <u>Even if an absentee ballot arrives on time, it can be rejected for a variety of other reasons</u>. Every absentee ballot must be submitted inside a special envelope, and on that envelope, the voter must provide essential information: name, address, signature and often additional identification (like a driver’s license number). Absentee ballots are routinely invalidated because of innocent clerical errors voters make in filling out the envelopes. Sometimes the voter doesn’t even do anything wrong, but an employee in the local election office innocently misreads what the voter has written. <u><mark>In 2018</mark>, nationwide <mark>91</mark>.8 percent <mark>of</mark> all <mark>absentee</mark> <mark>ballots</mark> sent in by voters to local election offices <mark>were counted</mark>, leaving 8.2 percent not counted <strong>— a <mark>significant disqualification</mark> <mark>rate</u></strong></mark>. For the last presidential election, in 2016, states reported their numbers somewhat differently, but still the rates of disqualification are alarming. For example, Georgia reported counting 93.6 percent of absentee ballots returned, meaning that 6.4 percent were not counted. New York reported counting 90.7 percent of returned absentee ballots, with 9.3 percent uncounted. <u>These ballots largely are rejected not because the voter is unqualified, but because of errors in the process of the voter’s submission</u>. Especially when it is possible to argue that the process defect was not the voter’s fault, there can be a sympathetic argument for counting the valid voter’s ballot despite the process problem. In fact, that sympathetic argument can be dressed up with constitutional principles and judicial precedents.<u> And in a situation where the voter did not want to vote absentee in the first place, but did so solely because of health reasons caused by Covid-19, the argument for counting a valid voter’s absentee ballot despite an innocent process defect might seem even more compelling — or, at the very least, worth pursuing in court if it might make the difference between winning and losing the election. <strong><mark>The result: lawsuits</mark>. This heightened risk of litigation over absentee ballots is not just theoretical. Most of the most significant vote-counting disputes in recent decades involved fights over absentee votes</u></strong>. Consider just a few of many examples. The 1984 election for Indiana’s 8th Congressional District saw an ugly fight in court, and in Congress itself, over absentee ballots that arguably deserved to be counted even though they had not been properly “witnessed” as required by state law. In the 2008 U.S. Senate race in Minnesota, between incumbent Norm Coleman and challenger Al Franken, absentee ballots were disqualified for various procedural reasons — some improperly so, others in accordance with state law. Still others were counted even though they were comparable to ballots that had been rejected, thereby generating an equal protection issue that took courts eight months to resolve (while keeping the crucial seat vacant in the middle of the financial crisis). Finally, absentee ballots were the focus of disputes in the 2018 midterms, both in Florida, where they came close to putting another U.S. Senate seat in doubt, and in North Carolina, where a House seat was left vacant for nine months because of an improper “ballot harvesting” operation. <u>Maybe you’re thinking: So what if we have a fight over counting absentee ballots in a few places this fall? We survived Bush v. Gore, after all. <strong>But <mark>a vote-counting</mark> <mark>dispute</mark> today <mark>could</mark> actually <mark>be much worse</mark> <mark>than</mark> that searing fight <mark>20 years ago.</mark> </strong>For one thing, not only is the body politic <mark>far more polarized</mark>; the Supreme Court has become engulfed in this hyperpolarization</u>. Since Bush v. Gore, the court has repeatedly divided 5-4 in election cases: Citizens United (campaign finance), Shelby County (the Voting Rights Act) and Rucho (gerrymanders). <u>Rightly or wrongly, Democrats view these 5-4 rulings, with Republican appointees in the majority, as having tilted the electoral playing field in favor of Republican candidates</u>. Again, in the pending Wisconsin election, the court split 5-4 along partisan lines over the rules for counting absentee ballots—an ominous sign for what might occur this fall. <u>Moreover, since Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell kept a Supreme Court seat vacant after Justice Antonin Scalia’s death, depriving President Barack Obama of the opportunity to appoint a replacement, progressives have viewed the current 5-4 balance of power on the court as itself illegitimately stolen</u>. If the current Supreme Court were to divide 5-4 in awarding the election to President Donald Trump, Democrats would see the presidency as well as the court as illegitimately stolen from them. Democrats reluctantly accepted Bush v. Gore as the product of a system that gave the court the power to do what it did. <u><strong>But <mark>if a “stolen” court</mark> <mark>were to steal the presidency</mark>, that combination could be too much to bear — a large proportion of the <mark>electorate might</mark> <mark>not</mark> <mark>see</mark> <mark>two</mark> of the three <mark>branches</mark> of government <mark>as</mark> <mark>legitimate</mark>. </strong>It is also possible that a vote-counting dispute would not stop at the Supreme Court, but would go all the way to Congress. Without going into the details of why the legislative branch is so unprepared for this situation, a topic I’ve delved into previously, <strong>suffice it to say that the <mark>country could face a full</mark>-blown <mark>constitutional crisis </mark>if a voting dispute held up the results of the presidential election and Congress were unable to settle it before the winner is supposed to be inaugurated for the new term, beginning at noon on January 20, 2021</strong>.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Patzek 8 (Ted, professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering at UC-Berkeley, 2008, “Can the Earth Deliver the Biomass-for-Fuel we Demand,” in Biofuels, Solar, and Wind as Renewable Energy Systems, ed. Pimentel, p. 36-44) fulltext: Physics, chemistry and biology say clearly that there can be no sustained net mass output from any ecosystem for more than a few years. A young forest in a temperate climate grows fast in a clear-cut area, see Fig. 2.16, and transfers nutrients from soil to the young trees. The young trees grow very fast (there is a positive NPP). but the amount of mass accumulated in the forest is small. When a tree burns or dies some or most of its nutrients go back to the soil. When this tree is logged and hauled away, almost no nutrients are returned. After logging young trees a couple of times the forest soil becomes depleted, while the populations of insects and pathogens are well-established, and the forest productivity rapidly declines (Patzek and Pimemel. 2006). When the forest is allowed to grow long enough, its net ecosystem productivity becomes zero on the average.¶ Therefore, in order to export biomass (mostly water, but also carbon, oxygen, hydrogen and a plethora of nutrients) an ecosystem must import equivalent quantities of the chemical elements it lost, or decline irreversibly. Carbon comes from the atmospheric CO2 and water flows in as rain, rivers and irrigation from mined aquifers and lakes. The other nutrients, however, must be rapidly produced from ancient plant matter transformed into methane, coal, petroleum, phosphates.17 etc., as well as from earth minerals (muriate of potash, dolomites, etc.), - all irreversibly mined by humans. Therefore, to the extent that humans are no longer integrated with the ecosystems in which they live, they are doomed to extinction by exhausting all planetary stocks of minerals, soil and clean water. The question is not if, but how fast.¶ It seems that with the exponentially accelerating mining of global ecosystems for biomass, the time scale of our extinction is shrinking with each crop harvest. Compare this statement with the feverish proclamations of sustainable biomass and agrofuel production that flood us from the confused media outlets, peer-reviewed journals, and politicians.¶ 2.5.3 Is There any Other Proof of NEP = 0?¶ I just gave you an abstract proof of no trash production in Earth's Kingdom, except for its dirty human slums.¶ Are there any other, more direct proofs, perhaps based on measurements? It turns out that there are two approaches that complement each other and lead to the same conclusions. The first approach is based on a top-down view of the Earth from a satellite and a mapping of the reflected infrared spectra into biomass growth. I will summarize this proof here. The second approach involves a direct counting of all crops, grass, and trees, and translating the weighed or otherwise measured biomass into net primary productivity of ecosystems. Both approaches yield very similar results.¶ 2.5.4 Satellite Sensor-Based Estimates¶ Global ecosystem productivity can be estimated by combining remote sensing with a carbon cycle analysis. The US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Earth Observing System (EOS) currently "produces a regular global estimate of gross primary productivity (GPP) and annual net primary productivity (NPP) of the entire terrestrial earth surface at 1-km spatial resolution, 150 million cells, each having GPP and NPP computed individually" (Running et al.. 2000). The MOD17A2/A3 User's Guide (Heinsch et al.. 2003) provides a description of the Gross and Net Primary Productivity estimation algorithms (MOD17A2/A3) designed for the MODIS1* sensor.¶ The sample calculation results based on the MODI7A2/A3 algorithm are listed in Table 2.2. The NPPs for Asia Pacific. South America, and Europe, relative to North America, are shown in Fig. 2.17. The phenomenal net ecosystem productivity of Asia Pacific is 4.2 larger than that of North America. The South American ecosystems deliver 2.7 times more than their North American counterparts, and Europe just 0.85. It is no surprise then that the World Bank19, as well as agribusiness and logging companies - Archer Daniel Midlands (ADM). Bunge. Cargill. Monsanto. CFBC. Safbois. Sodefor. ITB. Trans-M. and many others - all have moved in force to plunder the most productive tropical regions of the world, see Fig. 2.18.¶ According 10 a MODIS-based calculation (Roberts and Wooster, 2007) of biomass burned in Africa in February and August 2004. prior to the fires shown here, the resulting carbon dioxide emissions were 120 and 160 million tonnes per month, respectively.¶ The final result of this global "end-game" of ecological destruction will be an unmitigated and lightning-fast collapse of ecosystems protecting a large portion of humanity.20¶ 2.5.5 NPP in the US¶ The overall median values of net primary productivity may be converted to the higher heating value (HHV) of NPP in the US. see Fig. 2.19. In 2003. thus estimated net annual biomass production in the US was 5.3 Gt and its HHV was 90 EJ. One must be careful, however, because the underlying distributions of ecosystem productivity are different for each ecosystem and highly asymmetric. Therefore, lumping them together and using just one median value can lead to a substantial systematic error. For example, the lumped value of US NPP of 90 EJ. underestimates the overall 2003 estimate21 of 0.408 x 7444068 x 106 x 17 x 106 x 2.2 x 10"18 = 113EJ by some 20%.¶ To limit this error, one can perform a more detailed calculation based on the 16 classes of land cover listed in Table 2.2 in (Hum et al.. 2001). The MODIS-derived median NPPs are reported for most of these classes. The calculation inputs are shown in Table 2.3. Since the spatial set of land-cover classes cannot be easily mapped onto the administrative set of USDA classes of cropland, woodland, pastureland/rangeland. and forests. Hunt et al. (2001) provide an approximate linear mapping between these two sets, in the form of a 16x4 matrix of coefficients between 0 and 1.1 have lumped the land-cover classes somewhat differently (to be closer to USDA's classes), and the results are shown in Table 2.4 and Fig. 2.20.¶ The Cropland 4- Mosaic class here comprises die USDA's cropland, woodland, and some of the pasture classes. The Remote Vegetation class comprises some of the USDA's rangeland and pastureland classes. The USDA forest class is somewhat larger than here, as some of the smaller patches of forest, such as parks, etc.. are in the Mosaic class. Thus calculated 2003 US NPP is 118 EJ yr"1, 74 EJ yr"1 of above-ground (AG) plant construction and 44 EJ yr in root construction. In addition 12/74 = 17% of AG vegetation is in remote areas, not counting the remote forested areas. Note that my use of land-cover classes and their typical root-to-shoot ratios yields an overall result (118 EJ yr~') which is very similar to that derived by the Numerical Terradynamic Simulation Group {113 EJ yr-1).¶ Therefore, the DOE/USDA proposal to produce 130 billion gallons of ethanol from 1400 million tonnes of biomass (Perlack et a!., 2005) each year - and year-after-year-, would consume 32% of the remaining above-ground NPP in the US. see Fig. 2.20. if one assumes a 52% energy-efficiency of the conversion.~ At the current 26% overall efficiency of the corn-ethanol cycle (Patzek, 2006a), roughly 64% of all AG NPP in the US would have to be consumed to achieve this goal with zero harvest losses.23 To use more than half of all accessible above-ground plant growth in all forests, rangeland. pastureland and agriculture in the US to produce agrofuels would be a continental-scale ecologic and economic disaster of biblical proportions.24¶ 2.6 Conclusions¶ I have shown that the Earth simply cannot produce the vast quantities of biomass we want to use to prolong our unsustainable lifestyles, while slowly committing suicide as a global human civilization.¶ In passing- I have noted that the "cellulosic biomass" refineries are very inefficient, currently impossible to scale, and incapable of ever catching up with the runaway need to feed one billion gasoline- and diesel-powered cars and trucks.¶ [NPP is net primary productivity – biomass produced by the earth annually]<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Ramp-up collapses ecosystem productivity and causes extinction</h4><p><strong>Patzek 8</strong> (Ted, professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering at UC-Berkeley, 2008, “Can the Earth Deliver the Biomass-for-Fuel we Demand,” in Biofuels, Solar, and Wind as Renewable Energy Systems, ed. Pimentel, p. 36-44)</p><p>Physics, chemistry and biology say clearly that <u><strong><mark>there can be no sustained</mark> net <mark>mass output from any ecosystem </mark>for more than a few years</u></strong>. A young forest in a temperate climate grows fast in a clear-cut area, see Fig. 2.16, and transfers nutrients from soil to the young trees. The young trees grow very fast (there is a positive NPP). but the amount of mass accumulated in the forest is small. When a tree burns or dies some or most of its nutrients go back to the soil. When this tree is logged and hauled away, almost no nutrients are returned. After logging young trees a couple of times the forest soil becomes depleted, while the populations of insects and pathogens are well-established, and the forest productivity rapidly declines (Patzek and Pimemel. 2006). When the forest is allowed to grow long enough, its net ecosystem productivity becomes zero on the average.¶ Therefore, <u><strong>in order <mark>to export biomass</u></strong></mark> (mostly water, but also carbon, oxygen, hydrogen and a plethora of nutrients) <u><strong><mark>an ecosystem must import equivalent quantities</mark> of the chemical elements it lost, <mark>or decline irreversibly</u></strong></mark>. Carbon comes from the atmospheric CO2 and water flows in as rain, rivers and irrigation from mined aquifers and lakes. The other nutrients, however, must be rapidly produced from ancient plant matter transformed into methane, coal, petroleum, phosphates.17 etc., as well as from earth minerals (muriate of potash, dolomites, etc.), - all irreversibly mined by humans. Therefore, <u><strong>to the extent that <mark>humans are</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>no longer integrated with the ecosystems in which they live, they are <mark>doomed to extinction by exhausting</mark> all <mark>planetary stocks of minerals, soil and</mark> clean <mark>water</u></strong></mark>. The question is not if, but how fast.¶ It seems that <u><strong><mark>with the</mark> exponentially <mark>accelerating mining of global ecosystems for biomass</mark>, <mark>the time scale of our extinction is shrinking</mark> with each crop harvest. Compare this statement with the feverish proclamations of sustainable biomass and agrofuel production that flood us from the confused media outlets</u></strong>, peer-reviewed journals, and politicians.¶ 2.5.3 Is There any Other Proof of NEP = 0?¶ I just gave you an abstract proof of no trash production in Earth's Kingdom, except for its dirty human slums.¶ Are there any other, more direct proofs, perhaps based on measurements? It turns out that there are two approaches that complement each other and lead to the same conclusions. The first approach is based on a top-down view of the Earth from a satellite and a mapping of the reflected infrared spectra into biomass growth. I will summarize this proof here. The second approach involves a direct counting of all crops, grass, and trees, and translating the weighed or otherwise measured biomass into net primary productivity of ecosystems. Both approaches yield very similar results.¶ 2.5.4 Satellite Sensor-Based Estimates¶ Global ecosystem productivity can be estimated by combining remote sensing with a carbon cycle analysis. The US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Earth Observing System (EOS) currently "produces a regular global estimate of gross primary productivity (GPP) and annual net primary productivity (NPP) of the entire terrestrial earth surface at 1-km spatial resolution, 150 million cells, each having GPP and NPP computed individually" (Running et al.. 2000). The MOD17A2/A3 User's Guide (Heinsch et al.. 2003) provides a description of the Gross and Net Primary Productivity estimation algorithms (MOD17A2/A3) designed for the MODIS1* sensor.¶ The sample calculation results based on the MODI7A2/A3 algorithm are listed in Table 2.2. The NPPs for Asia Pacific. South America, and Europe, relative to North America, are shown in Fig. 2.17. The phenomenal net ecosystem productivity of Asia Pacific is 4.2 larger than that of North America. The South American ecosystems deliver 2.7 times more than their North American counterparts, and Europe just 0.85. It is no surprise then that the World Bank19, as well as agribusiness and logging companies - Archer Daniel Midlands (ADM). Bunge. Cargill. Monsanto. CFBC. Safbois. Sodefor. ITB. Trans-M. and many others - all have moved in force to plunder the most productive tropical regions of the world, see Fig. 2.18.¶ According 10 a MODIS-based calculation (Roberts and Wooster, 2007) of biomass burned in Africa in February and August 2004. prior to the fires shown here, the resulting carbon dioxide emissions were 120 and 160 million tonnes per month, respectively.¶ <u><strong><mark>The</mark> final <mark>result of this global</mark> "end-game" of <mark>ecological destruction will be</mark> an</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>unmitigated and lightning-fast collapse of ecosystems</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>protecting a large portion of humanity</u></strong>.20¶ 2.5.5 NPP in the US¶ The overall median values of net primary productivity may be converted to the higher heating value (HHV) of NPP in the US. see Fig. 2.19. In 2003. thus estimated net annual biomass production in the US was 5.3 Gt and its HHV was 90 EJ. One must be careful, however, because the underlying distributions of ecosystem productivity are different for each ecosystem and highly asymmetric. Therefore, lumping them together and using just one median value can lead to a substantial systematic error. For example, the lumped value of US NPP of 90 EJ. underestimates the overall 2003 estimate21 of 0.408 x 7444068 x 106 x 17 x 106 x 2.2 x 10"18 = 113EJ by some 20%.¶ To limit this error, one can perform a more detailed calculation based on the 16 classes of land cover listed in Table 2.2 in (Hum et al.. 2001). The MODIS-derived median NPPs are reported for most of these classes. The calculation inputs are shown in Table 2.3. Since the spatial set of land-cover classes cannot be easily mapped onto the administrative set of USDA classes of cropland, woodland, pastureland/rangeland. and forests. Hunt et al. (2001) provide an approximate linear mapping between these two sets, in the form of a 16x4 matrix of coefficients between 0 and 1.1 have lumped the land-cover classes somewhat differently (to be closer to USDA's classes), and the results are shown in Table 2.4 and Fig. 2.20.¶ The Cropland 4- Mosaic class here comprises die USDA's cropland, woodland, and some of the pasture classes. The Remote Vegetation class comprises some of the USDA's rangeland and pastureland classes. The USDA forest class is somewhat larger than here, as some of the smaller patches of forest, such as parks, etc.. are in the Mosaic class. Thus calculated 2003 US NPP is 118 EJ yr"1, 74 EJ yr"1 of above-ground (AG) plant construction and 44 EJ yr in root construction. In addition 12/74 = 17% of AG vegetation is in remote areas, not counting the remote forested areas. Note that my use of land-cover classes and their typical root-to-shoot ratios yields an overall result (118 EJ yr~') which is very similar to that derived by the Numerical Terradynamic Simulation Group {113 EJ yr-1).¶ Therefore, the DOE/USDA proposal to produce 130 billion gallons of ethanol from 1400 million tonnes of biomass (Perlack et a!., 2005) each year - and year-after-year-, would consume 32% of the remaining above-ground NPP in the US. see Fig. 2.20. if one assumes a 52% energy-efficiency of the conversion.~ At the current 26% overall efficiency of the corn-ethanol cycle (Patzek, 2006a), roughly 64% of all AG NPP in the US would have to be consumed to achieve this goal with zero harvest losses.23 <u><strong><mark>To use more than half of</mark> all <mark>accessible</mark> above-ground <mark>plant growth</mark> in all forests, rangeland. pastureland and agriculture in the US <mark>to produce agrofuels would be a continental-scale ecologic and economic disaster</mark> of biblical proportions</u></strong>.24<u><strong>¶ </u></strong>2.6 Conclusions¶ I have shown that <u><strong><mark>the Earth</mark> simply <mark>cannot produce the</mark> vast <mark>quantities of biomass we want to use to prolong our</mark> unsustainable <mark>lifestyles, while</mark> slowly <mark>committing suicide as a global human civilization</mark>.</u></strong>¶ In passing- I have noted that the "<u><strong><mark>cellulosic biomass" refineries are very inefficient</mark>, currently impossible to scale, and incapable of ever catching up with the runaway need to feed one billion</u></strong> gasoline- and diesel-powered <u><strong>cars</u></strong> and trucks.¶ [NPP is net primary productivity – biomass produced by the earth annually]</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Ghilonn ’22 (John Ghilonn; independent researcher and essayist published in Newsweek, New York Post, Yahoo Finance, and Sydney Morning Herald. “Are we witnessing the death of American soft power?” https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/are-we-witnessing-the-death-of-american-soft-power-54048 25 January 2022) // ELog fulltext: Unlike hard power, which involves coercion and even brute force, soft power involves persuasion, attraction and emulation. The term was coined by Joseph S. Nye, one of the most respected names in the field of international relations. According to Dr. Nye, soft power is “associated with intangible power resources” such as ideology and institutions. In an essay, aptly titled “Squandering the U.S. Soft Power Edge,” Nye said it is “the ability to affect others to get the outcomes you want. Nations need power because without it they have a difficult time advancing their goals.” Forget intimidation and threats; instead, he advised focusing on attracting followers through strong "values and culture." Historically, he noted: “The United States has been good at wielding soft power, which is based on culture, political ideals, and policies. Think of young people behind the Iron Curtain listening to American music.” But those heady days, when the US wielded soft power with considerable ease, appear to be gone. On the latest Global Soft Power Index, the US finds itself in the sixth position. Germany now occupies the top position. Is the American Dream, closely tied to the idea of soft power, withering away? Nathan Schneider, an author and academic who covers social movements in the United States, told TRT World: “[The] country has always had an ambivalent culture, with equal helpings of liberating vibrancy, suppression of minorities, and devastating colonialism." According to Jeffrey Tucker, a leading social commentator and the founder of the Brownstone Institute, for a century or more, the US "has been the owner of the most important cultural/political idea in the world: freedom. That idea reshaped the world.” "That idea is no longer ascendant in US culture," he said. "Over the last couple of decades, that idea has receded in importance while nostrums for the left and right have taken it over. Every sector you examine – academia, media, politics, and large businesses – you discover an extreme deprecation of the idea of freedom. It is being replaced by a culture of hectoring, compliance, ideological fanaticism, and nihilism.” Tucker said the Covid-19 lockdowns "cemented this trend, proving it to be a hard reality that freedom in the US is no longer the theme." "Many countries in the world followed the US in its lockdown policies and that decision proved disastrous. That has been devastating for the US reputation all over the world. It has also shattered the idealism of a whole generation,” he added. Now, of course, some readers will disagree with Tucker. That is to be expected. Lockdowns were, and still are, a contentious issue. Although plenty of professionals have argued that the lockdowns were worth it, others, like Tucker, have argued, and continue to argue, that lockdowns were an incredibly expensive mistake, both financially and psychologically. The truth, according to some academics, is simple but far from satisfying: we’ll never know whether or not they were worth it. But for those who think they weren’t worth it, and that the lockdowns (i.e “the cure”) were worse than the actual disease, their rage is palpable. In the US, these people, millions and millions of them, have lost faith in government institutions. In many ways, they have lost faith in the US. If everyday Americans are losing faith in the American system, then it’s little surprise that the world views the US as a shadow of its previous self. Losing some of its swag Jeremi Suri, an American historian, and the Mack Brown Distinguished Chair for Leadership in Global Affairs, at the University of Texas at Austin, told TRT World that the reasons for the country’s demise can be traced back to “the end of the Cold War,” when the United States began under-investing “in the State Department, aid agencies, and education about international affairs in general." Suri said that many Americans came to believe that diplomacy mattered less because the US had “won” the Cold War and had the strongest military in the world. In other words, the US became complacent. It became fixated on what it had already achieved, and less concerned with the dynamics of an ever-changing world. For Suri, the US retained its soft power dominance in the past decades because of its wealth and robust democracy. But in the past couple of decades, with growing income inequality, the country has become less attractive. The downfall was exacerbated by issues like gun violence, social divisions and poor governance. “We won the Cold War because we looked better, as a society, than our adversaries. Many doubt that today,” Dr. Suri said. Dr. Suri mentioned the word attraction. Although domestic politics and international diplomacy play a role in a country’s attractiveness, so too does the notion of “coolness.” The US, once synonymous with the word “cool,” appears to have lost some of its swag, to use a term favoured by the cool kids. This brings us on to the country's music scene. The US was once synonymous with music that excited the masses; it produced artists that inspired generations around the world. Again, those days appear to be gone. In a recent piece for The Atlantic, Ted Gioia, a music historian of considerable repute, discussed the decline of the country’s music scene. “Consider the recent reaction when the Grammy Awards were postponed,” he wrote. “Perhaps I should say the lack of reaction because the cultural response was little more than a yawn. I follow thousands of music professionals on social media, and I didn’t encounter a single expression of annoyance or regret that the biggest annual event in new music had been put on hold. That’s ominous.” It has been ominous for quite some. Less than a decade ago, 40 million people tuned in to watch the Grammy Awards. Last year, that number was 8.8 million. A decade from now, will anyone even watch the Grammys? More importantly, if the awards were to disappear, would anyone really care? Besides music, education also plays a role in a country’s attractiveness. American education, once viewed in a thoroughly positive light, has come in for some rather harsh criticisms of late. Such criticisms appear to have had quite an effect. To be specific, a highly negative one. And a global one at that. In 2020, as the authors Karin Fischer and Sasha Aslanian noted: “The US government reported an 18 percent drop in overall student-visa holders and a 72 percent decrease in new enrollments in 2020 — is without precedent.” Although Covid restrictions played a role, the authors stress that “America’s light was already flickering” long before the pandemic brought the world to a screeching halt. The authors argue, rather accurately, that today’s students "have more options than ever before, around the world and at home. Like their US classmates, they question the cost of college and the return on an American degree. They worry about whether they’d be safe in this country.” The safety point is an interesting one, not to mention a highly relevant one. In cities like Los Angeles and New York, the cultural capitals of the US, crime now reigns supreme. In LA, looting has become a recreational activity for hundreds, if not thousands, of citizens; in New York, meanwhile, violent crimes are on the rise. Can the US get its “mojo” back? Can it regain some respectability on the global stage? According to the aforementioned Tucker, yes, “but it won't be easy." Why? Because doing so "means an enormous confrontation with the media, academia, and big business. Regaining what we used to call liberalism will require herculean efforts to rebuild and restore freedom as the theme.” For the US to get its “mojo” back, the US must do three things, according to Suri: “One. Get our democracy in order — show the world that we can govern effectively and peacefully as a democracy. Two. Address wealth inequalities at home — show the world that we can create a society everyone wants to live in and learn from. Three. Return to our role as an inspiring alliance leader — bring the other democracies together to put pressure (economic and political) on the autocracies (especially Russia and China) to reform.” Nye, the aforementioned father of soft power, told TRT World that if he “had to pick two things” that would help the United States regain some credibility on the global stage, they would be as follows: “One. externally, do more to lead in combatting the pandemic in poor countries and don’t leave it to China’s 'vaccine diplomacy.' Two. Domestically, reduce the rhetoric and reality of extreme political polarisation when possible. (It may not be in an election year). And remember that a good deal of our soft power comes not from the government but from our civil society.”<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>US soft power is declining, but rekindled alliance leadership can solve</h4><p><strong>Ghilonn ’22 </strong>(John Ghilonn; independent researcher and essayist published in Newsweek, New York Post, Yahoo Finance, and Sydney Morning Herald. “Are we witnessing the death of American soft power?” https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/are-we-witnessing-the-death-of-american-soft-power-54048 25 January 2022) // ELog</p><p>Unlike hard power, which involves coercion and even brute force, soft power involves persuasion, attraction and emulation. The term was coined by Joseph S. Nye, one of the most respected names in the field of international relations. According to Dr. Nye, soft power is “associated with intangible power resources” such as ideology and institutions. In an essay, aptly titled “Squandering the U.S. Soft Power Edge,” Nye said it is “the ability to affect others to get the outcomes you want. Nations need power because without it they have a difficult time advancing their goals.” Forget intimidation and threats; instead, he advised focusing on attracting followers through strong "values and culture." Historically, he noted: “The United States has been good at wielding soft power, which is based on culture, political ideals, and policies. Think of young people behind the Iron Curtain listening to American music.” But those heady days, when the US wielded soft power with considerable ease, appear to be gone. <u><mark>On the latest Global Soft Power Index, the US finds itself</mark> in the <mark>sixth</mark> position.</u> Germany now occupies the top position. Is the American Dream, closely tied to the idea of soft power, withering away? Nathan Schneider, an author and academic who covers social movements in the United States, told TRT World: “[The] country has always had an ambivalent culture, with equal helpings of liberating vibrancy, suppression of minorities, and devastating colonialism." According to Jeffrey Tucker, a leading social commentator and the founder of the Brownstone Institute, for a century or more, the US "has been the owner of the most important cultural/political idea in the world: freedom. That idea reshaped the world.” "That idea is no longer ascendant in US culture," he said. "Over the last couple of decades, that idea has receded in importance while nostrums for the left and right have taken it over. Every sector you examine – academia, media, politics, and large businesses – you discover an extreme deprecation of the idea of freedom. It is being replaced by a culture of hectoring, compliance, ideological fanaticism, and nihilism.” Tucker said the Covid-19 lockdowns "cemented this trend, proving it to be a hard reality that freedom in the US is no longer the theme." <u>"Many countries in the world followed the <mark>US</mark> in its <mark>lockdown policies</mark> and that decision proved disastrous. That has been <mark>devastating</mark> for the US <mark>reputation</mark> all over the world.</u> It has also shattered the idealism of a whole generation,” he added. Now, of course, some readers will disagree with Tucker. That is to be expected. Lockdowns were, and still are, a contentious issue. Although plenty of professionals have argued that the lockdowns were worth it, others, like Tucker, have argued, and continue to argue, that lockdowns were an incredibly expensive mistake, both financially and psychologically. The truth, according to some academics, is simple but far from satisfying: we’ll never know whether or not they were worth it. But for those who think they weren’t worth it, and that the lockdowns (i.e “the cure”) were worse than the actual disease, their rage is palpable. <u>In the US, these people, <mark>millions</mark> and millions of them, have <mark>lost faith in government institutions</mark>.</u> In many ways, they have lost faith in the US. If everyday Americans are losing faith in the American system, then it’s little surprise that the world views the US as a shadow of its previous self. Losing some of its swag Jeremi Suri, an American historian, and the Mack Brown Distinguished Chair for Leadership in Global Affairs, at the University of Texas at Austin, told TRT World that the reasons for the country’s demise can be traced back to “the end of the Cold War,” when the United States began under-investing “in the State Department, aid agencies, and education about international affairs in general." Suri said that many Americans came to believe that diplomacy mattered less because the US had “won” the Cold War and had the strongest military in the world. In other words, the US became complacent. It became fixated on what it had already achieved, and less concerned with the dynamics of an ever-changing world. For Suri, the US retained its soft power dominance in the past decades because of its wealth and robust democracy. <u>But in the past couple of decades, with growing <mark>income inequality</mark>, the country has become less attractive. The downfall was exacerbated by issues like <mark>gun violence, social divisions</mark> and poor governance. </u>“We won the Cold War because we looked better, as a society, than our adversaries. Many doubt that today,” Dr. Suri said. Dr. Suri mentioned the word attraction. Although domestic politics and international diplomacy play a role in a country’s attractiveness, so too does the notion of “coolness.” The US, once synonymous with the word “cool,” appears to have lost some of its swag, to use a term favoured by the cool kids. This brings us on to the country's music scene. The US was once synonymous with music that excited the masses; it produced artists that inspired generations around the world. Again, those days appear to be gone. In a recent piece for The Atlantic, Ted Gioia, a music historian of considerable repute, discussed the decline of the country’s music scene. “Consider the recent reaction when the Grammy Awards were postponed,” he wrote. “Perhaps I should say the lack of reaction because the cultural response was little more than a yawn. I follow thousands of music professionals on social media, and I didn’t encounter a single expression of annoyance or regret that the biggest annual event in new music had been put on hold. That’s ominous.” It has been ominous for quite some. Less than a decade ago, 40 million people tuned in to watch the Grammy Awards. Last year, that number was 8.8 million. A decade from now, will anyone even watch the Grammys? More importantly, if the awards were to disappear, would anyone really care? Besides music, education also plays a role in a country’s attractiveness. <u>American <mark>education</mark>, once viewed in a thoroughly positive light, has <mark>come in</mark> for some rather harsh <mark>criticisms</mark> of late. Such <mark>criticisms</mark> appear to <mark>have</mark> had quite <mark>an effect</mark>. To be specific, a highly <mark>negative</mark> one. <mark>And</mark> a <mark>global</mark> one at that. </u>In 2020, as the authors Karin Fischer and Sasha Aslanian noted: “The US government reported an 18 percent drop in overall student-visa holders and a 72 percent decrease in new enrollments in 2020 — is without precedent.” Although Covid restrictions played a role, the authors stress that “America’s light was already flickering” long before the pandemic brought the world to a screeching halt. The authors argue, rather accurately, that today’s students "have more options than ever before, around the world and at home. Like their US classmates, they question the cost of college and the return on an American degree. They worry about whether they’d be safe in this country.” The safety point is an interesting one, not to mention a highly relevant one. In cities like Los Angeles and New York, the cultural capitals of the US, crime now reigns supreme. In LA, looting has become a recreational activity for hundreds, if not thousands, of citizens; in New York, meanwhile, violent crimes are on the rise.<u> <mark>Can the US get its “mojo” back?</u></mark> Can it regain some respectability on the global stage? <u>According to the aforementioned Tucker, <mark>yes</mark>, “but it won't be easy."</u> Why? Because doing so "means an enormous confrontation with the media, academia, and big business. Regaining what we used to call liberalism will require herculean efforts to rebuild and restore freedom as the theme.” <u>For the US <mark>to get its “mojo” back, the US must</mark> do three things, according to Suri: “One. Get our democracy in order — show the world that we can govern effectively and peacefully as a democracy. Two.</u> Address wealth inequalities at home — show the world that we can create a society everyone wants to live in and learn from. Three. <u><mark>Return to our role as an</mark> inspiring <mark>alliance leader</mark> — <mark>bring</mark> the <mark>other democracies together</mark> to put pressure (economic and political) on the autocracies (especially Russia and China) to reform.” </u>Nye, the aforementioned father of soft power, told TRT World that if he “had to pick two things” that would help the United States regain some credibility on the global stage, they would be as follows: “One. externally, do more to lead in combatting the pandemic in poor countries and don’t leave it to China’s 'vaccine diplomacy.' Two. Domestically, reduce the rhetoric and reality of extreme political polarisation when possible. (It may not be in an election year). And remember that a good deal of our soft power comes not from the government but from our civil society.” </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Evidence on diversionary war is mixed at best fulltext: They use hostile rhetoric instead of war to have their cake and eat it too – achieves same benefits without conflict Prefer our study because it’s based on 50,000 US diplomatic events classified by interstate interactions across economic crises Carter 18, Assistant Professor, School of International Relations, University of Southern California. (Erin Baggott, 08/29/18, “Diversionary Cheap Talk: Unemployment and US Foreign Policy Rhetoric, 1945-2010”, www.erinbcarter.org/documents/diversionUS.pdf] There is a large literature on diversionary conflict in international relations, but it focuses on material conflicts like militarized interstate disputes rather than foreign policy rhetoric. It is based in social identity theory, which suggests that leaders can increase ingroup affinity by making intergroup distinctions more salient (Closer, 1950; Simmel, 1955; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). A recent review concludes that though the internal logic of diversionary conflict is “compelling and theoretically well supported,” the empirical evidence is “decidedly mixed” (Baum and Potte r, 2008, 48). Several studies find evidence of diversionary aggression in US foreign policy (Clark, 2003; DeRouen, 2000; DeRouen and Peake, 2002; Fordham, 1998a, 6; Hess and Orphanides, 1995; Howell and Pevehouse, 2005; James and Hristoulas, 1994; James and Oneal, 1991; Levy, 1989«,fc; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; Ostrom and Job, 1986) and elsewhere (Bennett, 2000; Dassel and Reinhardt, 1000; Davies, 2002; Enterline and Gleditsch, 2000; Gelpi, 1997; Heldt, 1999; Lebow, 1981; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Oneal and Tir, 2006; Russett, 1990; Sobek, 2007; Tir, 2010). Yet skeptics have amassed opposing evidence (Chiozza and Gormans, 2003, 2004; Foster and Palmer, 2006; Gowa, 1998; Johnston, 1998; Leeds and Davis, 1997; Lian and Oneal, 1993; Meernik, 2000, 2004; Meeraik and Waterman, 1996; Moore and Lanoue, 2003; Potter, 2007). Some cases are hard to reconcile with the theory: in Britain, there were rallies in the Falklands War and the Gulf War but not in other cases in which rallies would be expected, such as the Korean, Suez, and Kosovo wars (Lai and Reiter, 2005). Some go so far as to call diversionary aggression a “myth” (Meernik and Waterman, 1996). Others have developed scope conditions for diversionary aggression. It is more likely between states with pre-standing rivalries (McLaughlin and Prins, 2004), when leaders are accountable (Carter, 2018; Kisangani and Pickering, 2011), and in mature democracies, consolidating autocracies, and transitional polities (Pickering and Kisangani, 2005). It is less likely when states avoid provoking troubled adversaries (Clark, 2003; Fordham, 2005; Leeds and Davis, 1997; Miller, 1999). Diversion appears more likely to produce a rally when supported by Security Council authorization (Chapman, 2011; Chapman and Reiter, 2004), when the White House draws attention to a dispute (Baker and Oneal, 2001), and in conditions of media attention, popular leadership, divided government, non election years, and first terms (Colaresi, 2007). Most recently, scholars have asked whether diversion occurs outside democracies. They find some autocracies, especially single party regimes, divert as well (Carter, 2018; Pickering and Kisangani, 2011). This study extends the logic of diversionary conflict to foreign policy rhetoric. There is surprisingly little research on rhetoric in international relations. The international relations literature deems talk “cheap” (Fearon, 1995; Kydd, 2005). The audience cost literature considers rhetoric meaningful, but only if it invokes audience costs through explicit, public threats (Fearon, 1994; Schultz, 2001; Smith, 1998; Tomz, 2007). However, if foreign policy rhetoric can activate ingroup identity, then it may be appealing for leaders who wish to improve their ratings without incurring the substantial risks of militarized interstate disputes. While it might be “outlandish” for presidents to engage in the impeachable exercise of diversionary war (Meernik and Waterman, 1996), hostile foreign policy rhetoric is far less outlandish a risk. To develop a theory of diversionary cheap talk, this paper draws upon research in political psychology and political communication. These literatures find persuasive evidence that elite statements influence citizen beliefs (Behr and Iyengar, 19s."); Bennett. Lawrence and Livingston, 2006; Brody, 1991; Cohen, 1995; Jentleson, 1992; Zaller and Chiu, 2000). I draw on social identity theory to argue that diversionary cheap talk highlights intergroup differences between nations and leads citizens to evaluate their leader favorably. When a leader criticizes foreigners, she cues ingroup identity, which increases citizens’ social attachment to the nation and to herself as its leader. This is a “solidarity mechanism,” through which “[c]ollective group goals and common group identity are highlighted, norms of group-based altruism are strengthened, punishment and rejection of defectors are increased, and perceptions of the in-group and out-group are manipulated” (Halevy, Bernstein and Sagiv, 2008, 405). The theory generates observable implications about when leaders use diversionary cheap talk and who they target. I follow the consensus in the diversionary conflict literature in focusing on poor economic conditions as the most important source of public disapproval for leaders. Low approval ratings limit leaders’ ability to advance their domestic agenda. Therefore, when the economy deteriorates, leaders will criticize foreign nations to improve their approval ratings and restore the political capital necessary for them to govern. Second, a key observation from social identity theory is that the depth of intergroup differences is important for group attachment. Therefore, consonant with recent empirical findings in the diversionary conflict literature (McLaughlin and Prins, 2004), I expect diversionary rhetoric to be most effective when it targets threatening outgroups. In the context of foreign policy, these are best represented by historical adversaries. And finally, because diversionary cheap talk shifts the focus of political competition from the partisan to the international level, it has differential partisan effects. Because national identity cues widen the tent of the political ingroup, diversionary cheap talk is most effective at boosting support among the leader’s nonpartisans: liberal citizens for conservative leaders, and conservative citizens for liberal leaders. I test these hypotheses with the American Diplomatic Dataset, an original record of over 50,000 US diplomatic events between 1945 and 2010 drawn from New York Times articles on foreign affairs. I used tools from computational social science to classify bilateral interstate interactions into hundreds of specific types and four aggregate categories: verbal cooperation, verbal conflict, material cooperation, and material conflict. This is by far the most historically extensive event dataset. As such, it allows an exploration of US foreign policy behavior across a variety of administrations and economic crises. I find robust evidence of diversionary cheap talk in US foreign policy. First, I establish that US presidents face incentives to divert verbally rather than materially: while militarized interstate dispute initiation does not affect presidential approval ratings, critical rhetoric about other nations is associated with increased ratings, especially among nonpartisans. Responding to this incentive, presidents between 1945 and 2010 typically diverted in the form of words, not deeds. Simulations indicate that as unemployment varied from its minimum to its maximum observed value, hostile foreign policy rhetoric nearly doubled, depending on the administration. Throughout this study, estimates are conservative: I operationalize conflict as events the United States initiated, although findings are robust to a redefinition of conflict as events the United States participated in. The verbal statements in the dataset are high profile and likely to be noticed by the American public: all appeared in the headlines of the New York Times. This study contributes to existing scholarship in several ways. First, it demonstrates that US foreign policy rhetoric responds significantly to domestic economic conditions. International relations scholars should therefore continue to focus more seriously on the communicative aspects of foreign policy, and in particular its relationship to domestic politics (Johnston, 2001, 2008; Kurizaki, 2007; Ramsay, 2011; Sartori, 2002, 2005; Trager, 2010, 2011, 201(i). The American Diplomacy Dataset will enable researchers to further explore the communicative aspects of foreign policy, and their relationships to material and economic factors, in more detail than existing datasets permit. Second, this study contributes to the diversionary conflict literature by showing that in many cases where diversionary theory predicts conflict initiation, leaders instead choose rhetorical hostility. In this sense, leaders may have their cake and eat it too: They benefit from an ingroup rally without inviting an international crisis. The mixed empirical findings in the diversionary conflict literature may be partly due to the fact that existing scholarship considers only the most serious forms of diversion like militarized interstate disputes. It is possible that a wide range of diversionary behavior takes place at less extreme levels, such as the rhetorical hostility documented in this paper.1 ***BEGIN FOOTNOTE 1*** In the language of the foreign policy substitutability literature (Bennett and Nordstrom, 2000; Clark, Nordstrom and Reed, 2008; Most and Starr, 1984, 1989; Oakes, 2012), rhetorical hostility, like the development of new economic policies, may be seen as a substitute for diversionary conflict. ***END FOOTNOTE 1***<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>No diversionary war---<u>rhetoric</u> solves. </h4><p>Evidence on diversionary war is mixed at best</p><p>They use <u>hostile rhetoric</u> instead of war to have their cake and eat it too – achieves same benefits without conflict</p><p>Prefer our study because it’s based on 50,000 US diplomatic events classified by interstate interactions across economic crises</p><p><u><strong>Carter 18</u></strong>, Assistant Professor, School of International Relations, University of Southern California. (Erin Baggott, 08/29/18, “Diversionary Cheap Talk: Unemployment and US Foreign Policy Rhetoric, 1945-2010”, www.erinbcarter.org/documents/diversionUS.pdf]</p><p>There is a large <u><mark>lit</mark>erature <mark>on diversionary conflict</mark> in international relations</u>, but it <u>focuses on material conflicts like <strong>militarized interstate disputes</u></strong> <u>rather than</u> foreign policy <u><strong>rhetoric</u></strong>. It is based in social identity theory, which suggests that leaders can increase ingroup affinity by making intergroup distinctions more salient (Closer, 1950; Simmel, 1955; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). A recent review concludes that though the internal logic of diversionary conflict is “compelling and theoretically well supported,” the <u><strong>empirical evidence</strong> <mark>is</mark> <strong>“decidedly <mark>mixed”</u></strong></mark> (Baum and Potte r, 2008, 48). <u>Several <strong>studies find evidence</strong> of <strong>diversionary aggression</strong> in US foreign policy</u> (Clark, 2003; DeRouen, 2000; DeRouen and Peake, 2002; Fordham, 1998a, 6; Hess and Orphanides, 1995; Howell and Pevehouse, 2005; James and Hristoulas, 1994; James and Oneal, 1991; Levy, 1989«,fc; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; Ostrom and Job, 1986) and elsewhere (Bennett, 2000; Dassel and Reinhardt, 1000; Davies, 2002; Enterline and Gleditsch, 2000; Gelpi, 1997; Heldt, 1999; Lebow, 1981; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Oneal and Tir, 2006; Russett, 1990; Sobek, 2007; Tir, 2010). Yet <u><strong>skeptics</strong> have <strong>amassed opposing evidence</u></strong> (Chiozza and Gormans, 2003, 2004; Foster and Palmer, 2006; Gowa, 1998; Johnston, 1998; Leeds and Davis, 1997; Lian and Oneal, 1993; Meernik, 2000, 2004; Meeraik and Waterman, 1996; Moore and Lanoue, 2003; Potter, 2007). <u>Some <strong>cases</strong> are <strong>hard to reconcile</strong> with the <strong>theory</u></strong>: in Britain, there were rallies in the Falklands War and the Gulf War but not in other cases in which rallies would be expected, such as the Korean, Suez, and Kosovo wars (Lai and Reiter, 2005). Some go so far as to call diversionary aggression a “myth” (Meernik and Waterman, 1996).</p><p>Others have developed scope conditions for diversionary aggression. It is more likely between states with pre-standing rivalries (McLaughlin and Prins, 2004), when leaders are accountable (Carter, 2018; Kisangani and Pickering, 2011), and in mature democracies, consolidating autocracies, and transitional polities (Pickering and Kisangani, 2005). It is less likely when states avoid provoking troubled adversaries (Clark, 2003; Fordham, 2005; Leeds and Davis, 1997; Miller, 1999). Diversion appears more likely to produce a rally when supported by Security Council authorization (Chapman, 2011; Chapman and Reiter, 2004), when the White House draws attention to a dispute (Baker and Oneal, 2001), and in conditions of media attention, popular leadership, divided government, non election years, and first terms (Colaresi, 2007). Most recently, scholars have asked whether diversion occurs outside democracies. They find some autocracies, especially single party regimes, divert as well (Carter, 2018; Pickering and Kisangani, 2011).</p><p>This study extends the logic of diversionary conflict to foreign policy rhetoric. There is surprisingly little research on rhetoric in international relations. The international relations literature deems talk “cheap” (Fearon, 1995; Kydd, 2005). The audience cost literature considers rhetoric meaningful, but only if it invokes audience costs through explicit, public threats (Fearon, 1994; Schultz, 2001; Smith, 1998; Tomz, 2007). However, <u>if foreign policy <strong>rhetoric</strong> can <strong>activate ingroup identity</strong>, then it may be <strong>appealing</strong> for leaders who wish to <strong>improve</strong> their <strong>ratings without</strong> incurring the <strong>substantial risks</strong> of <strong>militarized</strong> interstate <strong>disputes</u></strong>. <u><mark>While it might be <strong>“outlandish”</strong> for presidents to engage in</mark> the <strong>impeachable exercise</strong> of <strong><mark>diversionary war</u></strong></mark> (Meernik and Waterman, 1996), <u><strong><mark>hostile</strong></mark> foreign policy <strong><mark>rhetoric</strong> is <strong>far less</mark> outlandish</strong> a <mark>risk</u></mark>.</p><p>To develop a theory of diversionary cheap talk, this paper draws upon research in political psychology and political communication. These literatures find persuasive evidence that elite statements influence citizen beliefs (Behr and Iyengar, 19s."); Bennett. Lawrence and Livingston, 2006; Brody, 1991; Cohen, 1995; Jentleson, 1992; Zaller and Chiu, 2000). I draw on social identity theory to argue that diversionary cheap talk highlights intergroup differences between nations and leads citizens to evaluate their leader favorably. When a leader criticizes foreigners, she cues ingroup identity, which increases citizens’ social attachment to the nation and to herself as its leader. This is a “solidarity mechanism,” through which “[c]ollective group goals and common group identity are highlighted, norms of group-based altruism are strengthened, punishment and rejection of defectors are increased, and perceptions of the in-group and out-group are manipulated” (Halevy, Bernstein and Sagiv, 2008, 405).</p><p>The theory generates observable implications about when leaders use diversionary cheap talk and who they target. I follow the consensus in the diversionary conflict literature in focusing on poor economic conditions as the most important source of public disapproval for leaders. Low approval ratings limit leaders’ ability to advance their domestic agenda. Therefore, <u>when the <strong>economy deteriorates</strong>, <strong>leaders</strong> will <strong>criticize foreign nations</strong> to <strong>improve</strong> their <strong>approval ratings</strong> and <strong>restore</strong> the <strong>p</strong>olitical <strong>c</strong>apital necessary for them to govern</u>. Second, a key observation from social identity theory is that the depth of intergroup differences is important for group attachment. Therefore, consonant with recent empirical findings in the diversionary conflict literature (McLaughlin and Prins, 2004), I expect diversionary rhetoric to be most effective when it targets threatening outgroups. In the context of foreign policy, these are best represented by historical adversaries. And finally, because diversionary cheap talk shifts the focus of political competition from the partisan to the international level, it has differential partisan effects. Because national identity cues widen the tent of the political ingroup, diversionary cheap talk is most effective at boosting support among the leader’s nonpartisans: liberal citizens for conservative leaders, and conservative citizens for liberal leaders.</p><p><u><mark>I test</mark> these hypotheses with the <strong>A</strong>merican <strong>D</strong>iplomatic <strong>D</strong>ataset, an original record of over <strong><mark>50,000</mark> US diplomatic <mark>events</u></strong></mark> between 1945 and 2010 drawn from New York Times articles on foreign affairs. <u><mark>I used</mark> tools from <strong><mark>computational social</mark> science</strong> to <strong>classify</strong> bilateral <strong>interstate interactions</strong> into hundreds of specific types and four aggregate categories: <strong>verbal coop</strong>eration, <strong>verbal conflict</strong>, <strong>material coop</strong>eration, and <strong>material conflict</u></strong>. <u><mark>This is</mark> <strong>by far</strong> <mark>the <strong>most</mark> historically <mark>extensive</strong></mark> event <strong><mark>dataset</u></strong></mark>. As such, <u>it allows an exploration of US <strong>foreign policy behavior</strong> <mark>across</mark> a variety of administrations and <strong><mark>econ</mark>omic <mark>crises</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u><mark>I find <strong>robust evidence</strong> of <strong>diversionary cheap talk</strong></mark> in <strong>US foreign policy</u></strong>. First, I establish that <u>US <strong>presidents</strong> face <strong>incentives</strong> to <strong>divert verbally rather than materially</strong>: while militarized interstate dispute initiation does not affect presidential approval ratings, critical rhetoric about other nations is associated with increased ratings</u>, especially among nonpartisans. Responding to this incentive, <u>presidents</u> between 1945 and 2010 <u>typically diverted in the form of <strong>words, not deeds</u></strong>. Simulations indicate that as unemployment varied from its minimum to its maximum observed value, hostile foreign policy rhetoric nearly doubled, depending on the administration. Throughout this study, estimates are conservative: I operationalize conflict as events the United States initiated, although findings are robust to a redefinition of conflict as events the United States participated in. The verbal statements in the dataset are high profile and likely to be noticed by the American public: all appeared in the headlines of the New York Times.</p><p>This study contributes to existing scholarship in several ways. First, it demonstrates that US foreign policy rhetoric responds significantly to domestic economic conditions. International relations scholars should therefore continue to focus more seriously on the communicative aspects of foreign policy, and in particular its relationship to domestic politics (Johnston, 2001, 2008; Kurizaki, 2007; Ramsay, 2011; Sartori, 2002, 2005; Trager, 2010, 2011, 201(i). The American Diplomacy Dataset will enable researchers to further explore the communicative aspects of foreign policy, and their relationships to material and economic factors, in more detail than existing datasets permit.</p><p>Second, <u>this study contributes to the diversionary conflict literature by showing that in many cases where diversionary theory <strong>predicts conflict</strong> initiation, <strong>leaders instead choose</strong> <strong>rhetorical hostility</u></strong>. In this sense, <u><mark>leaders</mark> may <strong>have their cake and eat it too</u></strong>: <u>They <mark>benefit from</mark> an <strong><mark>ingroup rally without</strong> inviting</mark> an <strong>international <mark>crisis</u></strong></mark>. <u>The <strong>mixed empirical findings</strong> in the <strong>diversionary</strong> conflict <strong>literature</strong> may be</u> partly <u><strong>due</strong> to the fact that existing scholarship considers <strong>only</strong> the most <strong>serious</strong> forms of <strong>diversion</strong> like <strong>militarized</strong> interstate <strong>disputes</strong>. It is possible that a <strong>wide range</strong> of <strong>diversionary behavior</strong> takes place at less extreme levels, such as</u> the <u><strong>rhetoric</u>al hostility documented in this paper.1</p><p><u>***BEGIN FOOTNOTE 1***</p><p></u></strong>In the language of the foreign policy substitutability literature (Bennett and Nordstrom, 2000; Clark, Nordstrom and Reed, 2008; Most and Starr, 1984, 1989; Oakes, 2012), <u><strong><mark>rhetorical hostility</strong></mark>, like the development of new economic policies, <mark>may</mark> be seen as a <strong><mark>substitute</strong> for <strong></mark>diversionary <mark>conflict</u></mark>.</p><p>***END FOOTNOTE 1***</p></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Jobst Landgrebe & Barry Smith 23. Senior research associate specializing in the philosophy of AI, complex systems, physics, and mathematics. Author of more than 700 scientific publications, one of the most widely cited contemporary philosophers in the fields of ontology and biomedical informatics. “Introduction,” Why Machines Will Never Rule the World: Artificial Intelligence Without Fear.” First Edition, Routledge, 2023. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003310105 fulltext: 1.3 Limits to the modelling of animate nature It is well known that the utility of science depends (in increasing order) on its ability to describe, explain, and predict natural processes. We can describe the foraging behaviour of a parrot, for example, by using simple English. But to explain the parrot’s behaviour we need something more (defined in section 7.1.1.4). And for prediction we need causal models, and these causal models must be mathematical. For this reason, however, it will prove that the lack of success in creating a general AI is not, as some claim, something that can and will be overcome by increasing the processing power and memory size of computers. Rather, this lack of success flows not only from a lack of understanding of many biological matters, but also from an inability to create mathematical models of how brains and other organic systems work. In biology, valid mathematical models aiming at system explanation are hard or impossible to obtain, because there are in almost every case very large numbers of causal factors involved, making it well-nigh impossible to create models that would be predictive.15 The lack of models is most striking in neuroscience, which is the science dealing with the physical explanation of how the brain functions in giving rise not only to consciousness, intelligence, language and social behaviour but also to neurological disorders such as dementia, schizophrenia, and autism. The achievement of AGI would require models whose construction would presuppose solutions of some of the most intractable problems in all of science (see sections 8.5 to 8.8). It is thus disconcerting that optimism as concerns the potential of AI has been most vigorous precisely in the promotion of visions relating to enhancement, extension, and even total emulation of the human brain. We will see that such optimism rests in part on the tenacity of the view according to which the human brain is a type of computer (a view still embraced explicitly by some of our best philosophers), which on closer analysis betrays ignorance not only of the biology of the brain but also of the nature of computers. And for a further part it rests on naïve views as to the presumed powers of deep neural networks to deal with emanations from complex systems in ways which go beyond what is possible for traditional mathematical models. 1.3.1 Impossibility Throughout this book, we will defend the thesis that it is impossible to obtain what we shall call synoptic and adequate mathematical models of complex systems, which means: models that would allow us to engineer AI systems that can fulfill the requirements such systems must satisfy if they are to emulate intelligence. Because the proper understanding of the term impossible as it is used in this sentence is so important to all that follows, we start with an elucidation of how we are using it. First, we use the term in three different senses, which we refer to as technical, physical, and mathematical impossibility, respectively. To say that something is technically impossible—for example, controlled nuclear fusion with a positive energy output—is to draw attention to the fact that it is impossible given the technology we have today. We find it useful to document the technically impossible here only where (as is all too often) proponents of transhumanist and similar concepts seek to promote their ideas on the basis of claims which are, and may for all time remain, technically impossible.16 To say that something is physically impossible is to say that it is impossible because it would contravene the laws of physics. To give an example: in highly viscous fluids (low Reynolds numbers), no type of swimming object can achieve net displacement (this is the scallop theorem [Purcell 1977]).17 To speak of mathematical impossibility, finally, is to assert that a solution to some mathematically specified problem—for example, an analytical solution of the nbody problem (see p. 189) or an algorithmic solution of the halting problem (see section 7.2)—cannot be found; not because of any shortcomings in the data or hardware or software or human brains, but rather for a priori reasons of mathematics. This is the primary sense in which we use the term impossible in this book. 1.4 The AI hype cycle Despite the lack of success in brain modelling, and fired by a naïve understanding of human brain functioning, optimism as to future advances in AI feeds most conspicuously into what is now called ‘transhumanism’, the idea that technologies to enhance human capabilities will lead to the emergence of new ‘posthuman’ beings. On one scenario, humans themselves will become immortal because they will be able to abandon their current biological bodies and live on, forever, in digital form. On another scenario, machines will develop their own will and subdue mankind into slavery with their superintelligence while they draw on their immortality to go forth into the galaxy and colonise space. Speculations such as this are at the same time fascinating and disturbing. But we believe that, like some earlier pronouncements from the AI community, they must be taken with a heavy pillar of salt, for they reflect enthusiasm triggered by successes of AI research that does not factor in the fact that these successes have been achieved only along certain tightly defined paths. In 2016 it became known that the company DeepMind had used AI in their AlphaGo automaton to partially solve the game of Go.18 Given the complexity of the game, this must be recognised as a stunning achievement. But it is an achievement whose underlying methodology can be applied only to a narrow set of problems. What it shows is that, in certain completely rule-determined confined settings with a low-dimensional phase space such as abstract games, a variant of machine learning known as reinforcement learning (see 8.6.7.3) can be used to create algorithms that outperform humans. Importantly, this is done in ways that do not rely on any knowledge on the part of the machine of the rules of the games involved. This does not, however, mean that DeepMind can ‘discover’ the rules governing just any kind of activity. DeepMind’s engineers provided the software with carefully packaged examples of activity satisfying just this set of rules and allowed it to implicitly generate new playing strategies not present in the supplied examples by using purely computational adversarial settings (two algorithms playing against each other).19 The software is not in a position to go out and identify packages of this sort on its own behalf. It is cognizant neither of the rules nor of the new strategies which we, its human observers, conceive it to be applying. Yet the successes of DeepMind and of other AI engineering virtuosi have led once again to over-generalised claims on behalf of the machine learning approach, which gave new energy to the idea of an AI that would be general in the same sort of way that human intelligence is general, to the extent that it could go forth into the world unsupervised and achieve ever more startling results. Parallel bursts of enthusiasm have arisen also in connection with the great strides made in recent years in the field of image recognition. But there are already signs that there, too, the potential of AI technology has once again been overestimated (Marcus 2018; Landgrebe et al. 2021). Why is this so? Why, in other words, is AI once again facing a wave of dampening enthusiasm20 representing the third major AI sobering episode after the mid-1970s and late 1980s, both of which ended in AI winters? There are, certainly, many reasons for this cyclical phenomenon. One such reason is that genuine advances in AI fall from public view as they become embedded in innumerable everyday products and services. Many contributions of working (narrow) AI are thereby hidden. But a further reason is the weak foundation of AI enthusiasm itself, which involves in each cycle an initial exaggeration of the potential of AI under the assumption that impressive success along a single front will be generalisable into diverse unrelated fields (taking us, for instance, from Jeopardy! to curing cancer [Strickland 2019]).21 Assumptions of this sort are made, we believe, because AI enthusiasts often do not have the interdisciplinary scientific knowledge that is needed to recognise the obstacles that will stand in the way of envisaged new AI applications. It is part of our aim here to show that crucial lessons concerning both the limits and the potential of AI can be learned through application of the right sort of interdisciplinary knowledge. 1.5 Why machines will not inherit the earth In this book, we will argue that it is not an accident that so little progress has been made towards AGI over successive cycles of AI research. The lack of progress reflects, rather, certain narrow, structural limits to what can be achieved in this field, limits which we document in detail. The human tendency to anthropomorphise is very powerful (Ekbia 2008). When our computer pauses while executing some especially complicated operation, we are tempted to say, ‘it’s thinking’. But it is not so. The processes inside the computer are physical through and through and, as we shall see in section 7.2, limited to certain narrowly defined operations defined in the 1930s by Turing and Church. The fact that we describe them in mental terms turns on the fact that the computer has been built to imitate (inter alia) operations that human beings would perform by using their minds. We thus impute the corresponding mental capabilities to the machine itself, as we impute happiness to a cartoon clown. As Searle (1992) argued, computation has a physical, but no mental, reality because the significance that we impute to what the computer does (what we perceive as its mental reality) is observer dependent. If we take away all observers, then only the physical dimensions of its operations would remain. To see what is involved here, compare the difference between a dollar bill as a piece of paper and a dollar bill as money. If we take away all observers, then only the former would remain, because the latter is, again, ‘observer dependent’. While we impute consciousness to computers, we ourselves are conscious. Computers also will not be able to gain consciousness in the future, since as we will show, whatever remarkable feats they might be engineered to perform, the aspect of those feats we are referring to when we ascribe consciousness or mentality to the computer will remain forever a product of observer dependence. As we discuss in more detail in chapter 9, any process that machines can execute in order to emulate consciousness would have to be such that the feature of consciousness that is imputed to it would be observer dependent. From the fact that a certain green piece of paper is imputed to have the observer-dependent value of one dollar, we can infer with high likelihood that this piece of paper has the value of one dollar. As we will show in chapter 9, no analogous inference is possible from the fact that a process in a machine is imputed to have the feature of consciousness (or awareness, or excitedness, or happiness, or wariness, or desire). And thus we will never be able to create an AI with the faculty of consciousness in the sense in which we understand this term when referring to humans or animals.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>AGI and singularities are impossible. </h4><p>Jobst <strong>Landgrebe &</strong> Barry <strong>Smith 23</strong>. Senior research associate specializing in the philosophy of AI, complex systems, physics, and mathematics. Author of more than 700 scientific publications, one of the most widely cited contemporary philosophers in the fields of ontology and biomedical informatics. “Introduction,” Why Machines Will Never Rule the World: Artificial Intelligence Without Fear.” First Edition, Routledge, 2023. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003310105</p><p>1.3 Limits to the modelling of animate nature</p><p>It is well known that the utility of science depends (in increasing order) on its ability to describe, explain, and predict natural processes. We can describe the foraging behaviour of a parrot, for example, by using simple English. But to explain the parrot’s behaviour we need something more (defined in section 7.1.1.4). And for prediction we need causal models, and these causal models must be mathematical.</p><p>For this reason, however, it will prove that <u>the lack of success in creating a general AI is <strong>not</u></strong>, as some claim, <u>something that can and will be <strong>overcome</strong> by increasing the <strong>processing power and memory size of computers</u></strong>. Rather, this <u>lack of success flows</u> not only <u>from a lack of understanding of many biological matters</u>, but also from an <u>inability to create <strong>mathematical models</strong> of how brains and other organic systems work</u>.</p><p><u>In biology</u>, <u>valid mathematical models</u> aiming at system explanation <u>are hard or <strong>impossible to obtain</u></strong>, <u>because there are</u> in almost every case very <u>large numbers of <strong>causal factors</strong> involved</u>, <u>making it</u> well-nigh <u>impossible to create models that would be predictive</u>.15 The lack of models is most striking in neuroscience, which is the science dealing with the physical explanation of how the brain functions in giving rise not only to consciousness, intelligence, language and social behaviour but also to neurological disorders such as dementia, schizophrenia, and autism.</p><p>The achievement of <u><strong>AGI</strong> would require models whose construction would presuppose solutions of some of the most <strong>intractable problems</strong> in all of science</u> (see sections 8.5 to 8.8). It is thus disconcerting that optimism as concerns the potential of AI has been most vigorous precisely in the promotion of visions relating to enhancement, extension, and even total emulation of the human brain. We will see that such <u>optimism rests in</u> part on the tenacity of <u>the view according to which the human brain is a type of computer</u> (a view still embraced explicitly by some of our best philosophers), <u>which on closer analysis <strong>betrays ignorance</strong> not only of the biology of the brain but also of the nature of computers</u>. And for a further part <u>it rests on <strong>naïve views</strong> as to the presumed powers of deep neural networks</u> to deal with emanations from complex systems in ways which go <u>beyond what is possible for traditional mathematical models</u>.</p><p>1.3.1 Impossibility</p><p>Throughout this book, we will defend the thesis that <u>it is <strong>impossible to obtain</u></strong> what we shall call <u>synoptic and adequate mathematical models of complex systems</u>, <u>which means: models that would allow us to engineer AI systems that can fulfill the requirements such systems must satisfy if they are to <strong>emulate intelligence</u></strong>.</p><p>Because the proper understanding of the term impossible as it is used in this sentence is so important to all that follows, we start with an elucidation of how we are using it. First, we use the term in three different senses, which we refer to as technical, physical, and mathematical impossibility, respectively.</p><p><u>To say that something is technically impossible</u>—for example, controlled nuclear fusion with a positive energy output—<u>is to draw attention to the fact that it is <strong>impossible given the technology we have today</u></strong>. We find it useful to document the technically impossible here only where (as is all too often) proponents of transhumanist and similar concepts seek to promote their ideas on the basis of claims which are, and may for all time remain, technically impossible.16</p><p>To say that something is physically impossible is to say that it is impossible because it would contravene the laws of physics. To give an example: in highly viscous fluids (low Reynolds numbers), no type of swimming object can achieve net displacement (this is the scallop theorem [Purcell 1977]).17</p><p>To speak of mathematical impossibility, finally, is to assert that a solution to some mathematically specified problem—for example, an analytical solution of the nbody problem (see p. 189) or an algorithmic solution of the halting problem (see section 7.2)—cannot be found; not because of any shortcomings in the data or hardware or software or human brains, but rather for a priori reasons of mathematics. This is the primary sense in which we use the term impossible in this book.</p><p>1.4 The AI hype cycle</p><p><u>Despite the lack of success in brain modelling</u>, <u>and fired by a naïve understanding of human brain functioning</u>, <u>optimism as to future advances in AI feeds</u> most conspicuously <u>into</u> what is now called ‘<u>transhumanism’</u>, <u>the idea that technologies</u> to enhance human capabilities <u>will lead to</u> the emergence of <u>new ‘posthuman’ beings</u>. <u>On one scenario</u>, <u>humans themselves will become immortal</u> because they will be able to abandon their current biological bodies and live on, forever, in digital form. On another scenario, machines will develop their own will and subdue mankind into slavery with their superintelligence while they draw on their immortality to go forth into the galaxy and colonise space.</p><p><u>Speculations such as this are</u> at the same time fascinating and <u><strong>disturbing</u></strong>. But we believe that, like some earlier pronouncements from the AI community, <u>they must be taken with a <strong>heavy pillar of salt</u></strong>, <u>for they reflect enthusiasm triggered by successes of AI research that does not factor in the fact that these successes have been achieved only along certain <strong>tightly defined</strong> paths</u>.</p><p>In 2016 it became known that the company DeepMind had used AI in their <u>AlphaGo automaton</u> to partially solve the game of Go.18 Given the complexity of the game, this <u>must be recognised as a stunning achievement</u>. <u>But it is an achievement whose underlying methodology can be applied only to a <strong>narrow set of problems</u></strong>. <u>What it shows is that</u>, <u>in certain completely rule-determined confined settings with a low-dimensional phase space such as abstract games</u>, a variant of machine learning known as <u>reinforcement learning</u> (see 8.6.7.3) <u>can be used to create algorithms that outperform humans</u>. Importantly, <u>this is done in ways that <strong>do not rely on any knowledge on the part of the machine</strong> of the rules of the games involved</u>. This does not, however, mean that DeepMind can ‘discover’ the rules governing just any kind of activity. <u>DeepMind’s engineers provided the software with carefully packaged examples of activity satisfying <strong>just this set of rules</strong> and allowed it to implicitly generate new playing strategies</u> not present in the supplied examples by using purely computational adversarial settings (two algorithms playing against each other).19 The <u>software is <strong>not in a position</strong> to go out and identify packages of this sort on its own behalf</u>. It is cognizant neither of the rules nor of the new strategies which we, its human observers, conceive it to be applying.</p><p>Yet the <u>successes</u> of DeepMind and of other AI engineering virtuosi have <u>led once again to over-generalised claims on behalf of the machine learning approach</u>, <u>which gave new energy to the idea of an AI that would be general</u> in the same sort of way that human intelligence is general, to the extent that it could go forth into the world unsupervised and achieve ever more startling results.</p><p>Parallel bursts of enthusiasm have arisen also in connection with the great strides made in recent years in the field of image recognition. But there are already signs that there, too, the potential of AI technology has once again been overestimated (Marcus 2018; Landgrebe et al. 2021).</p><p>Why is this so? Why, in other words, is AI once again facing a wave of dampening enthusiasm20 representing the third major AI sobering episode after the mid-1970s and late 1980s, both of which ended in AI winters? There are, certainly, many reasons for this cyclical phenomenon. One such reason is that genuine advances in AI fall from public view as they become embedded in innumerable everyday products and services. Many contributions of working (narrow) AI are thereby hidden. But a further reason is the weak foundation of AI enthusiasm itself, which involves in each cycle an initial exaggeration of the potential of AI under the assumption that impressive success along a single front will be generalisable into diverse unrelated fields (taking us, for instance, from Jeopardy! to curing cancer [Strickland 2019]).21</p><p><u>Assumptions</u> of this sort <u>are made</u>, we believe, <u>because AI enthusiasts often <strong>do not have the interdisciplinary scientific knowledge</strong> that is needed to recognise the obstacles that will stand in the way of envisaged new AI applications</u>. It is part of our aim here to show that crucial lessons concerning both the limits and the potential of AI can be learned through application of the right sort of interdisciplinary knowledge.</p><p>1.5 Why machines will not inherit the earth</p><p>In this book, we will argue that it is not an accident that so little progress has been made towards AGI over successive cycles of AI research. The lack of progress reflects, rather, certain narrow, structural limits to what can be achieved in this field, limits which we document in detail.</p><p>The <u>human tendency to <strong>anthropomorphise</strong> is very powerful</u> (Ekbia 2008). <u>When our computer pauses</u> while executing some especially complicated operation, <u>we are tempted to say, ‘it’s thinking’. But <strong>it is not</strong> so</u>. The <u>processes</u> inside the computer <u>are physical <strong>through and through</u></strong> and, as we shall see in section 7.2, <u>limited to certain narrowly defined operations defined in the 1930s by Turing and Church</u>. The fact that we describe them in mental terms turns on the fact that the computer has been built to imitate (inter alia) operations that human beings would perform by using their minds. We thus impute the corresponding mental capabilities to the machine itself, as we impute happiness to a cartoon clown.</p><p>As Searle (1992) argued, <u>computation has a physical</u>, <u>but no mental</u>, <u>reality</u> because the significance that we impute to what the computer does (what we perceive as its mental reality) is observer dependent. If we take away all observers, then only the physical dimensions of its operations would remain. To see what is involved here, compare the difference between a dollar bill as a piece of paper and a dollar bill as money. If we take away all observers, then only the former would remain, because the latter is, again, ‘observer dependent’. While we impute consciousness to computers, we ourselves are conscious.</p><p><u>Computers</u> also <u><strong>will not</strong> be able to <strong>gain consciousness</strong> in the future</u>, <u>since as we will show</u>, <u>whatever remarkable feats they might be engineered to perform</u>, <u>the aspect of those feats</u> we are referring to when we ascribe consciousness or mentality to the computer <u>will remain forever a product of <strong>observer dependence</u></strong>.</p><p>As we discuss in more detail in chapter 9, <u><strong>any process</u></strong> <u>that machines can execute</u> in order <u>to emulate consciousness</u> would have to be such that the feature of consciousness that is imputed to it <u>would be observer dependent</u>. From the fact that a certain green piece of paper is imputed to have the observer-dependent value of one dollar, we can infer with high likelihood that this piece of paper has the value of one dollar. As we will show in chapter 9, no analogous inference is possible from the fact that a process in a machine is imputed to have the feature of consciousness (or awareness, or excitedness, or happiness, or wariness, or desire). And thus <u>we will never be able to create an AI with the faculty of consciousness</u> in the sense in which we understand this term when referring to humans or animals.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Hayes 18 - Nautilus Institute, Berkeley, California, USA; Center for International Security Studies, Sydney University, Sydney, Australia [Peter, 10/19/18, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, “Trump and the Interregnum of American Nuclear Hegemony”, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2018.1532525, accessed 1/11/19 *edited for problematic language] fulltext: When Trump’s political persona collides with geo-strategic reality, this conjuncture may increase greatly the risk of nuclear war during the post-hegemonic interregnum in a way that was not possible during the hegemonic era due to the international and domestic constraints on Presidential behavior. This reality also forces him to adjust his radical policies and to revert to reliance of some elements of the hegemonic era. This emergent condition of ambivalence, vacillation and transition is peculiar to the complexity that characterizes the interregnum. In it, Trump could easily overreach and catapult the world from its post-hegemonic interregnum into an era of full-blown nuclear disorder. There are two nuclear-prone conflicts in Northeast Asia that are structured in ways that contain such escalation potential. These are between US-China over Taiwan and US-DRPK over Korea. Three other nuclear-prone conflicts in this region (India-China, Russia-China, Russia-US via Europe) indirectly involve the United States. A particularly significant risk is that Trump may start making nuclear threats against other nuclear armed states primarily for compellence rather than deterrence. A deterrent threat tries to stop someone from doing something that they intend to do but have not yet done whereas a compellent threat tries to force someone to stop what they are already doing. The United States has found it much harder to achieve nuclear compellence even against non-nuclear states, let alone nuclear-armed states, because compellence is often attempted against states with higher resolve and greater stakes in a conflict than the United States. These factors usually outweigh the United States’ lesser ability to exit from an escalation spiral and its stake in maintaining reputation if it fails to follow through on a specific threat. Using nuclear threat more for compellence than deterrence also increases the stakes of all parties in a conflict, and thereby increases risks of inadvertent war, especially in conditions of increasing complexity that multiply the way that nuclear coercion is invoked by context (Bracken 2017). Trump exhibits a proclivity to embrace patently false theories and to invent and propagate purely fictional “facts” and a vindictive, self-aggrandizing, and aggressive decision-making style. His decision-making bias may drive him to order the United States to use military force in ways that purposely and inadvertently risk war and nuclear war with other nuclear weapons states. Such was undoubtedly the case in his “fire and fury” threats against the DPRK, his statement that he might annihilate the entire North Korean nation, and his deployment of strategic assets in the vicinity of the DPRK (Wagner and Johnson 2017; Nakamura and Gearan 2017; Schmitt 2017). Some pundits argued that this posture – and the North Korean response – increased the risk of war in the Korean Peninsula in 2017 to 50 percent (Rudd 2017). A more informed estimate from markets is that the risk of war increased from 0.1 percent per year to perhaps 1 percent per year as a result of the increased tension and combative rhetorical and forceful threat campaigns by Trump and Kim Jong Un, the risk being the use of nuclear weapons in Korea and beyond, and a trillion dollar war with resulting potential massive disruption of global financial, energy and other markets (Kim and Lam 2017). Such risks led South Korea’s newly elected leader, Moon Jae-in, to declare publicly that the ROK must concur in any decision to go to war against the DPRK, and his officials to state that it had not intention to do so in case of a unilateral American attack on the DPRK. That an allied leader felt impelled to make such a statement reveals the extent to which hegemonic leadership has already disappeared from the US-ROK alliance.10 If Trump were to make similar explicit compellence threats against China, for example, at the brink of a war over the future of Taiwan, then he could find himself standing on the nuclear brink almost overnight. Should this occur at the same time as he makes common cause with Russia to tilt the global strategic triangle against China, thereby threatening it with the two possible nuclear adversaries able to pre-emptively attack its strategic nuclear forces, then he may force Beijing to respond with new deployments and new threats of its own, setting the scene for rapid escalation from a local military clash that catapults the two states onto one or more of the pathways to inadvertent nuclear war. This outcome is not unthinkable. China’s deployment of DF-41 ICBM units in northern China in January 201711 (timed to coincide with Trump’s inauguration) is reminiscent of its 1968–69 deployments when it traded blows with the former Soviet Union at the Amur River and the latter apparently entertained a joint Soviet-American nuclear strike to disarm China.12 Putin reportedly sees no threat in these missiles and China’s main strategic concern is to reach the United States and India while defeating US antiballistic systems. But Russia’s prior deployment of short and intermediate range missiles along its Siberian and Far Eastern border with China13 and statements about strengthening its forces in response to China’s ICBM deployments (Blagov 2017) also suggest that distrust between Russia and China is still active in the global strategic triangle. There are other avenues to inadvertent nuclear war that Trump could find himself taking, leaving aside the most obvious flashpoint in the Taiwan Straits. For example, US allies could overreach by challenging Chinese core interests. If the June 2018 US-DPRK denuclearization deal collapses, South Korea could respond to North Korean covert or overt attacks with all-out war irrespective of American intention. Japan could attack Chinese warships or aircraft over contested islands, drawing US forces into military conflict with China. China might quickly use drones to attack US-Japanese joint facilities such as underwater tracking systems to protect its own submarines and to threaten American submarines supporting US aircraft carrier groups, leading to rapid fire escalation with the United States and allied military forces (Hayes 2018). That China and the United States could control subsequent escalation is certainly questionable (Ayson and Ball 2015). Nuclear terrorism is a wild card that could erupt in any of the states in the region and depending on the level of tension at the time, could catalyze inter-state conflict and lead to war involving nuclear threat and nuclear attacks. One of Trump’s core ancillary beliefs is that China has “raped” destroyed the American economy via “unfair” trade (Cowburn 2016). His apparent predisposition to exploit nuclear threats for non-existential objectives is most likely to be expressed in how he confronts China, especially as he seems determined to block the rise of Chinese hegemony. In contrast, he seems more inclined to make “deals” with Russian President Putin than to use nuclear compellence against Russia. But no-one can predict such outcomes and Trump’s strategy of causing and then exploiting chaos increases uncertainty for all nuclear-armed states – the opposite of what is needed to reduce the risk of inadvertent nuclear war.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Trump’s compellence strategy causes multiple nuclear conflicts and shreds US credibility, he threatens adversary arsenals that escalates to nuclear war </h4><p><u><strong>Hayes 18</u></strong> - Nautilus Institute, Berkeley, California, USA; Center for International Security Studies, Sydney University, Sydney, Australia</p><p>[Peter, 10/19/18, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, “Trump and the Interregnum of American Nuclear Hegemony”, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2018.1532525, accessed 1/11/19 *edited for problematic language]</p><p><u><strong>When <mark>Trump’s</mark> <mark>political persona collides with geo-strategic reality</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>this</mark> conjuncture <mark>may</mark> <mark>increase</mark> greatly <mark>the risk of</mark> <mark>nuclear war</mark> </u></strong>during the post-hegemonic interregnum in a way <u><strong>that was not possible during the hegemonic era due to the international and domestic constraints on Presidential behavior</u></strong>. This reality also forces him to adjust his radical policies and to revert to reliance of some elements of the hegemonic era. This emergent condition of ambivalence, vacillation and transition is peculiar to the complexity that characterizes the interregnum. In it, <u><strong><mark>Trump could </mark>easily <mark>overreach</mark> <mark>and catapult the world </mark>from its post-hegemonic interregnum <mark>into an era of</mark> <mark>full-blown nuclear disorder</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>There are two nuclear-prone conflicts in Northeast Asia that are structured in ways that contain such escalation potential. These are between US-China over Taiwan and US-DRPK over Korea. Three other nuclear-prone conflicts in this region (India-China, Russia-China, Russia-US via Europe) indirectly involve the United States</u></strong>. <u><strong>A particularly significant risk is that <mark>Trump may start making</mark> <mark>nuclear threats</mark> against other nuclear armed states primarily <mark>for compellence</mark> rather than deterrence</u></strong>. A deterrent threat tries to stop someone from doing something that they intend to do but have not yet done whereas a compellent threat tries to force someone to stop what they are already doing. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates has <mark>found</mark> <mark>it much</mark> <mark>harder to achieve</mark> nuclear <mark>compellence</mark> </u></strong>even against non-nuclear states, let alone nuclear-armed states, <u><strong>because <mark>compellence</mark> <mark>is</mark> often <mark>attempted against states with higher resolve and greater stakes</mark> <mark>in a conflict</mark> than the United States</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>These factors</mark> usually <mark>outweigh</mark> <mark>the</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates<mark>’</mark> <mark>lesser ability to exit from an escalation spira</mark>l and its stake in maintaining reputation if it fails to follow through on a specific threat</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Using</mark> nuclear threat more for <mark>compellence</mark> than deterrence also increases the stakes of all parties in a conflict, and thereby <mark>increases risks of inadvertent war</mark>,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>especially in</mark> <mark>conditions of</mark> increasing <mark>complexity</u></strong></mark> that multiply the way that nuclear coercion is invoked by context (Bracken 2017). <u><strong>Trump exhibits a proclivity to embrace patently false theories and to invent and propagate purely fictional “facts” and a vindictive, self-aggrandizing, and aggressive decision-making style</u></strong>. His decision-making bias may drive him to order the United States to use military force in ways that purposely and inadvertently risk war and nuclear war with other nuclear weapons states. Such was undoubtedly the case in his “fire and fury” threats against the DPRK, his statement that he might annihilate the entire North Korean nation, and his deployment of strategic assets in the vicinity of the DPRK (Wagner and Johnson 2017; Nakamura and Gearan 2017; Schmitt 2017). Some pundits argued that this posture – and the North Korean response – increased the risk of war in the Korean Peninsula in 2017 to 50 percent (Rudd 2017). A more informed estimate from markets is that the risk of war increased from 0.1 percent per year to perhaps 1 percent per year as a result of the increased tension and combative rhetorical and forceful threat campaigns by Trump and Kim Jong Un, the risk being the use of nuclear weapons in Korea and beyond, and a trillion dollar war with resulting potential massive disruption of global financial, energy and other markets (Kim and Lam 2017). Such risks led South Korea’s newly elected leader, Moon Jae-in, to declare publicly that the ROK must concur in any decision to go to war against the DPRK, and his officials to state that it had not intention to do so in case of a unilateral American attack on the DPRK. That an allied leader felt impelled to make such a statement reveals the extent to which hegemonic leadership has already disappeared from the US-ROK alliance.10 <u><strong>If <mark>Trump</mark> were to make similar explicit compellence threats against China, for example, at the brink of a war over the future of Taiwan, then he could find himself standing on the nuclear brink almost overnight</u></strong>. <u><strong>Should this occur at the same time as he makes common cause with Russia to tilt the global strategic triangle against China, thereby threatening it with the two possible nuclear adversaries able to pre-emptively attack its strategic nuclear forces, then he <mark>may force</mark> Beijing to respond with new deployments and new threats of its own, setting the scene for <mark>rapid escalation</mark> <mark>from</mark> <mark>a local </mark>military <mark>clash</mark> that catapults the two states onto one or more of the pathways <mark>to </mark>inadvertent <mark>nuclear war</mark>. </u></strong>This outcome is not unthinkable. China’s deployment of DF-41 ICBM units in northern China in January 201711 (timed to coincide with Trump’s inauguration) is reminiscent of its 1968–69 deployments when it traded blows with the former Soviet Union at the Amur River and the latter apparently entertained a joint Soviet-American nuclear strike to disarm China.12 Putin reportedly sees no threat in these missiles and China’s main strategic concern is to reach the United States and India while defeating US antiballistic systems. But Russia’s prior deployment of short and intermediate range missiles along its Siberian and Far Eastern border with China13 and statements about strengthening its forces in response to China’s ICBM deployments (Blagov 2017) also suggest that distrust between Russia and China is still active in the global strategic triangle. There are other avenues to inadvertent nuclear war that Trump could find himself taking, leaving aside the most obvious flashpoint in the Taiwan Straits. For example, US allies could overreach by challenging Chinese core interests. If the June 2018 US-DPRK denuclearization deal collapses, South Korea could respond to North Korean covert or overt attacks with all-out war irrespective of American intention. Japan could attack Chinese warships or aircraft over contested islands, drawing US forces into military conflict with China. China might quickly use drones to attack US-Japanese joint facilities such as underwater tracking systems to protect its own submarines and to threaten American submarines supporting US aircraft carrier groups, leading to rapid fire escalation with the United States and allied military forces (Hayes 2018). That China and the United States could control subsequent escalation is certainly questionable (Ayson and Ball 2015). <u><strong><mark>Nuclear terrorism is a wild card</mark> <mark>that</mark> could erupt in any of the states in the region and depending on the level of tension at the time, <mark>could catalyze</mark> inter-state <mark>conflict</mark> and lead to war involving nuclear threat and nuclear attacks</u></strong>. One of Trump’s core ancillary beliefs is that China has “raped” destroyed the American economy via “unfair” trade (Cowburn 2016). His apparent predisposition to exploit nuclear threats for non-existential objectives is most likely to be expressed in how he confronts China, especially as he seems determined to block the rise of Chinese hegemony. In contrast, he seems more inclined to make “deals” with Russian President Putin than to use nuclear compellence against Russia. But <u><strong>no-one can predict such outcomes and Trump’s strategy of causing and then exploiting chaos increases uncertainty for all nuclear-armed states – the opposite of what is needed to reduce the risk of inadvertent nuclear war</u>.</p></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Lincoln 14 — Taylor Lincoln, Research Director of the Congress Watch Division of Public Citizen, “Severing the Tie That Binds: Why a Publicly Funded, Universal Health Care System Would Be a Boon to U.S. Businesses,” Public Citizen, Date Accessed: 8-1 fulltext: * Cites Himmelstein and Woolhandler, James Khan et al. on Health Affairs, A. Potential Administrative Savings The question of how much is spent on administrative functions in health care has been extensively studied, yet is a frequent source of controversy among pundits and partisans. Much of the controversy likely stems from competing and often poorly understood definitions of what constitutes administrative costs. For instance, some estimates are limited solely to costs experienced by a single segment of the market, such as claims processors, while others define administrative functions much more broadly. Meanwhile, the activities that are categorized as administrative vary from study to study. These discrepancies sometimes foster comparisons purporting to show dramatic differences in administrative costs between systems or countries that do not provide any meaningful insight.23 But when one untangles the research on this broad subject and compares like categories, a fairly consistent picture emerges. For instance, multiple studies have determined that physician practices spent between 10 and 15 percent of their revenue on billing and insurance matters. Meanwhile, several studies have estimated overhead to consume between 10 and 12 percent of insurance premiums. (The administrative costs of selfinsured plans are lower, according to one study.) Given that health care costs in the United States were about $2.8 trillion in 2012, these findings lead to an undeniable conclusion that costs are enormous for billing and insurance related matters, the areas most likely to be mitigated by a universal care system. 24 In fairness, not all reductions in administrative spending would necessarily correlate with net savings. Some administrative spending, even on billing and insurance related matters, serves a beneficial purpose, such as policing against fraud. Still, comparisons illustrate that the United States spends much more than other countries on administrative functions, particularly those involving billing and claims processing. Given that these other countries have significantly lower total health care costs than the United States, it seems logical to conclude that they have managed to expend less on administrative functions without succumbing to rampant fraud. Likewise, comparisons between private and public payers within the United States indicate that savings on the insurance/payer segment of the equation would be achieved by switching entirely to a publicly funded system. These are among the reasons that the United States could reduce administrative costs by switching to a public system: 1. Data show that the share of costs that health care plans devote to administration is inversely proportional to the size of the plans. Due to economies of scale and other factors, plans insuring many people tend to spend less per beneficiary on administrative functions than those insuring fewer people. 25 Any publicly funded universal care plan would be extremely large compared to privately underwritten plans that currently exist. 2. Under a public system, resources would not be diverted to pay for insurance companies’ profits and marketing expenses. Payers and providers, meanwhile, would spend significantly less, if any, time negotiating over rates. 26 3. A publicly funded, universal care system would entail a tremendous reduction in the number of payers with which health care providers would be required to interact. This would significantly reduce providers’ administrative costs by streamlining bill submission processes and reducing the resources that providers have to expend navigating the nuances of different insurers’ benefits and policies. Thus, even if the administrative costs of payers remained the same, a public system would undoubtedly save money by reducing administrative costs incurred by providers. [See Table 1 for a summary of findings on administrative costs.] In a study published in Health Affairs in 2005, James Kahn et al. measured the administrative costs of private insurers, physicians’ offices and hospitals in the American West, then estimated the portion of each category’s administrative costs that was devoted to billing and insurance (BIR) functions. Kahn et al. determined that administrative costs for physicians’ offices ranged from 20.1 to 26.7 percent of revenue (depending on type of practice), and that BIR functions cost between 12.4 and 14.5 percent of revenue.27 They concluded that hospitals’ administrative costs averaged 20.9 percent of revenue, and that hospitals’ BIR functions cost somewhere between 6.6 and 10.8 percent of revenue, depending how the billing share of certain multipurpose functions was apportioned. 28 A 2009 study published in Health Affairs by Casalino et al. concluded that physicians in the United States spend an average of three hours weekly interacting with health plans at a cost of $23 billion to $31 billion a year.29 But physician time is a relatively small portion of practices’ spending on billing matters. A separate 2009 study by Sakowski et al., also published in Health Affairs, concluded that physician practices on average devote two-thirds of a full-time employee per physician solely to working on billing and insurance matters. The researchers concluded that the cost to practices, including physicians’ time, to interact with insurance companies was $85,276 annually per physician, or 10 percent of revenue. 30 A 2011 study published in Health Affairs by Morra et al. reached similar results, concluding that office-based physician practices in the United States spend an estimated $82,975 annually per physician interacting with insurance companies. 31 A synthesis of research presented by the aforementioned James Kahn to the Institute of Medicine in 2009 estimated that the BIR portion of physician revenue was $70 billion per year, or 13 percent of revenue. For hospital care, Kahn estimated BIR costs of $67 billion. Kahn estimated that if a similar rate could be applied to other categories of providers, such as pharmacies and nursing homes, the total, national BIR costs for all providers was about $214 billion a year. 32 Estimates on Insurers’ Administrative Costs In a study published in Health Affairs in 2005, referenced above, Kahn et al. determined that private insurers’ administrative costs equaled 9.9 percent of premiums. BIR functions made up the majority of such costs, accounting for 8.4 percent of premiums. 33 A 2009 study by the Vermont Department of Banking, Insurance, Securities and Health Care Administration concluded that the administrative cost for risk-bearing health insurers in Vermont ranged from 10.2 to 13 percent of premiums. Insurer administrative costs for employer-funded (or self-insured) plans ranged from 7.1 to 7.3 percent.34 Writing for the Commonwealth Fund, Sara Collins et al. estimated that U.S. health insurance overhead costs equaled $155.7 billion in 2007. Of this, $96.2 billion was for private insurance and $59.5 billion for publicly administered programs. Collins et al. found that administrative costs represent 12.2 percent of private health insurance expenditures, compared with 6.1 percent of public program expenditures.35 Collins et al. also found striking disparities in the administrative costs based on the size of the entity insured. Administrative costs ranged from 5 to 15 percent for group plans for employers with more than 50 employees; 15 to 25 percent for companies with fewer than 50 employees; and up to 40 percent for the individual market. The cost for brokers, alone, in the small-group market, accounted for 4 to 11 percent of premiums, they reported.36 Writing in the New England Journal of Medicine in 2003, Steffie Woolhandler, et al., estimated that overhead accounted for 11.7 percent of private insurance costs in 1999, 37 compared with 3.6 percent for Medicare and 6.8 percent for Medicaid.38 Estimates on Employers’ Administrative Costs Though smaller than the administrative cost for providers and insurers, employers also bear substantial expenses to provide health care benefits. The 2003 study by Woolhandler et al., referenced above, concluded that employers spent $15.9 billion on benefits administration and health care benefits consultants in 1999. 39 To put that in perspective, employer administrative costs amounted to 22 percent of Woolhandler et al.’s estimate of the total administrative costs paid by health insurance companies. 40 Estimates on Total Administrative Health Care Costs In his presentation to the Institute of Medicine, cited above, Kahn estimated the national, upper bound cost for billing and insurance related costs for providers and insurers at $361 billion in 2009. 41 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services estimated that national health care costs in 2009 were $2.5 trillion.42 Therefore, Kahn’s estimate would yield a conclusion that billing and insurance functions consumed up to 14 percent of national health care costs. In their 2003, paper, Woolhandler et al. generated an estimate the for all administrative health care related functions (including, and in addition to, billing functions) for which they were able obtain data. They estimated that total administrative costs accounted for 31 percent ($294.3 billion) of U.S. health care spending in 1999. 43 Comparisons Between the United States and Other Countries and Between Public and Private Systems in the United States The aforementioned 2011 study by Morra et al. in Health Affairs concluding that physicians’ practices in the United States spent $82,975 per physician interacting with insurance companies also estimated such costs for practices in Ontario, Canada, where a single-payer system finances many health care services. The authors concluded that Ontario practices spent just $22,205 per physician interacting with insurance companies, or just greater than one-fourth as much as in the United States. 44 The Canadian figure was adjusted upward to account for the reduced purchasing power in Canada; otherwise, the discrepancy would have been slightly greater. The researchers attributed the difference to the multitude of insurance products that U.S. physicians must deal with, the disparities in rules for those products, and requirements for physicians to receive pre-authorization to render care. The researchers concluded that if physician practices in the United States spent the same amount of time on billing issues as those in Canada, the United States would save $27.6 billion annually. The researchers concluded that such savings would be greater if hospital-based practices were included in their study. 45 The aforementioned study by Collins et al., which estimated that U.S. private health insurance overhead costs equal 12.2 percent of premiums, concluded that U.S. costs were higher as a percentage of national health care costs than in any of 10 other countries in the OECD that they analyzed. Insurance overhead costs accounted for about 7.5 percent of health care spending in the United States by their numbers. In contrast, payers’ overhead costs within the 10 other OECD countries averaged just 4 percent. The other countries’ totals ranged from 1.9 percent (Finland) to 6.9 percent (France).46 A December 2008 accounting of U.S. health care costs conducted by McKinsey Global Institute concluded that health administration and insurance accounted for costs of $145 billion in 2006. This figure appears from context in the report to include only costs experienced by insurers and other payers, not providers. The study’s authors determined that administration and insurance costs were $91 billion higher than would be expected if U.S. proportions paralleled other countries’ spending after adjusting for relative levels of wealth. Of the $91 billion in excess spending, $30 billion consisted of private insurers’ profits and taxes.47 “A multi-payer system (and a multistate regulated system) creates extra costs and inefficiencies in the form of redundant marketing, underwriting, and management overhead that other OECD countries, which have less fragmented systems, bear to a lesser extent,” the McKinsey authors wrote.48 Woolhandler et al. (2003) estimated total administrative costs in Canada to equal 16.7 percent of national health care costs, compared with 31 percent in the United States.49<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Plans <u>substantially</u> decreases administrative costs---consensus of literature concludes affirmative</h4><p><u><strong>Lincoln 14</u></strong> — Taylor Lincoln, Research Director of the Congress Watch Division of Public Citizen, “Severing the Tie That Binds: Why a Publicly Funded, Universal Health Care System Would Be a Boon to U.S. Businesses,” Public Citizen, Date Accessed: 8-1</p><p>* Cites Himmelstein and Woolhandler, James Khan et al. on Health Affairs, </p><p>A. Potential Administrative Savings</p><p>The question of how much is spent on administrative functions in health care has been extensively studied, yet is a frequent source of controversy among pundits and partisans. Much of the controversy likely stems from competing and often poorly understood definitions of what constitutes administrative costs. For instance, some estimates are limited solely to costs experienced by a single segment of the market, such as claims processors, while others define administrative functions much more broadly. Meanwhile, the activities that are categorized as administrative vary from study to study. These discrepancies sometimes foster comparisons purporting to show dramatic differences in administrative costs between systems or countries that do not provide any meaningful insight.23</p><p><u><strong>But <mark>when one untangles</mark> the <mark>research</mark> on this broad subject and compares like categories, <mark>a</u></strong></mark> fairly <u><strong><mark>consistent picture emerges</mark>.</u></strong> For instance, multiple studies have determined that physician practices spent between 10 and 15 percent of their revenue on billing and insurance matters. Meanwhile, several studies have estimated overhead to consume between 10 and 12 percent of insurance premiums. (The administrative costs of selfinsured plans are lower, according to one study.) Given that health care costs in the United States were about $2.8 trillion in 2012, these findings lead to an undeniable conclusion that costs are enormous for billing and insurance related matters, the areas most likely to be mitigated by a universal care system. 24</p><p>In fairness, not all reductions in administrative spending would necessarily correlate with net savings. Some administrative spending, even on billing and insurance related matters, serves a beneficial purpose, such as policing against fraud.</p><p>Still, comparisons illustrate that the United States spends much more than other countries on administrative functions, particularly those involving billing and claims processing. Given that these <u><strong><mark>other countries have</u></strong></mark> significantly lower total health care costs than the United States, it seems logical to conclude that they <u><strong>have <mark>managed to expend less</mark> on administrative functions <mark>without succumbing to</mark> rampant <mark>fraud</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>Likewise, comparisons between private and public payers within the United States indicate that savings on the insurance/payer segment of the equation would be achieved by switching entirely to a publicly funded system. These are among the reasons that the United States could reduce administrative costs by switching to a public system:</p><p>1. <u><strong><mark>Data show</mark> that the share of <mark>costs</u></strong></mark> that health care plans <u><strong>devote <mark>to admin</mark>istration<mark> is inversely proportional to</mark> the <mark>size</mark> of the plans. <mark>Due to economies of scale</u></strong></mark> and other factors, plans insuring many people tend to spend less per beneficiary on administrative functions than those insuring fewer people. 25 <u><strong><mark>Any public</u></strong></mark>ly funded <u><strong>universal care <mark>plan would be </mark>extremely <mark>large</u></strong></mark> compared to privately underwritten plans that currently exist.</p><p>2. Under a public system, <u><strong><mark>resources would not be diverted to pay for</mark> insurance companies’ <mark>profits and marketing expenses.</mark> Payers and <mark>providers</u></strong></mark>, meanwhile, <u><strong><mark>would spend</mark> significantly <mark>less</u></strong></mark>, if any, <u><strong>time negotiating over rates.</u></strong> 26</p><p>3. <u><strong><mark>A public</u></strong></mark>ly funded, universal care <u><strong><mark>system would entail a tremendous reduction in the number of payers</u></strong></mark> with which health care providers would be required to interact. <u><strong><mark>This would</mark> significantly <mark>reduce</mark> providers’ <mark>admin</mark>istrative <mark>costs by streamlining</mark> bill submission <mark>processes</u></strong></mark> and reducing the resources that providers have to expend navigating the nuances of different insurers’ benefits and policies. Thus, <u><strong><mark>even if the admin</mark>istrative<mark> costs of payers remained the same, a public system would</u></strong></mark> undoubtedly <u><strong><mark>save</u></strong></mark> money <u><strong><mark>by reducing admin</mark>istrative<mark> costs incurred by providers</mark>.</u></strong> [See Table 1 for a summary of findings on administrative costs.]</p><p>In a study published in Health Affairs in 2005, <u><strong>James Kahn et al.</u></strong> measured the administrative costs of private insurers, physicians’ offices and hospitals in the American West, then estimated the portion of each category’s administrative costs that was devoted to billing and insurance (BIR) functions. Kahn et al. determined that administrative costs for physicians’ offices ranged from 20.1 to 26.7 percent of revenue (depending on type of practice), and that BIR functions cost between 12.4 and 14.5 percent of revenue.27 They concluded that hospitals’ administrative costs averaged 20.9 percent of revenue, and that hospitals’ BIR functions cost somewhere between 6.6 and 10.8 percent of revenue, depending how the billing share of certain multipurpose functions was apportioned. 28</p><p>A 2009 study published in Health Affairs by <u><strong>Casalino et al.</u></strong> concluded that physicians in the United States spend an average of three hours weekly interacting with health plans at a cost of $23 billion to $31 billion a year.29 But physician time is a relatively small portion of practices’ spending on billing matters. A separate 2009 study by <u><strong>Sakowski et al.,</u></strong> also published in Health Affairs, concluded that physician practices on average devote two-thirds of a full-time employee per physician solely to working on billing and insurance matters. The researchers concluded that the cost to practices, including physicians’ time, to interact with insurance companies was $85,276 annually per physician, or 10 percent of revenue. 30 A 2011 study published in Health Affairs by <u><strong>Morra et al</u></strong>. reached similar results, concluding that office-based physician practices in the United States spend an estimated $82,975 annually per physician interacting with insurance companies. 31 </p><p>A synthesis of research presented by the aforementioned James Kahn to the Institute of Medicine in 2009 estimated that the BIR portion of physician revenue was $70 billion per year, or 13 percent of revenue. For hospital care, Kahn estimated BIR costs of $67 billion. Kahn estimated that if a similar rate could be applied to other categories of providers, such as pharmacies and nursing homes, the total, national BIR costs for all providers was about $214 billion a year. 32</p><p>Estimates on Insurers’ Administrative Costs</p><p>In a study published in Health Affairs in 2005, referenced above, Kahn et al. determined that private insurers’ administrative costs equaled 9.9 percent of premiums. BIR functions made up the majority of such costs, accounting for 8.4 percent of premiums. 33</p><p>A 2009 study by the Vermont Department of Banking, Insurance, Securities and Health Care Administration concluded that the administrative cost for risk-bearing health insurers in Vermont ranged from 10.2 to 13 percent of premiums. Insurer administrative costs for employer-funded (or self-insured) plans ranged from 7.1 to 7.3 percent.34</p><p>Writing for the Commonwealth Fund, <u><strong>Sara Collins et al.</u></strong> estimated that U.S. health insurance overhead costs equaled $155.7 billion in 2007. Of this, $96.2 billion was for private insurance and $59.5 billion for publicly administered programs. Collins et al. found that administrative costs represent 12.2 percent of private health insurance expenditures, compared with 6.1 percent of public program expenditures.35</p><p>Collins et al. also found striking disparities in the administrative costs based on the size of the entity insured. Administrative costs ranged from 5 to 15 percent for group plans for employers with more than 50 employees; 15 to 25 percent for companies with fewer than 50 employees; and up to 40 percent for the individual market. The cost for brokers, alone, in the small-group market, accounted for 4 to 11 percent of premiums, they reported.36</p><p>Writing in the New England Journal of Medicine in 2003, Steffie <u><strong>Woolhandler, et al.</u></strong>, estimated that overhead accounted for 11.7 percent of private insurance costs in 1999, 37 compared with 3.6 percent for Medicare and 6.8 percent for Medicaid.38</p><p>Estimates on Employers’ Administrative Costs</p><p>Though smaller than the administrative cost for providers and insurers, employers also bear substantial expenses to provide health care benefits.</p><p>The 2003 study by Woolhandler et al., referenced above, concluded that employers spent $15.9 billion on benefits administration and health care benefits consultants in 1999. 39 To put that in perspective, employer administrative costs amounted to 22 percent of Woolhandler et al.’s estimate of the total administrative costs paid by health insurance companies. 40</p><p>Estimates on Total Administrative Health Care Costs</p><p>In his presentation to the Institute of Medicine, cited above, Kahn estimated the national, upper bound cost for billing and insurance related costs for providers and insurers at $361 billion in 2009. 41 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services estimated that national health care costs in 2009 were $2.5 trillion.42 Therefore, Kahn’s estimate would yield a conclusion that billing and insurance functions consumed up to 14 percent of national health care costs.</p><p>In their 2003, paper, Woolhandler et al. generated an estimate the for all administrative health care related functions (including, and in addition to, billing functions) for which they were able obtain data. They estimated that total administrative costs accounted for 31 percent ($294.3 billion) of U.S. health care spending in 1999. 43</p><p>Comparisons Between the United States and Other Countries and Between Public and Private</p><p>Systems in the United States</p><p>The aforementioned 2011 study by Morra et al. in Health Affairs concluding that physicians’ practices in the United States spent $82,975 per physician interacting with insurance companies also estimated such costs for practices in Ontario, Canada, where a single-payer system finances many health care services. The authors concluded that Ontario practices spent just $22,205 per physician interacting with insurance companies, or just greater than one-fourth as much as in the United States. 44 The Canadian figure was adjusted upward to account for the reduced purchasing power in Canada; otherwise, the discrepancy would have been slightly greater. The researchers attributed the difference to the multitude of insurance products that U.S. physicians must deal with, the disparities in rules for those products, and requirements for physicians to receive pre-authorization to render care. The researchers concluded that if physician practices in the United States spent the same amount of time on billing issues as those in Canada, the United States would save $27.6 billion annually. The researchers concluded that such savings would be greater if hospital-based practices were included in their study. 45</p><p>The aforementioned study by Collins et al., which estimated that U.S. private health insurance overhead costs equal 12.2 percent of premiums, concluded that U.S. costs were higher as a percentage of national health care costs than in any of 10 other countries in the OECD that they analyzed. Insurance overhead costs accounted for about 7.5 percent of health care spending in the United States by their numbers. In contrast, payers’ overhead costs within the 10 other OECD countries averaged just 4 percent. The other countries’ totals ranged from 1.9 percent (Finland) to 6.9 percent (France).46</p><p>A December 2008 accounting of U.S. health care costs conducted by McKinsey Global Institute concluded that health administration and insurance accounted for costs of $145 billion in 2006. This figure appears from context in the report to include only costs experienced by insurers and other payers, not providers. The study’s authors determined that administration and insurance costs were $91 billion higher than would be expected if U.S. proportions paralleled other countries’ spending after adjusting for relative levels of wealth. Of the $91 billion in excess spending, $30 billion consisted of private insurers’ profits and taxes.47</p><p><u><strong><mark>“A multi-payer</mark> system <mark>(and a multistate</u></strong></mark> regulated <u><strong><mark>system) creates extra costs and inefficiencies</u></strong></mark> in the form of redundant marketing, underwriting, and management overhead that other OECD countries, which have less fragmented systems, bear to a lesser extent,” the McKinsey authors wrote.48</p><p><u><strong><mark>Woolhandler</mark> et al.</u></strong> (2003) <u><strong><mark>estimated</mark> total <mark>admin</mark>istrative<mark> costs in Canada to</mark> equal <mark>16.7 percent of</u></strong></mark> national <u><strong><mark>health care</mark> costs, <mark>compared with 31 percent in the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates.49</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Stephen Vladeck & Robert Chesney 4/1, Vladeck is A. Dalton Cross Professor in Law at the University of Texas School of Law, where he specializes in national security law, especially with relation to the prosecution of war crimes; Chesney is Charles I. Francis Professor in Law at The University of Texas School of Law, where he serves as the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and teaches courses relating to U.S. national security and constitutional law, “Episode 161: This Podcast Was Recorded “Before There Were Privacy Laws” The National Security Law Podcast.” Transcribed by Otter, edited by Truf, 04/01/2020, www.nationalsecuritylawpodcast.com, https://www.nationalsecuritylawpodcast.com/episode-161-this-podcast-was-recorded-before-there-were-privacy-laws/ Robert Chesney 22:16 fulltext: What is it you would want to see? Okay, so we should articulate what you and I know is the countervailing consideration that that acts as the counterweight in this process. Obviously, we're not going to move, not just as a predictive matter, but I'm suggesting as a merits matter, we not only are not going to but should not move to a situation in which the proposed target of the surveillance is involved in any way and I don't know anyone who would argue otherwise because that's [that is] tantamount to just not doing it at all. What is it you think would be a reasonable way to enable the requisite speed and efficiency of trying to monitor foreign agents foreign intelligence threats, foreign terrorism threats, without tipping off in advance? Are you interested in having, creating more ex ante anticipation of review by creating stronger post hoc tools? Do you want to instead see more ex ante or contemporaneous tools? Steve Vladeck 25:29 I think this actually dovetails with stuff I've written about more generally, I think national security law is a field of law where ex ante tools are much harder to defend normatively than ex post tools because, you know, in this context, what would ex ante tools look like? You're not going to put a lawyer in the FISA court to argue against the government's FISA application, because you know, who's gonna know who the target is, besides the government? No, I mean, I think the the right way to do this, Bobby, is a series of after the fact checking and auditing mechanisms that exert hydraulic pressure on the process to be cleaner on the front end. And so instead of a one off Horwitz audit, right, what about regular audits of individual, of a randomly selected cross section of Title I applications? Robert Chesney 26:26 So for example, taking exactly what's done here, and having this be a statutorily required recurring process that ensures that an agent who's in a huge rush, is under tremendous pressure, puts their life on the line on a regular basis, and is worried about other people's lives, nonetheless knows that, it's not just an easy out where you can blow off something, yeah, Woods Procedures, fill in the blank, I said a few words, now onto the thing I want to work on, but rather knows that there's a decent chance that happens all the time that somebody's case from last year gets pulled for audit and then you get blasted and it looks bad on review. And if you know that's the case then you tick the needle over a little bit into how much time and effort the agents will put into actually following the procedures, which on their face are good procedures, it's the execution we're being told here is shoddy. I think that actually to me, sounds pretty reasonable. You know, I am not moving closer to your view. I think both of us are just going to keep the same relative distance between us in terms of general level of trust. I'm assuming your general level of trust is going down, mine's moving some, we may just be moving in lockstep - a lowering tide lowering all boats proportionally. Steve Vladeck 27:46 Although I started much lower. Robert Chesney 27:47 Yeah, you're starting much lower. I'm starting much higher. And but I nonetheless think what you're describing sounds pretty reasonable and frankly, not particularly disruptive. I appreciate that you're focusing on ex post procedures as opposed to what the usual argument you hear people say is, "oh, we gotta put an amicus in there in all settings to litigate the way that America does litigation." All right, hold on, I have some requests for you to go fill out! I've got a lot of paperwork for you now to consider. Steve Vladeck 28:15 But so I said I had three ideas, and I wanted to sort of get them all on the table. Robert Chesney 28:18 Okay, that was just one. Steve Vladeck 28:19 Right. So one is one is mandate, by statute, periodic random audits of Title I applications. The second, and this is gonna sort of be in some tension with what you just said, but in the cases in which there already is authority to appoint an amicus, I would go back to the original proposal in the what was called the Leahy Bill in the 2015 FISA reform, the 2014-2015 FISA reform, and make the amicus not an amicus, make it mandatory. Not in all cases, Bobby, for the reasons you say, but stop having this sort of mechanism where it depends upon the court saying "I need help," right, as opposed to, mandateing the participation, at least in those cases where the statute already allows participation, which is to say, cases raising novel questions of law, or important questions of law under the statute. And then the... Robert Chesney 29:14 Before the third one, I just want to ask a question about that one. Steve Vladeck 29:15 Yeah. Robert Chesney 29:16 Would you would you agree the - both Horowitz reports, very, very problematic findings. They're not about that. That, to me is about the sorts of issues that were raised by... Steve Vladeck 29:30 That's right. And it's not clear to me that an amicus participating in the FISA court process, even in a Title I case, like a Carter Page type case, would have anywhere near enough information to actually, you know, point out the things that Horowitz can point out from behind the scenes as the Inspector General. Robert Chesney 29:50 I'd be very opposed to that sort of participation. Steve Vladeck 29:53 Right. Which is why it should be, you know, sort of, in the cases where the statue already exists, just make it a stronger power. But then third, and this is the one that I think comes back to Title I. So, you know, but I think listeners may not sort of follow this jot and tiddle, that FISA itself provides a procedure in any criminal case in which the government wants to introduce evidence derived from FISA for the defendant to collaterally attack the underlying FISA warrant. The statute, I think it's 1806(f), 50 USC Section 1806(f), provides at least what looks like it's [it is] supposed to be what's called a Franks Hearing, and this is named after the 1978 Supreme Court case, Franks v. Delaware. And the idea is that if the defendant can offer some non-speculative, some sort of plausible reason for thinking that there might be a problem with the warrant application, then he, or at least his security-cleared lawyer, should be allowed to look at the underlying application in order to help the judge determine whether it was invalid. This provision has been read quite narrowly by the courts that have carefully considered it. I think, Bobby, you might remember the seventh circuit's 2014 decision in the Daoud case, which was the most prominent one, where Judge Posner really went after a district judge who had, the district judge basically said in order to know which materials are relevant to the Franks Hearing, I need the security-cleared defense lawyer to be able to see the whole application. And Posner says, that's totally crazy. And read 1806(f) incredibly narrowly. I think it's worth having a conversation, Bobby, about whether 1806(f) is actually serving its purpose, and whether one of the other ways to put pressure on the government to really have its ducks in a row when it's pursuing a FISA application is to put more teeth into the defendant's right to collaterally attack the application if and when the government's going to use evidence against him in a criminal trial. Now, I should say, I mean, this is not a surprise to anyone, it's a tiny fraction of FISA cases that ever end up in that context, where the government's trying to bring 1806 evidence, trying to bring FISA evidence into a criminal case triggering 1806(f), but Bobby, again, I think the hydraulic pressure of having that out there, and of the government knowing that this application could, one day, be meaningfully scrutinized by an Article III, civilian, you know, non-FISA Court judge in the context of a motion to suppress, you know, I have to think that would have a salutary effect on the rigor and procedural propriety of what the government does. Robert Chesney 32:40 So would you feel equally comfortable if, so, the status quo is that it's clear, the judge certainly has authority to consider it - it's a question of whether the judge does it ex parte which is what always happens, or if instead the judge actually allows some adversariality in the review of the file. Would you be more or less satisfied if there was an amicus in that context so that it was not the defendant's own lawyer? Because you put the defendant's own lawyer in a pretty impossible position if they get exposed - first of all, the majority of these cases, they're not going to be in a position to have the clearances, and it's going to gum up the works to try to get them to that position. Steve Vladeck 33:18 Is that true? Is that true that in a majority of these cases, the defendant doesn't have the security clear defense counsel? Robert Chesney 33:24 I don't know. I don't know. That's just my assumption. That was... Steve Vladeck 33:27 My anecdotal experience, Bobby, and anecdotes are not data, but my anecdotal experience, the cases I'm familiar with, all invariably involve security-cleared defense counsel. I'm sorry, I didn't mean to throw you off. Robert Chesney 33:38 No, that's good. It's a fair point because I was asserting it like it's empirically documented. I don't know. So I'm happy to - let's just assume it's otherwise, they've all got clearance. They also have a duty to zealously represent their clients and you put them in a very difficult, difficult ethical position. They're the ones best situated to look for the problems, of course, because they know the case best, and amicus is a huge disadvantage. On the other hand, putting them in a position to potentially be exposed to information that the client may not be told is, as we learned in, say, the Moussaoui litigation and some other settings, that can be really problematic, too. But I also think you're just much more likely to actually get such an innovation if the 1806(f) motion to get some adversariality involved ran towards getting one of the standing amicus persons involved. Now that said, I that's actually, I think that's already within the courts authority. And it may be something they could do without any type of obligation. Steve Vladeck 34:38 But you could make it mandatory. You could make it mandatory. You could also sort of tie the existing amucus provisions in the FISA court to 1806(f) in civilian court. I just think there are there are ways, Bobby, that would not dramatically upset the government's internal processes, where you could put some real teeth into some of the few, sort of, back-end checking mechanisms that are out there that I think would go a long way toward incentivizing, sort of, reduction of shenanigans, reduction of sloppiness, and much more care on the government's part.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Plan <u>threads the needle</u>, causing <u>downstream effects</u> for the <u>entire FISA process</u> without unduly limiting investigation speed. </h4><p>Stephen <strong>Vladeck &</strong> Robert <strong>Chesney 4/1</strong>, Vladeck is A. Dalton Cross Professor in Law at the University of Texas School of Law, where he specializes in national security law, especially with relation to the prosecution of war crimes; Chesney is Charles I. Francis Professor in Law at The University of Texas School of Law, where he serves as the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and teaches courses relating to U.S. national security and constitutional law, “Episode 161: This Podcast Was Recorded “Before There Were Privacy Laws” The National Security Law Podcast.” Transcribed by Otter, edited by Truf, 04/01/2020, www.nationalsecuritylawpodcast.com, https://www.nationalsecuritylawpodcast.com/episode-161-this-podcast-was-recorded-before-there-were-privacy-laws/</p><p>Robert Chesney 22:16 </p><p>What is it you would want to see? Okay, so we should articulate what you and I know is the countervailing consideration that that acts as the counterweight in this process. <u>Obviously</u>, we're not going to move, not just as a predictive matter, but I'm suggesting as a merits matter, <u>we not only</u> <u><strong>are not</u></strong> <u>going to but</u> <u><strong>should not</u></strong> <u>move to <mark>a situation in which the</mark> <strong>proposed <mark>target</u></strong></mark> <u>of the surveillance <mark>is <strong>involved</mark> in any way</u></strong> <u>and I don't know anyone who would argue otherwise because that's [that <mark>is</mark>] <strong><mark>tantamount to</mark> just <mark>not doing it at all</strong>. What</u></mark> is it you think <u><strong><mark>would</strong></mark> be a</u> <u><strong>reasonable way</u></strong> <u>to <mark>enable</mark> the requisite <strong><mark>speed and efficiency</u></strong></mark> <u>of trying to monitor foreign agents foreign intelligence threats, foreign terrorism threats,</u> <u><strong><mark>without tipping off in advance?</u></strong></mark> Are you interested in having, creating more ex ante anticipation of review by creating stronger post hoc tools? Do you want to instead see more ex ante or contemporaneous tools? </p><p>Steve Vladeck 25:29 </p><p>I think this actually dovetails with stuff I've written about more generally, I think national security law is a field of law where <u><strong><mark>ex ante</u></strong> <u>tools are</u></mark> <u><strong>much <mark>hard</strong></mark>er <strong><mark>to defend</strong></mark> normatively than ex post tools because, you know, in this context, what would ex ante tools look like? You're not going to put a</u> <u><strong>lawyer</u></strong> <u>in the FISA court to argue against the government's FISA application</u>, because you know, who's gonna know who the target is, besides the government? No, I mean, I think the <u><mark>the</u> <u><strong>right way</u></strong></mark> <u>to do this</u>, Bobby, <u><mark>is</u></mark> a series of <u><strong><mark>after the fact checking</u></strong></mark> <u>and</u> <u><strong>auditing</u></strong> <u>mechanisms <mark>that exert</u></mark> <u><strong>hydraulic <mark>pressure</strong></mark> on the process <mark>to be <strong>cleaner on the front end</u></strong></mark>. And so instead of a one off Horwitz audit, right, what about regular audits of individual, of a randomly selected cross section of Title I applications?</p><p>Robert Chesney 26:26 </p><p>So for example, taking exactly what's done here, and having this be a statutorily required recurring process that ensures that an agent who's in a huge rush, is under tremendous pressure, puts their life on the line on a regular basis, and is worried about other people's lives, nonetheless knows that, it's not just an easy out where you can blow off something, yeah, Woods Procedures, fill in the blank, I said a few words, now onto the thing I want to work on, but rather knows that there's a decent chance that happens all the time that somebody's case from last year gets pulled for audit and then you get blasted and it looks bad on review. And if you know that's the case then you tick the needle over a little bit into how much time and effort the agents will put into actually following the procedures, which on their face are good procedures, it's the execution we're being told here is shoddy. I think that actually to me, sounds pretty reasonable. You know, I am not moving closer to your view. I think both of us are just going to keep the same relative distance between us in terms of general level of trust. I'm assuming your general level of trust is going down, mine's moving some, we may just be moving in lockstep - a lowering tide lowering all boats proportionally. </p><p>Steve Vladeck 27:46 </p><p>Although I started much lower. </p><p>Robert Chesney 27:47 </p><p>Yeah, you're starting much lower. I'm starting much higher. And but I nonetheless think what you're describing sounds pretty reasonable and frankly, not particularly disruptive. I appreciate that you're focusing on ex post procedures as opposed to what the usual argument you hear people say is, "oh, we gotta put an amicus in there in all settings to litigate the way that America does litigation." All right, hold on, I have some requests for you to go fill out! I've got a lot of paperwork for you now to consider.</p><p>Steve Vladeck 28:15 </p><p>But so I said I had three ideas, and I wanted to sort of get them all on the table. </p><p>Robert Chesney 28:18 </p><p>Okay, that was just one. </p><p>Steve Vladeck 28:19 </p><p>Right. So one is one is mandate, by statute, periodic random audits of Title I applications. The second, and this is gonna sort of be in some tension with what you just said, but in the cases in which there already is authority to appoint an amicus, I would go back to the original proposal in the what was called the Leahy Bill in the 2015 FISA reform, the 2014-2015 FISA reform, and make the amicus not an amicus, make it mandatory. Not in all cases, Bobby, for the reasons you say, but stop having this sort of mechanism where it depends upon the court saying "I need help," right, as opposed to, mandateing the participation, at least in those cases where the statute already allows participation, which is to say, cases raising novel questions of law, or important questions of law under the statute. And then the...</p><p>Robert Chesney 29:14 </p><p>Before the third one, I just want to ask a question about that one. </p><p>Steve Vladeck 29:15 </p><p>Yeah. </p><p>Robert Chesney 29:16 </p><p>Would you would you agree the - both Horowitz reports, very, very problematic findings. They're not about that. That, to me is about the sorts of issues that were raised by... </p><p>Steve Vladeck 29:30 </p><p>That's right. And it's not clear to me that an amicus participating in the FISA court process, even in a Title I case, like a Carter Page type case, would have anywhere near enough information to actually, you know, point out the things that Horowitz can point out from behind the scenes as the Inspector General.</p><p>Robert Chesney 29:50 </p><p>I'd be very opposed to that sort of participation.</p><p>Steve Vladeck 29:53 </p><p>Right. Which is why it should be, you know, sort of, in the cases where the statue already exists, just make it a stronger power. But then third, and this is the one that I think comes back to Title I. So, you know, but I think listeners may not sort of follow this jot and tiddle, that <u><mark>FISA</u></mark> itself <u><mark>provides</mark> a</u> <u><strong>procedure</u></strong> <u>in any</u> <u><strong>criminal case</u></strong> <u>in which the government wants to introduce evidence derived from FISA for the <strong>defendant</u></strong> <u>to</u> <u><strong>collaterally attack the underlying FISA warrant</strong>. The statute</u>, I think it's 1806(f), <u><strong>50 USC Section 1806(f)</u></strong>, <u>provides at least <mark>what</mark> looks like it's [it <mark>is</mark>] <mark>supposed to be</mark> what's called <mark>a</u> <u><strong>Franks Hearing</u></strong></mark>, and this is named after the 1978 Supreme Court case, Franks v. Delaware. And <u>the idea is that if the defendant can offer some non-speculative, some sort of plausible reason for thinking that there might be a problem with the warrant application, then he, or at least his security-cleared lawyer, should be allowed to</u> <u><strong>look at the underlying application</u></strong> in order <u>to help the judge determine whether it was</u> <u><strong>invalid</strong>. This</u> provision <u><mark>has been read</u></mark> <u><strong>quite narrowly by the courts</u></strong> <u>that have carefully considered it</u>. I think, Bobby, you might remember <u>the</u> <u><strong>seventh circuit</u></strong>'s 2014 decision in the Daoud case, which was the most prominent one, where Judge Posner really went after a district judge who had, the district judge basically said in order to know which materials are relevant to the Franks Hearing, I need the security-cleared defense lawyer to be able to see the whole application. And Posner says, that's totally crazy. And <u>read 1806(f)</u> <u><strong><mark>incredibly narrowly</u></strong></mark>. I think <u>it's worth having a conversation</u>, Bobby, <u>about whether 1806(f) is</u> <u><strong>actually serving its purpose</strong>, and whether <mark>one of the</mark> other <mark>ways to</mark> put <strong><mark>pressure</mark> on <mark>the government</strong> to</mark> really <mark>have its ducks in a row</mark> when it's pursuing a FISA application is <mark>to put</mark> more <strong><mark>teeth into the</strong></mark> defendant's <strong><mark>right to</strong></mark> collaterally <strong><mark>attack the application</u></strong></mark> if and <u><strong><mark>when the government's going to use evidence</mark> against him <mark>in a</mark> criminal <mark>trial</u></strong></mark>. Now, I should say, I mean, this is not a surprise to anyone, <u><mark>it's a <strong>tiny fraction</strong> of FISA</mark> cases that ever end up in that context, where the government's trying to bring 1806 evidence, trying to bring FISA evidence into a criminal case triggering 1806(f), <mark>but</u></mark> Bobby, again, I think <u><mark>the <strong>hydraulic pressure</strong> of</mark> having that out there, and of the government <mark>knowing</mark> that <mark>this</mark> application <mark>could</mark>, one day, <mark>be</u></mark> meaningfully <u><strong><mark>scrutinized by a</strong></mark>n Article III</u>, civilian, you know, <u>non-FISA</u> Court <u><mark>judge in</mark> the context of <mark>a <strong>motion to suppress</u></strong></mark>, you know, I have to think <u>that <mark>would have a</u> <u><strong>salutary effect</mark> on the rigor and procedural propriety of what the government does</u></strong>.</p><p>Robert Chesney 32:40 </p><p>So would you feel equally comfortable if, so, the status quo is that it's clear, the judge certainly has authority to consider it - <u>it's a question of whether the judge does it</u> <u><strong>ex parte</u></strong> <u>which is what always happens, or if instead the judge actually allows some</u> <u><strong>adversariality</u></strong> <u>in the review of the file</u>. Would you be more or less satisfied if there was an amicus in that context so that it was not the defendant's own lawyer? Because you put the defendant's own lawyer in a pretty impossible position if they get exposed - first of all, the majority of these cases, they're not going to be in a position to have the clearances, and it's going to gum up the works to try to get them to that position. </p><p>Steve Vladeck 33:18 </p><p>Is that true? Is that true that in a majority of these cases, the defendant doesn't have the security clear defense counsel? </p><p>Robert Chesney 33:24 </p><p>I don't know. I don't know. That's just my assumption. That was...</p><p>Steve Vladeck 33:27 </p><p>My anecdotal experience, Bobby, and anecdotes are not data, but my anecdotal experience, the cases I'm familiar with, all invariably involve <u><mark>security-cleared defense counsel</u></mark>. I'm sorry, I didn't mean to throw you off.</p><p>Robert Chesney 33:38 </p><p>No, that's good. It's a fair point because I was asserting it like it's empirically documented. I don't know. So I'm happy to - let's just assume it's otherwise, they've all got clearance. They also <u><mark>have a</u> <u><strong>duty</u></strong> <u>to</u></mark> <u><strong>zealously <mark>represent their clients</u></strong></mark> and you put them in a very difficult, difficult ethical position. <u><mark>They're</mark> the</u> ones <u><strong><mark>best situated to look for</mark> the <mark>problems</u></strong></mark>, of course, <u><mark>because they <strong>know the case best</u></strong></mark>, and <u><strong><mark>amicus</u></strong> <u>is a</u> <u><strong>huge disadvantage</u></strong></mark>. On the other hand, putting them in a position to potentially be exposed to information that the client may not be told is, as we learned in, say, the Moussaoui litigation and some other settings, that can be really problematic, too. But I also think you're just much more likely to actually get such an innovation if the 1806(f) motion to get some adversariality involved ran towards getting one of the standing amicus persons involved. Now that said, I that's actually, I think that's already within the courts authority. And it may be something they could do without any type of obligation. </p><p>Steve Vladeck 34:38 </p><p>But you could make it mandatory. You could make it mandatory. You could also sort of tie the existing amucus provisions in the FISA court to 1806(f) in civilian court. I just think there are <u>there are ways</u>, Bobby, <u>that would <strong>not dramatically upset the government's internal processes</strong>, where you could put</u> some <u><strong>real teeth</u></strong> <u>into</u> some of <u>the</u> few, sort of, <u><strong>back-end checking mechanisms</u></strong> <u>that are out there that</u> I think <u>would go a long way toward</u> <u><strong><mark>incentivizing</u></strong></mark>, sort of, <u><strong><mark>reduction of shenanigans</strong>,</mark> reduction <mark>of</u> <u><strong>sloppiness</strong>, and</mark> much <mark>more</u> <u><strong>care</u></strong></mark> <u>on the government's part</u>.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Chait Jan 30, 2015 (Secret confessions of the anti-anti-PC movement; nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/01/secret-confessions-of-the-anti-anti-pc-crowd.html; kdf) fulltext: I write frequently about health care. Nobody has ever thought to insinuate that my strong advocacy of Obamacare reflects a personal reliance on the law to insure my own family, which is fortunate enough to have had employer-provided insurance before the law took effect. Even my strongest critics understood that I advocated the law as a generalized good, not as a matter of self-interest. My recent article on political correctness provoked a very different and unusual response. The story describes a set of social norms and protocols within communities of the left that make meaningful disagreement impossible on issues related to race and gender. I decided to reclaim the widely misused term political correctness rather than invent my own. Within these p.c. subcultures, outrage is pervasive, a charge of bias cannot be disputed without further confirming its truth, and there is a presumed right to be “safe” from opposing views, which can even justify the heavy-handed squelching of opposing views. (I described in some detail an incident where a professor seized an anti-abortion poster, not because this episode shows it is no longer possible to protest abortion, but because the multiple defenses of her behavior displayed the lengths to which p.c. ideology can extend its idea of “safety.”) One possible response would be to defend these practices on normative grounds — the sort of confident defense that a confirmed left-wing critic of liberalism like Catharine MacKinnon might make. Another possible response might be to question the veracity of the description I provided. Interestingly, the critics chose neither response. Instead they settled on a strange line of attack: that the essay represents special pleading on my own behalf, a comical complaint of victimization. This theme supplied most or all of the rhetorical power in the replies written by Anne Theriault (“In New York Magazine, Jonathan Chait discusses how hard it is to be a white man these days”), Glenn Greenwald (“a trite note of self-victimization”), Amanda Marcotte (“Chait has no problem trying to silence anyone who says something that might hurt his feelings”), Alex Pareene ("here is sad white man Jonathan Chait's essay about the difficulty of being a white man in the second age of 'political correctness'”), Jia Tolentino, Jessica Valenti, and many others. Some of these replies quote the headline to the story — which, in the print edition, asked, “Can a white male liberal critique the country's current political-correctness craze (which, by the way, hurts liberals most)? We're sure you'll let us know.” This was my editors’ playful way to provocatively anticipate the firestorm the piece would set off. It was not a summary of the piece itself. And indeed, nothing in the story actually expresses any sense of victimization on behalf of myself or of white males. (Few of the sympathetic figures in the story are white males.) The story’s critics have repeated their claim that I am personally upset so often, they have come to take it as an obvious fact. (“It's understandable that Chait, and the many others who agree with him,” writes Amanda Taub faux-sympathetically, “find it so upsetting to be on the receiving end of what he refers to as ‘P.C.’ criticism.”) I am not upset in the slightest degree. Nor do I count myself among those whose freedom of expression is constrained by p.c. culture — as evidenced by, among other things, the existence of my story itself. The examples of p.c. culture described in the piece affect many people, but not me. If there were a single sentence in the story expressing self-pity, it would be widely quoted by the critics, but no such line can be found. (Belle Waring, unable to find any quotes substantiating her characterization of my views, actually goes so far as to invent her own quotes that supposedly describe my thinking.) Nor is such a sentiment hidden, lurking somewhere outside the text. I don’t feel victimized in any way by political correctness or (as some have alleged, in one strange variant of the charge) by new media, which has been a boon to me. I feel, with regard to my career and my place in American society, things have never been better. The response partly reflects the p.c. culture’s inability to evaluate arguments about identity as abstract arguments rather than reflections of the author’s own identity. But it also shows something else. The intensely personal and mostly imagined response reveals a fact about the left that is actually encouraging. My interlocutors have little appetite to defend the norms of p.c. culture. Some of them concede as an aside that they more or less share my critique (Valenti: “there is a good conversation to be had over how ideological one-upmanship and ‘call out culture’ impacts rigorous debate.” Marcotte: “To be clear, Chait has plenty of examples of what has become a genuinely serious problem of liberals who react to uncomfortable ideas by turning to censorship.” Etc.) They object to the problem being framed in a way that strikes them as an attack on their own culture from an outsider. “There's a lot about this lefty PC culture to criticize but it's an internal problem,” writes Heather Digby Parton, revealingly. Only Taub is dogmatic enough to insist that political correctness does not (and, as a matter of a priori ideological truth, cannot) exist. They don’t want to hear a critique of p.c. that appears to implicate themselves and their friends, and above all, they don’t want to hear it from goddamn Jonathan Chait. Many of the responses devote considerable space to recounting my past ideological offenses as a way of underscoring their conviction that I lack the standing to criticize their community. This tribal response is a natural one — I embarrassingly succumbed to it in 2006, when I argued, incoherently, that Joe Lieberman was annoying but the people attacking him annoyed me even more. But the personalized character of the response also shows my critics are not so much pro-p.c. as anti-anti-p.c., which is not exactly the same thing. ** There is also another line of thought running through some of the replies that does not rely on any personal animus against me. (Indeed, several of my friends have made versions of it.) Political correctness may involve “overcorrections,” argues Megan Garber, but only in the noble service of tolerance. The argument concedes that, yes, political correctness may be bad, but racism and sexism are worse. Why should we concern ourselves with the lesser evil rather than the greater evil against which it is directed? The first response to this objection is practical. The assumption that political correctness is perhaps too effective at fighting bias presumes that it is effective at all. But is it? An alternative possibility, which I find plausible but which can’t be proven, is that p.c. provokes a backlash that hinders the struggle against bias. Associating charges of racism or sexism with tendentious ideological hectoring naturally makes people more skeptical of the veracity of any such charges. What’s more, it is true, as anti-anti-p.c. critics charge, that complaints about political correctness are frequently used to defend beliefs or behaviors that don’t deserve defense. But it is easier to conceal racism or sexism behind complaints about political correctness when political correctness is real. The same dynamic was probably true with McCarthyism. (I am not equating the two phenomena in scale, but merely describing a similarity in the style of arguments surrounding them.) McCarthyism supplied American communists with the romantic aura of unjust persecution, and it taught many liberals to treat any charge of communism with reflexive suspicion. Actual communists hid their noxious beliefs under the guise of anti-McCarthyism in exactly the same way that actual racists hide their beliefs in the guise of anti-political-correctness. Communism in the 1950s was a very real and very terrifying threat, and yet the most effective response to it was probably not indiscriminate accusations of communist sympathy. The second response is that, irrespective of its practical impact, making distinctions is important and valuable. Voting may present us with limited and imperfect choices. But when we analyze the world, we don’t need to restrict ourselves to binary choices. We can oppose both racism and inappropriate responses to racism. Indeed, that kind of multifaceted thinking is a special responsibility for liberals. The objection to my argument from the right is just the opposite: that my condemnation of p.c. is too limited, and for different reasons, likewise self-serving. National Review’s Kevin Williamson, like many jeering conservatives, objects that I only object to p.c. when it is used against white liberals. (To find an example of me describing a target of p.c. who is neither white nor liberal, you need to read all the way to … the first sentence.) Another way in which my definition of “political correctness” differs from Williamson’s is that I am comfortable imputing racism to things like describing a black person in animalistic terms and calling them a “primate.” The critics of my argument from right and left share an apparent belief that we must either endorse all the accusations of racism or none of them. Taub, for instance, argues, “An example from outside of Chait's article makes it easy to see how that technique works in practice,” and she proceeds to describe a controversy over the offensive name “Washington Redskins.” Now, the fact that Taub has to go outside my article is itself an important signal of her inability to grapple with the facts within it. Because, of course, it may be true, as she points out, that some defenders of the Redskins’ name have described efforts to change it as “political correctness.” But I did not and would not describe it that way. The fact that some people use allegations of political correctness inappropriately does not make p.c. nonexistent. Naturally, people will disagree about the legitimate definition of which ideas are bigoted and which are not. I do not claim omniscience in settling these disputes — Michelle Goldberg and Freddie deBoer land on conclusions similar but not quite identical to my own. I submit that the answers need to be arrived at through reason, a channel to which everybody has access regardless of identity. That settling these questions through reason rather than through appeals to identity has become controversial is, of course, my point.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Their criticisms merely prove our args</h4><p><strong>Chait</strong> Jan 30, <strong>2015 <u></strong>(Secret confessions of the anti-anti-PC movement; nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/01/secret-confessions-of-the-anti-anti-pc-crowd.html; kdf)</p><p></u>I write frequently about health care. Nobody has ever thought to insinuate that my strong advocacy of Obamacare reflects a personal reliance on the law to insure my own family, which is fortunate enough to have had employer-provided insurance before the law took effect. Even my strongest critics understood that I advocated the law as a generalized good, not as a matter of self-interest. My recent article on political correctness provoked a very different and unusual response. <u>The story describes a set of social norms and protocols within communities of the left that make meaningful disagreement impossible on issues related to race and gender</u>. I decided to reclaim the widely misused term political correctness rather than invent my own. Within these p.c. subcultures, <u>outrage is pervasive</u>, a charge of bias cannot be disputed without further confirming its truth<u>, and there is a presumed right to be “safe” from opposing views, which can even justify the heavy-handed squelching of opposing views</u>. (I described in some detail an incident where a professor seized an anti-abortion poster, not because this episode shows it is no longer possible to protest abortion, but because the multiple defenses of her behavior displayed the lengths to which p.c. ideology can extend its idea of “safety.”) <u>One possible response would be to defend these practices on normative grounds</u> — the sort of confident defense that a confirmed left-wing critic of liberalism like Catharine MacKinnon might make. <u>Another possible response might be to question the veracity of the description I provided. Interestingly, the critics chose neither response</u>. <u>Instead they settled on a strange line of attack: that the essay represents special pleading on my own behalf</u>, a comical complaint of victimization. This theme supplied most or all of the rhetorical power in the replies written by Anne Theriault (“In New York Magazine, Jonathan Chait discusses how hard it is to be a white man these days”), Glenn Greenwald (“a trite note of self-victimization”), Amanda Marcotte (“Chait has no problem trying to silence anyone who says something that might hurt his feelings”), Alex Pareene ("here is sad white man Jonathan Chait's essay about the difficulty of being a white man in the second age of 'political correctness'”), Jia Tolentino, Jessica Valenti, and many others. Some of these replies quote the headline to the story — which, in the print edition, asked, “Can a white male liberal critique the country's current political-correctness craze (which, by the way, hurts liberals most)? We're sure you'll let us know.” This was my editors’ playful way to provocatively anticipate the firestorm the piece would set off. It was not a summary of the piece itself. And indeed, <u>nothing in the story actually expresses any sense of victimization on behalf of myself or of white males. </u>(Few of the sympathetic figures in the story are white males.) The story’s critics have repeated their claim that I am personally upset so often, they have come to take it as an obvious fact. (“It's understandable that Chait, and the many others who agree with him,” writes Amanda Taub faux-sympathetically, “find it so upsetting to be on the receiving end of what he refers to as ‘P.C.’ criticism.”) <u>I am not upset in the slightest degree. Nor do I count myself among those whose freedom of expression is constrained by p.c. culture</u> — as evidenced by, among other things, the existence of my story itself. The examples of p.c. culture described in the piece affect many people, but not me. <u>If there were a single sentence in the story expressing self-pity, it would be widely quoted by the critics, but no such line can be found</u>. (Belle Waring, unable to find any quotes substantiating her characterization of my views, actually goes so far as to invent her own quotes that supposedly describe my thinking.) Nor is such a sentiment hidden, lurking somewhere outside the text. I don’t feel victimized in any way by political correctness or (as some have alleged, in one strange variant of the charge) by new media, which has been a boon to me. I feel, with regard to my career and my place in American society, things have never been better. <u><strong>The response partly reflects the p.c. culture’s inability to evaluate arguments about identity as abstract arguments rather than reflections of the author’s own identity. </u></strong>But it also shows something else. <u>The intensely personal and mostly imagined response reveals a fact about the left that is actually encouraging.</u> <u>My interlocutors have little appetite to defend the norms of p.c. culture. Some of them concede as an aside that they more or less share my critique</u> (Valenti: “there is a good conversation to be had over how ideological one-upmanship and ‘call out culture’ impacts rigorous debate.” Marcotte: “To be clear, Chait has plenty of examples of what has become a genuinely serious problem of liberals who react to uncomfortable ideas by turning to censorship.” Etc.) They object to the problem being framed in a way that strikes them as an attack on their own culture from an outsider. “There's a lot about this lefty PC culture to criticize but it's an internal problem,” writes Heather Digby Parton, revealingly. Only Taub is dogmatic enough to insist that political correctness does not (and, as a matter of a priori ideological truth, cannot) exist. <u>They don’t want to hear a critique of p.c. that appears to implicate themselves and their friends, and above all, they don’t want to hear it from goddamn Jonathan Chait</u>. <u>Many of the responses devote considerable space to recounting my past ideological offenses as a way of underscoring their conviction that I lack the standing to criticize their community.</u> This tribal response is a natural one — I embarrassingly succumbed to it in 2006, when I argued, incoherently, that Joe Lieberman was annoying but the people attacking him annoyed me even more<u>. But the personalized character of the response also shows my critics are not so much pro-p.c. as anti-anti-p.c., which is not exactly the same thing. </u>** There is also another line of thought running through some of the replies that does not rely on any personal animus against me. (Indeed, several of my friends have made versions of it.) <u>Political correctness may involve “overcorrections</u>,” argues Megan Garber, but only in the noble service of tolerance. <u>The argument concedes that, yes, political correctness may be bad, but racism and sexism are worse.</u> Why should we concern ourselves with the lesser evil rather than the greater evil against which it is directed? <u>The first response to this objection is practical</u>. The assumption that political correctness is perhaps too effective at fighting bias presumes that it is effective at all. But is it? An alternative possibility, which I find plausible but which can’t be proven, is that p.<u>c. provokes a backlash that hinders the struggle against bias. Associating charges of racism or sexism with tendentious ideological hectoring naturally makes people more skeptical of the veracity of any such charges. </u>What’s more, it is true, as anti-anti-p.c. critics charge, that complaints about political correctness are frequently used to defend beliefs or behaviors that don’t deserve defense. <u><strong>But it is easier to conceal racism or sexism behind complaints about political correctness when political correctness is real</u></strong>. The same dynamic was probably true with McCarthyism. (I am not equating the two phenomena in scale, but merely describing a similarity in the style of arguments surrounding them.) McCarthyism supplied American communists with the romantic aura of unjust persecution, and it taught many liberals to treat any charge of communism with reflexive suspicion. Actual communists hid their noxious beliefs under the guise of anti-McCarthyism in exactly the same way that actual racists hide their beliefs in the guise of anti-political-correctness. Communism in the 1950s was a very real and very terrifying threat, and yet the most effective response to it was probably not indiscriminate accusations of communist sympathy. The second response is that, irrespective of its practical impact, making distinctions is important and valuable. <u><strong>Voting may present us with limited and imperfect choices. But when we analyze the world, we don’t need to restrict ourselves to binary choices. We can oppose both racism and inappropriate responses to racism.</u></strong> Indeed, that kind of multifaceted thinking is a special responsibility for liberals. The objection to my argument from the right is just the opposite: that my condemnation of p.c. is too limited, and for different reasons, likewise self-serving. National Review’s Kevin Williamson, like many jeering conservatives, objects that I only object to p.c. when it is used against white liberals. (To find an example of me describing a target of p.c. who is neither white nor liberal, you need to read all the way to … the first sentence.) Another way in which my definition of “political correctness” differs from Williamson’s is that I am comfortable imputing racism to things like describing a black person in animalistic terms and calling them a “primate.” <u>The critics of my argument from right and left share an apparent belief that we must either endorse all the accusations of racism or none of them</u>. Taub, for instance, argues, “An example from outside of Chait's article makes it easy to see how that technique works in practice,” and she proceeds to describe a controversy over the offensive name “Washington Redskins.” Now, the fact that Taub has to go outside my article is itself an important signal of her inability to grapple with the facts within it. Because, of course, it may be true, as she points out, that some defenders of the Redskins’ name have described efforts to change it as “political correctness.” But I did not and would not describe it that way. The fact that some people use allegations of political correctness inappropriately does not make p.c. nonexistent. Naturally<u>, people will disagree about the legitimate definition of which ideas are bigoted and which are not. I do not claim omniscience in settling these disputes </u>— Michelle Goldberg and Freddie deBoer land on conclusions similar but not quite identical to my own. I <u>submit that the answers need to be arrived at through reason, a channel to which everybody has access regardless of identity. That settling these questions through reason rather than through appeals to identity has become controversial is, of course, my point.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Pillar PhD, non-resident senior fellow at Georgetown University ‘15 – (6/8, Paul, PhD, non-resident senior fellow at Georgetown University's Center for Security Studies, nonresident senior fellow in the Brookings Institution's Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, 28 year veteran of the CIA, “No, Iran Isn’t Destabilizing the Middle East,” http://www.lobelog.com/no-iran-isnt-destabilizing-the-middle-east/) fulltext: But set aside for the moment all the logical inconsistencies and other reasons to reject the notion of an Iranian regional marauder as a reason to oppose the nuclear agreement. Focus instead on the image of an Iran whose current regional policy supposedly is already an assortment of destructive activities. This image has become the kind of conventional wisdom that repeatedly gets invoked (even, in this instance, by supporters of the nuclear agreement) without any felt need by those who invoke it to provide any supporting facts or analysis because it is taken for granted that everyone “knows” it to be true. The references to the image are almost always vague and general, couched in terms of Iran supposedly “destabilizing” the Middle East or seeking to “dominate” it or exercise “hegemony” over it, or that it is “on the march” to take over the region. Often there are references to “terrorism” and “subversion” without anything more specific being offered. Often the names of conflict-ridden countries in the region are recited, but again without any specifics as to who is doing what in those countries. To get away from such uselessly general accusations, ask: (1) what exactly is Iran doing in the Middle East that is of concern; and (2) how does what Iran is doing differ from what other states are doing in the same places? A careful comparison of this sort leads to the conclusion that Iran, contrary to the conventional wisdom, does not stand out in doing aggressive, destabilizing, or hegemonic things. Iran is one of the largest states in the Middle East and naturally, as with any such state, competes for influence in its region. To try to keep any such state, be it Iran or any other, from competing for such influence would be futile and damaging in its own right. To label Iranian policy as seeking “hegemony” or “domination” is only that—i.e., applying a label—when others are using more forceful and destructive ways of trying to extend their own influence in the same places. Iran, unlike others, has not launched wars or invaded neighboring territory (except in counterattacking during the war with Iraq that Saddam Hussein started). Nor has Iran drawn, China-like, any nine-dash lines and asserted unsupported domination over swaths of its own region. The assumption that just about anything Iran does in the Middle East is contrary to U.S. interests keeps getting made despite what should be the glaringly obvious counterexample of the war in Iraq. Iran and the United States are on the same side there. They both are supporting the government of Iraq in trying to push back the radical group generally known as ISIS. Why should Iran’s part of this effort be called part of regional trouble-making, while the U.S. part of it is given some more benign description? Those in the United States who would rather not face that counterexample are usually quick to mutter something like, “Yes, but the Iranians are doing this for their own malign purposes of spreading their influence in Iraq.” The first thing to note in response to such muttering is that if we are worried about increased Iranian influence in Iraq, that increase is due chiefly not to anything the Iranians have done but rather to a war of choice that the United States initiated. The next thing is to ask on behalf of what interests the Iranians would use their influence in Iraq, and how that relates to U.S. interests. The preeminent Iranian objective regarding Iraq is to avoid anything resembling the incredibly costly Iran-Iraq War, and to have a regime in Baghdad—preferably friendly to Iran, but at least not hostile to it—that would not launch such a conflict again. Iran also does not want endless instability along its long western border, and its leaders are smart enough to realize that narrowly prejudicial sectarian politics are not a prescription for stability. These lines of thinking are consistent with U.S. interests; it is not only in the current fight against ISIS that U.S. and Iranian interests converge. Look carefully also at another conflict-ridden Middle Eastern state whose name often gets casually invoked: Yemen. Iran and the United States are not on the same side of this civil war, although the United States probably has as much explaining to do as to why it has taken the side it has—the same side as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the most capable and threatening Al-Qaeda branch operating today—as Iran does. Iran has become identified with the side of the rebellious Houthi movement, although the most prominent Yemeni leader on the same side as the Houthis is Ali Abdullah Saleh, who as the Yemeni president for more than thirty years was seen as our guy in Yemen, not the Iranians’ guy. Iran did not instigate the Houthi rebellion, nor are the Houthis accurately described as “clients” of Iran much less “proxies,” as they often inaccurately are. Instead Iran was probably a source of restraint in advising the Houthis not to capture the capital of Sanaa, although the Houthis went ahead and did it anyway. The Iranians probably are glad to see the Saudis bleed some in Yemen, and whatever aid Tehran has given to the Houthis was given with that in mind. But any such aid pales in comparison to the extent and destructiveness of the Saudis’ intervention in Yemen, which has included aerial assaults that have caused many hundreds of civilian casualties. In the same vein consider Bahrain, which is an interesting case given historical Iranian claims to Bahrain and past Iranian activity there. Despite that background and despite Bahraini government accusations, there is an absence of reliable evidence of anything in recent years that could accurately be described as Iranian subversion in Bahrain. Instead it is again the Saudis who have used forceful methods to exert their influence on a neighbor, and in this case to prop up an unpopular Sunni regime in a Shia majority country. The principal Saudi military intervention in Bahrain came a few years ago, but it was an early shot in a campaign that has taken fuller shape under King Salman to use any available means, including military force, to expand Saudi influence in the region. If there is a Persian Gulf power that has been using damaging methods to try to become a regional hegemon, it is Saudi Arabia, not Iran. The Saudis could claim to be acting on behalf of a status quo in Bahrain and Yemen, but then what about Syria, where it is Iran that is backing the existing regime? And as perhaps the most germane question, how can any one of the outside players that have mucked into that incredibly complicated civil war be singled out as a destabilizing regional marauder while the others (some of whom, such as the United States and Israel, have conducted their own airstrikes in the country) be given the benefit of more benign labeling? Iran did not start the Syrian war. And each of the most significant sides fighting that war are dominated by what we normally would consider certifiable bad guys: the Assad regime, ISIS, and an Islamist coalition led by the local Al-Qaeda branch. It is hard to see a clear and convincing basis for parceling out benign and malign labeling here when it comes to the outside players. Then of course there is the rest of the Levantine part of the region, including Palestine; the aid relationships that Iran has had with the H groups—Hezbollah and Hamas—are continually invoked in any litany of Iranian regional activity. Lebanese Hezbollah certainly is still an important ally of Iran, although it has long since become strong enough to outgrow any Iranian hand-holding. We should never forget that prior to 9/11 Hezbollah was the group that had more U.S. blood on its hands through terrorism than any other group. We also should understand that Hezbollah has become a major player in Lebanese politics in a way in which many in the region, including its immediate political opponents, accept it as a legitimate political actor. Right now as a military actor it is deeply involved in the effort to support the Syrian regime, and it is not looking to stir up any new wars or instability anywhere else. Hamas has never been anything remotely resembling a proxy of Iran, although it has accepted, somewhat reluctantly, Iranian aid in the absence of other help. To Iran, Hamas represents Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation of (or blockading and subjugation of) Palestinian territory, without being an accessory to that occupation, which is how the Palestinian Authority is widely seen. Hamas is the winner of the last free Palestinian election, and it has repeatedly made clear that its ambition is to hold political power among Palestinians and that it is willing to maintain a long-term truce with Israel. Right now Hamas is trying, unfortunately with only partial success, to keep small groups from overturning the current cease-fire with rocket firings into Israel. Again, none of this is a conflict that Iran has instigated or that Iran is stirring up or escalating. Iran is not the cause of the instability that already reigns. And the broader opposition to continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory is opposition that Iran shares with many others, including the whole Arab world. As long as we are looking at this part of the region, it is impossible to escape notice that Iran does not hold a candle to Israel when it comes to forcefully throwing weight around in the neighborhood in damaging and destabilizing ways, even without considering the occupation of the West Bank. This has included multiple armed invasions of neighboring territory as well as other actions, such as the attack on Iraq years ago that stimulated Iraq to speed up its program to develop nuclear weapons. And before we leave the Middle East as a whole, it also is impossible to escape notice that the single most destabilizing action in the region over the past couple of decades was the U.S. launch of a war of aggression in Iraq in 2003. Iran certainly has done nothing like that. The ritualistically repeated notion that Iran is wreaking instability all over the region is a badly mistaken myth. There are important respects in which Iranian policies and actions do offend U.S. interests, but protection of those interests is not helped by perpetuating myths. Perpetuation of this particular myth has several deleterious effects. The most immediate and obvious one is to corrupt debate over the nuclear deal. Another is to foster broader misunderstanding about Iranian behavior and intentions that threatens to corrupt debate over other issues as well. Yet another consequence involves a failure to understand fully that every state competes for influence. Such efforts to compete are called foreign policy. It would be in our own interests for other states to wage that competition through peaceful and legitimate means. By misrepresenting who is doing what, and through what means, in the Middle East today, the myth about Iranian behavior maintains a constituency for isolating and ostracizing Iran—which makes it less, not more, likely that Iran, so ostracized, will use peaceful and legitimate means to pursue its interests in the future.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Iran’s not aggressive.</h4><p><strong>Pillar </strong>PhD, non-resident senior fellow at Georgetown University<strong> ‘15</strong> – (6/8, Paul, PhD, non-resident senior fellow at Georgetown University's Center for Security Studies, nonresident senior fellow in the Brookings Institution's Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, 28 year veteran of the CIA, “No, Iran Isn’t Destabilizing the Middle East,” http://www.lobelog.com/no-iran-isnt-destabilizing-the-middle-east/)</p><p>But set aside for the moment all the logical inconsistencies and other reasons to reject the notion of an Iranian regional marauder as a reason to oppose the nuclear agreement. <u>Focus </u>instead <u>on the image of an Iran whose current regional policy supposedly is already an assortment of destructive activities. This image has become </u>the kind of <u>conventional wisdom </u>that repeatedly gets invoked (even, in this instance, by supporters of the nuclear agreement) <u>without any felt need </u>by those who invoke it <u>to provide any supporting facts or analysis because it is taken for granted</u> that everyone “knows” it to be true. <u>The references to the image are almost always vague and general, couched in terms of Iran supposedly “destabilizing” the Middle East or seeking to “dominate” it or exercise “hegemony”</u> over it, or that it is “on the march” to take over the region. <u>Often there are references to “terrorism” and “subversion” without anything more specific being offered. Often the names of conflict-ridden countries in the region are recited, but again without any specifics as to who is doing what in those countries<strong>.</p><p></u></strong>To get away from such uselessly general accusations, ask: (1) <u>what exactly is Iran doing in the Middle East that is of concern; and</u> (2) <u>how does what Iran is doing differ from what other states are doing in the same places? <strong>A careful comparison of this sort leads to the conclusion that <mark>Iran</u></strong></mark>, contrary to the conventional wisdom, <u><strong><mark>does not </mark>stand out in <mark>do</mark>ing<mark> aggressive, destabilizing, or hegemonic things</strong></mark>.</p><p>Iran is one of the largest states</u> in the Middle East <u>and naturally</u>, as with any such state, <u>competes for influence in its region. <mark>To try to keep any </mark>such <mark>state</u></mark>, be it Iran or any other, <u><mark>from competing</u></mark> for such influence <u><mark>would be futile and damaging</mark> in its own right</u>. <u>To label Iranian policy as seeking “hegemony” or “domination” is only that</u>—i.e., <u>applying a label</u>—when others are using more forceful and destructive ways of trying to extend their own influence in the same places. <u><mark>Iran</mark>, <strong>unlike others</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>has not launched wars</strong> or <strong>invaded neighboring territory</strong></mark> </u>(except in counterattacking during the war with Iraq that Saddam Hussein started). <u>Nor has Iran drawn</u>, China-like, <u>any nine-dash lines and asserted unsupported domination over swaths of its own region.</p><p></u>T<u>he assumption that just about anything Iran does in the Middle East is contrary to U.S. interests keeps getting made despite what should be the glaringly obvious counterexample of the war in Iraq. Iran and the United States are on the same side</u> there. They both are supporting the government of Iraq in trying to push back the radical group generally known as ISIS. <u>Why should Iran’s part of this effort be called part of regional trouble-making, while the U.S. part of it is given some more benign description</u>? <u>Those in the United States</u> who would rather not face that counterexample <u>are</u> usually <u>quick to mutter something like, “Yes, but the Iranians are doing this for their own malign purposes of spreading their influence in Iraq</u>.” The first thing to note in response to such muttering is that <u>if we are worried about increased Iranian influence in Iraq, that increase is due chiefly not to anything the Iranians have done but rather to a war of choice that the <strong>U</strong>nited <strong>S</strong>tates initiated</u>.</p><p>The next thing is to ask on behalf of what interests the Iranians would use their influence in Iraq, and how that relates to U.S. interests. <u>The preeminent Iranian objective regarding Iraq is to avoid anything resembling the incredibly costly Iran-Iraq War, and to have a regime in Baghdad</u>—preferably friendly to Iran, but at least not hostile to it—<u>that would not launch such a conflict again</u>. <u><strong><mark>Iran also does not want endless instability</u></strong></mark> along its long western border,<u><strong> and its leaders are smart enough to realize that narrowly prejudicial sectarian politics are not a prescription for stability</u></strong>. <u>These lines of thinking are consistent with U.S. interests</u>; it is not only in the current fight against ISIS that U.S. and Iranian interests converge.</p><p>Look carefully also at another conflict-ridden Middle Eastern state whose name often gets casually invoked: Yemen. Iran and the United States are not on the same side of this civil war, although <u>the United States probably has as much explaining to do as to why it has taken</u> the side it has—<u>the same side as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the most capable and threatening Al-Qaeda branch operating today—as Iran does</u>. <u>Iran has become identified with the</u> side of the rebellious <u>Houthi movement</u>, although the most prominent Yemeni leader on the same side as the Houthis is Ali Abdullah Saleh, who as the Yemeni president for more than thirty years was seen as our guy in Yemen, not the Iranians’ guy.</p><p><u><mark>Iran did not instigate the Houthi rebellion</mark>, nor are the Houthis accurately described as “clients” of Iran much less “proxies,” as they often inaccurately are.</u> <u><strong><mark>Instead Iran was probably a source of restraint</mark> in advising the Houthis not to capture the capital of Sanaa</u></strong>, although the Houthis went ahead and did it anyway. The Iranians probably are glad to see the Saudis bleed some in Yemen, and whatever aid Tehran has given to the Houthis was given with that in mind. But <u>any such aid pales in comparison to the extent and destructiveness of the Saudis’ intervention in Yemen, </u>which has included aerial assaults that have caused many hundreds of civilian casualties.</p><p>In the same vein consider Bahrain, which is an interesting case given historical Iranian claims to Bahrain and past Iranian activity there. Despite that background and despite Bahraini government accusations, there is an absence of reliable evidence of anything in recent years that could accurately be described as Iranian subversion in Bahrain. Instead it is again the Saudis who have used forceful methods to exert their influence on a neighbor, and in this case to prop up an unpopular Sunni regime in a Shia majority country. The principal Saudi military intervention in Bahrain came a few years ago, but it was an early shot in a campaign that has taken fuller shape under King Salman to use any available means, including military force, to expand Saudi influence in the region. If there is a Persian Gulf power that has been using damaging methods to try to become a regional hegemon, it is Saudi Arabia, not Iran.</p><p>The Saudis could claim to be acting on behalf of a status quo in Bahrain and Yemen, but then what about Syria, where it is Iran that is backing the existing regime? And as perhaps the most germane question, <u>how can any one of the outside players that have mucked into that incredibly complicated civil war be singled out as a destabilizing regional marauder while the others</u> (some of whom, such as the United States and Israel, have conducted their own airstrikes in the country) <u>be given the benefit of more benign labeling? Iran did not start the Syrian war.</u> <u>And each of the most significant sides</u> fighting that war <u>are dominated by</u> what we normally would consider <u>certifiable bad guys</u>: the Assad regime, ISIS, and an Islamist coalition led by the local Al-Qaeda branch<u>. It is hard to see a clear and convincing basis for parceling out benign and malign labeling here when it comes to the outside players</u>.</p><p><u>Then of course there is the rest of the Levantine part of the region</u>, including Palestine; the aid relationships that Iran has had with the H groups—Hezbollah and Hamas—are continually invoked in any litany of Iranian regional activity. Lebanese Hezbollah certainly is still an important ally of Iran, although it has long since become strong enough to outgrow any Iranian hand-holding. We should never forget that prior to 9/11 Hezbollah was the group that had more U.S. blood on its hands through terrorism than any other group. We also should understand that Hezbollah has become a major player in Lebanese politics in a way in which many in the region, including its immediate political opponents, accept it as a legitimate political actor. Right now as a military actor it is deeply involved in the effort to support the Syrian regime, and it is not looking to stir up any new wars or instability anywhere else.</p><p>Hamas has never been anything remotely resembling a proxy of Iran, although it has accepted, somewhat reluctantly, Iranian aid in the absence of other help. To Iran, Hamas represents Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation of (or blockading and subjugation of) Palestinian territory, without being an accessory to that occupation, which is how the Palestinian Authority is widely seen. Hamas is the winner of the last free Palestinian election, and it has repeatedly made clear that its ambition is to hold political power among Palestinians and that it is willing to maintain a long-term truce with Israel. Right now Hamas is trying, unfortunately with only partial success, to keep small groups from overturning the current cease-fire with rocket firings into Israel. Again, <u>none of this is a conflict that Iran has instigated or that Iran is stirring up or escalating. <mark>Iran is not the cause of</mark> the <mark>instability</mark> that already reigns</u>. And the broader opposition to continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory is opposition that Iran shares with many others, including the whole Arab world.</p><p>As long as we are looking at this part of the region, <u>it is impossible to escape notice that Iran does not hold a candle to Israel when it comes to forcefully throwing weight around in the neighborhood in damaging and destabilizing ways, even without</u> considering the <u>occupation of the West Bank</u>. This has included multiple armed invasions of neighboring territory as well as other actions, such as the attack on Iraq years ago that stimulated Iraq to speed up its program to develop nuclear weapons.</p><p>And before we leave the Middle East as a whole, <u>it also is impossible to escape notice that the single most destabilizing action in the region over the past couple of decades was the U.S. launch of a war of aggression in Iraq in 2003. Iran certainly has done nothing like that.</p><p>The ritualistically repeated notion that Iran is wreaking instability all over the region <strong>is a badly mistaken myth</u></strong>. There are important respects in which Iranian policies and actions do offend U.S. interests, but p<u>rotection of those interests is not helped by perpetuating myths.</p><p>Perpetuation of this particular myth has several deleterious effects</u>. The most immediate and obvious one is to corrupt debate over the nuclear deal. Another is <u>to foster broader misunderstanding about Iranian behavior and intentions that threatens<strong> to corrupt debate over other issues as well.</p><p></strong>Yet another consequence involves a failure to understand fully that <mark>every state competes for influence</mark>. Such efforts to compete are called foreign policy</u>. It would be in our own interests for other states to wage that competition through peaceful and legitimate means. <u>By misrepresenting who is doing what</u>, and through what means, in the Middle East today, <u><mark>the myth </mark>about Iranian behavior <mark>maintains a constituency for isolating and ostracizing Iran—<strong>which makes it less</strong></mark>, not more, <strong><mark>likely that Iran</strong>,</mark> so ostracized, <strong><mark>will use peaceful</mark> and legitimate <mark>means to pursue its interests</mark> in the future.</p></u></strong><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Gressel 16—(Acting Director and a senior policy fellow with the Wider Europe Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations' Berlin office, European Council on Foreign Relations) Gustav Gressel. “The dangerous decade: Russia-NATO relations 2014 to 2024”, July 2016, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_dangerous_decade_russia_nato_relations_2014_to_2024 fulltext: The domestic logic of confrontation The Russian economy hit a structural crisis in 2011, so the “power swap” between Putin and Dmitry Medvedev was not sufficiently appreciated by the Russian urban middle class, and later, when oil prices plummeted, the regime looked to its foreign policy to distract people from the worsening domestic situation. But it would be an oversimplification to consider Russia’s policy of escalation as merely a short-term domestic diversion effort. For over a decade, the Russian leadership has tried to define Russia both ideologically and politically as the counter model to Europe, putting it in conflict with Europe. The struggle to reshape the European order will not lessen in the next decade. Structural factors play a role in Russia’s foreign policy. The Russian state is more de-institutionalised and personalised than ever before. The president and a small closed circle of advisers make decisions – sometimes behind closed doors – on crucial foreign policy issues, such as the interventions in Crimea, Donbas, and Syria. Formal government structures and institutions are increasingly irrelevant, while informal ties to the president are pivotal. This system depends solely on the president as post, and to a very large extent on Putin as a person. Any change to the position of the president – such as may come in the 2018 and 2024 elections – will lead to extreme danger for the regime. A highly de-institutionalised system depending on one person will by nature be less effective and more prone to erratic behaviour over time, as the leader ages. The longer this personalised authoritarianism lasts, the less flexible, open, and creative the system will become. It would not be surprising, therefore, if the system collapsed or came close to collapse. In that situation, those holding power might see an escalation to unite the country as a lesser evil. The risk of a succession crisis is amplified by the fact that Putin cannot give up power easily. Putin has a great deal to cover up: he has waged a war in the Donbas outside his constitutional competences, which has caused the deaths of 220 to 2,000 regular Russian servicemen so far, as well as 298 international civilian casualties after Russian air-defence crews shot down Malaysia Airlines flight MH17. Putin cannot be sure of indefinite protection under a new president, nor that any new Russian leadership might not consider extraditing him as part of some political deal. There is no way out save exile in Vienna or Zurich. So, Putin needs to create conditions to allow him to rule beyond 2024. It would be difficult, and very unlikely, to create a protégé who is both unconditionally loyal and no threat, but also capable of managing intra-elite battles. Therefore, Putin has to make elites and society accept that he will lead Russia until his death. The narrative for this move needs to be shaped before 2024, most likely from re-shaping the political order in “Eurasia”. Putin needs a major project that reshapes Russia to allow him stay on, and because of Russia’s political context, the de-institutionalisation of the state, and the concentration of power with a few decision-makers, it will likely need to involve foreign policy rather than domestic modernisation. Thus, the Russian elites’ desire to rewrite the European order will coincide with Putin searching for institutional arrangements to prolong his power. The positioning of different wings of the elite to benefit from the succession could also cause instability. In old age, Putin would pick a successor who shares his thinking about Russia’s future, meaning any potential successor will have to accept the current “Eurasian” ideological framework. Rival security services are key pillars of power, and their loyalty must be secured through policies that appease their interests. All this means that the Kremlin will most likely use its rivalry with the West to stabilise the regime. Russia cannot compete with the West as an economic bloc, so military might and the use of force will be the Kremlin’s main tools to shape its foreign policy and influence its neighbourhood. Contingencies such as domestic insecurity, insurgencies, riots, or terrorist incidents would also be interpreted in an anti-Western context. Russian military endeavours in the post-Soviet space, such as putting down a “Maidan” in Minsk or dealing with jihadist insurgencies in Central Asia, would not threaten NATO directly, but they would increase tensions with the West. Russian security forces usually blame domestic unrest or their own failures on Western interference, and the West is usually critical of Russia’s response to such events. The Kremlin’s paranoia could also trigger escalation, as Russian security forces might seek to pre-emptively destroy “foreign interventionist” forces seen as instigating unrest. The Russian Baltic Navy’s war game of the occupation of Gotland, Aaland, and Bonholm, citing “Scandinavian instigation of public unrest in Moscow”, should show Western policymakers the arbitrariness of Russian accusations. The military balance Militarily, Moscow has repeatedly surprised the West. The West, and particularly Washington, was sure that US military might would deter Russia from acting militarily against the West’s interests. But they failed to recognize the many grey zones where a full US military reaction would not be expected and where Russia could create facts on the ground. Even worse: while Russia could not sustain a war with NATO, especially if the US fully engaged in Europe, Russia could start a war, hoping to deter any major reaction to Russian initial aggression through its nuclear arsenal. The fact that Russia can start a war against NATO, but not sustain it, will remain the prevailing paradigm throughout the “dangerous decade” to come. It means that Russian behaviour inclines towards confrontation, hoping that the West will blink. Such games can easily spiral out of control. Miscalculation, unprofessional behaviour, and inter-agency rivalry for political leadership could cause escalation that Russia could not control. The main cause of Western difficulties in countering an initial Russian military escalation is that European armies in particular need to implement several structural adaptations that will take time to mature. Meanwhile, Russian defense reform is progressing. Russia’s defense reform has been largely successful. Russian armed forces are more combat-ready, flexible, and effective than ever before. The wars in Ukraine and Syria provided a testing ground for new Russian procedures, formations, and equipment. Ukraine in particular, where Russia has rotated battalions from almost every brigade, was an invaluable test. New leadership techniques and increased joint officer training introduced in the early 2010s will have increasing effect as more and more officers go through the new training. Profiting from patriotism and nationalistic hysteria after Crimea, the Russian armed forces could again afford to expand and came closer to fulfilling their recruitment goals than in previous years. On the equipment side, economic troubles derailed the 2011-2020 armament plan, and a decision on the subsequent plan was postponed until 2018. Ukrainian and Western sanctions on the defense sector forced the Russian defense industry to substitute 190 items (from Ukraine) and 860 items (from the West). Russia will not reach its goal of fielding 70 percent new weapons platforms until 2020. But it will upgrade existing weapons platforms, and continue to introduce specialized weapons and combat systems that target weaknesses in Western arsenals. As a result, any Western reaction to a Russian assault would face considerable difficulties, and Russia could at least delay a reaction. The West, and particularly Europe, also has problems producing new weapons systems. Neither Europe nor the US will produce a post-Cold War main battle tank until 2030. For infantry-fighting vehicles and artillery systems, the situation is similar. Additionally, legacy US and European equipment is suffering from wear and tear. Since the end of the Cold War, the West has engaged in expeditionary warfare operations and developed equipment specifically for this kind of mission, most of which is unsuitable for the new context. While the US, Germany, Poland, and Sweden have set out new development and procurement priorities, it will take years or decades to develop new systems. Hence, until 2024, many NATO armies will not be best equipped to engage a Russian enemy. In organizational terms, NATO is trying to react to the readiness and geographic challenge Russia poses. At the Wales Summit, the Alliance set up a small spearhead force to react within days to a hybrid incursion on a limited scale. NATO also began to retrain its forces for Article 5 operations. And the US wants to re-invest in European defence. But as long as NATO relies on “deterrence from a distance”, it will need time to effectively deploy to the eastern frontier or the Black Sea, and deployment will be vulnerable to disruption. Small forces rotating in exposed areas such as the Baltic states are capable of dealing with limited hybrid incursions, but are too small to deter larger invasions. Until NATO places more substantial troops closer to exposed borders, Russia will have a time gap of around a week to range free. But while testing NATO will always be a risky move for Russia, projecting military power into the post-Soviet periphery is not. Georgia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine will remain militarily vulnerable. The West Balkans, where Russia has deep roots in nationalist circles, is a theatre where destabilising action could prepare the ground for another conflict. Any domestic conflict could be used or abused by Russia to create a reason for a pre-emptive military strike to “prevent NATO expansion”. The West has so far neither come up with a credible policy for vulnerable periphery states, nor defined a clear policy for integrating states that have made a democratic transition, nor provided an assistance programme to enable those states to resist a conventional Russian incursion. For the time being, Russia’s expansionism is held back more by its own lack of resources and skills to govern (or finance) larger conquered territories than by neighbouring states’ military capacity. During the Cold War, most neutral states could check a Soviet onslaught, at least enough to allow Western counter-moves, but the existence of many weak and semi-penetrated non-aligned states is a feature of the “dangerous decade”. A succession crisis could easily result in aggression towards that region, and the West should be prepared. Conclusion Russia has ideologically and politically positioned itself as a counter model to Europe, and its leadership claims the right to fight for this model and its recognition in the post-Soviet space and on the world stage. Domestically, the struggle for prestige and international recognition is also a struggle for the current ruling elite’s survival. Putin has created a structure that relies on him as sole permanent political centre and decision maker, and he is dependent on the survival of this system. In the possible succession crises of 2018 and particularly 2024, the regime will fight for the continuation of his power, and confrontation with the West is likely to be used as a unifying force. In the same timeframe, Russia will still enjoy some military advantages over its neighbours, particularly in the post-Soviet space. The situation will remain tense unless the force-structure of the Alliance is greatly altered – and the Russia-NATO founding act revoked. The eastern periphery of the alliance and the Western Balkans will remain especially vulnerable. European-Russian relations are entering a very dangerous decade. Russian domestic instability coincides with a weak neighbourhood, low crisis stability, and military advantages for the party that initiates military operations. The West, and particularly Europe, needs to prepare for these contingencies.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Threatened Putin causes <u>diversionary war</u> against NATO—<u>goes nuclear</u>.</h4><p><u><strong>Gressel 16</u></strong>—(Acting Director and a senior policy fellow with the Wider Europe Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations' Berlin office, European Council on Foreign Relations) Gustav Gressel. “The dangerous decade: Russia-NATO relations 2014 to 2024”, July 2016, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_dangerous_decade_russia_nato_relations_2014_to_2024</p><p><u><strong>The domestic logic of confrontation</u></strong> The Russian economy hit a structural crisis in 2011, so the “power swap” between Putin and Dmitry Medvedev was not sufficiently appreciated by the Russian urban middle class, and later, when oil prices plummeted, the regime looked to its foreign policy to distract people from the worsening domestic situation. But it would be an oversimplification to consider Russia’s policy of escalation as merely a short-term domestic diversion effort. For over a decade, the Russian leadership has tried to define Russia both ideologically and politically as the counter model to Europe, putting it in conflict with Europe. The struggle to reshape the European order will not lessen in the next decade. Structural factors play a role in Russia’s foreign policy. <u><strong>The Russian state is more de-institutionalised and personalised than ever before. The president and a small closed circle of advisers make decisions – sometimes behind closed doors – on crucial foreign policy issues, such as the interventions in Crimea, Donbas, and Syria. Formal government </u></strong>structures and <u><strong>institutions are</u></strong> increasingly <u><strong>irrelevant</u></strong>, <u><strong>while informal ties to the president are pivotal.</u></strong> This system depends solely on the president as post, and to a very large extent on Putin as a person. <u><strong>Any <mark>change to the position of the president</u></strong></mark> – such as may come in the 2018 and 2024 elections – <u><strong><mark>will lead to extreme danger </mark>for the regime<mark>.</mark> </u></strong>A highly de-institutionalised system depending on one person will by nature be less effective and more prone to erratic behaviour over time, as the leader ages. The longer this personalised authoritarianism lasts, the less flexible, open, and creative the system will become. It would not be surprising, therefore, if the system collapsed or came close to collapse. In that situation, those holding power might see an escalation to unite the country as a lesser evil. <u><strong>The risk of a succession crisis is amplified by the fact that Putin cannot give up power easily.</u></strong> Putin has a great deal to cover up: he has waged a war in the Donbas outside his constitutional competences, which has caused the deaths of 220 to 2,000 regular Russian servicemen so far, as well as 298 international civilian casualties after Russian air-defence crews shot down Malaysia Airlines flight MH17. <u><strong><mark>Putin cannot be sure of </mark>indefinite <mark>protection</u></strong> <u><strong>under a new president</mark>, nor that any new Russian leadership might not consider extraditing him as </u></strong>part of<u><strong> some political deal.</u></strong> There is no way out save exile in Vienna or Zurich. <u><strong>So</u></strong>, <u><strong>Putin needs to create conditions to allow him to rule beyond 2024.</u></strong> It would be difficult, and very unlikely, to create a protégé who is both unconditionally loyal and no threat, but also capable of managing intra-elite battles. <u><strong>Therefore, <mark>Putin has to make elites</u></strong></mark> and society <u><strong><mark>accept</mark> that <mark>he will lead </mark>Russia</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>until </mark>his <mark>death</mark>. The narrative for this </u></strong>move <u><strong>needs to be shaped before 2024</u></strong>, most likely <u><strong><mark>from re-shaping the political order in “Eurasia”. Putin needs a major project that </mark>reshapes Russia</u></strong> to allow him stay on, <u><strong>and</u></strong> because of Russia’s political context, the de-institutionalisation of the state, and the concentration of power with a few decision-makers, <u><strong>it will</u></strong> likely <u><strong>need to <mark>involve foreign policy </mark>rather than domestic modernisation<mark>.</u></strong></mark> Thus, <u><strong><mark>the </mark>Russian <mark>elites’ desire to rewrite the European order will coincide with</mark> Putin searching for </u></strong>institutional<u><strong> <mark>arrangements to prolong</mark> his <mark>power.</u></strong></mark> The positioning of different wings of the elite to benefit from the succession could also cause instability. In old age, Putin would pick a successor who shares his thinking about Russia’s future, meaning any potential successor will have to accept the current “Eurasian” ideological framework. Rival security services are key pillars of power, and their loyalty must be secured through policies that appease their interests. All this means that <u><strong><mark>the Kremlin will</mark> </u></strong>most likely<u><strong> <mark>use its rivalry </mark>with the West <mark>to stabilise the regime.</u></strong></mark> Russia cannot compete with the West as an economic bloc, so military might and the <u><strong><mark>use of force</u></strong> <u><strong>will be the </mark>Kremlin’s <mark>main tools</mark> to shape</u></strong> its <u><strong>foreign policy and influence its neighbourhood.</u></strong> Contingencies such as domestic insecurity, insurgencies, riots, or terrorist incidents would also be interpreted in an anti-Western context. <u><strong><mark>Russian military endeavours</u></strong></mark> in the post-Soviet space, such as putting down a “Maidan” in Minsk or dealing with jihadist insurgencies in Central Asia, <u><strong><mark>would not threaten NATO directly, but</u></strong></mark> they would <u><strong><mark>increase tensions with the West.</mark> </u></strong>Russian security forces usually blame domestic unrest or their own failures on Western interference, and the West is usually critical of Russia’s response to such events. <u><strong>The Kremlin’s paranoia could also trigger escalation</u></strong>, as Russian security forces might seek to pre-emptively destroy “foreign interventionist” forces seen as instigating unrest<u><strong>. </u></strong>The Russian Baltic Navy’s war game of the occupation of Gotland, Aaland, and Bonholm, citing “Scandinavian instigation of public unrest in Moscow”, should show Western policymakers the arbitrariness of Russian accusations. The military balance Militarily, Moscow has repeatedly surprised the West. The West, and particularly <u><strong>Washington</u></strong>, was sure that US military might would deter Russia from acting militarily against the West’s interests. But they <u><strong>failed to recognize the many grey zones</u></strong> <u><strong>where a full US military reaction would not be expected and where Russia could create facts on the ground. </u></strong>Even worse: <u><strong><mark>while Russia could not sustain</mark> </u></strong>a<u><strong> <mark>war with NATO,</u></strong></mark> especially if the US fully engaged in Europe, <u><strong><mark>Russia could start a war</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>hoping <mark>to deter</u></strong></mark> any <u><strong>major <mark>reaction</mark> to Russian initial aggression <mark>through its nuclear arsenal.</mark> The fact that Russia can start a war</u></strong> <u><strong>against NATO, but not sustain it, will remain the prevailing paradigm </u></strong>throughout the “dangerous decade” to come<u><strong>. It means</u></strong> that <u><strong><mark>Russian behaviour inclines towards confrontation, hoping</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>the West will blink.</mark> Such <mark>games can easily spiral out of control.</mark> Miscalculation</u></strong>, unprofessional behaviour, and inter-agency rivalry for political leadership <u><strong>could cause escalation that Russia could not control.</u></strong> The main cause of Western difficulties in countering an initial Russian military escalation is that <u><strong>European</u></strong> armies in particular need to implement several <u><strong>structural adaptations</u></strong> that <u><strong>will take time to mature.</u></strong> Meanwhile, <u><strong>Russian defense reform is progressing.</u></strong> Russia’s defense reform has been largely successful. Russian armed forces are more combat-ready, flexible, and effective than ever before. The wars in Ukraine and Syria provided a testing ground for new Russian procedures, formations, and equipment. Ukraine in particular, where Russia has rotated battalions from almost every brigade, was an invaluable test. New leadership techniques and increased joint officer training introduced in the early 2010s will have increasing effect as more and more officers go through the new training. Profiting from patriotism and nationalistic hysteria after Crimea, the Russian armed forces could again afford to expand and came closer to fulfilling their recruitment goals than in previous years. On the equipment side, economic troubles derailed the 2011-2020 armament plan, and a decision on the subsequent plan was postponed until 2018. Ukrainian and Western sanctions on the defense sector forced the Russian defense industry to substitute 190 items (from Ukraine) and 860 items (from the West). Russia will not reach its goal of fielding 70 percent new weapons platforms until 2020. But it will upgrade existing weapons platforms, and continue to introduce specialized weapons and combat systems that target weaknesses in Western arsenals. As a result, any Western reaction to a Russian assault would face considerable difficulties, and Russia could at least delay a reaction. The West, and particularly Europe, also has problems producing new weapons systems. <u><strong>Neither Europe nor the US will produce a post-Cold War main battle tank until 2030. For infantry-fighting vehicles and artillery systems, the situation is similar. </u></strong>Additionally, <u><strong>legacy US and European equipment is suffering from wear and tear.</u></strong> Since the end of the Cold War, the West has engaged in expeditionary warfare operations and developed equipment specifically for this kind of mission, most of which is unsuitable for the new context. While the US, Germany, Poland, and Sweden have set out new development and procurement priorities, it will take years or decades to develop new systems. Hence, <u><strong>until 2024,</u></strong> many <u><strong>NATO armies will not be</u></strong> best <u><strong>equipped to engage a Russian enemy.</u></strong> In organizational terms, NATO is trying to react to the readiness and geographic challenge Russia poses. At the Wales Summit, the Alliance set up a small spearhead force to react within days to a hybrid incursion on a limited scale. NATO also began to retrain its forces for Article 5 operations. And the US wants to re-invest in European defence. But as long as NATO relies on “deterrence from a distance”, it will need time to effectively deploy to the eastern frontier or the Black Sea, and deployment will be vulnerable to disruption. <u><strong><mark>Small forces</mark> rotating <mark>in</u></strong></mark> exposed areas such as <u><strong><mark>the Baltic</mark> state<mark>s</u></strong></mark> are capable of dealing with limited hybrid incursions, but <u><strong><mark>are too small to deter larger invasions.</mark> </u></strong>Until NATO places more substantial troops closer to exposed borders, <u><strong>Russia will have a time gap of around a week to range free.</u></strong> But while testing NATO will always be a risky move for Russia, projecting military power into the post-Soviet periphery is not. Georgia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine will remain militarily vulnerable. The West Balkans, where Russia has deep roots in nationalist circles, is a theatre where destabilising action could prepare the ground for another conflict. Any domestic conflict could be used or abused by Russia to create a reason for a pre-emptive military strike to “prevent NATO expansion”. The West has so far neither come up with a credible policy for vulnerable periphery states, nor defined a clear policy for integrating states that have made a democratic transition, nor provided an assistance programme to enable those states to resist a conventional Russian incursion. For the time being, Russia’s expansionism is held back more by its own lack of resources and skills to govern (or finance) larger conquered territories than by neighbouring states’ military capacity. During the Cold War, most neutral states could check a Soviet onslaught, at least enough to allow Western counter-moves, but the existence of many weak and semi-penetrated non-aligned states is a feature of the “dangerous decade”. <u><strong><mark>A succession crisis could</mark> easily <mark>result in aggression</mark> </u></strong>towards that region, <u><strong>and the West should be prepared.</u></strong> <u><strong>Conclusion</u></strong> Russia has ideologically and politically positioned itself as a counter model to Europe, and its leadership claims the right to fight for this model and its recognition in the post-Soviet space and on the world stage. Domestically, the struggle for prestige and international recognition is also a struggle for the current ruling elite’s survival. Putin has created a structure that relies on him as sole permanent political centre and decision maker, and he is dependent on the survival of this system. In the possible succession crises of 2018 and particularly 2024, the regime will fight for the continuation of his power, and <u><strong>confrontation with the West is likely to be used as a unifying force</u></strong>. In the same timeframe, Russia will still enjoy some military advantages over its neighbours, particularly in the post-Soviet space. The situation will remain tense unless the force-structure of the Alliance is greatly altered – and the Russia-NATO founding act revoked. <u><strong>The <mark>eastern periphery of the alliance </mark>and the Western Balkans <mark>will remain</mark> especially <mark>vulnerable.</mark> </u></strong>European-Russian relations are entering a very dangerous decade. Russian domestic instability coincides with a weak neighbourhood, low crisis stability, and military advantages for the party that initiates military operations. The West, and particularly Europe, needs to prepare for these contingencies.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: AT: Thumpers/Announcements fulltext: AT: Shift Inevitable Sen and von Schickfus 20 — Suphi Sen is an assistant professor at the Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group at Wageningen University. His areas of research include environmental and resource economics, energy economies, and economies of climate change. Marie-Theres von Schickfus is an economist for the ifo Institute, Center for Energy, Climate, and Resources. (“Climate policy, stranded assets, and investors’ expectations” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Volume 100, March 2020. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083#!)//JLPark 1. Introduction As early as 2012, global financial services companies drew attention to the risk of coal investments becoming stranded as a consequence of the 2°C “carbon budget.“ HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "fn1" 1 This carbon budget specifies the maximal amount of cumulative carbon emissions that can be emitted without surpassing a 2°C temperature increase above preindustrial levels ( HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib45" Meinshausen et al., 2009;  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib4" Allen et al., 2009). Therefore, climate policies might render fossil-fuel assets worthless prior to the end of their economic life time. We study whether the current market valuation of companies owning fossil fuel assets reflects this risk of stranding assets. HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "fn2" 2 A failure to price in this risk can lead to costly consequences for the whole economy. First, the resulting misallocation of capital due to delayed divestment could render the transition to clean capital more expensive ( HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib31" IPCC, 2014;  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib32" IRENA, 2017a). Second, a sudden and unexpected tightening of carbon emission policies ( HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib6" Batten et al., 2016) or sudden changes in expectations in the presence of tipping points ( HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib39" Krugman, 1991) can lead to abrupt repricing of fossil fuel assets. This situation can result in a negative supply shock through changes in energy use and second-round effects in financial markets. HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "fn3" 3 Financial institutions such as the Bank of England, the Dutch Central Bank (DNB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) have identified the mispricing of stranded asset risk as a potential systemic risk and threat to financial stability. HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "fn4" 4 Therefore, we analyze the interaction between investors’ expectations and the development of climate policies. Investors’ reactions to new policies depend on their prior expectations, which, in turn, are shaped by previous policies. This interaction is central to the current paper: What are investors’ priors regarding stranded asset risk, and (how) do these priors change when climate policy proposals are announced? In particular, we analyze (i) whether investors have already priced in expected losses due to the carbon budget, (ii) whether they only respond to concrete policies, and (iii) whether they expect firms to be financially compensated for stranded assets. To answer these questions, we exploit the gradual development of a climate policy proposal in Germany targeting lignite assets and investigate how adjustments of this proposal have affected the market valuation of firms active in electricity production. We find that investors did not react to announcements of the initial “climate levy” proposal, which was directed at stranding lignite assets by charging an extra fee on carbon emissions (Stage 1). Investors also did not respond when the proposal transformed into a compensation mechanism (Stage 2), paying plant owners for not running their units. Only announcements that the compensation mechanism may not go through due to violating state aid rules (Stage 3) resulted in a significant and negative reaction. Our findings show that investors do care about the stranded asset risk, but with an expectation of a compensation mechanism. Our analysis starts from the notion that the evolution of climate policies and the expectations of investors are interrelated. First, climate policies and policy proposals provide signals that shape how the investors perceive the stranded asset risk. For instance, setting a price on CO2 emissions or imposing a cost on fossil resource extraction HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "fn5" 5 can reduce demand, slow down investment in fossil infrastructure, and cause asset stranding. Alternatively, policies addressing fossil-fuel reductions may compensate fossil-fuel owners for leaving their reserves unburned. For example,  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib27" Harstad (2012) proposed that, in the absence of a global climate agreement, “the coalition’s best policy is to simply buy foreign deposits and conserve them”. HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "fn6" 6 Second, investors' reactions to policy signals depend on their prior expectations regarding the likelihood of asset stranding and the credibility of climate policy announcements. For example, they may have already devalued assets following information on the carbon budget implied by the Paris Agreement, or they may find it difficult to translate the concept of a carbon budget into stranded asset risk. HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "fn7" 7 In the latter case, they would wait for further information on climate policies with clear asset stranding implications. Even the announcement of climate policies does not necessarily lead investors to reassess the likeliness of asset stranding, if they expect a compensation mechanism. The policy proposal we investigate provides the opportunity to disentangle the effects of these policy signals and expectations. By tracking the stock market response to different stages of the proposal, we can draw conclusions about investors' prior expectations and how they evolved in the course of the policy's development. Our baseline estimation strategy is a short-run event study analysis. We investigate whether there are abnormal returns to the assets of three publicly listed energy companies that can be associated with the three stages of the policy proposal. HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "fn8" 8 The pattern in the reactions to the different stages of the proposal helps us to identify whether an individual event surprised the investors. Furthermore, we test for effects in the power futures market to establish surprise empirically. Finally, we provide anectodal evidence for our empirical findings on the presence of surprise. We provide an extensive robustness analysis related to the identification of the event effects. First, we conduct placebo tests for the nonevent days just prior to the event days to verify the model's performance in predicting the counterfactual returns. Second, as an alternative to using a market price index to control for average market conditions, we estimate a synthetic portfolio aiming to produce a counterfactual control unit. HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "fn9" 9 These estimations show that our results are not driven by the endogeneity of the market price index to the event shocks. Third, in order to control for industry-wide shocks, we use an energy utility company without any lignite-related assets as the control unit, leading to a difference-in-differences estimation of abnormal returns. Finally, by using a news search engine, we identify a small number of potentially confounding events and verify that our results are not driven by these events. Our paper contributes to the literature on empirical assessments of market reactions to emission reduction policies, often in the form of event studies.  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib41" Lemoine (2017) and  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib20" Di Maria et al. (2014) find that market players do act in anticipation of demand-side policies.  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib55" Ramiah et al. (2013) and  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib42" Linn (2010) show that stock investors react to announcements of national carbon emission pledges or the introduction of emission trading programs, respectively.  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib38" Koch et al. (2016) find evidence that regulatory events drove EU ETS allowance prices. In the German power market context,  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib49" Oberndorfer et al. (2013) investigate the stock market effects of voluntary actions such as the inclusion of firms in a sustainability stock index. However, to date, investor expectations with regard to specific policies directed at stranding assets or to compensation mechanisms have not been studied. There are few papers investigating empirically how investors price in unburnable carbon risk. Batten et al. (2016) conclude that the announcement of the Paris Agreement in December 2015 had a positive effect on the valuation of renewable energy companies, but no significant effect on fossil fuel companies.  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib48" Mukanjari and Sterner (2018) report similar results both for the Paris Agreement and the U.S. presidential election in 2016.  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib25" Griffin et al. (2015) find that the publication of the Meinshausen et al. (2009) article in Nature led to a statistically significant, yet fairly small, reduction in the stock returns of oil and gas firms. They mention several reasons why this effect might be so small. One reason is investors’ expectations with respect to technological developments: this is what  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib11" Byrd and Cooperman (2016) examine, concluding that investors are aware of the relevance of carbon capture and storage (CCS) in allowing continued carbon use, but that they have already priced in stranded asset risk. A second potential reason is that investors are more concerned with specific energy policies, which is what this article examines in detail.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>3—Climate policies causes stranded asset risk for fossil fuels and kill demand and investment into the industry. Bolt out of the blue policies like the plan magnify the link.</h4><p>AT: Thumpers/Announcements</p><p>AT: Shift Inevitable</p><p><strong>Sen and von Schickfus 20 </strong>— Suphi Sen is an assistant professor at the Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group at Wageningen University. His areas of research include environmental and resource economics, energy economies, and economies of climate change. Marie-Theres von Schickfus is an economist for the ifo Institute, Center for Energy, Climate, and Resources. (“Climate policy, stranded assets, and investors’ expectations” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Volume 100, March 2020. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083#!)//JLPark</p><p>1. Introduction</p><p>As early as 2012, global financial services companies drew attention to the risk of coal investments becoming stranded as a consequence of the 2°C “carbon budget.“ HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "fn1" 1 This carbon budget specifies the maximal amount of cumulative carbon emissions that can be emitted without surpassing a 2°C temperature increase above preindustrial levels ( HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib45" Meinshausen et al., 2009;  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib4" Allen et al., 2009). Therefore, <u><strong>climate policies</strong> might render <strong>fossil-fuel</u></strong> assets <u><strong>worthless</strong> prior to the end of their economic life</u> time. We study whether the current market valuation of companies owning fossil fuel assets reflects this risk of stranding assets. HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "fn2" 2 A failure to price in this risk can lead to costly consequences for the whole economy. First, the resulting misallocation of capital due to delayed divestment could render the transition to clean capital more expensive ( HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib31" IPCC, 2014;  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib32" IRENA, 2017a). Second, <u>a <strong>sudden</strong> and <strong>unexpected</u></strong> tightening of carbon <u>emission policies</u> ( HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib6" Batten et al., 2016) <u>or sudden changes in <strong>expectations</strong> in the presence of tipping points</u> ( HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib39" Krugman, 1991) <u>can lead to <strong>abrupt repricing</strong> of fossil fuel</u> assets. <u>This situation can result in a <strong>negative supply shock</strong> through changes in <strong>energy use</strong> and <strong>second-round effects in financial markets</u></strong>. HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "fn3" 3 <u>Financial institutions such as the B</u>ank <u>o</u>f <u>E</u>ngland, the Dutch Central Bank (<u>DNB</u>), the Inter-American Development Bank (<u>IDB</u>), <u>and</u> the European Systemic Risk Board (<u>ESRB</u>) <u>have identified</u> the mispricing of <u><strong>stranded asset risk</strong> as a</u> potential <u><strong>systemic risk</strong> and threat to <strong>financial stability</u></strong>. HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "fn4" 4</p><p>Therefore, we analyze the interaction between investors’ expectations and the development of climate policies. <u>Investors’ reactions to</u> new <u>policies depend on</u> their prior <u>expectations</u>, <u>which</u>, in turn, <u>are shaped by <strong>previous policies</u></strong>. This interaction is central to the current paper: What are investors’ priors regarding stranded asset risk, and (how) do these priors change when climate policy proposals are announced? In particular, we analyze (i) whether investors have already priced in expected losses due to the carbon budget, (ii) whether they only respond to concrete policies, and (iii) whether they expect firms to be financially compensated for stranded assets. To answer these questions, we exploit the gradual development of a climate policy proposal in Germany targeting lignite assets and investigate how adjustments of this proposal have affected the market valuation of firms active in electricity production. We find that <u>investors <strong>did not react to announcements</strong> of the initial “climate levy”</u> proposal, which was directed at stranding lignite assets by charging an extra fee on carbon emissions (Stage 1). Investors also did not respond when the proposal transformed into a compensation mechanism (Stage 2), paying plant owners for not running their units. Only announcements that the compensation mechanism may not go through due to violating state aid rules (Stage 3) resulted in a significant and negative reaction. Our findings show that investors do care about the stranded asset risk, but with an expectation of a compensation mechanism.</p><p>Our analysis starts from the notion that the evolution of climate policies and the expectations of investors are interrelated. First, <u>climate policies</u> and policy proposals provide <u><strong>signals</strong> that shape how</u> the <u>investors perceive the stranded asset risk</u>. For instance, <u>setting a price on</u> CO2 <u>emissions or imposing a cost on <strong>fossil resource extraction HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "fn5" 5</u></strong> <u>can <strong>reduce demand</strong>, <strong>slow down investment</strong> in fossil infrastructure, and cause asset stranding</u>. Alternatively, policies addressing fossil-fuel reductions may compensate fossil-fuel owners for leaving their reserves unburned. For example,  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib27" Harstad (2012) proposed that, in the absence of a global climate agreement, “the coalition’s best policy is to simply buy foreign deposits and conserve them”. HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "fn6" 6 Second, <u>investors' reactions to policy signals depend on their <strong>prior expectations</strong> regarding the likelihood of asset stranding and the <strong>credibility of climate policy</u></strong> announcements. For example, they may have already devalued assets following information on the carbon budget implied by the Paris Agreement, or they may find it difficult to translate the concept of a carbon budget into stranded asset risk. HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "fn7" 7 In the latter case, they would wait for further information on climate policies with clear asset stranding implications. Even the announcement of climate policies does not necessarily lead investors to reassess the likeliness of asset stranding, if they expect a compensation mechanism. The policy proposal we investigate provides the opportunity to disentangle the effects of these policy signals and expectations. By tracking the stock market response to different stages of the proposal, we can draw conclusions about investors' prior expectations and how they evolved in the course of the policy's development.</p><p>Our baseline estimation strategy is a short-run event study analysis. We investigate whether there are abnormal returns to the assets of three publicly listed energy companies that can be associated with the three stages of the policy proposal. HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "fn8" 8 The pattern in the reactions to the different stages of the proposal helps us to identify whether an individual event surprised the investors. Furthermore, we test for effects in the power futures market to establish surprise empirically. Finally, we provide anectodal evidence for our empirical findings on the presence of surprise. We provide an extensive robustness analysis related to the identification of the event effects. First, we conduct placebo tests for the nonevent days just prior to the event days to verify the model's performance in predicting the counterfactual returns. Second, as an alternative to using a market price index to control for average market conditions, we estimate a synthetic portfolio aiming to produce a counterfactual control unit. HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "fn9" 9 These estimations show that our results are not driven by the endogeneity of the market price index to the event shocks. Third, in order to control for industry-wide shocks, we use an energy utility company without any lignite-related assets as the control unit, leading to a difference-in-differences estimation of abnormal returns. Finally, by using a news search engine, we identify a small number of potentially confounding events and verify that our results are not driven by these events.</p><p>Our paper contributes to the literature on empirical assessments of market reactions to emission reduction policies, often in the form of event studies.  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib41" Lemoine (2017) and  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib20" Di Maria et al. (2014) find that market players do act in anticipation of demand-side policies.  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib55" Ramiah et al. (2013) and  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib42" Linn (2010) show that stock investors react to announcements of national carbon emission pledges or the introduction of emission trading programs, respectively.  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib38" Koch et al. (2016) find evidence that regulatory events drove EU ETS allowance prices. In the German power market context,  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib49" Oberndorfer et al. (2013) investigate the stock market effects of voluntary actions such as the inclusion of firms in a sustainability stock index. However, to date, investor expectations with regard to specific policies directed at stranding assets or to compensation mechanisms have not been studied.</p><p>There are few papers investigating empirically how investors price in unburnable carbon risk. Batten et al. (2016) conclude that the announcement of the Paris Agreement in December 2015 had a positive effect on the valuation of renewable energy companies, but no significant effect on fossil fuel companies.  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib48" Mukanjari and Sterner (2018) report similar results both for the Paris Agreement and the U.S. presidential election in 2016.  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib25" Griffin et al. (2015) find that the publication of the Meinshausen et al. (2009) article in Nature led to a statistically significant, yet fairly small, reduction in the stock returns of oil and gas firms. They mention several reasons why this effect might be so small. One reason is investors’ expectations with respect to technological developments: this is what  HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083" \l "bib11" Byrd and Cooperman (2016) examine, concluding that <u>investors are aware of the relevance of</u> carbon capture and storage (<u>CCS</u>) <u>in allowing continued carbon use, but that they have already <strong>priced in</strong> stranded asset risk</u>. A second potential reason is that <u>investors are more concerned with <strong>specific energy policies</u></strong>, which is what this article examines in detail.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Rakoff 14 [Jed S. Rakoff, Senior United States District Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, PLI Securities Regulation Institute Keynote Address, “IS THE S.E.C. BECOMING A LAW UNTO ITSELF?,” 11/5/14, https://securitiesdiary.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/rakoff-pli-speech.pdf] fulltext: In 1990, Congress, once more at the behest of the Commission, granted the S.E.C. the power to seek through internal administrative proceedings cease-and-desist orders against any entity or person, whether broker/dealer or otherwise, that was 4 accused of violating the securities laws. More importantly, Congress gave the S.E.C. the power to seek through administrative proceedings disgorgement from any such entity or person and fines from regulated entities and persons. It was the addition of these monetary penalties that gave real “bite” to the S.E.C.’s administrative proceedings; but they were still used sparingly. In 2002, Congress, through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, went a step further and granted the S.E.C. the power to employ administrative proceedings to bar any person who had violated the securities laws from serving as an officer or director of a public company. The final, and largest expansion of the S.E.C.’s administrative enforcement power came, however, with the passage in 2010 of Section 929P(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 929P(a) gives the S.E.C. the power through internal administrative proceedings to impose substantial monetary penalties against any person or entity whatsoever if that person or entity has violated the federal securities laws, even if the violation was unintentional. The net result of all this is that the S.E.C. can today obtain through internal administrative proceedings nearly everything it might obtain by going to court. This sea-change has come about almost entirely at the request of the S.E.C., usually by tacking the provisions authorizing such expansion onto 5 one or another statute enacted in the wake of a financial scandal. What has been the stated rationale for all these changes? Usually nothing more than a claim of greater efficiency. Thus, for example, when then-Director of Enforcement Robert Khuzami submitted a statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee in support of Dodd-Frank, he devoted all of one sentence to what became Section 929P(a), stating: “Additional legislative proposals that would serve to enhance the Division’s effectiveness and efficiency include the ability to seek civil penalties in [administrative] cease-and-desist proceedings.” Similarly, the sole legislative history of Section 929P(a) in the House Report on Dodd-Frank states that “This section streamlines the SEC’s existing enforcement authorities by permitting the SEC to seek civil money penalties in cease-and-desist proceedings under Federal securities laws.” While a claim to greater efficiency by any federal bureaucracy suggests a certain chutzpah, it is hard to find a better example of what is sometimes disparagingly called “administrative creep” than this expansion of the S.E.C.’s internal enforcement power. To be sure, an S.E.C. enforcement action brought internally is in some superficial respects more “effective and efficient” 6 and more “streamlined” than a similar action brought in federal court, for the simple reason that S.E.C. administrative proceedings involve much more limited discovery than federal actions, with no provision whatsoever for either depositions or interrogatories. Similarly, at the hearing itself, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply and the S.E.C. is free to introduce hearsay. Further still, there is no jury, and the matter is decided by an administrative law judge appointed and paid by the S.E.C. It is hardly surprising in these circumstances that the S.E.C. won 100% of its internal administrative hearings in the fiscal year ending September 30, 2014, whereas it won only 61% of its trials in federal court during the same period. But, although the informality and arguable unfairness of S.E.C. administrative proceedings might present serious problems for those defending such actions, you might suppose that federal judges would be delighted to have fewer complicated securities cases burdening their overcrowded dockets. The reason, though, that I suggest that the judiciary and the public should be concerned about any trend toward preferring the S.E.C.’s internal administrative forum to the federal courts is that it hinders the balanced development of the securities laws. Let me explain why this is so: 7 Most of the significant S.E.C. enforcement actions, especially those involving complicated or novel questions of fact or law, are brought under the general anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, that is, section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. The development of the law under these catch-all provisions, which broadly outlaw any fraudulent securities scheme, has mostly been judge-made. Indeed, the S.E.C. has often resisted any attempt to replace these provisions with something more specific, on the theory that such broad statutory provisions provide the flexibility needed to deal with the new schemes that fraudsters are constantly devising. A good example is the law of insider trading, which is generally charged as a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. Although the very first insider trading decision was an internal S.E.C. decision, the famous Cady Roberts decision, since then almost all the major advances in the development of the law of insider trading – as in the Dirks case dealing with tippee liability, the O’Hagen case approving the misappropriation theory, and the like – have occurred in federal courts, usually either the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit. For its part, the S.E.C., though occasionally promulgating rules in response to particular court decisions in this area, has 8 repeatedly resisted any effort by Congress to statutorily define insider trading, preferring to leave the concept sufficiently flexible as to be able to adjust to new developments. But fair notice has nonetheless been provided by the S.E.C.’s almost uniform practice, until very recently, of bringing such cases in federal courts, where the law of insider trading has been developed and elaborated in much-publicized cases. However, bringing these cases in federal court has not been without its costs to the S.E.C. For while the U.S. Attorney’s Office has had a remarkable string of successes in prosecuting criminal insider trading cases, and the S.E.C. has likewise obtained success in civil insider trading cases brought parallel to the criminal cases, nonetheless, when the S.E.C. has filed in federal court those civil insider trading cases that are sufficiently novel that no parallel criminal cases are brought, the S.E.C. has not fared nearly so well. In just this past year, the S.E.C. suffered stinging defeats in two such cases, the Obus case in the Southern District of New York and the Cuban case in the Northern District of Texas. In both these cases, novel and difficult legal issues were presented that led initially to both cases being dismissed by the district courts; but the issues were ultimately resolved by appellate decisions favorable to the S.E.C.’s theories. Nonetheless when, on remand, the cases were 9 ultimately tried to juries, the S.E.C. lost. Thus, given the expansion of its internal jurisdiction occasioned by Dodd-Frank, the S.E.C. might well be tempted in the future to bring such cases as administrative enforcement actions, and thereby likely avoid the sting of well-publicized defeats. But the result would be that the law in such cases would effectively be made, not by neutral federal courts, but by S.E.C. administrative judges. This is because, at least in the case of administrative decisions that have been formally approved by the S.E.C., such decisions, though appealable to the federal courts of appeals, are presumed correct unless unreasonable. In other words, while the decisions of federal district courts on matters of law are subject to de novo review by the appellate courts, the law as determined by an administrative law judge in a formal administrative decision must be given deference by federal courts unless the decision is not within the range of reasonable interpretations. To put it in terms that this audience is familiar with, an S.E.C. administrative judge’s formal ruling on an otherwise undecided issue of statutory interpretation of the securities law is, just like rules enacted by the Commission, entitled to “Chevron” deference. And thus, for example, the Second Circuit, 10 in a 2011 decision entitled VanCook v. SEC, overruled its own prior interpretation of a novel 10b-5 issue, stating “The Commission has since issued a formal adjudicatory decision on the subject.... This later interpretation of Rule 10b-5 ‘trumps’ our prior interpretation.” In short, what you have here are broad anti-fraud provisions, critical to the transparency of the securities markets, that have historically been construed and elaborated by the federal courts but that, under Dodd-Frank, could increasingly be construed and interpreted by the S.E.C.’s administrative law judges if the S.E.C. chose to bring its more significant cases in that forum. Whatever one might say about the S.E.C.’s quasijudicial functions, this is unlikely, I submit, to lead to as balanced, careful, and impartial interpretations as would result from having those cases brought in federal court. In the short-run, this would be unfair to the litigants. In the longer-run, it might not be good for the S.E.C. itself, which has its own reputation for fairness to consider. But, most of all, in the both the short-run and the long-run, it would not be good for the impartial development of the law in an area of immense practical importance. Almost from the very outset of the administrative state, the defense of the huge power we accord to administrative agencies – 11 as classically stated by the second Chairman of the S.E.C., James Landis, in his book The Administrative Process – is that no practical alternative exists in our complex society. But when it comes to interpreting the securities laws, a practical alternative – and the very one provided by the Constitution – has functioned very effectively for decades, namely, adjudication in the federal courts. I see no good reason to displace that constitutional alternative with administrative fiat, and I would urge the S.E.C. to consider that it is neither in its own longterm interest, nor in the interest of the securities markets, nor in the interest of the public as a whole, for the S.E.C. to become, in effect, a law onto itself.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Chevron deference to the SEC wrecks securities law, specifically for insider trading </h4><p><strong>Rakoff 14</strong> [Jed S. Rakoff, Senior United States District Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, PLI Securities Regulation Institute Keynote Address, “IS THE S.E.C. BECOMING A LAW UNTO ITSELF?,” 11/5/14, https://securitiesdiary.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/rakoff-pli-speech.pdf]</p><p>In 1990, Congress, once more at the behest of the Commission, granted the S.E.C. the power to seek through internal administrative proceedings cease-and-desist orders against any entity or person, whether broker/dealer or otherwise, that was 4 accused of violating the securities laws. More importantly, Congress gave the S.E.C. the power to seek through administrative proceedings disgorgement from any such entity or person and fines from regulated entities and persons. It was the addition of these monetary penalties that gave real “bite” to the S.E.C.’s administrative proceedings; but they were still used sparingly. In 2002, Congress, through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, went a step further and granted the S.E.C. the power to employ administrative proceedings to bar any person who had violated the securities laws from serving as an officer or director of a public company. The final, and largest expansion of the S.E.C.’s administrative enforcement power came, however, with the passage in 2010 of Section 929P(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 929P(a) gives the S.E.C. the power through internal administrative proceedings to impose substantial monetary penalties against any person or entity whatsoever if that person or entity has violated the federal securities laws, even if the violation was unintentional. The net result of all this is that <u><strong><mark>the S.E.C. can</mark> today <mark>obtain</strong></mark> through <strong>internal administrative proceedings nearly <mark>everything</mark> it might obtain <mark>by going to court</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>This sea-change </strong>has com</mark>e about almost <strong>entirely at <mark>the request of the S.E.C.,</strong></mark> usually by tacking the provisions authorizing such expansion onto </u>5 <u>one or another statute enacted in the wake of a financial scandal.</u> <u>What has been the stated rationale for all these changes? Usually nothing more than a claim of greater efficiency. Thus, for example, when then-Director of Enforcement Robert</u> Khuzami submitted a statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee in support of Dodd-Frank, he devoted all of one sentence to what became Section 929P(a), stating: “Additional legislative proposals that would serve to enhance the Division’s effectiveness and efficiency include the ability to seek civil penalties in [administrative] cease-and-desist proceedings.” Similarly, the sole legislative history of Section 929P(a) in the House Report on Dodd-Frank states that “This section streamlines the SEC’s existing enforcement authorities by permitting the SEC to seek civil money penalties in cease-and-desist proceedings under Federal securities laws.” <u>While a claim to greater efficiency by any federal bureaucracy suggests a certain chutzpah, <mark>it is hard to find a better example of</u></mark> what is sometimes disparagingly called “<u><strong><mark>administrative creep</u></strong></mark>” than this expansion of the S.E.C.’s internal enforcement power. To be sure, an S.E.C. enforcement action brought internally is in some superficial respects more “effective and efficient” 6 and more “streamlined” than a similar action brought in federal court, for the simple reason that <u>S.E.C. administrative proceedings involve much more limited discovery than federal actions, with no provision whatsoever for either depositions or interrogatories.</u> Similarly, at the hearing itself, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply and the S.E.C. is free to introduce hearsay. Further still, there is no jury, and the matter is decided by an administrative law judge appointed and paid by the S.E.C. It is hardly surprising in these circumstances that <u><strong><mark>the S.E.C. won 100% of its internal</mark> administrative <mark>hearings</mark> in the fiscal year ending</u></strong> September 30, <u><strong>2014</u></strong>, whereas it won only 61% of its trials in federal court during the same period. But, <u>although the informality and arguable unfairness of S.E.C. administrative proceedings might present serious problems </u>for those defending such actions<u>, <strong>you might suppose that federal judges would be delighted to have fewer complicated securities cases</u></strong> burdening their overcrowded dockets. The reason, though, that I suggest that the judiciary and the public should be concerned about <u><strong>any trend</strong> toward <strong><mark>preferring the </mark>S.E.C.’s <mark>internal</mark> administrative <mark>forum</strong> to the</mark> <mark>federal courts</u></mark> is that it <u><strong><mark>hinders</mark> the <mark>balanced</mark> development of the <mark>securities law</mark>s</u></strong>. Let me explain why this is so: 7 <u><mark>Most</mark> of the <strong><mark>significant </mark>S.E.C. <mark>enforcement actions</strong></mark>, especially those involving complicated or novel questions of fact or law, <mark>are brought under</mark> the <strong>general <mark>anti-fraud provisions</mark> of the federal securities laws</u></strong>, that is, section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. <u>The development of the law under <mark>these</mark> catch-all provisions, which broadly outlaw any fraudulent securities scheme, <mark>has</mark> mostly <mark>been <strong>judge-made</strong></mark>. </u>Indeed, <u><mark>the S.E.C. has</mark> often <strong><mark>resisted </mark>any <mark>attempt to replace these</mark> provisions with something more specific</strong><mark>, on the theory that <strong></mark>such <mark>broad</strong></mark> statutory <strong><mark>provisions provide</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>flex</strong></mark>ibility needed to deal with the new schemes that fraudsters are constantly devising. </u>A good example is the law of insider trading, which is generally charged as a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. <u>Although</u> the<u> very first insider trading decision was an internal S.E.C. decision,</u> the famous Cady Roberts decision, <u>since then almost <strong>all the <mark>major advances in</mark> the development of <mark>the law of insider trading</u></strong></mark> – as in the Dirks case dealing with tippee liability, the O’Hagen case approving the misappropriation theory, and the like – <u><strong><mark>have occurred in</mark> federal courts, usually</u></strong> either <u><strong><mark>the Supreme Court</u></strong></mark> or the Second Circuit. For its part, the S.E.C., though occasionally promulgating rules in response to particular court decisions in this area, has 8 repeatedly resisted any effort by Congress to statutorily define insider trading, preferring to leave the concept sufficiently flexible as to be able to adjust to new developments. But fair notice has nonetheless been provided by the S.E.C.’s almost uniform practice, until very recently, of bringing such cases in federal courts, where the law of insider trading has been developed and elaborated in much-publicized cases. However, <u>bringing these cases in federal court has not been without its costs to the S.E.C</u>. For while the U.S. Attorney’s Office has had a remarkable string of successes in prosecuting criminal insider trading cases, and the S.E.C. has likewise obtained success in civil insider trading cases brought parallel to the criminal cases, nonetheless, <u>when the S.E.C. has filed in federal court those civil insider trading cases that are sufficiently novel that no parallel criminal cases are brought, the S.E.C. has not fared nearly so well</u>. In just this past year, the S.E.C. suffered stinging defeats in two such cases, the Obus case in the Southern District of New York and the Cuban case in the Northern District of Texas. In both these cases, novel and difficult legal issues were presented that led initially to both cases being dismissed by the district courts; but the issues were ultimately resolved by appellate decisions favorable to the S.E.C.’s theories. Nonetheless when, on remand, the cases were 9 ultimately tried to juries, the S.E.C. lost. Thus, given the expansion of its internal jurisdiction occasioned by Dodd-Frank, <u>the S.E.C. might well be tempted in the future to bring such cases as administrative enforcement actions, and thereby likely avoid the sting of well-publicized defeats. </u>But <u>the result would be that <strong>the law in such cases would effectively be made</strong>, not by neutral federal courts, <strong>but by S.E.C. administrative judges</strong>. </u>This is because, at least in the case of administrative decisions that have been formally approved by the S.E.C., <u>such</u> <u>decisions</u>, though appealable to the federal courts of appeals, <u><strong>are presumed correct unless unreasonable</u></strong>. In other words, while the decisions of federal district courts on matters of law are subject to de novo review by the appellate courts, <u>the law as determined by an administrative law judge in a formal administrative decision must be given deference by federal courts unless the decision is not within the range of reasonable interpretations. </u>To put it in terms that this audience is familiar with, <u><mark>an S.E.C.</mark> administrative <mark>judge’s</mark> formal <mark>ruling</mark> on an otherwise undecided issue of statutory interpretation of the securities law</u> <u><mark>is</u></mark>, just like rules enacted by the Commission, <u><strong><mark>entitled to “Chevron” deference</mark>.</u></strong> And thus, for example, the Second Circuit, 10 in a 2011 decision entitled VanCook v. SEC, overruled its own prior interpretation of a novel 10b-5 issue, stating “The Commission has since issued a formal adjudicatory decision on the subject.... This later interpretation of Rule 10b-5 ‘trumps’ our prior interpretation.” In short, <u><mark>what you have</mark> here <mark>are <strong>broad anti-fraud provisions</u></strong></mark>, critical to the transparency of the securities markets, <u>that have <mark>historically</mark> been construed and <mark>elaborated by the federal courts but that, <strong>under Dodd-Frank</strong>, could</mark> increasingly <mark>be</mark> <strong>construed and <mark>interpreted by</mark> the <mark>S.E.C.</mark>’s administrative law <mark>judges</strong></mark> if the S.E.C. chose to bring its more significant cases in that forum</u>. Whatever one might say about the S.E.C.’s quasijudicial functions, this is unlikely, I submit, to lead to as balanced, careful, and impartial interpretations as would result from having those cases brought in federal court. <u><strong>In the short-run, <mark>this would be unfair to the litigants. In the long</mark>er-<mark>run</mark>, <mark>it might not be good for the S.E.C.</mark> itself, <mark>which</mark> <mark>has its own reputation</mark> for fairness to consider</u></strong>. But, most of all, in the both the short-run and the long-run, <u>it would not be good for the impartial development of the law in an area of immense practical importance.</u> Almost from the very outset of the administrative state, the defense of the huge power we accord to administrative agencies – 11 as classically stated by the second Chairman of the S.E.C., James Landis, in his book The Administrative Process – is that no practical alternative exists in our complex society. But <u><strong><mark>when it comes to interpreting the securities laws</mark>, a practical alternative </u></strong>– and the very one provided by the Constitution – <u><strong>has functioned very effectively for decades, namely, adjudication in the federal courts</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>I see no good </mark>reason to displace that constitutional alternative with <mark>administrative fiat</mark>, and I would urge the S.E.C. to consider that <mark>it is neither in its own</mark> longterm <mark>interest, nor in</mark> the interest of <mark>the securities markets</mark>,</u></strong> nor in the interest of the public as a whole, <u><strong><mark>for the S.E.C. to become</u></strong></mark>, in effect, <u><strong>a <mark>law onto itself</u></strong></mark>. </p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Wehba 17 Hannah Bloch-Wehba is an associate research scholar, clinical lecturer, and a Stanton First Amendment Fellow at Yale Law School, WILL TRUMP KILL EXECUTIVE WAR POWERS?, If he did, it would be because of his own incompetence., 5 June 2017, https://theoutline.com/post/1614/will-trump-kill-executive-war-powers?zd=1&zi=2du4gdqa fulltext: Although he has not yet been able to achieve any of his signature campaign promises five months into his presidency, Donald Trump nonetheless finds himself singularly empowered by his office — at least in theory. We know relatively little about Trump’s beliefs regarding executive power; he’s a man of few words when it comes to constitutional theory. But it would be surprising if Trump’s White House did not seek to take advantage of its supposed monopoly over what the Supreme Court recognized in 1936 as the president’s “very delicate, plenary and exclusive power” when it comes to foreign affairs and international relations. The question is if — and how much — Trump’s seeming unwillingness to play by the normal rules will change the office of the presidency. Traditionally, courts have often refused to rule on the most pressing national security issues because these questions are better resolved by the political branches. Courts have also reasoned that the president is uniquely situated to respond to volatile and sensitive international situations and to make decisions based on secret intelligence and other information to which the public is not privy. In 2010, the Supreme Court concluded that courts’ own “lack of competence” to understand national security threats made it “dangerous” to require “details,” “specific facts,” and “specific evidence” from the executive branch. When courts renounce their own abilities to understand the specifics of executive branch action in the areas of foreign policy and national security and refuse to substitute their judgment for the president’s, they often rely on the tacit assumption that the person in office is both minimally capable and committed to common values. But with Trump, that ground is shifting. Take, for example, his Muslim ban. In a February brief filed with the Ninth Circuit on the constitutionality of the first ban, the government took the extreme position that the constitutional principle of separation of powers forbade the Court from reviewing the executive order containing the ban at all, a premise that the Ninth Circuit rejected as “contrary to the fundamental structure of our constitutional democracy.” Last week, when the Fourth Circuit again struck down the (now-revised) ban, it noted that Trump had originally issued the order “without consulting the relevant national security agencies… and that those agencies only offered a national security rationale after [the order] was enjoined.” It’s difficult to convince judges that the executive branch is making rational decisions when the current president invokes “national security” to justify overtly discriminatory campaign statements that he made when he had never held public office and was receiving only occasional intelligence briefings. As Harvard Law professor Jack Goldsmith put it on Lawfare Blog in February, Trump’s public statements make it “very, very hard for courts in the short term to read immigration and constitutional law, as they normally would, with significant deference to the president’s broad delegated powers from Congress and to the president’s broad discretion in foreign relations.” This shift in power raises an interesting question: Is there a real risk that Trump could endanger future presidents’ ability to assert broad theories of executive power in administrations to come? Perhaps if courts did nothing at all when faced with constitutional challenges to presidential power, they might ameliorate Trump’s disdain for “so-called judges,” but judicial inaction and executive abuse are a toxic combination. Questions about the nature of presidential authority will continue to crop up in decisions about armed conflict, detention and prosecution of enemy belligerents, and surveillance. Although Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 74 in 1788 that the commander-in-chief clause was so obvious that “little need be said to explain or enforce it,” today nothing could be less true. Decades of war may erode Americans’ tolerance when the commander in chief goes on the march yet again in the “direction of the common strength.” While the misbehavior of prior administrations does not excuse a current one, it poses a real conundrum: The exercise of power by presidents sets a form of precedent. Congressional silence and inaction, widespread secrecy, and blasé handwaving at abuse of power create expectations for the office itself. Reading the history of how presidents exercise their power is a critical way to understand whether that exercise is appropriate. As Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote in the seminal Steel Seizure case in 1952, a “systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution… may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President.” In other words, the more the president does, the more the next president gets away with. In an effort to change this pattern, in 1973 Congress enacted — over President Nixon’s veto — the War Powers Resolution, which requires the president to consult with Congress before he introduces troops into hostile situations and limits armed conflicts to two or three months unless specifically authorized by Congress. Since then, most presidents have maintained that the War Powers Resolution unconstitutionally infringes on their authority under Article II of the Constitution. Only a handful of combat operations since 1973 were congressionally authorized — the Gulf War, Lebanon mission, Somalia mission, and the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The United States’ participation in NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo, which lasted 79 days, was the first unauthorized air campaign in the post-War Powers Resolution era to exceed the statutory time limit, but it was not the last. When the 2011 Libya intervention lasted longer than 60 days, the Obama White House took the mind-bending position that U.S. forces leading the bombing campaign were not “engaged in the kind of hostilities” covered by the War Powers Resolution at all. Presidents have repeatedly taken the position that authorizations of the use of military force are nice to have, but not necessary as a matter of law. As a result, Congress hardly ever makes overt statements about whether it has authorized continued engagements abroad, even as it frequently appropriates funds to support those actions (Trump’s defense budget sets aside more than $64 billion for “contingency operations” alone). Since 2001, the U.S. has waged many of its wars under the same ostensible legal authority: the authorization for use of military force enacted days after 9/11, a joint resolution which approved the president to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4><strong>That <u>spills over</u> --- restrictions cause <u>broader</u> incursions on <u>war powers </h4><p>Wehba 17</p><p></u></strong>Hannah Bloch-Wehba is an associate research scholar, clinical lecturer, and a Stanton First Amendment Fellow at Yale Law School, WILL TRUMP KILL EXECUTIVE WAR POWERS?,<u> If he did, it would be because of his own incompetence., 5 June 2017, https://theoutline.com/post/1614/will-trump-kill-executive-war-powers?zd=1&zi=2du4gdqa</p><p></u>Although he has not yet been able to achieve any of his signature campaign promises five months into his presidency, Donald <u>Trump</u> nonetheless <u>finds himself <strong>singularly empowered by his office</strong> — at least in theory</u>. We know relatively little about Trump’s beliefs regarding executive power; he’s a man of few words when it comes to constitutional theory. But it would be surprising if Trump’s White House did not seek to take advantage of its supposed monopoly over what <u><mark>the Supreme Court recognized</mark> in 1936</u> as <u><strong>the president’s</u></strong> “<u><strong>very delicate</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>plenary and exclusive</u></strong> <u><strong>power</u></strong></mark>” <u><strong>when it comes <mark>to foreign affairs</u></strong></mark> <u>and international relations</u>. <u>The question is <strong>if — and how much</strong> — Trump’s seeming unwillingness to play by the normal rules will</u> <u><strong>change the office of the presidency</strong>.</p><p>Traditionally</u>, <u>courts</u> <u>have</u> often <u><strong>refused to rule</u></strong> <u>on</u> <u>the most pressing national security issues because these questions are better resolved by the political branches</u>. <u>Courts have also reasoned that the president is <strong>uniquely situated</strong> to respond to <strong>volatile and sensitive international situations</u></strong> <u>and to make decisions based on secret intelligence </u>and other information to which the public is not privy. <u>In 2010, the Supreme Court concluded that <strong>courts’ own “lack of competence</u></strong>” <u>to</u> understand <u>national security threats made it “<strong>dangerous</u></strong>” <u>to require</u> “<u>details</u>,” “<u>specific</u> <u>facts,” and</u> “specific <u>evidence” from the executive</u> branch. When <u>courts <strong>renounce their own abilities</strong> to understand the specifics of executive branch action <strong>in the areas of foreign policy</strong> and</u> national security and <u><strong>refuse to substitute their judgment for the president’s</u></strong>, they often rely on the tacit assumption that the person in office is both minimally capable and committed to common values.</p><p>But <u><strong>with Trump, that ground is shifting</u></strong>. Take, for example, his Muslim ban. In a February brief filed with the Ninth Circuit on the constitutionality of the first ban, the government took the extreme position that the constitutional principle of separation of powers forbade the Court from reviewing the executive order containing the ban at all, a premise that the Ninth Circuit rejected as “contrary to the fundamental structure of our constitutional democracy.” Last week, when the Fourth Circuit again struck down the (now-revised) ban, it noted that Trump had originally issued the order “without consulting the relevant national security agencies… and that those agencies only offered a national security rationale after [the order] was enjoined.”</p><p>It’s difficult to convince judges that the executive branch is making rational decisions when the current president invokes “national security” to justify overtly discriminatory campaign statements that he made when he had never held public office and was receiving only occasional intelligence briefings. As Harvard Law professor Jack Goldsmith put it on Lawfare Blog in February, <u>Trump’s</u> public statements <u>make it “very,</u> <u>very hard for courts</u> in the short term <u>to read</u> immigration and <u>constitutional law</u>, <u>as they normally would, <mark>with <strong></mark>significant <mark>deference to</mark> the president’s <mark>broad delegated powers</u></strong></mark> from Congress <u><strong>and to the president’s</u></strong> <u><strong>broad discretion <mark>in</mark> <mark>foreign relations</u></strong></mark>.”</p><p><u>This shift in power raises</u> an interesting question: Is there <u>a <strong>real risk</strong> that <mark>Trump</u> <u>could</u> <u><strong>endanger</mark> <mark>future presidents’</mark> ability to assert broad theories of executive power in administrations to come</u></strong>? Perhaps if courts did nothing at all when faced with constitutional challenges to presidential power, they might ameliorate Trump’s disdain for “so-called judges,” but judicial inaction and executive abuse are a toxic combination. <u><strong>Questions about the nature of presidential authority</u></strong> <u><strong>will continue to crop up</u></strong> <u>in decisions about <strong>armed conflict</u></strong>, <u><strong>detention</u></strong> and prosecution of enemy belligerents, <u><strong>and surveillance</u></strong>. Although Alexander <u>Hamilton</u> <u>wrote</u> in Federalist 74 in 1788 <u>that the commander-in-chief clause was so obvious that “little need be said to explain or enforce it,”</u> <u><strong>today nothing could be less true.</u></strong> <u>Decades of war may</u> <u><strong>erode Americans’ tolerance</strong> when the commander in chief goes on the march yet again in the “direction of the common strength<strong>.”</p><p></u></strong>While the <u><strong>misbehavior of prior administrations</u></strong> does not excuse a current one, it <u><strong>poses a real conundrum</u></strong>: <u><strong>The exercise of power by presidents</u></strong> <u><strong>sets a</u></strong> form of <u><strong>precedent</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Congressional</mark> silence and <mark>inaction</u></strong></mark>, widespread secrecy, <u><strong>and blasé handwaving at abuse of power</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>create expectations</u></strong> <u><strong>for the office itself</u></strong></mark>. Reading <u><strong>the history of how presidents exercise their power</strong> is a <strong>critical way</strong> to understand <strong>whether that exercise is appropriate</u></strong>. <u>As Supreme Court Justice</u> Robert H. Jackson <u>wrote</u> in the seminal Steel Seizure case in 1952, <u>a “<strong>systematic, unbroken, <mark>executive practice</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>never </mark>before <mark>questioned</mark>,</u></strong> <u><strong>engaged in by Presidents</u></strong> who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution… <u><strong>may be t<mark>reated</mark> <mark>as </mark>a</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>gloss on ‘executive Power’ </mark>vested in the President.”</p><p>In other words</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>the more the president does, the more the next</mark> president <mark>gets away with</u></strong></mark>. In an effort to change this pattern, in 1973 Congress enacted — over President Nixon’s veto — the War Powers Resolution, which requires the president to consult with Congress before he introduces troops into hostile situations and limits armed conflicts to two or three months unless specifically authorized by Congress. Since then, most presidents have maintained that the War Powers Resolution unconstitutionally infringes on their authority under Article II of the Constitution. Only a handful of combat operations since 1973 were congressionally authorized — the Gulf War, Lebanon mission, Somalia mission, and the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The United States’ participation in NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo, which lasted 79 days, was the first unauthorized air campaign in the post-War Powers Resolution era to exceed the statutory time limit, but it was not the last. When the 2011 Libya intervention lasted longer than 60 days, the Obama White House took the mind-bending position that U.S. forces leading the bombing campaign were not “engaged in the kind of hostilities” covered by the War Powers Resolution at all. Presidents have repeatedly taken the position that authorizations of the use of military force are nice to have, but not necessary as a matter of law.</p><p>As a result, <u>Congress <strong>hardly ever</strong> makes overt statements</u> about whether it has authorized continued engagements abroad, even as it frequently appropriates funds to support those actions (Trump’s defense budget sets aside more than $64 billion for “contingency operations” alone). Since 2001, the U.S. has waged many of its wars under the same ostensible legal authority: the authorization for use of military force enacted days after 9/11, a joint resolution which approved the president to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Barannikova 19 [Anastasia Barannikova is a research fellow at ADM Nevelskoy Maritime State University (Vladivostok). Her research interests include (but not limited by) regional (Northeast Asia) security and nuclear non-proliferation; Korean Peninsula, DPRK foreign and domestic policies, DPRK nuclear and missile program, nuclear posture. Barannikova is the author of more than 100 publications in scientific journals, newspapers and blogs, including articles in Russian, English, Chinese, Korean, Mongolian and Japanese languages. She is also a speaker /presenter / security expert at the number of international conferences held in China, DPRK, Japan, Mongolia, ROK, and Russia. She worked at different universities of Vladivostok, Russia, in the sphere of foreign affairs and international education programs, “What Russia thinks about North Korea’s nuclear weapons,” April 24, 2019, https://thebulletin.org/2019/04/what-russia-thinks-about-north-koreas-nuclear-weapons/, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists] fulltext: North Korean nuclear weapons and denuclearization. Russia continues to consider the North as a party to the NPT, arguing that Russia recognizes only those nuclear countries that had produced and tested nuclear weapons before January 1, 1967, as nuclear weapons states. Russia refuses to make distinctions among the de facto nuclear nations, including the North, and categorizes it, along with Israel, India, and Pakistan, as a nonnuclear country. Despite considering the North’s nuclear weapons illegitimate, the Kremlin wants to see measures to ensure international security accompany calls for disarmament–and adherence to the NPT–for the “unofficial nuclear powers.” Resolving the problem of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs says, “is impossible without reducing overall military and political tensions, refusing to build up military infrastructure, reducing the scale of maneuvers, and building trust between the states of the region.” It takes two to denuclearize. Based on how Russia views issues on the Korean Peninsula, it seems clear that a resolution of the nuclear proliferation problem posed by the North will require, at a minimum, the denuclearization of the entire peninsula. The unilateral disarmament of the North is an impossible demand. Pyongyang now relies on nuclear weapons as its main deterrent against large-scale enemy aggression, even aggression which only uses conventional weapons. From this point-of-view, real denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula would be more acceptable for the North. But the United States would need to remove its nuclear umbrella guarantees for South Korea. The South cannot be considered nonnuclear as long as it can rely on another country’s nuclear weapons. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula would require not only the North’s nuclear disarmament, but also complete, verifiable, and irreversible removal of the US nuclear arsenal, including nuclear-armed bombers and submarines on the peninsula. Indeed, it means disarmament of the United States, which is as impossible as unilateral disarmament of the North. North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. Even denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is itself only a partial solution: a viable solution must also take into account the greater regional security environment. Indeed, the security architecture in Northeast Asia has been in flux for decades. And for many years, countries have used North Korea’s nuclear program as justification for military buildup. This dynamic has produced a regional arms race. Countries have modernized their forces and weaponry and North Korea has made dramatic progress in nuclear weapons and missile development. Аnd the United States has contributed to this phenomenon by agreeing to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system on the Korean Peninsula, a rather useless defense against North Korea, but quite capable against Chinese missiles. Russia and China are improving their strategic capabilities, developing hypersonic weapons to overcome US missile defenses. Their expert communities are discussing ideas such as collective missile defense systems. Japan, under the pretext of protection against North Korea, has modernized its military, exceeding the needs of self-defense, and now is considering deployment of US missile defense systems on its territory. The arms race involves a wide sphere of countries, including India, Pakistan, Iran, and others. North Korean security. At the Eastern Economic Forum in 2017, Putin seemed empathetic to North Korea’s quest for nuclear weaponry: “They know full-well how the situation developed, for example, in Iraq … and they see possession of nuclear weapons and missiles as the only way to defend themselves.” Such statements may indicate that Russia understands North Korea’s motives for going nuclear and does not see any alternatives. Indeed, Russia can offer little to North Korea in the absence of an effective military cooperation treaty. The treaty between North Korea and Russia, which was signed in 2000 in order to update the 1961 North Korean-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, has no clause on military cooperation. A Chinese treaty with North Korea, meanwhile, requires that China aid Pyongyang only if a third country attacks the North. Moreover, China sometimes seems to question its obligations under the treaty. For North Korea relying on one’s own forces (including nuclear weapons) offers more security than any treaty. A significant question is whether North Korea, deprived of its own nuclear deterrent, would need another country’s nuclear umbrella to guarantee its security. Many experts believe China is most likely the country to do that. But Russian experts, however, argue that North Korea has decided not to rely upon big countries’ nuclear umbrellas. While China’s nuclear umbrella could provide North Korea more security than its own arsenal, this protection contradicts the concept of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. Another strike against the idea that North Korea would settle for the protection of someone else’s nuclear umbrella is that the notion doesn’t take into account Pyongyang’s accomplishments or pride. North Korea has already acquired nuclear weapons and has developed good enough systems to bring the United States to the negotiating table. Such a country is unlikely to exchange security assurances for what it views as a pretty good deterrent. Also, much of North Korea’s official ideology is wrapped up in the concept of having nuclear weapons. Nuclear status is even enshrined in the country’s constitution. Kim Jong Un has called his country the “nuclear power in the East,” thus confirming a special status and role for nuclear weapons. They aren’t just the main deterrent in its arsenal but also a symbol of prestige and an indicator of the efficacy of the country’s current political course. If Kim abandoned these weapons, he would be inviting serious consequences for his leadership domestically—as he also would were he to form a military alliance with a big power. These consequences could include society and regime destabilization. Russia wants a stable North more than a non-nuclear North. Although, Russia continues to officially oppose North Korea’s nuclear status on the basis of its strict interpretation of the NPT, experts already speak about “nuclear emancipation” for the North, meaning recognition of its status as a lesser nuclear state. These ideas coincide with an idea some Chinese scholars have developed whereby North Korea would reduce its nuclear arsenal but keep some weapons as a deterrent. From Russia’s perspective, nuclear weapons now guarantee the security of the North Korean regime. The weapons can prevent attempts at violent regime change by external force. Through them, North Korean leadership has the independence to make changes within its borders. That’s good for Russia. The security of Kim’s regime, in turn, guarantees stability near Russia’s eastern borders. For Russia, a stable North Korean regime guarantees the absence of refugees flows, a normal feature of conflict zones, but also prevents US troops from deploying in a potentially disintegrating North. And with its nuclear weapons as diplomatic leverage, North Korea can maintain some independence from China. Thus, Moscow views Kim’s stability as providing something of a buffer between Russia and China. Do North Korean nuclear weapons pose a threat to Russia? From Moscow’s perspective, the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia are relatively stable and don’t pose any immediate threats to security. Relations between Russia and North Korea are neutral, if not friendly. North Korean leadership appreciates Russia’s cautious, slow approach to the relationship, in contrast to China’s activist take on issues on the Korean Peninsula. Russia’s emphasis on the need to respect state sovereignty as a fundamental principle of international relations further lubricates the bilateral relationship: Russia avoids any attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the North, so Pyongyang does not consider Russia as an external threat. Many Russian analysts consider North Korea’s nuclear program to be defensive. Looking at the North’s nuclear doctrine, it seems likely the country wouldn’t use its nuclear weapons against a country that isn’t planning an attack. While little is known about Russia’s military planning beyond its publicly available doctrines, the specifics of the bilateral relations it holds with the North may guarantee that Russia has no plans to attack its neighbor. But there is one scenario whereby North Korea’s nuclear weapons could threaten Russia. If Kim launches missiles against the United States, experts say they’ll fly over Russian territory. A US anti-missile response could, thus, risk a war between Russia and the United States. But Russian experts don’t believe that North Korea would ever attack the United States; they consider Kim Jong Un too rational for that. Why did Russia support UN sanctions? While there is little threat to Russia from North Korean weapons, there remains the question of why Russia supported the last Security Council resolution imposing sanctions against the North. One potential explanation is that the situation on the Korean Peninsula was really tense, and Russia preferred economic pressure to military actions by the United States. But the risk of invasion decreased significantly when the North achieved serious progress in its nuclear and missile programs and thus acquired a minimal nuclear deterrent. Supporting sanctions in September 2017 damaged economic interests in Russia’s Far East and created other economic obstacles for Russia. Even as Russia voted for sanctions, Moscow was convinced they were ineffective in halting the North’s nuclear ambitions. Indeed, decades of sanctions have had little discernible impact on North Korea’s intention to develop its nuclear potential. On the contrary, they pushed the country to accelerate the pace of its development. And it was, in fact, China that benefited from the latest sanctions. China could monopolize trade relations with Pyongyang, retaining its influence on North Korean leadership. Thus it’s hard to see what Russia gets from supporting sanctions.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Denuke causes <u>regime instability</u> and <u>evaporates deterrence</u> – prompts quick invasion</h4><p><strong>Barannikova 19</strong> [Anastasia Barannikova is a research fellow at ADM Nevelskoy Maritime State University (Vladivostok). Her research interests include (but not limited by) regional (Northeast Asia) security and nuclear non-proliferation; Korean Peninsula, DPRK foreign and domestic policies, DPRK nuclear and missile program, nuclear posture. Barannikova is the author of more than 100 publications in scientific journals, newspapers and blogs, including articles in Russian, English, Chinese, Korean, Mongolian and Japanese languages. She is also a speaker /presenter / security expert at the number of international conferences held in China, DPRK, Japan, Mongolia, ROK, and Russia. She worked at different universities of Vladivostok, Russia, in the sphere of foreign affairs and international education programs, “What Russia thinks about North Korea’s nuclear weapons,” April 24, 2019, https://thebulletin.org/2019/04/what-russia-thinks-about-north-koreas-nuclear-weapons/, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists]</p><p><u>North Korean nuclear weapons and <strong>denuclearization</u></strong>. Russia continues to consider the North as a party to the NPT, arguing that Russia recognizes only those nuclear countries that had produced and tested nuclear weapons before January 1, 1967, as nuclear weapons states. Russia refuses to make distinctions among the de facto nuclear nations, including the North, and categorizes it, along with Israel, India, and Pakistan, as a nonnuclear country. Despite considering the North’s nuclear weapons illegitimate, the Kremlin wants to see measures to ensure international security accompany calls for disarmament–and adherence to the NPT–for the “unofficial nuclear powers.”</p><p><u>Resolving </u>the problem of<u> North Korea’s <strong>nuclear weapons</u></strong>, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs says, “is impossible without reducing overall military and political tensions, refusing to build up military infrastructure, reducing the scale of maneuvers, and building trust between the states of the region.”</p><p> It takes two to denuclearize. Based on how Russia views issues on the Korean Peninsula, it seems clear that a resolution of the nuclear proliferation problem posed by the North will require, at a minimum, the denuclearization of the entire peninsula. The unilateral disarmament of the North is an impossible demand. Pyongyang now relies on nuclear weapons as its main deterrent against large-scale enemy aggression, even aggression which only uses conventional weapons. From this point-of-view, real denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula would be more acceptable for the North. But the United States would need to remove its nuclear umbrella guarantees for South Korea. The South cannot be considered nonnuclear as long as it can rely on another country’s nuclear weapons. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula would require not only the North’s nuclear disarmament, but also complete, verifiable, and irreversible removal of the US nuclear arsenal, including nuclear-armed bombers and submarines on the peninsula. Indeed, it means disarmament of the United States, which is as impossible as unilateral disarmament of the North.</p><p><u><mark>North Korea</mark>’s <strong>nuclear arsenal</u></strong>. <u>Even <strong><mark>denuclearization</u></strong></mark> of the Korean Peninsula <u>is itself only a partial solution</u>: a viable solution <u><mark>must</mark> also <mark>take into account</mark> the <strong><mark>greater regional security</strong></mark> <strong>environment</strong>.</u> Indeed, <u>the security architecture in Northeast Asia has been in flux</u> for decades. And for many years, countries have used North Korea’s nuclear program as justification for military buildup. This dynamic has produced a regional arms race. Countries have modernized their forces and weaponry and North Korea has made dramatic progress in nuclear weapons and missile development. Аnd the United States has contributed to this phenomenon by agreeing to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system on the Korean Peninsula, a rather useless defense against North Korea, but quite capable against Chinese missiles. Russia and China are improving their strategic capabilities, developing hypersonic weapons to overcome US missile defenses. Their expert communities are discussing ideas such as collective missile defense systems. Japan, under the pretext of protection against North Korea, has modernized its military, exceeding the needs of self-defense, and now is considering deployment of US missile defense systems on its territory. The arms race involves a wide sphere of countries, including India, Pakistan, Iran, and others.</p><p><u><mark>North Korean <strong>security</u></strong></mark>. At the Eastern Economic Forum in 2017, Putin seemed empathetic to North Korea’s quest for nuclear weaponry: “<u><strong><mark>They know</strong></mark> full-well how the situation developed, for example, in <strong><mark>Iraq</u></strong></mark> … and <u><mark>they see <strong>possession</strong></mark> of nuclear weapons and missiles <mark>as the <strong>only way</strong></mark> to defend themselves</u>.” Such statements may indicate that Russia understands North Korea’s motives for going nuclear and does not see any alternatives.</p><p>Indeed, Russia can offer little to North Korea in the absence of an effective military cooperation treaty. The treaty between North Korea and Russia, which was signed in 2000 in order to update the 1961 North Korean-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, has no clause on military cooperation. A Chinese treaty with North Korea, meanwhile, requires that China aid Pyongyang only if a third country attacks the North. Moreover, China sometimes seems to question its obligations under the treaty.</p><p><u>For North Korea relying on</u> one’s own forces (including <u><strong>nuclear weapons</u></strong>) <u>offers more security than any treaty</u>.</p><p><u><strong>A significant question is whether North Korea, deprived of its own nuclear deterrent, would need another country’s nuclear umbrella to guarantee its security. Many experts believe China is most likely the country to do that. But Russian experts, however, argue that North Korea has decided not to rely upon big countries’ nuclear umbrellas. While China’s nuclear umbrella could provide North Korea more security than its own arsenal, this protection contradicts the concept of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.</p><p></u></strong>Another strike against the idea that North Korea would settle for the protection of someone else’s nuclear umbrella is that the notion doesn’t take into account Pyongyang’s accomplishments or pride. North Korea has already acquired nuclear weapons and has developed good enough systems to bring the United States to the negotiating table. Such a country is unlikely to exchange security assurances for what it views as a pretty good deterrent. Also, <u>much of <mark>North Korea’s <strong>official ideology</strong> is wrapped up in</mark> the concept of having <mark>nuclear weapons</u></mark>. <u>Nuclear status is</u> even <u>enshrined in the country’s constitution</u>. Kim Jong Un has called his country the “nuclear power in the East,” thus confirming a special status and role for nuclear weapons. They aren’t just the main deterrent in its arsenal but also a symbol of prestige and an indicator of the efficacy of the country’s current political course. <u><mark>If <strong>Kim abandoned these weapons</strong></mark>, <mark>he would be <strong>inviting</mark> <mark>serious consequences</strong></mark> for his <strong>leadership</strong> <mark>domestically</u></mark>—as he also would were he to form a military alliance with a big power. <u>These <strong><mark>consequences</strong></mark> could <mark>include <strong>society</strong> and <strong>regime destabilization</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>Russia wants a stable North more than a non-nuclear North. Although, Russia continues to officially oppose North Korea’s nuclear status on the basis of its strict interpretation of the NPT, experts already speak about “nuclear emancipation” for the North, meaning recognition of its status as a lesser nuclear state. These ideas coincide with an idea some Chinese scholars have developed whereby North Korea would reduce its nuclear arsenal but keep some weapons as a deterrent. From Russia’s perspective, <u><strong><mark>nuclear weapons</strong></mark> now <strong><mark>guarantee</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>security</strong> of the North Korean <strong>regime</u></strong></mark>. The <u><mark>weapons </mark>can <mark>prevent attempts at <strong></mark>violent <mark>regime change</strong> by <strong>external force</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Through them</mark>, North Korean <mark>leadership has</mark> the <strong><mark>independence</strong></mark> to make changes within its borders.</u> That’s good for Russia.</p><p>The security of Kim’s regime, in turn, guarantees stability near Russia’s eastern borders. For Russia, a stable North Korean regime guarantees the absence of refugees flows, a normal feature of conflict zones, but also prevents US troops from deploying in a potentially disintegrating North. And with its nuclear weapons as diplomatic leverage, North Korea can maintain some independence from China. Thus, Moscow views Kim’s stability as providing something of a buffer between Russia and China.</p><p>Do North Korean nuclear weapons pose a threat to Russia? From Moscow’s perspective, the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia are relatively stable and don’t pose any immediate threats to security. Relations between Russia and North Korea are neutral, if not friendly. North Korean leadership appreciates Russia’s cautious, slow approach to the relationship, in contrast to China’s activist take on issues on the Korean Peninsula. Russia’s emphasis on the need to respect state sovereignty as a fundamental principle of international relations further lubricates the bilateral relationship: Russia avoids any attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the North, so Pyongyang does not consider Russia as an external threat.</p><p>Many Russian analysts consider North Korea’s nuclear program to be defensive. Looking at the North’s nuclear doctrine, it seems likely the country wouldn’t use its nuclear weapons against a country that isn’t planning an attack. While little is known about Russia’s military planning beyond its publicly available doctrines, the specifics of the bilateral relations it holds with the North may guarantee that Russia has no plans to attack its neighbor.</p><p>But there is one scenario whereby North Korea’s nuclear weapons could threaten Russia. If Kim launches missiles against the United States, experts say they’ll fly over Russian territory. A US anti-missile response could, thus, risk a war between Russia and the United States. But Russian experts don’t believe that North Korea would ever attack the United States; they consider Kim Jong Un too rational for that.</p><p>Why did Russia support UN sanctions? While there is little threat to Russia from North Korean weapons, there remains the question of why Russia supported the last Security Council resolution imposing sanctions against the North. One potential explanation is that the situation on the Korean Peninsula was really tense, and Russia preferred economic pressure to military actions by the United States. But <u>the <strong><mark>risk of invasion decreased significantly</strong> when the <strong>North achieved</strong></mark> serious <strong><mark>progress in its nuclear</strong></mark> and missile <strong><mark>programs</strong> and</mark> thus <strong><mark>acquired a minimal nuclear deterrent</u></strong></mark>. Supporting sanctions in September 2017 damaged economic interests in Russia’s Far East and created other economic obstacles for Russia. Even as Russia voted for sanctions, Moscow was convinced they were ineffective in halting the North’s nuclear ambitions. Indeed, <u>decades of sanctions have had little discernible impact on North Korea’s intention to develop its nuclear potential</u>. On the contrary, they pushed the country to accelerate the pace of its development. And it was, in fact, China that benefited from the latest sanctions. China could monopolize trade relations with Pyongyang, retaining its influence on North Korean leadership. Thus it’s hard to see what Russia gets from supporting sanctions.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Sherrod Lewis Bumgardner 10, Legal Adviser, NATO Allied Transformation Staff Element Europe, et al., 2010, NATO Legal Deskbook: Second Edition, https://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-LegalDeskbook.pdf fulltext: The 2nd pillar (below the Washington Treaty) relates to the status of NATO as an international organisation (the civilian headquarters in Brussels, the political bodies, and the NATO agencies) and the status of the international staff and the national representations to NATO. For NATO members, the status is defined in the Ottawa Agreement (September 1951). The Ottawa Agreement announces explicitly that it does not apply to any military headquarters established by NATO or to any other military bodies – unless so decided by the North Atlantic Council. In very broad terms the Agreement defines NATO as a legal entity under international law. Furthermore, in addition to providing NATO with a legal personality, the Ottawa Agreement defines the immunities and privileges to be granted to NATO, to the international staff (not full diplomatic immunity) and to the national missions established to NATO (full diplomatic immunity). In 1994, in connection with the introduction of the PfP Framework Document, it was decided to invite PfP states to post national missions to NATO. In order to define the status of those missions, an agreement – the Brussels Agreement (September 1994) - was concluded between NATO member states. The Brussels Agreement grants equivalent status to missions representing PfP states as conferred to missions of NATO states. PfP states are not signatories to the agreement, but upon accession to NATO, the new NATO members are required to sign the Agreement. 3. Third pillar – Status of forces and headquarters The 3rd pillar records agreements regarding the status of forces and international military Headquarters within NATO. The two main documents in this category are the NATO Status of Forces Agreement concluded in June 1951 and the Paris Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters (August 1952). The NATO SOFA defines the status of forces when NATO states are sending and receiving troops as a genuine part of the co-operation within the alliance. The NATO SOFA defines the bilateral relations between a sending and a receiving state in a multinational treaty. Both the NATO SOFA and the Paris Protocol are supplemented by agreements concluded amongst Nations (NATO SOFA) and between Supreme Headquarters and individual Nations (Paris Protocol).58 4. Fourth Pillar – Partnership for Peace The 4th pillar is linked to the PfP Framework Document, and lists the agreements concluded in support of PfP. While the PfP Framework Document is not an agreement in the legal sense, it is the foundation of the PfP co-operation that covers a broad spectre of activities, depending on the wishes and capabilities of the involved countries. The cooperation is the result of and driven by political commitments, a shared understanding of the values on which NATO is founded. In 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was created to replace the NACC and to build on its achievements, paving the way for the development of an enhanced and more operational partnership. The EAPC and the PfP programme have steadily developed their own dynamic, as successive steps have been taken by NATO and its Partner countries to extend security cooperation, building on the partnership arrangements they have created. The formal basis for the Partnership for Peace is the Framework Document, which sets out specific undertakings for each Partner country. Each Partner country makes a number of far-reaching political commitments to preserve democratic societies; to maintain the principles of international law; to fulfil obligations under the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act and international disarmament and arms control agreements; to refrain from the threat or use of force against other states; to respect existing borders; and to settle disputes peacefully. Specific commitments are also made to promote transparency in national defence planning and budgeting to establish democratic control over armed forces, and to develop the capacity for joint action with NATO in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The Framework Document also enshrines a commitment by the Allies to consult with any Partner country that perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. Cooperation is tailored to the Partner Nations‘ individual requirements but may include: - Efforts to maintaining the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the United Nations and/or the responsibility of the OSCE; - Military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises, aimed at strengthening the ability of PfP nations to undertake various missions (peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed); - Development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance. Launched at the November 2002 Prague Summit, Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) are open to countries that have the political will and ability to deepen their relationship with NATO. An IPAP should clearly set out the cooperation objectives and priorities of the individual partner country, and ensure that the various mechanisms in use correspond directly to these priorities. In addition to the Brussels Agreement, the agreements that regulate the status issues in activities in cooperation with PfP countries are the following: - Agreement among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the other States participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the Status of their Forces / Brussels, 19 June 1995 - Additional Protocol to the Agreement among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Other States Participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the Status of their Forces. Done at Brussels June 19, 1995 - Further Additional Protocol to the Agreement among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Other States Participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the Status of their Forces. Done at Brussels December 19, 1997 D. GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL PERSONALITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1. Legal personality on international level International law presupposes that legal personality is a prerequisite for the capacity to bear rights and obligations. It is increasingly recognized that while the indicia for legal personality of international organization has been drawn from the incidents of statehood, international organizations are not merely states writ large and that rights and duties resulting from their personhood are not identical to that enjoyed by states.59 Given that international organizations are ―secondary subjects‖ of international law, their creation and their actual existence flows from the will of other international legal persons. Having international personality means that the international organization possesses rights, duties, powers and liabilities as distinct from its members or creators on the international plane and in international law. THE EXAMPLE OF OTTAWA AGREEMENT Preamble of the Ottawa Agreement states that regulating of the status is in the interest of the functions: ―Considering that for the exercise of their functions and the fulfilment of their purposes it is necessary that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its international staff and the representatives of Member States attending meetings thereof should have the status set out hereunder,‖ The assertion that an international organization has legal personality is generally accepted, unless there is clear evidence to the contrary.60 Taking into consideration diverse guidance given by definitions of international organization, by using the common denominators offered by commonly used definitions,61 an international organization may be described as an autonomous entity, set up by a constituent instrument, which expresses independent will through common organs and has capacity to act on the international scene.62 It is legitimate to maintain that international personality is a necessary attribute of an international organization63 and it simply reflects the autonomy of the organization to act on its own. The legal personality can be conferred: - Explicit recognition by conventional means – in the constituent document of the international organization. - Implicitly – approach introduced by the International Court Of Justice in the Reparations64 case based on the observation that of the conferment of specific legal capacities on the organization as such and of particular functions which could not practically be carried out if the organization did not posses juridical personality in the international sphere. - The international legal personality is associated with certain criteria, the existence of which endows the organization with personality on the basis of general international law.65<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>The CP does not increase cooperation <u>with NATO</u>. Even if <u>every</u> NATO state joins the league of democracies, that’s <u>distinct</u> from cooperating <u>with NATO as an organization</u>. International organizations have <u>unique legal personality</u> that’s distinct from <u>their member states</u>, AND other organizations.</h4><p>Sherrod Lewis <strong>Bumgardner 10</strong>, Legal Adviser, NATO Allied Transformation Staff Element Europe, et al., 2010, NATO Legal Deskbook: Second Edition, https://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-LegalDeskbook.pdf</p><p>The 2nd pillar (below the Washington Treaty) relates to the <u>status of NATO as an international organisation</u> (the civilian headquarters in Brussels, the political bodies, and the NATO agencies) and the status of the international staff and the national representations to NATO. </p><p>For NATO members, the status <u>is defined in <mark>the Ottawa Agreement</u></mark> (September 1951). The Ottawa Agreement announces explicitly that it does not apply to any military headquarters established by NATO or to any other military bodies – unless so decided by the North Atlantic Council. In very broad terms <u>the Agreement <strong><mark>defines</mark> <mark>NATO as a legal entity under i</mark>nternational <mark>law</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, <u><mark>in addition to <strong>providing NATO</u></strong></mark> with <u><strong><mark>a legal personality</strong>, the</mark> Ottawa <mark>Agreement defines</u></mark> the <u>immunities and <mark>privileges</mark> to be granted <mark>to NATO</u></mark>, to the international staff (not full diplomatic immunity) and to the national missions established to NATO (full diplomatic immunity).</p><p>In 1994, in connection with the introduction of the PfP Framework Document, it was decided to invite PfP states to post national missions to NATO. In order to define the status of those missions, an agreement – the Brussels Agreement (September 1994) - was concluded between NATO member states. The Brussels Agreement grants equivalent status to missions representing PfP states as conferred to missions of NATO states. PfP states are not signatories to the agreement, but upon accession to NATO, the new NATO members are required to sign the Agreement.</p><p>3. Third pillar – Status of forces and headquarters</p><p>The 3rd pillar records agreements regarding the status of forces and international military Headquarters within NATO.</p><p>The two main documents in this category are the NATO Status of Forces Agreement concluded in June 1951 and the Paris Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters (August 1952). The NATO SOFA defines the status of forces when NATO states are sending and receiving troops as a genuine part of the co-operation within the alliance. The NATO SOFA defines the bilateral relations between a sending and a receiving state in a multinational treaty.</p><p>Both the NATO SOFA and the Paris Protocol are supplemented by agreements concluded amongst Nations (NATO SOFA) and between Supreme Headquarters and individual Nations (Paris Protocol).58</p><p>4. Fourth Pillar – Partnership for Peace </p><p>The 4th pillar is linked to the PfP Framework Document, and lists the agreements concluded in support of PfP. While the PfP Framework Document is not an agreement in the legal sense, it is the foundation of the PfP co-operation that covers a broad spectre of activities, depending on the wishes and capabilities of the involved countries. The cooperation is the result of and driven by political commitments, a shared understanding of the values on which NATO is founded. In 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was created to replace the NACC and to build on its achievements, paving the way for the development of an enhanced and more operational partnership.</p><p>The EAPC and the PfP programme have steadily developed their own dynamic, as successive steps have been taken by NATO and its Partner countries to extend security cooperation, building on the partnership arrangements they have created.</p><p>The formal basis for the Partnership for Peace is the Framework Document, which sets out specific undertakings for each Partner country.</p><p>Each Partner country makes a number of far-reaching political commitments to preserve democratic societies; to maintain the principles of international law; to fulfil obligations under the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act and international disarmament and arms control agreements; to refrain from the threat or use of force against other states; to respect existing borders; and to settle disputes peacefully.</p><p>Specific commitments are also made to promote transparency in national defence planning and budgeting to establish democratic control over armed forces, and to develop the capacity for joint action with NATO in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The Framework Document also enshrines a commitment by the Allies to consult with any Partner country that perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. Cooperation is tailored to the Partner Nations‘ individual requirements but may include:</p><p>- Efforts to maintaining the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the United Nations and/or the responsibility of the OSCE;</p><p>- Military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises, aimed at strengthening the ability of PfP nations to undertake various missions (peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed);</p><p>- Development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.</p><p>Launched at the November 2002 Prague Summit, Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) are open to countries that have the political will and ability to deepen their relationship with NATO. An IPAP should clearly set out the cooperation objectives and priorities of the individual partner country, and ensure that the various mechanisms in use correspond directly to these priorities.</p><p>In addition to the Brussels Agreement, the agreements that regulate the status issues in activities in cooperation with PfP countries are the following:</p><p>- Agreement among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the other States participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the Status of their Forces / Brussels, 19 June 1995</p><p>- Additional Protocol to the Agreement among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Other States Participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the Status of their Forces. Done at Brussels June 19, 1995</p><p>- Further Additional Protocol to the Agreement among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Other States Participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the Status of their Forces. Done at Brussels December 19, 1997</p><p>D. GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL PERSONALITY OF</p><p>INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS</p><p>1. Legal personality on international level</p><p><u>International law presupposes</u> that <u><mark>legal personality is a prerequisite for</mark> the capacity to bear <mark>rights and obligations</u></mark>. It is increasingly recognized that <u>while the indicia for legal personality of international organization has been drawn from the incidents of statehood</u>, <u><strong><mark>international organizations are not merely states writ large</u></strong></mark> and that <u>rights and duties resulting from <mark>their personhood are <strong>not</mark> <mark>identical to</mark> that enjoyed by <mark>states</u></strong></mark>.59 Given that international organizations are ―secondary subjects‖ of international law, their creation and their actual existence flows from the will of other international legal persons. <u>Having international personality means</u> that <u><mark>the</mark> international <mark>organization possesses</mark> <mark>rights</mark>, duties, powers and liabilities as <strong><mark>distinct from its members</mark> or creators</strong> on the international plane and in international law</u>. </p><p>THE EXAMPLE OF OTTAWA AGREEMENT</p><p>Preamble of the Ottawa Agreement states that regulating of the status is in the interest of the functions:</p><p>―Considering that for the exercise of their functions and the fulfilment of their purposes it is necessary that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its international staff and the representatives of Member States attending meetings thereof should have the status set out hereunder,‖</p><p>The assertion that an international organization has legal personality is generally accepted, unless there is clear evidence to the contrary.60 Taking into consideration diverse guidance given by definitions of international organization, by using the common denominators offered by commonly used definitions,61 <u><mark>an international organization</mark> <mark>may be described as an <strong>autonomous entity</u></strong></mark>, set up by a constituent instrument, <u><mark>which expresses <strong>independent will</u></strong></mark> through common organs <u>and has capacity to act on the international scene</u>.62</p><p>It is legitimate to maintain that international personality is a necessary attribute of an international organization63 and it simply reflects the autonomy of the organization to act on its own.</p><p>The legal personality can be conferred:</p><p>- Explicit recognition by conventional means – in the constituent document of the international organization.</p><p>- Implicitly – approach introduced by the International Court Of Justice in the Reparations64 case based on the observation that of the conferment of specific legal capacities on the organization as such and of particular functions which could not practically be carried out if the organization did not posses juridical personality in the international sphere.</p><p>- The international legal personality is associated with certain criteria, the existence of which endows the organization with personality on the basis of general international law.65</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Rohan Mukherjee 19, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale-NUS College, Singapore, 2/22/19, “Policy Series: Two Cheers for the Liberal World Order: The International Order and Rising Powers in a Trumpian World,” https://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-5bo-two-cheers fulltext: The empirical evidence since the end of the Cold War suggests that rising powers such as China, India, and Brazil are content not to challenge the liberal order despite their varying levels of dissatisfaction with it.[24] Instead, they have adopted a free-riding strategy, i.e. not fully paying the costs of maintaining the order while benefiting significantly from it. This type of strategy is what underlies China’s exploitation of international trading rules, India’s grandstanding on climate change, and Brazil’s outsized influence relative to its economic power within the World Trade Organization (WTO).[25] This unwillingness to genuinely contribute to the liberal order may seem puzzling given that it makes these countries diplomatically vulnerable to the charge of free-riding. It is explained, however, by the non-material aspects of the order, or what Gilpin called the “hierarchy of prestige.”[26] Put simply, the distribution of prestige within the liberal order is still skewed in favor of the U.S. and its allies, while the distribution of power is shifting steadily in favor of the rising powers. Voting rights at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), permanent membership of the UNSC, top leadership positions in International Financial Institutions (IFIs), the official designation of nuclear weapons states in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), and small-group decision-making within the WTO are some of the more prominent institutional aspects of the liberal order that rising powers to varying extents have contested as exclusionary, discriminatory, and unequal.[27] Wherever possible, they have sought to reform institutions from within. Where these efforts have been repeatedly frustrated, they have established new institutions such as the New Development Bank (NDB) of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) group (which, unlike the IMF, operates on the principle of “one country, one vote, and no veto”)[28] and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),[29] or bolstered existing forums where they already hold leadership positions, such as the India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) group and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The overarching question is this: who gets to be included in the club of great powers that manage the liberal order alongside the United States? Club membership brings both material and status benefits, but it also comes at a price. Rising powers are unwilling to pay the price unless they are made full and equal members, especially since material benefits already accrue to them in significant measure simply through membership in the order. For its part, the U.S. has been unwilling to admit rising powers into the club, questioning their ability to act as “responsible stakeholders.”[30] These conflicting incentives create a chicken-and-egg problem: rising powers decline full responsibility without elite membership, while the U.S. refuses them elite membership without full responsibility. The Trump Transformation The Trump presidency has unsettled this equilibrium. Washington’s newfound willingness to challenge the fundamental tenets of the global order—capitalism, democracy, and multilateralism—and Trump’s undermining of key institutional arrangements in areas such as international trade, climate change, and arms control have opened up space in the upper echelons of the global governance architecture for rising powers (and other countries). In the security realm, as Trump shifts U.S. global strategy to what looks like offshore balancing,[31] China and India have each begun stepping up their strategic presence to the extent of their respective capabilities, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Across the board, Chinese and Indian leaders are counselling caution and patience with an eye to managing Washington’s illiberal turn toward the liberal international order.[32] In the process, the rising powers have become the guardians of the status quo and the U.S. has finally taken ownership of its post-Cold War role as a revisionist power.[33] There is no better example of the decoupling of the liberal order and U.S. foreign policy. The Trump presidency has in effect been a gift to Xi’s Chinese Dream and Modi’s desire to make India a “leading power”[34] within the parameters of the existing order. As the second-ranked power in the international system, China in particular has perceived an opportunity “to define itself as the representative and spokesperson of forward-looking forces.”[35] Yet, as Chinese and Indian leaders well know, global leadership is a costly proposition. The cost is only worthwhile if the eclipse of U.S. credibility under Trump can translate into status benefits for their countries. The decoupling of the U.S. from the international order of its own creation becomes significant in this context. In the absence of an engaged Washington, it is unclear whether the institutions that comprise the international order will function on business-as-usual terms, or they will be more open to reform and the inclusion of new aspirants to the great-power club. Despite Trump’s disengagement, the U.S. still retains significant structural power in the international order and may be willing to exert this power in order to prevent rising states from rushing too quickly to fill the temporary leadership void. A more fundamental challenge faces the rising powers, which is simply the lack of capacity and vision to fundamentally alter the basis of the liberal order. Importantly, none of the rising powers has a credible alternative set of principles or institutional arrangements to offer as the foundation of a new order.[36] China’s influence, while growing, is largely based on a mercantilist approach and is increasingly facing resistance across the vast geography covered by the Belt and Road Initiative.[37] India lacks the capacity to maintain international order and must focus inward on long-term economic development before it can shoulder global responsibilities. Brazil lacks the hard power resources and domestic political consensus necessary to single-handedly underwrite an international order.[38] At a fundamental level, none of these powers has any reason to fundamentally alter an order that has so far handsomely abetted their stellar economic performance, enhanced their diplomatic influence, and ensured their national security. A contemporary alternative to the liberal order therefore does not exist. This fact should give pause to both those who celebrate the order’s alleged demise and those who mourn it. The current policy and academic debates fail to consider this simple question: relative to what is the liberal order a failure or success? In other words, could the world have done better? The answer is both yes and no. On the one hand, yes, the United States could have set up a ‘truly’ liberal international rules-based order; this is a question of degree. On the other hand, no, there was no other credible alternative that was attractive to as large a number of countries as the U.S.-led liberal order; this is a question of type. At present, the fact that no other major power is in a position to offer an alternative type of global order suggests that the much-maligned liberal order, while it may change in degree, is fundamentally secure. If not Washington, then Beijing, New Delhi, and Brasilia will ensure this outcome. Looking Forward Historically, new international orders have emerged in the aftermath of major wars. Major wars are today ruled out by the state of military technology, i.e., nuclear weapons. Barring a change in this dimension, we can expect the politics of power shifts to play out to a great extent in international institutions. The evolution of the liberal international order will depend on the role of the dominant and rising powers within it. If Donald Trump is a one-term aberration, then the U.S. may course-correct after 2020 and reinvest in the liberal order. Outcomes will then hinge on Washington’s ability to accommodate the status demands of an increasingly powerful cabal of rising powers. If Donald Trump turns out to be a two-term president, or a herald of deeper changes in the United States’ worldview, then the U.S. will likely further disengage from an order that it perceives to be a bad deal (precisely because that order has benefited rising powers to such an extent). Outcomes will then hinge on the ability of rising powers to take leadership of one or more issue areas, or to co-manage the order as its new guardians. The former scenario will lead to a fragmentation of the liberal order as the respective powers impose their own preferences on different pieces of it. The latter scenario may reinvest the order with resilience by aligning the distribution of capabilities with the distribution of prestige. Nonetheless, severe conflicts of interest will remain as the U.S. goes from system insider to outsider.[39] For decades now, rising powers such as China, India, and Brazil have benefited from the liberal order while criticizing it and even seeking to undermine certain aspects of it. Today, as Washington begins to abdicate leadership and undermine the order itself, these countries will be called upon to match their rhetoric with action and genuinely take leadership of the order so that they can reform it. It will take a great deal of creative thinking and diplomatic energy in these capitals to overcome long histories of reflexive free-riding and sniping at U.S. leadership from the sidelines. It is unclear if the rising powers are even up to the task. No matter the outcome, one thing is clear. The age of U.S. dominance is over. In whatever form the order evolves, it will be strenuously negotiated, not imposed by a single power.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Rising states <u>won’t</u> aggressively challenge the international order <u>now</u> because it <u>serves their interest</u> in boosting their <u>status</u> and <u>prestige</u>. Trump’s effect on U.S. foreign policy <u>prevents</u> the U.S. from <u>blocking</u> entry into the club of major powers---that <u>invests the overall order with resilience</u> by allowing rising states to shape it </h4><p>Rohan <strong>Mukherjee 19</strong>, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale-NUS College, Singapore, 2/22/19, “Policy Series: Two Cheers for the Liberal World Order: The International Order and Rising Powers in a Trumpian World,” https://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-5bo-two-cheers</p><p>The <u><mark>empirical ev</mark>idence</u> since the end of the Cold War <u><mark>suggests</u></mark> that <u>rising powers such as <mark>China, India, and Brazil are <strong>content not to challenge the</mark> liberal <mark>order</strong> despite</mark> their varying levels of <mark>dissatisfaction</mark> with it</u>.[24] Instead, <u><mark>they have adopted</mark> a <mark>free-riding</mark> strategy</u>, <u>i.e. not fully paying the costs of maintaining the order while benefiting significantly from it</u>. This type of strategy is what underlies China’s exploitation of international trading rules, India’s grandstanding on climate change, and Brazil’s outsized influence relative to its economic power within the World Trade Organization (WTO).[25]</p><p>This <u><mark>unwillingness to <strong>genuinely contribute</strong></mark> to the liberal order</u> may seem puzzling given that it makes these countries diplomatically vulnerable to the charge of free-riding. It <u><mark>is <strong>explained</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><mark>by</mark> the non-material aspects of the order</u>, or what Gilpin called the “hierarchy of prestige.”[26] Put simply, <u><mark>the distribution of prestige</mark> within the liberal order is <strong>still <mark>skewed in favor of the U.S.</u></strong></mark> and its allies, while the distribution of power is shifting steadily in favor of the rising powers. Voting rights at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), permanent membership of the UNSC, top leadership positions in International Financial Institutions (IFIs), the official designation of nuclear weapons states in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), and small-group decision-making within the WTO are some of the more prominent institutional aspects of the liberal order that <u>rising powers</u> to varying extents have contested as exclusionary, discriminatory, and unequal.[27] <u>Wherever possible, they have sought to reform institutions from within. Where these efforts have been repeatedly frustrated, they have established new institutions</u> such as the New Development Bank (NDB) of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) group (which, unlike the IMF, operates on the principle of “one country, one vote, and no veto”)[28] and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),[29] or bolstered existing forums where they already hold leadership positions, such as the India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) group and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).</p><p><u><mark>The</mark> overarching <mark>question is</u></mark> this: <u><mark>who gets to be</mark> included <mark>in the club of <strong>great powers that manage</mark> the liberal <mark>order</u></strong></mark> alongside the United States? <u>Club membership brings</u> both <u>material and status benefits, but</u> it also comes <u>at a price. <mark>Rising powers are unwilling to pay</mark> the price <strong><mark>unless they are</mark> made <mark>full</mark> and equal <mark>members</strong></mark>, especially since material benefits already accrue</u> to them in significant measure <u>simply through membership</u> in the order. For its part, <u><strong><mark>the U.S. has been unwilling to admit rising powers</mark> into the club</u></strong>, questioning their ability to act as “responsible stakeholders.”[30] These conflicting incentives create a chicken-and-egg problem: rising powers decline full responsibility without elite membership, while the U.S. refuses them elite membership without full responsibility.</p><p><u><strong>The Trump Transformation</p><p></u></strong>The <u><mark>Trump</u></mark> presidency <u>has <strong><mark>unsettled this</mark> equilibrium</strong>. Washington’s newfound <mark>willingness to challenge</mark> the</u> fundamental tenets of the <u>global order</u>—<u><strong>capitalism, <mark>democracy</mark>, and <mark>multilat</mark>eralism</u></strong>—<u><mark>and</mark> Trump’s undermining of key institutional <mark>arrangements in</u></mark> areas such as international <u><strong><mark>trade, climate change</mark>, and <mark>arms control</strong></mark> have <strong><mark>opened</mark> up <mark>space in</mark> the upper echelons of the global <mark>governance architecture for rising powers</p><p></u></strong></mark> (and other countries). In the security realm, as Trump shifts U.S. global strategy to what looks like offshore balancing,[31] China and India have each begun stepping up their strategic presence to the extent of their respective capabilities, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Across the board, <u>Chinese and Indian leaders are counselling caution and patience with an eye to managing Washington’s illiberal turn toward the liberal international order</u>.[32] In the process, the <u><strong><mark>rising powers have become</mark> the <mark>guardians of the status quo</strong></mark> and the U.S. has finally taken ownership of its post-Cold War role as a revisionist power</u>.[33] There is no better example of the decoupling of the liberal order and U.S. foreign policy. <u>The Trump presidency has</u> in effect <u><strong>been a gift</strong> to Xi’s Chinese Dream and Modi’s desire to make India a “leading power</u>”[34] <u><strong>within</strong> the parameters of the existing order</u>. As the second-ranked power in the international system, China in particular has perceived an opportunity “to define itself as the representative and spokesperson of forward-looking forces.”[35]</p><p><u>Yet</u>, as Chinese and Indian leaders well know, <u>global <mark>leadership is</mark> a <mark>costly</mark> proposition. <strong><mark>The cost is only worthwhile if</mark> the <mark>eclipse of U.S. credibility under Trump can translate into status benefits</mark> for their countries</strong>. The decoupling of the U.S. from the international order of its own creation becomes significant in this context. <strong>In the absence of an engaged Washington</strong>, it is unclear whether</u> the <u>institutions</u> that comprise the international order will function on business-as-usual terms, or they <u>will be more open to reform and the inclusion of new aspirants to the great-power club</u>. Despite Trump’s disengagement, <u>the U.S. still retains significant structural power</u> in the international order <u>and <strong>may</u></strong> be willing to <u>exert this power in order to prevent rising states from rushing too quickly to fill the temporary leadership void</u>.</p><p>A more fundamental challenge faces the <u>rising powers</u>, which is simply the <u>lack</u> of <u><strong>capacity</u></strong> and vision <u>to fundamentally alter the basis of the liberal order</u>. Importantly, none of the rising powers has a credible alternative set of principles or institutional arrangements to offer as the foundation of a new order.[36] China’s influence, while growing, is largely based on a mercantilist approach and is increasingly facing resistance across the vast geography covered by the Belt and Road Initiative.[37] India lacks the capacity to maintain international order and must focus inward on long-term economic development before it can shoulder global responsibilities. Brazil lacks the hard power resources and domestic political consensus necessary to single-handedly underwrite an international order.[38] At a fundamental level, <u>none of these powers has any reason to fundamentally alter an order that has so far handsomely abetted their stellar economic performance, enhanced their diplomatic influence, and ensured their national security</u>.</p><p><u>A contemporary alternative to the liberal order</u> therefore <u><strong>does not exist</u></strong>. This fact should give pause to both those who celebrate the order’s alleged demise and those who mourn it. The current policy and academic debates fail to consider this simple question: relative to what is the liberal order a failure or success? In other words, could the world have done better? The answer is both yes and no. On the one hand, yes, the United States could have set up a ‘truly’ liberal international rules-based order; this is a question of degree. On the other hand, no, there was no other credible alternative that was attractive to as large a number of countries as the U.S.-led liberal order; this is a question of type. At present, <u>the fact that no other major power is in a position to offer an alternative type of global order suggests that the much-maligned liberal order, while it may change in degree, is <strong>fundamentally secure</strong>. <strong>If not Washington, then Beijing</strong>, New Delhi, and Brasilia will ensure this outcome</u>.</p><p>Looking Forward</p><p>Historically, new international orders have emerged in the aftermath of major wars. Major wars are today ruled out by the state of military technology, i.e., nuclear weapons. Barring a change in this dimension, we can expect the politics of power shifts to play out to a great extent in international institutions. The evolution of the liberal international order will depend on the role of the dominant and rising powers within it. If Donald Trump is a one-term aberration, then the U.S. may course-correct after 2020 and reinvest in the liberal order. Outcomes will then hinge on Washington’s ability to accommodate the status demands of an increasingly powerful cabal of rising powers.</p><p><u><mark>If</u></mark> Donald <u><mark>Trump turns out to</u></mark> be a two-term president, or a <u><mark>herald</u></mark> of <u><strong><mark>deeper changes</strong> in the <strong>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tate<u><strong>s’</strong> <mark>worldview</u></mark>, then <u><mark>the U.S. will</mark> likely <mark>further disengage</u></mark> from an order that it perceives to be a bad deal (precisely because that order has benefited rising powers to such an extent). <u><mark>Outcomes will</mark> then <mark>hinge on</mark> the <strong><mark>ability of rising powers to take leadership</u></strong></mark> of one or more issue areas, or to co-manage the order as its new guardians. The former scenario will lead to a fragmentation of the liberal order as the respective powers impose their own preferences on different pieces of it. <u><mark>The latter scenario may <strong>reinvest the order with resilience</strong> by aligning</mark> the distribution of <mark>capabilities with</mark> the distribution of <mark>prestige</u></mark>. Nonetheless, severe conflicts of interest will remain as the U.S. goes from system insider to outsider.[39]</p><p>For decades now, rising powers such as China, India, and Brazil have benefited from the liberal order while criticizing it and even seeking to undermine certain aspects of it. Today, <u>as Washington begins to abdicate leadership and undermine the order</u> itself, <u>these countries will be called upon to match their rhetoric with action and genuinely take leadership of the order so that they can reform it. <mark>It will take</mark> a <strong><mark>great</mark> deal of</u></strong> creative thinking and <u><strong><mark>diplomatic energy</u></strong></mark> in these capitals <u><mark>to overcome</mark> long histories of <strong><mark>reflexive free-riding</u></strong></mark> and sniping at U.S. leadership from the sidelines. It is unclear if the rising powers are even up to the task.</p><p>No matter the outcome, one thing is clear. The age of U.S. dominance is over. In whatever form the order evolves, it will be strenuously negotiated, not imposed by a single power.</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Wilcox 15 (Lauren Wilcox | Associate Professor in Gender Studies, Director of the University of Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies, and a fellow of Selwyn College, Cambridge. | Bodies of Violence Theorizing Embodied Subjects in International Relations pg 1-4 | DOA: 7/21/2022 | SAoki) fulltext: Between 70 and 100 people died in one airstrike in northern Afghanistan in September 2009 when NATO targeted two fuel tankers that the Taliban had hijacked. Having gotten them stuck in a riverbed, the Taliban decided to give them to impoverished villagers who were struggling to stockpile fuel for the winter. The bodies were mangled and scorched beyond recognition; because the bodies were unidentifiable, village elders asked grieving relatives how many family members they had lost, and distributed one body to match each one lost so they could be buried and grieved. When bodies had run out, the elders gave body parts to families still missing relatives. One man said, “I couldn’t find my son, so I took a piece of flesh with me . . . and I called it my son” (Abdul-Ahad 2009). Bodies have long been outside the frame of International Relations (IR)—unrecognizable even as the modes of violence that use, target, and construct bodies in complex ways have proliferated. Drones make it possible to both watch people and bomb them, often killing dozens of civilians as well, while the pilots operating these machines remain thousands of miles away, immune from bodily harm. Suicide bombers seek certain death by turning their bodies into weapons that seem to attack at random. Images of tortured bodies from Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib provoke shock and outrage, and prisoners on hunger strikes to protest their treatment are force-fed. Meanwhile, the management of violence increasingly entails the scrutiny of persons as bodies through biometric technologies [2] Bodies of Violence and “body scanners.” In each of these instances, the body becomes the focal point, central to practices of security and International Relations—the body brought into excruciating pain, the body as weapon, or the body as that which is not to be targeted and hence is hit only accidentally or collaterally. Such bodily focus is quite distinct from prevailing international security practices and the disciplinary ways of addressing those practices in IR. Convention has it that states or groups make war and, in doing so, kill and injure people that other states are charged with protecting. The strategic deployment of force in the language of rational control and risk management that dominates security studies presents a disembodied view of subjects as reasoning actors. However, as objects of security studies, the people who are protected from violence or are killed are understood as only bodies: they are ahistorical, biopolitical aggregations whose individual members breathe, suffer, and die. In both cases, the politics and sociality of bodies are erased. One of the deep ironies of security studies is that while war is actually inflicted on bodies, bodily violence and vulnerability, as the flip side of security, are largely ignored. By contrast, feminist theory is at its most powerful when it denaturalizes accounts of individual subjectivity so as to analyze the relations of force, violence, and language that compose our profoundly unnatural bodies. Security studies lacks the reflexivity necessary to see its contribution to the very context it seeks to domesticate. It has largely ignored work in feminist theory that opens up the forces that have come to compose and constitute the body: by and large, security studies has an unarticulated, yet implicit, conception of bodies as individual organisms whose protection from damage constitutes the provision of security. In IR, human bodies are implicitly theorized as organisms that are exogenously determined—they are relevant to politics only as they live or die. Such bodies are inert objects: they exist to be manipulated, possess no agency, and are only driven by the motivations of agents. Attentive to the relations provoked by both discourse and political forces, feminist theory redirects attention to how both of these compose and produce bodies on terms often alien and unstable. Contemporary feminist theorizing about embodiment provides a provocative challenge to the stability and viability of several key concepts such as sovereignty, security, violence, and vulnerability in IR. In this book, I draw on recent work in feminist theory that offers a challenge to the deliberate maintenance and policing of boundaries and the delineation of human bodies from the broader political context. Challenging this theorization of bodies as natural organisms is a key step in not only exposing how bodies have been implicitly theorized in IR, but in developing a reading of IR that is attentive to the ways in which bodies are both produced and productive. In conceptualizing the subject of IR as essentially disembodied, IR theory impoverishes itself. An explicit focus on the subject as embodied makes two contributions to IR. First, I address the question vexing the humanities and social sciences of how to account for the subject by showing that IR is wrong in its uncomplicated way of thinking about the subject in relation to its embodiment. In its rationalist variants, IR theory comprehends bodies only as inert objects animated by the minds of individuals. Constructivist theory argues that subjects are formed through social relations, but leaves the bodies of subjects outside politics as “brute facts” (Wendt 2001, 110), while many variants of critical theory understand the body as a medium of social power, rather than also a force in its own right. In contrast, feminist theory offers a challenge to the delineation of human bodies from subjects and the broader political context. My central argument is that the bodies that the practices of violence take as their object are deeply political bodies, constituted in reference to historical political conditions while at the same time acting upon our world. The second contribution of this work is to argue that because of the way it theorizes subjects in relation to their embodiment, IR is also lacking in one of its primary purposes: theorizing international political violence. This project argues that violence is more than a strategic action of rational actors (as in rationalist theories) or a destructive violation of community laws and norms (as in liberal and constructivist theories). Because IR conventionally theorizes bodies as outside politics and irrelevant to subjectivity, it cannot see how violence can be understood as a creative force for shaping the limits of how we understand ourselves as political subjects, as well as forming the boundaries of our bodies and political communities. Understanding how “war is a generative force like no other” (Barkawi and Brighton 2011, 126) requires us to pay attention to how bodies are killed and injured, but also formed, re-formed, gendered, and racialized through the bodily relations of war; it also requires that we consider how bodies are enabling and generative of war and practices of political violence more broadly. Security studies, the subfield of IR that focuses on violence, has defined its topic of study as “the study of the threat, use, and control of military force” (Walt 1991, 212), with emphasis on the causes of war and the conditions for peace. Despite the traditional focus on military force, security studies has by and large ignored the bodies that are the intended or inevitable targets of the use of such force. One classic work in the field, Schelling’s Arms and Influence (1966), specifically addresses coercion as the threat to cause pain and to hurt human bodies in order to manipulate a certain outcome. Few works are so explicit—that force involves the threat or use of military power to hurt and kill human bodies is usually implicit in security studies. Furthermore, when the violence to human bodies is made explicit, as in Schelling, such bodies are implicitly theorized precisely as organisms that can be hurt or killed. Contributing to the neglect of theorizing bodies has been the emphasis placed on national security. National security has long been the center of analysis in security studies, but in recent decades, the field has broadened to consider the referent object of security to be the individual, as “people represent, in one sense, the irreducible basic unit to which the concept of security can be applied” (Buzan 1991, 18). The concept of “human security” posits the question of violence against human bodies as a central issue in security studies, yet this theorization accepts the individual as an exogenous unit of analysis. The relationship between bodies, subjects, and violence still remains under-theorized, a matter at least partly related to the ways in which the conduct of war and political violence, as violent social practices, have been written out of the field of IR and, in particular, out of security studies as a subfield (Barkawi 2011). This lacuna has been noted, if rarely explored in depth: “the absence of bodies in the discourses of a discipline that was borne of a concern with war and hence violence against bodies, itself raises curiosity as to the conditions of possibility that enabled this absence” (Jabri 2006b, 825). This work addresses this absence and aims to show what taking bodies seriously would mean to the study of violence in IR<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>“Between 70 and 100 people died in one airstrike… when NATO targeted two fuel tankers… The bodies were mangled beyond recognition; because the bodies were unidentifiable, village elders… distributed one body to match each one lost so they could be buried and grieved. When bodies had run out, the elders gave body parts to families still missing relatives. One man said, ‘I couldn’t find my son, so I took a piece of my flesh with me… and I called it my son’”</h4><p><strong>Wilcox 15</strong> (Lauren Wilcox | Associate Professor in Gender Studies, Director of the University of Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies, and a fellow of Selwyn College, Cambridge. | Bodies of Violence Theorizing Embodied Subjects in International Relations pg 1-4 | DOA: 7/21/2022 | SAoki)</p><p><u><strong>Between 70 and 100 people died in one airstrike</u></strong> in northern Afghanistan in September 2009 <u><strong>when NATO targeted two fuel tankers</u></strong> that the Taliban had hijacked. Having gotten them stuck in a riverbed, the Taliban decided to give them to impoverished villagers who were struggling to stockpile fuel for the winter. <u><strong>The bodies were mangled and scorched beyond recognition; because the bodies were unidentifiable, village elders</u></strong> asked grieving relatives how many family members they had lost, and <u><strong>distributed one body to match each one lost so they could be buried and grieved</u></strong>. <u><strong>When bodies had run out, the elders gave body parts to families still missing relatives. One man said, “I couldn’t find my son, so I took a piece of flesh with me . . . and I called it my son”</u></strong> (Abdul-Ahad 2009). <u><strong>Bodies have long been outside the frame of</u></strong> International Relations (<u><strong>IR</u></strong>)—<u><strong>unrecognizable even as the modes of violence that use, target, and construct bodies in complex ways have proliferated</u></strong>. <u><strong>Drones</u></strong> make it possible to both <u><strong>watch people and bomb them</u></strong>, often killing dozens of civilians as well, <u><strong>while</u></strong> the <u><strong>pilots</u></strong> operating these machines <u><strong>remain</u></strong> thousands of miles away, <u><strong>immune from bodily harm</u></strong>. Suicide bombers seek certain death by turning their bodies into weapons that seem to attack at random. <u><strong>Images of tortured bodies from Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib provoke shock and outrage, and prisoners on hunger strikes to protest their treatment are force-fed.</u></strong> <u><strong>Meanwhile, the management of violence increasingly entails the scrutiny of persons as bodies through biometric technologies </u></strong>[2] Bodies of Violence <u><strong>and “body scanners.”</u></strong> In each of these instances, <u><strong>the body becomes the focal point, central to practices of security and I</u></strong>nternational <u><strong>R</u></strong>elations—the body brought into excruciating pain, the body as weapon, or the body as that which is not to be targeted and hence is hit only accidentally or collaterally. <u><strong>Such bodily focus is quite distinct from prevailing international security practices and the disciplinary ways of addressing those practices in IR</u></strong>. Convention has it that states or groups make war and, in doing so, kill and injure people that other states are charged with protecting. <u><strong>The strategic deployment of force in the language of rational control and risk management that dominates security studies presents a disembodied view of subjects as reasoning actors</u></strong>. However, as objects of security studies, <u><strong>the people who are protected from violence or are killed are understood as only bodies: they are ahistorical, biopolitical aggregations whose individual members breathe, suffer, and die</u></strong>. In both cases, <u><strong>the politics and sociality of bodies are erased. </u></strong>One of <u><strong>the</u></strong> deep <u><strong>ironies of security studies is that while war is actually inflicted on bodies, bodily violence and vulnerability</u></strong>, as <u><strong>the flip side of security</u></strong>, are largely <u><strong>ignored</u></strong>. By contrast, feminist theory is at its most powerful when it denaturalizes accounts of individual subjectivity so as to analyze the relations of force, violence, and language that compose our profoundly unnatural bodies. Security studies lacks the reflexivity necessary to see its contribution to the very context it seeks to domesticate. It has largely ignored work in feminist theory that opens up the forces that have come to compose and constitute the body: by and large, security studies has an unarticulated, yet implicit, conception of bodies as individual organisms whose protection from damage constitutes the provision of security. <u><strong>In IR, human bodies are implicitly theorized as organisms that are exogenously determined—they are relevant to politics only as they live or die</u></strong>. Such <u><strong>bodies</u></strong> are inert objects: they <u><strong>exist to be manipulated, possess no agency, and are only driven by the motivations of agents</u></strong>. Attentive to the relations provoked by both discourse and political forces, feminist theory redirects attention to how both of these compose and produce bodies on terms often alien and unstable. Contemporary feminist theorizing about embodiment provides a provocative challenge to the stability and viability of several key concepts such as sovereignty, security, violence, and vulnerability in IR. In this book, I draw on recent work in <u><strong>feminist theory</u></strong> that <u><strong>offers a challenge to the deliberate maintenance and policing of boundaries and the delineation of human bodies from the broader political context. </u></strong>Challenging this theorization of bodies as natural organisms is a key step in not only exposing how bodies have been implicitly theorized in IR, but in developing a reading of IR that is attentive to the ways in which bodies are both produced and productive. In conceptualizing the subject of IR as essentially disembodied, IR theory impoverishes itself. An explicit focus on the subject as embodied makes two contributions to IR. First, I address the question vexing the humanities and social sciences of how to account for the subject by showing that IR is wrong in its uncomplicated way of thinking about the subject in relation to its embodiment. In its rationalist variants, IR theory comprehends bodies only as inert objects animated by the minds of individuals. Constructivist theory argues that subjects are formed through social relations, but leaves the bodies of subjects outside politics as “brute facts” (Wendt 2001, 110), while many variants of critical theory understand the body as a medium of social power, rather than also a force in its own right. In contrast, feminist theory offers a challenge to the delineation of human bodies from subjects and the broader political context. My central argument is that the bodies that the practices of violence take as their object are deeply political bodies, constituted in reference to historical political conditions while at the same time acting upon our world. The second contribution of this work is to argue that because of the way it theorizes subjects in relation to their embodiment, IR is also lacking in one of its primary purposes: theorizing international political violence. This project argues that violence is more than a strategic action of rational actors (as in rationalist theories) or a destructive violation of community laws and norms (as in liberal and constructivist theories). <u><strong>Because IR conventionally theorizes bodies as outside politics and irrelevant to subjectivity, it cannot see how violence can be understood as a creative force for shaping the limits of how we understand ourselves as political subjects, as well as forming the boundaries of our bodies and political communities.</u></strong> <u><strong>Understanding how “war is a generative force like no other”</u></strong> (Barkawi and Brighton 2011, 126) <u><strong>requires us to pay attention to how bodies are killed and injured, but also formed, re-formed, gendered, and racialized through the bodily relations of war</u></strong>; it also requires that we consider how bodies are enabling and generative of war and practices of political violence more broadly. <u><strong>Security studies</u></strong>, the subfield of IR that focuses on violence, <u><strong>has defined its topic of study as “the study of the threat, use, and control of military force”</u></strong> (Walt 1991, 212), with emphasis on the causes of war and the conditions for peace. <u><strong>Despite the traditional focus on military force, security studies has by and large ignored the bodies that are the intended or inevitable targets of the use of such force</u></strong>. One classic work in the field, Schelling’s Arms and Influence (1966), specifically addresses coercion as the threat to cause pain and to hurt human bodies in order to manipulate a certain outcome. Few works are so explicit—that force involves the threat or use of military power to hurt and kill human bodies is usually implicit in security studies. <u><strong>Furthermore, when the violence to human bodies is made explicit</u></strong>, as in Schelling, <u><strong>such bodies are implicitly theorized precisely as organisms that can be hurt or killed</u></strong>. <u><strong>Contributing to the neglect of theorizing bodies has been the emphasis placed on national security. </u></strong>National security has long been the center of analysis in security studies, but in recent decades, the field has broadened to consider the referent object of security to be the individual, as “people represent, in one sense, the irreducible basic unit to which the concept of security can be applied” (Buzan 1991, 18). The concept of “human security” posits the question of violence against human bodies as a central issue in security studies, yet this theorization accepts the individual as an exogenous unit of analysis. The relationship between bodies, subjects, and violence still remains under-theorized, a matter at least partly related to the ways in which the conduct of war and political violence, as violent social practices, have been written out of the field of IR and, in particular, out of security studies as a subfield (Barkawi 2011). This lacuna has been noted, if rarely explored in depth: “<u><strong>the absence of bodies in the discourses of a discipline that was borne of a concern with war and hence violence against bodies, itself raises curiosity as to the conditions of possibility that enabled this absence</u></strong>” (Jabri 2006b, 825). This work addresses this absence and aims to show what taking bodies seriously would mean to the study of violence in IR</p><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: WEISMAN, NYT, 2-15-15 (Jonathan, “Currency Battle Is Tethered to Obama Trade Agenda,” http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/16/business/economy/obamas-trade-agenda-may-hinge-on-attacking-currency-manipulation.html?_r=0, accessed 2-17-15, CMM) fulltext: A number of countries — China most prominent among them — have long acted to hold down the value of their currencies against the dollar, helping their industries by keeping exports to American consumers cheaper and making goods from the United States more expensive. And while every president from Bill Clinton on has repeatedly criticized the practice, none have ever taken formal action against China or any other nation to try to stop it. Now, a growing bipartisan majority in Congress is coalescing around a demand that could derail President Obama’s ambitious trade agenda before it really gets moving: include a robust attack on international currency manipulation or no deal. The push for strong currency provisions — in legislation to grant the president “fast track” trade negotiating authority, in a major trade deal with a dozen Pacific Rim countries, or in both — has presented the White House with what it fears is something of a Catch-22. If members of Congress are to be believed, unless the president’s trade negotiator includes strict, enforceable prohibitions on policies to intentionally hold down the value of currencies, any completed trade accord will die on Capitol Hill. But, administration officials say, demanding the inclusion of such prohibitions would kill the trade deals before they were completed. “You cannot be pro trade and pro this kind of currency mechanism,” warned Tony Fratto, a former official in the George W. Bush administration who is working against the congressional currency push. “They are completely incompatible. It will in fact kill a deal.” None of the officials representing the 12 nations, including the United States, want to see such prohibitions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is near completion, and negotiators working on a follow-up deal with Europe are similarly unenthusiastic. “We agree with many in Congress that more needs to be done and are working with them to figure out if there is something that can be accomplished in the context of our trade agreements that is consistent with our overall strategy of bilateral and multilateral engagement,” Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew said in a statement. “We remain concerned that an enforceable provision on currency could have a negative impact on our ability to protect American workers and firms and set back our international efforts.” But on Capitol Hill, currency is gaining currency. “An awful lot of this is real, and the reason is the frustrations on this have built up for a very long time,” said C. Fred Bergsten, director emeritus of the Peterson Institute for International Economics and an administration trade adviser. “There’s a pretty strong insistence on action. Next question is, what action.” There is little wonder why lawmakers from both parties say their patience has grown thin. For years, the United States has endured a large, chronic trade deficit, intensified by China and some other trading partners that have deliberately kept their currencies cheap relative to the dollar. A study conducted by Joseph E. Gagnon, a scholar at the Peterson Institute, and C. Fred Bergsten, now its director emeritus, estimated that currency interventions had cost the United States as many as five million jobs over the last decade. In fact, currency manipulation may be far more effective in distorting trade than the import tariffs and export subsidies that trade agreements focus on, Mr. Bergsten said. Senator Charles E. Schumer, Democrat of New York, and Senator Lindsey Graham, Republican of South Carolina, have been banging the drum on currency manipulation since 2002. Yet beyond talk, neither the Obama nor the Bush administration has done what they were legally entitled to do: fight back. Some 230 members of the House have pledged in writing to oppose future trade deals without action on currency, more than enough to stop the president’s agenda. “If your area of the country has experienced job exporting by the thousands, you understand,” said Representative Marcy Kaptur, a Democrat whose district includes the industrial north of Ohio. “That’s bipartisan.” The Obama administration fears that prohibitions on currency intervention could boomerang on Washington, allowing trading partners to challenge policies of the independent Federal Reserve Board and possibly even basic fiscal policies, like stimulus spending in times of recession. Officials also worry about other forms of potential retaliation, including reducing purchases of government debt, which help keep long-term interest rates low. Corporate America is badly split. Some industries, including automobiles, steel and textiles, are standing with Congress. Ford Motor has threatened to oppose the Trans-Pacific Partnership if it lacks a currency chapter. Other companies, better positioned to take advantage of growing globalization, are perfectly happy to buy components from Asia that are artificially cheapened by currency manipulation. “A lot of Big Business uses currency as a hedge,” said one industry lobbyist, who spoke on condition of anonymity to be frank about the business divide. “They’re comfortable operating in an environment where manipulation is part of the process.” The administration has a crucial ally in Representative Paul D. Ryan of Wisconsin, the Republican chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee. The trade promotion authority bill he plans to push through his committee by March will include new reporting, monitoring and transparency rules to spotlight currency manipulation, but it will avoid retaliatory enforcement rules that he fears could prompt a trade war. “Such a result could jeopardize our status as the world’s leading currency,” said Brendan Buck, the committee’s spokesman. “We are confident there are ways the administration can make progress on this issue without upending our trade agenda and the good jobs it stands to create.” It is difficult at times to distinguish between currency manipulation and market forces that can push currency values in directions that work against the United States. The global currency market is naturally biased toward a strong dollar, the world’s reserve currency. The recent rise in the dollar is more attributable to economic weakness in Europe, China and Japan and falling interest rates abroad than any intentional effort to increase exports at the expense of American workers. At the same time, the global supply chain has diminished if not nullified the advantage that currency manipulation might bring to sophisticated economies like Japan’s, Mr. Fratto noted. Japan’s exports might be cheaper with a devalued yen, but its manufacturers import components that would be more expensive. Even in China, the policy has begun to shift. As economic growth fades, foreign investors are starting to show less interest in the country, while Chinese investors are trying harder to put their money into foreign markets that may offer better returns. The result has been that the Chinese central bank, the People’s Bank of China, has been spending some of the dollars from its hoard to prevent the renminbi from weakening in currency markets, an about-face from when it prevented the renminbi from strengthening. Still, Congress appears done with equivocating. The traditional pitch that free trade will expand business and help consumers has lost salience in an era when middle-class incomes are declining and well-paying industrial jobs are disappearing. “To a president, geopolitics matter a great deal, but to senators and congressmen, what matters is how their constituents and economy are doing,” Mr. Schumer said. Last week lawmakers from both parties and across the ideological spectrum introduced legislation that would allow companies in the United States to petition for relief from foreign competitors benefiting from currency manipulation, setting off a mandatory Commerce Department investigation. That investigation could lead Washington to impose duties on imports that benefit from depressed currencies. Legislation would also allow the government to counter manipulation with manipulation: If China spent $1 billion to buy United States dollars to drive up their value, the United States could buy the same amount of Chinese currency to negate the move. Such legislation passed the Senate in 2011 by a vote of 63-35. The year before, the legislation passed the House 348-79. “With more U.S. jobs at stake every year, we must stand up to protect Americans from unfair trade practices by countries who fight dirty via currency manipulation,” Senator Richard M. Burr, Republican of North Carolina,said at the bills’ unveiling. To the Obama administration, such legislation is unnecessary and dangerous. Mr. Lew testified before the Senate Finance Committee that currency is “the No. 1 topic” he raises in bilateral trade talks, and he insisted that diplomacy was working. China has eased on its manipulation, he said, letting the renminbi appreciate in recent years. Japan has not intervened in currency markets in some time. “The challenge in the context of a trade agreement is how to address the issue in a way that helps and doesn’t hurt,” he said. Would the Federal Reserve’s program of “quantitative easing” — basically printing money to keep interest rates low — be an actionable offense under a strict currency regime? asked Bruce Josten, a senior lobbyist at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. What about large government spending programs financed by international borrowing? “Treasury needs to figure out what kind of flexibility it needs to manage the economy,” said Tom Linebarger, chairman and chief executive of Cummins, the diesel engine giant, who is heading the trade push for the Business Roundtable, which includes dozens of chief executives from major corporations. Lawmakers in both parties are not buying it. Mr. Schumer said he had advised the White House to embrace currency protection legislation now, either as part of the bill granting Mr. Obama trade promotion authority or as a stand-alone bill that would move with the Trans-Pacific Partnership. That way, the currency issue would subside before the partnership comes before Congress. Mr. Schumer said Congress did not “have the votes” for a plain Trans-Pacific Partnership or for granting trade promotion authority.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>Currency provisions kill TPA – PC is failing </h4><p><strong>WEISMAN, NYT, 2-15-15</strong> (Jonathan, “Currency Battle Is Tethered to Obama Trade Agenda,” http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/16/business/economy/obamas-trade-agenda-may-hinge-on-attacking-currency-manipulation.html?_r=0<u>, accessed 2-17-15, CMM)</p><p></u>A number of countries — China most prominent among them — have long acted to hold down the value of their currencies against the dollar, helping their industries by keeping exports to American consumers cheaper and making goods from the United States more expensive. And while every president from Bill Clinton on has repeatedly criticized the practice, none have ever taken formal action against China or any other nation to try to stop it. Now<u><strong>, <mark>a growing bipartisan majority</strong></mark> in Congress is coalescing around a demand that <strong><mark>could derail</u></strong></mark> President <u><strong><mark>Obama’s</mark> ambitious <mark>trade agenda before it</mark> really <mark>gets moving</strong></mark>: include a robust attack on international <mark>currency manipulation </mark>or no deal. The push for strong currency provisions</u> — in legislation to grant the president “fast track” trade negotiating authority, in a major trade deal with a dozen Pacific Rim countries, or in both <u>— has presented the White House with what it fears <mark>is</mark> something of <mark>a Catch-22</mark>. </u>If members of Congress are to be believed<u>, <mark>unless </mark>the president’s trade negotiator includes strict, enforceable prohibitions on <mark>policies</mark> to intentionally <mark>hold down the value of currencies, <strong>any</mark> completed <mark>trade accord will die on Capitol Hill</u></strong>. <u>But</u>,</mark> administration <u>officials say, <mark>demanding</mark> the inclusion of <mark>such prohibitions would <strong>kill the trade deals before they were completed</u></strong>.</mark> <u>“You cannot be <mark>pro trade and pro this</mark> kind of <mark>currency mechanism</mark>,” </u>warned Tony Fratto, a former official in the George W. Bush administration who is working against the congressional currency push. “<u><strong>They <mark>are completely incompatible. It will </mark>in fact <mark>kill a deal</mark>.”</u></strong> <u><mark>No</mark>ne of the officials representing the 12 <mark>nations</u></mark>, including the United States, <u><mark>want to see such prohibitions in the T</mark>rans-<mark>P</mark>acific <mark>P</mark>artnership, which is near completion, <mark>and</mark> negotiators working on a follow-up deal with <mark>Europe</mark> are similarly unenthusiastic. </u>“We agree with many in Congress that more needs to be done and are working with them to figure out if there is something that can be accomplished in the context of our trade agreements that is consistent with our overall strategy of bilateral and multilateral engagement,” Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew said in a statement. “We remain concerned that an enforceable provision on currency could have a negative impact on our ability to protect American workers and firms and set back our international efforts<mark>.” <u><strong>But on Capitol Hill, currency is gaining currency</mark>. </u></strong>“<u>An awful lot of this is real, and the reason is the <strong><mark>frustrations</mark> on this <mark>have built</mark> up for a very long time,” </strong>said</u> C. Fred <u>Bergsten, director emeritus of the Peterson Institute for International Economics and an administration trade adviser. </u>“<u><strong><mark>There’s</mark> a pretty <mark>strong insistence on action</u></strong></mark>. Next question is, what action.” <u>There is little wonder why lawmakers from both parties say their patience has grown thin. <mark>For years, the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u>has <mark>endured a</mark> large, chronic <mark>trade deficit, intensified by</mark> China and some other <mark>trading partners that</mark> have <mark>deliberately kept their currencies cheap</mark> relative to the dollar</u>. A study conducted by Joseph E. Gagnon, a scholar at the Peterson Institute, and C. Fred Bergsten, now its director emeritus, estimated that currency interventions had cost the United States as many as five million jobs over the last decade. In fact, currency manipulation may be far more effective in distorting trade than the import tariffs and export subsidies that trade agreements focus on, Mr. Bergsten said. Senator Charles E. <u>Schumer</u>, Democrat of New York, <u>and</u> Senator Lindsey <u>Graham</u>, Republican of South Carolina, <u>have been banging the drum on currency manipulation since 2002</u>. Yet beyond talk, neither the Obama nor the Bush administration has done what they were legally entitled to do: fight back. <u>Some <strong><mark>230 members of the House have pledged in writing to oppose future trade deals without action on currency, more than enough to stop the president’s agenda</mark>. </u></strong>“If your area of the country has experienced job exporting by the thousands, you understand,” said Representative Marcy Kaptur, a Democrat whose district includes the industrial north of Ohio. “That’s bipartisan.” The <u>Obama</u> administration <u>fears that prohibitions on currency intervention could boomerang on Washington, allowing trading partners to challenge policies of the independent Fed</u>eral Reserve Board <u>and</u> possibly <u>even basic fiscal policies, like stimulus spending in times of recession. Officials </u>also <u>worry about other forms of potential retaliation, including reducing purchases of government debt, which help keep long-term interest rates low. <strong><mark>Corporate America is badly split.</u></strong> <u>Some industries</u></mark>, including automobiles, steel and textiles, <u>are <mark>stand</mark>ing <mark>with Congress</mark>. </u>Ford Motor has threatened to oppose the Trans-Pacific Partnership if it lacks a currency chapter<u>. <mark>Other</mark> companie<mark>s</mark>, better positioned to <mark>take advantage o</mark>f growing globalization, are perfectly happy to buy components from Asia that are artificially cheapened by <mark>currency manipulation</mark>. </u>“A lot of Big Business uses currency as a hedge,” said one industry lobbyist, who spoke on condition of anonymity to be frank about the business divide. “They’re comfortable operating in an environment where manipulation is part of the process.” The administration has a crucial ally in Representative Paul D. Ryan of Wisconsin, the Republican chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee. The trade promotion authority bill he plans to push through his committee by March will include new reporting, monitoring and transparency rules to spotlight currency manipulation, but it will avoid retaliatory enforcement rules that he fears could prompt a trade war. “Such a result could jeopardize our status as the world’s leading currency,” said Brendan Buck, the committee’s spokesman. “We are confident there are ways the administration can make progress on this issue without upending our trade agenda and the good jobs it stands to create.” It is difficult at times to distinguish between currency manipulation and market forces that can push currency values in directions that work against the United States. The global currency market is naturally biased toward a strong dollar, the world’s reserve currency. The recent rise in the dollar is more attributable to economic weakness in Europe, China and Japan and falling interest rates abroad than any intentional effort to increase exports at the expense of American workers. At the same time, the global supply chain has diminished if not nullified the advantage that currency manipulation might bring to sophisticated economies like Japan’s, Mr. Fratto noted. Japan’s exports might be cheaper with a devalued yen, but its manufacturers import components that would be more expensive. Even in China, the policy has begun to shift. As economic growth fades, foreign investors are starting to show less interest in the country, while Chinese investors are trying harder to put their money into foreign markets that may offer better returns. The result has been that the Chinese central bank, the People’s Bank of China, has been spending some of the dollars from its hoard to prevent the renminbi from weakening in currency markets, an about-face from when it prevented the renminbi from strengthening. Still, <u><strong><mark>Congress appears done with equivocating. The traditional pitch that free trade will expand business and help consumers has lost salience</u></strong> <u>in an era when</mark> middle-class <mark>incomes are declining and</mark> well-paying industrial <mark>jobs are disappearing. </u>“<u>To a president, geopolitics matter</mark> a great deal, <mark>but to senators</mark> and congressmen, <mark>what matters is how their constituents and economy are doing</u></mark>,” Mr. Schumer said. Last week lawmakers from both parties and across the ideological spectrum introduced legislation that would allow companies in the United States to petition for relief from foreign competitors benefiting from currency manipulation, setting off a mandatory Commerce Department investigation. That investigation could lead Washington to impose duties on imports that benefit from depressed currencies. Legislation would also allow the government to counter manipulation with manipulation: If China spent $1 billion to buy United States dollars to drive up their value, the United States could buy the same amount of Chinese currency to negate the move. Such legislation passed the Senate in 2011 by a vote of 63-35. The year before, the legislation passed the House 348-79. “With more U.S. jobs at stake every year, we must stand up to protect Americans from unfair trade practices by countries who fight dirty via currency manipulation,” Senator Richard M. Burr, Republican of North Carolina,said at the bills’ unveiling. <u>To the Obama administration, such legislation is unnecessary and dangerous</u>. Mr. Lew testified before the Senate Finance Committee that currency is “the No. 1 topic” he raises in bilateral trade talks, and he insisted that diplomacy was working. China has eased on its manipulation, he said, letting the renminbi appreciate in recent years. Japan has not intervened in currency markets in some time. “The challenge in the context of a trade agreement is how to address the issue in a way that helps and doesn’t hurt,” he said. <u>Would the Federal Reserve’s program of “quantitative easing”</u> — basically printing money to keep interest rates low — <u>be an actionable offense under a strict currency regime</u>? asked Bruce Josten, a senior lobbyist at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. <u>What about large government spending programs financed by international borrowing? “Treasury needs to figure out what kind of flexibility it needs to manage the economy</u>,” said Tom Linebarger, chairman and chief executive of Cummins, the diesel engine giant, who is heading the trade push for the Business Roundtable, which includes dozens of chief executives from major corporations. <u><strong><mark>Lawmakers in both parties are not buying it</mark>.</u></strong> Mr. <u>Schumer said he had advised the White House to embrace currency protection legislation now</u>, either as part of the bill granting Mr. Obama trade promotion authority or as a stand-alone bill that would move with the Trans-Pacific Partnership. That way, the currency issue would subside before the partnership comes before Congress. Mr. <u>Schumer said <strong><mark>Congress did not “have the votes” for</mark> a plain <mark>T</u></strong></mark>rans-<u><strong><mark>P</u></strong></mark>acific <u><strong><mark>P</mark>a</u></strong>rtnership <u><strong><mark>or</mark> for granting <mark>t</strong></mark>rade <strong><mark>p</strong></mark>romotion <strong><mark>a</strong></mark>uthority.</p></u><|im_end|>

<|begin_of_text|><|im_start|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <|im_end|> <|im_start|>user citation: Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams 15. **Lecturer at City University London and a PhD from the London School of Economics. **Lecturer at City University London. Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work. Verso Books. 34-40. fulltext: OVERWHELMED Why did folk politics arise in the first place? Why is it that folk political tendencies, for all their manifest flaws, are so seductive and appealing to the movements of today? At least three answers present themselves. The first explanation is to see folk politics as a response to the problem of how to interpret and act within an ever more complex world. The second, related explanation involves situating folk politics as a reaction to the historical experiences of the communist and social democratic left. Finally, folk politics is a more immediate response to the empty spectacle of contemporary party politics. Increasingly, multipolar global politics, economic instability, and anthropogenic climate change outpace the narratives we use to structure and make sense of our lives. Each of these is an example of what is termed a complex system, which features nonlinear dynamics, where marginally different inputs can cause dramatically divergent outputs, intricate sets of causes feedback on one another in unexpected ways, and which characteristically operates on scales of space and time that go far beyond any individual’s unaided perception.23 Globalisation, international politics, and climate change: each of these systems shapes our world, but their effects are so extensive and complicated that it is difficult to place our own experience within them. The global economy is a good example of this. In simple terms, the economy is not an object amenable to direct perception; it is distributed across time and space (you will never meet ‘the economy’ in person); it incorporates a wide array of elements, from property laws to biological needs, natural resources to technological infrastructures, market stalls and supercomputers; and it involves an enormous and intricately interacting set of feedback loops, all of which produce emergent effects that are irreducible to its individual components.24 In other words, the interaction of an economy’s parts produces effects that cannot be understood just by knowing how those parts work in isolation – it is only in grasping the relations between them that the economy can be made sense of. While we might have an idea of what an economy consists of, we will never be able to experience it directly in the same way as other phenomena. It can only be observed symptomatically through key statistical indexes (charting changes in inflation or interest rates, stock indexes, GDP, and so on), but can never be seen, heard or touched in its totality. As a result, despite everything that has been written about capitalism, we still struggle to understand its dynamics and its mechanisms. Most importantly, we lack a ‘cognitive map’ of our socioeconomic system: a mental picture of how individual and collective human action can be situated within the unimaginable vastness of the global economy.25 Recent decades have seen an increasing complexity in the dynamics that impinge upon politics. We might consider the imminent threat of anthropogenic climate change as a new kind of problem – one that is unamenable to any simple solution and that involves such intricately woven effects that it is hard to even know where to intervene. Equally, the global economy today appears significantly more complex in terms of the mobility of capital, the intricacies of global finance and the multiplicity of actors involved. How well do our traditional political images of the world map onto these changes? For the left at least, an analysis premised on the industrial working class was a powerful way to interpret the totality of social and economic relations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, thereby articulating clear strategic objectives. Yet the history of the global left over the course of the twentieth century attests to the ways in which this analysis failed to attend to both the range of possible liberating struggles (based in gender, race or sexuality) and the ability of capitalism to restructure itself – through the creation of the welfare state, or the neoliberal transformations of the global economy. Today, the old models often falter in the face of new problems; we lose the capacity to understand our position in history and in the world at large. This separation between everyday experience and the system we live within results in increased alienation: we feel adrift in a world we do not understand. The cultural theorist Fredric Jameson notes that the proliferation of conspiracy theories is partly a response to this situation.26 Conspiracy theories act by narrowing the agency behind our world to a single figure of power (the Bilderberg Group, the Freemasons or some other convenient scapegoat). Despite the extraordinary complexity of some of these theories, they nevertheless provide a reassuringly simple answer to ‘who is behind it all’, and what our own role is in the situation. In other words, they act precisely as a (faulty) cognitive map. Folk politics presents itself as another possible response to the problems of overwhelming complexity. If we do not understand how the world operates, the folk-political injunction is to reduce complexity down to a human scale. Indeed, folk-political writing is saturated with calls for a return to authenticity, to immediacy, to a world that is ‘transparent’, ‘human-scaled’, ‘tangible’, ‘slow’, ‘harmonious’, ‘simple’, and ‘everyday’.27 Such thinking rejects the complexity of the contemporary world, and thereby rejects the possibility of a truly postcapitalist world. It attempts to give a human face to power; whereas what is truly terrifying is the generally asubjective nature of the system. The faces are interchangeable; the power remains the same. The turn towards localism, temporary moments of resistance, and the intuitive practices of direct action all effectively attempt to condense the problems of global capitalism into concrete figures and moments. In this process, folk politics often reduces politics to an ethical and individual struggle. There is a tendency sometimes to imagine that we simply need ‘good’ capitalists, or a ‘responsible’ capitalism. At the same time, the imperative to ‘make it local’ leads folk politics to fetishise immediate results and the concrete appearance of action. Delaying a corporate attack on the environment, for instance, is lauded as a success – even if the company simply waits out public attention before returning once again. Moreover, as Rosa Luxemburg pointed out long ago, the fetishisation of ‘immediate results’ leads to an empty pragmatism that struggles to maintain the present balance of power, rather than seeking to change structural conditions.28 Without the necessary abstraction of strategic thought, tactics are ultimately fleeting gestures. Finally, the abjuring of complexity dovetails with the neoliberal case for markets. One of the primary arguments made against planning has been that the economy is simply too complex to be guided.29 The only alternative is therefore to leave the distribution of resources to the market and reject any attempt to guide it rationally.30 Considered in all these ways, folk politics appears as an attempt to make global capitalism small enough to be thinkable – and at the same time, to articulate how to act upon this restricted image of capitalism. By contrast, the argument of this book is that folk-political tendencies are mistaken. If complexity presently outstrips humanity’s capacities to think and control, there are two options: one is to reduce complexity down to a human scale; the other is to expand humanity’s capacities. We endorse the latter position. Any postcapitalist project will necessarily require the creation of new cognitive maps, political narratives, technological interfaces, economic models, and mechanisms of collective control to be able to marshal complex phenomena for the betterment of humanity.<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant <h4>3---<u>Escapism Link</u>---the idea that we should <u>only</u> focus on the things that <u>directly affect our lives</u> ignores <u>multipolar global politics</u>, <u>economic instability</u>, and <u>climate change</u>---all necessitate a <u>collective response</u> which requires conceptualization <u>beyond the individual</h4><p></u>Nick <strong>Srnicek and</strong> Alex <strong>Williams 15</strong>. **Lecturer at City University London and a PhD from the London School of Economics. **Lecturer at City University London. Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work. Verso Books. 34-40.</p><p>OVERWHELMED</p><p>Why did folk politics arise in the first place? Why is it that <u><mark>folk political tendencies</u></mark>, for all their manifest flaws, <u><mark>are</mark> so <strong><mark>seductive</strong></mark> and appealing to</u> the <u>movements</u> of today? At least three answers present themselves. The first explanation is to see folk <u>politics as a response to the problem of how to interpret and act within an ever more complex world</u>. The second, related explanation involves situating folk politics as a reaction to the historical experiences of the communist and social democratic left. Finally, folk politics is a more immediate response to the empty spectacle of contemporary party politics.</p><p><u>Increasingly, <strong><mark>multipolar global politics</strong>, <strong>economic instability</strong>, and</u></mark> anthropogenic <u><strong><mark>climate change</strong> outpace the narratives we use to</mark> structure and <mark>make sense of our lives</mark>. <mark>Each</u></mark> of <u>these is an example</u> of what is termed <u><mark>a <strong>complex system</strong></mark>, which features nonlinear dynamics, where marginally different inputs can cause dramatically divergent outputs, intricate sets of causes feedback on one another in unexpected ways, and <mark>which</u></mark> characteristically <u><mark>operates on <strong>scales</strong></mark> of space and time <mark>that go <strong>far beyond any individual’s</mark> unaided <mark>perception</u></strong></mark>.23 <u>Globalisation, international politics, and climate change: each</u> of these systems <u>shapes our world, but their effects are so extensive and complicated that it is difficult to place our own experience within them</u>. The global economy is a good example of this. In simple terms, <u>the economy is not an object amenable to direct perception; it is distributed across time and space (you will never meet ‘<mark>the economy’</mark> in person); it <mark>incorporates a <strong>wide array of elements</strong></mark>, from <strong><mark>property laws</strong></mark> to <strong><mark>biological needs</strong>, <strong>natural resources</strong></mark> to <strong><mark>tech</mark>nological <mark>infrastructures</strong>, <strong>market stalls</strong> and <strong>supercomputers</strong>; and</mark> it <mark>involves</mark> <mark>an enormous and</mark> intricately <mark>interacting set of <strong>feedback loops</strong></mark>, all of which produce emergent effects <mark>that are <strong>irreducible</strong></mark> to its individual components</u>.24 In other words, <u>the interaction of an economy’s parts produces effects that cannot be understood just by knowing how those parts work in isolation – it is only in grasping the relations between them that the economy can be made sense of</u>. While we might have an idea of what an economy consists of, <u><mark>we will <strong>never</strong></mark> be able to <strong><mark>experience it directly</u></strong></mark> in the same way as other phenomena. It can only be observed symptomatically through key statistical indexes (charting changes in inflation or interest rates, stock indexes, GDP, and so on), but can never be seen, heard or touched in its totality.</p><p>As a result, despite everything that has been written about capitalism, we still struggle to understand its dynamics and its mechanisms. Most importantly, <u><mark>we <strong>lack a ‘cognitive map’</strong> of our socioeconomic system</mark>: a mental picture of how individual and collective human action can be situated within the unimaginable vastness of the global economy</u>.25 Recent decades have seen an increasing complexity in the dynamics that impinge upon politics. We might consider the imminent threat of anthropogenic climate change as a new kind of problem – one that is unamenable to any simple solution and that involves such intricately woven effects that it is hard to even know where to intervene. Equally, the global economy today appears significantly more complex in terms of the mobility of capital, the intricacies of global finance and the multiplicity of actors involved. How well do our traditional political images of the world map onto these changes? For the left at least, an analysis premised on the industrial working class was a powerful way to interpret the totality of social and economic relations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, thereby articulating clear strategic objectives. Yet the history of the global left over the course of the twentieth century attests to the ways in which this analysis failed to attend to both the range of possible liberating struggles (based in gender, race or sexuality) and the ability of capitalism to restructure itself – through the creation of the welfare state, or the neoliberal transformations of the global economy. Today, the old models often falter in the face of new problems; we lose the capacity to understand our position in history and in the world at large.</p><p><u>This separation between everyday experience and the system we live within results in increased <strong>alienation</strong>: we feel adrift in a world we do not understand</u>. The cultural theorist Fredric Jameson notes that the <u>proliferation of conspiracy theories is partly a response to this situation</u>.26 <u>Conspiracy theories act by narrowing the agency behind our world to a single figure of power</u> (the Bilderberg Group, the Freemasons or some other convenient scapegoat). Despite the extraordinary complexity of some of these theories, <u>they</u> nevertheless <u>provide a reassuringly simple answer to ‘who is behind it all’</u>, and what our own role is in the situation. In other words, they act precisely as a (faulty) cognitive map.</p><p><u>Folk politics presents itself as another</u> possible <u>response to the problems of overwhelming complexity</u>. <u>If we do not understand how the world operates, <mark>the folk-political injunction is to <strong>reduce complexity down to a human scale</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, <u>folk-political writing is <mark>saturated with calls for a return to <strong>authenticity</u></strong></mark>, to <u><strong><mark>immediacy</u></strong></mark>, to <u><mark>a world that is</u></mark> ‘transparent’, <u><strong><mark>‘human-scaled’</strong></mark>, ‘tangible’,</u> ‘slow’, ‘harmonious’, ‘simple’, <u>and ‘everyday’.</u>27 <u><mark>Such thinking <strong>rejects</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>complexity</strong></mark> of the contemporary world</u>, and thereby rejects the possibility of a truly postcapitalist world. <u><strong><mark>It attempts to give a human face to power; whereas what is truly terrifying</strong> is the</u></mark> generally <u><strong><mark>asubjective nature of the system</u></strong></mark>. <u>The faces are interchangeable; the power remains the same</u>. <u>The turn towards localism, temporary moments of resistance, and the intuitive practices of direct action all effectively attempt to condense the problems of global capitalism into concrete figures and moments</u>.</p><p>In this process, <u><mark>folk politics</u></mark> often <u><strong><mark>reduces politics</strong> to an <strong>ethical and individual struggle</u></strong></mark>. There is a tendency sometimes to imagine that we simply need ‘good’ capitalists, or a ‘responsible’ capitalism. At the same time, <u><mark>the <strong>imperative to ‘make it local’</strong></mark> leads folk politics to <strong><mark>fetishise immediate results</strong></mark> and the concrete appearance of action</u>. <u>Delaying a corporate attack on the environment</u>, for instance, <u>is lauded as a success – even if the company simply waits out public attention before returning once again</u>. Moreover, as Rosa Luxemburg pointed out long ago, <u>the fetishisation of ‘immediate results’ leads to <mark>an <strong>empty pragmatism</strong> that struggles to maintain</mark> the present balance of <mark>power, rather than</mark> seeking to <strong><mark>change structural conditions</u></strong></mark>.28 <u><mark>Without the <strong>necessary abstraction of strategic thought</strong>, tactics are</mark> ultimately <strong><mark>fleeting gestures</u></strong></mark>. Finally, the abjuring of complexity dovetails with the neoliberal case for markets. One of the primary arguments made against planning has been that the economy is simply too complex to be guided.29 The only alternative is therefore to leave the distribution of resources to the market and reject any attempt to guide it rationally.30 Considered in all these ways, folk politics appears as an attempt to make global capitalism small enough to be thinkable – and at the same time, to articulate how to act upon this restricted image of capitalism. By contrast, the argument of this book is that folk-political tendencies are mistaken. If complexity presently outstrips humanity’s capacities to think and control, there are two options: one is to reduce complexity down to a human scale; the other is to expand humanity’s capacities. We endorse the latter position. Any postcapitalist project will necessarily require the creation of new cognitive maps, political narratives, technological interfaces, economic models, and mechanisms of collective control to be able to marshal complex phenomena for the betterment of humanity.</p><|im_end|>